and even minimal of content. Recovering some sustainable sort of incorrectly), determinateness cognitive authority associated with immediacy then obliges the candidate knower (consciousness) to something, to make distinctions and invoke relations among the various do instances of authority of this kind. The chapter is an investigation into the epistemic authority of what Hegel Sense Certainty calls [Unmittelbarkeit]. The distinction between immediacy and mediation is a “immediacy” central one in Hegel’s philosophical vocabulary. Though it has many species and ramifications, the idea he generalizes from is to be found in specifically epistemic immediacy. We can think of his terminology as anchored in Kant’s usage: All certainty is either or that is, it either requires proof or mediated not mediated, is neither susceptible nor in need of any proof. There may be ever so much in our cognition that is mediately certain only, that is only through proof, yet there must also be something or and all our cognition indemonstrable immediately certain, must start from propositions. immediately certain Kant is distinguishing between knowledge or belief that is the result of and inference what we come to know or believe noninferentially. The paradigm (though not the only species) of noninferentially acquired belief is observational judgments, in subjects respond directly to perceptible states of affairs—for instance, the visible redness of an apple—by coming to belief that the apple is red. It is the kind of epistemic authority distinctive of such episodes that Hegel analyzes under the rubric of sense “immediate certainty.” Kant finds it natural to talk about inference (whose most robust, variety he calls in terms of because he is thinking of the “proof”) “mediation” role of the middle terms in classical syllogisms (for him, the very form of inference), which secure the inferential connections between premises and conclusions. that is, commitments, arrived at by reasoning are accordingly denominated “Certainties”, Those with a noninferential provenance, by contrast, are called “mediated.” “immediate.” The epistemological conception Hegel addresses as certainty” is shaped not “sense just by Kant’s conception of epistemic but more proximally by his conception immediacy,
incorrectly), and even minimal determinateness of content. Recovering some sustainable sort of cognitive authority associated with immediacy then obliges the candidate knower (consciousness) to do something, to make distinctions and invoke relations among the various instances of authority of this kind. The Sense Certainty chapter is an investigation into the epistemic authority of what Hegel calls “immediacy” [Unmittelbarkeit]. The distinction between immediacy and mediation is a central one in Hegel’s philosophical vocabulary. Though it has many species and ramifications, the idea he generalizes from is to be found in specifically epistemic immediacy. We can think of his terminology as anchored in Kant’s usage: All certainty is either mediated or not mediated, that is, it either requires proof or is neither susceptible nor in need of any proof. There may be ever so much in our cognition that is mediately certain only, that is only through proof, yet there must also be something indemonstrable or immediately certain, and all our cognition must start from immediately certain propositions. Kant is distinguishing between knowledge or belief that is the result of inference and what we come to know or believe noninferentially. The paradigm (though not the only species) of noninferentially acquired belief is observational judgments, in subjects respond directly to perceptible states of affairs—for instance, the visible redness of an apple—by coming to belief that the apple is red. It is the kind of epistemic authority distinctive of such episodes that Hegel analyzes under the rubric of “immediate sense certainty.” Kant finds it natural to talk about inference (whose most robust, variety he calls “proof”) in terms of “mediation” because he is thinking of the role of the middle terms in classical syllogisms (for him, the very form of inference), which secure the inferential connections between premises and conclusions. “Certainties”, that is, commitments, arrived at by reasoning are accordingly denominated “mediated.” Those with a noninferential provenance, by contrast, are called “immediate.” The epistemological conception Hegel addresses as “sense certainty” is shaped not just by Kant’s conception of epistemic immediacy, but more proximally by his conception