Online Material (Section 8) includes discussion of demographic effects and interactions with experimental condition. In subsequent analyses, condition had no effect on religious variables or authoritarianism variables, all < 1, suggesting that while activating the salience of Fs religiosity may attenuate support for oppression-militarization, it does not necessarily increase professed religious belief itself or have an effect one way or the other on authoritarian sentiment. Also, while we found evidence that exposure to religious questions decreased support for militarization-oppression, we did not find that exposure to questions on militarization-oppression (support for which was very low in the overall sample) affected religious belief. Thus, although we necessarily measured oppression as predictor and religiosity/conservatism as criterion in the first two studies (as oppression could only be measured at the country level and religiosity was measured at the individual level), Study 3 suggests that the causal arrow may run more readily from religiosity to lack of militarization/oppression, rather than from lack of militarization/oppression to religiosity. Multiple regression analyses. We also entered an aggregated measure of religiosity (combining all 10 items of IRM with the nine other religiosity items) and an aggregated measure of conservatism (combining all 14 items of RWA with the four other authoritarianism items and the one exclusivity item) into a linear multiple regression predicting oppression-militarization in each of the three conditions. Conservatism was not a significant predictor of the dependent variable in the religiosity first condition, = .27, = 1.53, = .13, ns, though it was a significant positive predictor in the control t(50) p and authoritarianism first conditions, = .46, = 3.14, = .003 and = .43, = t(44) p t(48)
Online Material (Section 8) includes discussion of demographic effects and interactions with experimental condition. In subsequent analyses, condition had no effect on religious variables or authoritarianism variables, all Fs < 1, suggesting that while activating the salience of religiosity may attenuate support for oppression-militarization, it does not necessarily increase professed religious belief itself or have an effect one way or the other on authoritarian sentiment. Also, while we found evidence that exposure to religious questions decreased support for militarization-oppression, we did not find that exposure to questions on militarization-oppression (support for which was very low in the overall sample) affected religious belief. Thus, although we necessarily measured oppression as predictor and religiosity/conservatism as criterion in the first two studies (as oppression could only be measured at the country level and religiosity was measured at the individual level), Study 3 suggests that the causal arrow may run more readily from religiosity to lack of militarization/oppression, rather than from lack of militarization/oppression to religiosity. Multiple regression analyses. We also entered an aggregated measure of religiosity (combining all 10 items of IRM with the nine other religiosity items) and an aggregated measure of conservatism (combining all 14 items of RWA with the four other authoritarianism items and the one exclusivity item) into a linear multiple regression predicting oppression-militarization in each of the three conditions. Conservatism was not a significant predictor of the dependent variable in the religiosity first condition, = .27, t(50) = 1.53, p = .13, ns, though it was a significant positive predictor in the control and authoritarianism first conditions, = .46, t(44) = 3.14, p = .003 and = .43, t(48) =