the Netherlands sooner than he deemed wise. After saving Paris, he spurned crude attempts by the to keep him attached to French interests. In February 1592, following Ligue Villars’ astonishing sortie during the Rouen siege, Parma conducted what he feared was a premature withdrawal from the region because Mayenne insisted. Two months later, he had to forgo what he considered an excellent opportunity to harry the royalist forces, again on account of Mayenne. account of in France derived from his reading of Palma-Cayet Rozée’s Parma’s activities and de Thou. He greatly admired the general. Aware of the delay in arrival in 1590 Parma’s longueur du secours he contrived to paint a positive picture: Philip – ‘la prommis’ – II’s command was Parma moved tost que de ‘promptement executé’; ‘aussy l’esquipage fut Approaching Lagny in September the general showed charisma: l’artillerie prest’. cete ville seroit assize sur la moustache du prince de Bearn, il la prendroit devant ‘quand put lever le bras pour la But Parma also displayed admirable caution the qu’il secourir’. – attack on Lagny was preceded by painstaking preparation and he showed restraint there – – was no need to sack Caudebec (in spring 1592), for it sufficed to send their et ‘vivres to Rouen. Rozée was surely impressed by focus when the general munitions’ Parma’s declared in late summer 1590 estoit inutil de luy proposer aucun traité avec le roy ‘qu’il heretique, estant envoyé dela part du Roy Catholique son Maistre, au secours des catholiques de france, a de et deffence dela religion And l’extirpation l’heresie catholique’. wounded at Caudebec, Parma displayed coup ne luy fit pas seulement courage: ‘[C]e changer de couleur; il ne laissa de continuer son propos jusques a ce que le sang coulant hors la manche de son pourpoint, il ne le put plus celer a ceux qui estoient aupres de luy, le prierent de se lesqu’els retirer’.
the Netherlands sooner than he deemed wise. After saving Paris, he spurned crude attempts by the Ligue to keep him attached to French interests. In February 1592, following Villars’ astonishing sortie during the Rouen siege, Parma conducted what he feared was a premature withdrawal from the region because Mayenne insisted. Two months later, he had to forgo what he considered an excellent opportunity to harry the royalist forces, again on account of Mayenne. Rozée’s account of Parma’s activities in France derived from his reading of Palma-Cayet and de Thou. He greatly admired the general. Aware of the delay in Parma’s arrival in 1590 – ‘la longueur du secours prommis’ – he contrived to paint a positive picture: Philip II’s command was ‘promptement executé’; Parma moved ‘aussy tost que l’esquipage de l’artillerie fut prest’. Approaching Lagny in September the general showed charisma: ‘quand cete ville seroit assize sur la moustache du prince de Bearn, il la prendroit devant qu’il put lever le bras pour la secourir’. But Parma also displayed admirable caution – the attack on Lagny was preceded by painstaking preparation – and he showed restraint – there was no need to sack Caudebec (in spring 1592), for it sufficed to send their ‘vivres et munitions’ to Rouen. Rozée was surely impressed by Parma’s focus when the general declared in late summer 1590 ‘qu’il estoit inutil de luy proposer aucun traité avec le roy heretique, estant envoyé dela part du Roy Catholique son Maistre, au secours des catholiques de france, a l’extirpation de l’heresie et deffence dela religion catholique’. And wounded at Caudebec, Parma displayed courage: ‘[C]e coup ne luy fit pas seulement changer de couleur; il ne laissa de continuer son propos jusques a ce que le sang coulant hors la manche de son pourpoint, il ne le put plus celer a ceux qui estoient aupres de luy, lesqu’els le prierent de se retirer’.