2.1 The Command was protected cryptographically using the Private Key As specified in Section 13.2.4.3.1 corresponding to the Remote Party Public Key held in the Trust Anchor Cell identified by authorisingRemotePartyTACellIdentifier Table 13.2.4.3: Provide Security Credentials Command authenticity and integrity verification Should any of the checks detailed in this Section 13.2.4.3 fail then the Device shall: generate an entry in the Security Log recording failed Authentication; discard the Command without execution and without sending a Response; and send an Alert notifying the failed Authentication, constructed as specified in Section 6.2.4.2, populated with the relevant Alert Code from Section 16 , to the Known Remote Party identified by the Security Credentials it holds in the {supplier, management, Trust Anchor Cell. digitalSignature} Where all of the checks detailed in this Section 13.2.4.3 succeed the Device shall process the Command and produce a Response. Command Authenticity and Integrity Verification The Device shall undertake the following checks until either all are successful or one has failed. 1. If trustAnchorCellUsage is present it has a value of management else this test shall fail. 2. If trustAnchorCellKeyUsage = keyAgreement then ((trustAnchorCellRemotePartyRole = accessControlBroker) and (the MAC calculated by the Device according to Table 13.2.4.3.1 equates to ACB-SMD MAC) else ((trustAnchorCellKeyUsage = digitalSignature) and (the Device shall use the Public Key in the Trust Anchor Cell identified by authorisingRemotePartyTACellIdentifier to verify that KRP Signature is the Digital Signature across Grouping Header || @ProvideSecurityCredentialDetails.Command) else 3. This test shall fail. Input Parameter Value Note To calculate the Shared Secret input to the KDF: (‘Z’) Private Key Agreement Key Device’s Public Key Agreement Key Access Control As held by the Device in Trust Anchor Broker’s Cell {accessControlBroker, keyAgreement, management}
2.1 The Command was protected cryptographically using the Private Key corresponding to the Remote Party Public Key held in the Trust Anchor Cell identified by authorisingRemotePartyTACellIdentifier As specified in Section 13.2.4.3.1 Table 13.2.4.3: Provide Security Credentials Command authenticity and integrity verification Should any of the checks detailed in this Section 13.2.4.3 fail then the Device shall: generate an entry in the Security Log recording failed Authentication; discard the Command without execution and without sending a Response; and send an Alert notifying the failed Authentication, constructed as specified in Section 6.2.4.2, populated with the relevant Alert Code from Section 16 , to the Known Remote Party identified by the Security Credentials it holds in the {supplier, management, digitalSignature} Trust Anchor Cell. Where all of the checks detailed in this Section 13.2.4.3 succeed the Device shall process the Command and produce a Response. Command Authenticity and Integrity Verification The Device shall undertake the following checks until either all are successful or one has failed. 1. If trustAnchorCellUsage is present it has a value of management else this test shall fail. 2. If trustAnchorCellKeyUsage = keyAgreement then ((trustAnchorCellRemotePartyRole = accessControlBroker) and (the MAC calculated by the Device according to Table 13.2.4.3.1 equates to ACB-SMD MAC) else ((trustAnchorCellKeyUsage = digitalSignature) and (the Device shall use the Public Key in the Trust Anchor Cell identified by authorisingRemotePartyTACellIdentifier to verify that KRP Signature is the Digital Signature across Grouping Header || @ProvideSecurityCredentialDetails.Command) else 3. This test shall fail. Input Parameter Value Note To calculate the Shared Secret (‘Z’) input to the KDF: Private Key Agreement Key Device’s Public Key Agreement Key Access Control Broker’s As held by the Device in Trust Anchor Cell {accessControlBroker, keyAgreement, management}