construction of the wide language used therein, the resolutions adopted and lodged by the applicants in the appeal contemplate and authorise proceedings of that nature. In the result, we hold that it was not necessary for the applicants to adopt resolutions after the lapsing of the appeal in which they specifically mandated the application for condonation and reinstatement. Counsel for both respondents drew our attention to a judgment by Hannah J in Duntrust (Pty) Ltd v H Sediacek t/a GM Refrigeration where the High Court rejected the applicant’s contention that an application for reinstatement of an appeal from the Magistrate's Court to the High Court might not necessarily require a resolution by the applicant because it was part and parcel of the appeal process. The rejection of the submission came in rather terse terms and without reference to any authority. It is not apparent from the judgment whether the applicant adopted a resolution authorising the appeal at all or, if it did, what the terms thereof were. A closer reading of the judgment shows the Court's 'disquiet' about procedural irregularities in the application that suggested that the application had not been authorised. The case falls to be distinguished on that basis. In any event, to the extent that the Duntrust judgment may be interpreted as authority for the proposition that, once an appeal has lapsed, a separate and distinct resolution authorising an application for condonation and reinstatement of an appeal must in all instances be adopted by juristic persons, irrespective of the terms on which it authorised the appeal and prosecution thereof in the first instance, we would disapprove of it for the reasons given earlier.
construction of the wide language used therein, the resolutions adopted and lodged by the applicants in the appeal contemplate and authorise proceedings of that nature. In the result, we hold that it was not necessary for the applicants to adopt resolutions after the lapsing of the appeal in which they specifically mandated the application for condonation and reinstatement. Counsel for both respondents drew our attention to a judgment by Hannah J in Duntrust (Pty) Ltd v H Sediacek t/a GM Refrigeration where the High Court rejected the applicant’s contention that an application for reinstatement of an appeal from the Magistrate's Court to the High Court might not necessarily require a resolution by the applicant because it was part and parcel of the appeal process. The rejection of the submission came in rather terse terms and without reference to any authority. It is not apparent from the judgment whether the applicant adopted a resolution authorising the appeal at all or, if it did, what the terms thereof were. A closer reading of the judgment shows the Court's 'disquiet' about procedural irregularities in the application that suggested that the application had not been authorised. The case falls to be distinguished on that basis. In any event, to the extent that the Duntrust judgment may be interpreted as authority for the proposition that, once an appeal has lapsed, a separate and distinct resolution authorising an application for condonation and reinstatement of an appeal must in all instances be adopted by juristic persons, irrespective of the terms on which it authorised the appeal and prosecution thereof in the first instance, we would disapprove of it for the reasons given earlier.