Corporate the governance structure investigation has the characteristics governance such as the Characteristics, of the firm, and its been gathered of the governance proportion of independents governance rules disclosure policy. from a sample structure of the on the board, the and the extent of (117) of Spanish firm. The used appointment of an audit voluntary firms listed on the ANOVA and committee, and directors’ disclosure in Madrid Stock Kruskall-Wallis to shareholdings and stock Spain Exchange test their option plans, are positively expectations. related to voluntary disclosure. We have also observed that these governance practices are significantly influenced by cross-listings and by the ownership structure of the firm (Leung & To examine if there is a 376Hong Kong The study uses They find that high Horwitz, 2004) relationship between Listed companies voluntary (concentrated) board disclosures above a for 1996 after segment disclosure ownership explains the extent Director certain benchmark to the exclusion of above the of low voluntary segment Ownership and ownership structure of companies that benchmark disclosure and this negative Voluntary corporate boards. did not disclose minimum as a relationship is stronger when Segment segment proxy for firm performance is very poor Disclosure: Hong information or transparency and and the contribution of Kong Evidence had missing data. examines its directors to enhance relationship to the voluntary segment disclosure ownership structure is effective for firms with low and composition of director ownership but not corporate boards for concentrated-ownership in Hong Kong firms. (Eng & Mak, This paper examines the The sample is They regress the The results show that 2003) impact of ownership drawn from firms disclosure score on ownership structure and structure and board listed on the Stock ownership variables board composition affect Corporate composition on Exchange and board disclosure. We find that lower governance and voluntary disclosure of Singapore composition managerial ownership and voluntary (SES) as at the after controlling for significant government disclosure end of 1995. The debt, firm size, ownership are associated total sample growth with increased disclosure. contained 158 opportunities, Block holder ownership is not firms with industry, analyst related to disclosure. An complete data for following, auditor increase in outside directors analysis that reputation, reduces corporate disclosure. covered all the profitability and They also find that larger nine industry stock performance. firms and firms with lower sectors. debt had greater disclosure.
Corporate Characteristics, governance rules and the extent of voluntary disclosure in Spain the governance structure of the firm, and its disclosure policy. investigation has been gathered from a sample (117) of Spanish firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange the characteristics of the governance structure of the firm. The used ANOVA and Kruskall-Wallis to test their expectations. governance such as the proportion of independents on the board, the appointment of an audit committee, and directors’ shareholdings and stock option plans, are positively related to voluntary disclosure. We have also observed that these governance practices are significantly influenced by cross-listings and by the ownership structure of the firm (Leung & Horwitz, 2004) Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence To examine if there is a relationship between disclosures above a certain benchmark to the ownership structure of corporate boards. 376Hong Kong Listed companies for 1996 after exclusion of companies that did not disclose segment information or had missing data. The study uses voluntary segment disclosure above the benchmark minimum as a proxy for transparency and examines its relationship to the ownership structure and composition of corporate boards in Hong Kong They find that high (concentrated) board ownership explains the extent of low voluntary segment disclosure and this negative relationship is stronger when firm performance is very poor and the contribution of directors to enhance voluntary segment disclosure is effective for firms with low director ownership but not for concentrated-ownership firms. (Eng & Mak, 2003) Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and board composition on voluntary disclosure The sample is drawn from firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) as at the end of 1995. The total sample contained 158 firms with complete data for analysis that covered all the nine industry sectors. They regress the disclosure score on ownership variables and board composition after controlling for debt, firm size, growth opportunities, industry, analyst following, auditor reputation, profitability and stock performance. The results show that ownership structure and board composition affect disclosure. We find that lower managerial ownership and significant government ownership are associated with increased disclosure. Block holder ownership is not related to disclosure. An increase in outside directors reduces corporate disclosure. They also find that larger firms and firms with lower debt had greater disclosure.