two separate aspects, namely the SUBJECT MATTER and THE FURNITURE & INVENTORY (LAST MENTIONED SEPARATELY LISTED IN AN ANNEXURE). [108] For the foregoing reasons, it becomes clear that the subject matter does not include the furniture and inventory. A reading of clause 12 shows indubitably that any default in that case referred exclusively to the subject matter and had nothing to do with the purchase of the furniture and inventory. It is for that reason that I am of the considered opinion that Ms De Jager is eminently correct and Mr Brandt is correspondingly wrong in his reliance on this clause. In any event, this issue was never pleaded by the defendants, thus depriving the plaintiff, of the necessary notice, to deal with it at the appropriate time. Neither, I must add, was it raised with the plaintiff in The defendants attempt to use this is as a sword when it was never even introduced in the pleadings as a shield, so to speak, must accordingly be rejected as I hereby do. [109] Ms De Jager also argued, in the event her submissions recorded above did not carry the day, that even if the plaintiff had given notice, there was no prospect of the defendants remedying the breach for the reason that they left for Germany, with the property forming part of the furniture and inventory locked away. I do not think it is necessary to deal with this issue in the light of the clear and unambiguous wording of the agreement as discussed above. [110] One is, however, certain as death and taxes and it is this - the plaintiff, by letter dated 6 June 2011, authored by Messrs. Ahrens & Associates on his behalf, cancelled the portion of the agreement relating to furniture and inventory in clear and unambiguous terms. A tender for the return of the furniture and inventory received, was also made in this letter. In this regard, at the top of page 3 of the letter under reference provides the following:
two separate aspects, namely the SUBJECT MATTER and THE FURNITURE & INVENTORY (LAST MENTIONED SEPARATELY LISTED IN AN ANNEXURE). [108] For the foregoing reasons, it becomes clear that the subject matter does not include the furniture and inventory. A reading of clause 12 shows indubitably that any default in that case referred exclusively to the subject matter and had nothing to do with the purchase of the furniture and inventory. It is for that reason that I am of the considered opinion that Ms De Jager is eminently correct and Mr Brandt is correspondingly wrong in his reliance on this clause. In any event, this issue was never pleaded by the defendants, thus depriving the plaintiff, of the necessary notice, to deal with it at the appropriate time. Neither, I must add, was it raised with the plaintiff in The defendants attempt to use this is as a sword when it was never even introduced in the pleadings as a shield, so to speak, must accordingly be rejected as I hereby do. [109] Ms De Jager also argued, in the event her submissions recorded above did not carry the day, that even if the plaintiff had given notice, there was no prospect of the defendants remedying the breach for the reason that they left for Germany, with the property forming part of the furniture and inventory locked away. I do not think it is necessary to deal with this issue in the light of the clear and unambiguous wording of the agreement as discussed above. [110] One is, however, certain as death and taxes and it is this - the plaintiff, by letter dated 6 June 2011, authored by Messrs. Ahrens & Associates on his behalf, cancelled the portion of the agreement relating to furniture and inventory in clear and unambiguous terms. A tender for the return of the furniture and inventory received, was also made in this letter. In this regard, at the top of page 3 of the letter under reference provides the following: