of the opacity doctrine and strict liability Consider Harry Walker’s illustration thesis, in a passage of his article on the incorporation of the idea of by the Urarina “Law” of Amazonian Peru (Walker, 2015, p. 53). Walker describes a mediated dispute regarding the case of the death of a young boy named Toribio, who died as a consequence of his friend having accidentally struck his hand with a machete. Toribio’s father demanded reparation in terms of for the death, and, according to Walker, the “hefty compensation” dispute focused only on the fact of the death and the degree of compensation, suggesting a complete disregard of the nature of the mental states of the perpetrator. However, Walker states that everyone in the dispute implicitly acknowledged that the strike was unintentional; and he also suggests that the case would have been quite different if the strike had been interpreted as intentional may not otherwise (“negotiations have even if the action were seen as intentional, the case might have begun”). Plausibly, lead to the pursuit of bloody retribution (even if by mystical means) and/or to the intuition that deserves even greater compensation. Either reaction would Toribio’s father show that the mental states of the perpetrator are not disregarded and that the contrast between intentional and unintentional killing is indeed important for the Urarina. not give an account of the arguments put Moreover, Walker’s passage does forward by the two sides of the dispute concerning the appropriate degree of compensation—in particular, it does not describe whether the two sides of the dispute had different interpretations of the accident. Did the something akin to victim’s side invoke recklessness/negligence (e.g., that there was some lack of due care on the part of the friend, in terms of the strike and/or what happened afterwards)? Did the side perpetrator’s interpret the death more like a pure accident or invoke something akin to contributory
Consider Harry Walker’s illustration of the opacity doctrine and strict liability thesis, in a passage of his article on the incorporation of the idea of “Law” by the Urarina of Amazonian Peru (Walker, 2015, p. 53). Walker describes a mediated dispute regarding the case of the death of a young boy named Toribio, who died as a consequence of his friend having accidentally struck his hand with a machete. Toribio’s father demanded reparation in terms of “hefty compensation” for the death, and, according to Walker, the dispute focused only on the fact of the death and the degree of compensation, suggesting a complete disregard of the nature of the mental states of the perpetrator. However, Walker states that everyone in the dispute implicitly acknowledged that the strike was unintentional; and he also suggests that the case would have been quite different if the strike had been interpreted as intentional (“negotiations may not otherwise have even begun”). Plausibly, if the action were seen as intentional, the case might have lead to the pursuit of bloody retribution (even if by mystical means) and/or to the intuition that Toribio’s father deserves even greater compensation. Either reaction would show that the mental states of the perpetrator are not disregarded and that the contrast between intentional and unintentional killing is indeed important for the Urarina. Moreover, Walker’s passage does not give an account of the arguments put forward by the two sides of the dispute concerning the appropriate degree of compensation—in particular, it does not describe whether the two sides of the dispute had different interpretations of the accident. Did the victim’s side invoke something akin to recklessness/negligence (e.g., that there was some lack of due care on the part of the friend, in terms of the strike and/or what happened afterwards)? Did the perpetrator’s side interpret the death more like a pure accident or invoke something akin to contributory
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