good reasons for thinking and doing what we do, but in the sense that whether we do or not, we are always liable to normative concerning our reasons for thinking as we do or doing assessment what we do. However we are in fact on any particular occasion to the normative force sensitive of reasons (that peculiar force, at once compulsory and yet not always compelling, that so fascinated and puzzled the ancient Greek philosophers), we are the kind of creatures we and agents, creatures whose world is structured by the and commitments responsibilities we undertake—only because we are always liable to normative assessments of our reasons. The norms that articulate the contents of judgments are The conceptual faculty, concepts. the understanding, is the faculty of judgment. Concepts articulate the contents of judgments by determining what one would make oneself responsible for, what one would be committing oneself to, were one to endorse those contents. Kant thinks of concepts as a kind of What rule. are they rules for doing? They are rules for synthesizing a unity of apperception. And that is to say that they are rules articulating what is a for what. The concepts being applied reason determine what from a given claim(able), hence what (else) one would have committed follows oneself to or made oneself responsible for by endorsing it. They determine what counts as rational or against, or a judgeable content, hence would count as a evidence for justification of or against endorsing it. reason for The task of integrating a judgment (or practical maxim) into a synthetic unity of apperception has determinate conditions of success and failure only insofar as the judgments have contents that stand in relations of material inferential consequence and incompatibility to one another. A knower can have a determinate integrative task-responsibility only if it is critical
good reasons for thinking and doing what we do, but in the sense that whether we do or not, we are always liable to normative assessment concerning our reasons for thinking as we do or doing what we do. However sensitive we are in fact on any particular occasion to the normative force of reasons (that peculiar force, at once compulsory and yet not always compelling, that so fascinated and puzzled the ancient Greek philosophers), we are the kind of creatures we and agents, creatures whose world is structured by the commitments and responsibilities we undertake—only because we are always liable to normative assessments of our reasons. The norms that articulate the contents of judgments are concepts. The conceptual faculty, the understanding, is the faculty of judgment. Concepts articulate the contents of judgments by determining what one would make oneself responsible for, what one would be committing oneself to, were one to endorse those contents. Kant thinks of concepts as a kind of rule. What are they rules for doing? They are rules for synthesizing a unity of apperception. And that is to say that they are rules articulating what is a reason for what. The concepts being applied determine what follows from a given claim(able), hence what (else) one would have committed oneself to or made oneself responsible for by endorsing it. They determine what counts as rational evidence for or against, or justification of a judgeable content, hence would count as a reason for or against endorsing it. The task of integrating a judgment (or practical maxim) into a synthetic unity of apperception has determinate conditions of success and failure only insofar as the judgments have contents that stand in relations of material inferential consequence and incompatibility to one another. A knower can have a determinate critical integrative task-responsibility only if it is