and attainment in deprived communities’ the original aim of the academies programme (DCSF – n.d.) all other subjects can be dispensed with altogether. – The ideological fracture at the level of espoused policy has in effect made fracture’ ‘agency or dislocation between espoused policy and policy enactment inevitable. The lack of clarity means that the ideological debates are down the system, for resolution at school level. While such ‘shunted’ local control offers a space for creative thinking and the scope to respond to local contexts, the process of decision-making is complicated by the interventions of diverse interest groups, each seeking to mediate the official policy, and offering authoritative interpretations of its implications for curriculum design. Thus, for example, the RSA has developed its curriculum (RSA, Opening Minds n.d.); the for Learning’ has launched its model (Campaign for Learning to Learn ‘Campaign Learning n.d.), while Guy Claxton’s ideas have found expression in the Building Learning Power initiative (The Learning Organisation n.d.). Decision-making processes at the micro-political level have always, in fact, been important. As Kelchtermans (2007: 472) rightly points out, any macro-policy measures their ‘during implementation get caught up in the process of interpretation and translation towards the particularities of the local context’ a process that makes it crucial to understand the factors that – determine the policy choices of school leaders. But here the inter-related changes outlined by Hodgson and Spours (2006) have had profound implications on the degree of freedom actually enjoyed by individual schools. While much greater power has undoubtedly been vested in school heads, their choices in the exercise of that power have in fact been simultaneously guided by very powerful external mechanisms. The process is described by Ozga (2009) as control through a system of Although the education system has the appearance of greater deregulation, the use ‘governance’. of data-rich systems to monitor educational outcomes provides a strong form of leverage over decision-making, as do the Ofsted inspection regime and other length’ agencies which evaluate ‘arms
and attainment in deprived communities’ – the original aim of the academies programme (DCSF n.d.) – all other subjects can be dispensed with altogether. The ideological fracture at the level of espoused policy has in effect made ‘agency fracture’ or dislocation between espoused policy and policy enactment inevitable. The lack of clarity means that the ideological debates are ‘shunted’ down the system, for resolution at school level. While such local control offers a space for creative thinking and the scope to respond to local contexts, the process of decision-making is complicated by the interventions of diverse interest groups, each seeking to mediate the official policy, and offering authoritative interpretations of its implications for curriculum design. Thus, for example, the RSA has developed its Opening Minds curriculum (RSA, n.d.); the ‘Campaign for Learning’ has launched its Learning to Learn model (Campaign for Learning n.d.), while Guy Claxton’s ideas have found expression in the Building Learning Power initiative (The Learning Organisation n.d.). Decision-making processes at the micro-political level have always, in fact, been important. As Kelchtermans (2007: 472) rightly points out, any macro-policy measures ‘during their implementation get caught up in the process of interpretation and translation towards the particularities of the local context’ – a process that makes it crucial to understand the factors that determine the policy choices of school leaders. But here the inter-related changes outlined by Hodgson and Spours (2006) have had profound implications on the degree of freedom actually enjoyed by individual schools. While much greater power has undoubtedly been vested in school heads, their choices in the exercise of that power have in fact been simultaneously guided by very powerful external mechanisms. The process is described by Ozga (2009) as control through a system of ‘governance’. Although the education system has the appearance of greater deregulation, the use of data-rich systems to monitor educational outcomes provides a strong form of leverage over decision-making, as do the Ofsted inspection regime and other ‘arms length’ agencies which evaluate