the British government increased its efforts to prevent violent extremism, introducing a series of policies and measures designed to counter political and religiously motivated violence (see Schmid, 2013; Thomas, 2012). In the last decade, serious terrorist attacks have occurred across Europe in France, Belgium, the UK, Turkey and Denmark. Contemporarily, anxieties about terrorism have risen up political and policy agendas, with attention ‘home-grown’ becoming focused on European citizens travelling to Syria and Iraq to engage in conflict. After the January and November 2015 attacks in Paris, widespread concerns have been expressed that individuals fighting with Islamist militants in conflict zones in the Middle East will become and may return to commit atrocities in Europe (see Francis, 2015). ‘radicalised’ In the UK, extant anxieties about radicalisation rendered explicit after the 7/7 attacks have escalated after the emergence of violence committed by British citizens active within ISIS, most notably Mohammed Enwazi, dubbed in the media as John’. These concerns form ‘Jihadi part of the contextual backdrop in which the wide-ranging legislative powers sanctioned in Crime, Terrorism and Security Act (2015) were introduced. This Act permits the passports of British citizens returning to the UK to be seized if they are suspected of involvement of terrorism and also sanctions the implementation of exclusion orders to prevent individuals thought to have engaged in terrorism overseas from re-entering the country. Whilst the 2015 attacks in Paris caution against dismissing the risk of individuals being trained in foreign countries returning to conduct attacks in the West, the question as to what exactly it is that motivates individuals to get involved with non State organisations that systematically deploy violence remains open. It is a complex question that produces diffuse answers. In the UK, the intelligence services have sought to identify common factors in the cases of individuals that turn to organised violence, while internationally academic researchers have sought to investigate the root causes of violent extremism (see Borum, 2011; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Horgan, 2009). While necessarily broad and cross-disciplinary, these efforts have resulted in
the British government increased its efforts to prevent violent extremism, introducing a series of policies and measures designed to counter political and religiously motivated violence (see Schmid, 2013; Thomas, 2012). In the last decade, serious terrorist attacks have occurred across Europe in France, Belgium, the UK, Turkey and Denmark. Contemporarily, anxieties about ‘home-grown’ terrorism have risen up political and policy agendas, with attention becoming focused on European citizens travelling to Syria and Iraq to engage in conflict. After the January and November 2015 attacks in Paris, widespread concerns have been expressed that individuals fighting with Islamist militants in conflict zones in the Middle East will become ‘radicalised’ and may return to commit atrocities in Europe (see Francis, 2015). In the UK, extant anxieties about radicalisation rendered explicit after the 7/7 attacks have escalated after the emergence of violence committed by British citizens active within ISIS, most notably Mohammed Enwazi, dubbed in the media as ‘Jihadi John’. These concerns form part of the contextual backdrop in which the wide-ranging legislative powers sanctioned in Crime, Terrorism and Security Act (2015) were introduced. This Act permits the passports of British citizens returning to the UK to be seized if they are suspected of involvement of terrorism and also sanctions the implementation of exclusion orders to prevent individuals thought to have engaged in terrorism overseas from re-entering the country. Whilst the 2015 attacks in Paris caution against dismissing the risk of individuals being trained in foreign countries returning to conduct attacks in the West, the question as to what exactly it is that motivates individuals to get involved with non State organisations that systematically deploy violence remains open. It is a complex question that produces diffuse answers. In the UK, the intelligence services have sought to identify common factors in the cases of individuals that turn to organised violence, while internationally academic researchers have sought to investigate the root causes of violent extremism (see Borum, 2011; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Horgan, 2009). While necessarily broad and cross-disciplinary, these efforts have resulted in
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