the assumption that people behave in manner then when is implemented it satisfy B, C will N because, by hypothesis, people do in fact behave in manner behavioral postulate B. Buchanan’s – if we understand it not as insisting on strictly but rather as taking men as they homo economicus are, be this or not thus allows his model to succeed where model homo economicus – Rawls’s failed: it allows the model to pass the identity test. Though social contract excels at identity it falters at recognition. The reason Buchanan’s why has to do with the epistemological assumptions Buchanan places on contractors what we – shall call the In modeling the social contract Buchanan (in conjunction with veil of uncertainty. Tullock) describes the information sets of the parties as follows: Recall that we try only to analyze the calculus of the utility-maximizing individual who is confronted with the constitutional problem. Essential to the analysis is the presumption that the individual is as to what his own precise role will be in any one of the uncertain whole chain of later collective choices that will actually have to be made. For this reason he is considered not to have a particular and distinguishable interest separate and apart from his fellows. This is not to suggest that he will act contrary to his own interest; but the individual will not find it advantageous to vote for rules that may promote sectional, class, or group interests because, by presupposition, he is unable to predict the role that he will be playing in the actual collective decision-making process at any particular time in the future. He cannot predict with any degree of certainty whether he is more likely to be in a winning or losing coalition on any specific issue. Therefore he will assume occasionally he will be in one group and occasionally in the other. His own self-interest will lead him to choose rules that maximize the utility of an individual in a series of collective decisions with his own preferences on separate issues being more or less randomly distributed (Buchanan and Tullock 1962/2004: 74). By my reading, Buchanan here intends to place constraints on the information sets of the no contracting parties at all. Rather, Buchanan thinks that the of constitutional choice mere exercise places those involved in the choice problem in a state of relative ignorance no restrictions – imposed are required. This is in contrast to Rawls, who does specifically model by the theorist contractors as behind the highly artificial veil of ignorance.
the assumption that people behave in manner B, then when C is implemented it will satisfy N because, by hypothesis, people do in fact behave in manner B. Buchanan’s behavioral postulate – if we understand it not as insisting on homo economicus strictly but rather as taking men as they are, be this homo economicus or not – thus allows his model to succeed where Rawls’s model failed: it allows the model to pass the identity test. Though Buchanan’s social contract excels at identity it falters at recognition. The reason why has to do with the epistemological assumptions Buchanan places on contractors – what we shall call the veil of uncertainty. In modeling the social contract Buchanan (in conjunction with Tullock) describes the information sets of the parties as follows: Recall that we try only to analyze the calculus of the utility-maximizing individual who is confronted with the constitutional problem. Essential to the analysis is the presumption that the individual is uncertain as to what his own precise role will be in any one of the whole chain of later collective choices that will actually have to be made. For this reason he is considered not to have a particular and distinguishable interest separate and apart from his fellows. This is not to suggest that he will act contrary to his own interest; but the individual will not find it advantageous to vote for rules that may promote sectional, class, or group interests because, by presupposition, he is unable to predict the role that he will be playing in the actual collective decision-making process at any particular time in the future. He cannot predict with any degree of certainty whether he is more likely to be in a winning or losing coalition on any specific issue. Therefore he will assume occasionally he will be in one group and occasionally in the other. His own self-interest will lead him to choose rules that maximize the utility of an individual in a series of collective decisions with his own preferences on separate issues being more or less randomly distributed (Buchanan and Tullock 1962/2004: 74). By my reading, Buchanan here intends to place no constraints on the information sets of the contracting parties at all. Rather, Buchanan thinks that the mere exercise of constitutional choice places those involved in the choice problem in a state of relative ignorance – no restrictions imposed by the theorist are required. This is in contrast to Rawls, who does specifically model contractors as behind the highly artificial veil of ignorance.