takes (bsam widely as both conceptual “mentations” pa) consciousnesses and nonconceptual consciousnesses: The of living beings are not just conceptual “mentations” consciousnesses but also are to be taken as non-conceptual consciousnesses. False things—that is to say, that do not exist ultimately but are posited as existing through the force of those two [conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses]—exist only conventionally. This is the meaning of the statement in the [Descent production of things [exists] into Laṅkā Sūtra], “The conventionally (kun Moreover, this does rdzob tu, saṃvṛtyā).” not mean that [such falsities] exist conventionally in the sense of existing for a (kun that is an apprehender of true saṃvṛti rdzob) existence [as it does in the final line of the same passage]. The of Tsong-kha-pa’s argument is the meaning of Kamalashīla’s term which he reads not as the ignorance obscuring reality “mentations,” but as conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses in the face of which objects are posited as existing. Tsong-kha-pa does not cite it, but just three sentences later, Kamalashīla himself offers another explanation: Also, with regard to the proposition that things are] “[All conventionally produced” and so forth [that is to say, are “and not ultimately produced”], it is asserted that the meaning is this: Because the aforementioned mistaken entity—the obscurer (kun all things as if rdzob, saṃvṛti)—displays produced even though in reality they are not produced, it is said that due to the power of [all living beings’] mentations things are conventionally produced. Therefore, the Buddha [in the says, Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra] production of things [exists] conventionally (kun rdzob tu, “The saṃvṛtyā).”
takes “mentations” (bsam pa) widely as both conceptual consciousnesses and nonconceptual consciousnesses: The “mentations” of living beings are not just conceptual consciousnesses but also are to be taken as non-conceptual consciousnesses. False things—that is to say, that do not exist ultimately but are posited as existing through the force of those two [conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses]—exist only conventionally. This is the meaning of the statement in the [Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra], “The production of things [exists] conventionally (kun rdzob tu, saṃvṛtyā).” Moreover, this does not mean that [such falsities] exist conventionally in the sense of existing for a saṃvṛti (kun rdzob) that is an apprehender of true existence [as it does in the final line of the same passage]. The of Tsong-kha-pa’s argument is the meaning of Kamalashīla’s term “mentations,” which he reads not as the ignorance obscuring reality but as conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses in the face of which objects are posited as existing. Tsong-kha-pa does not cite it, but just three sentences later, Kamalashīla himself offers another explanation: Also, with regard to the proposition that “[All things are] conventionally produced” and so forth [that is to say, “and are not ultimately produced”], it is asserted that the meaning is this: Because the aforementioned mistaken entity—the obscurer (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti)—displays all things as if produced even though in reality they are not produced, it is said that due to the power of [all living beings’] mentations things are conventionally produced. Therefore, the Buddha [in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra] says, “The production of things [exists] conventionally (kun rdzob tu, saṃvṛtyā).”