#13 Ronen J., J. Tzur, 2006 The effect of Journal of Examines the Not applicable Not applicable Incentive packages contribute to V. Yaari directors’ Accounting effect of insider motivating directors to tailor equity and Public trading by incentives for effort-averse incentives on Policy directors on the managers. At the same time, they earnings likelihood of also induce directors to tacitly management earnings collude with managers in management, on pernicious earnings the value of the management. firm and on the stock price. #14 Erickson M., M. 2006 Is There a Link Journal of Examines 50 firms that are both A variety of equity incentive The analysis reveals no Hanon, E.L. between Accounting whether the accused of fraud by the SEC measures is estimated to consistent evidence to support Maydew Executive Research empirical and for which compare accused firms with the conclusion that the Equity evidence supports compensation data is matched and unmatched probability of accounting fraud is Incentives and the claim that available from 1996 to samples of firms that are not increasing in the sensitivity Accounting equity incentives 2003. Further, 100 accused of fraud. of executives’ total equity or Fraud? are positively matched sample firms who vested stock and stock associated with are not accused of fraud wealth to changes in stock the probability of and an unmatched sample prices. Also, managerial exercises accounting fraud which contains 13,033 of stock options and managerial firm-year observations on stock sales are not significantly ExecuComp. higher for fraud firms than for nonfraud firms. #15 Core, J.E., W.R. 2003 Executive Economic To synthesize the Not applicable - literature Not applicable - literature Not applicable - literature review Guay, D.F. equity Policy broad literature review review Larcker compensation Review on equity and compensation and incentives: a executive survey incentives.
#13 Ronen J., J. Tzur, V. Yaari 2006 The effect of directors’ equity incentives on earnings management Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Examines the effect of insider trading by directors on the likelihood of earnings management, on the value of the firm and on the stock price. Not applicable Not applicable Incentive packages contribute to motivating directors to tailor incentives for effort-averse managers. At the same time, they also induce directors to tacitly collude with managers in pernicious earnings management. #14 Erickson M., M. Hanon, E.L. Maydew 2006 Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud? Journal of Accounting Research Examines whether the empirical evidence supports the claim that equity incentives are positively associated with the probability of accounting fraud 50 firms that are both accused of fraud by the SEC and for which compensation data is available from 1996 to 2003. Further, 100 matched sample firms who are not accused of fraud and an unmatched sample which contains 13,033 firm-year observations on ExecuComp. A variety of equity incentive measures is estimated to compare accused firms with matched and unmatched samples of firms that are not accused of fraud. The analysis reveals no consistent evidence to support the conclusion that the probability of accounting fraud is increasing in the sensitivity of executives’ total equity or vested stock and stock wealth to changes in stock prices. Also, managerial exercises of stock options and managerial stock sales are not significantly higher for fraud firms than for nonfraud firms. #15 Core, J.E., W.R. Guay, D.F. Larcker 2003 Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey Economic Policy Review To synthesize the broad literature on equity compensation and executive incentives. Not applicable - literature review Not applicable - literature review Not applicable - literature review