coordination. His conclusion was threefold. First, the new governance instruments under investigation were not referred to in the case law to a significant extent. In his view, this occurs because unlike other soft law instruments, the OMC instruments have a solely political value and are not necessarily linked to hard law provisions, and they do not interpret directives, regulations or the Treaty. Second, the ideational repertoire of Lisbon strategy – covering terms such as competitveness and sustainability appears more and more in the case – law of the EU Courts, especially after 2000. However, as Smismans himself points out, arguing that this proves an engagement with the objectives of OMC processes is purely speculative, in the absence of judicial analyses of the instruments themselves. Finally, there is no conclusive evidence showing that Courts act as guardians of procedural standards and good administration principles in relation to processes like the OMC. The research conducted by Smismans is undoubtedly sector and key word specific. Nonetheless, given the absence of relevant results in the two of the main OMC policy areas, judicial engagement with instruments issued in the framework of Lisbon/Europe 2020 processes appears indeed to be scarce. A more optimistic perspective on the impact of soft law on adjudication is illustrated by Korkea-aho, who looked at the implementation of the Water Framework Directive through soft mechanisms based on networks and consensual enforcement. Empirical evidence showed that soft enforcement mechanisms might streamline legal actions, by offering the information and the administrative resources necessary in order to lead effective infringement proceedings. Furthermore, managing implementation through networks reduces case load, as problems are solved by participants, without judicial intervention.As briefly outlined in the previous section, competition case law admits legally binding effects of soft law for the European Commission on the basis of a mechanism based on general principles of law (such as legitimate expectations, legal certainty, transparency). Thus, hybrid interactions between
coordination. His conclusion was threefold. First, the new governance instruments under investigation were not referred to in the case law to a significant extent. In his view, this occurs because unlike other soft law instruments, the OMC instruments have a solely political value and are not necessarily linked to hard law provisions, and they do not interpret directives, regulations or the Treaty. Second, the ideational repertoire of Lisbon strategy – covering terms such as competitveness and sustainability – appears more and more in the case law of the EU Courts, especially after 2000. However, as Smismans himself points out, arguing that this proves an engagement with the objectives of OMC processes is purely speculative, in the absence of judicial analyses of the instruments themselves. Finally, there is no conclusive evidence showing that Courts act as guardians of procedural standards and good administration principles in relation to processes like the OMC. The research conducted by Smismans is undoubtedly sector and key word specific. Nonetheless, given the absence of relevant results in the two of the main OMC policy areas, judicial engagement with instruments issued in the framework of Lisbon/Europe 2020 processes appears indeed to be scarce. A more optimistic perspective on the impact of soft law on adjudication is illustrated by Korkea-aho, who looked at the implementation of the Water Framework Directive through soft mechanisms based on networks and consensual enforcement. Empirical evidence showed that soft enforcement mechanisms might streamline legal actions, by offering the information and the administrative resources necessary in order to lead effective infringement proceedings. Furthermore, managing implementation through networks reduces case load, as problems are solved by participants, without judicial intervention.As briefly outlined in the previous section, competition case law admits legally binding effects of soft law for the European Commission on the basis of a mechanism based on general principles of law (such as legitimate expectations, legal certainty, transparency). Thus, hybrid interactions between
Oana_Stefan_Courts_soft_law_Maastricht_FINAL.docx