structure that has an ultimate monopoly over the legitimate exercise of coercive capabilities’”. The same issues of economic inefficiency that exist with other non-natural monopolies (post office, public utilities, transportation) must also be true with a monopoly over law. V. Ostrom argues that for any polycentric system of governance to exist and persist through time, structure of order relationships would have to prevail, perhaps, under the “a illusion of chaos.” One might say a Smithian invisible hand producing a hidden order. Polanyi distinguished between two different methods of organization: deliberate direct order coordinated by central authority and the other spontaneous and polycentric, the elements of a “where complex system are allowed to make mutual adjustments to each other” as a part of a system of rules. While Polanyi fully support polycentricity within a legal system—differing courts and circuits—he argues that polycentricity cannot function without a pre-existing legal framework which provides adequate private property protection and contract enforcement. V. Ostrom affirmed Polanyi’s claim, adding that such private property rights must be maintained in a legal and judicial system which exists prior to the market being able to function. E. Ostrom also does not believe in the plausibility of private courts, stating that you need centralized government to provide fair, and honest courts systems, effective property right systems”, which “efficient, cannot be provided locally, to facilitate self-governing societies and private common pool resource management. However, as seen, the theory of polycentricity still strongly supports private legal systems without the prerequisite of private property protection. V. Ostrom provides three conditions for polycentric governance to exist and function efficiently: first, there must be freedom of entry. Second, there must be enforcement: “If individuals or units operating in a polycentric order have incentives to take actions to enforce general rules of conduct, then polycentricity will become an increasingly viable form of
structure that has an ultimate monopoly over the legitimate exercise of coercive capabilities’”. The same issues of economic inefficiency that exist with other non-natural monopolies (post office, public utilities, transportation) must also be true with a monopoly over law. V. Ostrom argues that for any polycentric system of governance to exist and persist through time, “a structure of order relationships would have to prevail, perhaps, under the illusion of chaos.” One might say a Smithian invisible hand producing a hidden order. Polanyi distinguished between two different methods of organization: deliberate direct order coordinated by central authority and the other spontaneous and polycentric, “where the elements of a complex system are allowed to make mutual adjustments to each other” as a part of a system of rules. While Polanyi fully support polycentricity within a legal system—differing courts and circuits—he argues that polycentricity cannot function without a pre-existing legal framework which provides adequate private property protection and contract enforcement. V. Ostrom affirmed Polanyi’s claim, adding that such private property rights must be maintained in a legal and judicial system which exists prior to the market being able to function. E. Ostrom also does not believe in the plausibility of private courts, stating that you need centralized government to provide “efficient, fair, and honest courts systems, effective property right systems”, which cannot be provided locally, to facilitate self-governing societies and private common pool resource management. However, as seen, the theory of polycentricity still strongly supports private legal systems without the prerequisite of private property protection. V. Ostrom provides three conditions for polycentric governance to exist and function efficiently: first, there must be freedom of entry. Second, there must be enforcement: “If individuals or units operating in a polycentric order have incentives to take actions to enforce general rules of conduct, then polycentricity will become an increasingly viable form of