The problem with effectiveness does not stop in Pakistan. There is a lot of data that suggests the United States is targeting people in Yemen who have little to no interest in the United States. By October 19, 2012 the United States had conducted 35 drone strikes in Yemen. Many of these strikes were directed at Islamic extremist factions that were hostile toward the Yemen government. The second deterrent that the drone program poses is simple intimidation. The idea behind a strategy as bold and pervasive as drone strikes is that they would quietly set terror organizations into compliance by forcing them to realize that they were out gunned and outmanned at all times; militants were safe nowhere, not even in their homes. Because of this the surge of people willing to plot against the United States would level off and ultimately decline. According to research this simply was not the case. Lyall used quantitative analysis Jason Lyall’s of a large amount of data on drone strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Afghanistan, and military activity in these areas between 2006 and 2011. Lyall found that over a seven day period there was an of .371 more estimated difference insurgent attacks in the 2km2 around the targeted village. This rose to 2.14 attacks with a 100 km2 radius around the bombed village for the same seven day period. If the number of days after the strike is increased to 120 then there is a 3.08 increase in insurgent attacks for the area 2km2 around the village. Similarly, if the distance of the observed area is widened to 100km2 around the village there is an increase of 16.81 militant attacks. Not only did it not have a deterrent effect on the terror actors, it actually had the opposite than hoped for effect. Lyall found that when a place was subjected to drone strikes there was a positive association with an increased amount of insurgent attacks, exactly opposite the relationship expected by supporters of the drone program.
The problem with effectiveness does not stop in Pakistan. There is a lot of data that suggests the United States is targeting people in Yemen who have little to no interest in the United States. By October 19, 2012 the United States had conducted 35 drone strikes in Yemen. Many of these strikes were directed at Islamic extremist factions that were hostile toward the Yemen government. The second deterrent that the drone program poses is simple intimidation. The idea behind a strategy as bold and pervasive as drone strikes is that they would quietly set terror organizations into compliance by forcing them to realize that they were out gunned and outmanned at all times; militants were safe nowhere, not even in their homes. Because of this the surge of people willing to plot against the United States would level off and ultimately decline. According to Jason Lyall’s research this simply was not the case. Lyall used quantitative analysis of a large amount of data on drone strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Afghanistan, and military activity in these areas between 2006 and 2011. Lyall found that over a seven day period there was an estimated of .371 more insurgent attacks in the 2km2 around the targeted village. This difference rose to 2.14 attacks with a 100 km2 radius around the bombed village for the same seven day period. If the number of days after the strike is increased to 120 then there is a 3.08 increase in insurgent attacks for the area 2km2 around the village. Similarly, if the distance of the observed area is widened to 100km2 around the village there is an increase of 16.81 militant attacks. Not only did it not have a deterrent effect on the terror actors, it actually had the opposite than hoped for effect. Lyall found that when a place was subjected to drone strikes there was a positive association with an increased amount of insurgent attacks, exactly opposite the relationship expected by supporters of the drone program.
Ernst_Drone_Warfare.docx