Liberal egalitarianism The first principle of justice according to liberal egalitarianism is that everyone is entitled to a full set of basic liberties. According to Rawls, social and economic inequalities are justifiable in some circumstances and not in others. First, Rawls argues that all parts of society there are to be roughly the same prospects of ‘in culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed’ (Rawls, 2001, p. 44). This is a strong statement of non-discrimination, including on grounds of gender, ethnicity, sexual identity and so on. Secondly, any inequalities must benefit of the least advantaged members of society. This formulation, known as the ‘difference principle’ reflects the idea that some degree of inequality may be necessary in order to incentivise people to be productive, thereby increasing the size of the cake overall and, potentially, increasing the size of the slice allocated to the least well-off members of society. One of the distinctive features of Rawls’ approach is that the difference principle applies to what he calls goods’ things such as income and wealth that are ‘primary – generally useful for people in pursuing their goals, whatever those goals may be. Rawls argues that evaluation of equality and inequality should focus on these means (resources, or inputs) available to people to achieve desirable ends rather than on the ends themselves, because people have diverse goals and the state should not prescribe a particular vision of good life’. However, critics of ‘the egalitarianism have focused on the choice of primary goods as the currency of justice. Sen (1999), for example, argues that relying on primary goods overlooks the diverse rates at which people can convert them into real opportunities. He reminds us, for example, that a disabled person may need more or different resources to achieve the same standard of living as a non-disabled person. 3.2 Capability In our view, the most compelling theoretical underpinning for equality and rights monitoring is provided by Sen’s capability approach (Sen, 1985, 1993, 1999, 2009). The capability approach has been a major theoretical influence on the development of new indicator-based monitoring exercises, such as the UNDP’s Human Development Index, the Millenium Development Goals and the OECD’s Better Life Index, and it has formed the basis of our previous equality and children’s measurement frameworks.
Liberal egalitarianism The first principle of justice according to liberal egalitarianism is that everyone is entitled to a full set of basic liberties. According to Rawls, social and economic inequalities are justifiable in some circumstances and not in others. First, Rawls argues that ‘in all parts of society there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed’ (Rawls, 2001, p. 44). This is a strong statement of non-discrimination, including on grounds of gender, ethnicity, sexual identity and so on. Secondly, any inequalities must benefit of the least advantaged members of society. This formulation, known as the ‘difference principle’ reflects the idea that some degree of inequality may be necessary in order to incentivise people to be productive, thereby increasing the size of the cake overall and, potentially, increasing the size of the slice allocated to the least well-off members of society. One of the distinctive features of Rawls’ approach is that the difference principle applies to what he calls ‘primary goods’ – things such as income and wealth that are generally useful for people in pursuing their goals, whatever those goals may be. Rawls argues that evaluation of equality and inequality should focus on these means (resources, or inputs) available to people to achieve desirable ends rather than on the ends themselves, because people have diverse goals and the state should not prescribe a particular vision of ‘the good life’. However, critics of egalitarianism have focused on the choice of primary goods as the currency of justice. Sen (1999), for example, argues that relying on primary goods overlooks the diverse rates at which people can convert them into real opportunities. He reminds us, for example, that a disabled person may need more or different resources to achieve the same standard of living as a non-disabled person. 3.2 Capability In our view, the most compelling theoretical underpinning for equality and rights monitoring is provided by Sen’s capability approach (Sen, 1985, 1993, 1999, 2009). The capability approach has been a major theoretical influence on the development of new indicator-based monitoring exercises, such as the UNDP’s Human Development Index, the Millenium Development Goals and the OECD’s Better Life Index, and it has formed the basis of our previous equality and children’s measurement frameworks.