Russia’s low nuclear threshold instantly raises the stakes in any conflict, and forces adversaries to confront the real possibility that should they become involved, so too would nuclear weapons. This has been displayed throughout the Crimea crisis, as nuclear exercises, official statements, and bomber patrols have served as signals to Western states. As noted previously, Russian officials also regularly issue nuclear threats against polices they deem objectionable. Thus, it is clear Russia seeks employ nuclear threats in order to achieve its strategic aims, particularly in its sphere of vital interest. What the greatest challenge for NATO is not the possibility of being deterred from conducting an all-out assault to knock down the gates surrounding the Kremlin to depose Putin and the Russian state; this would likely never be a desirable goal for NATO. Rather, Russia’s strategic posture allows for a form of offensive deterrence, or a strategy of conducting operations belligerent in nature coupled with overt nuclear threats for the purpose of deterring retaliation by the aggrieved party and/or its allies. In order to consolidate its gains, Russia could simply threaten nuclear retaliation to anyone who dare interfere, forcing others to choose between appeasement or nuclear war. According to a recent Russian documentary on the events in Crimea, Putin himself demonstrated a readiness to do this, as he stated he was prepared to put Russia’s nuclear forces on alert in order to deter outside interference, although he ultimately did not do so. This would essentially allow Moscow an ultimate trump card within its near-abroad. Despite describing its policy as purely defensive, it is clear that Russia considers nuclear coercion as a great power instrument to be leveraged during periods of hostilities. Obviously, this poses challenges for NATO’s ability to protect and defend its eastern-most members.
Russia’s low nuclear threshold instantly raises the stakes in any conflict, and forces adversaries to confront the real possibility that should they become involved, so too would nuclear weapons. This has been displayed throughout the Crimea crisis, as nuclear exercises, official statements, and bomber patrols have served as signals to Western states. As noted previously, Russian officials also regularly issue nuclear threats against polices they deem objectionable. Thus, it is clear Russia seeks employ nuclear threats in order to achieve its strategic aims, particularly in its sphere of vital interest. What the greatest challenge for NATO is not the possibility of being deterred from conducting an all-out assault to knock down the gates surrounding the Kremlin to depose Putin and the Russian state; this would likely never be a desirable goal for NATO. Rather, Russia’s strategic posture allows for a form of offensive deterrence, or a strategy of conducting operations belligerent in nature coupled with overt nuclear threats for the purpose of deterring retaliation by the aggrieved party and/or its allies. In order to consolidate its gains, Russia could simply threaten nuclear retaliation to anyone who dare interfere, forcing others to choose between appeasement or nuclear war. According to a recent Russian documentary on the events in Crimea, Putin himself demonstrated a readiness to do this, as he stated he was prepared to put Russia’s nuclear forces on alert in order to deter outside interference, although he ultimately did not do so. This would essentially allow Moscow an ultimate trump card within its near-abroad. Despite describing its policy as purely defensive, it is clear that Russia considers nuclear coercion as a great power instrument to be leveraged during periods of hostilities. Obviously, this poses challenges for NATO’s ability to protect and defend its eastern-most members.