that is, on a fundamental universality of basic human rights, tempered by a recognition of the possible need for limited cultural variations. Basic human rights 419). This resonates with his perspective that are…relatively universal” (1984: rights are, literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human “[h]uman being” (Donnelly, 1984: 400). Messer (1993) suggests that anthropologists could contribute to the understanding of human rights by undertaking comparative research in diverse cultures. Their objective would be to examine the extent to which human rights principles were expressed in common ways in different local contexts. Schirmer (2006) argues that the very nature of the relativism debate could be impeding progress with empirical research on the understandings of human rights discourses and practices. Schirmer contends that as anthropologists need to recognise that the debate “[w]e about whether human rights are culturally specific or universal takes us in the wrong direction; whose rights and which rights will always be up for debate” (2006: 505). Gearty (2008) suggests that the debates about the legitimacy of human rights principles to act as both a pragmatic tool and a universal moral ideal enable ? their underlying concepts, such as human dignity, to be contested and adapted. These debates promote the means by which the framework survives within the international justice structures. Gearty contends that human rights as a framework to achieve social justice gains its universal legitimacy because of the language it provides to express core values. Debates can be conducted with of “local dialect[s] a shared tongue rather than an 9). entirely foreign language” (Gearty 2008: The thrust of (2006) and (2008) argument is that the human Schirmer’s Gearty’s rights framework itself undergoes change as the discourse is operationalised in different local contexts. research seeks to clarify how universals and Tsing’s particulars interact in a process she cultures are calls “friction”, whereby in and creative qualities of interconnection “awkward, unequal, unstable, across (2005: 4). It is this friction that leads to a significant difference in difference” outcomes of the implementation of abstract principles by human rights and development activists in concrete situations that underpins much of the research focus. Merry (2006b) suggests that anthropologists are starting to focus on understanding the social processes involved as local activists adapt the abstract human rights principles to the needs and conditions of small communities. In
that is, on a fundamental universality of basic human rights, tempered by a recognition of the possible need for limited cultural variations. Basic human rights are…relatively universal” (1984: 419). This resonates with his perspective that “[h]uman rights are, literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being” (Donnelly, 1984: 400). Messer (1993) suggests that anthropologists could contribute to the understanding of human rights by undertaking comparative research in diverse cultures. Their objective would be to examine the extent to which human rights principles were expressed in common ways in different local contexts. Schirmer (2006) argues that the very nature of the relativism debate could be impeding progress with empirical research on the understandings of human rights discourses and practices. Schirmer contends that “[w]e as anthropologists need to recognise that the debate about whether human rights are culturally specific or universal takes us in the wrong direction; whose rights and which rights will always be up for debate” (2006: 505). Gearty (2008) suggests that the debates about the legitimacy of human rights principles to act as both a pragmatic tool and a universal moral ideal enable ? their underlying concepts, such as human dignity, to be contested and adapted. These debates promote the means by which the framework survives within the international justice structures. Gearty contends that human rights as a framework to achieve social justice gains its universal legitimacy because of the language it provides to express core values. Debates can be conducted with “local dialect[s] of a shared tongue rather than an entirely foreign language” (Gearty 2008: 9). The thrust of Schirmer’s (2006) and Gearty’s (2008) argument is that the human rights framework itself undergoes change as the discourse is operationalised in different local contexts. Tsing’s research seeks to clarify how universals and particulars interact in a process she calls “friction”, whereby cultures are in “awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference” (2005: 4). It is this friction that leads to a significant difference in outcomes of the implementation of abstract principles by human rights and development activists in concrete situations that underpins much of the research focus. Merry (2006b) suggests that anthropologists are starting to focus on understanding the social processes involved as local activists adapt the abstract human rights principles to the needs and conditions of small communities. In