493. Baldyga v. Oldman, 261 N.J. Super. 259, 267 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 238 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 1989), and citing Tyler v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins., 228 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 1988). But see Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998) (holding that generally only an affidavit, and not a certification or report, satisfies the Affidavit of Merit Statute). See discussion of Affidavit of Merit in § 7-5, et seq. 494. Hearon v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 213 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 1986). that the trial court had not reviewed the plaintiff’s expert’s report and that a review of the report revealed that the expert did render the opinion that there was a deviation from the standard of care. Furthermore, the Appellate Division instructed: [T]he report does not spell out a deviation of any medical standard in legal terms to a degree of medical probability. Nevertheless, this failure to specify a deviation of medical standards in the appropriate legal terms is not fatal to this case. Legal standards are usually talismanic to a practicing physician unfamiliar with legal nuances and terminology. Undoubtedly, before his trial testimony, plaintiff’s attorney would have apprised [plaintiff’s expert] that the legal requirement of causation must be established to a reasonable degree of medical probability. So informed, [plaintiff’s expert] could then respond more appropriately on direct examination.495 The court instructed that where the language in an expert’s report was subject to more than one interpretation, the trial court should determine exactly what the expert means. Therefore, the better procedure would have been first, for the trial judge to examine the medical report and, if he had any doubt as to the sufficiency of the proffered proofs, he should then have questioned [plaintiff’s
493. Baldyga v. Oldman, 261 N.J. Super. 259, 267 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 238 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 1989), and citing Tyler v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins., 228 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 1988). But see Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998) (holding that generally only an affidavit, and not a certification or report, satisfies the Affidavit of Merit Statute). See discussion of Affidavit of Merit in § 7-5, et seq. 494. Hearon v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 213 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 1986). that the trial court had not reviewed the plaintiff’s expert’s report and that a review of the report revealed that the expert did render the opinion that there was a deviation from the standard of care. Furthermore, the Appellate Division instructed: [T]he report does not spell out a deviation of any medical standard in legal terms to a degree of medical probability. Nevertheless, this failure to specify a deviation of medical standards in the appropriate legal terms is not fatal to this case. Legal standards are usually talismanic to a practicing physician unfamiliar with legal nuances and terminology. Undoubtedly, before his trial testimony, plaintiff’s attorney would have apprised [plaintiff’s expert] that the legal requirement of causation must be established to a reasonable degree of medical probability. So informed, [plaintiff’s expert] could then respond more appropriately on direct examination.495 The court instructed that where the language in an expert’s report was subject to more than one interpretation, the trial court should determine exactly what the expert means. Therefore, the better procedure would have been first, for the trial judge to examine the medical report and, if he had any doubt as to the sufficiency of the proffered proofs, he should then have questioned [plaintiff’s