will decide whether the delay should nevertheless be condoned. In deciding to condone an unreasonable delay, the Court will consider whether the public interest in the finality of administrative decisions is outweighed in a particular case by other considerations. Was the delay unreasonable? In this case, the High Court concluded that the delay was unreasonable. In reaching this conclusion, the High Court noted, amongst other things, that the appellant had provided no explanation for the delay in instituting proceedings between 4 July 2007 and 13 February 2008, despite the raising the respondents’ issue in limine in their answering affidavits. The appellant asserts that the High Court erred in this conclusion, though as mentioned above, in written argument on behalf of the appellant this issue was not fully addressed. As set out above, the relevant delay in this case was from 4 July 2007, when appellant was informed that he has been discharged from the Defence Force with immediate effect, until 13 February 2008 when these proceedings were instituted in the High Court. As the High Court reasoned, the delay should be seen against the background of the fact that in the period immediately before the appellant was informed of his discharge, he was represented by a legal practitioner who was communicating with the respondent in relation to the question of his discharge. The same legal practitioner represents the appellant in these proceedings. Indeed, the legal practitioner had threatened as early as appellant’s 26 March 2007 to launch High Court proceedings in relation to the appellant’s discharge from the Namibian Defence Force and annexed to the appellant’s founding affidavit is a draft notice of motion dated 31 May 2007.
will decide whether the delay should nevertheless be condoned. In deciding to condone an unreasonable delay, the Court will consider whether the public interest in the finality of administrative decisions is outweighed in a particular case by other considerations. Was the delay unreasonable? In this case, the High Court concluded that the delay was unreasonable. In reaching this conclusion, the High Court noted, amongst other things, that the appellant had provided no explanation for the delay in instituting proceedings between 4 July 2007 and 13 February 2008, despite the respondents’ raising the issue in limine in their answering affidavits. The appellant asserts that the High Court erred in this conclusion, though as mentioned above, in written argument on behalf of the appellant this issue was not fully addressed. As set out above, the relevant delay in this case was from 4 July 2007, when appellant was informed that he has been discharged from the Defence Force with immediate effect, until 13 February 2008 when these proceedings were instituted in the High Court. As the High Court reasoned, the delay should be seen against the background of the fact that in the period immediately before the appellant was informed of his discharge, he was represented by a legal practitioner who was communicating with the respondent in relation to the question of his discharge. The same legal practitioner represents the appellant in these proceedings. Indeed, the appellant’s legal practitioner had threatened as early as 26 March 2007 to launch High Court proceedings in relation to the appellant’s discharge from the Namibian Defence Force and annexed to the appellant’s founding affidavit is a draft notice of motion dated 31 May 2007.