from a physician specializing in family medicine. Accordingly, at the summary-judgment stage, plaintiffs had no statutorily qualified expert who could render an opinion regarding the standard of care applicable to Drs. Mynster and Sehgal…. For these reasons, we reverse the trial court, enter summary judgment in favor of defendants, Drs. Mynster and Sehgal, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.154 Perhaps the result would have been different if the plaintiff ’s expert, who as noted above, was board certified in Internal Medicine, Pulmonary Diseases, Critical Care, and Undersea & Hyperbaric Medicine, had simply declared that Internal Medicine encompassed Family Medicine, and that Critical Care encompassed Emergency Medicine, and thus self-declared that he was also a specialist in both Family Medicine and Emergency Medicine, albeit not board certified in those specialties. In such a case, the fact that the plaintiff ’s expert was credentialed by a hospital to treat the condition at issue would have permitted this expert to testify against the defendants. Indeed, the Nicholas Court explained: The hospital-credentialing provision is not an alternative to the same-specialty requirement; it only comes into play if a physician is board certified in a specialty. Again, only a specialist can testify against a specialist about the treatment of a condition that falls within the specialty area. The hospital-credentialing provision is only a substitute for board certification.155 154. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 487-88 (2013). 155. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 481-83 (2013) (emphasis added). Of course, the prudent malpractice lawyer will strive to avoid such artificial manipulations, and rely upon experts whose credentials match those of the defendants. The Nicholas decision has raised many serious concerns amongst the medical malpractice bar. First, this decision appears to be a
from a physician specializing in family medicine. Accordingly, at the summary-judgment stage, plaintiffs had no statutorily qualified expert who could render an opinion regarding the standard of care applicable to Drs. Mynster and Sehgal…. For these reasons, we reverse the trial court, enter summary judgment in favor of defendants, Drs. Mynster and Sehgal, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.154 Perhaps the result would have been different if the plaintiff ’s expert, who as noted above, was board certified in Internal Medicine, Pulmonary Diseases, Critical Care, and Undersea & Hyperbaric Medicine, had simply declared that Internal Medicine encompassed Family Medicine, and that Critical Care encompassed Emergency Medicine, and thus self-declared that he was also a specialist in both Family Medicine and Emergency Medicine, albeit not board certified in those specialties. In such a case, the fact that the plaintiff ’s expert was credentialed by a hospital to treat the condition at issue would have permitted this expert to testify against the defendants. Indeed, the Nicholas Court explained: The hospital-credentialing provision is not an alternative to the same-specialty requirement; it only comes into play if a physician is board certified in a specialty. Again, only a specialist can testify against a specialist about the treatment of a condition that falls within the specialty area. The hospital-credentialing provision is only a substitute for board certification.155 154. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 487-88 (2013). 155. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 481-83 (2013) (emphasis added). Of course, the prudent malpractice lawyer will strive to avoid such artificial manipulations, and rely upon experts whose credentials match those of the defendants. The Nicholas decision has raised many serious concerns amongst the medical malpractice bar. First, this decision appears to be a