Ms. theory, which she expressed at the hearing, seems to be two-fold: Inmates Martin’s and detainees were in she was the Superintendent; therefore, she had Massachusetts’s custody; custody of them. And if she could have custody rescinded, they were in her custody. detainees’ At the hearing, Ms. Martin I looked at custody She did not explain said, “I guess differently.” from what or whom she viewed custody As I explained at the hearing, I must base “differently.” my decision on the law, not on how Ms. Martin views custody. An additional problem exists with Ms. view that being able to have Martin’s detainees’ custody rescinded means they were in her custody: Group 2 is for employees who work with not detainees. prisoners, Ms. Martin distinguished between inmates and detainees, indicating that not everyone inside perimeter was an inmate. (I assume that and are MASAC’s “inmates” “prisoners” synonymous for purposes of this appeal.) Chapter 32 does not G.L. c. 32, § 1. define “prisoner.” And Chapter 123, § 35 does not refer to prisoners or otherwise indicate that committed people are prisoners or inmates. The section uses variations of the and words “commit,” “treat,” but not or a similar word. Even if alcoholics and substance “house,” “imprison,” “incarcerate,” abusers are committed to prisons, the section specifies twice they are to be separated from convicted criminals, indicating that they are not prisoners or inmates. The daily morning meetings that Ms. Martin attended and that are a major basis for her appeal were about detainees, not inmates. Even if Ms. regular and major duties required her to engage in hands-on Martin’s care, custody, instruction, or other supervision of detainees, it would not qualify her for Group 2.
Ms. Martin’s theory, which she expressed at the hearing, seems to be two-fold: Inmates and detainees were in Massachusetts’s custody; she was the Superintendent; therefore, she had custody of them. And if she could have detainees’ custody rescinded, they were in her custody. At the hearing, Ms. Martin said, “I guess I looked at custody differently.” She did not explain from what or whom she viewed custody “differently.” As I explained at the hearing, I must base my decision on the law, not on how Ms. Martin views custody. An additional problem exists with Ms. Martin’s view that being able to have detainees’ custody rescinded means they were in her custody: Group 2 is for employees who work with prisoners, not detainees. Ms. Martin distinguished between inmates and detainees, indicating that not everyone inside MASAC’s perimeter was an inmate. (I assume that “inmates” and “prisoners” are synonymous for purposes of this appeal.) Chapter 32 does not define “prisoner.” G.L. c. 32, § 1. And Chapter 123, § 35 does not refer to prisoners or otherwise indicate that committed people are prisoners or inmates. The section uses variations of the words “commit,” “treat,” and “house,” but not “imprison,” “incarcerate,” or a similar word. Even if alcoholics and substance abusers are committed to prisons, the section specifies twice they are to be separated from convicted criminals, indicating that they are not prisoners or inmates. The daily morning meetings that Ms. Martin attended and that are a major basis for her appeal were about detainees, not inmates. Even if Ms. Martin’s regular and major duties required her to engage in hands-on care, custody, instruction, or other supervision of detainees, it would not qualify her for Group 2.