Y. The situation is the same as in X except one is certain that, as a special promotion, travelers on train B will get a free ticket to the Superbowl. Here epistemic position with regard to the proposition that train A is going to one’s Foxboro is practically inadequate in X but practically adequate in Y: in Y, actual one’s preference is to take train B and preference conditional on train A going to Foxboro one’s is still to take train B. Case Y is higher stakes than Case X since there is greater maximal regret (ie. that between getting the Superbowl tickets while travelling to Foxboro and going to Charleston). But it is the higher stakes case where position is practically one’s adequate. Case Y in pair I has a special structural feature with respect to the proposition that train A is going to Foxboro: in that case the information that A is going to Foxboro is irrelevant to the decision to go on train B, since news about whether A is going to Foxboro will not bear on that decision. More precisely, call a decision just p-dependent in case preference conditional on does not match preference conditional on p one’s one’s not-p. In case Y of pair 1, the decision is not dependent upon the proposition that train A is going to Foxboro. This suggests a natural fix to the HIGH STAKES principle above: HIGH STAKES* In general, if there is a merely practical mismatch for between a pair of p cases, and also a stakes mismatch between those cases, and each case involves it will be the higher stakes case where the a p-dependent decision, subject’s epistemic position for is practically inadequate. p There is an analogous fix to EVEN STAKES: EVEN STAKES* In general, if the stakes between a pair of cases match, and the decision in each case is then there will be no merely practical mismatch for p-dependent, between those cases. p While these principles are immune to pair I, there remain myriad ways that they break down, as we illustrate in the next two subsections.
Y. The situation is the same as in X except one is certain that, as a special promotion, travelers on train B will get a free ticket to the Superbowl. Here one’s epistemic position with regard to the proposition that train A is going to Foxboro is practically inadequate in X but practically adequate in Y: in Y, one’s actual preference is to take train B and one’s preference conditional on train A going to Foxboro is still to take train B. Case Y is higher stakes than Case X since there is greater maximal regret (ie. that between getting the Superbowl tickets while travelling to Foxboro and going to Charleston). But it is the higher stakes case where one’s position is practically adequate. Case Y in pair I has a special structural feature with respect to the proposition that train A is going to Foxboro: in that case the information that A is going to Foxboro is irrelevant to the decision to go on train B, since news about whether A is going to Foxboro will not bear on that decision. More precisely, call a decision p-dependent just in case one’s preference conditional on p does not match one’s preference conditional on not-p. In case Y of pair 1, the decision is not dependent upon the proposition that train A is going to Foxboro. This suggests a natural fix to the HIGH STAKES principle above: HIGH STAKES* In general, if there is a merely practical mismatch for p between a pair of cases, and also a stakes mismatch between those cases, and each case involves a p-dependent decision, it will be the higher stakes case where the subject’s epistemic position for p is practically inadequate. There is an analogous fix to EVEN STAKES: EVEN STAKES* In general, if the stakes between a pair of cases match, and the decision in each case is p-dependent, then there will be no merely practical mismatch for p between those cases. While these principles are immune to pair I, there remain myriad ways that they break down, as we illustrate in the next two subsections.