interests, this approach avoids claims of subject’s ‘real’ ‘false consciousness’ by, instead, highlighting how these interests came to be how these interests are – themselves structured by a whole series of power relations that shape what can/cannot be thought and practiced. In short, it focuses on how context- and conduct-shaping are very much entwined by examining the construction of preferences, rather than measuring them up against a set of interests. ‘real’ Beyond Hay: On the importance of Bourdieu and Foucault to preference shaping Rather than eliding the structure-agency debate through claims of co-constitution, we suggest that both Bourdieu and Foucault provide important insights into the mechanics involved in these intertwined processes. Indeed, as we highlight below, their immanent, or decentred, appreciations of these workings of power provide novel ways forward in thinking through the shaping of preferences. Like Hay, both Bourdieu and Foucault, to the extent that they acknowledge the structure-agency debate, emphasise their co-constitutive nature. However, in doing so, they acknowledge the limits of such a debate and the need to go further if we want properly to understand the workings of power. Bourdieu, for example, refers to the distinction in his words a distinction between mechanism and finalism as – – ‘a false More specifically, in relation to questions of structure he argues for the dilemma’. need to all theories which explicitly or implicitly treat practice as a ‘abandon the same time, however, he also rejects the view that this mechanical reaction’. At somehow implies a reduction to agency alone: we should not the objective ‘reduce intentions and constituted significations of actions and works to the conscious and deliberate intentions of their In short, neither is authors’ (Bourdieu 1977: 72, 73). adequate. Importantly, it is in this context that Bourdieu turns to his concepts of and habitus in order to resolve this analytical tension. Rejecting abstract theoretical practice categories of and and attempts to plot interactions between the ‘structure’ ‘agency’ two, he argues that the site of analysis should instead be practice as it occurs within the confines of habitus. He suggests that practices in habitus are products of a scheme
subject’s ‘real’ interests, this approach avoids claims of ‘false consciousness’ by, instead, highlighting how these interests came to be – how these interests are themselves structured by a whole series of power relations that shape what can/cannot be thought and practiced. In short, it focuses on how context- and conduct-shaping are very much entwined by examining the construction of preferences, rather than measuring them up against a set of ‘real’ interests. Beyond Hay: On the importance of Bourdieu and Foucault to preference shaping Rather than eliding the structure-agency debate through claims of co-constitution, we suggest that both Bourdieu and Foucault provide important insights into the mechanics involved in these intertwined processes. Indeed, as we highlight below, their immanent, or decentred, appreciations of these workings of power provide novel ways forward in thinking through the shaping of preferences. Like Hay, both Bourdieu and Foucault, to the extent that they acknowledge the structure-agency debate, emphasise their co-constitutive nature. However, in doing so, they acknowledge the limits of such a debate and the need to go further if we want properly to understand the workings of power. Bourdieu, for example, refers to the distinction – in his words a distinction between mechanism and finalism – as ‘a false dilemma’. More specifically, in relation to questions of structure he argues for the need to ‘abandon all theories which explicitly or implicitly treat practice as a mechanical reaction’. At the same time, however, he also rejects the view that this somehow implies a reduction to agency alone: we should not ‘reduce the objective intentions and constituted significations of actions and works to the conscious and deliberate intentions of their authors’ (Bourdieu 1977: 72, 73). In short, neither is adequate. Importantly, it is in this context that Bourdieu turns to his concepts of habitus and practice in order to resolve this analytical tension. Rejecting abstract theoretical categories of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ and attempts to plot interactions between the two, he argues that the site of analysis should instead be practice as it occurs within the confines of habitus. He suggests that practices in habitus are products of a scheme
12%20Aug%202015_Faces%20of%20Power%20-%20Submitted-with%20authors%20names%20(2-6-15).docx