and objectively unanswerable question, which called what unilateral Reese II “vexing”: employer reductions in vested benefits are “reasonable.” A Clear Path Ahead? The better path is the one that, before the Sixth Circuit followed since Reese I, Yard-Man. Post-Reese decisions, including and I Bender, Moore, Hargrove, Kelsey-Hayes, Zino, unlike continue to apply the law defined by They enforce CBA healthcare Tackett, Yard-Man. promises, giving effect to the contracting parties’ intent at the time the promises were made. They bar unilateral changes to vested benefits. They do so without regard to whether the employer, or one of Plato’s philosopher-kings, or some chancellor-in-equity, or a Sixth Circuit majority might, long after-the-fact, consider breach of those promises somehow to be “sensible” or or not too and These cases, to coin a phrase, continue the “reasonable” “extreme” “severe.” Thread of justice and the best traditions of contract law. They decline to Golden Yard-Man negate promises in service to employers suffering promisor’s remorse. They show that now depart from the distinguished history of enforcement of CBA retiree Tackett— healthcare promises that began with and continued for three decades. Yard-Man CONCLUSION How should be read? Where the parties to a CBA to unilateral Reese II actually agreed employer changes in vested healthcare (a that is rare, if not non-existent), courts can “context” determine the of proposed changes to protect retirees from and “reasonableness” “nugatory” promises. But where the CBA promises vested benefits, the courts must enforce that “illusory” promise, even if healthcare costs now make corporate accountants queasy or cause “evolving” management to discard CBAs as commitments.” “modern” “improvident Retirement healthcare benefits typically understood as a form of delayed “are compensation or reward for past services” and it is that benefits” would be “unlikely” “such “left
and objectively unanswerable question, which Reese II called “vexing”: what unilateral employer reductions in vested benefits are “reasonable.” A Clear Path Ahead? The better path is the one that, before Reese I, the Sixth Circuit followed since Yard-Man. Post-Reese I decisions, including Bender, Moore, Hargrove, Kelsey-Hayes, and Zino, unlike Tackett, continue to apply the law defined by Yard-Man. They enforce CBA healthcare promises, giving effect to the contracting parties’ intent at the time the promises were made. They bar unilateral changes to vested benefits. They do so without regard to whether the employer, or one of Plato’s philosopher-kings, or some chancellor-in-equity, or a Sixth Circuit majority might, long after-the-fact, consider breach of those promises somehow to be “sensible” or “reasonable” or not too “extreme” and “severe.” These cases, to coin a phrase, continue the Golden Thread of Yard-Man justice and the best traditions of contract law. They decline to negate promises in service to employers suffering promisor’s remorse. They show that now Tackett— depart from the distinguished history of enforcement of CBA retiree healthcare promises that began with Yard-Man and continued for three decades. CONCLUSION How should Reese II be read? Where the parties to a CBA actually agreed to unilateral employer changes in vested healthcare (a “context” that is rare, if not non-existent), courts can determine the “reasonableness” of proposed changes to protect retirees from “nugatory” and “illusory” promises. But where the CBA promises vested benefits, the courts must enforce that promise, even if “evolving” healthcare costs now make corporate accountants queasy or cause “modern” management to discard CBAs as “improvident commitments.” Retirement healthcare benefits “are typically understood as a form of delayed compensation or reward for past services” and it is “unlikely” that “such benefits” would be “left