because United States has and independent basis for jurisdiction under Title II of the “separate ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation see also, e.g., United States v. N. Ill. Special Act”); No. 12-cv-7613, 2013 WL 1499034, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2013) (denying Recreation Ass’n, motion to dismiss United Title II complaint alleging that public athletic association States’ discriminates against individuals with epilepsy); 845 F. Supp. United States v. City of Baltimore, 2d 640 (D. Md. 2012) (granting Department of motion for summary judgment in Title Justice’s II claim). In addition, the Department has entered into numerous court-enforceable consent decrees. The district courts that have approved these decrees, of necessity, have determined that the United States had a right of action to initiate these complaints under Title II of the ADA. See, U.S. of Justice, https://www.ada.gov/enforce_current.htm#TitleII e.g., ADA Enforcement, Dep’t (detailing consent agreements); U.S. of Justice, Housing Case Summary Page, Dep’t https://www.justice.gov/crt/housing-cases-summary-page (Beaumont, Ft. Worth). There Is No Indication That Congress Was Motivated by Federalism Concerns Harris final argument is that Congress precluded the Attorney General from County’s enforcing Title II to avoid federal intrusion on the states. MTD at 7. But Harris County does not cite a single sentence from either the text or its legislative history suggesting that ADA’s Congress had such a concern. To the contrary, the legislative history reveals Congress’ overwhelming concern with expanding the reach of the Rehabilitation Act to all programs, activities, or services provided by state and local governments. H.R. Rep. No. See, e.g., at 84 (1990). Thus, Harris argument would mean that although chief goal was to County’s Congress’ eliminate disability-based discrimination in public services, and Congress incorporated two
because United States has “separate and independent basis for jurisdiction under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act”); see also, e.g., United States v. N. Ill. Special Recreation Ass’n, No. 12-cv-7613, 2013 WL 1499034, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss United States’ Title II complaint alleging that public athletic association discriminates against individuals with epilepsy); United States v. City of Baltimore, 845 F. Supp. 2d 640 (D. Md. 2012) (granting Department of Justice’s motion for summary judgment in Title II claim). In addition, the Department has entered into numerous court-enforceable consent decrees. The district courts that have approved these decrees, of necessity, have determined that the United States had a right of action to initiate these complaints under Title II of the ADA. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ADA Enforcement, https://www.ada.gov/enforce_current.htm#TitleII (detailing consent agreements); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Housing Case Summary Page, https://www.justice.gov/crt/housing-cases-summary-page (Beaumont, Ft. Worth). There Is No Indication That Congress Was Motivated by Federalism Concerns Harris County’s final argument is that Congress precluded the Attorney General from enforcing Title II to avoid federal intrusion on the states. MTD at 7. But Harris County does not cite a single sentence from either the ADA’s text or its legislative history suggesting that Congress had such a concern. To the contrary, the legislative history reveals Congress’ overwhelming concern with expanding the reach of the Rehabilitation Act to all programs, activities, or services provided by state and local governments. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. at 84 (1990). Thus, Harris County’s argument would mean that although Congress’ chief goal was to eliminate disability-based discrimination in public services, and Congress incorporated two