Introduction and Summary Defendant’s argument rests entirely on its untenable assertion that the Supreme Court in __ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 1718, 2017 WL 2507342 Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., (2017), held that it cannot be a collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act “debt (“FDCPA”) because it is the current owner of Plaintiff’s debt that it obtained after default. In a narrow opinion, held that an entity that purchases defaulted debts to collect Henson “regularly” for its own account is not a collector” pursuant to the second prong of the definition in 15 “debt U.S.C. § 1692a(6) covering a person who collects or attempts to collect ... debts owed “regularly or due ... another.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, Defendant does not address the dispositive issue here that Congress chose to subject it to FDCPA coverage under the first prong of the § – 1692a(6)’s alternative definition applicable to an entity engaging any business the principal “in purpose of which is the collection of any debts” The Supreme Court expressly warned in that do not attempt to” address this purpose” prong because parties Henson “we “principal “the haven't much litigated that alternative definition and granting certiorari we didn't agree to “in address it.” 2017 WL 2507342, *3. Defendant’s exclusive reliance on is accordingly Henson unavailing. Defendant’s sole business as shown by the [SJ: summary judgment here record /MTD: the specific allegations of the complaint], is to purchase portfolios of defaulted consumer debts at steep discounts for pennies on the dollar and then attempt to collect those debts from individual consumers such as Plaintiff; its sole revenue source is derived from debt collection. This business model is precisely the type of debt collection activity that the plain language of the purpose” prong covers. This alternative definition excludes the or due another” “principal “owed component of the second definition that compelled the result in thus eliminating any Henson,
Introduction and Summary Defendant’s argument rests entirely on its untenable assertion that the Supreme Court in Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., __ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 1718, 2017 WL 2507342 (2017), held that it cannot be a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) because it is the current owner of Plaintiff’s debt that it obtained after default. In a narrow opinion, Henson held that an entity that “regularly” purchases defaulted debts to collect for its own account is not a “debt collector” pursuant to the second prong of the definition in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) covering a person who “regularly collects or attempts to collect ... debts owed or due ... another.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, Defendant does not address the dispositive issue here – that Congress chose to subject it to FDCPA coverage under the first prong of the § 1692a(6)’s alternative definition applicable to an entity engaging “in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” The Supreme Court expressly warned in Henson that “we do not attempt to” address this “principal purpose” prong because “the parties haven't much litigated that alternative definition and “in granting certiorari we didn't agree to address it.” 2017 WL 2507342, *3. Defendant’s exclusive reliance on Henson is accordingly unavailing. Defendant’s sole business as shown by the [SJ: summary judgment here record /MTD: the specific allegations of the complaint], is to purchase portfolios of defaulted consumer debts at steep discounts for pennies on the dollar and then attempt to collect those debts from individual consumers such as Plaintiff; its sole revenue source is derived from debt collection. This business model is precisely the type of debt collection activity that the plain language of the “principal purpose” prong covers. This alternative definition excludes the “owed or due another” component of the second definition that compelled the result in Henson, thus eliminating any
model-henson-brief.docx