The rule is based on legislative intent. the Legislature amends a Estrada “When statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply The to every case to which it constitutionally could apply. amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.” (Estrada, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745, italics added.) The Supreme Court noted supra, the Legislature could indicate a desire that a defendant be punished under the law in existence at the time the offense was committed by enacting a saving clause spelling out such an intent, but held there is no saving clause [the defendant] can and should be “[i]f punished under the new law.” (Ibid.) The same principles guide our interpretation of successful ballot initiatives. (Park, 56 Cal.4th at p. 796.) As we discussed in part II.A., Section 1170.18(k) supra, ante, shows the voters specifically anticipated reclassification would have collateral effects and directs that a reclassified offense be considered a misdemeanor for purposes.” all “shall (Italics added.) This language is broad and not limited by a saving clause that would indicate the voters intended offenders should continue being punished under the old law. The plain language of the statute therefore indicates the voters intended offenders should be able to avoid punishment for reclassified offenses imposed through Section 667.5(b)
The Estrada rule is based on legislative intent. “When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745, italics added.) The Supreme Court noted the Legislature could indicate a desire that a defendant be punished under the law in existence at the time the offense was committed by enacting a saving clause spelling out such an intent, but held “[i]f there is no saving clause [the defendant] can and should be punished under the new law.” (Ibid.) The same principles guide our interpretation of successful ballot initiatives. (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 796.) As we discussed in part II.A., ante, Section 1170.18(k) shows the voters specifically anticipated reclassification would have collateral effects and directs that a reclassified offense “shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes.” (Italics added.) This language is broad and not limited by a saving clause that would indicate the voters intended offenders should continue being punished under the old law. The plain language of the statute therefore indicates the voters intended offenders should be able to avoid punishment for reclassified offenses imposed through Section 667.5(b)