explaining how the world works. The letters by Duffield, Farrell, and Price raise four issues about which we do not in fact disagree. One charge is that I regard comparing theories as a game, where there is room for one, and only one, “zero-sum theory that must be declared the and p. 169). However, my argument that cultural theories could ‘best’ ‘prevail’” (Price, supplement realism explicitly acknowledges that both approaches may be of value. A second charge is that I employ a standard in assessing the relative merits of cultural and realist p. 156). In fact, I believe that “double approaches” (Duffield, rival theories should be held to the same standard.3 My preference for realism rests on its ability to outperform cultural theories even in those cases where cultural approaches should be at an advantage. The third charge is that I reject cultural theories because they exhibit various conceptual flaws (e.g., vague definitions of key terms, lack of generalizability, and contradictions within the cultural family of theories) while failing to acknowledge that realist theories display similar weaknesses. I did mention these potential conceptual problems in my article, but I explicitly stated that do not present “they to the development and testing of cultural theories.4 Moreover, I freely acknowledge that realism insurmountable obstacles” too has conceptual problems that I also believe can be surmounted through careful scholarship. A final charge (Farrell, p. 162) is that I advocate single case studies, a position supposedly incompatible with method of assessing rival Imre Lakatos’s research programs through I did not advocate single cases instead of large-n studies but simply “sophisticated falsiacation.”5 argued that when comparing rival theories, scholars must be sure to include cases in which competing theories make distinct predictions. This is a widely accepted principle among methodologists and not at all incompatible with approach.6 Lakatos’s The real issue in this debate is whether culturalism can supplant or merely supplement realism in explaining the real world of international politics. In other words, which approach is most consistent with the typical behavior of states?
explaining how the world works. The letters by Duffield, Farrell, and Price raise four issues about which we do not in fact disagree. One charge is that I regard comparing theories as a “zero-sum game, where there is room for one, and only one, theory that must be declared the ‘best’ and ‘prevail’” (Price, p. 169). However, my argument that cultural theories could supplement realism explicitly acknowledges that both approaches may be of value. A second charge is that I employ a “double standard in assessing the relative merits of cultural and realist approaches” (Duffield, p. 156). In fact, I believe that rival theories should be held to the same standard.3 My preference for realism rests on its ability to outperform cultural theories even in those cases where cultural approaches should be at an advantage. The third charge is that I reject cultural theories because they exhibit various conceptual flaws (e.g., vague definitions of key terms, lack of generalizability, and contradictions within the cultural family of theories) while failing to acknowledge that realist theories display similar weaknesses. I did mention these potential conceptual problems in my article, but I explicitly stated that “they do not present insurmountable obstacles” to the development and testing of cultural theories.4 Moreover, I freely acknowledge that realism too has conceptual problems that I also believe can be surmounted through careful scholarship. A final charge (Farrell, p. 162) is that I advocate single case studies, a position supposedly incompatible with Imre Lakatos’s method of assessing rival research programs through “sophisticated falsiacation.”5 I did not advocate single cases instead of large-n studies but simply argued that when comparing rival theories, scholars must be sure to include cases in which competing theories make distinct predictions. This is a widely accepted principle among methodologists and not at all incompatible with Lakatos’s approach.6 The real issue in this debate is whether culturalism can supplant or merely supplement realism in explaining the real world of international politics. In other words, which approach is most consistent with the typical behavior of states?