responsible in judging, and its representational content (what is represented by it) is what one for makes oneself responsible For Kant, we have seen, being responsible for a judgment to. Hegel’s to the effect that consists in being responsible for integrating it into the constellation of p one’s prior commitments, so as to sustain the rational normative unity characteristic of apperception. What the judgment is what is represented by it, is what exercises a distinctive kind of about, over assessments of its correctness—as, we might want to say, a representing of that authority represented. Something (paradigmatically, a judging) is intelligible as being a representing just insofar as it is responsible for its correctness to something that thereby counts as represented by it. In terms, the objective form of judgment is the which every judgment as such Kant’s “object=X” is responsible to (for its correctness). (The subjective form of judgment, the which can “I think” accompany every judging, marks the knower who is responsible for the judgment—that is, responsible for integrating it with the others for which that knower takes the same kind of responsibility.) In the form in which this thought appears in represented Introduction, Hegel’s objects are what serves as a normative for assessments of commitments that standard [Maβstab] count as representing those objects just in virtue of that constellation of authority and responsibility. idea is to apply the functionalist explanatory strategy, which looked to Hegel’s normative role in the synthetic-integrative activity of judging for understanding the conceptual dimension of judgeable contents, also to the understanding of the representational dimension of content. That is, he will look to what knowing subjects need to in order thereby to count as do acknowledging the authority of something to serve as a standard for assessing the correctness of a judgment, in order to understand representational relations. If he can exhibit that kind of doing
responsible for in judging, and its representational content (what is represented by it) is what one makes oneself responsible to. For Hegel’s Kant, we have seen, being responsible for a judgment to the effect that p consists in being responsible for integrating it into the constellation of one’s prior commitments, so as to sustain the rational normative unity characteristic of apperception. What the judgment is about, what is represented by it, is what exercises a distinctive kind of authority over assessments of its correctness—as, we might want to say, a representing of that represented. Something (paradigmatically, a judging) is intelligible as being a representing just insofar as it is responsible for its correctness to something that thereby counts as represented by it. In Kant’s terms, the objective form of judgment is the “object=X” which every judgment as such is responsible to (for its correctness). (The subjective form of judgment, the “I think” which can accompany every judging, marks the knower who is responsible for the judgment—that is, responsible for integrating it with the others for which that knower takes the same kind of responsibility.) In the form in which this thought appears in Hegel’s Introduction, represented objects are what serves as a normative standard [Maβstab] for assessments of commitments that count as representing those objects just in virtue of that constellation of authority and responsibility. Hegel’s idea is to apply the functionalist explanatory strategy, which looked to normative role in the synthetic-integrative activity of judging for understanding the conceptual dimension of judgeable contents, also to the understanding of the representational dimension of content. That is, he will look to what knowing subjects need to do in order thereby to count as acknowledging the authority of something to serve as a standard for assessing the correctness of a judgment, in order to understand representational relations. If he can exhibit that kind of doing