The SVBX SSRC has met on a monthly basis and as-needed throughout the project life. Staff reviewed the master checklist for certifiable items. Staff reviewed samples of designs stamped and signed by Registered Engineers. Staff reviewed several Non-Conformance Reports and noted a Registered Engineers had stamped and signed the analyses. The SSMP outlines the training requirements and updates to training programs which will be made as the project approaches completion. Staff reviewed both the Project and the Contractor’s testing program plans. Both BART’s and VTA’s highest-ranking officers will be required to sign the Final Safety Certification Verification Report. Staff reviewed the signature page of the Draft report to verify the requirement. The SSRC includes members from BART’s System Safety Department and Police Department. The project workshops with stakeholders to distribute and discuss certification materials. The VTA’s Rail System Safety Review Board is the forum for coordination between departments, and hosts regular debriefings regarding staffing, preparation for the Mountain View Station project, and other coordination issues. Findings: The VTA procedures provided to Staff, including the SSPP, did not clearly define how new projects would be selected to require submittals of Safety Certification Plans to the CPUC. Safety Certification Plans have not been submitted for several projects which VTA explained will require certification but have passed the Preliminary Engineering Phase. Comments: The VTA personnel present during the audit activities were unknowledgeable in CPUC’s requirements and VTA’s own procedures for safety certification. At numerous times, questions could not be answered and Staff was referred to absent individuals. This was attributed to scheduling conflicts with other CPUC review checklists. Recommendations: VTA should revise the SSPP and the procedure to define which types of projects” “major VTA intends to submit a Safety Certification Plan to CPUC.
The SVBX SSRC has met on a monthly basis and as-needed throughout the project life. Staff reviewed the master checklist for certifiable items. Staff reviewed samples of designs stamped and signed by Registered Engineers. Staff reviewed several Non-Conformance Reports and noted a Registered Engineers had stamped and signed the analyses. The SSMP outlines the training requirements and updates to training programs which will be made as the project approaches completion. Staff reviewed both the Project and the Contractor’s testing program plans. Both BART’s and VTA’s highest-ranking officers will be required to sign the Final Safety Certification Verification Report. Staff reviewed the signature page of the Draft report to verify the requirement. The SSRC includes members from BART’s System Safety Department and Police Department. The project workshops with stakeholders to distribute and discuss certification materials. The VTA’s Rail System Safety Review Board is the forum for coordination between departments, and hosts regular debriefings regarding staffing, preparation for the Mountain View Station project, and other coordination issues. Findings: The VTA procedures provided to Staff, including the SSPP, did not clearly define how new projects would be selected to require submittals of Safety Certification Plans to the CPUC. Safety Certification Plans have not been submitted for several projects which VTA explained will require certification but have passed the Preliminary Engineering Phase. Comments: The VTA personnel present during the audit activities were unknowledgeable in CPUC’s requirements and VTA’s own procedures for safety certification. At numerous times, questions could not be answered and Staff was referred to absent individuals. This was attributed to scheduling conflicts with other CPUC review checklists. Recommendations: VTA should revise the SSPP and the procedure to define which types of “major projects” VTA intends to submit a Safety Certification Plan to CPUC.
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