of December 1592, had attributed the death of Henry III to coup du Déclaration ‘un ciel’. Presumably Rozée sensed malice behind the for the implication was that the duke ‘error’, had been covering up a conspiracy in which Clément was a mere pawn. Rozée Ligue corrected the error by quoting precise words: the regicide resulted from Mayenne’s ‘un coup malheureux seul homme, sans ny sçeu de ceux qui que trop de d’un l’ayde n’avoient passion dela Elsewhere too, Rozée had his red pen at hand. Those who wrote that desirer’. the troops accompanying Caetani to France ate meat during Lent (1590) were evidently wrong: civic leaders had already welcomed Caetani to Paris on 8 January. Allegations that during the great siege the Paris clergy had a of food hidden away were based year’s supply on Even in the darkest days, children were not eaten: qui ‘de mauvaises mémoires’. ‘ceux escrit ne le sçavoient pas And, contrary to what some had written, Mayenne and l’ont bien’. Parma parted on good terms after the siege: qui ont dit le contraire se sont fort ‘ceux trompez et ils confondent le premier voyage avec le second voyage quand le duc de parme vint au secours de Rouen’. Inaccuracy was not the only focus of criticism of the writings of others about the Rozée’s In an extensive passage he explored the tension which emerged in 1591 between Ligue. royalist Catholics and ultramontanists. Rozée sought to expose the triviality and Ligueur woolly thinking of royalist Catholics by interrogating their witnesses: the rulings from their Parlements at Châlons and Tours (6 June and 5 August respectively) and the declaration issued by royalist clergy at Chartres in September. Why did they bother to score points against Gregory disant according to the judges at Tours) when they XIV (‘se pape’, intended in any case to use the device of to disregard papal bulls? If appel comme d’abus they believed the pope was self-styled, and if the at Châlons required a procureur-général
Déclaration of December 1592, had attributed the death of Henry III to ‘un coup du ciel’. Presumably Rozée sensed malice behind the ‘error’, for the implication was that the duke had been covering up a Ligue conspiracy in which Clément was a mere pawn. Rozée corrected the error by quoting Mayenne’s precise words: the regicide resulted from ‘un coup malheureux d’un seul homme, sans l’ayde ny sçeu de ceux qui n’avoient que trop de passion dela desirer’. Elsewhere too, Rozée had his red pen at hand. Those who wrote that the troops accompanying Caetani to France ate meat during Lent (1590) were evidently wrong: civic leaders had already welcomed Caetani to Paris on 8 January. Allegations that during the great siege the Paris clergy had a year’s supply of food hidden away were based on ‘de mauvaises mémoires’. Even in the darkest days, children were not eaten: ‘ceux qui l’ont escrit ne le sçavoient pas bien’. And, contrary to what some had written, Mayenne and Parma parted on good terms after the siege: ‘ceux qui ont dit le contraire se sont fort trompez et ils confondent le premier voyage avec le second voyage quand le duc de parme vint au secours de Rouen’. Inaccuracy was not the only focus of Rozée’s criticism of the writings of others about the Ligue. In an extensive passage he explored the tension which emerged in 1591 between royalist Catholics and Ligueur ultramontanists. Rozée sought to expose the triviality and woolly thinking of royalist Catholics by interrogating their witnesses: the rulings from their Parlements at Châlons and Tours (6 June and 5 August respectively) and the declaration issued by royalist clergy at Chartres in September. Why did they bother to score points against Gregory XIV (‘se disant pape’, according to the judges at Tours) when they intended in any case to use the device of appel comme d’abus to disregard papal bulls? If they believed the pope was self-styled, and if the procureur-général at Châlons required a