the assignment of politicians to latent segments. We also investigated the consequences of segment membership for career choices. We found that segment membership is politicians’ responsible for large differences in the probability of continuing in office and leaving politics altogether. Equally important, segment membership appears to condition the effects of the electoral environment and of Australian ballot reforms. states’ adoption We believe further progress in understanding political mobility can be made by extending our LSMC model to other offices and other time periods. One limitation of our application of the model to House members serving from 1849 to 1944 is that our estimates of the initial distribution, and transition probabilities, might not be generalizable. Our population of ajk, λj, House members likely does not constitute a random sample of politicians occupying other offices or states, such as governor and state legislator. We hope to add career sequences of other officeholders, including senators, governors, cabinet members, judges and others who did not serve in the House (see Kernell and MacKenzie 2011), and determine whether the political mobility patterns we identify are specific to particular destination offices or suggest more general features of a national structure of political opportunity. References Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldrich and among David W. Rohde. 1987. “Progressive Ambition United States Senators: 1972-1988.” 47: 3-35. Journal of Politics Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in Chicago: University of Chicago Press. America. Andrews, Rick L. and Imran S. of Segment Retention Criteria Currim. 2003. “A Comparison for 40(2): 235-243. Journal of Marketing Research Finite Mixture Logit Models.”
the assignment of politicians to latent segments. We also investigated the consequences of segment membership for politicians’ career choices. We found that segment membership is responsible for large differences in the probability of continuing in office and leaving politics altogether. Equally important, segment membership appears to condition the effects of the electoral environment and states’ adoption of Australian ballot reforms. We believe further progress in understanding political mobility can be made by extending our LSMC model to other offices and other time periods. One limitation of our application of the model to House members serving from 1849 to 1944 is that our estimates of the initial distribution, λj, and transition probabilities, ajk, might not be generalizable. Our population of House members likely does not constitute a random sample of politicians occupying other offices or states, such as governor and state legislator. We hope to add career sequences of other officeholders, including senators, governors, cabinet members, judges and others who did not serve in the House (see Kernell and MacKenzie 2011), and determine whether the political mobility patterns we identify are specific to particular destination offices or suggest more general features of a national structure of political opportunity. References Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde. 1987. “Progressive Ambition among United States Senators: 1972-1988.” Journal of Politics 47: 3-35. Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Andrews, Rick L. and Imran S. Currim. 2003. “A Comparison of Segment Retention Criteria for Finite Mixture Logit Models.” Journal of Marketing Research 40(2): 235-243.