C. Robustness of Main Findings to Focusing on More Agrarian Countries In order to ensure that the Table 1 statistical analyses are not sensitive to the relational nature of the power of different classes, I test the robustness of the main findings to a subset of country-years where the agricultural population comprises greater than 30% of the total population. I do the same for a subset of country-years where the agricultural population comprises greater than 40% or 50% of the total population. This captures more agrarian economies where landed elites should be stronger vis-à-vis other economic elites (e.g., industrialists) and state actors. Table A3 presents the results. Models 1-4 of Table A3 replicate Models 1-4 of Table 1 in the manuscript but restrict the sample to country-years where the agricultural population comprises greater than 30% of the total population. The results are similar to those in Table 1 despite the reduced sample, and strengthen in several models. Labor-Dependent Agriculture remains negatively and statistically significantly tied to democratic duration in Models 1B-4B, and the magnitude of the coefficients generally increases. Furthermore, Labor-Dependent Agriculture drops below the 10% level in Models 3A and 4A of Table A3 relative to Models 3A and 4A in the paper. In short, the findings strengthen somewhat under this robustness test. 5 of Table A3 repeats Model 3 but restricts the sample to country-years where the agricultural population comprises greater than 40% of the total population. Again the results for Labor-Dependent Agriculture hold despite the reduced sample, and grow even stronger in substantive terms. Model 6 of Table A3 again repeats Model 3 but now restricts the sample to country-years where the agricultural population comprises greater than 50% of the total population. Yet again the results hold, even though the sample size is reduced by more than 60% relative to Model 3 of Table 1 in the paper. D. Empirical Extensions to Neighboring Land Reform Findings landowners should be most capable of successfully pushing for democracy when threatened by neighboring land reform in circumstances where they are members of or allies to the coalition supporting the current authoritarian regime. This gives them greater political influence over regime change. Furthermore, landowners should be more willing to support democracy when state capacity is higher and could be effectively leveraged to expropriate landowners.
C. Robustness of Main Findings to Focusing on More Agrarian Countries In order to ensure that the Table 1 statistical analyses are not sensitive to the relational nature of the power of different classes, I test the robustness of the main findings to a subset of country-years where the agricultural population comprises greater than 30% of the total population. I do the same for a subset of country-years where the agricultural population comprises greater than 40% or 50% of the total population. This captures more agrarian economies where landed elites should be stronger vis-à-vis other economic elites (e.g., industrialists) and state actors. Table A3 presents the results. Models 1-4 of Table A3 replicate Models 1-4 of Table 1 in the manuscript but restrict the sample to country-years where the agricultural population comprises greater than 30% of the total population. The results are similar to those in Table 1 despite the reduced sample, and strengthen in several models. Labor-Dependent Agriculture remains negatively and statistically significantly tied to democratic duration in Models 1B-4B, and the magnitude of the coefficients generally increases. Furthermore, Labor-Dependent Agriculture drops below the 10% level in Models 3A and 4A of Table A3 relative to Models 3A and 4A in the paper. In short, the findings strengthen somewhat under this robustness test. 5 of Table A3 repeats Model 3 but restricts the sample to country-years where the agricultural population comprises greater than 40% of the total population. Again the results for Labor-Dependent Agriculture hold despite the reduced sample, and grow even stronger in substantive terms. Model 6 of Table A3 again repeats Model 3 but now restricts the sample to country-years where the agricultural population comprises greater than 50% of the total population. Yet again the results hold, even though the sample size is reduced by more than 60% relative to Model 3 of Table 1 in the paper. D. Empirical Extensions to Neighboring Land Reform Findings landowners should be most capable of successfully pushing for democracy when threatened by neighboring land reform in circumstances where they are members of or allies to the coalition supporting the current authoritarian regime. This gives them greater political influence over regime change. Furthermore, landowners should be more willing to support democracy when state capacity is higher and could be effectively leveraged to expropriate landowners.