duplicate their resources and mandates, and the EU should be given autonomy with regards to conducing autonomous operations (BMVg 2006, 48-51). is therefore our “It duty and our the government charges preserve the unique quality of mission”, “to transatlantic relations, to strengthen our ties and our exchanges and to continue to develop the partnership with the United States by performing our tasks responsibly” (BMVg 2011, 7). Above all, however, for Germany, relations play a “Franco-German pivotal role owing to their special nature, underlined in the Élysée Treaty, and their unique (BMVg 2011, 8). To put it succinctly, for Germany alignment with the closeness” West, reconciliation, European integration and effective multilateralism are the essential framework for the pursuit of its values and interests. The UK, on the other hand, as Paul Cornish notes, are by a singular “driven determination to remain involved in international (Cornish 2013, 372). They also affairs” underline their special relationship with the United States, which is above and beyond that with the EU, NATO, and the UN (in that order) (Cabinet Office 2010, 4). Above all, NATO is paramount in the strategic thinking because it provides collective security UK’s a basis for territorial defence of the UK, and stability of our European neighbourhood “as (SDSR 2010, 12). In contrast, the EU is only relevant in UK thinking in so far as it promotes security and prosperity (not defence). 4. Inferences and Conclusions Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, analysts questioned the pervasiveness of shared and deep-seated transatlantic norms, beliefs and ideas about the means and ends of national security policy (Heiselberg 2003; Longhurst and Zaborowski 2005; Rynning 2003). They argued that the growing strategic
duplicate their resources and mandates, and the EU should be given autonomy with regards to conducing autonomous operations (BMVg 2006, 48-51). “It is therefore our duty and our mission”, the government charges “to preserve the unique quality of transatlantic relations, to strengthen our ties and our exchanges and to continue to develop the partnership with the United States by performing our tasks responsibly” (BMVg 2011, 7). Above all, however, for Germany, “Franco-German relations play a pivotal role owing to their special nature, underlined in the Élysée Treaty, and their unique closeness” (BMVg 2011, 8). To put it succinctly, for Germany alignment with the West, reconciliation, European integration and effective multilateralism are the essential framework for the pursuit of its values and interests. The UK, on the other hand, as Paul Cornish notes, are “driven by a singular determination to remain involved in international affairs” (Cornish 2013, 372). They also underline their special relationship with the United States, which is above and beyond that with the EU, NATO, and the UN (in that order) (Cabinet Office 2010, 4). Above all, NATO is paramount in the UK’s strategic thinking because it provides collective security “as a basis for territorial defence of the UK, and stability of our European neighbourhood (SDSR 2010, 12). In contrast, the EU is only relevant in UK thinking in so far as it promotes security and prosperity (not defence). 4. Inferences and Conclusions Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, analysts questioned the pervasiveness of shared and deep-seated transatlantic norms, beliefs and ideas about the means and ends of national security policy (Heiselberg 2003; Longhurst and Zaborowski 2005; Rynning 2003). They argued that the growing strategic