natural rights, which limit the actions of (1974, p. 57). This moral individual’s others” space, this sphere of rights, encompasses an body her property, both individual’s and which is why taxation is seen as such an evil it represents a piercing of the sphere of – rights, which is just as reprehensible as if it were an infringement on the body itself. This explains why libertarians endow such strong rights to the ownership of private property: any threat to property threatens the deepest rights of the individual. In order to critique these views I want to make the case that the libertarian conception of the self is deeply problematic. It is empirically unrealistic and normatively suspect. To begin to see why, consider three examples as intuition pumps. (i) Recall of in the wilderness, one bald and Otsuka’s example “two strangers” one of whom will freeze to (2003, p. 18). Notice that hirsute, “each death unless clothed” the example only works in favour of libertarianism if we allow premise that the Otsuka’s two are It is this presumption of atomism that obliterates any sense of strangers. obligation. As soon as we relax this presumption our intuitions change. Imagine that the bald person is actually the father of the hirsute person (and his genes are entirely responsible for her long, thick hair). Imagine that the father was also her teacher, so that she would be physically incapable of weaving hair were it not for him. In this scenario we see that the to weave hair is a direct result of past social facts and weaver’s ability social relations, and therefore it seems obvious that she has some (at least minimal) reciprocal obligations to her father/teacher. What exactly does justice demand in this case? Is the weaver obliged to provide just the minimal amount of clothing to prevent her father from freezing? Is she obliged to provide more than that? It is not clear, because the weaver has rights too, which must somehow be balanced against her obligations.
individual’s natural rights, which limit the actions of others” (1974, p. 57). This moral space, this sphere of rights, encompasses both an individual’s body and her property, which is why taxation is seen as such an evil – it represents a piercing of the sphere of rights, which is just as reprehensible as if it were an infringement on the body itself. This explains why libertarians endow such strong rights to the ownership of private property: any threat to property threatens the deepest rights of the individual. In order to critique these views I want to make the case that the libertarian conception of the self is deeply problematic. It is empirically unrealistic and normatively suspect. To begin to see why, consider three examples as intuition pumps. (i) Recall Otsuka’s example of “two strangers” in the wilderness, one bald and one hirsute, “each of whom will freeze to death unless clothed” (2003, p. 18). Notice that the example only works in favour of libertarianism if we allow Otsuka’s premise that the two are strangers. It is this presumption of atomism that obliterates any sense of obligation. As soon as we relax this presumption our intuitions change. Imagine that the bald person is actually the father of the hirsute person (and his genes are entirely responsible for her long, thick hair). Imagine that the father was also her teacher, so that she would be physically incapable of weaving hair were it not for him. In this scenario we see that the weaver’s ability to weave hair is a direct result of past social facts and social relations, and therefore it seems obvious that she has some (at least minimal) reciprocal obligations to her father/teacher. What exactly does justice demand in this case? Is the weaver obliged to provide just the minimal amount of clothing to prevent her father from freezing? Is she obliged to provide more than that? It is not clear, because the weaver has rights too, which must somehow be balanced against her obligations.