Complementing Consensus Plurality Election Groups that seek consensus on basic agreements may Here we see rivals up for election. Each voter vote on other issues, such as choosing a minor detail prefers the one with the closest political position. So the like a paint color or funding a few optional projects. voters on the left vote yes for the candidate on the left. Fair Share Voting gives fair shares of power. Ms. K is the candidate nearest four voters. Inclusive yet fast, it won't let one person block action. L is nearest two and M is nearest Cooperative, not consensual or adversarial, it is less Candidates L and M split the voters on the right. about blocking rivals, more about attracting allies. Does anyone get a majority (over half)? Yes, No Its ballot guides a voter to limit and prioritize budgets. Who gets the plurality (the largest number)? K, L, M Its tally weighs dozens of desires, of varied cost and Who gets the second-largest number of K, L, M priority, from dozens of overlapping groups. We may modify our FSV results through our usual process. A mere plurality gives the winner a weak mandate. That is the legitimacy effective votes loan to a winner. All majorities prefer the Condorcet winner. Strong mandates are a goal of accurate democracy. A proposal needs to top each rival by 50% plus one; and we may require it to win 60% or even 100% over the status quo on issues that involve our basic agreements. So 41%, or even one voter, may block a Condorcet winner by writing-in a basic concern about it. By plurality rule, the one with the most votes wins. K is nearest four voters. M is nearest three. L is nearest two. Carpentry Analogy No. K. M. 9 The nice consensus methods are like nice hand tools, and these nice voting methods are like nice power tools. (Unlike power tools, nice voting tools are free and easy.) The power tools speed cutting through piles of boards or issues and cutting through a hardened board or issue. But high-touch tools help us appreciate our options and develop insights.2 So most of us use both kinds of tools. 56
Complementing Consensus Groups that seek consensus on basic agreements may vote on other issues, such as choosing a minor detail like a paint color or funding a few optional projects. Fair Share Voting gives fair shares of power. Inclusive yet fast, it won't let one person block action. Cooperative, not consensual or adversarial, it is less about blocking rivals, more about attracting allies. Its ballot guides a voter to limit and prioritize budgets. Its tally weighs dozens of desires, of varied cost and priority, from dozens of overlapping groups. We may modify our FSV results through our usual process. All majorities prefer the Condorcet winner. A proposal needs to top each rival by 50% plus one; and we may require it to win 60% or even 100% over the status quo on issues that involve our basic agreements. So 41%, or even one voter, may block a Condorcet winner by writing-in a basic concern about it. Carpentry Analogy The nice consensus methods are like nice hand tools, and these nice voting methods are like nice power tools. (Unlike power tools, nice voting tools are free and easy.) The power tools speed cutting through piles of boards or issues and cutting through a hardened board or issue. But high-touch tools help us appreciate our options and develop insights.2 So most of us use both kinds of tools. 56 Plurality Election Here we see rivals up for election. Each voter prefers the one with the closest political position. So the voters on the left vote yes for the candidate on the left. Ms. K is the candidate nearest four voters. L is nearest two and M is nearest Candidates L and M split the voters on the right. Does anyone get a majority (over half)? Yes, No Who gets the plurality (the largest number)? K, L, M Who gets the second-largest number of K, L, M A mere plurality gives the winner a weak mandate. That is the legitimacy effective votes loan to a winner. Strong mandates are a goal of accurate democracy. By plurality rule, the one with the most votes wins. K is nearest four voters. M is nearest three. L is nearest two. No. K. M. 9