publicly funded system. When these costs become greater than potential income tax revenue, a publicly funded system should become the preference of the median voter. The economic preference model may be useful in explaining why Roosevelt and Truman were not successful in passing universal healthcare in an environment of already high taxation, because the potential to raise money through an increase in taxation was very low. It does not, however, explain why the Clinton administration was unable to get a single payer bill out of committee when the average tax burden for households was around 21 percent (Tax Policy Center). Batinti et al. (2016) accommodate for this with two important acknowledgements. The first is that “[H]ealthcare systems are rarely adopted whole cloth,” which is best reflected in Johnson’s compromise to pass a version of single payer via the creation of Medicare and Medicaid, which are for the elderly and poor only. The second is that voters receive utility from the representation of their ideologies, which may not reflect their personal interest, in public policy. An exploration of both can explain why Canada adopted universal healthcare in the 1960s, while the US is still fighting over it. An exploration of the history of healthcare in the US and Canada showed that in both countries the liberals have supported the adoption of a universal single payer system. The Commonwealth Federation (CCF), a Canadian third party, passed single payer in Saskatchewan before allying with labor to form the New Democratic Party (NDP) which achieved healthcare reform at the federal level in the 1950s and 1960s (Ostry, 2008). The Democratic party in the US had similar popularity from the 1940s through the 1960s, but missed their window of opportunity to pass universal healthcare during the New Deal reforms due to already high taxation and preoccupation with the war effort (Markel, 2014; Thomasson, 2000). I argue that the strategies
publicly funded system. When these costs become greater than potential income tax revenue, a publicly funded system should become the preference of the median voter. The economic preference model may be useful in explaining why Roosevelt and Truman were not successful in passing universal healthcare in an environment of already high taxation, because the potential to raise money through an increase in taxation was very low. It does not, however, explain why the Clinton administration was unable to get a single payer bill out of committee when the average tax burden for households was around 21 percent (Tax Policy Center). Batinti et al. (2016) accommodate for this with two important acknowledgements. The first is that “[H]ealthcare systems are rarely adopted whole cloth,” which is best reflected in Johnson’s compromise to pass a version of single payer via the creation of Medicare and Medicaid, which are for the elderly and poor only. The second is that voters receive utility from the representation of their ideologies, which may not reflect their personal interest, in public policy. An exploration of both can explain why Canada adopted universal healthcare in the 1960s, while the US is still fighting over it. An exploration of the history of healthcare in the US and Canada showed that in both countries the liberals have supported the adoption of a universal single payer system. The Commonwealth Federation (CCF), a Canadian third party, passed single payer in Saskatchewan before allying with labor to form the New Democratic Party (NDP) which achieved healthcare reform at the federal level in the 1950s and 1960s (Ostry, 2008). The Democratic party in the US had similar popularity from the 1940s through the 1960s, but missed their window of opportunity to pass universal healthcare during the New Deal reforms due to already high taxation and preoccupation with the war effort (Markel, 2014; Thomasson, 2000). I argue that the strategies