On 29.9.17 p451 he continued on this theme, calling for the promotion of saving, not amongst the workers, where the War Savings Committee was succeeding in harnessing resources, but amongst well-to-do who were not doing ‘the classes’ like their and wasting money on clothes, Stock Exchange speculation ‘anything duty’ and parties. Too much of the war, HW argued, was being funded by borrowing abroad and machinery of not enough by saving. ‘the credit’, As the war continued, there was a convergence of views between the Economist and the IR that Government policy was not working. On 16.3.18, for instance, The Economist reported (p 462) that the last war bonds campaign had produced week’s £139m. But the Government should go for not ‘real saving’ steadily, ‘explosive The grand promotional campaigns resulted in a outbursts…injunctionary booming.’ response that was saving at just a sort of craze or panic. What HW wanted ’not all’, to see was a change of morale brought about by policy, not by marketing. The IR argued that the German economy was in a state of collapse (see e.g. 29.7.16) and buoyed up only by inflation, but it, too, was losing confidence in the efficacy of WL. On 21.10.16 264-5 borrowing attacked British ‘Our muddlements’ borrowing: WSC, though all the devices known to the advertised ‘by expert publicist’ were and there was the danger of credit leading Britain ‘only feebly popular’ ‘a storm’ to For the IR, the problem was that Britain had started the war ‘financial paralysis.’ unprepared for financial demands: this respect our treasury management ‘in contrasts unfavourably with the German and still more the The British French.’ should have prepared for war with long-term bonds (10-20 years) issued in bulk. The difference between the journals was in the solution they promoted. For the IR, it was crucial to promote mass saving, and this could not be achieved by WSC alone.
On 29.9.17 p451 he continued on this theme, calling for the promotion of saving, not amongst the workers, where the War Savings Committee was succeeding in harnessing resources, but amongst ‘the well-to-do classes’ who were not doing ‘anything like their duty’ and wasting money on clothes, Stock Exchange speculation and parties. Too much of the war, HW argued, was being funded by borrowing abroad and ‘the machinery of credit’, not enough by saving. As the war continued, there was a convergence of views between the Economist and the IR that Government policy was not working. On 16.3.18, for instance, The Economist reported (p 462) that the last week’s war bonds campaign had produced £139m. But the Government should go for ‘real saving’ steadily, not ‘explosive outbursts…injunctionary booming.’ The grand promotional campaigns resulted in a response that was ’not saving at all’, just a sort of craze or panic. What HW wanted to see was a change of morale brought about by policy, not by marketing. The IR argued that the German economy was in a state of collapse (see e.g. 29.7.16) and buoyed up only by inflation, but it, too, was losing confidence in the efficacy of WL. On 21.10.16 264-5 ‘Our borrowing muddlements’ attacked British borrowing: WSC, though advertised ‘by all the devices known to the expert publicist’ were ‘only feebly popular’ and there was the danger of ‘a credit storm’ leading Britain to ‘financial paralysis.’ For the IR, the problem was that Britain had started the war unprepared for financial demands: ‘in this respect our treasury management contrasts unfavourably with the German and still more the French.’ The British should have prepared for war with long-term bonds (10-20 years) issued in bulk. The difference between the journals was in the solution they promoted. For the IR, it was crucial to promote mass saving, and this could not be achieved by WSC alone.