democracy attitudes and their effect seems dependent on the non-mainstream party’s ideology and emphasis on citizens’ political involvement. (Figure 2 about here) Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of party choice by stealth democracy attitudes Ideology is, in any case, a relevant variable to explain the electoral support for all political parties across the board and it has been shown in previous studies that stealth democrats have right wing leanings. However, these two variables are not so highly correlated to make us think of a spurious relationship between stealth attitudes and party choices (correlation coefficient of about 0.12). We have assessed how ideological orientations condition the way stealth democracy attitudes affect party choice, thus deepening our understanding of how voters’ attitudes translate into voting preferences for some new parties. Table A.2 in the appendix shows the results of the logistic models where the stealth democracy index is interacted with ideology (Model 1) and ideology squared (Model 2). From these analyses we gain some more insights. First, voters’ ideology does not condition the null result about the effect of stealth democracy on the support for mainstream parties. Neither PP nor PSOE have an ideological space where having preferences against ‘political as usual’ pays off. Second, the impact of stealth democracy attitudes on the probabilities of voting for new and challenger parties does vary across different levels of the ideological scale. However, the form in which ideology conditions such a relationship differs by party choice. Results from the interaction models for Podemos and Ciudadanos are shown in Figure 3. (Figures 3 about here)
democracy attitudes and their effect seems dependent on the non-mainstream party’s ideology and emphasis on citizens’ political involvement. (Figure 2 about here) Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of party choice by stealth democracy attitudes Ideology is, in any case, a relevant variable to explain the electoral support for all political parties across the board and it has been shown in previous studies that stealth democrats have right wing leanings. However, these two variables are not so highly correlated to make us think of a spurious relationship between stealth attitudes and party choices (correlation coefficient of about 0.12). We have assessed how ideological orientations condition the way stealth democracy attitudes affect party choice, thus deepening our understanding of how voters’ attitudes translate into voting preferences for some new parties. Table A.2 in the appendix shows the results of the logistic models where the stealth democracy index is interacted with ideology (Model 1) and ideology squared (Model 2). From these analyses we gain some more insights. First, voters’ ideology does not condition the null result about the effect of stealth democracy on the support for mainstream parties. Neither PP nor PSOE have an ideological space where having preferences against ‘political as usual’ pays off. Second, the impact of stealth democracy attitudes on the probabilities of voting for new and challenger parties does vary across different levels of the ideological scale. However, the form in which ideology conditions such a relationship differs by party choice. Results from the interaction models for Podemos and Ciudadanos are shown in Figure 3. (Figures 3 about here)
EPSR%20Lavezzolo%20and%20Ramiro%20Final.docx