was preoccupied, tired, withdrawn, suffering weight loss, and generally not himself; she saw him crying in his office and said he was of the time. This evidence supports “visibly upset” much testimony that he experienced difficulty making proper decisions around the time his Lazo’s family members died. (See (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1357, 1364 [Supreme Court Lawhorn v. State Bar considered lay testimony of emotional problems as mitigation].) Although these emotional difficulties were situational as they were due to the family member deaths, Lazo did not establish his full recovery or present an expert witness to opine on his present emotional status. Accordingly, we assign this factor minimal mitigation credit. IV. DISCIPLINE Standard 2.8(a) is most applicable and provides that or actual suspension is “disbarment for violating sections 6068, subdivision (d) (misleading a judge) and 6103 appropriate” (disobeying a court order). Given the broad range of discipline, we consult case law to guide us. (See (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302, 1310-1311.) Snyder v. State Bar In urging a private reproval, Lazo relies on (Review Dept. In the Matter of Respondent X 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 592 and 3 Cal. State Bar In the Matter of Respondent Y, supra, Ct. Rptr. 862. These cases are not applicable; in both, the attorneys disobeyed a single court order and the misconduct was not as serious as Although no case is directly parallel to Lazo’s. we focus on 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 774, In the Matter of Maloney and Virsik, supra, Lazo’s, which involved intentional misrepresentations in court pleadings. These two attorneys knowingly filed pleadings that were with half-truths, omissions, and outright “permeated misstatements of fact and at p. 786.) The which constituted law.” (Id. attorneys’ misconduct, moral turpitude, was aggravated by several serious factors but tempered by good character and community service. The supervising attorney received credit for 31 years of discipline-free practice while the junior attorney had practiced less than three years and took direction from his
was preoccupied, tired, withdrawn, suffering weight loss, and generally not himself; she saw him crying in his office and said he was “visibly upset” much of the time. This evidence supports Lazo’s testimony that he experienced difficulty making proper decisions around the time his family members died. (See Lawhorn v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1357, 1364 [Supreme Court considered lay testimony of emotional problems as mitigation].) Although these emotional difficulties were situational as they were due to the family member deaths, Lazo did not establish his full recovery or present an expert witness to opine on his present emotional status. Accordingly, we assign this factor minimal mitigation credit. IV. DISCIPLINE Standard 2.8(a) is most applicable and provides that “disbarment or actual suspension is appropriate” for violating sections 6068, subdivision (d) (misleading a judge) and 6103 (disobeying a court order). Given the broad range of discipline, we consult case law to guide us. (See Snyder v. State Bar (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302, 1310-1311.) In urging a private reproval, Lazo relies on In the Matter of Respondent X (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 592 and In the Matter of Respondent Y, supra, 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 862. These cases are not applicable; in both, the attorneys disobeyed a single court order and the misconduct was not as serious as Lazo’s. Although no case is directly parallel to Lazo’s, we focus on In the Matter of Maloney and Virsik, supra, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 774, which involved intentional misrepresentations in court pleadings. These two attorneys knowingly filed pleadings that were “permeated with half-truths, omissions, and outright misstatements of fact and law.” (Id. at p. 786.) The attorneys’ misconduct, which constituted moral turpitude, was aggravated by several serious factors but tempered by good character and community service. The supervising attorney received credit for 31 years of discipline-free practice while the junior attorney had practiced less than three years and took direction from his