have] held that a State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of a minor victim was sufficiently weighty to justify depriving the press and public of their constitutional right to attend criminal trials, where the trial court makes a case-specific finding that closure of the trial is necessary to protect the welfare of the minor.” (Craig, at p. 852.) The question we face in this appeal is whether, under and its progeny, the Craig record supports accommodating an witness by placing an between adult opaque barrier her and her accused abuser. In upholding the accommodation, the majority relies almost entirely on (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772 (Sharp) and People v. Sharp People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234 (Gonzales). I find those cases unhelpful. First, they involve child witnesses, not adult witnesses. Second, the accommodations in those cases the preserved defendants’ ability to view the witnesses as they testified. Third, both cases involved much more evidence of the need for the accommodation. As a result, I do not believe and Gonzales provide the majority a sound basis for its decision. Sharp In the trial court allowed the young witness (who was 8 or 9 years old) to Sharp, turn to the side and face the jury while testifying. (Sharp, 29 Cal.App.4th at supra, p. 1783.) Before the accommodation, the witness was becoming incommunicative on the stand, suffering inexplicable memory lapses about incidents she had previously consistently reported, and providing inconsistent, evasive, and confused testimony. (Id. at pp. 1783-1784.) Even with the accommodation, the defendant still had a view of the witness’s face, just not a frontal view.” (Ibid.) The court described the Sharp “full, accommodation as causing the most minimal interference with appellant’s right to “only
have] held that a State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of a minor victim was sufficiently weighty to justify depriving the press and public of their constitutional right to attend criminal trials, where the trial court makes a case-specific finding that closure of the trial is necessary to protect the welfare of the minor.” (Craig, at p. 852.) The question we face in this appeal is whether, under Craig and its progeny, the record supports accommodating an adult witness by placing an opaque barrier between her and her accused abuser. In upholding the accommodation, the majority relies almost entirely on People v. Sharp (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772 (Sharp) and People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234 (Gonzales). I find those cases unhelpful. First, they involve child witnesses, not adult witnesses. Second, the accommodations in those cases preserved the defendants’ ability to view the witnesses as they testified. Third, both cases involved much more evidence of the need for the accommodation. As a result, I do not believe Sharp and Gonzales provide the majority a sound basis for its decision. In Sharp, the trial court allowed the young witness (who was 8 or 9 years old) to turn to the side and face the jury while testifying. (Sharp, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1783.) Before the accommodation, the witness was becoming incommunicative on the stand, suffering inexplicable memory lapses about incidents she had previously consistently reported, and providing inconsistent, evasive, and confused testimony. (Id. at pp. 1783-1784.) Even with the accommodation, the defendant still had a view of the witness’s face, just not a “full, frontal view.” (Ibid.) The Sharp court described the accommodation as causing “only the most minimal interference with appellant’s right to