Veto threatened provisions are more likely to be introduced in the initial proposal than 2A: subsequently. The second chamber will modify the chamber’s threatened provisions, producing a 2B: Bicameral Haggle. The House of Representatives’ proposals are more likely to attract a veto threat than the Senate’s. 2C: Given the institutional differences between the House and Senate, veto threatened provisions will 2D: follow a House-initiated Bicameral Haggle. Conference Committee Conference represents a critical juncture in discovering policy that each chamber’s pivotal member and the president prefer to the status quo. Conferees must find a bill that a majority in each chamber will agree to, as well as one that the president will likely sign. To minimize miscalculation, conferees routinely solicit the views of the president’s representatives, even inviting them into deliberations (Longley and Oleszek 1988). As conference searches for mutually acceptable policy, 3A predicts that it will favor available moderation of veto threatened provisions. This might involve conferees simply ratifying compromises the House and Senate have already struck (same chamber and bicameral haggles), resolving disagreements between the chambers (same chamber reversals) or even perhaps moderating provisions the chambers had previously stonewalled. Conference will be more likely to modify (and preserve previous modifications to) veto 3A: threatened than unthreatened provisions. IV. Data and Method Both former White House aides and internal memoranda archived at presidential libraries tell a story of administration representatives continuously communicating the president’s views on legislation pending before Congress. White House legislative affairs teams spend much of the workday on the Hill privately plying individual legislators. These and numerous other private efforts are certainly less costly, and less credible, than public veto threats. The latter class includes a variety of activities spanning a broad spectrum of publicness from the president’s nationally televised annual
2A: Veto threatened provisions are more likely to be introduced in the initial proposal than subsequently. 2B: The second chamber will modify the chamber’s threatened provisions, producing a Bicameral Haggle. 2C: The House of Representatives’ proposals are more likely to attract a veto threat than the Senate’s. 2D: Given the institutional differences between the House and Senate, veto threatened provisions will follow a House-initiated Bicameral Haggle. Conference Committee Conference represents a critical juncture in discovering policy that each chamber’s pivotal member and the president prefer to the status quo. Conferees must find a bill that a majority in each chamber will agree to, as well as one that the president will likely sign. To minimize miscalculation, conferees routinely solicit the views of the president’s representatives, even inviting them into deliberations (Longley and Oleszek 1988). As conference searches for mutually acceptable policy, 3A predicts that it will favor available moderation of veto threatened provisions. This might involve conferees simply ratifying compromises the House and Senate have already struck (same chamber and bicameral haggles), resolving disagreements between the chambers (same chamber reversals) or even perhaps moderating provisions the chambers had previously stonewalled. 3A: Conference will be more likely to modify (and preserve previous modifications to) veto threatened than unthreatened provisions. IV. Data and Method Both former White House aides and internal memoranda archived at presidential libraries tell a story of administration representatives continuously communicating the president’s views on legislation pending before Congress. White House legislative affairs teams spend much of the workday on the Hill privately plying individual legislators. These and numerous other private efforts are certainly less costly, and less credible, than public veto threats. The latter class includes a variety of activities spanning a broad spectrum of publicness from the president’s nationally televised annual