Introduction My immediate purpose is to defend what I take to be the basic spirit of realism that is represented in Michael Freeden’s recent book on The Political Theory of Political Thinking: The (2013), that is, to study actual instances of the thinking that occur in Anatomy of a Practice political practices. Freeden views this, quite correctly I believe, as an alternative, or at least an addition, to studying the history of classic canon of political thought, engaging in analytical and prescriptive claims about justice, and the like. I will focus on three issues that are central to his argument: the relationship between language and thought; the nature of concepts; and the circumscription of political.” My primary concern is to think through and articulate my own “the position on these issues, but I will do so in part by querying certain aspects of Freeden’s account of these matters. Freeden stresses that much of what is advanced as realism has not cast off the normative idealism that characterizes so much of political theory, but I suggest that the residue of epistemic idealism continues to inform much of political theory, whether or not it presents itself as realist. It is useful, however, to situate, briefly, Freeden’s work among the burgeoning claims to realism in political inquiry (for fuller discussions of realism, see Gunnell 1995; 1998, ch. 3; 2011, ch. 3). In Search of Realism In the history of political science, has been a consistent rallying cry from at “realism” least the beginning of twentieth century, but, despite family resemblances, the word has signified some quite different agendas. Although the call to realism was in part a reaction, at the end of the nineteenth century, to both the epistemology and prescriptive character of European idealism, it was also informed by a critical, normative, and practical purpose that reflected the endemic concern among political scientists not simply to understand politics but, as recently vocalized, to
Introduction My immediate purpose is to defend what I take to be the basic spirit of realism that is represented in Michael Freeden’s recent book on The Political Theory of Political Thinking: The Anatomy of a Practice (2013), that is, to study actual instances of the thinking that occur in political practices. Freeden views this, quite correctly I believe, as an alternative, or at least an addition, to studying the history of classic canon of political thought, engaging in analytical and prescriptive claims about justice, and the like. I will focus on three issues that are central to his argument: the relationship between language and thought; the nature of concepts; and the circumscription of “the political.” My primary concern is to think through and articulate my own position on these issues, but I will do so in part by querying certain aspects of Freeden’s account of these matters. Freeden stresses that much of what is advanced as realism has not cast off the normative idealism that characterizes so much of political theory, but I suggest that the residue of epistemic idealism continues to inform much of political theory, whether or not it presents itself as realist. It is useful, however, to situate, briefly, Freeden’s work among the burgeoning claims to realism in political inquiry (for fuller discussions of realism, see Gunnell 1995; 1998, ch. 3; 2011, ch. 3). In Search of Realism In the history of political science, “realism” has been a consistent rallying cry from at least the beginning of twentieth century, but, despite family resemblances, the word has signified some quite different agendas. Although the call to realism was in part a reaction, at the end of the nineteenth century, to both the epistemology and prescriptive character of European idealism, it was also informed by a critical, normative, and practical purpose that reflected the endemic concern among political scientists not simply to understand politics but, as recently vocalized, to