1552 4.5.4.2 "IEEE Std 802.11 defines Clarify the relationship Rejected the following four IEEE between 802.11ay and IEEE 802.11ai FILS 802.11 authentication 802.11ai FILS authentication methods: Open System 5 authentication. doesn't fit in the authentication, Shared message protocol Key authentication, FT flow with FAA. authentication, and The first simultaneous authentication authentication of equals message is 6 (SAE) and EDMG fast piggybacked over authentication and the DMG beacon association (FAA)." message while the FILS starts with IEEE 802.11 authentication FILS autentication is not message. referred here. It is not clear FILS authentication can be used with 802.11ay. 1640 12.12 The FAA construction Remove FAA from Rejected with a fixed PSK and PTK P802.11ay or more clearly 1) The EDMG FAA derivation using describe when it can (and was introduced in ANonce/SNonce does more importantly, cannot the paragraph of not look particularly be used) and how a secure 4.5.4.2 with secure. Why is that PSK is going to be defintion. added here? The existing provisioned. 2) The PSK PSK mechanism in 4-way geneation handshake is already algorithm is out known to be problematic of scope but with weak passwords recommended to and same would apply follow the NIST for this new FAA design, SP800-92 as so it would depend on specified in 12.12 some unspecified 3) EDMG FAA mechanism for only applies to the 11ad/11ay cryptographically secure devices PSKs. What would that provisioning mechanism be? Why is FAA needed in the first place? SAE should be used if passwords-style authentication without EAP is desired (or alternatively, FILS public key authentication if this could use public keys instead of PSKs).
1552 4.5.4.2 "IEEE Std 802.11 defines the following four IEEE 802.11 authentication methods: Open System 5 authentication, Shared Key authentication, FT authentication, and simultaneous authentication of equals 6 (SAE) and EDMG fast authentication and association (FAA)." FILS autentication is not referred here. It is not clear FILS authentication can be used with 802.11ay. Clarify the relationship between 802.11ay and 802.11ai FILS authentication. Rejected IEEE 802.11ai FILS authentication doesn't fit in the message protocol flow with FAA. The first authentication message is piggybacked over the DMG beacon message while the FILS starts with IEEE 802.11 authentication message. 1640 12.12 The FAA construction with a fixed PSK and PTK derivation using ANonce/SNonce does not look particularly secure. Why is that added here? The existing PSK mechanism in 4-way handshake is already known to be problematic with weak passwords and same would apply for this new FAA design, so it would depend on some unspecified mechanism for cryptographically secure PSKs. What would that provisioning mechanism be? Why is FAA needed in the first place? SAE should be used if passwords-style authentication without EAP is desired (or alternatively, FILS public key authentication if this could use public keys instead of PSKs). Remove FAA from P802.11ay or more clearly describe when it can (and more importantly, cannot be used) and how a secure PSK is going to be provisioned. Rejected 1) The EDMG FAA was introduced in the paragraph of 4.5.4.2 with defintion. 2) The PSK geneation algorithm is out of scope but recommended to follow the NIST SP800-92 as specified in 12.12 3) EDMG FAA only applies to the 11ad/11ay devices