For me to committed, I have to have a commitment, and others must be acknowledged attribute it to me. Only so is a real, contentful commitment instituted. Only so can I really be understood to have myself. This is, at base, why the possibility of freedom (in the normative bound my sense of the autonomy thesis: my capacity to commit myself, to bind myself by norms) depends on Thus Hegel maintains the apparently paradoxical view that the possibility of my others. autonomy depends on others adopting attitudes toward me. But the paradox is merely apparent: autonomy does not on this conception collapse into heteronomy. Having a commitment with a definite content is intelligible, Hegel thinks, only in the context of a division of labor between the one who undertakes the commitment and those who attribute it and hold the undertaker to it. I get to decide which piece in the game I will the one labeled metal is or to drive you to the airport ‘That molybdenum,’ ‘I promise tomorrow I do not then get to decide I have committed myself to thereby, what morning,’—but what further moves are appropriate or obligatory for one who has played that piece. My authority is real, but it is partial. And the same can be said of the others, who play the game with me and simultaneously referee it. For they have no authority over my acknowledging of commitments. Their authority is only operative in the administration of those me to a commitment with a determinate content to which they are responsible no less than I. (Compare: the legislative and judicial functions of government.) As Hegel puts it, I have a certain in which commitments I embrace. Apart from my acknowledgment, independence, they have no normative force over me. But in exercising that very independence, I am at the same time on the attitudes of others, who attribute and hold me to the commitment, dependent and thereby administer its content. And the others, reciprocally dependent on my recognition,
For me to be committed, I have to have acknowledged a commitment, and others must attribute it to me. Only so is a real, contentful commitment instituted. Only so can I really be understood to have bound myself. This is, at base, why the possibility of my freedom (in the normative sense of the autonomy thesis: my capacity to commit myself, to bind myself by norms) depends on others. Thus Hegel maintains the apparently paradoxical view that the possibility of my autonomy depends on others adopting attitudes toward me. But the paradox is merely apparent: autonomy does not on this conception collapse into heteronomy. Having a commitment with a definite content is intelligible, Hegel thinks, only in the context of a division of labor between the one who undertakes the commitment and those who attribute it and hold the undertaker to it. I get to decide which piece in the game I will the one labeled ‘That metal is molybdenum,’ or ‘I promise to drive you to the airport tomorrow morning,’—but I do not then get to decide what I have committed myself to thereby, what further moves are appropriate or obligatory for one who has played that piece. My authority is real, but it is partial. And the same can be said of the others, who play the game with me and simultaneously referee it. For they have no authority over my acknowledging of commitments. Their authority is only operative in the administration of those me to a commitment with a determinate content to which they are responsible no less than I. (Compare: the legislative and judicial functions of government.) As Hegel puts it, I have a certain independence, in which commitments I embrace. Apart from my acknowledgment, they have no normative force over me. But in exercising that very independence, I am at the same time dependent on the attitudes of others, who attribute and hold me to the commitment, and thereby administer its content. And the others, reciprocally dependent on my recognition,