the Conflict Resolution Requirement is satisfied. Recall the very reason why we are focusing on jurisdictional rights is because they are plausible mechanisms for adjudicating disputes. A natural test in deciding whether jurisdictional rights actually perform this task is to ask whether there remain conflicting claims in the space that the right was intended to regulate after the right in question has been exercised. In case there is no such conflict after right to over (β) – Althea’s is implemented both Althea and Bertha are satisfied with the resulting state of affairs and thus do not make conflicting claims on one another. But this may not be so if (i) Althea and Bertha see different social states and , yet (ii) preferences over and do minimally accord with For in this case, after not Bertha’s Althea’s. we implement right to over there may still be discord. Even though Althea thinks she Althea’s has merely exercised her rights in the relevant case, because Bertha sees these social states differently disagrees with decision, Bertha will press a claim on Althea: she does and Althea’s not see actions as a instance of an exercise of rights. When this occurs, we bona fide Althea’s still have social conflict even after a right has been exercised, meaning that the Conflict Resolution Requirement goes unsatisfied. In such a case jurisdictional rights fail to perform their intended function. This is why we do not model jurisdictional rights as being operative in these sets of cases. Rights are only operative in cases of perspectival disagreement when obtains, (β) for in such cases exercising the right clearly settles the relevant dispute, allowing rights to perform their intended function. Having explained our definition of rights for cases of perspectival diversity, we now introduce our second and final condition on social preference functions. It is as follows:
the Conflict Resolution Requirement is satisfied. Recall the very reason why we are focusing on jurisdictional rights is because they are plausible mechanisms for adjudicating disputes. A natural test in deciding whether jurisdictional rights actually perform this task is to ask whether there remain conflicting claims in the space that the right was intended to regulate after the right in question has been exercised. In case (β) there is no such conflict – after Althea’s right to over is implemented both Althea and Bertha are satisfied with the resulting state of affairs and thus do not make conflicting claims on one another. But this may not be so if (i) Althea and Bertha see different social states and , yet (ii) Bertha’s preferences over and do not minimally accord with Althea’s. For in this case, after we implement Althea’s right to over there may still be discord. Even though Althea thinks she has merely exercised her rights in the relevant case, because Bertha sees these social states differently and disagrees with Althea’s decision, Bertha will press a claim on Althea: she does not see Althea’s actions as a bona fide instance of an exercise of rights. When this occurs, we still have social conflict even after a right has been exercised, meaning that the Conflict Resolution Requirement goes unsatisfied. In such a case jurisdictional rights fail to perform their intended function. This is why we do not model jurisdictional rights as being operative in these sets of cases. Rights are only operative in cases of perspectival disagreement when (β) obtains, for in such cases exercising the right clearly settles the relevant dispute, allowing rights to perform their intended function. Having explained our definition of rights for cases of perspectival diversity, we now introduce our second and final condition on social preference functions. It is as follows: