productivity improvements in FY 2002-2012 than the U.S. railroads (combined freight and passenger outputs) in 1951-1974 (2.5% RPM SFP v. 1.5% [RPM & RTM] TFP) (Caves et al. 1980). Table 5.1- Summary of NEC SFP Growth in FY 2002-2012 Yearly Ridership Revenue RPM SFP ASM SFP Average SFP SFP SFP Growth 2005-2012 NEC 0.9% 2.8% 2.5% 0.4% Express 1.3% 2.9% 2.8% -1.1% 1.0% 2.1% 2.4% 1.3% Regional 2002-2012 NEC 2.4% 2.0% --- --- Express 2.0% 1.7% --- --- Regional 3.0% 2.4% --- --- In the past decade, Amtrak increased its ability to fill up and economically exploit the available capacity in the NEC. On the other hand, supply-side productivity did not follow it. The NEC became cumulatively ~20% more productive on RPM SFP (demand side) and only ~3% more productive on ASM SFP (supply side) in the past seven years. In fact, the ASM SFP of the express services actually decreased. Amtrak was far more effective at using the available capacity in the NEC (by filling up trains with more passengers over longer distances) than at generating it (running trains cheaper). The NEC-spine trains were volatile to external events, had large economies of scale, and presented slow adjustment of capacity that were not homogenous, but rather depended on specific routes. Even though the effect of the economic recession of 2009 was a regrettable 2-3-year setback in ridership and revenue for all routes in the NEC, the effects of lost or gained ridership on ticket revenue were more pronounced for express services than for regional services. Also, the SFP of express services was more volatile than that of regional services. This shows that the Acela Express is more sensitive than the Northeast Regional to external factors, thus revealing risks but also opportunities for improved performance of future HSR.
productivity improvements in FY 2002-2012 than the U.S. railroads (combined freight and passenger outputs) in 1951-1974 (2.5% RPM SFP v. 1.5% [RPM & RTM] TFP) (Caves et al. 1980). Table 5.1- Summary of NEC SFP Growth in FY 2002-2012 Yearly Average SFP Growth Ridership SFP Revenue SFP RPM SFP ASM SFP 2005-2012 NEC 0.9% 2.8% 2.5% 0.4% Express 1.3% 2.9% 2.8% -1.1% Regional 1.0% 2.1% 2.4% 1.3% 2002-2012 NEC 2.4% 2.0% --- --- Express 2.0% 1.7% --- --- Regional 3.0% 2.4% --- --- In the past decade, Amtrak increased its ability to fill up and economically exploit the available capacity in the NEC. On the other hand, supply-side productivity did not follow it. The NEC became cumulatively ~20% more productive on RPM SFP (demand side) and only ~3% more productive on ASM SFP (supply side) in the past seven years. In fact, the ASM SFP of the express services actually decreased. Amtrak was far more effective at using the available capacity in the NEC (by filling up trains with more passengers over longer distances) than at generating it (running trains cheaper). The NEC-spine trains were volatile to external events, had large economies of scale, and presented slow adjustment of capacity that were not homogenous, but rather depended on specific routes. Even though the effect of the economic recession of 2009 was a regrettable 2-3-year setback in ridership and revenue for all routes in the NEC, the effects of lost or gained ridership on ticket revenue were more pronounced for express services than for regional services. Also, the SFP of express services was more volatile than that of regional services. This shows that the Acela Express is more sensitive than the Northeast Regional to external factors, thus revealing risks but also opportunities for improved performance of future HSR.