reward management with equity -based compensation, i.e. stock options. #8 Bauman M.P., 2006 Stock option Review of The relation 2,513 firms top 5 Earnings per share is set off Firms that employ higher K.W. Shaw compensation quantitative between stock executives from the years against analyst forecast amounts of stock option and the finance and options employed 1992-2002. (MEET) and if difference is compensation in their top likelihood of accounting in a firm's between 0 and 1 cent per share executive pay schemes more meeting executive pay (SHARE). frequently meet or beat analysts' analysts' plan and the quarterly earnings targets, and quarterly firm's propensity more frequently report small earnings to meet or beat earnings surprises, than firms targets analysts' earnings with lower stock-based forecasts. compensation. #9 Roychowdhury,S. 2006 Earnings Journal for Contributes to the All firms in COMPUSTAT Based on the model of Dechow, The results complement existing management Accounting literature on between 1987 and 2001 normal levels for CFO, literature on earnings through real and earnings that have sufficient data production costs and management. Methods have been activities Economics management by available for the discretionary expenses are developed to detect real activity manipulation presenting calculations needed. Data is attained for each firm. manipulation in large samples. evidence on the analyzed is taken from Deviations from normal levels The paper also detects activity management of annual figures. In total are termed abnormal. These manipulation around earnings operational 17,338 firms year spread firms are stated suspect firms. threshold, particularly the zero activities. Prior over 3,672 firms The three different categories threshold. Furthermore, insights literature focuses are to establish weather or not are given into the factors of more on detecting there in differences in the activity manipulation. abnormal managerial decisions or accruals. operational activities, rather that reported activities.
reward management with equity -based compensation, i.e. stock options. #8 Bauman M.P., K.W. Shaw 2006 Stock option compensation and the likelihood of meeting analysts' quarterly earnings targets Review of quantitative finance and accounting The relation between stock options employed in a firm's executive pay plan and the firm's propensity to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts. 2,513 firms top 5 executives from the years 1992-2002. Earnings per share is set off against analyst forecast (MEET) and if difference is between 0 and 1 cent per share (SHARE). Firms that employ higher amounts of stock option compensation in their top executive pay schemes more frequently meet or beat analysts' quarterly earnings targets, and more frequently report small earnings surprises, than firms with lower stock-based compensation. #9 Roychowdhury,S. 2006 Earnings management through real activities manipulation Journal for Accounting and Economics Contributes to the literature on earnings management by presenting evidence on the management of operational activities. Prior literature focuses more on detecting abnormal accruals. All firms in COMPUSTAT between 1987 and 2001 that have sufficient data available for the calculations needed. Data is analyzed is taken from annual figures. In total 17,338 firms year spread over 3,672 firms Based on the model of Dechow, normal levels for CFO, production costs and discretionary expenses are attained for each firm. Deviations from normal levels are termed abnormal. These firms are stated suspect firms. The three different categories are to establish weather or not there in differences in the managerial decisions or operational activities, rather that reported activities. The results complement existing literature on earnings management. Methods have been developed to detect real activity manipulation in large samples. The paper also detects activity manipulation around earnings threshold, particularly the zero threshold. Furthermore, insights are given into the factors of activity manipulation.