37. In an appeal on law only the appellate court ‘ must bear in mind what scope the circumstances provide for reasonable minds to differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the primary facts found. If the fact-finding tribunal’s conclusion is a reasonable one, the appellate court cannot disturb that conclusion even if its own preference is for a contrary conclusion. But if the appellate court regards the contrary conclusion as the true and only reasonable one, the appellate court is duty-bound to substitute the contrary conclusion for the one reached by the factfinding tribunal. The correct approach for the appellate court is composed essentially of the foregoing three propositions. These propositions complement each other, although the understandable tendency is for those attacking the fact-finding tribunal’s conclusion to stress the third one while those defending that conclusion stress the first two.’ The complaint by the taxpayer that the and Chung J had ignored the separate legal entities, in fact, had been raised below. Mr Kwok dealt with this argument as follows : 126. I have decided that the change of intention ‘ … took place on 30 July 1994 when the [taxpayer] entered into the Redevelopment Agreement. The change took place before Prodes came into existence or the picture. Hence the reference to ‘Newco’. Chargeability arose before Prodes came into existence or the picture. 127. In any the facts, including: the fact that the Redevelopment Agreement • purported to bind before it came into ‘Newco’ existence or the picture; and the facts stated in paragraphs 47 and 48 above • [namely, 47. On 11 February 1999, the Board of the [taxpayer] ratified and approved, inter alia,
‘ 37. In an appeal on law only the appellate court must bear in mind what scope the circumstances provide for reasonable minds to differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the primary facts found. If the fact-finding tribunal’s conclusion is a reasonable one, the appellate court cannot disturb that conclusion even if its own preference is for a contrary conclusion. But if the appellate court regards the contrary conclusion as the true and only reasonable one, the appellate court is duty-bound to substitute the contrary conclusion for the one reached by the factfinding tribunal. The correct approach for the appellate court is composed essentially of the foregoing three propositions. These propositions complement each other, although the understandable tendency is for those attacking the fact-finding tribunal’s conclusion to stress the third one while those defending that conclusion stress the first two.’ The complaint by the taxpayer that the and Chung J had ignored the separate legal entities, in fact, had been raised below. Mr Kwok dealt with this argument as follows : ‘ 126. I have decided … that the change of intention took place on 30 July 1994 when the [taxpayer] entered into the Redevelopment Agreement. The change took place before Prodes came into existence or the picture. Hence the reference to ‘Newco’. Chargeability arose before Prodes came into existence or the picture. 127. In any the facts, including: • the fact that the Redevelopment Agreement purported to bind ‘Newco’ before it came into existence or the picture; and • the facts stated in paragraphs 47 and 48 above [namely, 47. On 11 February 1999, the Board of the [taxpayer] ratified and approved, inter alia,