A2 Stuxnet Stuxnet failed and future cyberattacks won’t work Farwell and Rohozinski, ’11 (James P. Farwell is an expert in strategic communication and information strategy who has served as a consultant to the US Department of Defense, the US Strategic Command and the US Special Operations Command, Rafal Rohozinski is the CEO of The SecDev Group and a Senior Scholar at the Canada Centre for Global Security, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, and the Future of Cyber War” Survival, 53(1), February-March, pp. 23-40) “Stuxnet Stuxnet was quickly disarmed. This approach comes at a cost. Despite its relative sophistication, and effectively Within months its Iran was able to quickly harness the technical characteristics and components were well known. intellectual capital of the global computer security community through crowdsourcing solutions to the worm, effectively casting doubt on the conventional wisdom surrounding the efficacy of computer some and hype network attacks. Stuxnet’s rapid neutralisation also raises the question of why this approach, rather than a more stealthy or direct one, was chosen to target Tehran’s nuclear programme. The answer depends upon the strategic and political goals the Stuxnet attackers aimed to achieve.
A2 Stuxnet Stuxnet failed and future cyberattacks won’t work Farwell and Rohozinski, ’11 (James P. Farwell is an expert in strategic communication and information strategy who has served as a consultant to the US Department of Defense, the US Strategic Command and the US Special Operations Command, Rafal Rohozinski is the CEO of The SecDev Group and a Senior Scholar at the Canada Centre for Global Security, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War” Survival, 53(1), February-March, pp. 23-40) This approach comes at a cost. Despite its relative sophistication, Stuxnet was quickly and effectively disarmed. Within months its technical characteristics and components were well known. Iran was able to quickly harness the intellectual capital of the global computer security community through effectively crowdsourcing solutions to the worm, casting some doubt on the conventional wisdom and hype surrounding the efficacy of computer network attacks. Stuxnet’s rapid neutralisation also raises the question of why this approach, rather than a more stealthy or direct one, was chosen to target Tehran’s nuclear programme. The answer depends upon the strategic and political goals the Stuxnet attackers aimed to achieve.
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