Two members of the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) attempted to counter the argument that the PRC was becoming aggressive, arguing that a more self-confident would be a more responsible member of the world community. Nations conduct diplomacy based on both their self-images and images of the outside world, they opined, and since the PRC no longer viewed itself as a county on the edge of collapse but as a rising power with increasing capability to shape its environment, it would behave responsibly on the world scene. Beijing, the CASS scholars predicted, would neither try to reclaim lost territories nor seize the whole of the South China Sea, and it would try to re-establish the [China] Order”42 by ‘not “Zhonghua bullying regional states into submission’. Japanese Woes By this time, it had become clear to Japan as well as the rest of the world that, after a decade of effort to recover from the bursting of the economic bubble, there was a serious question of whether it would ever be able to do so. Other factors included a declining birth rate, an aging population, and a younger generation that was unwilling to work as hard as its elders. Meanwhile, the PRC was entering its third decade of spectacular economic growth, and to the extent that there were bright spots in the Japanese economy, trade with China was largely responsible. With the exception of Koizumi’s unusually long five-year term, Japan has also suffered from weak leadership—there have been 16 prime ministers in 22 years and, if one leaves out the Koizumi years, 14 in 17 years. DPJ and appeasement of Beijing Singapore’s former prime minister Lee Kwan Yew stressed the importance of the US remaining in Asia to balance China’s rise, which Beijing reacted sharply to, again stressing the PRC’s commitment to peace and stability in the area.46 Perhaps the worst fate of all was the blow to Kan’s desire to improve Sino– Japanese relations. In a textbook case of how not to handle an
Two members of the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) attempted to counter the argument that the PRC was becoming aggressive, arguing that a more self-confident would be a more responsible member of the world community. Nations conduct diplomacy based on both their self-images and images of the outside world, they opined, and since the PRC no longer viewed itself as a county on the edge of collapse but as a rising power with increasing capability to shape its environment, it would behave responsibly on the world scene. Beijing, the CASS scholars predicted, would neither try to reclaim lost territories nor seize the whole of the South China Sea, and it would ‘not try to re-establish the “Zhonghua [China] Order”42 by bullying regional states into submission’. Japanese Woes By this time, it had become clear to Japan as well as the rest of the world that, after a decade of effort to recover from the bursting of the economic bubble, there was a serious question of whether it would ever be able to do so. Other factors included a declining birth rate, an aging population, and a younger generation that was unwilling to work as hard as its elders. Meanwhile, the PRC was entering its third decade of spectacular economic growth, and to the extent that there were bright spots in the Japanese economy, trade with China was largely responsible. With the exception of Koizumi’s unusually long five-year term, Japan has also suffered from weak leadership—there have been 16 prime ministers in 22 years and, if one leaves out the Koizumi years, 14 in 17 years. DPJ and appeasement of Beijing Singapore’s former prime minister Lee Kwan Yew stressed the importance of the US remaining in Asia to balance China’s rise, which Beijing reacted sharply to, again stressing the PRC’s commitment to peace and stability in the area.46 Perhaps the worst fate of all was the blow to Kan’s desire to improve Sino– Japanese relations. In a textbook case of how not to handle an
notes12.docx