that an applicant who creates the urgency either in bad faith or through his or her culpable remissness or inaction cannot be granted refuge under these provisions. Similar sentiments were stated by Damaseb J.P., in Mulopo v Minister of Home Affairs. The learned J.P. stated the following: Court has already warned that it will act sternly against those who come to this ‘The Court on self-created urgency.’ [20] In similar vein, in The President of the Court of Appeal (Justice Michael Mathealira Ramodibedi) v The Prime Minister (Dr. Motsoahae Thomas Thabane) And Others the Constitutional Court of Lesotho held that the applicant in that matter had created the urgency by being inactive and doing nothing until he suddenly approached the court on urgency to try to stop impeachment proceedings initiated against him. Importantly, the court made reference to the Lesotho High Court case of Marumo v National Executive Committee and Others where it was held as follows: is not a hat that one can put on or off at one’s convenience. Urgency is a ‘Urgency condition imposed upon by reasons of circumstances beyond his or her control . . .’ The issue could not have been better put. It would appear to me that there are no circumstances pleaded in this case which can be said to be beyond the applicants’ control. [21] In the instant case, it would seem to me, there is nothing alleged that has happened in recent days or weeks to suddenly create the urgency alleged. For lack of a better word, there must, in such circumstances be a that activates the urgency “trigger” as it were and signify that although the waters were previously calm, some violent tempest must have intervened to stir the waters and create panic, being the urgency. In this case there appears to be no trigger at all. It is of course a matter of grave concern to this court that the applicants have been in custody for such a long time but the reasons for this state of affairs are the subject of serious disputes with a cross fire of accusations and counter-accusations and which may not, from present indications, be easily resolved on motion proceedings.
that an applicant who creates the urgency either in bad faith or through his or her culpable remissness or inaction cannot be granted refuge under these provisions. Similar sentiments were stated by Damaseb J.P., in Mulopo v Minister of Home Affairs. The learned J.P. stated the following: ‘The Court has already warned that it will act sternly against those who come to this Court on self-created urgency.’ [20] In similar vein, in The President of the Court of Appeal (Justice Michael Mathealira Ramodibedi) v The Prime Minister (Dr. Motsoahae Thomas Thabane) And Others the Constitutional Court of Lesotho held that the applicant in that matter had created the urgency by being inactive and doing nothing until he suddenly approached the court on urgency to try to stop impeachment proceedings initiated against him. Importantly, the court made reference to the Lesotho High Court case of Marumo v National Executive Committee and Others where it was held as follows: ‘Urgency is not a hat that one can put on or off at one’s convenience. Urgency is a condition imposed upon by reasons of circumstances beyond his or her control . . .’ The issue could not have been better put. It would appear to me that there are no circumstances pleaded in this case which can be said to be beyond the applicants’ control. [21] In the instant case, it would seem to me, there is nothing alleged that has happened in recent days or weeks to suddenly create the urgency alleged. For lack of a better word, there must, in such circumstances be a “trigger” that activates the urgency as it were and signify that although the waters were previously calm, some violent tempest must have intervened to stir the waters and create panic, being the urgency. In this case there appears to be no trigger at all. It is of course a matter of grave concern to this court that the applicants have been in custody for such a long time but the reasons for this state of affairs are the subject of serious disputes with a cross fire of accusations and counter-accusations and which may not, from present indications, be easily resolved on motion proceedings.
Nghiimbwasha%20v%20Minister%20of%20Justice%20(A%2038-2015)%20[2015]%20NAHCMD%2067%20(20%20March%202015).docx