concept users retrospectively discern conceptual norms that are determinately contentful in the Kantian sense, as having been in play all along, with different aspects of their Verstand boundaries (relations of material consequence and incompatibility) discovered by correct (precedential) applications at various critical junctures in the development of the tradition. We can think of the way the theoretical metaconceptual role played by the Hegelian notion of recollection is related to the Kantian idea of rational integration in either of two ways. We can think of Hegel as adding a complementary, recognitively dual notion alongside rational integration. is taking making a commitment, by petitioning future Integrating responsibility, concept-users to be recognized; is asserting vindicating an entitlement, by recollecting authority, recognizing past concept-users. Together the two make up a recognitive whole. But we can also think of the basic Kantian idea that what one needs to to count thereby as having undertaken a do discursive commitment, taken responsibility for a claim or judgment, is rationally integrating it with other commitments as being broadened and extended by the Hegelian move, so that the rational unity that must be synthesized (the synthetic unity of comprises “original apperception”) the whole developmental process by which one arrived at current commitments, and not one’s just the current time-slice of that on-going enterprise. The new kind of rational unity requires not just that one have extracted the inferential consequences of commitments and extruded one’s the incompatibilities from among them, but also that one have shown how the process by which those commitments arose out of their predecessors was a rational one. The retrospective justificatory responsibility is not only to exhibit the doxastic commitments one now acknowledges as fitting together rationally, but also to exhibit the concepts applied in those
concept users retrospectively discern conceptual norms that are determinately contentful in the Kantian Verstand sense, as having been in play all along, with different aspects of their boundaries (relations of material consequence and incompatibility) discovered by correct (precedential) applications at various critical junctures in the development of the tradition. We can think of the way the theoretical metaconceptual role played by the Hegelian notion of recollection is related to the Kantian idea of rational integration in either of two ways. We can think of Hegel as adding a complementary, recognitively dual notion alongside rational integration. Integrating is taking responsibility, making a commitment, by petitioning future concept-users to be recognized; recollecting is asserting authority, vindicating an entitlement, by recognizing past concept-users. Together the two make up a recognitive whole. But we can also think of the basic Kantian idea that what one needs to do to count thereby as having undertaken a discursive commitment, taken responsibility for a claim or judgment, is rationally integrating it with other commitments as being broadened and extended by the Hegelian move, so that the rational unity that must be synthesized (the “original synthetic unity of apperception”) comprises the whole developmental process by which one arrived at one’s current commitments, and not just the current time-slice of that on-going enterprise. The new kind of rational unity requires not just that one have extracted the inferential consequences of one’s commitments and extruded the incompatibilities from among them, but also that one have shown how the process by which those commitments arose out of their predecessors was a rational one. The retrospective justificatory responsibility is not only to exhibit the doxastic commitments one now acknowledges as fitting together rationally, but also to exhibit the concepts applied in those