review of the ratemaking system by the Commission; notice to the public and an opportunity for comment; and a determination by the Commission that the system is not achieving the PAEA’s objectives, taking into account the statutory factors. Second, whereas the impermissible Line Item Veto Act required the President to make certain determinations before cancelling a provision, those determinations did not qualify his discretion as to whether to cancel or not. at 443-44. By contrast, the Id. Commission’s discretion under section 3622(d)(3) to either modify the ratemaking system, adopt an alternative system, or do neither is contingent on a determination that the system did not achieve the PAEA’s objectives, taking into account the statutory factors. If the Commission determined that the system had achieved the objectives, taking into account the factors, the Commission’s authority under section 3622(d)(3) to either modify the system or adopt an alternative system would not have been triggered. Third, the impermissible Line Item Veto Act allowed the President to override the policy objectives contained in a cancelled statute, which were developed by Congress, with his own policy objectives, which were developed unilaterally. Id. at 444. By contrast, section 3622(d)(3)’s delegation of rulemaking authority to the Commission is limited because it is required to effectuate the nine objectives embodied in the PAEA, which were developed by Congress. Therefore, the Commission’s authority to modify or adopt an alternative system under section 3622(d)(3) remains within the permissible bounds of the separation of powers between the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch. In conclusion, the Commission has authority to either modify or replace the existing market dominant ratemaking system. This authority extends to modification of regulations currently in place and the statutory rate setting requirements of section 3622 (including those applicable to workshare discounts in 39 U.S.C. 3622(e)). The constraint on the Commission’s authority is that the system as implemented must be designed to achieve the objectives of section 3622(b).
review of the ratemaking system by the Commission; notice to the public and an opportunity for comment; and a determination by the Commission that the system is not achieving the PAEA’s objectives, taking into account the statutory factors. Second, whereas the impermissible Line Item Veto Act required the President to make certain determinations before cancelling a provision, those determinations did not qualify his discretion as to whether to cancel or not. Id. at 443-44. By contrast, the Commission’s discretion under section 3622(d)(3) to either modify the ratemaking system, adopt an alternative system, or do neither is contingent on a determination that the system did not achieve the PAEA’s objectives, taking into account the statutory factors. If the Commission determined that the system had achieved the objectives, taking into account the factors, the Commission’s authority under section 3622(d)(3) to either modify the system or adopt an alternative system would not have been triggered. Third, the impermissible Line Item Veto Act allowed the President to override the policy objectives contained in a cancelled statute, which were developed by Congress, with his own policy objectives, which were developed unilaterally. Id. at 444. By contrast, section 3622(d)(3)’s delegation of rulemaking authority to the Commission is limited because it is required to effectuate the nine objectives embodied in the PAEA, which were developed by Congress. Therefore, the Commission’s authority to modify or adopt an alternative system under section 3622(d)(3) remains within the permissible bounds of the separation of powers between the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch. In conclusion, the Commission has authority to either modify or replace the existing market dominant ratemaking system. This authority extends to modification of regulations currently in place and the statutory rate setting requirements of section 3622 (including those applicable to workshare discounts in 39 U.S.C. 3622(e)). The constraint on the Commission’s authority is that the system as implemented must be designed to achieve the objectives of section 3622(b).