Thus the that Rozée remembered numbered more than sixteen, and any conseil de la Ligue confusion about this had arisen from the existence at the same time of sixteen informers – one for each At least some of these informers had been operating covertly since quartier. 1585. Probably in January 1589 their activities became overt. It is likely that these men were not just informers but were also pro-active on behalf of the in the and Ligue quartiers, that the perceived them as supplementing the work of the the conseil quarteniers, traditional local leaders. If the felt undermined by the in the they must also quarteniers Ligue’s quartiers, key men have been dismayed by suggested by the that each district should Aumale’s decision, Seize, also have a These local cells were intended to supervise, possibly even to conseil des neuf. supersede, the though that they had the opportunity to quarteniers, Salmon’s suggestion build up electoral support for the is open to question, being dependent upon the Seize number of places in the that they might have been allocated, had they Bureau de la Ville survived. Made up of the were given quelques notables bourgeois, conseils des neuf responsibilities. They were also tasked with handling any disputes in their those they could not settle were to be passed on to the a procedure that quartier; échevins – would undermine the role of the Parlement. By early 1589 the new were in place, conseils but they were destined not to last, for before long they were being infiltrated by Politiques – the very rivals whose influence their existence was presumably supposed to minimise. The unpopularity in Paris increased markedly after the murders of the Guise king’s brothers, and during the seven weeks before Mayenne arrived the ruled without check Seize to their power. The tone was confident and authoritative, their business forged in regular
Thus the conseil de la Ligue that Rozée remembered numbered more than sixteen, and any confusion about this had arisen from the existence at the same time of sixteen informers – one for each quartier. At least some of these informers had been operating covertly since 1585. Probably in January 1589 their activities became overt. It is likely that these men were not just informers but were also pro-active on behalf of the Ligue in the quartiers, and that the conseil perceived them as supplementing the work of the quarteniers, the traditional local leaders. If the quarteniers felt undermined by the Ligue’s key men in the quartiers, they must also have been dismayed by Aumale’s decision, suggested by the Seize, that each district should also have a conseil des neuf. These local cells were intended to supervise, possibly even to supersede, the quarteniers, though Salmon’s suggestion that they had the opportunity to build up electoral support for the Seize is open to question, being dependent upon the number of places in the Bureau de la Ville that they might have been allocated, had they survived. Made up of quelques notables bourgeois, the conseils des neuf were given responsibilities. They were also tasked with handling any disputes in their quartier; those they could not settle were to be passed on to the échevins – a procedure that would undermine the role of the Parlement. By early 1589 the new conseils were in place, but they were destined not to last, for before long they were being infiltrated by Politiques – the very rivals whose influence their existence was presumably supposed to minimise. The king’s unpopularity in Paris increased markedly after the murders of the Guise brothers, and during the seven weeks before Mayenne arrived the Seize ruled without check to their power. The tone was confident and authoritative, their business forged in regular