idea that our intuitions can give us good reason to believe such a thesis. To say a bit more about this, I think the problem with the argument from (i) and (ii) is that while both of these premises can seem plausible when considered in isolation, it’s not plausible to suppose that we currently have good reason to believe that they’re both true. In particular, if we had good reason to believe thesis (ii), that would immediately give us good reason to think that we had no reason to believe thesis (i), for in this scenario, the truth of (i) would depend on a controversial thesis of subatomic physics. 4. ARGUMENTS AGAINST HB-LIBERTARIANISM Prima facie, the arguments against HB-libertarianism seem much stronger than the arguments in favor of that view. Here are three arguments against that, I think, a lot of people find convincing: 1. The argument from determinism: HB-libertarianism is false because it requires a certain sort of indeterminism, and there are good empirical reasons to think that this sort of indeterminism isn’t true. 2. The luck argument (aka, the Mind argument, or the argument from or the Hobbes-Hume-Hobart argument): Even if the relevant sort of indeterminism is true, it doesn’t matter because there’s a clear sense in which undetermined events are random, or lucky. In other words, they occur by chance--i.e., they just happen. Thus, if we introduce an undetermined event into a decision-making process, that would seem to either (a) increase the level of randomness (or luckiness) in that process or (b) leave the level of randomness (or luckiness) alone (if the indeterminacy ends up not
idea that our intuitions can give us good reason to believe such a thesis. To say a bit more about this, I think the problem with the argument from (i) and (ii) is that while both of these premises can seem plausible when considered in isolation, it’s not plausible to suppose that we currently have good reason to believe that they’re both true. In particular, if we had good reason to believe thesis (ii), that would immediately give us good reason to think that we had no reason to believe thesis (i), for in this scenario, the truth of (i) would depend on a controversial thesis of subatomic physics. 4. ARGUMENTS AGAINST HB-LIBERTARIANISM Prima facie, the arguments against HB-libertarianism seem much stronger than the arguments in favor of that view. Here are three arguments against that, I think, a lot of people find convincing: 1. The argument from determinism: HB-libertarianism is false because it requires a certain sort of indeterminism, and there are good empirical reasons to think that this sort of indeterminism isn’t true. 2. The luck argument (aka, the Mind argument, or the argument from or the Hobbes-Hume-Hobart argument): Even if the relevant sort of indeterminism is true, it doesn’t matter because there’s a clear sense in which undetermined events are random, or lucky. In other words, they occur by chance--i.e., they just happen. Thus, if we introduce an undetermined event into a decision-making process, that would seem to either (a) increase the level of randomness (or luckiness) in that process or (b) leave the level of randomness (or luckiness) alone (if the indeterminacy ends up not