and well recognised principles accepted in a civilized society governed by the rule of law. If judicial bias or partiality is to be readily inferred, it opens the door to all manner of flimsy and bogus objections being raised to try and influence the judicial process by shopping around for the so-called correct judge in effect litigants or those with – causes before the Court seeking to decide who should sit in judgment over them.’ It was submitted that the court a quo correctly applied the test of recusal and that the appeal be removed from the roll. In view of the authorities referred to above propounding the view that it is rare to successfully raise the exceptio recusationis as a result of the conduct of a presiding officer during trial proceedings, this view appears to me to be the general rule, and does not exclude the possibility of exceptions. In my view, the facts in the Munuma matter is an example of such an exception. In that matter the appellants who had been arraigned on several charges including high treason applied for the presiding judge to recuse himself but he refused to do so. During the trial the appellants unsuccessfully challenged the jurisdiction of the court to hear the matter. In dismissing alibi defences raised by the appellants the judge a quo made certain credibility findings against some of the appellants. The appellants were at the conclusion of the trial convicted and sentenced. The question on appeal was whether the fact that the judge had a quo refused to recuse himself had resulted in an irregularity so gross that it would vitiate the proceedings.
and well recognised principles accepted in a civilized society governed by the rule of law. If judicial bias or partiality is to be readily inferred, it opens the door to all manner of flimsy and bogus objections being raised to try and influence the judicial process by shopping around for the so-called correct judge – in effect litigants or those with causes before the Court seeking to decide who should sit in judgment over them.’ It was submitted that the court a quo correctly applied the test of recusal and that the appeal be removed from the roll. In view of the authorities referred to above propounding the view that it is rare to successfully raise the exceptio recusationis as a result of the conduct of a presiding officer during trial proceedings, this view appears to me to be the general rule, and does not exclude the possibility of exceptions. In my view, the facts in the Munuma matter is an example of such an exception. In that matter the appellants who had been arraigned on several charges including high treason applied for the presiding judge to recuse himself but he refused to do so. During the trial the appellants unsuccessfully challenged the jurisdiction of the court to hear the matter. In dismissing alibi defences raised by the appellants the judge a quo made certain credibility findings against some of the appellants. The appellants were at the conclusion of the trial convicted and sentenced. The question on appeal was whether the fact that the judge a quo had refused to recuse himself had resulted in an irregularity so gross that it would vitiate the proceedings.