Finally, we reject Choe’s request for mitigation credit for promptly refunding some of the at-issue fees because he did not do so until well after he was terminated. V. PUBLIC PROTECTION REQUIRES DISBARMENT Our disciplinary analysis begins with the standards. (In (2005) 36 Cal.4th re Silverton 81, 91.) Standard 2.18 instructs that disbarment or actual suspension is appropriate discipline for a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3, and standard 2.11 instructs that actual suspension to disbarment is appropriate for acts of turpitude with the degree of sanction depending on the magnitude of the misconduct, the harm caused, and the extent to which it relates to the member’s practice of law. Choe maintains that disbarment is excessive in light of our only published case involving Section 2944.7—In 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 221. We disagree the Matter of Taylor, supra, because is distinguishable. Taylor Taylor was culpable of charging pre-performance loan modification fees in eight matters and one count of failing to provide the required loan modification disclosures. His misconduct was aggravated by multiple acts of misconduct, significant client harm, and lack of remorse; his single mitigating factor was good character. He failed to provide full refunds to his clients upon their request. Throughout the disciplinary proceedings, Taylor maintained that Section 2944.7 permitted him to charge for unbundled services. He was suspended for six months and ordered to pay restitution totaling about $15,000 with interest. Unquestionably, Choe’s misconduct is more serious than Taylor’s given the number of client matters and the amount of fees involved. Significantly, Taylor was not culpable of moral turpitude whereas Choe committed several acts of moral turpitude both in his bankruptcy practice and through the unauthorized withdrawal of fees. Accordingly, a much more significant discipline is warranted.
Finally, we reject Choe’s request for mitigation credit for promptly refunding some of the at-issue fees because he did not do so until well after he was terminated. V. PUBLIC PROTECTION REQUIRES DISBARMENT Our disciplinary analysis begins with the standards. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 91.) Standard 2.18 instructs that disbarment or actual suspension is appropriate discipline for a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3, and standard 2.11 instructs that actual suspension to disbarment is appropriate for acts of turpitude with the degree of sanction depending on the magnitude of the misconduct, the harm caused, and the extent to which it relates to the member’s practice of law. Choe maintains that disbarment is excessive in light of our only published case involving Section 2944.7—In the Matter of Taylor, supra, 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 221. We disagree because Taylor is distinguishable. Taylor was culpable of charging pre-performance loan modification fees in eight matters and one count of failing to provide the required loan modification disclosures. His misconduct was aggravated by multiple acts of misconduct, significant client harm, and lack of remorse; his single mitigating factor was good character. He failed to provide full refunds to his clients upon their request. Throughout the disciplinary proceedings, Taylor maintained that Section 2944.7 permitted him to charge for unbundled services. He was suspended for six months and ordered to pay restitution totaling about $15,000 with interest. Unquestionably, Choe’s misconduct is more serious than Taylor’s given the number of client matters and the amount of fees involved. Significantly, Taylor was not culpable of moral turpitude whereas Choe committed several acts of moral turpitude both in his bankruptcy practice and through the unauthorized withdrawal of fees. Accordingly, a much more significant discipline is warranted.