See BACKGROUND OF LIBERALIZATION AND EXPERIENCES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN REGION (Presented by LACAC states : Argentina, Aruba, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) LACAC fosters this type of processes by promoting harmonization and coordination, permitting the amalgamation of policies and the development of air transport, in such a way that it will not only respond to the interests of developed countries but mainly to those of less developed nations. POINT 1.5.2. p. 10 OSA with US : Chile, Peru, Argentina and Brazil. OSA between Latin American states, i.e. Argentina-Uruguay The Latin America Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC) has a model clause designed to prevent unlawful and anti-competitive behaviour by airlines, which it recommends that its member States introduce in liberal air services agreements. See: LACAC Rec. A13-3 - Draft model clause to avoid unlawful competition Practices, Presentations and conclusions of the Seminar on the Liberalization of Air Transport (Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 1-3 October 2002) ATRP/10 - Report of the tenth meeting of the Air Transport Regulation Panel (Montreal, 13 - 17 May 2002) – the published text of the draft model clause is not yet available in English. OECD Document - Latin American Competition Forum – Competition issues in air transport p.5 . Emerging consensus on best practices in competition law enforcement and in applying competition policy principles to regulatory systems. Countries now co-operate regularly in such areas as anti-cartel enforcement and international mergers. Government behavior, including state aid, the granting of antitrust immunity, airline taxation, and foreign ownership and control limitations may also affect airline competition, but such behavior is connected with the broader subject of trade policy and economic regulation. This paper argues that state assistance to airlines, whether direct or indirect may be deemed to distort the market and to be detrimental to airlines and users. Likewise, arguments can be made for the reduction of limitations on foreign ownership of airlines as air transport development should be determined by economic and technical considerations and not by questions of national pride and national ownership. Point 63 (p.15) For the present purpose, the following distinction is made with regard to airline behaviour:
See BACKGROUND OF LIBERALIZATION AND EXPERIENCES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN REGION (Presented by LACAC states : Argentina, Aruba, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) LACAC fosters this type of processes by promoting harmonization and coordination, permitting the amalgamation of policies and the development of air transport, in such a way that it will not only respond to the interests of developed countries but mainly to those of less developed nations. POINT 1.5.2. p. 10 OSA with US : Chile, Peru, Argentina and Brazil. OSA between Latin American states, i.e. Argentina-Uruguay The Latin America Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC) has a model clause designed to prevent unlawful and anti-competitive behaviour by airlines, which it recommends that its member States introduce in liberal air services agreements. See: LACAC Rec. A13-3 - Draft model clause to avoid unlawful competition Practices, Presentations and conclusions of the Seminar on the Liberalization of Air Transport (Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 1-3 October 2002) ATRP/10 - Report of the tenth meeting of the Air Transport Regulation Panel (Montreal, 13 - 17 May 2002) – the published text of the draft model clause is not yet available in English. OECD Document - Latin American Competition Forum – Competition issues in air transport p.5 . Emerging consensus on best practices in competition law enforcement and in applying competition policy principles to regulatory systems. Countries now co-operate regularly in such areas as anti-cartel enforcement and international mergers. Government behavior, including state aid, the granting of antitrust immunity, airline taxation, and foreign ownership and control limitations may also affect airline competition, but such behavior is connected with the broader subject of trade policy and economic regulation. This paper argues that state assistance to airlines, whether direct or indirect may be deemed to distort the market and to be detrimental to airlines and users. Likewise, arguments can be made for the reduction of limitations on foreign ownership of airlines as air transport development should be determined by economic and technical considerations and not by questions of national pride and national ownership. Point 63 (p.15) For the present purpose, the following distinction is made with regard to airline behaviour: