Chapter: CHAPTER IV. OF SPEECH





Originall Of Speech

The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention
of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use
of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men
say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia. A profitable
Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of
mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and
with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the
divers motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech;
whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them.
But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of
Speech, consisting of Names or Apellations, and their Connexion; whereby
men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also
declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation;
without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor
Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears,
and Wolves. The first author of Speech was GOD himselfe, that instructed
Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; For the
Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient
to direct him to adde more names, as the experience and use of the
creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by
degrees, as to make himselfe understood; and so by succession of time,
so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so
copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find any
thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can
be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers,
Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies, Relations; much less the names
of Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative,
Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive, all which are usefull; and least of
all, of Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity, and other significant words of
the School.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity,
was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man
was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language.
And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of
the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is,
proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of
all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more
copious.




The Use Of Speech

The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into
Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that
for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences
of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put
us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were
marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes,
or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words,
to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another, what they
conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare,
or have any other passion for, and for this use they are called
Signes. Speciall uses of Speech are these; First, to Register, what by
cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and
what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which in
summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge
which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another.
Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that we may
have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight
our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or
ornament, innocently.




Abuses Of Speech

To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First,
when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the
signification of their words; by which they register for their
conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves.
Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense
than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly,
when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not.
Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature
hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some
with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve
him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern;
and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence
of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the
Connexion of them.




Names Proper & Common Universall

Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter,
John, This Man, This Tree: and some are Common to many things; as Man,
Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the
name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it
is called an Universall; there being nothing in the world Universall
but Names; for the things named, are every one of them Individual and
Singular.

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in
some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name bringeth to
mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent; the
larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent,
comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body is
of larger signification than the word Man, and conprehendeth it; and the
names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually
one another. But here wee must take notice, that by a Name is not
alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely word; but sometimes by
circumlocution many words together. For all these words, Hee That In
His Actions Observeth The Lawes Of His Country, make but one Name,
equivalent to this one word, Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter
signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things
imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of
Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all,
(such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set
before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the
corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that
the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles
that stand by it. But if another triangle be shewn him different in
shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the
three angles of that also be equall to the same. But he that hath the
use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not
to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his
triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the
angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle;
will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in
all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall
termes, Every Triangle Hath Its Three Angles Equall To Two Right Angles.
And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred
and remembred, as a Universall rule; and discharges our mentall
reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the
mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true Here, and
Now, to be true in All Times and Places.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so
evident as in Numbering. A naturall foole that could never learn by
heart the order of numerall words, as One, Two, and Three, may observe
every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can
never know what houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when
those names of number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their
fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep
account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall words
are but ten, in any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin
again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will
lose himselfe, and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be
able to add, and substract, and performe all other operations of
Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no possibility of
reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force,
and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or
well-being of man-kind.

When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation;
as thus, A Man Is A Living Creature; or thus, If He Be A Man, He Is A
Living Creature, If the later name Living Creature, signifie all that
the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is
True; otherwise False. For True and False are attributes of Speech, not
of things. And where Speech in not, there is neither Truth nor Falshood.
Errour there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not be; or
suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with
Untruth.

Seeing then that Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our
affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to remember
what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or els
he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the
more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which
is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on
mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words; which
settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the
beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true
Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either
to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them
himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according
as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last
they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning;
in which lyes the foundation of their errours. From whence it happens,
that they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little
summs into a greater, without considering whether those little summes
were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour visible,
and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to cleere
themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds
that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed in a
chamber, flitter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit
to consider which way they came in. So that in the right Definition
of Names, lyes the first use of Speech; which is the Acquisition of
Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions' lyes the first abuse; from
which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets; which make those men that
take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their
own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as
men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science,
and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense and
imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre:
and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise,
or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters for any
man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by
disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words
are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the
mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a
Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.




Subject To Names

Subject To Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an
account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substracted one
from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called Accounts of mony
Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or
books of account call Items, they called Nomina; that is, Names: and
thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word Ratio, to the
faculty of Reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word
Logos, for both Speech and Reason; not that they thought there was no
Speech without Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of
reasoning they called syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the
consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may
enter into account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that
diversity) diversly wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names
may be reduced to foure generall heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as Living,
Sensible, Rationall, Hot, Cold, Moved, Quiet; with all which names the
word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident
or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for Being Moved, for Being
So Long, for Being Hot, &c; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe,
by a little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which
we consider; and for Living put into account Life; for Moved, Motion;
for Hot, Heat; for Long, Length, and the like. And all such Names, are
the names of the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body
is distinguished from another. These are called Names Abstract; Because
Severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies,
whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us, we
reckon not the thing it selfe; but the Sight, the Colour, the Idea of
it in the fancy: and when any thing is Heard, wee reckon it not; but the
Hearing, or Sound onely, which is our fancy or conception of it by the
Eare: and such are names of fancies.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to Names
themselves, and to Speeches: For, Generall, Universall, Speciall,
Oequivocall, are names of Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation,
Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other
such, are names of Speeches.




Use Of Names Positive

And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark
somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as
Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties
that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.




Negative Names With Their Uses

There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifie
that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words
Nothing, No Man, Infinite, Indocible, Three Want Foure, and the
like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of
reckoning; and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not
names of any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not
rightly used.




Words Insignificant

All other names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two
sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by
Definition; whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men,
and pusled Philosophers.

Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are
contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an Incorporeall Body, or
(which is all one) an Incorporeall Substance, and a great number more.
For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it
is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all. For
example if it be a false affirmation to say A Quadrangle Is Round,
the word Round Quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound. So
likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up
and down; the words In-powred Vertue, In-blown Vertue, are as absurd
and insignificant, as a Round Quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly
meet with a senselesse and insignificant word, that is not made up of
some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called
by the name of Parole, but by the name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and
Parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.




Understanding

When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which the
words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted
to signifie; Then he is said to understand it; Understanding being
nothing els, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if Speech
be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is Understanding
peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations,
in case they be universall, there can be no Understanding; though many
think they understand, then, when they do but repeat the words softly,
or con them in their mind.

What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and Passions
of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have
spoken of the Passions.




Inconstant Names

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and
displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing,
nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of
Inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie
our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we
conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd different
naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the
same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different
constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a
tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man
bust take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we
imagine of their nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such
as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome,
what another calleth Feare; and one Cruelty, what another Justice;
one Prodigality, what another Magnanimity; one Gravity, what another
Stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any
ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these
are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the
other do not.

 Now it's time for the officers to try to thin the ranks of new recruits. Only the best and bravest for the British Air Service. The first intimidation factor comes from lupine tigeresques--yes, gigantic wolf tigers. We're not sure we would make it, but Deryn does. A bunch of other recruits don't stop running until they're out of there, though, which seems like a perfectly appropriate response to us. The next intimidation factor comes from another beastie: this time, it's a giant jellyfish thing, otherwise known as a Huxley ascender, a jellyfish that works like a giant balloon. The thought of going up in that thing thins the ranks even further, but when the flight captain asks for volunteers, Deryn steps up. After buckling into the harness, Deryn rises over London in the Huxley. At first, she's having a great time, but then the Huxley starts getting nervous, and Deryn sees why: a storm is coming. She doesn't want to throw out her panic flag for fear of losing face, but she knows she needs to get out of the air before that storm arrives.

