interpreted in a way that allows any IOE short of that involving, for instance, violence and torture. This interpretation is unfounded. Even before the HRA, judges could evaluate the impact of excluding evidence against the illegitimacy of the conducts that retrieved it. For instance, in Marcel v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, Sir Christopher Slade explained that judges do have the power to exclude evidence from civil cases obtained without consideration of justice and public interest. A more appropriate reading of the ‘outrageous violation criterion’ interprets it as: the judicial task of balancing the need of an objective reconstruction of the facts and the protection of justice. For instance, the judge, in unloading the tasks set in Rule 32.1 (1), should consider, firstly, whether the activities that yield the contested evidence had engaged some specific articles of the ECHR (and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR). Secondly, if the result of the first activity resulted in a negative response, the court should balance the violation of a protected right(s), with the effects of excluding the evidence (which were connected with the improper conduct). The case Lifely v Lifely confirmed the requirement of the two stages procedure set in Jones v University of Warwick. The ancillary issue in Lifely v Lifely hinged on the admissibility of a series of entries in a personal diary that would have changed the criteria of allocation of a family inheritance. In reporting to the court, Lord Ward conceived that the diary was retrieved in a way that might have engaged article 8 of the ECHR. However, the decision balanced the potential effects of excluding the IOE. ‘The result of undertaking this balancing exercise is plain. Here there was no trespass or burglary […] It would be wholly disproportionate to exclude this evidence and I have no hesitation whatsoever in rejecting this submission.’ The decision is in favor of admitting the diary, but Lord Ward, in the same passage, is quick to reduce the general implications of his decision. ‘What forensic use, if any, should be permitted of an opponent's private information when it has been obtained criminally, or unlawfully, or opportunistically, or even adventitiously gives rise to current problems […] My judgement will not be and should
interpreted in a way that allows any IOE short of that involving, for instance, violence and torture. This interpretation is unfounded. Even before the HRA, judges could evaluate the impact of excluding evidence against the illegitimacy of the conducts that retrieved it. For instance, in Marcel v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, Sir Christopher Slade explained that judges do have the power to exclude evidence from civil cases obtained without consideration of justice and public interest. A more appropriate reading of the ‘outrageous violation criterion’ interprets it as: the judicial task of balancing the need of an objective reconstruction of the facts and the protection of justice. For instance, the judge, in unloading the tasks set in Rule 32.1 (1), should consider, firstly, whether the activities that yield the contested evidence had engaged some specific articles of the ECHR (and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR). Secondly, if the result of the first activity resulted in a negative response, the court should balance the violation of a protected right(s), with the effects of excluding the evidence (which were connected with the improper conduct). The case Lifely v Lifely confirmed the requirement of the two stages procedure set in Jones v University of Warwick. The ancillary issue in Lifely v Lifely hinged on the admissibility of a series of entries in a personal diary that would have changed the criteria of allocation of a family inheritance. In reporting to the court, Lord Ward conceived that the diary was retrieved in a way that might have engaged article 8 of the ECHR. However, the decision balanced the potential effects of excluding the IOE. ‘The result of undertaking this balancing exercise is plain. Here there was no trespass or burglary […] It would be wholly disproportionate to exclude this evidence and I have no hesitation whatsoever in rejecting this submission.’ The decision is in favor of admitting the diary, but Lord Ward, in the same passage, is quick to reduce the general implications of his decision. ‘What forensic use, if any, should be permitted of an opponent's private information when it has been obtained criminally, or unlawfully, or opportunistically, or even adventitiously gives rise to current problems […] My judgement will not be and should
Evidence%20in%20Civil%20Procedings%20in%20UK%20and%20in%20%20Italy%20-%20Clean%20for%20review%20%20%20.docx