under Title III, and that some of Winn-Dixie services are provided via its website. Stores’ Accordingly, this court need not decide whether Winn-Dixie website itself is a place of Stores’ public accommodation in order to resolve this motion. Rather, this court need only determine whether Mr. Gil has sufficiently pled that Winn Dixie Stores denied him the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations on the basis of disability when it refused to make its website accessible to blind patrons. Thus, the district analysis in is inapposite. Southwest Airlines court’s Title III Coverage of the Goods and Services on Winn-Dixie Website is also Stores’ Consistent with the Case Law in All Other Circuits to have Decided the Issue. Outside of the Eleventh Circuit, some courts have concluded that Title III reaches all private entities whose operations fall within the 12 statutorily enumerated categories of public accommodation, regardless of whether the entity owns or operates out of a brick and mortar facility. Other courts have concluded that Title prohibition on discrimination in the goods III’s and services any place of public requires a physical place and that Title III “of accommodation” only covers goods and services with a sufficient nexus to that physical place. But no courts have found, as Defendant proposes here, Title III inapplicable to goods and services provided on a website of a place of public accommodation that has a strong nexus to a physical location. In the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits, courts have concluded that Title III does not limit places of public accommodation to physical spaces. See, e.g., Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding Title of New England, Inc., Automotive Wholesaler’s Assoc. III not limited to physical places); 97 F.Supp. 3d 565 (D. Vt. of the Blind v. Scribd, Nat’l Fed’n 2015) (finding website with no nexus to a physical space covered under Title III); Nat’l Assoc. of
under Title III, and that some of Winn-Dixie Stores’ services are provided via its website. Accordingly, this court need not decide whether Winn-Dixie Stores’ website itself is a place of public accommodation in order to resolve this motion. Rather, this court need only determine whether Mr. Gil has sufficiently pled that Winn Dixie Stores denied him the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations on the basis of disability when it refused to make its website accessible to blind patrons. Thus, the district court’s analysis in Southwest Airlines is inapposite. Title III Coverage of the Goods and Services on Winn-Dixie Stores’ Website is also Consistent with the Case Law in All Other Circuits to have Decided the Issue. Outside of the Eleventh Circuit, some courts have concluded that Title III reaches all private entities whose operations fall within the 12 statutorily enumerated categories of public accommodation, regardless of whether the entity owns or operates out of a brick and mortar facility. Other courts have concluded that Title III’s prohibition on discrimination in the goods and services “of any place of public accommodation” requires a physical place and that Title III only covers goods and services with a sufficient nexus to that physical place. But no courts have found, as Defendant proposes here, Title III inapplicable to goods and services provided on a website of a place of public accommodation that has a strong nexus to a physical location. In the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits, courts have concluded that Title III does not limit places of public accommodation to physical spaces. See, e.g., Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Assoc. of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding Title III not limited to physical places); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd, 97 F.Supp. 3d 565 (D. Vt. 2015) (finding website with no nexus to a physical space covered under Title III); Nat’l Assoc. of