SEVENTH LESSON THE COGITO (3) THE REASONABLE ANIMAL Thus the questions set off again, after the Cogito, identical in degree to those that were before it. then did I believe I was before? Without difficulty, I thought that I “What was a man. But what is a man? Would I say a reasonable animal? he’s Certainly not: for it would be afterwards necessary to seek out what an animal is and what is reasonable [...]” The definition of man as as classic as it may be, is rejected by reasonable animal, Descartes as non-primitive. tone, disdain, severity, are worth noting here; for Descartes’ the definition of man belongs to Aristotle and to all of scholasticism, “reasonable animal” and also, in the end, that of Plato and the whole tradition. Why does he call an it’s “abusive the most venerable definition of man in the whole tradition? Why refuse to subtlety” such that, on the one hand, he manifestly belongs to the determine man in his complexity, animal kingdom, as scientific evidence shows me, and on the other hand, such that, to this fundamental animality is added something essentially different which makes, in spite of this difference, a unity with the rest, that is: reason. It seems, on the contrary, that the duality that there is between the terms “animal” and may be a sort of dialectical spring already sprung [deja that is going to tendu] “reason” give an account of all the richness of human behaviors. One can thus supply many words of wisdom showing that it is always necessary to take into account human weakness [On that is to say, its rootedness in animality, but also peut ainsi alimenter bien des sagesses...], its vocation for thought, and try to account for this in a Pascalian style: “disproportion” monster, therefore, is “What man?” But Descartes refuses. Descartes is the most abstinent philosopher there is: he refuses to use all the resources that such a formula holds within it [porte en elle-même]. And if he refuses, it is because he thinks the road of thought is How is that? wholly other. What allows him to say that? It is not a question, however, of denying what it is customary
SEVENTH LESSON THE COGITO (3) THE REASONABLE ANIMAL Thus the questions set off again, after the Cogito, identical in degree to those that were before it. “What then did I believe I was before? Without difficulty, I thought that I was a man. But what is a man? Would I say he’s a reasonable animal? Certainly not: for it would be afterwards necessary to seek out what an animal is and what is reasonable [...]” The definition of man as reasonable animal, as classic as it may be, is rejected by Descartes as non-primitive. Descartes’ tone, disdain, severity, are worth noting here; for the “reasonable animal” definition of man belongs to Aristotle and to all of scholasticism, and it’s also, in the end, that of Plato and the whole tradition. Why does he call an “abusive subtlety” the most venerable definition of man in the whole tradition? Why refuse to determine man in his complexity, such that, on the one hand, he manifestly belongs to the animal kingdom, as scientific evidence shows me, and on the other hand, such that, to this fundamental animality is added something essentially different which makes, in spite of this difference, a unity with the rest, that is: reason. It seems, on the contrary, that the duality that there is between the terms “animal” and “reason” may be a sort of dialectical spring already sprung [deja tendu] that is going to give an account of all the richness of human behaviors. One can thus supply many words of wisdom showing that it is always necessary to take into account human weakness [On peut ainsi alimenter bien des sagesses...], that is to say, its rootedness in animality, but also its vocation for thought, and try to account for this “disproportion” in a Pascalian style: “What monster, therefore, is man?” But Descartes refuses. Descartes is the most abstinent philosopher there is: he refuses to use all the resources that such a formula holds within it [porte en elle-même]. And if he refuses, it is because he thinks the road of thought is wholly other. How is that? What allows him to say that? It is not a question, however, of denying what it is customary