Spoofing Happens Spoofing is a risk Homeland Security News Wire October 2, 2008 http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/more-danger-gps-spoofing?page=0,0 , a professor in the Department of Geodesy and Geomatics at the University of New Brunswick, in Canada, who has worked extensively with GPS, says that this potential weak spot in the technology has, in fact, been known for years, although little has been done to date to protect the civilian system against it. would think that more would have been developed by he maybe it takes the demonstration “You now,” says, “but that these guys have carried out to show how easily a GPS receiver can be that solutions are some distance away. spoofed.” Langley notes Although the European navigation system Galileo will have the ability to send encrypted signals for civilian use, it is not scheduled to be — — fully operational until 2013. It would be possible to add encryption to the existing system, but Langley says that the likely cost and disruption One option make this an unlikely solution. The best bet in the near term, he says, is to add security features to normal GPS receivers. would be to add more antennas to receivers. The attack relies on the fact that most consumer GPS receivers use just a single antenna to receive signals from multiple satellites. By adding multiple antennas, a normal receiver could recognize that the spoofed signals in fact come from only one source. Langley notes, though, that there would be a cost trade-off. have to get a “Manufacturers return on any investment they make in he says. antispoofing technology,”
Spoofing Happens Spoofing is a risk Homeland Security News Wire October 2, 2008 http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/more-danger-gps-spoofing?page=0,0 , a professor in the Department of Geodesy and Geomatics at the University of New Brunswick, in Canada, who has worked extensively with GPS, says that this potential weak spot in the technology has, in fact, been known for years, although little has been done to date to protect the civilian system against it. “You would think that more would have been developed by now,” he says, “but maybe it takes the demonstration that these guys have carried out to show how easily a GPS receiver can be spoofed.” Langley notes that solutions are some distance away. Although the European navigation system — Galileo — will have the ability to send encrypted signals for civilian use, it is not scheduled to be fully operational until 2013. It would be possible to add encryption to the existing system, but Langley says that the likely cost and disruption make this an unlikely solution. The best bet in the near term, he says, is to add security features to normal GPS receivers. One option would be to add more antennas to receivers. The attack relies on the fact that most consumer GPS receivers use just a single antenna to receive signals from multiple satellites. By adding multiple antennas, a normal receiver could recognize that the spoofed signals in fact come from only one source. Langley notes, though, that there would be a cost trade-off. “Manufacturers have to get a return on any investment they make in antispoofing technology,” he says.