defence applies where the statement has been made (a) in the discharge of a legal, social or moral duty to persons having a reciprocal duty or interest to receive it, and (b) in the protection or furtherance of an interest to a person who has a common or corresponding duty or interest to receive it, and the statement was relevant to the matter under discussion on that occasion. These grounds, founded upon public policy, are for that reason not limited and may be extended whenever the dictates of public and legal policy so require, the boundaries of which fall to be See also Alexis determined by applying the general criterion of reasonableness.’ v Pieter Hendrick Fischer and Rauha Amwele v AlinaNdeyapo [32] The learned authors Neethling et al (op cit) state that this defence is divided into two, namely absolute privilege and qualified privilege. The former, the learned authors posit, applies in circumstances where the privilege is arrogated by statute, for instance to members of cabinet and Members of Parliament who have absolute privilege in respect of defamatory matter uttered in Parliament or in any of the committees on Parliament. The other is relative or qualified privilege and it includes the one raised by the 1st defendant i.e.in discharge of a duty or the furtherance of an interest. [33] Crucially, the learned authors say the following which may be considered in addition to the enlightening treatise by Schimming-Chase AJ: in the opinion of the reasonable man, was there a duty or interest both to ‘Hence, communicate and to be informed of the defamatory words or behaviour? Obviously the application of this criterion depends on the facts of each particular case. Nevertheless, the following factors can play a role here: the existence of a between the particular relationship parties; the fact that the information was provided confidentially on request to someone with a legitimate interest therein; and the evident seriousness, importance and urgency of the issue in respect of which the defamatory charge was made. If it is proved that both parties had a corresponding duty or interest (that is, that a privileged occasion existed), then the defendant must further prove that he acted within the scope of the privilege. To do this he must prove that
defence applies where the statement has been made (a) in the discharge of a legal, social or moral duty to persons having a reciprocal duty or interest to receive it, and (b) in the protection or furtherance of an interest to a person who has a common or corresponding duty or interest to receive it, and the statement was relevant to the matter under discussion on that occasion. These grounds, founded upon public policy, are for that reason not limited and may be extended whenever the dictates of public and legal policy so require, the boundaries of which fall to be determined by applying the general criterion of reasonableness.’ See also Alexis v Pieter Hendrick Fischer and Rauha Amwele v AlinaNdeyapo [32] The learned authors Neethling et al (op cit) state that this defence is divided into two, namely absolute privilege and qualified privilege. The former, the learned authors posit, applies in circumstances where the privilege is arrogated by statute, for instance to members of cabinet and Members of Parliament who have absolute privilege in respect of defamatory matter uttered in Parliament or in any of the committees on Parliament. The other is relative or qualified privilege and it includes the one raised by the 1st defendant i.e.in discharge of a duty or the furtherance of an interest. [33] Crucially, the learned authors say the following which may be considered in addition to the enlightening treatise by Schimming-Chase AJ: ‘Hence, in the opinion of the reasonable man, was there a duty or interest both to communicate and to be informed of the defamatory words or behaviour? Obviously the application of this criterion depends on the facts of each particular case. Nevertheless, the following factors can play a role here: the existence of a particular relationship between the parties; the fact that the information was provided confidentially on request to someone with a legitimate interest therein; and the evident seriousness, importance and urgency of the issue in respect of which the defamatory charge was made. If it is proved that both parties had a corresponding duty or interest (that is, that a privileged occasion existed), then the defendant must further prove that he acted within the scope of the privilege. To do this he must prove that