Chad—have been removed from the list of covered countries. . . . Second, for those countries that remain subject to entry restrictions, the Proclamation includes significant exceptions for various categories of foreign nationals. The policy permits nationals from nearly every covered country to travel to the United States on a variety of nonimmigrant visas [including, depending on the country, students, exchange or business visitors, and tourists]. The Proclamation also exempts permanent residents and individuals who have been granted asylum. the Proclamation creates a waiver program open to all covered foreign nationals seeking entry as immigrants or nonimmigrants. [Consular officers can give waivers if] the alien demonstrates that (1) denying entry would cause undue hardship; (2) entry would not pose a threat to public safety; and (3) entry would be in the interest of the United States. . . . Finally, the dissent invokes v. (1944). Korematsu United States Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, has nothing to do with this case. The forcible Korematsu relocation of U. S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission. The entry suspension is an act that is well within executive authority and could have been taken by any other President—the only question is evaluating the actions of this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid Proclamation. The dissent’s reference to however, affords this Korematsu, Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has Korematsu been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—“has no place in law under the Constitution.” (Jackson, J., dissenting). Id. * * * Under these circumstances, the Government has set forth a sufficient national security justification to survive rational basis review. We express no view on the soundness of the policy. We simply hold today that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claim. Justice KENNEDY, concurring. I join the Court’s opinion in full. . . .
Chad—have been removed from the list of covered countries. . . . Second, for those countries that remain subject to entry restrictions, the Proclamation includes significant exceptions for various categories of foreign nationals. The policy permits nationals from nearly every covered country to travel to the United States on a variety of nonimmigrant visas [including, depending on the country, students, exchange or business visitors, and tourists]. The Proclamation also exempts permanent residents and individuals who have been granted asylum. the Proclamation creates a waiver program open to all covered foreign nationals seeking entry as immigrants or nonimmigrants. [Consular officers can give waivers if] the alien demonstrates that (1) denying entry would cause undue hardship; (2) entry would not pose a threat to public safety; and (3) entry would be in the interest of the United States. . . . Finally, the dissent invokes Korematsu v. United States (1944). Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation of U. S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission. The entry suspension is an act that is well within executive authority and could have been taken by any other President—the only question is evaluating the actions of this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid Proclamation. The dissent’s reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—“has no place in law under the Constitution.” Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting). * * * Under these circumstances, the Government has set forth a sufficient national security justification to survive rational basis review. We express no view on the soundness of the policy. We simply hold today that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claim. Justice KENNEDY, concurring. I join the Court’s opinion in full. . . .