model of democracy with both and arguments. (Thompson 1976, 14) “protective” “educative” The first relies on the idea that participation protects the interests of citizens and implies that apathy leads to either political community’s total disregard of nonparticipants’ interests or lack of necessary knowledge and perspectives in public deliberations where such interests are at stake. In addition, the protective argument suggests that greater participation will increase society’s general level of material prosperity. Meanwhile, the educative argument holds that participation produces mentally and morally developed individuals who improve the “active” world by against evils” as well as have better lives for themselves. (CRG, 248) By “[struggling] not only tending to the existing interests of citizens but also fundamentally transforming their preferences by developing their mental and moral capacities, participation promotes Mill’s innovative and broader notion of utility on the permanent interests of man as a “grounded progressive being.” (OL, 17) Apathy, in contrast, traps individuals in an unhappy condition of underdevelopment. Mill’s critique of conformity is likewise premised on his novel account of happiness. As illustrated most clearly by (1861), Mill thinks human happiness requires the Utilitarianism exercise of the higher faculties such as intellect and imagination that uniquely belong to human beings and are essential to their nature as progressive beings. The higher faculties, which have intellectual, and aesthetic aspects,” (Zakaras 2009, 157) enhance happiness by generating “moral, the experience of what Mill refers to as the pleasures.” (U, 624) Whereas the lower “higher pleasures are derived from sensation,” the higher pleasures the intellect, of the feelings “mere “of and imagination, and of the moral sentiments” (U, 263) take certain abstractions, or ideas, as their source. Marking a departure from Jeremy Bentham’s classical utilitarianism, Mill establishes so-called hedonism” by claiming that higher pleasures are qualitatively “qualitative
model of democracy with both “protective” and “educative” arguments. (Thompson 1976, 14) The first relies on the idea that participation protects the interests of citizens and implies that apathy leads to either political community’s total disregard of nonparticipants’ interests or lack of necessary knowledge and perspectives in public deliberations where such interests are at stake. In addition, the protective argument suggests that greater participation will increase society’s general level of material prosperity. Meanwhile, the educative argument holds that participation produces mentally and morally developed “active” individuals who improve the world by “[struggling] against evils” as well as have better lives for themselves. (CRG, 248) By not only tending to the existing interests of citizens but also fundamentally transforming their preferences by developing their mental and moral capacities, participation promotes Mill’s innovative and broader notion of utility “grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.” (OL, 17) Apathy, in contrast, traps individuals in an unhappy condition of underdevelopment. Mill’s critique of conformity is likewise premised on his novel account of happiness. As illustrated most clearly by Utilitarianism (1861), Mill thinks human happiness requires the exercise of the higher faculties such as intellect and imagination that uniquely belong to human beings and are essential to their nature as progressive beings. The higher faculties, which have “moral, intellectual, and aesthetic aspects,” (Zakaras 2009, 157) enhance happiness by generating the experience of what Mill refers to as the “higher pleasures.” (U, 624) Whereas the lower pleasures are derived from “mere sensation,” the higher pleasures “of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments” (U, 263) take certain abstractions, or ideas, as their source. Marking a departure from Jeremy Bentham’s classical utilitarianism, Mill establishes so-called “qualitative hedonism” by claiming that higher pleasures are qualitatively