No. Comment Suggested Change Severity Action Test 2 of FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.6 and ND Remove Test 2. 1 The tests for FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6. The use of “none” SD, FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.4-6 and MAC algorithm. Most SSH client and Pages FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4-6 have server don’t support configuring as “none” 42 and been updated to specify a valid option. In addition, if we are only 45 using an algorithm not selecting AES-GCM and not AES-CBC, supported by the TOE would the integrity check be built into the (rather than a specific named GCM mode? algorithm) in each case. If we don’t even allow hmac-md5, why would we allow “none”? ND Test 3 of FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 and We should do what we did for 1 No Change. SD, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1. This looks like an the next test 4 and append “Test The test is as intended. Pages ill-attempt at taking a test case for the TLS [3] in FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 or 46 and server and trying to convert it for a TLS FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.1 can be 50 client. In this case, the TLS server will used as a substitute for this test.” disconnect the connection first because of Or just remove this test no shared ciphersuite. If you have a completely. TLS server, it will detect the mismatch (i.e., send ECDSA cert but only select RSA ciphersuite) and will terminate the connection. What this test is asking is force the TLS server to select a ciphersuite (RSA) that is not supported by the server certificate (ECDSA) and this is not something normal TLS server will do. The TLS server will kills the handshake before the TLS client (TOE) will have the chance to disconnect.
No. Comment Suggested Change Severity Action ND SD, Pages 42 and 45 Test 2 of FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.6 and FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6. The use of “none” MAC algorithm. Most SSH client and server don’t support configuring “none” as a valid option. In addition, if we are only selecting AES-GCM and not AES-CBC, would the integrity check be built into the GCM mode? If we don’t even allow hmac-md5, why would we allow “none”? Remove Test 2. 1 The tests for FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.4-6 and FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4-6 have been updated to specify using an algorithm not supported by the TOE (rather than a specific named algorithm) in each case. ND SD, Pages 46 and 50 Test 3 of FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 and FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1. This looks like an ill-attempt at taking a test case for the TLS server and trying to convert it for a TLS client. In this case, the TLS server will disconnect the connection first because of no shared ciphersuite. If you have a TLS server, it will detect the mismatch (i.e., send ECDSA cert but only select RSA ciphersuite) and will terminate the connection. What this test is asking is force the TLS server to select a ciphersuite (RSA) that is not supported by the server certificate (ECDSA) and this is not something normal TLS server will do. The TLS server will kills the handshake before the TLS client (TOE) will have the chance to disconnect. We should do what we did for the next test 4 and append “Test [3] in FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 or FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.1 can be used as a substitute for this test.” Or just remove this test completely. 1 No Change. The test is as intended.