successful realisation. As with substantive rationality, value rationality is value-laden and is thus imbued with moral concerns. The third is ‘affectual orientation’ determined by an effects and states of feeling, and fourth is individual’s specific determined by ingrained habituation. These latter two ‘traditional orientation’ orientations are not considered rational as they lie on the borderline, often on the wrong side, of meaningfully action. So from on rationality Weber’s ideas we can identify three specific types: formal; instrumental; and, substantive (equating this with value rationality). Other sociologists have attempted to add other kinds but three rationalities remain dominant. Weber’s Legal Rationality As already observed, law can be considered to be enterprise of subjecting “the human conduct to the governance of or human attempt to establish social rules” “the order as a way of regulating and managing human As such it deals with conflict”. human action and human social action. Nozick states that term something “to rational is to make an evaluation; its reasons are good ones (of a certain sort), and it meets the standards (of a certain sort) that it should Law is built on judgment meet”. rather than chance and thus the evaluation of the legal enterprise must be grounded by practical reason. Academic writers, with the supposed advent of a political, and thus legal, legitimation crisis across the western world, have begun to explore rationality. An important participant in the debate is Professor Roger Brownsword with his use of rationality as an instrument of analysis of contract law under the heads of formal, instrumental and substantive rationality that represent “the standards that we judge that [the law] should meet and the reasons that we count as good where the is society in general. ones”, “we”
successful realisation. As with substantive rationality, value rationality is value-laden and is thus imbued with moral concerns. The third is ‘affectual orientation’ determined by an individual’s specific effects and states of feeling, and fourth is ‘traditional orientation’ determined by ingrained habituation. These latter two orientations are not considered rational as they lie on the borderline, often on the wrong side, of meaningfully action. So from Weber’s ideas on rationality we can identify three specific types: formal; instrumental; and, substantive (equating this with value rationality). Other sociologists have attempted to add other kinds but Weber’s three rationalities remain dominant. Legal Rationality As already observed, law can be considered to be “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules” or “the human attempt to establish social order as a way of regulating and managing human conflict”. As such it deals with human action and human social action. Nozick states that “to term something rational is to make an evaluation; its reasons are good ones (of a certain sort), and it meets the standards (of a certain sort) that it should meet”. Law is built on judgment rather than chance and thus the evaluation of the legal enterprise must be grounded by practical reason. Academic writers, with the supposed advent of a political, and thus legal, legitimation crisis across the western world, have begun to explore rationality. An important participant in the debate is Professor Roger Brownsword with his use of rationality as an instrument of analysis of contract law under the heads of formal, instrumental and substantive rationality that represent “the standards that we judge that [the law] should meet and the reasons that we count as good ones”, where the “we” is society in general.