apprehended, and the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy. The Court retains a limited discretion, if at all. [83] Wallis JA in Hotz v UCT 2017 (2) SA 485 (SCA) ([2016] 4 All SA 723; [2016] ZASCA 159) - (Navsa JA, Bosielo JA, Theron JA and Mathopo JA concurring) has – compellingly analysed this facet of interdictory relief by stating: [29} Once the applicant has established the three requisite elements for the grant of an … interdict, the scope, if any, for refusing relief is limited. There is no general discretion to refuse relief. That is a logical corollary of the court holding that the applicant has suffered an injury or has a reasonable apprehension of injury and that there is no similar protection against that injury by way of another ordinary remedy. In those circumstances, were the court to withhold an interdict, that would deny the injured party a remedy for their injury, a result inconsistent with the constitutionally protected right of access to courts for the resolution of disputes … ‘. [84] Again it is to be said that the aforementioned considerations are squarely applicable in our jurisdiction. Not only are the requirements pertaining to final interdicts based on the same legal background and principles, but also the constitutional environment, in which such principles operate here, is similar to that set by the South African Constitution. I believe that the reasons for- and the qualifications relating to the discretionary aspect pertaining to final interdicts can safely be endorsed in our jurisdiction as well. The defences [85] Before considering the applicants’ case it might again be apposite to just call to mind that the respondents have raised various defences. They have contended in the main: that the applicants are not entitled to the orders sought as the orders are overbroad, vague and/or incapable of enforcement; that the applicants papers are excipiable and thus do not entitle them to any relief as they have failed to set out facts on which any relief could be based; that the relief sought would violate the respondents constitutional Article 21(1)(a) rights; that the material that the respondents intend to publish is in any event already
apprehended, and the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy. The Court retains a limited discretion, if at all. [83] Wallis JA in Hotz v UCT 2017 (2) SA 485 (SCA) ([2016] 4 All SA 723; [2016] ZASCA 159) - (Navsa JA, Bosielo JA, Theron JA and Mathopo JA concurring) – has compellingly analysed this facet of interdictory relief by stating: [29} … Once the applicant has established the three requisite elements for the grant of an interdict, the scope, if any, for refusing relief is limited. There is no general discretion to refuse relief. That is a logical corollary of the court holding that the applicant has suffered an injury or has a reasonable apprehension of injury and that there is no similar protection against that injury by way of another ordinary remedy. In those circumstances, were the court to withhold an interdict, that would deny the injured party a remedy for their injury, a result inconsistent with the constitutionally protected right of access to courts for the resolution of disputes … ‘. [84] Again it is to be said that the aforementioned considerations are squarely applicable in our jurisdiction. Not only are the requirements pertaining to final interdicts based on the same legal background and principles, but also the constitutional environment, in which such principles operate here, is similar to that set by the South African Constitution. I believe that the reasons for- and the qualifications relating to the discretionary aspect pertaining to final interdicts can safely be endorsed in our jurisdiction as well. The defences [85] Before considering the applicants’ case it might again be apposite to just call to mind that the respondents have raised various defences. They have contended in the main: that the applicants are not entitled to the orders sought as the orders are overbroad, vague and/or incapable of enforcement; that the applicants papers are excipiable and thus do not entitle them to any relief as they have failed to set out facts on which any relief could be based; that the relief sought would violate the respondents constitutional Article 21(1)(a) rights; that the material that the respondents intend to publish is in any event already