sanctuaries and staging areas [used] for attacks into Kandahar said Colonel Rafael Torres, City,” director of the ISAF Joint Operations Center. Chinook support 21 aircraft total for – – DRAGON STRIKE came from B Company, 6th Battalion, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, B Company, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, and an Australian rotary wing detachment. Since ground movement in many areas of Kandahar Province was often restricted by extensive vegetation, numerous rat lines, and dozens of Taliban-placed IEDs, aviation support was essential to freedom of movement and the ability jump over the IED belts. enemy knew we “The would have to come from north to south, and they had prepared some pretty nasty defensive belts [trenches, bunkers, IEDs, minefields] to keep us from doing explained Lieutenant Colonel that,” Peter Benchoff, commander 2d battalion, 502 IN at the time. the air assaults were a way of “So jumping behind those defensive coined the term air assault to the belts…we ‘back clears’…you south of these defensive belts and then back clear up to from an area that them… you’re coming is likely to be less of a Benchoff continued. threat,” During the initial month of DRAGON STRIKE, Chinooks conducted 24 air assaults, placing a large number of troops but broken down into small elements into strategic locations – – spread throughout the AO. The extensive number of insertions frustrated the Taliban’s situational awareness, and prevented the insurgents from reinforcing. In the first week, eight Chinooks were hit by enemy fire. Prior to the operation, portions of the objective area had been declared zones due to the heavy concentration of Taliban anti-aircraft fires. Since the ‘no-fly’ plan called for the inserted forces to remain in-place for months rather than being quickly extracted, resupply requirements were unceasing. Each night four Chinooks were assigned to fly the seemingly endless resupply missions.
sanctuaries and staging areas [used] for attacks into Kandahar City,” said Colonel Rafael Torres, director of the ISAF Joint Operations Center. Chinook support – 21 aircraft total – for DRAGON STRIKE came from B Company, 6th Battalion, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, B Company, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, and an Australian rotary wing detachment. Since ground movement in many areas of Kandahar Province was often restricted by extensive vegetation, numerous rat lines, and dozens of Taliban-placed IEDs, aviation support was essential to freedom of movement and the ability jump over the IED belts. “The enemy knew we would have to come from north to south, and they had prepared some pretty nasty defensive belts [trenches, bunkers, IEDs, minefields] to keep us from doing that,” explained Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, commander 2d battalion, 502 IN at the time. “So the air assaults were a way of jumping behind those defensive belts…we coined the term ‘back clears’…you air assault to the south of these defensive belts and then back clear up to them… you’re coming from an area that is likely to be less of a threat,” Benchoff continued. During the initial month of DRAGON STRIKE, Chinooks conducted 24 air assaults, placing a large number of troops – but broken down into small elements – into strategic locations spread throughout the AO. The extensive number of insertions frustrated the Taliban’s situational awareness, and prevented the insurgents from reinforcing. In the first week, eight Chinooks were hit by enemy fire. Prior to the operation, portions of the objective area had been declared ‘no-fly’ zones due to the heavy concentration of Taliban anti-aircraft fires. Since the plan called for the inserted forces to remain in-place for months rather than being quickly extracted, resupply requirements were unceasing. Each night four Chinooks were assigned to fly the seemingly endless resupply missions.