The intelligence services are already subject to a robust oversight regime which includes oversight of their functions under RIPA by the Intelligence Services Commissioner and, where relevant, the Interception of Communications Commissioner. The Ministry of Defence and Her Majesty’s forces are also subject to oversight by those Commissioners where relevant. All those who are using the authorisation regimes set out in RIPA must already comply with the legislative provisions and the statutory Codes of Practice, which are subject to parliamentary approval. The power of direction will be used to further enhance those safeguards by identifying specific additional functions that are appropriate for oversight by the Intelligence Services Commissioner. It will not detract from the existing oversight regime or alter the nature of the safeguards that have already been approved by Parliament. It is therefore appropriate for the power of direction to be exercised without additional parliamentary approval. Those directions will also be published unless that would be contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to one of the matters set out above. This ensures increased transparency of the functions of the Intelligence Services Commissioner and of the oversight of the intelligence services. An example of a direction under section 59A will be produced and published alongside the Bill. If the Bill successfully passes through Parliament it is intended that this direction will be made to put the Intelligence Services Commissioner’s role in monitoring compliance with the detainee guidance referred to in paragraph 29 above on a statutory footing. Closed material proceedings Clauses 6 to 11 of the Bill will introduce a statutory mechanism for proceedings in the High Court, Court of Appeal and Court of Session to be heard using a closed material procedure (“CMP”). A CMP is a procedure which incorporates the following elements: A party to the court proceedings is in possession of relevant material which, if disclosed openly, even if only to another party in the litigation or to that party’s legal representatives, would risk damaging the interests of national security. Such a party will nearly always be a Government body but it is
The intelligence services are already subject to a robust oversight regime which includes oversight of their functions under RIPA by the Intelligence Services Commissioner and, where relevant, the Interception of Communications Commissioner. The Ministry of Defence and Her Majesty’s forces are also subject to oversight by those Commissioners where relevant. All those who are using the authorisation regimes set out in RIPA must already comply with the legislative provisions and the statutory Codes of Practice, which are subject to parliamentary approval. The power of direction will be used to further enhance those safeguards by identifying specific additional functions that are appropriate for oversight by the Intelligence Services Commissioner. It will not detract from the existing oversight regime or alter the nature of the safeguards that have already been approved by Parliament. It is therefore appropriate for the power of direction to be exercised without additional parliamentary approval. Those directions will also be published unless that would be contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to one of the matters set out above. This ensures increased transparency of the functions of the Intelligence Services Commissioner and of the oversight of the intelligence services. An example of a direction under section 59A will be produced and published alongside the Bill. If the Bill successfully passes through Parliament it is intended that this direction will be made to put the Intelligence Services Commissioner’s role in monitoring compliance with the detainee guidance referred to in paragraph 29 above on a statutory footing. Closed material proceedings Clauses 6 to 11 of the Bill will introduce a statutory mechanism for proceedings in the High Court, Court of Appeal and Court of Session to be heard using a closed material procedure (“CMP”). A CMP is a procedure which incorporates the following elements: A party to the court proceedings is in possession of relevant material which, if disclosed openly, even if only to another party in the litigation or to that party’s legal representatives, would risk damaging the interests of national security. Such a party will nearly always be a Government body but it is