these results because furthering their educations may have prepared the foreign-born for careers in academia, but it also may have increased the likelihood of obtaining H-1B visas in the private sector given that 20,000 H-1B visas are reserved for people with a Master’s degree or above. As a final examination of potential mechanisms through H-1B visa caps may affect career trajectories, we examine whether the foreign-born who remain in the United States, despite a binding visa cap, are less likely to work in the field in which they received their highest degree. The last column of Table 8 presents results from a model run on our baseline sample of foreign nationals who obtain any degree in the United States. The estimated coefficient of interest suggests that the policy did not induce people to change their fields in order to work in the U.S. private sector. The point estimate is, in fact, negative, but very close to zero. 7. Summary and Conclusions Overall, our analysis informs on various intended and unintended impacts of the more restrictive immigration policy pertaining to high-skill immigrants. Did the policy exclusions intended to retain talent in academic and research-related sectors achieve their aim? Did the impacts vary by highest degree, field, and country of origin? Our analysis suggests that the answer is yes to all of these questions. We examine whether immigrants from countries without H-1B substitute visas are more likely to work in academic institutions after the H-1B quota cut in 2004, relative to the countries with H-B substitutes. We find that indeed they are. We also address common threats of difference-in-difference analyses. For example, we test for differential trends in employment patterns between our group (Canadians, Mexicans, Chileans and Singaporeans control graduating in/after 2004 or Australians graduating after 2005) and our group (all other treated foreign-born students) prior to the change in the H-1B visa cap in 2004. We find no evidence
these results because furthering their educations may have prepared the foreign-born for careers in academia, but it also may have increased the likelihood of obtaining H-1B visas in the private sector given that 20,000 H-1B visas are reserved for people with a Master’s degree or above. As a final examination of potential mechanisms through H-1B visa caps may affect career trajectories, we examine whether the foreign-born who remain in the United States, despite a binding visa cap, are less likely to work in the field in which they received their highest degree. The last column of Table 8 presents results from a model run on our baseline sample of foreign nationals who obtain any degree in the United States. The estimated coefficient of interest suggests that the policy did not induce people to change their fields in order to work in the U.S. private sector. The point estimate is, in fact, negative, but very close to zero. 7. Summary and Conclusions Overall, our analysis informs on various intended and unintended impacts of the more restrictive immigration policy pertaining to high-skill immigrants. Did the policy exclusions intended to retain talent in academic and research-related sectors achieve their aim? Did the impacts vary by highest degree, field, and country of origin? Our analysis suggests that the answer is yes to all of these questions. We examine whether immigrants from countries without H-1B substitute visas are more likely to work in academic institutions after the H-1B quota cut in 2004, relative to the countries with H-B substitutes. We find that indeed they are. We also address common threats of difference-in-difference analyses. For example, we test for differential trends in employment patterns between our control group (Canadians, Mexicans, Chileans and Singaporeans graduating in/after 2004 or Australians graduating after 2005) and our treated group (all other foreign-born students) prior to the change in the H-1B visa cap in 2004. We find no evidence
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