under which is limited to a review for intentional discrimination. Batson, Compare 552 U.S. 472, 476-77 (2008) (under trial court must Snyder v. Louisiana, Batson, “the determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.”). The incorporation of implicit bias into the objective observer standard is consistent with a growing recognition that racial disparities appear in the justice system for reasons far more complex than blatant, intentional racism. For example, the National Center for State Courts has documented the development and implementation of pilot programs on the topic of implicit racial bias in three states, and has issued a Primer for Courts on the subject of implicit bias. 898 N.W.2d 801, 817 See also Iowa v. Plain, (Iowa 2017) (“While there is general agreement that courts should address the problem of implicit bias in the courtroom . . . . We strongly encourage district courts to be proactive about addressing implicit bias”). The objective observer standard’s recognition of implicit bias is critical, because it avoids one of the primary factors that has limited as an effective tool for Batson preventing the racially-disparate use of peremptory strikes. Namely, reliance on implicit bias dispenses with the necessity under that a court rule that the prosecutor has Batson engaged in intentionally racist conduct. 2 Cal. 5th 1150, See also People v. Gutierrez, 1182-83 (2017) (Goodwin, J., concurring) (arguing that should be understood as a Batson standard [that] is not designed to elicit a definitive finding of deceit or “probabilistic racism” but instead a level of risk that courts cannot tolerate,” because “defines the prosecutor a liar or a bigot . . . obscure[s] the systemic values that the “brand[ing] constitutional prohibition on racial discrimination in jury selection is designed to serve.”).
under Batson, which is limited to a review for intentional discrimination. Compare Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-77 (2008) (under Batson, “the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.”). The incorporation of implicit bias into the objective observer standard is consistent with a growing recognition that racial disparities appear in the justice system for reasons far more complex than blatant, intentional racism. For example, the National Center for State Courts has documented the development and implementation of pilot programs on the topic of implicit racial bias in three states, and has issued a Primer for Courts on the subject of implicit bias. See also Iowa v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 817 (Iowa 2017) (“While there is general agreement that courts should address the problem of implicit bias in the courtroom . . . . We strongly encourage district courts to be proactive about addressing implicit bias”). The objective observer standard’s recognition of implicit bias is critical, because it avoids one of the primary factors that has limited Batson as an effective tool for preventing the racially-disparate use of peremptory strikes. Namely, reliance on implicit bias dispenses with the necessity under Batson that a court rule that the prosecutor has engaged in intentionally racist conduct. See also People v. Gutierrez, 2 Cal. 5th 1150, 1182-83 (2017) (Goodwin, J., concurring) (arguing that Batson should be understood as a “probabilistic standard [that] is not designed to elicit a definitive finding of deceit or racism” but instead “defines a level of risk that courts cannot tolerate,” because “brand[ing] the prosecutor a liar or a bigot . . . obscure[s] the systemic values that the constitutional prohibition on racial discrimination in jury selection is designed to serve.”).