evidence, the appellant is, understandably, unlikely to feel complacent about his prospects of receiving a fair trial before that magistrate.' A further matter which is in my opinion relevant in this regard is the case of SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Others v Irvin and Johnson. The facts of the case are correctly set out in the headnote which reads as follows: of the respondent's employees had participated in industrial action (the first ‘Certain matter), which resulted in some being dismissed and others being given final written warnings. Subsequent thereto there was protest action against these dismissals (the second matter), which resulted in further dismissals, including employees to whom final warnings had been given. Separate proceedings arising out of this action were instituted in the industrial court. Both matters were then referred to the Labour Appeal Court (LAC), with the second matter being heard first. The LAC found in favour of the respondent, with the Court reciting evidence which was uncontested in that case, but which was in issue in the first matter. When the first matter came before the LAC, two of the Judges who had heard the second matter were due to preside over the appeal. The applicants brought an application for the recusal of those Judges. The application was refused, with the LAC finding, inter alia, that the issues in the two cases were not identical. The applicants then applied for a certificate to apply for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court, but were granted a negative certificate by the LAC. They then lodged an application for leave to appeal to that Court, which heard the application together with the merits of the appeal. During the course of argument the applicants advanced different grounds for recusal from those advanced before the LAC.’ In their application for leave to appeal the applicants in the Irvin and alleged that the issues decided in the second trial and the witnesses were identical to those before the LAC in the first trial. It was also alleged that in the first trial the evidence of one Ms Holland, an official of the Union, was rejected. The
evidence, the appellant is, understandably, unlikely to feel complacent about his prospects of receiving a fair trial before that magistrate.' A further matter which is in my opinion relevant in this regard is the case of SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Others v Irvin and Johnson. The facts of the case are correctly set out in the headnote which reads as follows: ‘Certain of the respondent's employees had participated in industrial action (the first matter), which resulted in some being dismissed and others being given final written warnings. Subsequent thereto there was protest action against these dismissals (the second matter), which resulted in further dismissals, including employees to whom final warnings had been given. Separate proceedings arising out of this action were instituted in the industrial court. Both matters were then referred to the Labour Appeal Court (LAC), with the second matter being heard first. The LAC found in favour of the respondent, with the Court reciting evidence which was uncontested in that case, but which was in issue in the first matter. When the first matter came before the LAC, two of the Judges who had heard the second matter were due to preside over the appeal. The applicants brought an application for the recusal of those Judges. The application was refused, with the LAC finding, inter alia, that the issues in the two cases were not identical. The applicants then applied for a certificate to apply for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court, but were granted a negative certificate by the LAC. They then lodged an application for leave to appeal to that Court, which heard the application together with the merits of the appeal. During the course of argument the applicants advanced different grounds for recusal from those advanced before the LAC.’ In their application for leave to appeal the applicants in the Irvin and alleged that the issues decided in the second trial and the witnesses were identical to those before the LAC in the first trial. It was also alleged that in the first trial the evidence of one Ms Holland, an official of the Union, was rejected. The
Munuma%20and%20Others%20v%20S%20(SA%2010-2010)%20[2013]%20NASC%2010%20(15%20July%202013).docx