656 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). See Hardesty v. State, State 650 N.W.2d 177, 186 (Minn. 2002) particular step of v. Litzau, (“a and 752 A.2d 384, 389 (Pa. Commonwealth v. MacPherson, logic”) 2000) evidentiary tool that enables the factfinder to proceed by (“an inferential reasoning from one fact to It is a device another”). guaranteeing the trier of fact will consider a specific inference from among the universe of possible inferences arising from the same proven facts. Presumptions are problematic because they are judicial comments on the weight of the evidence. See 122 S.W.3d 794, Brown v. State, (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Texas judges forbidden from “are instructing the jury on any presumption . . . that does not have a statutory at 799, construing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04. Id. basis.” Presumptions blur the line between judge and jury and can alter the role as a neutral arbiter between the advocates and an instructor judge’s in the law for the jury, and instead involve the court the at Id. “in fray.” 798, citing 209 S.W. 411, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919). Lagrone v. State, Judge Cochran delivered the opinion and was the liaison between Brown
Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). See State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 186 (Minn. 2002) (“a particular step of logic”) and Commonwealth v. MacPherson, 752 A.2d 384, 389 (Pa. 2000) (“an evidentiary tool that enables the factfinder to proceed by inferential reasoning from one fact to another”). It is a device guaranteeing the trier of fact will consider a specific inference from among the universe of possible inferences arising from the same proven facts. Presumptions are problematic because they are judicial comments on the weight of the evidence. See Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Texas judges “are forbidden from instructing the jury on any presumption . . . that does not have a statutory basis.” Id. at 799, construing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04. Presumptions blur the line between judge and jury and can alter the judge’s role as a neutral arbiter between the advocates and an instructor in the law for the jury, and instead involve the court “in the fray.” Id. at 798, citing Lagrone v. State, 209 S.W. 411, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919). Judge Cochran delivered the Brown opinion and was the liaison between
Eutsler_presumptions_July-30-2015.docx