Philosophy, Phenomenology and Heidegger I propose philosophy and specifically phenomenology, not only as a relevant approach to understanding truth in the context of this research, but as an inherent part of the choreographic practice itself. Conversely the practice is an intrinsic part of the way in which I am thinking phenomenology. This is a point I expand on through an in depth discussion in Chapter Three, however I want to briefly outline some of the key thoughts here in order to provide a rationale for choosing phenomenology as a methodology. There are essential links between the practice of philosophy and theatre in relation to some of their key purposes and methods. Both theatre and philosophy are concerned with ways in which humans are in the world and both aim to reveal something beyond what we understand as apparent external appearances. This is a point supported by David Krasner and David Saltz who see philosophy and theatre as (2006, p.2). This is in part, is due to what “natural allies” they describe within theatre and philosophy as methods that on thought, “shed light behaviour and existence while simultaneously enhancing our comprehension of the world and (p.3). Aldo Tassi sees philosophy and theatre as activities ourselves” “in which we might how things come to be and significantly for this research ‘see’ describes theatre and philosophy as a way to us in the pursuit of truth as an “involve unconcealment 1998, cited in Krasner and Saltz, 2006, p.3). process” (Tassi, point is one that clearly resonates with Heideggerian phenomenology as well Tassi’s a fundamental aspect of this research. There are key similarities between features of Heideggerian phenomenology and approach to acting. One Stanislavski’s significant connection is between concept of truth as unconcealment Heidegger’s and process of truth as experiencing. This is a point which I come to Stanislavski’s explain extensively and return to repeatedly throughout the thesis, as well as give examples of from my own practice. Both are processual accounts of truth and both
Philosophy, Phenomenology and Heidegger I propose philosophy and specifically phenomenology, not only as a relevant approach to understanding truth in the context of this research, but as an inherent part of the choreographic practice itself. Conversely the practice is an intrinsic part of the way in which I am thinking phenomenology. This is a point I expand on through an in depth discussion in Chapter Three, however I want to briefly outline some of the key thoughts here in order to provide a rationale for choosing phenomenology as a methodology. There are essential links between the practice of philosophy and theatre in relation to some of their key purposes and methods. Both theatre and philosophy are concerned with ways in which humans are in the world and both aim to reveal something beyond what we understand as apparent external appearances. This is a point supported by David Krasner and David Saltz who see philosophy and theatre as “natural allies” (2006, p.2). This is in part, is due to what they describe within theatre and philosophy as methods that “shed light on thought, behaviour and existence while simultaneously enhancing our comprehension of the world and ourselves” (p.3). Aldo Tassi sees philosophy and theatre as activities “in which we might ‘see’ how things come to be and significantly for this research describes theatre and philosophy as a way to “involve us in the pursuit of truth as an unconcealment process” (Tassi, 1998, cited in Krasner and Saltz, 2006, p.3). Tassi’s point is one that clearly resonates with Heideggerian phenomenology as well a fundamental aspect of this research. There are key similarities between features of Heideggerian phenomenology and Stanislavski’s approach to acting. One significant connection is between Heidegger’s concept of truth as unconcealment and Stanislavski’s process of truth as experiencing. This is a point which I come to explain extensively and return to repeatedly throughout the thesis, as well as give examples of from my own practice. Both are processual accounts of truth and both