and Mark Begich (D-Alaska) were attacked for voting their party line. Former centrist senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME) remarked that the inability of moderate senators to get amendments onto the agenda was, “shocking.” In this article, I examine the effects of filling the amendment tree on each party. By filling the amendment tree, Reid effectively cut both parties, including his colleagues and the electorally vulnerable moderates of his party, out of the legislative early game of amending legislation. However, by looking at the amendments submitted for consideration, I find that moderate Democrats were no more or less likely than their colleagues to protest the procedure. Indeed, it was Republican moderates who were much less likely to submit an amendment when the procedure was used while their more conservative counterparts filed amendments in an act of protest. The use of the procedure did however, likely contribute to homogenizing the voting record of senators who relied on or centrist voting records to win reelection. Indeed, “maverick” the difference in voting records for moderate Democrats and their more ideological colleagues was statistically insignificant. The paper proceeds as follows. I begin with a description of what the filling the amendment tree procedure is and how the procedure works. Then I examine the theoretical reasons for what we should expect in terms of legislative participation. I follow this with an empirical look at the amendment process and voting records. I conclude with implications for the study and suggestions for future research. Senate Procedures
and Mark Begich (D-Alaska) were attacked for voting their party line. Former centrist senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME) remarked that the inability of moderate senators to get amendments onto the agenda was, “shocking.” In this article, I examine the effects of filling the amendment tree on each party. By filling the amendment tree, Reid effectively cut both parties, including his colleagues and the electorally vulnerable moderates of his party, out of the legislative early game of amending legislation. However, by looking at the amendments submitted for consideration, I find that moderate Democrats were no more or less likely than their colleagues to protest the procedure. Indeed, it was Republican moderates who were much less likely to submit an amendment when the procedure was used while their more conservative counterparts filed amendments in an act of protest. The use of the procedure did however, likely contribute to homogenizing the voting record of senators who relied on “maverick” or centrist voting records to win reelection. Indeed, the difference in voting records for moderate Democrats and their more ideological colleagues was statistically insignificant. The paper proceeds as follows. I begin with a description of what the filling the amendment tree procedure is and how the procedure works. Then I examine the theoretical reasons for what we should expect in terms of legislative participation. I follow this with an empirical look at the amendment process and voting records. I conclude with implications for the study and suggestions for future research. Senate Procedures
Filling%20the%20Amendment%20Tree_WPSA2017.docx