shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” State law must give way to the extent it with federal law.” Crosby “conflicts 530 U.S. 363, 378 (2000). Such conflicts exist not only where v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, is impossible . . . to comply with both state and federal law,” but also under the “it “where circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” at 372-73 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has repeatedly that “held state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes,” Hillsborough 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985), and that regulations County v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., “[f]ederal have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes,” Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). Cuesta, The courts of appeals have repeatedly applied such principles in holding that federal disability rights laws, including the ADA, preempt state statutes to the extent that state laws conflict with federal mandates. 620 F.3d 62, 69-70 (1st See, e.g., Astralis Condo. Ass’n v. HUD, Cir. 2010) (defendant could not permissibly rely on Puerto Rico law to refuse to provide an accommodation required under the Fair Housing Act for a person with a disability); Crowder v. 81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Hawaii’s animal quarantine law, as Kitagawa, applied to guide dogs, denied plaintiffs access to state services, programs, and activities in violation of the ADA); 562 F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. Barber v. Colorado Dep’t of Revenue, 2009) (emphasizing that proposed accommodation under federal disability law is not unreasonable simply because it might require defendants to violate state law). As the Tenth Circuit has emphasized, on state statutes to excuse non-compliance with federal laws “[r]eliance is simply unacceptable under the Supremacy Clause.” 562 F.3d at 1233. Simply put, a Barber,
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” State law must give way to the extent it “conflicts with federal law.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 378 (2000). Such conflicts exist not only where “it is impossible . . . to comply with both state and federal law,” but also “where under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 372-73 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has “held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes,” Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985), and that “[f]ederal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes,” Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). The courts of appeals have repeatedly applied such principles in holding that federal disability rights laws, including the ADA, preempt state statutes to the extent that state laws conflict with federal mandates. See, e.g., Astralis Condo. Ass’n v. HUD, 620 F.3d 62, 69-70 (1st Cir. 2010) (defendant could not permissibly rely on Puerto Rico law to refuse to provide an accommodation required under the Fair Housing Act for a person with a disability); Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Hawaii’s animal quarantine law, as applied to guide dogs, denied plaintiffs access to state services, programs, and activities in violation of the ADA); Barber v. Colorado Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009) (emphasizing that proposed accommodation under federal disability law is not unreasonable simply because it might require defendants to violate state law). As the Tenth Circuit has emphasized, “[r]eliance on state statutes to excuse non-compliance with federal laws is simply unacceptable under the Supremacy Clause.” Barber, 562 F.3d at 1233. Simply put, a