Chapter: The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 20, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States,
in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be
formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to
those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with
each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not
united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some
of the consequences that would attend such a situation.

War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence,
would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is
in those countries where regular military establishments have long
obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent
of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy,
have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of
rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that
rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their
introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends.
The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places,
which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two
or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country.
Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and
delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would
penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as
intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively
small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid
of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises
of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter
of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires
overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide
nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and
little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy
of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible.
The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open
to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with
little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests
would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore,
would be desultory and predatory. PLUNDER and devastation ever march in
the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the
principal figure in the events which would characterize our military
exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not
long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful
director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will,
after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life
and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant
on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to
liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a
tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe,
they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the
correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies,
it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it
is therefore inferred that they may exist under it.(1) Their existence,
however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most,
problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied,
must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent
war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant
preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or
confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon
an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to
supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular
and effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by
fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to
strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their
constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It
is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the
legislative authority.

The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or
confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors.
Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous
governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often
triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural strength,
which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the
safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them
long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They
would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had been
effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus, we
should, in a little time, see established in every part of this country
the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old
World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our
reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are
accommodated to this standard.

These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative
defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the
hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they
are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of
human affairs.

It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did
not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often
distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally
satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of
the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain,
and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are
incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the
true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue,
which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver
and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the
offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have
produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered
disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the
inseparable companions of frequent hostility.

There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a
country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in
one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them.
The rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if they are even so
inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be
maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely,
if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the people are in
no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not
accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil
state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the
principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army
renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it;
and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for
protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the
soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a
necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may
be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.

The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to
suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it
will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of
the great body of the people.

In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this
happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to
be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for
instant defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the
importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of
the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The
inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably
subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to
weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are
brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but
as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of
considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is
very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make
a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military
power.

The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An
insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure
against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity
of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head
against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time to rally and
embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No motive of national
policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger
number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has been, for a
long time past, little room for the operation of the other causes, which
have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war. This peculiar
felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve
the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the
prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had been
situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have
been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at home
coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like
them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute
power of a single man. It is possible, though not easy, that the people
of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by
the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually
kept up within the kingdom.

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a
great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to
continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any
dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this
position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited,
and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most
probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies,
we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the
continental powers of Europe--our liberties would be a prey to the means
of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It
deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and
honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and
solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this
interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and
trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with
trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in
all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that
flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries
would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real,
certain, and formidable.

PUBLIUS

1. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it
will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been
taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to
be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America,
most of which contain no guard at all on this subject.

 Hamilton begins this Federalist paper by assuming that he has proven to his readers that the union provides safety from foreign attack, and wants to proceed and address some of the other consequences of the dissolution of the states. Of paramount interest to Hamilton is "war between the states," something this author believes would be "accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries, where regular military establishments have long obtained." While Europe has many fortifications against military advance, the United States has none. Instead, the United States has a wide-open frontier, and geography that would create a situation where the "populous states would with little difficulty overrun their less populous neighbors." War would consequently be more deadly than in Europe. Because of this fact, standing armies would soon become a necessity and standing armies, regardless of the form of government, "compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort for repose and security, to institutions, which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights." The weaker states would have the first need of standing armies, an institution Hamilton despises, and would thus, in Hamilton's opinion, make the state governments evolve towards monarchy, because a strong executive is necessary during war. The small states, in Hamilton's suppositions, would have more power over the larger states, and the larger states would result to the same methods of defense that the smaller states first resorted to. Next, Hamilton distinguishes between countries with military establishments who are frequently subject to invasion, and states that do not deal with this dilemma. A country that is not subject to invasion has no excuse for a standing army, while a country constantly under the threat of an invasion has an excuse for an army. In a country where there is a standing army because of the constant threat of invasion, people's liberties are infringed upon. Great Britain is a country in the first situation. Because of the sea insulating it from attack, the people would never stand for a standing army, and thus, liberty is defended. Hamilton concludes, "if we are wise enough to preserve the union, we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation," thus holding off Europe and her colonies and putting all of the states at the greatest advantage possible.

