determining whether a special relationship or state-created danger exists in those specific cases”). The culpability requirement in such a case is governed by the “special relationship” framework set forth in 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 212 F.3d County of Sacramento v. Lewis, See Nicini, at 809. Under that framework, the plaintiff must show that the conduct the defendant’s “shocked the precise level of culpability required will vary depending on the circumstances, conscience”; and especially on the availability (or not) of the opportunity for the defendant to deliberate before acting. at 810. In the Court of Appeals applied a standard. See id. Nicini, “deliberate indifference” at 811 the context of this case . . . Cyrus's actions in investigating the Morra home See id. (“In should be judged under the deliberate indifference The court did not, however, Nicini standard.”). decide whether this standard should follow the subjective “deliberate indifference” “deliberate standard applied to Eighth Amendment claims, 212 F.3d at 811 see Nicini, indifference” prisoners’ (citing 511 U.S. 825 (1994)), or whether a to act in light Farmer v. Brennan, defendant’s “failure of a risk of which the official should have known, as opposed to failure to act in light of an actually known risk, constitutes deliberately indifferent conduct in this because under either setting,” standard the court held the claim should fail, 212 F.3d at 812 (holding that see Nicini, plaintiff’s conduct at most, to defendant’s “amounted, negligence”).
determining whether a special relationship or state-created danger exists in those specific cases”). The culpability requirement in such a “special relationship” case is governed by the framework set forth in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). See Nicini, 212 F.3d at 809. Under that framework, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct “shocked the conscience”; the precise level of culpability required will vary depending on the circumstances, and especially on the availability (or not) of the opportunity for the defendant to deliberate before acting. See id. at 810. In Nicini, the Court of Appeals applied a “deliberate indifference” standard. See id. at 811 (“In the context of this case . . . Cyrus's actions in investigating the Morra home should be judged under the deliberate indifference standard.”). The Nicini court did not, however, decide whether this “deliberate indifference” standard should follow the subjective “deliberate indifference” standard applied to prisoners’ Eighth Amendment claims, see Nicini, 212 F.3d at 811 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)), or whether a defendant’s “failure to act in light of a risk of which the official should have known, as opposed to failure to act in light of an actually known risk, constitutes deliberately indifferent conduct in this setting,” because under either standard the court held the plaintiff’s claim should fail, see Nicini, 212 F.3d at 812 (holding that defendant’s conduct “amounted, at most, to negligence”).