[24] Desai, to which Mr. Muluti referred and relied upon in his heads of argument, has recently come for trenchant criticism by the Constitutional Court of South Africa as having unduly extended the meaning of debt in a manner that is impermissible and more importantly, in one that is not supported by the decision in Electricity Supply Commission v Stewarts and Lloyds of SA (Pty) Ltd, (Escom) on which it purported to rely for the extended meaning. [25] In Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd, the Constitutional Court reasoned as follows on this matter at p 34 para 85-86: The absence of any explanation for so broad a construction of the word is ‘[85] “debt” significant because it is inconsistent with earlier decisions of the same Court that gave the word a more circumscribed meaning. In Escom the Appellate Division said that the word in the “debt” Prescription Act should be given the meaning ascribed to it in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, namely: owed or due: something (as money or goods or service) which one person “1. Something is under an obligation to pay or render to another. 2. A liability or obligation to pay or render something; the condition of being so obligated.’ Escom was cited and followed in subsequent cases. It was also cited as authority for the proposition in Desai NO. [86] It is unclear whether the Court in Desai intended to extend the meaning of the word “debt” beyond the meaning given to it in Escom. If it did, it does not appear that this followed either from any submissions made to the Court by the parties or any issue arising in the case. Nor, if that was the intention, did the Court give consideration to the constitutional imperatives in regard to the interpretation of statutes in section 39 of the Constitution.’ [26] At para 93, the Constitutional Court concluded the treatise in the following manner on the wide meaning it found had been impermissibly given to the word by Desai: “debt” the extent that Desai went beyond what was said in Escom it was decided in error. ‘To There is nothing in Escom that remotely suggests that includes every obligation to do “debt” something or refrain from doing something apart from payment or delivery. It follows that the trial Court attached an incorrect meaning to the word A debt contemplated in section 10 of the “debt”.
[24] Desai, to which Mr. Muluti referred and relied upon in his heads of argument, has recently come for trenchant criticism by the Constitutional Court of South Africa as having unduly extended the meaning of debt in a manner that is impermissible and more importantly, in one that is not supported by the decision in Electricity Supply Commission v Stewarts and Lloyds of SA (Pty) Ltd, (Escom) on which it purported to rely for the extended meaning. [25] In Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd, the Constitutional Court reasoned as follows on this matter at p 34 para 85-86: ‘[85] The absence of any explanation for so broad a construction of the word “debt” is significant because it is inconsistent with earlier decisions of the same Court that gave the word a more circumscribed meaning. In Escom the Appellate Division said that the word “debt” in the Prescription Act should be given the meaning ascribed to it in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, namely: “1. Something owed or due: something (as money or goods or service) which one person is under an obligation to pay or render to another. 2. A liability or obligation to pay or render something; the condition of being so obligated.’ Escom was cited and followed in subsequent cases. It was also cited as authority for the proposition in Desai NO. [86] It is unclear whether the Court in Desai intended to extend the meaning of the word “debt” beyond the meaning given to it in Escom. If it did, it does not appear that this followed either from any submissions made to the Court by the parties or any issue arising in the case. Nor, if that was the intention, did the Court give consideration to the constitutional imperatives in regard to the interpretation of statutes in section 39 of the Constitution.’ [26] At para 93, the Constitutional Court concluded the treatise in the following manner on the wide meaning it found had been impermissibly given to the word “debt” by Desai: ‘To the extent that Desai went beyond what was said in Escom it was decided in error. There is nothing in Escom that remotely suggests that “debt” includes every obligation to do something or refrain from doing something apart from payment or delivery. It follows that the trial Court attached an incorrect meaning to the word “debt”. A debt contemplated in section 10 of the