Would be acceptable just in case one accepted either of: (a) would bring about D E or (b) and would not change this E, D condition (a) conforms to the undesired interpretation of in which Harper’s ‘safety’, the agent would the truth in a godlike fashion by merely believing it to be ‘bring about’ the case. Condition (b) denies that the believing affects the truth thereby agent’s – getting Sosa off the hook but in doing so it removes causation from the expression – completely. So if we want to attend to the causal train that enables students to acquire knowledge in other words, the learning processes we are better off staying with – – tracking rather than with Sosa. Nozick’s Returning to four conditions, then, we can say that knows if and only if: s p Nozick’s 1. p 2. Bs p 3. ~p ~Bs p □→ 4. Bs p p □→ If we can notionally tick all four conditions, then our putatively knowing student indeed has knowledge. Deciding whether or not the first two are assertible is conceptually (if not operationally) straightforward: (1) is true? and (2) does believe p s The third condition is not so simple to decide upon, however, for it treats of p’? ‘that counterfactuals: statements which are true in some other possible worlds. How then can the statement be assessed for truth in this world? How can it be evaluated as Here again, we use the Harper test. Applying it to Nozick (3) ~p ~Bs we see p, □→ that either [(a) ~p would bring about ~Bs OR [(b) ~Bs and ~p would not change p] p, this]. Clearly, this time we ought to reject (b), for implausibly claiming as a condition for knowledge that would have a belief with no causal link to and was thus a fixed s ~p, and incorrigible prejudice. So we are left with the causative claim of (a). In other words, the that uses to determine that must be counterfactually sensitive: it method s p tracks the truth, such that if were false he would notice. p
Would be acceptable just in case one accepted either of: (a) D would bring about E or (b) E, and D would not change this Harper’s condition (a) conforms to the undesired interpretation of ‘safety’, in which the agent would ‘bring about’ the truth in a godlike fashion by merely believing it to be the case. Condition (b) denies that the agent’s believing affects the truth – thereby getting Sosa off the hook – but in doing so it removes causation from the expression completely. So if we want to attend to the causal train that enables students to acquire knowledge – in other words, the learning processes – we are better off staying with Nozick’s tracking rather than with Sosa. Returning to Nozick’s four conditions, then, we can say that s knows p if and only if: 1. p 2. Bs p 3. ~p □→ ~Bs p 4. p □→ Bs p If we can notionally tick all four conditions, then our putatively knowing student indeed has knowledge. Deciding whether or not the first two are assertible is conceptually (if not operationally) straightforward: (1) is p true? and (2) does s believe ‘that p’? The third condition is not so simple to decide upon, however, for it treats of counterfactuals: statements which are true in some other possible worlds. How then can the statement be assessed for truth in this world? How can it be evaluated as Here again, we use the Harper test. Applying it to Nozick (3) ~p □→ ~Bs p, we see that either [(a) ~p would bring about ~Bs p] OR [(b) ~Bs p, and ~p would not change this]. Clearly, this time we ought to reject (b), for implausibly claiming as a condition for knowledge that s would have a belief with no causal link to ~p, and was thus a fixed and incorrigible prejudice. So we are left with the causative claim of (a). In other words, the method that s uses to determine that p must be counterfactually sensitive: it tracks the truth, such that if p were false he would notice.