at inception by a sizeable tranche of funding - over 180 million pounds - distributed across three government Departments: the Home Office, the Department for Communities and Local Government and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The PREVENT strategy was originally constituted by five overarching objectives, subsequently limited to three in the current version published in 2011: to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and to work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which need to be addressed (HM Government, 2011: 7). As social policy scholars have noted, the implementation of the PREVENT strategy was plagued by internal contests and conflicts. The allocation of funding across different government departments with competing organizational logics and different interpretations of PREVENT produced problems from the outset, with the tension between community cohesion aspirations and preventative interventions generating cleavages (see Ratcliffe, 2012; Thomas, 2010). Furthermore, research into the external effects of particular counter-terrorism initiatives housed under the PREVENT umbrella raised serious concerns about the surveillant aspects of the strategy, particularly those directed squarely at Muslim communities (see Awan, 2013; Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009). As Kundnani’s (2009) systematic evaluation of PREVENT demonstrates, policies pursued under the PREVENT strategy have discriminated against Muslim Minority Groups, reproduced divisions between the police and targeted communities and damaged community relations. Given the aspiration to counter radicalisation through a wide variety of policy measures, it is perhaps unsurprising that the PREVENT strategy has been party to challenges regarding its focus and implementation (see Dodd, 2009; Travis, 2011). These criticisms led to a revised version of the strategy being implemented in 2011, which was more oriented toward interventions on the basis of risk and vulnerability and divorced community cohesion activities (Heath-Kelly, 2013). Noteworthy
at inception by a sizeable tranche of funding - over 180 million pounds - distributed across three government Departments: the Home Office, the Department for Communities and Local Government and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The PREVENT strategy was originally constituted by five overarching objectives, subsequently limited to three in the current version published in 2011: to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and to work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which need to be addressed (HM Government, 2011: 7). As social policy scholars have noted, the implementation of the PREVENT strategy was plagued by internal contests and conflicts. The allocation of funding across different government departments with competing organizational logics and different interpretations of PREVENT produced problems from the outset, with the tension between community cohesion aspirations and preventative interventions generating cleavages (see Ratcliffe, 2012; Thomas, 2010). Furthermore, research into the external effects of particular counter-terrorism initiatives housed under the PREVENT umbrella raised serious concerns about the surveillant aspects of the strategy, particularly those directed squarely at Muslim communities (see Awan, 2013; Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009). As Kundnani’s (2009) systematic evaluation of PREVENT demonstrates, policies pursued under the PREVENT strategy have discriminated against Muslim Minority Groups, reproduced divisions between the police and targeted communities and damaged community relations. Given the aspiration to counter radicalisation through a wide variety of policy measures, it is perhaps unsurprising that the PREVENT strategy has been party to challenges regarding its focus and implementation (see Dodd, 2009; Travis, 2011). These criticisms led to a revised version of the strategy being implemented in 2011, which was more oriented toward interventions on the basis of risk and vulnerability and divorced community cohesion activities (Heath-Kelly, 2013). Noteworthy
Mythen%20Walklate%20and%20Peatfield%202017.docx