repressing the opposition and the media), incumbents are more likely to use bribery, co-optation, and more subtle forms of persecution, such as the use of tax authorities, compliant judiciaries, and other state agencies to “legally” harass, persecute, or extort cooperative behavior from critics. Yet even if the of autocratic incumbents, the persistence of cards are stacked in favor meaningful democratic institutions creates arenas through which opposition forces may—and frequently do—pose significant challenges. As a result, even though democratic institutions may be badly flawed, both authoritarian incumbents and their opponents must take them seriously. In this sense, competitive authoritarianism is distinct from what might be called “façade” electoral regimes—that is, regimes in which electoral institutions exist but yield no meaningful contestation for power (such as Egypt, Singapore, and Uzbekistan in the 1990s). Such regimes have been called “pseudodemocracies,” “virtual democracies,” and “electoral authoritarian” regimes. In our view, they are cases of full-scale authoritarianism. The line between this type of regime and competitive authoritarianism can be hard to draw, and noncompetitive electoral in- stitutions may one day become competitive (as occurred in Mexico). It is essential, however, to distinguish regimes in which democratic insti- tutions offer an important channel through which the opposition may seek power from those regimes in which democratic rules simply serve as to legitimate an existing autocratic leadership. Finally, competitive authoritarianism must be distinguished from other types of hybrid regimes. Regimes may mix authoritarian and democratic features in a variety of ways, and competitive authoritarianism should not be viewed as encompassing all of these regime forms. Other hybrid regime types include “exclusive republics” (regimes with strong demo- cratic institutions but highly restrictive citizenship laws) and “tutelary” or “guided” democracies—competitive regimes in which nondemocratic actors such as military or religious authorities wield veto power. Four Arenas of Democratic Contestation Due to the persistence of meaningful democratic institutions in com- petitive authoritarian regimes, arenas of contestation exist through which opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasion- ally even defeat autocratic incumbents. Four such arenas are of particular importance: 1) the electoral arena; 2) the legislature; 3) the judiciary; and 4) the media.
repressing the opposition and the media), incumbents are more likely to use bribery, co-optation, and more subtle forms of persecution, such as the use of tax authorities, compliant judiciaries, and other state agencies to “legally” harass, persecute, or extort cooperative behavior from critics. Yet even if the cards are stacked in favor of autocratic incumbents, the persistence of meaningful democratic institutions creates arenas through which opposition forces may—and frequently do—pose significant challenges. As a result, even though democratic institutions may be badly flawed, both authoritarian incumbents and their opponents must take them seriously. In this sense, competitive authoritarianism is distinct from what might be called “façade” electoral regimes—that is, regimes in which electoral institutions exist but yield no meaningful contestation for power (such as Egypt, Singapore, and Uzbekistan in the 1990s). Such regimes have been called “pseudodemocracies,” “virtual democracies,” and “electoral authoritarian” regimes. In our view, they are cases of full-scale authoritarianism. The line between this type of regime and competitive authoritarianism can be hard to draw, and noncompetitive electoral in- stitutions may one day become competitive (as occurred in Mexico). It is essential, however, to distinguish regimes in which democratic insti- tutions offer an important channel through which the opposition may seek power from those regimes in which democratic rules simply serve as to legitimate an existing autocratic leadership. Finally, competitive authoritarianism must be distinguished from other types of hybrid regimes. Regimes may mix authoritarian and democratic features in a variety of ways, and competitive authoritarianism should not be viewed as encompassing all of these regime forms. Other hybrid regime types include “exclusive republics” (regimes with strong demo- cratic institutions but highly restrictive citizenship laws) and “tutelary” or “guided” democracies—competitive regimes in which nondemocratic actors such as military or religious authorities wield veto power. Four Arenas of Democratic Contestation Due to the persistence of meaningful democratic institutions in com- petitive authoritarian regimes, arenas of contestation exist through which opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasion- ally even defeat autocratic incumbents. Four such arenas are of particular importance: 1) the electoral arena; 2) the legislature; 3) the judiciary; and 4) the media.