still interested in the value produced by a colony like Haiti, still competing with Great Britain, still willing (often extremely willing) to maintain slavery. We see here the complicated dynamic between false (and idolatrous) liberal derived notions of universal and natural rights on the one hand and the slaves’ engagement with those ideals for purposes that are diametrically opposed to such intentions. In his own analysis of the Haitian revolution, Illan rua Wall offers us a critical insight into how, not only leaders like Toussaint Louverture, but the Haitian slaves in general, received the complicated legacy of the French revolution. Wall writes: [The Haitian slaves] (mis)understood the meaning of the idealistic phrases [such as the It was a misunderstanding, Declaration of the Rights of Man and Ctiizen]. of course, because the ideals of the revolution were hardly meant to apply to women and Jews, let alone slaves! However, the slaves that they were to be knew excluded from these declarations; theirs was not a mistake of ignorance. Thus, when they took up the words, they did so out of a of purposive misunderstanding the implicit logic and therefore they do not represent some sort of on tabula rasa which the enlightenment norms were projected, but rather active, thinking subjects who with its own norms. resisted ‘enlightenment’ In his notion of Wall offers us a helpful way to think misunderstanding,” “purposive about the functioning and importance of the Haitian revolution. The term, in its very apparent self-contradiction, suggests the kinds of engagement with phantasm that can escape totalization. In a sense, we the nature of such false always “misunderstand” promises; our understanding of truths that seem to present themselves as natural and unavoidable are always suspect, always a Yet to speak of “miss.” “purposive” misunderstanding suggests something different, a way to engage with phantasm that does not lead to just more of the same. Here, we must be careful because one could easily think that by being one is in control of an engagement with a political form of fetishism that “purposive”
still interested in the value produced by a colony like Haiti, still competing with Great Britain, still willing (often extremely willing) to maintain slavery. We see here the complicated dynamic between false (and idolatrous) liberal derived notions of universal and natural rights on the one hand and the slaves’ engagement with those ideals for purposes that are diametrically opposed to such intentions. In his own analysis of the Haitian revolution, Illan rua Wall offers us a critical insight into how, not only leaders like Toussaint Louverture, but the Haitian slaves in general, received the complicated legacy of the French revolution. Wall writes: [The Haitian slaves] (mis)understood the meaning of the idealistic phrases [such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Ctiizen]. It was a misunderstanding, of course, because the ideals of the revolution were hardly meant to apply to women and Jews, let alone slaves! However, the slaves knew that they were to be excluded from these declarations; theirs was not a mistake of ignorance. Thus, when they took up the words, they did so out of a purposive misunderstanding of the implicit logic and therefore they do not represent some sort of tabula rasa on which the enlightenment norms were projected, but rather active, thinking subjects who resisted ‘enlightenment’ with its own norms. In his notion of “purposive misunderstanding,” Wall offers us a helpful way to think about the functioning and importance of the Haitian revolution. The term, in its very apparent self-contradiction, suggests the kinds of engagement with phantasm that can escape totalization. In a sense, we always “misunderstand” the nature of such false promises; our understanding of truths that seem to present themselves as natural and unavoidable are always suspect, always a “miss.” Yet to speak of “purposive” misunderstanding suggests something different, a way to engage with phantasm that does not lead to just more of the same. Here, we must be careful because one could easily think that by being “purposive” one is in control of an engagement with a political form of fetishism that