any discretion which took into account youth with its [the defendants’] – attendant immaturity and inability to appreciate risk, as well as its greater capacity for redemption.”) As the court explained, unless sentences take account Ramirez “‘into how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in as cruel prison’…they qualify and unusual under In other words, a sentence Miller. Id. punishment” cannot pass constitutional muster if it is derived only from the nature of a crime, and not reflect any consideration of [the “does defendant’s] youth, and does not explain why anyone should assume [the defendant was] less amenable to rehabilitation than other juvenile offenders might have been expected to at 33-34 (quoting 132 S.Ct. at 2469). Rather be.” Id. Miller, than analyze Mr. individual culpability and characteristics and Gutierrez’s then fashion a just sentence accordingly, the trial court instead had to consider whether to from the of life without statutory requirement “deviate the possibility of 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52 (emphasis Moffett, parole.” added) (internal quotation omitted). Sentencing schemes that, absent exceptional circumstances, require courts to impose life without parole contravene for Miller’s requirement individualized sentencing, especially where the statute neither defines exceptional circumstances nor dictates that youth be among them. Prior to imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender, the U.S.
any discretion which took into account [the defendants’] youth – with its attendant immaturity and inability to appreciate risk, as well as its greater capacity for redemption.”) As the Ramirez court explained, unless sentences take “‘into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison’…they qualify as cruel and unusual punishment” under Miller. Id. In other words, a sentence cannot pass constitutional muster if it is derived only from the nature of a crime, and “does not reflect any consideration of [the defendant’s] youth, and does not explain why anyone should assume [the defendant was] less amenable to rehabilitation than other juvenile offenders might have been expected to be.” Id. at 33-34 (quoting Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469). Rather than analyze Mr. Gutierrez’s individual culpability and characteristics and then fashion a just sentence accordingly, the trial court instead had to consider whether to “deviate from the statutory requirement of life without the possibility of parole.” Moffett, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted). Sentencing schemes that, absent exceptional circumstances, require courts to impose life without parole contravene Miller’s requirement for individualized sentencing, especially where the statute neither defines exceptional circumstances nor dictates that youth be among them. Prior to imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender, the U.S.