in the series of actions and how’ to make it and there is a series of ‘knowing ‘why’ actions x, y and z. The diagnosis of SWERVING THE WHEEL is that action is conceived in its secondary conception, namely as a description of events, i.e. mental states, bodily movements and further effects that happen in the world. But the primary conception of an action is the model of OMELETTE. If we ask Mr. Enemy he deliberately ‘why’ moved the wheel in the direction of your neighbour he will respond that did not’ ‘he and then understand that his action was not intentional. The difficulty is that any correct description of an action and therefore of social practices must the model of OMELETTE. In other words, it needs to grasp the deliberative mode of the agent and this is only possible if we begin and finish with the answers to the question The correct interpretation is not that we ‘Why?’. ask the agent he did this and not that. It is rather that it is implicit ‘effectively’ ‘why’ because we ourselves are of the how’ of the practice and tap into the ‘knowers’ ‘know good-making characteristics, values and principles of the intentional actions and resultant practices. We are all practical reasoners, we have acquired know how and exercise this capacity. Therefore we can perceive this capacity in others . III.- A Criticism of Deep Conventions: Deep Conventions are Always and Therefore Presuppose Practical Reason From this feature of forward-looking many paradoxes arise and the most significant one is that the responsibility for and evaluation of an action is
in the series of actions and ‘knowing how’ to make it and ‘why’ there is a series of actions x, y and z. The diagnosis of SWERVING THE WHEEL is that action is conceived in its secondary conception, namely as a description of events, i.e. mental states, bodily movements and further effects that happen in the world. But the primary conception of an action is the model of OMELETTE. If we ask Mr. Enemy ‘why’ he deliberately moved the wheel in the direction of your neighbour he will respond that ‘he did not’ and then understand that his action was not intentional. The difficulty is that any correct description of an action and therefore of social practices must the model of OMELETTE. In other words, it needs to grasp the deliberative mode of the agent and this is only possible if we begin and finish with the answers to the question ‘Why?’. The correct interpretation is not that we ‘effectively’ ask the agent ‘why’ he did this and not that. It is rather that it is implicit because we ourselves are ‘knowers’ of the ‘know how’ of the practice and tap into the good-making characteristics, values and principles of the intentional actions and resultant practices. We are all practical reasoners, we have acquired know how and exercise this capacity. Therefore we can perceive this capacity in others . III.- A Criticism of Deep Conventions: Deep Conventions are Always and Therefore Presuppose Practical Reason From this feature of forward-looking many paradoxes arise and the most significant one is that the responsibility for and evaluation of an action is