transform those programs and render them unworkable as written"). I with the Court that the word "any," when used in a statute, does not normally mean "any in the universe." Cf. FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U. S. 293, 311 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (" 'Tell all customers that . . .' does not refer to every customer of every business in the world"). Rather, "[g]eneral terms as used on particular occasions often carry with them implied restrictions as to scope," ibid., and so courts must interpret the word "any," like all other words, in context. As Judge Learned Hand pointed out when interpreting another statute many years ago, "[w]e can best reach the meaning here, as always, by recourse to the underlying purpose, and, with that as a guide, by trying to project upon the specific occasion how we think persons, actuated by such a purpose, would have dealt with it, if it had been presented to them at the time." Borella v. Borden Co., 145 F. 2d 63, 64 (CA2 1944). The pursuit of that underlying purpose may sometimes require us to "abandon" a "literal interpretation" of a word like "any." Id., at 64-65. The law has long recognized that terms such as "any" admit of unwritten limitations and exceptions. Legal philosophers like to point out that a statute providing that " '[w]hoever shall willfully take the life of another shall be punished by death' " need not encompass a man who kills
transform those programs and render them unworkable as written"). I with the Court that the word "any," when used in a statute, does not normally mean "any in the universe." Cf. FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U. S. 293, 311 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (" 'Tell all customers that . . .' does not refer to every customer of every business in the world"). Rather, "[g]eneral terms as used on particular occasions often carry with them implied restrictions as to scope," ibid., and so courts must interpret the word "any," like all other words, in context. As Judge Learned Hand pointed out when interpreting another statute many years ago, "[w]e can best reach the meaning here, as always, by recourse to the underlying purpose, and, with that as a guide, by trying to project upon the specific occasion how we think persons, actuated by such a purpose, would have dealt with it, if it had been presented to them at the time." Borella v. Borden Co., 145 F. 2d 63, 64 (CA2 1944). The pursuit of that underlying purpose may sometimes require us to "abandon" a "literal interpretation" of a word like "any." Id., at 64-65. The law has long recognized that terms such as "any" admit of unwritten limitations and exceptions. Legal philosophers like to point out that a statute providing that " '[w]hoever shall willfully take the life of another shall be punished by death' " need not encompass a man who kills