So in the conceptual normativity implicit in linguistic practice we have a model of a kind of constraint—loss of negative freedom—that is repaid many times over in a bonanza of positive freedom. Anyone who was in a position to consider the trade-off rationally would consider it a once-in-a-lifetime bargain. Of course, one need not be a creature like us. As Sellars says, one always could simply only at the price of having nothing to say. And non-sapient not speak—but sentients are hardly in a position to weigh the pros and cons involved. But the fact remains that there an argument that shows that at least sort of normative constraint is rational from the is this point of view of the individual—that it pays off by opening up a dimension of positive expressive freedom that is a pearl without price, available in no other way. idea is that Hegel’s this case provides the model that every other social or political institution that proposes to constrain our negative freedom should be compared to and measured against. The question always is: what new kind of positive expressive freedom, what new kinds of life-possibilities, what new kinds of commitment, responsibility, and authority are made possible by the institution? V. Conclusion 8. normative conception of intentionality moves to the center of the philosophical Kant’s stage the question of how we should think about the force or bindingness (‘Gültigkeit’, of normative statuses such as commitment, authority, and responsibility. ‘Verbindlichkeit’) response is to develop and extend the Enlightenment commitment to the Kant’s dependence of normative statuses in the form of his model, which serves also as a autonomy
So in the conceptual normativity implicit in linguistic practice we have a model of a kind of constraint—loss of negative freedom—that is repaid many times over in a bonanza of positive freedom. Anyone who was in a position to consider the trade-off rationally would consider it a once-in-a-lifetime bargain. Of course, one need not be a creature like us. As Sellars says, one always could simply not speak—but only at the price of having nothing to say. And non-sapient sentients are hardly in a position to weigh the pros and cons involved. But the fact remains that there is an argument that shows that at least this sort of normative constraint is rational from the point of view of the individual—that it pays off by opening up a dimension of positive expressive freedom that is a pearl without price, available in no other way. Hegel’s idea is that this case provides the model that every other social or political institution that proposes to constrain our negative freedom should be compared to and measured against. The question always is: what new kind of positive expressive freedom, what new kinds of life-possibilities, what new kinds of commitment, responsibility, and authority are made possible by the institution? V. Conclusion 8. Kant’s normative conception of intentionality moves to the center of the philosophical stage the question of how we should think about the force or bindingness (‘Gültigkeit’, ‘Verbindlichkeit’) of normative statuses such as commitment, authority, and responsibility. Kant’s response is to develop and extend the Enlightenment commitment to the of normative statuses in the form of his autonomy model, which serves also as a dependence