have a he or she concedes that the primary intensions of “hidden backside”—once phenomenal concepts are not epistemically rigid—this complaint against Levin’s version and my version of PCS falls by the wayside and the dialectical situation shifts to our favor. References Alter, T. and Walter, S. (eds.) 2007, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1968, London: Routledge & Kegan A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Paul Ltd. Armstrong, D. M. 1978, Cambridge: Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume II, Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1997, Cambridge: Cambridge University A World of States of Affairs, Press. Blackburn, S. in 1990, “Filling Space”, Analysis 50, pp. 62-65. Chalmers, D. to the Problem of of 1995, “Facing up Consciousness”, Journal Consciousness Studies 2, pp. 200-219. Chalmers, D. 1996, Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Conscious Mind, Chalmers, D. and Its Place in S. Stich and T. Warfield, 2002, “Consciousness Nature”, in: eds., Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, pp. 102-142. Chalmers, D. 2003, Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal in: Q. Smith “The Belief”, and A. Jokic, eds., Oxford: Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press, pp. 220-272. Chalmers, D. 2007, Concepts and the in: T. Alter and S. “Phenomenal Explanatory Gap”, Walter, eds., Oxford: Oxford Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, University Press, pp. 167-194. Chalmers, D. 2010, Two-Dimensional Argument in: D. “The Against Materialism”, Chalmers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. The Character of Consciousness, 141-205. Chalmers, D. 2012, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Constructing the World, Chalmers, D. unpublished manuscript, Combination Problem for “The PanPyschism”, available at website: http://consc.net/chalmers/ Chalmers’
have a “hidden backside”—once he or she concedes that the primary intensions of phenomenal concepts are not epistemically rigid—this complaint against Levin’s version and my version of PCS falls by the wayside and the dialectical situation shifts to our favor. References Alter, T. and Walter, S. (eds.) 2007, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Armstrong, D. M. 1978, Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1997, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blackburn, S. 1990, “Filling in Space”, Analysis 50, pp. 62-65. Chalmers, D. 1995, “Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2, pp. 200-219. Chalmers, D. 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, D. 2002, “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature”, in: S. Stich and T. Warfield, eds., Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 102-142. Chalmers, D. 2003, “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”, in: Q. Smith and A. Jokic, eds., Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 220-272. Chalmers, D. 2007, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”, in: T. Alter and S. Walter, eds., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 167-194. Chalmers, D. 2010, “The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism”, in: D. Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 141-205. Chalmers, D. 2012, Constructing the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, D. unpublished manuscript, “The Combination Problem for PanPyschism”, available at Chalmers’ website: http://consc.net/chalmers/