Similarly, I contend, the psychology of hedonic evaluation in a cultural context is a good match for aesthetic norms. a priori Part I: Facilitating Pleasure There are many kinds of pleasure. I now distinguish two broad varieties, and r-pleasures and discuss the characteristics of the hitherto little-noticed f-pleasures. In Part II, I argue that pleasure is a species of f-pleasure. aesthetic Pleasure, Motivation, and Facilitation To begin, let us take note of pleasures that are quite different from the sort we find in art. Certain bodily or mental states are departures from normal resting equilibrium, and though some are pleasant, all are physically and psychologically costly to prolong indefinitely. Pain, physical exertion, sexual arousal, and mental concentration are examples. When these states come to an end, the return to a normal resting condition is attended by pleasure. Once equilibrium is restored, this pleasure quickly ebbs away. These are pleasures of or restoration I call them Michael Kubovy [1999] includes in this category sneezing, relief. r-pleasures. coughing, defecation, and orgasm. We also feel r-pleasure when a source of discomfort—an annoying noise or an itch—is removed. R-pleasures are Because they are they have no forward passive. retrospective, motivational force. An orgasm, for example, is a source of intense bodily pleasure; but it is not an impulse to follow some specific action. It has motivational force in the teleological manner of a reward one aims for; it can serve as an Aristotelian final cause, but it is not motivational in the sense of an make the point clearer, sexual desire is ‘efficient cause’. (To an efficient motive cause, as are other drives, including hunger and thirst.) R-pleasure exemplifies how many philosophers conceive of pleasure in effect, they think that in general: it is a bodily feeling that arises out of and welcomes a bodily event, but which motivates only as a goal does. My concern in this paper is with a different class of pleasures. For reasons that will be apparent in a moment, I characterize them as and call them As we facilitating, f-pleasures. shall see, these pleasures are like urges or drives; they motivate prospectively. More specifically, they motivate the continuation of the activity that gives rise to them. Here is one example of an f-pleasure:
Similarly, I contend, the psychology of hedonic evaluation in a cultural context is a good match for a priori aesthetic norms. Part I: Facilitating Pleasure There are many kinds of pleasure. I now distinguish two broad varieties, r-pleasures and and discuss the characteristics of the hitherto little-noticed f-pleasures. In Part II, I argue that aesthetic pleasure is a species of f-pleasure. Pleasure, Motivation, and Facilitation To begin, let us take note of pleasures that are quite different from the sort we find in art. Certain bodily or mental states are departures from normal resting equilibrium, and though some are pleasant, all are physically and psychologically costly to prolong indefinitely. Pain, physical exertion, sexual arousal, and mental concentration are examples. When these states come to an end, the return to a normal resting condition is attended by pleasure. Once equilibrium is restored, this pleasure quickly ebbs away. These are pleasures of restoration or relief. I call them r-pleasures. Michael Kubovy [1999] includes in this category sneezing, coughing, defecation, and orgasm. We also feel r-pleasure when a source of discomfort—an annoying noise or an itch—is removed. R-pleasures are passive. Because they are retrospective, they have no forward motivational force. An orgasm, for example, is a source of intense bodily pleasure; but it is not an impulse to follow some specific action. It has motivational force in the teleological manner of a reward one aims for; it can serve as an Aristotelian final cause, but it is not motivational in the sense of an ‘efficient cause’. (To make the point clearer, sexual desire is an efficient motive cause, as are other drives, including hunger and thirst.) R-pleasure exemplifies how many philosophers conceive of pleasure in general: in effect, they think that it is a bodily feeling that arises out of and welcomes a bodily event, but which motivates only as a goal does. My concern in this paper is with a different class of pleasures. For reasons that will be apparent in a moment, I characterize them as facilitating, and call them f-pleasures. As we shall see, these pleasures are like urges or drives; they motivate prospectively. More specifically, they motivate the continuation of the activity that gives rise to them. Here is one example of an f-pleasure: