Defendants and indeed their solicitors as carrying, in the event of the relief sought being granted, the potentially extremely serious financial consequences for them, as deposed to in the affidavits filed in Court. The Court has, it seems to me, accepted the validity of the Defendants' fears as a constituent of its ratio decidendi. 67. It seems to me that, in the circumstances of this case, the urgency applied to the matter by the solicitors was reasonably done and accordingly, the reasonable costs associated with addressing the work in this manner are recoverable as between party and party. 68. However, that is not to say that the hourly rates agreed between solicitor and client in the case can be applied to the assessment of the time aspect. While it is no part of a Taxing Master's function to specify or fix hourly rates of remuneration for solicitors or anyone else, I think it is permissible, by way of test, to apply various rates, if necessary, to allowable hours. 69. In my view a Taxing Master should, in the course of considering and assessing the nature, extent and value of a solicitor's work, including the time element thereof, place valuations on the work undertaken at appropriate stages of the case. It is those valuations which ultimately may be tested as described. 70. In the instant case the Defendants' solicitors have not only applied their various hourly rates to recorded time but have then applied an uplift to the value of such time, presumably to cater for the urgency, importance and other intangible factors referred to at Order 99 Rule 37 (22) (ii) RSC. 71. It is I believe well settled, since the judgement of Laffoy J. in Goodman v The Minister for Finance [ 1999] 3 IR 356 that the intangible factors are already included in any commercial rate applied to aid the assessment of an instructions fee. 72. I do not think that the consideration of urgency, novelty, importance or value necessitates that notional hourly rates applicable as between party and party should or could be increased to cater for these factors. It seems to me that any additional time allowable at the appropriate commercial rate would be sufficient to cater for these factors. 73. There is considerable divergence between the parties' respective valuations of the appropriate instructions fee. Both parties have provided their own assessments by way of breaking the instructions fee into various component parts. Neither party has addressed or tested the time element against such amounts.
Defendants and indeed their solicitors as carrying, in the event of the relief sought being granted, the potentially extremely serious financial consequences for them, as deposed to in the affidavits filed in Court. The Court has, it seems to me, accepted the validity of the Defendants' fears as a constituent of its ratio decidendi. 67. It seems to me that, in the circumstances of this case, the urgency applied to the matter by the solicitors was reasonably done and accordingly, the reasonable costs associated with addressing the work in this manner are recoverable as between party and party. 68. However, that is not to say that the hourly rates agreed between solicitor and client in the case can be applied to the assessment of the time aspect. While it is no part of a Taxing Master's function to specify or fix hourly rates of remuneration for solicitors or anyone else, I think it is permissible, by way of test, to apply various rates, if necessary, to allowable hours. 69. In my view a Taxing Master should, in the course of considering and assessing the nature, extent and value of a solicitor's work, including the time element thereof, place valuations on the work undertaken at appropriate stages of the case. It is those valuations which ultimately may be tested as described. 70. In the instant case the Defendants' solicitors have not only applied their various hourly rates to recorded time but have then applied an uplift to the value of such time, presumably to cater for the urgency, importance and other intangible factors referred to at Order 99 Rule 37 (22) (ii) RSC. 71. It is I believe well settled, since the judgement of Laffoy J. in Goodman v The Minister for Finance [ 1999] 3 IR 356 that the intangible factors are already included in any commercial rate applied to aid the assessment of an instructions fee. 72. I do not think that the consideration of urgency, novelty, importance or value necessitates that notional hourly rates applicable as between party and party should or could be increased to cater for these factors. It seems to me that any additional time allowable at the appropriate commercial rate would be sufficient to cater for these factors. 73. There is considerable divergence between the parties' respective valuations of the appropriate instructions fee. Both parties have provided their own assessments by way of breaking the instructions fee into various component parts. Neither party has addressed or tested the time element against such amounts.