observations into transitions that result in continuing in an office, moves to the private sector and moves to other offices. For the latter, we distinguish between upward moves (e.g., state legislature to House) and those that suggest downward mobility (e.g., high state to state administrative). We analyze choices using a discrete time competing risks hazard politicians’ model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). In addition to segment membership, we examine the effects of electoral, institutional and personal attributes that previous studies suggest might influence choices. Given the diversity of offices we examine, we focus on broad members’ aspects of the electoral and institutional environment as well as personal characteristics that vary over the course of a career. One contribution of event history analyses of congressional career choices is the attention they give to choices are conditional on surviving long enough duration dependence. Politicians’ in an office to make a choice at time t. We account for duration dependence in our hazard model by counting the number of consecutive two-year intervals a politician has occupied a state at time t and taking its log transformation (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). In general, we expect duration to decrease the probability of continuing while increasing the likelihood of moving up and, perhaps, opting for private-sector activity. We are also interested in examining whether sensitivity to time spent in an office depends on segment membership. members’ Previous research demonstrates that electoral vulnerability is a major factor dictating the retirement decisions of members of Congress (Kiewiet and Zeng 1993; Brady et al. 1999; Fukumoto 2009) as well as the entry decisions of challengers (Jacobson and Kernell 1981; Carson and Roberts 2005). We believe that a favorable electoral environment is conducive to political career development more generally. Politicians who enjoy large partisan advantages typically have more opportunities to serve and can remain longer in public offices. These
observations into transitions that result in continuing in an office, moves to the private sector and moves to other offices. For the latter, we distinguish between upward moves (e.g., state legislature to House) and those that suggest downward mobility (e.g., high state to state administrative). We analyze politicians’ choices using a discrete time competing risks hazard model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). In addition to segment membership, we examine the effects of electoral, institutional and personal attributes that previous studies suggest might influence members’ choices. Given the diversity of offices we examine, we focus on broad aspects of the electoral and institutional environment as well as personal characteristics that vary over the course of a career. One contribution of event history analyses of congressional career choices is the attention they give to duration dependence. Politicians’ choices are conditional on surviving long enough in an office to make a choice at time t. We account for duration dependence in our hazard model by counting the number of consecutive two-year intervals a politician has occupied a state at time t and taking its log transformation (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). In general, we expect duration to decrease the probability of continuing while increasing the likelihood of moving up and, perhaps, opting for private-sector activity. We are also interested in examining whether members’ sensitivity to time spent in an office depends on segment membership. Previous research demonstrates that electoral vulnerability is a major factor dictating the retirement decisions of members of Congress (Kiewiet and Zeng 1993; Brady et al. 1999; Fukumoto 2009) as well as the entry decisions of challengers (Jacobson and Kernell 1981; Carson and Roberts 2005). We believe that a favorable electoral environment is conducive to political career development more generally. Politicians who enjoy large partisan advantages typically have more opportunities to serve and can remain longer in public offices. These