Council of Islamic Ideology in Article 199), the Constitution of 1962-63 simply reiterated key elements first articulated in 1956 to prevent the courts from correcting instances of on their own. Even as the superior courts were empowered to review laws that ‘repugnancy’ cut against specific rights’, for instance, they were unilaterally empowered not ‘fundamental to revise any law suspected of having questionable ties to This was partially a ‘Islam’. consequence of Article 6 (regarding the primacy of parliament vis-à-vis Pakistan’s ‘principles of law-making’), but for the most part, it was the result of a rather unusual Fourth Schedule (which stated that certain laws, including laws like the MFLO that fell under the heading personal law’, would not be subject to judicial review). In fact, together with Article ‘Muslim 6, this Fourth Schedule stepped in to ensure that, precisely insofar as Ayub Khan’s Muslim Family Laws Ordinance sought to revise the parameters of Muslim personal law, it would remain set apart from any form of judicial review that might seek to challenge its ‘unfettered’ (nationalist) approach to shari‘a. Islamic Constitutionalism Review’ (1963-2000) ‘Under Naturally, Islamists like Maududi were appalled by Ayub Khan’s Fourth Schedule. In fact Maududi’s ire was so pronounced that, by 1965, he chose to abandon his own insistence that the Head of State must be a pious Muslim male in order to support Fatima Jinnah (the sister of Mohammad Ali Jinnah) in her bid to challenge Ayub Khan in that year’s presidential election. Fatima Jinnah failed to win the election, but Maududi’s opposition to Ayub’s religious tinkering carried on. In fact, by 1968, his protests had reached such a pitch that one of Pakistan’s most influential philosophers, Fazlur Rahman, was compelled to ‘nationalist’
Council of Islamic Ideology in Article 199), the Constitution of 1962-63 simply reiterated key elements first articulated in 1956 to prevent the courts from correcting instances of ‘repugnancy’ on their own. Even as the superior courts were empowered to review laws that cut against specific ‘fundamental rights’, for instance, they were not unilaterally empowered to revise any law suspected of having questionable ties to ‘Islam’. This was partially a consequence of Article 6 (regarding the primacy of parliament vis-à-vis Pakistan’s ‘principles of law-making’), but for the most part, it was the result of a rather unusual Fourth Schedule (which stated that certain laws, including laws like the MFLO that fell under the heading ‘Muslim personal law’, would not be subject to judicial review). In fact, together with Article 6, this Fourth Schedule stepped in to ensure that, precisely insofar as Ayub Khan’s Muslim Family Laws Ordinance sought to revise the parameters of Muslim personal law, it would remain set apart from any form of judicial review that might seek to challenge its ‘unfettered’ (nationalist) approach to shari‘a. Islamic Constitutionalism ‘Under Review’ (1963-2000) Naturally, Islamists like Maududi were appalled by Ayub Khan’s Fourth Schedule. In fact Maududi’s ire was so pronounced that, by 1965, he chose to abandon his own insistence that the Head of State must be a pious Muslim male in order to support Fatima Jinnah (the sister of Mohammad Ali Jinnah) in her bid to challenge Ayub Khan in that year’s presidential election. Fatima Jinnah failed to win the election, but Maududi’s opposition to Ayub’s religious tinkering carried on. In fact, by 1968, his protests had reached such a pitch that one of Pakistan’s most influential ‘nationalist’ philosophers, Fazlur Rahman, was compelled to