The thought of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras is not to be explained as being that howsoever forms are apprehended—as 39 the four extremes of being empty or not empty or as the middle free from them—are apprehensions of extremes and hence have to be refuted. Tsong-kha-pa, having solely refuted truth, that is, true 40 establishment (bden asserts that forms abide in the par grub pa), middle. The distinction should be made that reasoning analyzing the 41 ultimate refutes inherent existence but does not refute forms and so forth that are illusory-like dependent-arisings. 42 Reasoning does not refute all whatsoever objects. Go-ram-pa contradicts many sūtras and treatises such as Chandrakīrti’s which says: Clear Words We are not propounding that doer, effect, and so “Action, 42 forth do not exist.” Why? We posit that inherent existence does not exist. Seventh Debate Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and 43 Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly. Even innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of 44 permanence and of former and later phenomena as one. is something eliminated by in the statement that “only” refutation of objects imputed by Forders and Proponents of only 45 Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly: namely, what is misapprehended by innate misapprehensions. Whatever is an apprehension of permanence is not necessarily 46 an apprehension in accordance with the Forders’ superimposition that the self is permanent. An innate apprehension of permanence does not apprehend in 47 that way, that is to say, in accordance with the Forders’ superimposition that the self is permanent. In the continuums of who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth, there is no apprehension that the 48 self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions.
39 The thought of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras is not to be explained as being that howsoever forms are apprehended—as the four extremes of being empty or not empty or as the middle free from them—are apprehensions of extremes and hence have to be refuted. 40 Tsong-kha-pa, having solely refuted truth, that is, true establishment (bden par grub pa), asserts that forms abide in the middle. 41 The distinction should be made that reasoning analyzing the ultimate refutes inherent existence but does not refute forms and so forth that are illusory-like dependent-arisings. 42 Reasoning does not refute all whatsoever objects. 42 Go-ram-pa contradicts many sūtras and treatises such as Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words which says: We are not propounding that “Action, doer, effect, and so forth do not exist.” Why? We posit that inherent existence does not exist. 43 Seventh Debate Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly. 44 Even innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later phenomena as one. 45 is something eliminated by “only” in the statement that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly: namely, what is misapprehended by innate misapprehensions. 46 Whatever is an apprehension of permanence is not necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders’ superimposition that the self is permanent. 47 An innate apprehension of permanence does not apprehend in that way, that is to say, in accordance with the Forders’ superimposition that the self is permanent. 48 In the continuums of who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth, there is no apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions.
opposite_of_emptiness_SEPT2014.docx