Breadth of The court holds that the reasoning in and the principle of Seminole Tribe: Hans sovereign immunity amounts to a universal principle of law that encompasses all of article I. Thus, it takes in all of the Article I dissent criticizes this overbreadth, and his powers. Souter’s reasoning leads to the notion of carve-outs. Importation of reasoning: The court imports the theory of congressional intent from the Bivens line of cases, specifically This was forecast in in Bivens Chilicky. Coeur Kennedy’s opinion The Court inferred congressional intent to have an exclusive negotiation remedy from d’Alene. the face of the statute. (This is the remedy the court just struck down.) So it uses a line of reasoning that was designed to prevent the court from fashioning a cause of action to oust the court of equitable authority. This is not a good analogy. The source of relief in and in Bivens is different—Bivens draws directly from the constitution, while was an Seminole Tribe Tribe expressly passed statute. The source of the cause of action is likewise different as is the defendant in the suit. Dissents: Stevens, following his reasoning in rejects state sovereign immunity as a Union Gas, constitutional bar. The constitutional prohibition is limited to diversity cases, and anything else that adds is only common law, and Congress can abrogate it. This is clearly leaving open a Hans day where this might prevail. Souter invites the court to consider whether could remain the Hans rule, but that Congress could still abrogate under some aspects of art. I. Problem of Carve-Outs (Katz): The majority in this case seemed to want to say that bankruptcy was a special case, and that sates were concerned about uniformity and ceded immunity in this area. Stevens also noted the nature of the proceedings in bankruptcy. Four justices in rem dissented, on the ground that there is nothing to distinguish bankruptcy from anything else in the constitution. Quite true. Also, it should be noted that a preference action is not and at in rem, any rate, stands for the idea that proceedings could be the most Couer in rem d’Alene problematic of all with respect to state sovereignty. CLOSING STATE COURT: ALDEN v. MAINE State sovereign immunity is a common-law principle, in the background of Article I, Principle: and it limits of power to create causes in all Congress’s any forum.
Breadth of Seminole Tribe: The court holds that the reasoning in Hans and the principle of sovereign immunity amounts to a universal principle of law that encompasses all of article I. Thus, it takes in all of the Article I powers. Souter’s dissent criticizes this overbreadth, and his reasoning leads to the notion of carve-outs. Importation of Bivens reasoning: The court imports the theory of congressional intent from the Bivens line of cases, specifically Chilicky. This was forecast in Kennedy’s opinion in Coeur d’Alene. The Court inferred congressional intent to have an exclusive negotiation remedy from the face of the statute. (This is the remedy the court just struck down.) So it uses a line of reasoning that was designed to prevent the court from fashioning a cause of action to oust the court of equitable authority. This is not a good analogy. The source of relief in Bivens and in Seminole Tribe is different—Bivens draws directly from the constitution, while Tribe was an expressly passed statute. The source of the cause of action is likewise different as is the defendant in the suit. Dissents: Stevens, following his reasoning in Union Gas, rejects state sovereign immunity as a constitutional bar. The constitutional prohibition is limited to diversity cases, and anything else that Hans adds is only common law, and Congress can abrogate it. This is clearly leaving open a day where this might prevail. Souter invites the court to consider whether Hans could remain the rule, but that Congress could still abrogate under some aspects of art. I. Problem of Carve-Outs (Katz): The majority in this case seemed to want to say that bankruptcy was a special case, and that sates were concerned about uniformity and ceded immunity in this area. Stevens also noted the in rem nature of the proceedings in bankruptcy. Four justices dissented, on the ground that there is nothing to distinguish bankruptcy from anything else in the constitution. Quite true. Also, it should be noted that a preference action is not in rem, and at any rate, Couer d’Alene stands for the idea that in rem proceedings could be the most problematic of all with respect to state sovereignty. CLOSING STATE COURT: ALDEN v. MAINE Principle: State sovereign immunity is a common-law principle, in the background of Article I, and it limits all of Congress’s power to create causes in any forum.