of in passing the ADA. Congress found that, has tended Congress’s intents “historically, society to isolate and segregate individuals with 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). Congress further disabilities.” found that such discriminatory segregation continues. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). Congress thus stated that one of proper is to ensure for individuals “the Nation’s goals” “independent living” with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). In 527 U.S. 581 (1999), the Supreme Court recognized that the unnecessary Olmstead v. L.C., segregation of an individual with a disability is discrimination prohibited by Title II and the integration mandate. The Court held that isolation * * * is properly regarded as “[u]njustified discrimination based on because it that persons disability” “perpetuates unwarranted assumptions so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community at 597, 600. The Id. life.” Court reasoned that in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities “confinement of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and at 601. These concerns and the potential Id. cultural enrichment.” for harm exist both where individuals unnecessarily institutionalized seek to return to their communities and where those with disabilities seek to avoid unnecessary, discriminatory institutionalization or segregation in the first place. Three Circuits Are Cognizable Agree “At-Risk” Claims The Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have each held that an individual who is at serious risk of institutionalization has a claim under the integration mandate; no court to squarely address the issue has held otherwise. In 335 F.3d 1175 (10th Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority, Cir. 2003), the Tenth Circuit held that persons who * * * stand imperiled with “disabled have standing to bring a claim the integration regulation without first segregation” “under ADA’s submitting to at 1182. The court reasoned that is nothing in the Id. institutionalization.” “there plain language of the regulations that limits protection to persons who are currently
of Congress’s intents in passing the ADA. Congress found that, “historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). Congress further found that such discriminatory segregation continues. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). Congress thus stated that one of “the Nation’s proper goals” is to ensure “independent living” for individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). In Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), the Supreme Court recognized that the unnecessary segregation of an individual with a disability is discrimination prohibited by Title II and the integration mandate. The Court held that “[u]njustified isolation * * * is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability” because it “perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life.” Id. at 597, 600. The Court reasoned that “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.” Id. at 601. These concerns and the potential for harm exist both where individuals unnecessarily institutionalized seek to return to their communities and where those with disabilities seek to avoid unnecessary, discriminatory institutionalization or segregation in the first place. Three Circuits Agree “At-Risk” Claims Are Cognizable The Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have each held that an individual who is at serious risk of institutionalization has a claim under the integration mandate; no court to squarely address the issue has held otherwise. In Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority, 335 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2003), the Tenth Circuit held that “disabled persons who * * * stand imperiled with segregation” have standing to bring a claim “under the ADA’s integration regulation without first submitting to institutionalization.” Id. at 1182. The court reasoned that “there is nothing in the plain language of the regulations that limits protection to persons who are currently