available to conduct the hearing, and the parties likely will have to be represented by new defense counsel or prosecutors who might have no familiarity with the matter. The issues identified by Respondent are inherent in the remedy afforded by whether granted by direct appeal or collateral challenge. We take judicial Franklin, notice of the Court of Appeal docket in which shows that nearly four People v. Franklin, years elapsed from the date the notice of appeal was lodged (June 5, 2012) to the date on which the Supreme Court issued its opinion (May 26, 2016). Thus, when the court in remanded the matter for a determination whether the defendant had had the Franklin opportunity to make a record of youthrelated factors, it did so with the knowledge and understanding that such determination and any evidentiary hearing would be conducted more than four years after the date of original sentencing. As explained in 63 Cal.4th at page 269, the criteria for Franklin, supra, parole suitability in Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801 that the “contemplate Board’s decisionmaking at [the eventual parole hearing will be informed by defendant]’s youthrelated factors, such as his cognitive ability, character, and social and family background at the time of the It would be most effective to make a record of offense.” those youthrelated factors as near in time as possible to the date of original sentencing. Nine years after original sentencing is far from ideal, but it is better than the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, which are the possible times for the youth offender parole hearing. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(1), (2) & (3).)
available to conduct the hearing, and the parties likely will have to be represented by new defense counsel or prosecutors who might have no familiarity with the matter. The issues identified by Respondent are inherent in the remedy afforded by Franklin, whether granted by direct appeal or collateral challenge. We take judicial notice of the Court of Appeal docket in People v. Franklin, which shows that nearly four years elapsed from the date the notice of appeal was lodged (June 5, 2012) to the date on which the Supreme Court issued its opinion (May 26, 2016). Thus, when the court in Franklin remanded the matter for a determination whether the defendant had had the opportunity to make a record of youthrelated factors, it did so with the knowledge and understanding that such determination and any evidentiary hearing would be conducted more than four years after the date of original sentencing. As explained in Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at page 269, the criteria for parole suitability in Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801 “contemplate that the Board’s decisionmaking at [the defendant]’s eventual parole hearing will be informed by youthrelated factors, such as his cognitive ability, character, and social and family background at the time of the offense.” It would be most effective to make a record of those youthrelated factors as near in time as possible to the date of original sentencing. Nine years after original sentencing is far from ideal, but it is better than the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, which are the possible times for the youth offender parole hearing. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(1), (2) & (3).)