The terminating SP must employ a method for assessing the level of confidence in the received calling number information and conveying that assessment to the called user in a meaningful form, The terminating SP will need to educate its customers on this new spoofing assessment tool and how customers should interpret the display to reduce their exposure to fraud. Author’s note: Expand on suggested categories from Pierce Gorman’s suggestions: no credentials, carrier signed but no authentication of CgPN, carrier signed but semi authenticated, carrier signed and authenticated. The terminating SP also has the option to query authoritative, trusted databases to request information on the received TN, such as type of service and the service provider responsible for that number (account owner), to bolster its overall assessment. SIP WebRTC Verification of Call Delivery The caller typically recognizes the TN of the party they are trying to reach and trusts he/she will reach the intended party. Exceptions would include a classified call where the caller needs to ensure the station/device they reach is the intended one. This is not a verification of the identity of the person answering the call but verification that the call was terminated to the station/device authorized to use that called TN. To assist in verifying the called party, the response to the INVITE could either be: A 18x response (e.g., 183 Session Progress) Reason-Phrase, or message body that conveys: The called party’s authorization to use that TN, and, optionally, The disposition of completing the call to the called TN. For example, if the called party does not accept the credentials of the calling party because of suspected spoofing, the 183 response would communicate the status back to the calling party. Editor’s Note: address forwarding scenario Xxx SIP WebRTC Verification of Originating Service Provider xxx Verification of Terminating Service Provider xxx Verification of Transit Service Provider xxx
The terminating SP must employ a method for assessing the level of confidence in the received calling number information and conveying that assessment to the called user in a meaningful form, The terminating SP will need to educate its customers on this new spoofing assessment tool and how customers should interpret the display to reduce their exposure to fraud. Author’s note: Expand on suggested categories from Pierce Gorman’s suggestions: no credentials, carrier signed but no authentication of CgPN, carrier signed but semi authenticated, carrier signed and authenticated. The terminating SP also has the option to query authoritative, trusted databases to request information on the received TN, such as type of service and the service provider responsible for that number (account owner), to bolster its overall assessment. SIP WebRTC Verification of Call Delivery The caller typically recognizes the TN of the party they are trying to reach and trusts he/she will reach the intended party. Exceptions would include a classified call where the caller needs to ensure the station/device they reach is the intended one. This is not a verification of the identity of the person answering the call but verification that the call was terminated to the station/device authorized to use that called TN. To assist in verifying the called party, the response to the INVITE could either be: A 18x response (e.g., 183 Session Progress) Reason-Phrase, or message body that conveys: The called party’s authorization to use that TN, and, optionally, The disposition of completing the call to the called TN. For example, if the called party does not accept the credentials of the calling party because of suspected spoofing, the 183 response would communicate the status back to the calling party. Editor’s Note: address forwarding scenario Xxx SIP WebRTC Verification of Originating Service Provider xxx Verification of Terminating Service Provider xxx Verification of Transit Service Provider xxx