Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) Opinion of the Court reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances. Endrew’s parents argue that the Act goes even further. In their view, a FAPE is “an education that aims to provide a child with a disability opportunities to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and contribute tosociety that are substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities.” Brief for Petitioner 40. This standard is strikingly similar to the one the lowerc ourts adopted in Rowley, and it is virtually identical tothe formulation advanced by Justice Blackmun in his separate writing in that case. See 458 U. S., at 185–186; id., at 211 (opinion concurring in judgment) (“[T]he question is whether Amy’s program . . . offered her an opportunity to understand and participate in the classroom that was substantially equal to that given her non-handicapped classmates”). But the majority rejected any such standard in clear terms. Id., at 198 (“The requirement that States provide ‘equal’ educational opportunities would . . . seem to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons”). Mindful that Congress (despite several intervening amendments to the IDEA) has not materially changed the statutory definition of a FAPE since Rowley was decided, we decline to interpret the FAPE provision in a manner so plainly at odds with the Court’s analysis in that case. Compare §1401(18) (1976 ed.) with §1401(9) (2012 ed.). We will not attempt to elaborate on what “appropriate” progress will look like from case to case. It is in the nature of the Act and the standard we adopt to resist such an effort: The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) Opinion of the Court reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances. Endrew’s parents argue that the Act goes even further. In their view, a FAPE is “an education that aims to provide a child with a disability opportunities to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and contribute tosociety that are substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities.” Brief for Petitioner 40. This standard is strikingly similar to the one the lowerc ourts adopted in Rowley, and it is virtually identical tothe formulation advanced by Justice Blackmun in his separate writing in that case. See 458 U. S., at 185–186; id., at 211 (opinion concurring in judgment) (“[T]he question is whether Amy’s program . . . offered her an opportunity to understand and participate in the classroom that was substantially equal to that given her non-handicapped classmates”). But the majority rejected any such standard in clear terms. Id., at 198 (“The requirement that States provide ‘equal’ educational opportunities would . . . seem to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons”). Mindful that Congress (despite several intervening amendments to the IDEA) has not materially changed the statutory definition of a FAPE since Rowley was decided, we decline to interpret the FAPE provision in a manner so plainly at odds with the Court’s analysis in that case. Compare §1401(18) (1976 ed.) with §1401(9) (2012 ed.). We will not attempt to elaborate on what “appropriate” progress will look like from case to case. It is in the nature of the Act and the standard we adopt to resist such an effort: The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique