has placed facts before me to indicate the harm it will suffer if I do not suspend the operation of the arbitrator’s order of 06 October 2015. I am thus of the view that, having regard to all the circumstances of this application, the possible irreparable harm to be suffered by any of the parties favours the applicant. [27] I am cognisant of the pronouncement by the Supreme Court that: statutory intention behind the new regime of arbitration of disputes is clearly that ‘The Labour disputes be determined with all due speed and not subject to delays which had previously characterised court proceedings. This underlying statutory intention was explained in earlier Labour Court proceedings: the Act did away with district labour courts. It placed greater emphasis on ‘But conciliation and, of importance in this context, it brought about a new regime of arbitration of disputes by specialised arbitration tribunals operating under the auspices of the Labour Commissioner. The provisions dealing with these tribunals in Part C of the Act place emphasis upon expediting the finalisation of disputes and upon the informality of those proceedings. The restriction of participation of legal practitioners and the range of time limits for bringing and completing proceedings demonstrate this. Arbitrators are enjoined to determine matters fairly and quickly and deal with the substantial merits of disputes with a minimum of legal formalities. The overriding intention of the legislature concerning the resolution of disputes is that this should be achieved with a minimum of legal formality and with due speed. This is not only laudable but particularly appropriate to labour issues. I stress that it is within this context that the Act places greater emphasis on alternative dispute resolution and confines the issues to be adjudicated upon by this court (in terms of) s 117’. [28] Section 89 (9) of the Labour Act reads as follows: The Labour Court may- ‘(9) (a) order that all or any part of the award be suspended; and (b) attach conditions to its order, including but not limited to- (i) conditions requiring the payment of a monetary into Court; or
has placed facts before me to indicate the harm it will suffer if I do not suspend the operation of the arbitrator’s order of 06 October 2015. I am thus of the view that, having regard to all the circumstances of this application, the possible irreparable harm to be suffered by any of the parties favours the applicant. [27] I am cognisant of the pronouncement by the Supreme Court that: ‘The statutory intention behind the new regime of arbitration of disputes is clearly that Labour disputes be determined with all due speed and not subject to delays which had previously characterised court proceedings. This underlying statutory intention was explained in earlier Labour Court proceedings: ‘But the Act did away with district labour courts. It placed greater emphasis on conciliation and, of importance in this context, it brought about a new regime of arbitration of disputes by specialised arbitration tribunals operating under the auspices of the Labour Commissioner. The provisions dealing with these tribunals in Part C of the Act place emphasis upon expediting the finalisation of disputes and upon the informality of those proceedings. The restriction of participation of legal practitioners and the range of time limits for bringing and completing proceedings demonstrate this. Arbitrators are enjoined to determine matters fairly and quickly and deal with the substantial merits of disputes with a minimum of legal formalities. The overriding intention of the legislature concerning the resolution of disputes is that this should be achieved with a minimum of legal formality and with due speed. This is not only laudable but particularly appropriate to labour issues. I stress that it is within this context that the Act places greater emphasis on alternative dispute resolution and confines the issues to be adjudicated upon by this court (in terms of) s 117’. [28] Section 89 (9) of the Labour Act reads as follows: ‘(9) The Labour Court may- (a) order that all or any part of the award be suspended; and (b) attach conditions to its order, including but not limited to- (i) conditions requiring the payment of a monetary into Court; or
Nedbank%20Namibia%20Limited%20v%20The%20Namibia%20Financial%20Institutions%20Union%20(LC%20154-2015)%20[2015]%20NALCMD%2026%20(02%20November%202015).docx