existence, unless Stanford also holds that we should be realists about (empirically successful, widely adopted) theoretical claims that are inferred. But if the projectively PUA applies to projective inferences, then we should not be realists about the conclusions of projective arguments. Thus, it appears Stanford can only use reply (a) by giving up his selective, or instrumentalism. And if he does that, then his view ‘limited,’ “piecemeal” collapses back into the classical PI (or something very similar) (Magnus 2010, §3), at least in terms of how much we should cast over our current scientific theories, ‘suspicion’ i.e. the cognitive attitude we take towards scientific theories that we endorse. There could still be other differences with the old-fashioned PI. Specifically, even if the extent of suspicion of current scientific theories is the same for this kind of Stanfordite and e.g. someone who follows Laudan (1981), this for that amount of reasons Stanfordite’s suspicion—namely, the PUA (extended to cover projective inferences)—could differ from a reasons (or lack thereof). Laudanite’s Suppose Stanford instead pursues (b), claiming that the above examples are actually eliminative inferences in disguise. Then there are two possibilities: either all apparently projective inferences are actually eliminative inferences, or there is something special about these particular apparently projective inferences that makes them eliminative inferences in disguise. If the first, i.e. all apparently projective inferences are actually eliminative inferences, then the distinction between projective and eliminative inference disappears again, and with it piecemeal, limited skepticism. So Stanford’s there must be something about these apparently projective inferences that particular make them eliminative. However, this appears untenable for Stanford as well. For he says that because one can projective inference as an eliminative one (2010, any “reframe”
existence, unless Stanford also holds that we should be realists about (empirically successful, widely adopted) theoretical claims that are projectively inferred. But if the PUA applies to projective inferences, then we should not be realists about the conclusions of projective arguments. Thus, it appears Stanford can only use reply (a) by giving up his ‘limited,’ selective, or “piecemeal” instrumentalism. And if he does that, then his view collapses back into the classical PI (or something very similar) (Magnus 2010, §3), at least in terms of how much ‘suspicion’ we should cast over our current scientific theories, i.e. the cognitive attitude we take towards scientific theories that we endorse. There could still be other differences with the old-fashioned PI. Specifically, even if the extent of suspicion of current scientific theories is the same for this kind of Stanfordite and e.g. someone who follows Laudan (1981), this Stanfordite’s reasons for that amount of suspicion—namely, the PUA (extended to cover projective inferences)—could differ from a Laudanite’s reasons (or lack thereof). Suppose Stanford instead pursues (b), claiming that the above examples are actually eliminative inferences in disguise. Then there are two possibilities: either all apparently projective inferences are actually eliminative inferences, or there is something special about these particular apparently projective inferences that makes them eliminative inferences in disguise. If the first, i.e. all apparently projective inferences are actually eliminative inferences, then the distinction between projective and eliminative inference disappears again, and with it Stanford’s piecemeal, limited skepticism. So there must be something about these particular apparently projective inferences that make them eliminative. However, this appears untenable for Stanford as well. For he says that because one can “reframe” any projective inference as an eliminative one (2010,