Results from these joint SAMSO/ACIC ICBM G&G investigations were used collectively to form the first Minuteman G&G Error Budget*. The error budget with its numerical values had a National Security Classification of Secret and, therefore, is not included here. However, the format of the Minuteman G&G Error Budget, presented in the enclosed Table, was (is) Unclassified. The CEP value in the Minuteman G&G Error Budget reflects at a given time the predicted Minuteman target impact error due solely to the uncertainties present in the in-use supporting G&G data. This error budget was the Standard Minuteman G&G Error Budget kept by SAMSO for the Air Force, with a copy maintained at ACIC. Two additional error sources, missile hardware (principally the inertial guidance system) and software also degrade Minuteman target impact accuracy. Somewhere within the Air Force, the missile CEPs resulting from these two error sources were combined with the G&G CEP to obtain the (total) CEP for the field deployed Minuteman Force. As a result of the security dictum, it is believed that no one within ACIC ever knew the predicted Total Error Budget CEP Value for Minuteman. Note: Irrespective of the Minuteman G&G Error Budget discussions in this paper, it is assumed that the Air Force maintains (has) a Minuteman Error Budget with a Total CEP Value reflective of the target impact scoring of actual test range flights. As time progressed, it became possible to develop a more accurate Minuteman ICBM. This was due to the technological advances made in many For example, improvements in: +Inertial guidance systems They became smaller in size, lighter in weight, and more – accurate. ____________________ *No G&G Error Budgets are believed to have been generated for earlier Air Force ICBMs: the Atlas D, E, and F; and Titan I and II. An excellent discussion of the development, deployment, and deactivation of these ICBMs is provided in [8]. The earlier Atlases (A, B, and C) were ICBM of concept configurations” [8; p. 8], flight tested near the end of the 1950s. Therefore, “proof as prototypes, these three systems were not part of any field deployment plans.
Results from these joint SAMSO/ACIC ICBM G&G investigations were used collectively to form the first Minuteman G&G Error Budget*. The error budget with its numerical values had a National Security Classification of Secret and, therefore, is not included here. However, the format of the Minuteman G&G Error Budget, presented in the enclosed Table, was (is) Unclassified. The CEP value in the Minuteman G&G Error Budget reflects at a given time the predicted Minuteman target impact error due solely to the uncertainties present in the in-use supporting G&G data. This error budget was the Standard Minuteman G&G Error Budget kept by SAMSO for the Air Force, with a copy maintained at ACIC. Two additional error sources, missile hardware (principally the inertial guidance system) and software also degrade Minuteman target impact accuracy. Somewhere within the Air Force, the missile CEPs resulting from these two error sources were combined with the G&G CEP to obtain the (total) CEP for the field deployed Minuteman Force. As a result of the security dictum, it is believed that no one within ACIC ever knew the predicted Total Error Budget CEP Value for Minuteman. Note: Irrespective of the Minuteman G&G Error Budget discussions in this paper, it is assumed that the Air Force maintains (has) a Minuteman Error Budget with a Total CEP Value reflective of the target impact scoring of actual test range flights. As time progressed, it became possible to develop a more accurate Minuteman ICBM. This was due to the technological advances made in many For example, improvements in: +Inertial guidance systems – They became smaller in size, lighter in weight, and more accurate. ____________________ *No G&G Error Budgets are believed to have been generated for earlier Air Force ICBMs: the Atlas D, E, and F; and Titan I and II. An excellent discussion of the development, deployment, and deactivation of these ICBMs is provided in [8]. The earlier Atlases (A, B, and C) were ICBM “proof of concept configurations” [8; p. 8], flight tested near the end of the 1950s. Therefore, as prototypes, these three systems were not part of any field deployment plans.
Minuteman%20G&G%20Comments,%20Final,%20May%202016.docx