not be self-evident. Although perfect simulation is not necessary to retain internal validity while increasing external validity, how best to simulate selection behavior is not at all self-evident. For the most part, our proposed design avoids one set of potential problems. The condition does not ask subjects to predict future behavior, recall past behavior, or describe hypothetical, counterfactual behavior. Nor does it ask them to justify or explain their choices. Our proposed design avoids errors that might arise from these reflective and simply invites subjects to make a choice that should resemble its equivalent. One question that any user of a self-selection experiment will want to consider is how blind the subject should be to selection into the treatment. As a general matter, economists and psychologists could not disagree more, with the former blind at and the latter answering “not all” answering with the ads example, to simulate self-selection, an “completely blind.” Staying experimenter might simply give subjects the option of watching a negative campaign ad, a positive campaign ad, or an ad that has no political content. Giving subjects that choice would, however, break with past precedent of disguising the experiment's focus. Insofar as one worries that subjects react to ads differently if they know that the experiment is focused on ads, an option is to alter the self-selection item. Because candidates frequently air their campaign advertisements during the evening news hour, researchers might invite subjects to choose whether or not to watch a newscast. That implementation might mimic accidental self-selection, but it would not account for those who systematically miss real-world advertisements because, when these air, they leave the room, change the channel, or shut off their brains. To that end, the study might also give subjects the ability to fast through video material, change channels, turn the TV off, or walk about. Generally, there will be tradeoffs between alternative
not be self-evident. Although perfect simulation is not necessary to retain internal validity while increasing external validity, how best to simulate selection behavior is not at all self-evident. For the most part, our proposed design avoids one set of potential problems. The condition does not ask subjects to predict future behavior, recall past behavior, or describe hypothetical, counterfactual behavior. Nor does it ask them to justify or explain their choices. Our proposed design avoids errors that might arise from these reflective and simply invites subjects to make a choice that should resemble its equivalent. One question that any user of a self-selection experiment will want to consider is how blind the subject should be to selection into the treatment. As a general matter, economists and psychologists could not disagree more, with the former answering “not blind at all” and the latter answering “completely blind.” Staying with the ads example, to simulate self-selection, an experimenter might simply give subjects the option of watching a negative campaign ad, a positive campaign ad, or an ad that has no political content. Giving subjects that choice would, however, break with past precedent of disguising the experiment's focus. Insofar as one worries that subjects react to ads differently if they know that the experiment is focused on ads, an option is to alter the self-selection item. Because candidates frequently air their campaign advertisements during the evening news hour, researchers might invite subjects to choose whether or not to watch a newscast. That implementation might mimic accidental self-selection, but it would not account for those who systematically miss real-world advertisements because, when these air, they leave the room, change the channel, or shut off their brains. To that end, the study might also give subjects the ability to fast through video material, change channels, turn the TV off, or walk about. Generally, there will be tradeoffs between alternative