The independence of the object—its true existence—is indicated by being posited through the power of appearing to an awareness, “without or through the force of an awareness.” It is as if one’s awareness does not influence the existence of the object at all. The word (min par)” “without makes Tsong-kha-pa’s restatement opposite from Kamalashīla’s exposition that things only exist conventionally through the power of Tsong-kha-pa understands mentations as Kamalashīla’s mentations. prerequisite for explaining all things as conventionally existing; that is, the power of mentations, nothing would exist conventionally. He without does this by changing the power of mentations” in “through Kamalashīla’s statement to the power of appearing to an “through awareness, or through the power of an awareness,” thereby emphasizing that mentations are not mistaken awarenesses since they allow things to conventionally exist. True existence is the very opposite of this conventional existence. Conventional existence itself depends upon the force of and non-conceptual awarenesses, whereas true establishment excludes the role of awarenesses from its appearance. In this way signifies that true existence is seemingly dissociated from what appears to an awareness. By bringing in Tsong-kha-pa “posited,” explains that the role of mentations, or awarenesses, is to posit, or certify things as conventionally existent. Tsong-kha-pa also converts the status of the object in Kamalashīla’s statement, entities of false things…are said to exist “All ‘only conventionally’” into its opposite. He converts entities of false “All things” into the mode of true existence: in the manner of an “existing objective mode of abiding,” and Kamalashīla’s to exist “only conventionally” into its opposite: truly exist.” Then, he adds “to of such is an innate apprehension of true existence” to “apprehension introduce the notion of the apprehending consciousness and to summarize his point. Unlike the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence that is only apprehended in dependence
The independence of the object—its true existence—is indicated by “without being posited through the power of appearing to an awareness, or through the force of an awareness.” It is as if one’s awareness does not influence the existence of the object at all. The word “without (min par)” makes Tsong-kha-pa’s restatement opposite from Kamalashīla’s exposition that things only exist conventionally through the power of mentations. Tsong-kha-pa understands mentations as Kamalashīla’s prerequisite for explaining all things as conventionally existing; that is, without the power of mentations, nothing would exist conventionally. He does this by changing “through the power of mentations” in Kamalashīla’s statement to “through the power of appearing to an awareness, or through the power of an awareness,” thereby emphasizing that mentations are not mistaken awarenesses since they allow things to conventionally exist. True existence is the very opposite of this conventional existence. Conventional existence itself depends upon the force of and non-conceptual awarenesses, whereas true establishment excludes the role of awarenesses from its appearance. In this way signifies that true existence is seemingly dissociated from what appears to an awareness. By bringing in “posited,” Tsong-kha-pa explains that the role of mentations, or awarenesses, is to posit, or certify things as conventionally existent. Tsong-kha-pa also converts the status of the object in Kamalashīla’s statement, “All entities of false things…are said ‘only to exist conventionally’” into its opposite. He converts “All entities of false things” into the mode of true existence: “existing in the manner of an objective mode of abiding,” and Kamalashīla’s “only to exist conventionally” into its opposite: “to truly exist.” Then, he adds “apprehension of such is an innate apprehension of true existence” to introduce the notion of the apprehending consciousness and to summarize his point. Unlike the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence that is only apprehended in dependence
opposite_of_emptiness_SEPT2014.docx