association based on from one based on sovereignty (lordship or solidarity (‘fellowship’) legal theory has since fallen into disrepute not least because of the Herrschaft). Gierke’s difficulty of making sense of his idea of and, in particular, of separating it ‘group personality’, from the conception of person, both real and fictional, received from Roman law. Strictly speaking, this [Gesamtpersönlichkeit or is best Gemeinwesen] ‘group personality’ understood as the group as such should be addressed always and only in the ‘im-personal’: ‘third and never as another or as a The reason is that the group, as a person’ ‘I’ ‘Thou’. cannot be represented by one person, contrary to what happens with the idea of a corporate personality. This body without or a without ‘social corporation’ ‘community society’ should not be considered an immaturecollection of individuals, who is only thanks to its ‘alive’ representative or but as a social group that makes use of reason in common (a ‘head’ ‘guardian’, truly use of reason). ‘public’ The great advantage of this idea of the real personality of the group is that it requires no in order to bring it into existence. In a trust it is the concession by a sovereign forms of exhibited by these fellowships that generate the of its members. These rights and duties rights and duties are, strictly speaking, they designate the space of neither private nor public: what today Negri, Agamben and Esposito call the common. In the common, rights and duties are neither nor are they held the product of positive state legislation individually in the state of Phrased affirmatively, in the common, rights are not protections or immunities of the nature. individual against the common, but exist strictly in a context. Rights exist as the result of federal the power acquired by individuals in and through their alliances (foedera), which, in turn, are generated only thanks to the in the common form of life. Conversely, individual’s participation duties towards the common do not weaken the self-identity (and hence do not need individual’s to be coerced out of him or her through the threat of punishment, as occurs in corporations) but rather empower the differentiation or distinction. With this federalist conception of individual’s
association based on solidarity (‘fellowship’) from one based on sovereignty (lordship or Herrschaft). Gierke’s legal theory has since fallen into disrepute not least because of the difficulty of making sense of his idea of ‘group personality’, and, in particular, of separating it from the conception of person, both real and fictional, received from Roman law. Strictly speaking, this ‘group personality’ [Gesamtpersönlichkeit or Gemeinwesen] is best understood as ‘im-personal’: the group as such should be addressed always and only in the ‘third person’ and never as another ‘I’ or as a ‘Thou’. The reason is that the group, as a cannot be represented by one person, contrary to what happens with the idea of a corporate personality. This ‘social body without corporation’ or a ‘community without society’ should not be considered an immaturecollection of individuals, who is ‘alive’ only thanks to its representative ‘head’ or ‘guardian’, but as a social group that makes use of reason in common (a truly ‘public’ use of reason). The great advantage of this idea of the real personality of the group is that it requires no concession by a sovereign in order to bring it into existence. In a trust it is the forms of exhibited by these fellowships that generate the rights and duties of its members. These rights and duties are, strictly speaking, neither private nor public: they designate the space of what today Negri, Agamben and Esposito call the common. In the common, rights and duties are neither the product of positive state legislation nor are they held individually in the state of nature. Phrased affirmatively, in the common, rights are not protections or immunities of the individual against the common, but exist strictly in a federal context. Rights exist as the result of the power acquired by individuals in and through their alliances (foedera), which, in turn, are generated only thanks to the individual’s participation in the common form of life. Conversely, duties towards the common do not weaken the individual’s self-identity (and hence do not need to be coerced out of him or her through the threat of punishment, as occurs in corporations) but rather empower the individual’s differentiation or distinction. With this federalist conception of