with the speaker being agnostic on the matter? Perhaps so. And if we can handle it that way, then is another variation on generic necessity. I think that must be true, but it seems too supposed to purely a linguistic matter for me to usefully attempt to deal with here, and I will pass over it. I do think the characteristics of are reasonably clear, however. But notice that this same supposed to problem will arise again with all the other deontic modals with their slight variations on the theme of generic deontic necessity. The power of account of generic deontic necessity Kratzer’s is compelling, but it remains something of an open question how the differences among must, and all the others are to be recognized, while at the same ought, supposed to, have to, required to time maintaining a firm hold on the strong underlying samenesses. 4.0 is a deontic modal word Function 4.1 as a modal word and concept Function The Kratzerian schema I want to begin this explanation by reviewing how I arrived at the conclusion that is a function deontic modal word. The standard Kratzerian schema for for given f and g values, function, would be: F-p is true at the world of evaluation iff p is true at all the good enough f-worlds as ordered by the g of the ordering source This is correct but not revealing. To display all the needed semantic elements of we function, need the particular f- and g-values that make a function a function. Also, just as for vs. ought we need to differentiate the better/worse ranking types of function from the right/not-right, must, correct/incorrect types. The schema, adapted Type 1: Biology, chemical systems and agential cases where the enabling is “better/worse” F-p is true at the world of evaluation iff p is true at all the well-enough enabling structure worlds at which p = C1 and Ci enables Ci+1 well enough to fully enable Cn The ordering source ranks worlds based on how relatively well the enabling is performed. The selected world or worlds of the truth-conditions are the worlds at which the Ci are well-enough enabled to fully enable Cn. In terms of my standard example:
with the speaker being agnostic on the matter? Perhaps so. And if we can handle it that way, then supposed to is another variation on generic necessity. I think that must be true, but it seems too purely a linguistic matter for me to usefully attempt to deal with here, and I will pass over it. I do think the characteristics of supposed to are reasonably clear, however. But notice that this same problem will arise again with all the other deontic modals with their slight variations on the theme of generic deontic necessity. The power of Kratzer’s account of generic deontic necessity is compelling, but it remains something of an open question how the differences among must, ought, supposed to, have to, required to and all the others are to be recognized, while at the same time maintaining a firm hold on the strong underlying samenesses. 4.0 Function is a deontic modal word 4.1 Function as a modal word and concept The Kratzerian schema I want to begin this explanation by reviewing how I arrived at the conclusion that function is a deontic modal word. The standard Kratzerian schema for function, for given f and g values, would be: F-p is true at the world of evaluation iff p is true at all the good enough f-worlds as ordered by the g of the ordering source This is correct but not revealing. To display all the needed semantic elements of function, we need the particular f- and g-values that make a function a function. Also, just as for ought vs. must, we need to differentiate the better/worse ranking types of function from the right/not-right, correct/incorrect types. The schema, adapted Type 1: Biology, chemical systems and agential cases where the enabling is “better/worse” F-p is true at the world of evaluation iff p is true at all the well-enough enabling structure worlds at which p = C1 and Ci enables Ci+1 well enough to fully enable Cn The ordering source ranks worlds based on how relatively well the enabling is performed. The selected world or worlds of the truth-conditions are the worlds at which the Ci are well-enough enabled to fully enable Cn. In terms of my standard example: