ii. The context of torture With this clarification of torture in mind, let us suppose from here on that survey respondents have been told that the word torture refers to an interrogation technique that will make the victim experience extreme suffering. Assume, in words, that the respondent thinks he/she is being asked about acts that considers torture. The issue to which we now move he/she is how survey results could measure respondents’ actual moral positions with regard to that act. Let us begin with a question that would tell us very much: you approve of torture?” The not “Do problem with this question is that it lacks a context; it does not tell us anything about the circumstances under which torture is to be used. Without such a context without knowing the – reason for the torture there is no actual way for respondents to have a meaningful judgment. – Virtually no one, for instance, would approve of torture to satisfy the sadistic pleasures of interrogators or so we hope. Torture is, after all, a moral wrong. The only issue is whether there – exists a context some countervailing moral consideration(s) that might render that moral – – wrong morally justifiable. In this sense, torture is no different from punishment: everything from spanking to incarceration to execution is a moral wrong in the sense that there needs to be a justification in order to do it. Unlike other acts, such as smiling or greeting someone, a reason is required. What we want to know if we are truly to get a handle on people’s judgments about torture is: What reasons count? What context would make this presumptive moral wrong permissible? In order, therefore, to provide a meaningful measure of people’s acceptance of torture, we need a question in the form of torture be acceptable in the following “Would context…?” In responding, people would in effect be revealing the relative weight they give to the moral wrong of torture and the moral right presented by following context.” It is this “the relative weight that reveals the perceived permissibility of torture.
ii. The context of torture With this clarification of torture in mind, let us suppose from here on that survey respondents have been told that the word torture refers to an interrogation technique that will make the victim experience extreme suffering. Assume, in words, that the respondent thinks he/she is being asked about acts that he/she considers torture. The issue to which we now move is how survey results could measure respondents’ actual moral positions with regard to that act. Let us begin with a question that would not tell us very much: “Do you approve of torture?” The problem with this question is that it lacks a context; it does not tell us anything about the circumstances under which torture is to be used. Without such a context – without knowing the reason for the torture – there is no actual way for respondents to have a meaningful judgment. Virtually no one, for instance, would approve of torture to satisfy the sadistic pleasures of interrogators – or so we hope. Torture is, after all, a moral wrong. The only issue is whether there exists a context – some countervailing moral consideration(s) – that might render that moral wrong morally justifiable. In this sense, torture is no different from punishment: everything from spanking to incarceration to execution is a moral wrong in the sense that there needs to be a justification in order to do it. Unlike other acts, such as smiling or greeting someone, a reason is required. What we want to know if we are truly to get a handle on people’s judgments about torture is: What reasons count? What context would make this presumptive moral wrong permissible? In order, therefore, to provide a meaningful measure of people’s acceptance of torture, we need a question in the form of “Would torture be acceptable in the following context…?” In responding, people would in effect be revealing the relative weight they give to the moral wrong of torture and the moral right presented by “the following context.” It is this relative weight that reveals the perceived permissibility of torture.