operation of of the State Bar shall be deemed by operation of . . . law to law. “Every member have irrevocably authorized the disclosure to the State Bar and the Supreme Court . . . of any and all financial records held by financial institutions . . . 6069, subd. (a).) Further, the .” (§ Supreme Court has held that section 6069, subdivision (a), complies with constitutional requirements and that State Bar proceedings are not criminal in nature. Therefore, while Kun is entitled to a fair hearing (Dahlman (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1088, 1094-1095), v. State Bar “particular procedural safeguards applicable in criminal and civil litigation are not required in disciplinary proceedings to insure a right to (1980) 28 Cal.3d 465, v. State Bar due process.” (Giovanazzi 472; see also (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12.) Doyle v. State Bar III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Work for Dana LeGrande A. Kun’s After initially consulting with Kun during April of 2014 regarding a separate legal matter, Dana LeGrande subsequently hired him on June 9, 2014, to represent her in obtaining a restraining order against her brother to stop him from making false allegations against her and otherwise harassing her. Kun agreed to represent her for $2,000 in attorney fees and $460 for the filing fee. LeGrande sent Kun a check for $2,460. The memo line of the check contained the and filing Kun did not discuss with her whether he was charging her a notation “retainer fee.” flat fee or an hourly fee. He also did not enter into a written fee agreement, as required under section 6148, telling LeGrande it was not necessary when she asked him if one was required. Kun failed to communicate with LeGrande for a month after she retained him. In late June, she called and left him a message that she no longer wanted him to represent her since she had not heard from him, and asked him to refund her money. During a call with LeGrande on July 7, 2014, Kun persuaded her not to terminate him because he had already prepared a
operation of law. “Every member of the State Bar shall be deemed by operation of . . . law to have irrevocably authorized the disclosure to the State Bar and the Supreme Court . . . of any and all financial records held by financial institutions . . . .” (§ 6069, subd. (a).) Further, the Supreme Court has held that section 6069, subdivision (a), complies with constitutional requirements and that State Bar proceedings are not criminal in nature. Therefore, while Kun is entitled to a fair hearing (Dahlman v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1088, 1094-1095), “particular procedural safeguards applicable in criminal and civil litigation are not required in disciplinary proceedings to insure a right to due process.” (Giovanazzi v. State Bar (1980) 28 Cal.3d 465, 472; see also Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12.) III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Kun’s Work for Dana LeGrande After initially consulting with Kun during April of 2014 regarding a separate legal matter, Dana LeGrande subsequently hired him on June 9, 2014, to represent her in obtaining a restraining order against her brother to stop him from making false allegations against her and otherwise harassing her. Kun agreed to represent her for $2,000 in attorney fees and $460 for the filing fee. LeGrande sent Kun a check for $2,460. The memo line of the check contained the notation “retainer and filing fee.” Kun did not discuss with her whether he was charging her a flat fee or an hourly fee. He also did not enter into a written fee agreement, as required under section 6148, telling LeGrande it was not necessary when she asked him if one was required. Kun failed to communicate with LeGrande for a month after she retained him. In late June, she called and left him a message that she no longer wanted him to represent her since she had not heard from him, and asked him to refund her money. During a call with LeGrande on July 7, 2014, Kun persuaded her not to terminate him because he had already prepared a