The second broad debate focuses on proscription’s effectiveness. For some, proscription offers a potentially significant weapon in the counter-terrorism armoury of modern states. Lynch for example, offer cautious support for the absence of et al, judicial restrictions in this context, given that this the permits executives, ‘to protect community against not just the familiar enemy but also those that are emerging as hostile that proscription can support democratic interests’. Finn, similarly, suggests elections in transitional states by channelling dissent into legitimate processes; reducing the field of election candidates and parties and political debate and ‘focusing choice’. Other authors advance more equivocal support, suggesting that while proscription powers little is unlikely that they do much ‘probably do harm…it good’. Stronger critics of efficacy argue that it fails to recognise - or to proscription’s address - the fragmented and changeable nature of contemporary terrorist organisations which rarely exhibit organisational stability or existential longevity. Others, moreover, contend that the delegitimising function of proscription is counter-productive to domestic and international security. Muller, for instance, argues that the or ‘illegitimate legally botched use of these proscription procedures is dangerous as it breeds long-term resentment among many exiled dissident groups and in turn, risks communities’. This, perpetuating conflicts in other states, whereby, for may even example: ‘proscriptions have consolidated the resolve of the Tamil diaspora organisations to support the Tamil nationalist project and the In respect of states, Finn suggests that LTTE’. ‘transitional’ the exclusion of popular parties from the democratic process via proscription might delegitimise electoral processes and, to of ‘contribute [an organisation’s] sense alienation and isolation, making them more likely to resort to For Muller, violence’. by which the proscription regime was deployed merely similarly: ‘the manner [EU’s] fuelled the PKK's eventual return to violence as all avenues for dialogue were closed’.
The second broad debate focuses on proscription’s effectiveness. For some, proscription offers a potentially significant weapon in the counter-terrorism armoury of modern states. Lynch et al, for example, offer cautious support for the absence of judicial restrictions in this context, given that this permits executives, ‘to protect the community against not just the familiar enemy but also those that are emerging as hostile interests’. Finn, similarly, suggests that proscription can support democratic elections in transitional states by channelling dissent into legitimate processes; reducing the field of election candidates and parties and ‘focusing political debate and choice’. Other authors advance more equivocal support, suggesting that while proscription powers ‘probably do little harm…it is unlikely that they do much good’. Stronger critics of proscription’s efficacy argue that it fails to recognise - or to address - the fragmented and changeable nature of contemporary terrorist organisations which rarely exhibit organisational stability or existential longevity. Others, moreover, contend that the delegitimising function of proscription is counter-productive to domestic and international security. Muller, for instance, argues that the ‘illegitimate or legally botched use of these proscription procedures is dangerous as it breeds long-term resentment among many exiled dissident groups and communities’. This, in turn, risks perpetuating conflicts in other states, whereby, for example: ‘proscriptions may even have consolidated the resolve of the Tamil diaspora organisations to support the Tamil nationalist project and the LTTE’. In respect of ‘transitional’ states, Finn suggests that the exclusion of popular parties from the democratic process via proscription might delegitimise electoral processes and, ‘contribute to [an organisation’s] sense of alienation and isolation, making them more likely to resort to violence’. For Muller, similarly: ‘the manner by which the [EU’s] proscription regime was deployed merely fuelled the PKK's eventual return to violence as all avenues for dialogue were closed’.