thought and talk, has two dimensions: what we express when we say or think something, and what we represent in doing so. We can say both came to believe Lampl was “Kant that and believed his faithful servant that he was betraying In the of betraying him,” “Kant Kant.” first, the declarative sentence that follows the expresses the content of the belief, and in the ‘that’ second, the noun-phrase within the scope of the says what the belief is about. ‘of’ What I have called nonpsychological conception of the which construes “Hegel’s conceptual,” conceptual contentfulness as consisting in standing in relations of material incompatibility and consequence, is a model of what one says or thinks: the first dimension of intentionality or contentfulness For that reason, I will call this the (‘that’-intentionality). “conceptual dimension” of intentional contentfulness. The question on the table now is how he understands the other, representational dimension (‘of’-intentionality). The empiricists pursued an order of explanation that begins with representational contentfulness and seeks, in effect, to understand and explain conceptual contentfulness more generally in terms of it. One potential advantage of such an approach is that representation shows up as a genus, of which representation is only one species. As I understand him, Hegel pursues a conceptual complementary order of explanation. The project he outlines in the is to explain the Introduction notion of representation in terms of his nonpsychological concept of conceptual contentfulness. In what follows, I want to explain how I understand his strategy for pursuing this conceptualist order of explanation. For one of the principal lessons I think we ought to learn from Hegel concerns his working out of an alternative to the order of explanation of the representationalist two dimensions of intentionality, which has dominated the philosophical semantics of the
thought and talk, has two dimensions: what we express when we say or think something, and what we represent in doing so. We can say both “Kant came to believe that Lampl was betraying him,” and “Kant believed of his faithful servant that he was betraying Kant.” In the first, the declarative sentence that follows the ‘that’ expresses the content of the belief, and in the second, the noun-phrase within the scope of the ‘of’ says what the belief is about. What I have called “Hegel’s nonpsychological conception of the conceptual,” which construes conceptual contentfulness as consisting in standing in relations of material incompatibility and consequence, is a model of what one says or thinks: the first dimension of intentionality or contentfulness (‘that’-intentionality). For that reason, I will call this the “conceptual dimension” of intentional contentfulness. The question on the table now is how he understands the other, representational dimension (‘of’-intentionality). The empiricists pursued an order of explanation that begins with representational contentfulness and seeks, in effect, to understand and explain conceptual contentfulness more generally in terms of it. One potential advantage of such an approach is that representation shows up as a genus, of which conceptual representation is only one species. As I understand him, Hegel pursues a complementary order of explanation. The project he outlines in the Introduction is to explain the notion of representation in terms of his nonpsychological concept of conceptual contentfulness. In what follows, I want to explain how I understand his strategy for pursuing this conceptualist order of explanation. For one of the principal lessons I think we ought to learn from Hegel concerns his working out of an alternative to the representationalist order of explanation of the two dimensions of intentionality, which has dominated the philosophical semantics of the