domestic political elites’ pursuit of survival, the first part of the chapter demonstrate how the EU used political survival of ruling elites to impose the EPA on West African countries. That is, unlike the Yaoundé Convention and the Lomé Conventions, in which ruling elites used provisions like price support to safeguard existing economic systems, the EU’s EPA proposal (which initially met with opposition from ACP elites) is based on the threat that the continued protection of minimum economic performance is based on the signing of the EPA. The second part of the chapter assess the main impact of EPA on (1) market access to the EU (including its protection of existing economic systems or minimum economic performance) and (2) economic diversification in West African countries. To start from the second objective, the main impact of the EPA, under the Cotonou Agreement, there was a major shift in the patterns of trade between the two regions: for example, the EU’s abolition of price support and quotas (for products such as sugar, banana and pineapple) reduced the means of gaining trade advantages (or securing minimum economic performance) to tariffs alone (e.g. zero tariffs as opposed to 20 percent under the Generalized Scheme of Tariff Preferences (GSP) for bananas). This exposed West African sectors to possible competition in the EU market if, for example, the EU were to sign FTAs with more competent suppliers. – Such competition can only be avoided in products in which West African countries are dominant in the global market and which also have a tariff advantage (e.g. cocoa beans). In Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, products such as bananas and pineapples, which have been produced exclusively under EU protection since independence, might be in the process of erosion (however, signing the EPA is predicated on maintaining their advantaged position in the EU market). The argument regarding market access is that the historical market preferences offered in the trade agreements have shrunk. Ordinarily, the erosion of these preferences would be a positive development, because Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are not competitive in such products, and halting their production could provoke factor reallocation through threat to ruling elites. However, I argue that the EPA (which amounts to a liberalisation of 75 percent of West Africa’s imports from the EU) in itself prevents diversification in two ways: first, by reducing policy space; and more importantly, by restructuring West African countries towards similar diversification schemes (regional obstruction).
domestic political elites’ pursuit of survival, the first part of the chapter demonstrate how the EU used political survival of ruling elites to impose the EPA on West African countries. That is, unlike the Yaoundé Convention and the Lomé Conventions, in which ruling elites used provisions like price support to safeguard existing economic systems, the EU’s EPA proposal (which initially met with opposition from ACP elites) is based on the threat that the continued protection of minimum economic performance is based on the signing of the EPA. The second part of the chapter assess the main impact of EPA on (1) market access to the EU (including its protection of existing economic systems or minimum economic performance) and (2) economic diversification in West African countries. To start from the second objective, the main impact of the EPA, under the Cotonou Agreement, there was a major shift in the patterns of trade between the two regions: for example, the EU’s abolition of price support and quotas (for products such as sugar, banana and pineapple) reduced the means of gaining trade advantages (or securing minimum economic performance) to tariffs alone (e.g. zero tariffs as opposed to 20 percent under the Generalized Scheme of Tariff Preferences (GSP) for bananas). This exposed West African sectors to possible competition in the EU market – if, for example, the EU were to sign FTAs with more competent suppliers. Such competition can only be avoided in products in which West African countries are dominant in the global market and which also have a tariff advantage (e.g. cocoa beans). In Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, products such as bananas and pineapples, which have been produced exclusively under EU protection since independence, might be in the process of erosion (however, signing the EPA is predicated on maintaining their advantaged position in the EU market). The argument regarding market access is that the historical market preferences offered in the trade agreements have shrunk. Ordinarily, the erosion of these preferences would be a positive development, because Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are not competitive in such products, and halting their production could provoke factor reallocation through threat to ruling elites. However, I argue that the EPA (which amounts to a liberalisation of 75 percent of West Africa’s imports from the EU) in itself prevents diversification in two ways: first, by reducing policy space; and more importantly, by restructuring West African countries towards similar diversification schemes (regional obstruction).
Michael%27s%20Revised%20Thesis%20April%202017.docx