case, insofar as it illuminated the decisionmaking process that resulted in Kims’ the Tundra’s design. On cross-examination, Toyota elicited the same information from Lobenstein, as well as testimony regarding the industry practice of phasing new safety technologies into vehicles on the market. The Kims did not object to this line of questioning, and even if they had, the questioning was not objectionable: In response to questions raised by the Kims concerning decisionmaking Toyota’s process, Toyota elicited additional evidence to explain how Toyota decides whether and when to implement emerging safety technologies. In so doing, it shed light on relative complexity of design decisions and the trade-offs that “the are frequently required in the adoption of alternative (Barker, 20 supra, designs.” Cal.3d at p. 418.) We agree with the Court of Appeal that even if the Kims had not first put decisionmaking process at issue, about how new Toyota’s “testimony safety technologies evolve and are phased in to vehicles in general, first as an option and then as standard equipment, is relevant to the risk-benefit analysis . . .” and thus admissible. Toyota also argues that the challenged evidence was admissible to shed light on the safety of its design, absent standard VSC. Toyota argues in particular that the jury was entitled to consider that the theory that the 2005 Toyota Kims’ Tundra contained a design defect that every 2005 pickup was “meant defective.” And indeed, Toyota asked the jury to do just that, arguing in closing argument that a single pickup on the market in model year 2005 or had standard VSC. “[n]ot ’6 And if the position of the plaintiffs is that every vehicle or every pickup that didn’t have VSC in 2005 was defective, then we sure have a lot of ticking time bombs out there.” The Court of Appeal criticized this theory, calling it of “a prime example” when industry custom and practice would not be relevant. A manufacturer’s
Kims’ case, insofar as it illuminated the decisionmaking process that resulted in the Tundra’s design. On cross-examination, Toyota elicited the same information from Lobenstein, as well as testimony regarding the industry practice of phasing new safety technologies into vehicles on the market. The Kims did not object to this line of questioning, and even if they had, the questioning was not objectionable: In response to questions raised by the Kims concerning Toyota’s decisionmaking process, Toyota elicited additional evidence to explain how Toyota decides whether and when to implement emerging safety technologies. In so doing, it shed light on “the relative complexity of design decisions and the trade-offs that are frequently required in the adoption of alternative designs.” (Barker, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 418.) We agree with the Court of Appeal that even if the Kims had not first put Toyota’s decisionmaking process at issue, “testimony about how new safety technologies evolve and are phased in to vehicles in general, first as an option and then as standard equipment, is relevant to the risk-benefit analysis . . .” and thus admissible. Toyota also argues that the challenged evidence was admissible to shed light on the safety of its design, absent standard VSC. Toyota argues in particular that the jury was entitled to consider that the Kims’ theory that the 2005 Toyota Tundra contained a design defect “meant that every 2005 pickup was defective.” And indeed, Toyota asked the jury to do just that, arguing in closing argument that “[n]ot a single pickup on the market in model year 2005 or ’6 had standard VSC. And if the position of the plaintiffs is that every vehicle or every pickup that didn’t have VSC in 2005 was defective, then we sure have a lot of ticking time bombs out there.” The Court of Appeal criticized this theory, calling it “a prime example” of when industry custom and practice would not be relevant. A manufacturer’s