as guidance for DSPs, generally. Accordingly, to maintain consistency, the DSP Order ALJ recommended that PECO’s DSP II load cap be set at 50%. R.D. at 34. iii. Exceptions In its Exception, FES argues that the ALJ’s conclusion, that the Commission’s controls PECO’s case, is erroneous as a matter of law and FE DSP Order not supported by the record evidence. FES Exc. at 2. In support of its Exception FES submits that, in the the FE DSP Order, Commission accepted the questionable propositions that, as a result of the 2011 merger, the FirstEnergy EDCs’ market power had increased, and that allowing one or a few suppliers to dominate the FirstEnergy wholesale auctions could result in controlling pricing such that other competitors are eventually driven out of this market. FE DSP at 31-32. Thus, FES argues that the Commission’s rationale in the Order FE DSP Order was based upon perceived circumstances specific to those particular EDCs. Accordingly, FES asserts that the is not applicable here. FES Exc. at 3. FE DSP Order FES also contends that, absent the the Recommended FES DSP Order, Decision correctly concluded that PECO had met its evidentiary burden in opposition to any reduction of its default supply load cap. FES Exc. at 3. FES also believes that PECO presented evidence that participation in its procurements has been substantial, and that its proposed procurement plans already include numerous protections against supplier default, including credit provisions and a contingency plan. Accordingly, it is FES’s Id. position that the Recommended Decision’s conclusion should be reversed, and the recommendation to reduce PECO’s default supply load caps should be rejected. Id. iv. Disposition
DSP Order as guidance for DSPs, generally. Accordingly, to maintain consistency, the ALJ recommended that PECO’s DSP II load cap be set at 50%. R.D. at 34. iii. Exceptions In its Exception, FES argues that the ALJ’s conclusion, that the Commission’s FE DSP Order controls PECO’s case, is erroneous as a matter of law and not supported by the record evidence. FES Exc. at 2. In support of its Exception FES submits that, in the FE DSP Order, the Commission accepted the questionable propositions that, as a result of the 2011 merger, the FirstEnergy EDCs’ market power had increased, and that allowing one or a few suppliers to dominate the FirstEnergy wholesale auctions could result in controlling pricing such that other competitors are eventually driven out of this market. FE DSP Order at 31-32. Thus, FES argues that the Commission’s rationale in the FE DSP Order was based upon perceived circumstances specific to those particular EDCs. Accordingly, FES asserts that the FE DSP Order is not applicable here. FES Exc. at 3. FES also contends that, absent the FES DSP Order, the Recommended Decision correctly concluded that PECO had met its evidentiary burden in opposition to any reduction of its default supply load cap. FES Exc. at 3. FES also believes that PECO presented evidence that participation in its procurements has been substantial, and that its proposed procurement plans already include numerous protections against supplier default, including credit provisions and a contingency plan. Id. Accordingly, it is FES’s position that the Recommended Decision’s conclusion should be reversed, and the recommendation to reduce PECO’s default supply load caps should be rejected. Id. iv. Disposition