Defendants stores (e.g. providing statements and other messages in large text or braille, allowing persons with disabilities to be accompanied by service animals, or providing auxiliary aids for effective communication that are as simple as paper and pencil or perhaps to provide sign language interpreters for certain complex transactions), receive no relief under this Decree, yet they will forgo their rights to bring a claim for such relief. This outcome does not comport with the requirement that consent decrees binding class members be fair, adequate, and reasonable. Piambino, 757 F.2d at 1139. 2. Even If The Association Has Standing To Sue On Behalf of Its Members, It Has Not Satisfied the Standing Requirements For Class Actions An association typically has standing to sue to redress injuries suffered by its own members. Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879 (11th Cir. 1999). However, an association seeking to represent a class must have members who allege injuries sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements for each class claim or subclaim on behalf of the class. See, e.g., Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1280 (11th Cir. 2000) ([E]ach [class] claim must be analyzed separately, and a claim cannot be asserted on behalf of a class unless at least one named plaintiff has suffered the injury that gives rise to that claim.); see also Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir. 1987) ([A]ny analysis of class certification must begin with the issue of standing.); 1 Newberg on Class Actions 2.05 .06 (3d ed. 1992) (representative plaintiffs must be members of the class they seek to represent and cannot acquire standing to sue by bringing action on behalf of others who suffered injury) (collecting cases). A named plaintiff cannot acquire standing to sue by bringing an action on behalf of others who suffered injury which would have afforded them standing had they been named plaintiffs; it bears repeating that a person cannot predicate standing on an
Defendants stores (e.g. providing statements and other messages in large text or braille, allowing persons with disabilities to be accompanied by service animals, or providing auxiliary aids for effective communication that are as simple as paper and pencil or perhaps to provide sign language interpreters for certain complex transactions), receive no relief under this Decree, yet they will forgo their rights to bring a claim for such relief. This outcome does not comport with the requirement that consent decrees binding class members be fair, adequate, and reasonable. Piambino, 757 F.2d at 1139. 2. Even If The Association Has Standing To Sue On Behalf of Its Members, It Has Not Satisfied the Standing Requirements For Class Actions An association typically has standing to sue to redress injuries suffered by its own members. Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879 (11th Cir. 1999). However, an association seeking to represent a class must have members who allege injuries sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements for each class claim or subclaim on behalf of the class. See, e.g., Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1280 (11th Cir. 2000) ([E]ach [class] claim must be analyzed separately, and a claim cannot be asserted on behalf of a class unless at least one named plaintiff has suffered the injury that gives rise to that claim.); see also Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir. 1987) ([A]ny analysis of class certification must begin with the issue of standing.); 1 Newberg on Class Actions 2.05 .06 (3d ed. 1992) (representative plaintiffs must be members of the class they seek to represent and cannot acquire standing to sue by bringing action on behalf of others who suffered injury) (collecting cases). A named plaintiff cannot acquire standing to sue by bringing an action on behalf of others who suffered injury which would have afforded them standing had they been named plaintiffs; it bears repeating that a person cannot predicate standing on an