In deciding to avoid examining motives, Rozée took a line that was Ligue leaders’ inconsonant with the duty to reveal and explain; fortunately, particularly with historian’s respect to Mayenne, he let down his guard. Moreover, his humble station gave him an advantage over contemporaries whose published views might be affected by closeness to their superiors. A matter of great importance to Mayenne and Parma, and to the ambassadors, was the state of relations between France and Spain. Mendoza and Parma were in Philip The II’s employ. cardinal legate Caetani was cautiously sympathetic to support for the Ligue. Spain’s Mayenne distrusted Spanish intentions while being heavily dependent on financial Philip’s aid. In 1559 the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis had ended sixty-five years of warfare between France and Spain, but it had not brought trust. The saddleback Pyrennean kingdom of Navarre and parts of the Flemish border remained disputed territories, and the religious situation in France the spread of Protestantism, with its potential to inflame the deeply – troublesome revolt in the Netherlands chagrined the Catholic king. In the 1560s and – ’70s relations were uneasy. Catherine de willingness to negotiate with the Huguenots Medici’s seriously worried Madrid. Philip in Paris kept in close touch with the II’s ambassadors Guise; the queen mother distrusted the first and had the second recalled. Later, the duc activities in the Spanish Netherlands aggravated the situation, particularly when d’Anjou’s Catherine made it clear that Cambrai, seized in August 1581, would not be returned. death in June 1584 introduced the inevitability that a Huguenot would in due Anjou’s course inherit the French throne, and presented Philip II with an opportunity that he could
In deciding to avoid examining Ligue leaders’ motives, Rozée took a line that was inconsonant with the historian’s duty to reveal and explain; fortunately, particularly with respect to Mayenne, he let down his guard. Moreover, his humble station gave him an advantage over contemporaries whose published views might be affected by closeness to their superiors. A matter of great importance to Mayenne and Parma, and to the ambassadors, was the state of relations between France and Spain. Mendoza and Parma were in Philip II’s employ. The cardinal legate Caetani was cautiously sympathetic to Spain’s support for the Ligue. Mayenne distrusted Spanish intentions while being heavily dependent on Philip’s financial aid. In 1559 the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis had ended sixty-five years of warfare between France and Spain, but it had not brought trust. The saddleback Pyrennean kingdom of Navarre and parts of the Flemish border remained disputed territories, and the religious situation in France – the spread of Protestantism, with its potential to inflame the deeply troublesome revolt in the Netherlands – chagrined the Catholic king. In the 1560s and ’70s relations were uneasy. Catherine de Medici’s willingness to negotiate with the Huguenots seriously worried Madrid. Philip II’s ambassadors in Paris kept in close touch with the Guise; the queen mother distrusted the first and had the second recalled. Later, the duc d’Anjou’s activities in the Spanish Netherlands aggravated the situation, particularly when Catherine made it clear that Cambrai, seized in August 1581, would not be returned. Anjou’s death in June 1584 introduced the inevitability that a Huguenot would in due course inherit the French throne, and presented Philip II with an opportunity that he could