himself struggled with, and is, I think, a point of tension between and Buchanan’s Tullock’s understandings of their shared work. In the opening pages of the Buchanan and Tullock write: The Calculus Political theory has concerned itself with the question: What is the State? Political philosophy has extended this to: What ought the state be? Political has asked: “science” How is the state organized? None of these questions will be answered here. We are not directly interested in what State or State actually is, but propose to define quite specifically, yet quite the a briefly, what a State ought to be (Buchanan and Tullock 1962/2004: 3) we think (emphasis original). Now detailing what they think the state to be certainly seems like a normative project, but ought it is not clear that Buchanan and Tullock agree on this point. In their separately written appendices to Buchanan and Tullock each describe how their jointly authored The Calculus contribution fits within broader schools of scholarly enquiry. Tullock primarily sees theoretical forerunners to their project in the then-developing game theory and social choice literature, citing the work of John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, Duncan Black, and Kenneth Arrow (Buchanan and Tullock 1962/2004: 310-331). On this understanding, is decidedly a The Calculus work of positive social science, not a contribution to normative social contract theory. appendix, however, places the piece squarely in the social contract tradition Buchanan’s and explicitly as a normative project. Buchanan begins by noting that the science of politics contains both a positive as well as a normative component: A positive science of politics should analyze the operation of an existing, or postulated, set of rules for collective decision-making quite independent of the efficacy of this set in furthering or in A normative theory of politics should, promoting certain “social goals.” by contrast, array the alternative sets of rules in accordance with their predicted efficiency in producing certain ends or goals which should be, if possible, made quite explicit (Buchanan and Tullock 1962/2004: 292).
himself struggled with, and is, I think, a point of tension between Buchanan’s and Tullock’s understandings of their shared work. In the opening pages of the The Calculus Buchanan and Tullock write: Political theory has concerned itself with the question: What is the State? Political philosophy has extended this to: What ought the state be? Political “science” has asked: How is the state organized? None of these questions will be answered here. We are not directly interested in what the State or a State actually is, but propose to define quite specifically, yet quite briefly, what we think a State ought to be (Buchanan and Tullock 1962/2004: 3) (emphasis original). Now detailing what they think the state ought to be certainly seems like a normative project, but it is not clear that Buchanan and Tullock agree on this point. In their separately written appendices to The Calculus Buchanan and Tullock each describe how their jointly authored contribution fits within broader schools of scholarly enquiry. Tullock primarily sees theoretical forerunners to their project in the then-developing game theory and social choice literature, citing the work of John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, Duncan Black, and Kenneth Arrow (Buchanan and Tullock 1962/2004: 310-331). On this understanding, The Calculus is decidedly a work of positive social science, not a contribution to normative social contract theory. Buchanan’s appendix, however, places the piece squarely in the social contract tradition and explicitly as a normative project. Buchanan begins by noting that the science of politics contains both a positive as well as a normative component: A positive science of politics should analyze the operation of an existing, or postulated, set of rules for collective decision-making quite independent of the efficacy of this set in furthering or in promoting certain “social goals.” A normative theory of politics should, by contrast, array the alternative sets of rules in accordance with their predicted efficiency in producing certain ends or goals which should be, if possible, made quite explicit (Buchanan and Tullock 1962/2004: 292).