This decision does not assist this court in determining whether the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee itself are proceedings that determine civil rights and obligations for two reasons. First, the proceedings at issue here are different from those under consideration in case. Here Solomon’s we are concerned with the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee itself, not the proceedings brought before the court. Secondly, the rule that governed the question before the Appellate Division is different from the rule in question here. There the court was concerned with the application of a rule regulating appeals as of right to the Appellate Division, whereas here we are concerned with the interpretation of a constitutional provision conferring rights. The difference in the purpose and language of the underlying rule thus renders the reasoning in case of little value in deciding whether the Disciplinary Committee Solomon’s conducting proceedings in terms of s 35 is bound by the provisions of Art 12. There is guidance to be found elsewhere, however. In Vaatz, Levy J correctly pointed out that Art 12 is drafted in language similar to Art 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Given the textual similarity of the two provisions, the jurisprudence on the meaning of Art 6 of the European Convention may be of assistance. The jurisprudence on Art 6 makes plain that the phrase 'in the determination of his civil rights and obligations' covers all proceedings that are 'decisive' of civil rights and obligations. The Court of Appeal for England and Wales has held that disciplinary proceedings that impose a reprimand on a legal practitioner does not amount to a determination of his civil rights or obligations within Art 6(1) of the Convention. The court held that whereas an order that barred a legal practitioner from practice
This decision does not assist this court in determining whether the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee itself are proceedings that determine civil rights and obligations for two reasons. First, the proceedings at issue here are different from those under consideration in Solomon’s case. Here we are concerned with the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee itself, not the proceedings brought before the court. Secondly, the rule that governed the question before the Appellate Division is different from the rule in question here. There the court was concerned with the application of a rule regulating appeals as of right to the Appellate Division, whereas here we are concerned with the interpretation of a constitutional provision conferring rights. The difference in the purpose and language of the underlying rule thus renders the reasoning in Solomon’s case of little value in deciding whether the Disciplinary Committee conducting proceedings in terms of s 35 is bound by the provisions of Art 12. There is guidance to be found elsewhere, however. In Vaatz, Levy J correctly pointed out that Art 12 is drafted in language similar to Art 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Given the textual similarity of the two provisions, the jurisprudence on the meaning of Art 6 of the European Convention may be of assistance. The jurisprudence on Art 6 makes plain that the phrase 'in the determination of his civil rights and obligations' covers all proceedings that are 'decisive' of civil rights and obligations. The Court of Appeal for England and Wales has held that disciplinary proceedings that impose a reprimand on a legal practitioner does not amount to a determination of his civil rights or obligations within Art 6(1) of the Convention. The court held that whereas an order that barred a legal practitioner from practice