the time but which he later included in his witness statement to police. It is suggested that this was a fact that may have been of relevance in deciding whether to allow Mr Noakes to leave the hospital with the apparent intention to go that premises. But the letter made it perfectly clear that Mr Noakes had planned to hang himself, had taken a step of a very serious kind towards achieving that outcome and had attempted to kill himself by other means that day. I do not believe that any criticism of Dr Baker is warranted. On the contrary, it is difficult to see what else Dr Baker could have possibly done in order to protect Mr Noakes. A brief summary of Mr Noakes’ admission at the Lyell McEwin Hospital In this section I will briefly describe Mr Noakes’ time within the LMH. In the following section I will examine those events in greater detail. Mr Noakes arrived at the Hospital by Ambulance at 12:17am on Wednesday 20 February 2013. He was seen by an emergency department registrar, Dr Boonstra. Dr Boonstra performed neither a mental health assessment nor a risk assessment. Mr Noakes stated that he just wanted to Dr Boonstra partially completed a document entitled The section that catered Mental Health Assessment Clinical Record”. “Initial for an assessment of the patient’s initial risk level was not completed. Proforma questions that were designed to assist in the determination of the risk of harm ‘patient’s were also not completed. These questions to themselves should they leave the hospital’ addressed general topics that included background risk factors and current risk factors. This document would never be completed at any stage prior to Mr Noakes’ discharge from the hospital. It appears that Mr Noakes slept until the following morning when he was seen by nursing staff. Other than the superficial, nursing staff failed to develop a meaningful rapport with Mr Noakes whose behaviour and demeanour was aggressive and overtly unreasonable. Although Dr Baker’s letter and the notes compiled by the Rural and Remote Triage Service were available to clinical staff within the emergency department, no further information was sought about Mr Noakes from any person including his partner, members of his family or Dr Baker.
the time but which he later included in his witness statement to police. It is suggested that this was a fact that may have been of relevance in deciding whether to allow Mr Noakes to leave the hospital with the apparent intention to go that premises. But the letter made it perfectly clear that Mr Noakes had planned to hang himself, had taken a step of a very serious kind towards achieving that outcome and had attempted to kill himself by other means that day. I do not believe that any criticism of Dr Baker is warranted. On the contrary, it is difficult to see what else Dr Baker could have possibly done in order to protect Mr Noakes. A brief summary of Mr Noakes’ admission at the Lyell McEwin Hospital In this section I will briefly describe Mr Noakes’ time within the LMH. In the following section I will examine those events in greater detail. Mr Noakes arrived at the Hospital by Ambulance at 12:17am on Wednesday 20 February 2013. He was seen by an emergency department registrar, Dr Boonstra. Dr Boonstra performed neither a mental health assessment nor a risk assessment. Mr Noakes stated that he just wanted to Dr Boonstra partially completed a document entitled “Initial Mental Health Assessment Clinical Record”. The section that catered for an assessment of the patient’s initial risk level was not completed. Proforma questions that were designed to assist in the determination of the ‘patient’s risk of harm to themselves should they leave the hospital’ were also not completed. These questions addressed general topics that included background risk factors and current risk factors. This document would never be completed at any stage prior to Mr Noakes’ discharge from the hospital. It appears that Mr Noakes slept until the following morning when he was seen by nursing staff. Other than the superficial, nursing staff failed to develop a meaningful rapport with Mr Noakes whose behaviour and demeanour was aggressive and overtly unreasonable. Although Dr Baker’s letter and the notes compiled by the Rural and Remote Triage Service were available to clinical staff within the emergency department, no further information was sought about Mr Noakes from any person including his partner, members of his family or Dr Baker.
NOAKES%20Geoffrey%20Scott.docx