(“pleasantness = goodness”) or whether instead it a predication (“pleasure is good”). I will try to avoid confusion on this. f. Semantic terminology. Moore sometimes writes in such a way as to suggest that an ordinary predicate expression such as yellow’ in a sentence such as orange is yellow’ ‘is ‘this (or denotes or refers to) yellowness. That seems to me to be a possible source of trouble. names I will say that such predicate expressions yellowness; and that only a nominal expression express such as actually (or denotes or refers to) yellowness. names ‘yellowness’ 4. Some commentators have claimed that Moore gives several distinct and incompatible accounts of the naturalistic fallacy. In other cases, we find that different commentators attribute fundamentally different accounts to Moore one saying that Moore gave a certain account of the – naturalistic fallacy, and the other saying that Moore gave a completely different account of the same fallacy. I think, however, that there is one main idea that stands at the root of most of Moore’s thought about the naturalistic fallacy. I acknowledge that Moore himself did not always put it in precisely the way I am going to put it, but I hope nevertheless to present something that may be viewed as a sympathetic reconstruction of what he did say. My reconstruction makes essential use of three controversial notions. The first of these is the concept of the Moore took intrinsic goodness to be an evaluative property; evaluative property. similarly for moral obligatoriness and moral rightness; and similarly for beauty. Additionally, in a discussion of Mill’s Proof (cited in passage E above), he seems to be assuming that the property of being desirable is an evaluative property. Some will recognize these as normative properties. Others perhaps those who believe in a gap” will say that these are all – “fact/value – properties from the side of the gap. “value” The second controversial notion is the concept of the Yellowness, being natural property. something we desire to desire, being more evolved, etc. are all cited by Moore as natural properties. He took a few stabs at saying what makes it correct to categorize a property as natural, but (as he himself made clear in the Preface) his stabs missed their mark. I will return to this later. At any rate, properties in this group belong on the side of the fact/value gap. “fact”
(“pleasantness = goodness”) or whether instead it a predication (“pleasure is good”). I will try to avoid confusion on this. f. Semantic terminology. Moore sometimes writes in such a way as to suggest that an ordinary predicate expression such as ‘is yellow’ in a sentence such as ‘this orange is yellow’ names (or denotes or refers to) yellowness. That seems to me to be a possible source of trouble. I will say that such predicate expressions express yellowness; and that only a nominal expression such as ‘yellowness’ actually names (or denotes or refers to) yellowness. 4. Some commentators have claimed that Moore gives several distinct and incompatible accounts of the naturalistic fallacy. In other cases, we find that different commentators attribute fundamentally different accounts to Moore – one saying that Moore gave a certain account of the naturalistic fallacy, and the other saying that Moore gave a completely different account of the same fallacy. I think, however, that there is one main idea that stands at the root of most of Moore’s thought about the naturalistic fallacy. I acknowledge that Moore himself did not always put it in precisely the way I am going to put it, but I hope nevertheless to present something that may be viewed as a sympathetic reconstruction of what he did say. My reconstruction makes essential use of three controversial notions. The first of these is the concept of the evaluative property. Moore took intrinsic goodness to be an evaluative property; similarly for moral obligatoriness and moral rightness; and similarly for beauty. Additionally, in a discussion of Mill’s Proof (cited in passage E above), he seems to be assuming that the property of being desirable is an evaluative property. Some will recognize these as normative properties. Others – perhaps those who believe in a “fact/value gap” – will say that these are all properties from the “value” side of the gap. The second controversial notion is the concept of the natural property. Yellowness, being something we desire to desire, being more evolved, etc. are all cited by Moore as natural properties. He took a few stabs at saying what makes it correct to categorize a property as natural, but (as he himself made clear in the Preface) his stabs missed their mark. I will return to this later. At any rate, properties in this group belong on the “fact” side of the fact/value gap.
Naturalistic%20Fallacy%20Jan%208.docx