of is the same under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act). These “reasonable accommodation” ADA instructions can therefore be applied, and modified if necessary, to a claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act. The provision ADA’s association Chapter 9 does not include an instruction specifically dealing with claims under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4), which against a qualified individual on the basis defines “discriminat[ion] of to include or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified disability” “excluding individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or For a discussion of such claims, see Erdman v. association.” 582 F.3d 500, 510-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Nationwide Ins. Co., Religious Entities; Ministerial Exception Religious entities sued under Subchapter I of the ADA may assert two statutory defenses set out in 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d). But retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) arise under Subchapter IV of the ADA, which does not contain such defenses. Apart from those statutory defenses, the give rise to First Amendment’s religion clauses an affirmative defense that the government from interfering with the decision of a “bar[s] religious group to fire one of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & its ministers.” 132 S. Ct. 694, 702, 709 n.4 (2012) (applying this defense to an ADA retaliation Sch. v. EEOC, claim). For further discussion of the ministerial exception, see Comment 5.0.
of “reasonable accommodation” is the same under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act). These ADA instructions can therefore be applied, and modified if necessary, to a claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act. The ADA’s association provision Chapter 9 does not include an instruction specifically dealing with claims under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4), which defines “discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” to include “excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.” For a discussion of such claims, see Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 510-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Religious Entities; Ministerial Exception Religious entities sued under Subchapter I of the ADA may assert two statutory defenses set out in 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d). But retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) arise under Subchapter IV of the ADA, which does not contain such defenses. Apart from those statutory defenses, the First Amendment’s religion clauses give rise to an affirmative defense that “bar[s] the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702, 709 n.4 (2012) (applying this defense to an ADA retaliation claim). For further discussion of the ministerial exception, see Comment 5.0.