It should not be forgotten that Martin establishes the intriguing possibility that evidence pertaining to the defendant’s condition” might nevertheless be taken into account “psychiatric for the purposes of a self-defence plea exceptional circumstances which would make the “in evidence especially probative”. Martin itself was deemed not to be sufficiently “exceptional” and neither was Canns nor Oye. If those two cases fall short of the threshold it “exceptional” is submitted that we may have to wait a very long time before such a case does arise. Perhaps Parliament may deem it appropriate to add another subsection to s.76 to further the law. The section has been amended already, by s.148 of the Legal Aid, “clarify” Sentencing & Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and by s.43 of the Crime & Courts Act 2013, so a further amendment along the following lines might not be inappropriate: (4)(b) does not enable D to rely on any mistaken belief induced by psychosis or ‘Subsection any other psychiatric disorder, unless there are exceptional circumstances which would make the evidence especially probative.’
It should not be forgotten that Martin establishes the intriguing possibility that evidence pertaining to the defendant’s “psychiatric condition” might nevertheless be taken into account for the purposes of a self-defence plea “in exceptional circumstances which would make the evidence especially probative”. Martin itself was deemed not to be sufficiently “exceptional” and neither was Canns nor Oye. If those two cases fall short of the “exceptional” threshold it is submitted that we may have to wait a very long time before such a case does arise. Perhaps Parliament may deem it appropriate to add another subsection to s.76 to further “clarify” the law. The section has been amended already, by s.148 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing & Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and by s.43 of the Crime & Courts Act 2013, so a further amendment along the following lines might not be inappropriate: ‘Subsection (4)(b) does not enable D to rely on any mistaken belief induced by psychosis or any other psychiatric disorder, unless there are exceptional circumstances which would make the evidence especially probative.’