Appendix 2: Literature table and list of banks Literature table: study Title Author Object of study Sample(size, country, Methodology Conclusion period) 1 Conservatism in Ross L. Watts Examination of This paper is based on This paper studies The main conclusion Accounting Part 2003 alternative existing conservatism in of this paper is that I: Explanations explanations for literature(literature study), accounting and is conservatism is and Implications conservatism in thus there is no test divided in two parts. essential. Managers accounting and information included, The first Part discusses will bias and noise their implications September 2003 explanations for value estimates, for accounting conservatism and because there is a regulators. draws implications for lack of verifiability, regulation and managers have standard setting. The limited tenures and paper draws a general limited liability’s. If contracting regulators want to explanation for improve financial conservatism and reporting, they must predicts that other recognize the contracts employed importance of within the firm, will verification, also generate problems that conservatism. It offers conservatism’s also a new argument: asymmetric that an information requirement perspective produces evolved to address conservatism once the and regulators information costs of should concentrate changed managerial on the accounting’s
Appendix 2: Literature table and list of banks Literature table: study Title Author Object of study Sample(size, country, period) Methodology Conclusion 1 Conservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and Implications Ross L. Watts 2003 Examination of alternative explanations for conservatism in accounting and their implications for accounting regulators. This paper is based on existing literature(literature study), thus there is no test information included, September 2003 This paper studies conservatism in accounting and is divided in two parts. The first Part discusses explanations for conservatism and draws implications for regulation and standard setting. The paper draws a general contracting explanation for conservatism and predicts that other contracts employed within the firm, will also generate conservatism. It offers also a new argument: that an information perspective produces conservatism once the information costs of changed managerial The main conclusion of this paper is that conservatism is essential. Managers will bias and noise value estimates, because there is a lack of verifiability, managers have limited tenures and limited liability’s. If regulators want to improve financial reporting, they must recognize the importance of verification, problems that conservatism’s asymmetric requirement evolved to address and regulators should concentrate on the accounting’s