referred to the document issued by the Director of the Commission, which is a summons. In order to support this contention counsel referred this court to the following paragraphs of the judgment: paragraph 3 where the court a quo correctly stated that the objected ‘(i) ‘defence to the production of evidence of bank statements obtained from the bank with summons issued under the Anti-Corruption Commission . . . .; Act’ (ii) paragraph 22 where the court a quo refers to a summons issued in terms of s 21(5) of the Act by the Director of the Commission where Mr Knouwds was required to appear before an authorized officer; (iii) paragraph 25 where the court stated that the of the matter is the validity “crux or otherwise of the search and seizure warrants issued by the Director of the Commission which ultimately led to the recovery of various bank statements and those from bank accounts and other relevant evidence to the accused’s and case”; (iv) paragraph 39 where the court a quo stated that Director of the “the Commission had a genuine belief . . . that an offence had been committed . . .” and that warrants are clear as to what official needed to conduct such “the searches . . . .”.’ Mr Small conceded that there was no explanation in the recusal application judgment for the reproduction of a search warrant instead of a summons, if one were to accept his contention that the court a quo ruled on the admissibility of evidence
referred to the document issued by the Director of the Commission, which is a summons. In order to support this contention counsel referred this court to the following paragraphs of the judgment: ‘(i) paragraph 3 where the court a quo correctly stated that the ‘defence objected to the production of evidence of bank statements obtained from the bank with summons issued under the Anti-Corruption Commission Act’ . . . .; (ii) paragraph 22 where the court a quo refers to a summons issued in terms of s 21(5) of the Act by the Director of the Commission where Mr Knouwds was required to appear before an authorized officer; (iii) paragraph 25 where the court stated that the “crux of the matter is the validity or otherwise of the search and seizure warrants issued by the Director of the Commission which ultimately led to the recovery of various bank statements and those from accused’s bank accounts and other relevant evidence to the case”; and (iv) paragraph 39 where the court a quo stated that “the Director of the Commission had a genuine belief . . . that an offence had been committed . . .” and that “the warrants are clear as to what official needed to conduct such searches . . . .”.’ Mr Small conceded that there was no explanation in the recusal application judgment for the reproduction of a search warrant instead of a summons, if one were to accept his contention that the court a quo ruled on the admissibility of evidence