on his and do something to save her case, as early as September 8, 2014, the day of the sword” hearing. That statement indicates, at a minimum, that Gentino acknowledged fault for the default ruling, even if Galvez did not fully understand the legal consequences of judge’s statement to her that his demurrer was untimely. Given this evidence, we find that Gentino’s OCTC did not meet its burden to prove that Gentino made a misrepresentation to Galvez. (Galardi (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 689 [all reasonable doubts must be resolved in v. State Bar respondent’s favor].) Count four alleged moral turpitude for concealment of facts from Galvez. The Gentino’s hearing judge dismissed this count, with prejudice, as duplicative because the concealments it alleged were more appropriately charged as failures to communicate and were duplicative of the charges in count two. OCTC does not challenge this holding, and we affirm. PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES FAIL IV. GENTINO’S Gentino argues that the hearing judge erred in ruling that he could not ask Galvez at trial if she had submitted an application to the Client Security Fund and in preventing Gentino from and practice of civil litigation attorneys in Los introducing expert testimony “concerning custom We find that the judge did not abuse her discretion in making these evidentiary Angeles.” rulings. Hearing judges are accorded wide latitude to receive all relevant evidence, and actual prejudice must be established before a party is entitled to relief. (In the Matter of Johnson (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 233, 241; Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.104(F).) We also agree with OCTC that Gentino has not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the excluded testimony. (In (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 456, the Matter of Hertz 469 [to prevail on claim of error, respondent must show specific prejudicial effect].) V. AGGRAVATION AND MITIGATION
on his sword” and do something to save her case, as early as September 8, 2014, the day of the hearing. That statement indicates, at a minimum, that Gentino acknowledged fault for the judge’s default ruling, even if Galvez did not fully understand the legal consequences of Gentino’s statement to her that his demurrer was untimely. Given this evidence, we find that OCTC did not meet its burden to prove that Gentino made a misrepresentation to Galvez. (Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 689 [all reasonable doubts must be resolved in respondent’s favor].) Count four alleged moral turpitude for Gentino’s concealment of facts from Galvez. The hearing judge dismissed this count, with prejudice, as duplicative because the concealments it alleged were more appropriately charged as failures to communicate and were duplicative of the charges in count two. OCTC does not challenge this holding, and we affirm. IV. GENTINO’S PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES FAIL Gentino argues that the hearing judge erred in ruling that he could not ask Galvez at trial if she had submitted an application to the Client Security Fund and in preventing Gentino from introducing expert testimony “concerning custom and practice of civil litigation attorneys in Los Angeles.” We find that the judge did not abuse her discretion in making these evidentiary rulings. Hearing judges are accorded wide latitude to receive all relevant evidence, and actual prejudice must be established before a party is entitled to relief. (In the Matter of Johnson (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 233, 241; Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.104(F).) We also agree with OCTC that Gentino has not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the excluded testimony. (In the Matter of Hertz (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 456, 469 [to prevail on claim of error, respondent must show specific prejudicial effect].) V. AGGRAVATION AND MITIGATION