-----(2014b) to McKenna, Pereboom, and Philosophical Studies “Replies Kane,” -----(2016) and X-Phi,” 193: 2367-2388. Synthese “Conceptual Analysis Bernstein, M. 11:151-57. Southwest Philosophy Review (1995) “Kanean Libertarianism,” Berofsky, B. in a Philosophy and (2000) “Ultimate Responsibility Determined World,” 60:135-40. Phenomenological Research Bramhall, J. (1655) Reprinted 1977, New York: Garland Pub. A Defense of True Liberty. Campbell, C.A. (1967) London: Allen & Unwin. In Defense of Free Will, and the Reprinted in G. Watson (ed.), Free Chisholm, R. (1964) “Human Freedom Self.” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 24-35. Will, Clarke, R. a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Nous (1993) “Toward Will,” 27:191-203. -----(1995) and 32:125-38. American Philosophical Quarterly “Indeterminism Control,” -----(1996) and Event Causation in the Production of Free “Agent Causation Action,” 24:19-48. Philosophical Topics -----(2002) of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts “Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Free in Kane (2002a), pp. 356-85. Agency,” Dennett, D. (1978) Libertarians What They Say They in Brainstorms, “On Giving Want,” Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Donagan, A. (1987) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Choice, Double, R. (1991) New York: Oxford University Press. The Non-Reality of Free Will, Ekstrom, L.W. (2000) Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Free Will: A Philosophical Study, Festinger, L., (1957) Theory of University “A Cognitive Dissonance,” Palo Alto: Stanford
-----(2014b) “Replies to McKenna, Pereboom, and Kane,” Philosophical Studies -----(2016) “Conceptual Analysis and X-Phi,” Synthese 193: 2367-2388. Bernstein, M. (1995) “Kanean Libertarianism,” Southwest Philosophy Review 11:151-57. Berofsky, B. (2000) “Ultimate Responsibility in a Determined World,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60:135-40. Bramhall, J. (1655) A Defense of True Liberty. Reprinted 1977, New York: Garland Pub. Campbell, C.A. (1967) In Defense of Free Will, London: Allen & Unwin. Chisholm, R. (1964) “Human Freedom and the Self.” Reprinted in G. Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 24-35. Clarke, R. (1993) “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will,” Nous 27:191-203. -----(1995) “Indeterminism and Control,” American Philosophical Quarterly 32:125-38. -----(1996) “Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action,” Philosophical Topics 24:19-48. -----(2002) “Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency,” in Kane (2002a), pp. 356-85. Dennett, D. (1978) “On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want,” in Brainstorms, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Donagan, A. (1987) Choice, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Double, R. (1991) The Non-Reality of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. Ekstrom, L.W. (2000) Free Will: A Philosophical Study, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Festinger, L., (1957) “A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance,” Palo Alto: Stanford University