Chapter: CHAPTER. XIX. OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT.


Sect. 211. HE that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of
government, ought in the first place to distinguish between the
dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government. That
which makes the community, and brings men out of the loose state of
nature, into one politic society, is the agreement which every one has
with the rest to incorporate, and act as one body, and so be one
distinct commonwealth. The usual, and almost only way whereby this
union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest
upon them: for in that case, (not being able to maintain and support
themselves, as one intire and independent body) the union belonging to
that body which consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so every
one return to the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for
himself, and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other
society. Whenever the society is dissolved, it is certain the government
of that society cannot remain. Thus conquerors swords often cut up
governments by the roots, and mangle societies to pieces, separating the
subdued or scattered multitude from the protection of, and dependence
on, that society which ought to have preserved them from violence. The
world is too well instructed in, and too forward to allow of, this way
of dissolving of governments, to need any more to be said of it; and
there wants not much argument to prove, that where the society is
dissolved, the government cannot remain; that being as impossible, as
for the frame of an house to subsist when the materials of it are
scattered and dissipated by a whirl-wind, or jumbled into a confused
heap by an earthquake.

Sect. 212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are
dissolved from within.

First, When the legislative is altered. Civil society being a state of
peace, amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is
excluded by the umpirage, which they have provided in their legislative,
for the ending all differences that may arise amongst any of them, it is
in their legislative, that the members of a commonwealth are united, and
combined together into one coherent living body. This is the soul that
gives form, life, and unity, to the commonwealth: from hence the
several members have their mutual influence, sympathy, and connexion:
and therefore, when the legislative is broken, or dissolved, dissolution
and death follows: for the essence and union of the society consisting
in having one will, the legislative, when once established by the
majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that will. The
constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of
society, whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union,
under the direction of persons, and bonds of laws, made by persons
authorized thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the people,
without which no one man, or number of men, amongst them, can have
authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest. When any
one, or more, shall take upon them to make laws, whom the people have
not appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, which the
people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again
to be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new
legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the
force of those, who without authority would impose any thing upon them.
Every one is at the disposure of his own will, when those who had, by
the delegation of the society, the declaring of the public will, are
excluded from it, and others usurp the place, who have no such authority
or delegation.

Sect. 213. This being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth
who misuse the power they have; it is hard to consider it aright, and
know at whose door to lay it, without knowing the form of government in
which it happens. Let us suppose then the legislative placed in the
concurrence of three distinct persons.

(<i>1</i>). A single hereditary person, having the constant, supreme,
executive power, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the
other two within certain periods of time.

(<i>2</i>). An assembly of hereditary nobility.

(<i>3</i>). An assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the
people. Such a form of government supposed, it is evident,

Sect. 214. First, That when such a single person, or prince, sets up his
own arbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the
society, declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed:
for that being in effect the legislative, whose rules and laws are put
in execution, and required to be obeyed; when other laws are set up, and
other rules pretended, and inforced, than what the legislative,
constituted by the society, have enacted, it is plain that the
legislative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, not being thereunto
authorized by the fundamental appointment of the society, or subverts
the old, disowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and so
sets up a new legislative.

Sect. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from
assembling in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those
ends for which it was constituted, the legislative is altered: for it is
not a certain number of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have
also freedom of debating, and leisure of perfecting, what is for the
good of the society, wherein the legislative consists: when these are
taken away or altered, so as to deprive the society of the due exercise
of their power, the legislative is truly altered; for it is not names
that constitute governments, but the use and exercise of those powers
that were intended to accompany them; so that he, who takes away the
freedom, or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons, in
effect takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the government.

Sect. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the
electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and
contrary to the common interest of the people, there also the
legislative is altered: for, if others than those whom the society hath
authorized thereunto, do chuse, or in another way than what the society
hath prescribed, those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the
people.

Sect. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the subjection
of a foreign power, either by the prince, or by the legislative, is
certainly a change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the
government: for the end why people entered into society being to be
preserved one intire, free, independent society, to be governed by its
own laws; this is lost, whenever they are given up into the power of
another.

Sect. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the
government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince, is evident;
because he, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to
employ, and often persuading himself, or being flattered by others, that
as supreme magistrate he is uncapable of controul; he alone is in a
condition to make great advances toward such changes, under pretence of
lawful authority, and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress
opposers, as factious, seditious, and enemies to the government: whereas
no other part of the legislative, or people, is capable by themselves to
attempt any alteration of the legislative, without open and visible
rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails,
produces effects very little different from foreign conquest. Besides,
the prince in such a form of government, having the power of dissolving
the other parts of the legislative, and thereby rendering them private
persons, they can never in opposition to him, or without his
concurrence, alter the legislative by a law, his consent being necessary
to give any of their decrees that sanction. But yet, so far as the other
parts of the legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the
government, and do either promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder
such designs, they are guilty, and partake in this, which is certainly
the greatest crime which men can partake of one towards another.

Sec. 219.There is one way more whereby such a government may be
dissolved, and that is: When he who has the supreme executive power,
neglects and abandons that charge, so that the laws already made can no
longer be put in execution. This is demonstratively to reduce all to
anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the government: for laws not
being made for themselves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of
the society, to keep every part of the body politic in its due place and
function; when that totally ceases, the government visibly ceases, and
the people become a confused multitude, without order or connexion.
Where there is no longer the administration of justice, for the securing
of men's rights, nor any remaining power within the community to direct
the force, or provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly
is no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one
as if there were no laws; and a government without laws is, I suppose, a
mystery in politics, unconceivable to human capacity, and inconsistent
with human society.

Sect. 220. In these and the like cases, when the government is
dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by
erecting a new legislative, differing from the other, by the change of
persons, or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety
and good: for the society can never, by the fault of another, lose the
native and original right it has to preserve itself, which can only be
done by a settled legislative, and a fair and impartial execution of the
laws made by it. But the state of mankind is not so miserable that they
are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too late to look for
any. To tell people they may provide for themselves, by erecting a new
legislative, when by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a
foreign power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may
expect relief when it is too late, and the evil is past cure. This is in
effect no more than to bid them first be slaves, and then to take care
of their liberty; and when their chains are on, tell them, they may act
like freemen. This, if barely so, is rather mockery than relief; and men
can never be secure from tyranny, if there be no means to escape it till
they are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not
only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.

Sect. 221. There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments
are dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, either
of them, act contrary to their trust.

First, The legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when they
endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves,
or any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the
lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.

Sect. 222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of
their property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative,
is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to
the properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power,
and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for
since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society, that the
legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs
to secure, by entering into society, and for which the people submitted
themselves to legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators
endeavour to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to
reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a
state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any
farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God hath
provided for all men, against force and violence. Whensoever therefore
the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and
either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to grasp
themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over
the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust
they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite
contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume
their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative,
(such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and
security, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have
said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true also
concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him,
both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the
law, acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary
will as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when
he either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society, to
corrupt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly
preengages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he
has, by sollicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his
designs; and employs them to bring in such, who have promised
before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates
and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but to cut
up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of public
security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of
their representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for
no other end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so
chosen, freely act, and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth,
and the public good should, upon examination, and mature debate, be
judged to require. This, those who give their votes before they hear the
debate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable of
doing. To prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the
declared abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of the
people, and the law-makers of the society, is certainly as great a
breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the
government, as is possible to be met with. To which, if one shall add
rewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end, and all the
arts of perverted law made use of, to take off and destroy all that
stand in the way of such a design, and will not comply and consent to
betray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is
doing. What power they ought to have in the society, who thus employ it
contrary to the trust went along with it in its first institution, is
easy to determine; and one cannot but see, that he, who has once
attempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted.

Sect. 223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the people being
ignorant, and always discontented, to lay the foundation of government
in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expose
it to certain ruin; and no government will be able long to subsist, if
the people may set up a new legislative, whenever they take offence at
the old one. To this I answer, Quite the contrary. People are not so
easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are
hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the
frame they have been accustomed to. And if there be any original
defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is
not an easy thing to get them changed, even when all the world sees
there is an opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion in the people
to quit their old constitutions, has, in the many revolutions which have
been seen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us to,
or, after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brought us back
again to our old legislative of king, lords and commons: and whatever
provocations have made the crown be taken from some of our princes
heads, they never carried the people so far as to place it in another
line.

Sect. 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for
frequent rebellion. To which I answer,

First, No more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are made
miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary
power, cry up their governors, as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter;
let them be sacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven;
give them out for whom or what you please, the same will happen. The
people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon
any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them.
They will wish, and seek for the opportunity, which in the change,
weakness and accidents of human affairs, seldom delays long to offer
itself. He must have lived but a little while in the world, who has not
seen examples of this in his time; and he must have read very little,
who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the
world.

Sect. 225. Secondly, I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every
little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling
part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human
frailty, will be born by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a
long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending the same
way, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel
what they lie under, and see whither they are going; it is not to be
wondered, that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put
the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which
government was at first erected; and without which, ancient names, and
specious forms, are so far from being better, that they are much worse,
than the state of nature, or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies being all
as great and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult.

Sect. 226. Thirdly, I answer, that this doctrine of a power in the
people of providing for their safety a-new, by a new legislative, when
their legislators have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their
property, is the best fence against rebellion, and the probablest means
to hinder it: for rebellion being an opposition, not to persons, but
authority, which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of the
government; those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by
force justify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels:
for when men, by entering into society and civil-government, have
excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation of property,
peace, and unity amongst themselves, those who set up force again in
opposition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back again the
state of war, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by
the pretence they have to authority, the temptation of force they have
in their hands, and the flattery of those about them) being likeliest to
do; the properest way to prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger
and injustice of it, who are under the greatest temptation to run into
it.

Sect. 227. In both the fore-mentioned cases, when either the legislative
is changed, or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they
were constituted; those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion: for if
any one by force takes away the established legislative of any society,
and the laws by them made, pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes
away the umpirage, which every one had consented to, for a peaceable
decision of all their controversies, and a bar to the state of war
amongst them. They, who remove, or change the legislative, take away
this decisive power, which no body can have, but by the appointment and
consent of the people; and so destroying the authority which the people
did, and no body else can set up, and introducing a power which the
people hath not authorized, they actually introduce a state of war,
which is that of force without authority: and thus, by removing the
legislative established by the society, (in whose decisions the people
acquiesced and united, as to that of their own will) they untie the
knot, and expose the people a-new to the state of war, And if those, who
by force take away the legislative, are rebels, the legislators
themselves, as has been shewn, can be no less esteemed so; when they,
who were set up for the protection, and preservation of the people,
their liberties and properties, shall by force invade and endeavour to
take them away; and so they putting themselves into a state of war with
those who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace, are
properly, and with the greatest aggravation, rebellantes, rebels.

Sect. 228. But if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, mean
that it may occasion civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the people
they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon
their liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of
those who were their magistrates, when they invade their properties
contrary to the trust put in them; and that therefore this doctrine is
not to be allowed, being so destructive to the peace of the world: they
may as well say, upon the same ground, that honest men may not oppose
robbers or pirates, because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If
any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who
defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbours. If the
innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has, for peace sake, to him
who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered, what
a kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in
violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit
of robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an admirable peace
betwix the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance,
yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus's den
gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace, and such a government,
wherein Ulysses and his companions had nothing to do, but quietly to
suffer themselves to be devoured. And no doubt Ulysses, who was a
prudent man, preached up passive obedience, and exhorted them to a quiet
submission, by representing to them of what concernment peace was to
mankind; and by shewing the inconveniences might happen, if they should
offer to resist Polyphemus, who had now the power over them.

Sect. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is
best for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the
boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable
to be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and
employ it for the destruction, and not the preservation of the
properties of their people?

Sect. 230. Nor let any one say, that mischief can arise from hence, as
often as it shall please a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the
alteration of the government. It is true, such men may stir, whenever
they please; but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition:
for till the mischief be grown general, and the ill designs of the
rulers become visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part,
the people, who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by
resistance, are not apt to stir. The examples of particular injustice,
or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man, moves them not. But
if they universally have a persuation, grounded upon manifest evidence,
that designs are carrying on against their liberties, and the general
course and tendency of things cannot but give them strong suspicions of
the evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed for it? Who
can help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring themselves into this
suspicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have the sense of
rational creatures, and can think of things no otherwise than as they
find and feel them? And is it not rather their fault, who put things
into such a posture, that they would not have them thought to be as they
are? I grant, that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men
have sometimes caused great disorders in commonwealths, and factions
have been fatal to states and kingdoms. But whether the mischief hath
oftener begun in the peoples wantonness, and a desire to cast off the
lawful authority of their rulers, or in the rulers insolence, and
endeavours to get and exercise an arbitrary power over their people;
whether oppression, or disobedience, gave the first rise to the
disorder, I leave it to impartial history to determine. This I am sure,
whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about to invade the
rights of either prince or people, and lays the foundation for
overturning the constitution and frame of any just government, is highly
guilty of the greatest crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to
answer for all those mischiefs of blood, rapine, and desolation, which
the breaking to pieces of governments bring on a country. And he who
does it, is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind,
and is to be treated accordingly.

Sect. 231. That subjects or foreigners, attempting by force on the
properties of any people, may be resisted with force, is agreed on all
hands. But that magistrates, doing the same thing, may be resisted, hath
of late been denied: as if those who had the greatest privileges and
advantages by the law, had thereby a power to break those laws, by which
alone they were set in a better place than their brethren: whereas their
offence is thereby the greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater
share they have by the law, and breaking also that trust, which is put
into their hands by their brethren.

Sect. 232. Whosoever uses force without right, as every one does in
society, who does it without law, puts himself into a state of war with
those against whom he so uses it; and in that state all former ties are
cancelled, all other rights cease, and every one has a right to defend
himself, and to resist the aggressor. This is so evident, that Barclay
himself, that great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings, is
forced to confess, That it is lawful for the people, in some cases, to
resist their king; and that too in a chapter, wherein he pretends to
shew, that the divine law shuts up the people from all manner of
rebellion. Whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine, that, since
they may in some cases resist, all resisting of princes is not
rebellion. His words are these. Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus
tyrannicae crudelitati & furori jugulum semper praebebit? Ergone
multitude civitates suas fame, ferro, & flamma vastari, seque, conjuges,
& liberos fortunae ludibrio & tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitae
pericula omnesque miserias & molestias a rege deduci patientur? Num
illis quod omni animantium generi est a natura tributum, denegari debet,
ut sc. vim vi repellant, seseq; ab injuria, tueantur? Huic breviter
responsum sit, Populo universo negari defensionem, quae juris naturalis
est, neque ultionem quae praeter naturam est adversus regem concedi
debere. Quapropter si rex non in singulares tantum personas aliquot
privatum odium exerceat, sed corpus etiam reipublicae, cujus ipse caput
est, i.e. totum populum, vel insignem aliquam ejus partem immani &
intoleranda saevitia seu tyrannide divexet; populo, quidem hoc casu
resistendi ac tuendi se ab injuria potestas competit, sed tuendi se
tantum, non enim in principem invadendi: & restituendae injuriae
illatae, non recedendi a debita reverentia propter acceptam injuriam.
Praesentem denique impetum propulsandi non vim praeteritam ulciscenti
jus habet. Horum enim alterum a natura est, ut vitam scilicet corpusque
tueamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, ut inferior de superiori
supplicium sumat. Quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum sit,
impedire potest, ne fiat, id postquam factum est, in regem authorem
sceleris vindicare non potest: populus igitur hoc amplius quam privatus
quispiam habet: quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto
Buchanano, nullum nisi in patientia remedium superest. Cum ille si
intolerabilis tyrannus est (modicum enim ferre omnino debet) resistere
cum reverentia possit, Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 8.

In English thus:

Sect. 233. But if any one should ask, Must the people then always lay
themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? Must they see their
cities pillaged, and laid in ashes, their wives and children exposed to
the tyrant's lust and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their
king to ruin, and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit
still? Must men alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force
with force, which nature allows so freely to all other creatures for
their preservation from injury? I answer: Self-defence is a part of the
law of nature; nor can it be denied the community, even against the king
himself: but to revenge themselves upon him, must by no means be allowed
them; it being not agreeable to that law. Wherefore if the king shall
shew an hatred, not only to some particular persons, but sets himself
against the body of the commonwealth, whereof he is the head, and
shall, with intolerable ill usage, cruelly tyrannize over the whole, or
a considerable part of the people, in this case the people have a right
to resist and defend themselves from injury: but it must be with this
caution, that they only defend themselves, but do not attack their
prince: they may repair the damages received, but must not for any
provocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect. They may
repulse the present attempt, but must not revenge past violences: for it
is natural for us to defend life and limb, but that an inferior should
punish a superior, is against nature. The mischief which is designed
them, the people may prevent before it be done; but when it is done,
they must not revenge it on the king, though author of the villany. This
therefore is the privilege of the people in general, above what any
private person hath; that particular men are allowed by our adversaries
themselves (Buchanan only excepted) to have no other remedy but
patience; but the body of the people may with respect resist intolerable
tyranny; for when it is but moderate, they ought to endure it.

Sect. 234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of
resistance.

Sect. 235. It is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to no
purpose:

First, He says, it must be with reverence.

Secondly, It must be without retribution, or punishment; and the reason
he gives is, because an inferior cannot punish a superior. First, How to
resist force without striking again, or how to strike with reverence,
will need some skill to make intelligible. He that shall oppose an
assault only with a shield to receive the blows, or in any more
respectful posture, without a sword in his hand, to abate the confidence
and force of the assailant, will quickly be at an end of his resistance,
and will find such a defence serve only to draw on himself the worse
usage. This is as ridiculous a way of resisting, as juvenal thought it
of fighting; ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum. And the success of the
combat will be unavoidably the same he there describes it:

/*[4]
      -----Libertas pauperis haec est:
    Pulsatus rogat, et pugnis concisus, adorat,
    Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.
*/

This will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, where men
may not strike again. He therefore who may resist, must be allowed to
strike. And then let our author, or any body else, join a knock on the
head, or a cut on the face, with as much reverence and respect as he
thinks fit. He that can reconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught I
know, desire for his pains, a civil, respectful cudgeling where-ever he
can meet with it.

Secondly, As to his second, An inferior cannot punish a superior; that
is true, generally speaking, whilst he is his superior. But to resist
force with force, being the state of war that levels the parties,
cancels all former relation of reverence, respect, and superiority: and
then the odds that remains, is, that he, who opposes the unjust
agressor, has this superiority over him, that he has a right, when he
prevails, to punish the offender, both for the breach of the peace, and
all the evils that followed upon it. Barclay therefore, in another
place, more coherently to himself, denies it to be lawful to resist a
king in any case. But he there assigns two cases, whereby a king may
un-king himself. His words are,

Quid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere
atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo
suaque authoritate liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex
divinis id obstat, Regem honorificato; & qui potestati resistit, Dei
ordinationi resisit: non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si
id committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat. Tunc enim se ipse
principatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber: hoc modo populus &
superior efficitur, reverso ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante regem
inauguratum in interregno habuit. At sunt paucorum generum commissa
ejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt. At ego cum plurima animo
perlustrem, duo tantum invenio, duos, inquam, casus quibus rex ipso
facto ex rege non regem se facit & omni honore & dignitate regali atque
in subditos potestate destituit; quorum etiam meminit Winzerus. Horum
unus est, Si regnum disperdat, quemadmodum de Nerone fertur, quod is
nempe senatum populumque Romanum, atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque
vastare, ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset. Et de Caligula, quod
palam denunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui amplius fore,
inque animo habuerit interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque
Alexandriam commigrare, ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei
cervicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis meditator & molitur serio, omnem
regnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in subditos
amittit, ut dominus servi pro derelicto habiti dominium.

Sect. 236. Alter casus est, Si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit,
ac regnum quod liberum a majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienae
ditioni mancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo
plane ut incommodet: tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis
amifit, ut summus scilicet in regno secundum Deum sit, & solo Deo
inferior, atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cujus
libertatem sartam & tectam conservare debuit, in alterius gentis
ditionem & potestatem dedidit; hac velut quadam regni ab alienatione
effecit, ut nec quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat, nec in eum
cui collatum voluit, juris quicquam transferat; atque ita eo facto
liberum jam & suae potestatis populum relinquit, cujus rei exemplum unum
annales Scotici suppeditant. Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 16.

Which in English runs thus:

Sect. 237. What then, can there no case happen wherein the people may of
right, and by their own authority, help themselves, take arms, and set
upon their king, imperiously domineering over them? None at all, whilst
he remains a king. Honour the king, and he that resists the power,
resists the ordinance of God; are divine oracles that will never permit
it, The people therefore can never come by a power over him, unless he
does something that makes him cease to be a king: for then he divests
himself of his crown and dignity, and returns to the state of a private
man, and the people become free and superior, the power which they had
in the interregnum, before they crowned him king, devolving to them
again. But there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this
state. After considering it well on all sides, I can find but two. Two
cases there are, I say, whereby a king, ipso facto, becomes no king, and
loses all power and regal authority over his people; which are also
taken notice of by Winzerus.

The first is, If he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if he
have a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it is
recorded of Nero, that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of
Rome, lay the city waste with fire and sword, and then remove to some
other place. And of Caligula, that he openly declared, that he would be
no longer a head to the people or senate, and that he had it in his
thoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks, and then retire to
Alexandria: and he wisht that the people had but one neck, that he might
dispatch them all at a blow, Such designs as these, when any king
harbours in his thoughts, and seriously promotes, he immediately gives
up all care and thought of the commonwealth; and consequently forfeits
the power of governing his subjects, as a master does the dominion over
his slaves whom he hath abandoned.

Sect. 238. The other case is, When a king makes himself the dependent of
another, and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him, and the
people put free into his hands, to the dominion of another: for however
perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet because
he has hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be next
and immediately under God, supreme in his kingdom; and also because he
betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought to have carefully
preserved, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation. By this, as
it were, alienation of his kingdom, he himself loses the power he had in
it before, without transferring any the least right to those on whom he
would have bestowed it; and so by this act sets the people free, and
leaves them at their own disposal. One example of this is to be found in
the Scotch Annals.

Sect. 239. In these cases Barclay, the great champion of absolute
monarchy, is forced to allow, that a king may be resisted, and ceases to
be a king. That is, in short, not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he
has no authority, there he is no king, and may be resisted: for
wheresoever the authority ceases, the king ceases too, and becomes like
other men who have no authority. And these two cases he instances in,
differ little from those above mentioned, to be destructive to
governments, only that he has omitted the principle from which his
doctrine flows: and that is, the breach of trust, in not preserving the
form of government agreed on, and in not intending the end of government
itself, which is the public good and preservation of property. When a
king has dethroned himself, and put himself in a state of war with his
people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king, as
they would any other man, who has put himself into a state of war with
them, Barclay, and those of his opinion, would do well to tell us. This
farther I desire may be taken notice of out of Barclay, that he says,
The mischief that is designed them, the people may prevent before it be
done: whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is but in design. Such
designs as these (says he) when any king harbours in his thoughts and
seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the
commonwealth; so that, according to him, the neglect of the public good
is to be taken as an evidence of such design, or at least for a
sufficient cause of resistance. And the reason of all, he gives in these
words, Because he betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought
carefully to have preserved. What he adds, into the power and dominion
of a foreign nation, signifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying
in the loss of their liberty, which he ought to have preserved, and not
in any distinction of the persons to whose dominion they were subjected.
The peoples right is equally invaded, and their liberty lost, whether
they are made slaves to any of their own, or a foreign nation; and in
this lies the injury, and against this only have they the right of
defence. And there are instances to be found in all countries, which
shew, that it is not the change of nations in the persons of their
governors, but the change of government, that gives the offence. Bilson,
a bishop of our church, and a great stickler for the power and
prerogative of princes, does, if I mistake not, in his treatise of
Christian subjection, acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power,
and their title to the obedience of their subjects; and if there needed
authority in a case where reason is so plain, I could send my reader to
Bracton, Fortescue, and the author of the Mirrour, and others, writers
that cannot be suspected to be ignorant of our government, or enemies to
it. But I thought Hooker alone might be enough to satisfy those men, who
relying on him for their ecclesiastical polity, are by a strange fate
carried to deny those principles upon which he builds it. Whether they
are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen, to pull down their own
fabric, they were best look. This I am sure, their civil policy is so
new, so dangerous, and so destructive to both rulers and people, that as
former ages never could bear the broaching of it; so it may be hoped,
those to come, redeemed from the impositions of these Egyptian
under-task-masters, will abhor the memory of such servile flatterers,
who, whilst it seemed to serve their turn, resolved all government into
absolute tyranny, and would have all men born to, what their mean souls
fitted them for, slavery.

Sect. 240. Here, it is like, the common question will be made, Who shall
be judge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust?
This, perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the
people, when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I
reply, The people shall be judge; for who shall be judge whether his
trustee or deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him,
but he who deputes him, and must, by having deputed him, have still a
power to discard him, when he fails in his trust? If this be reasonable
in particular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in that
of the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned, and
also where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the redress very
difficult, dear, and dangerous?

Sect. 241. But farther, this question, (Who shall be judge?) cannot
mean, that there is no judge at all: for where there is no judicature on
earth, to decide controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge. He
alone, it is true, is judge of the right. But every man is judge for
himself, as in all other cases, so in this, whether another hath put
himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal to
the Supreme Judge, as Jeptha did.

Sect. 242. If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the
people, in a matter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing
be of great consequence, I should think the proper umpire, in such a
case, should be the body of the people: for in cases where the prince
hath a trust reposed in him, and is dispensed from the common ordinary
rules of the law; there, if any men find themselves aggrieved, and think
the prince acts contrary to, or beyond that trust, who so proper to
judge as the body of the people, (who, at first, lodged that trust in
him) how far they meant it should extend? But if the prince, or whoever
they be in the administration, decline that way of determination, the
appeal then lies no where but to heaven; force between either persons,
who have no known superior on earth, or which permits no appeal to a
judge on earth, being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal lies
only to heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for
himself, when he will think fit to make use of that appeal, and put
himself upon it.

Sect. 243. To conclude, The power that every individual gave the
society, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals
again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the
community; because without this there can be no community, no
commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement: so also when
the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to
continue in them and their successors, with direction and authority for
providing such successors, the legislative can never revert to the
people whilst that government lasts; because having provided a
legislative with power to continue for ever, they have given up their
political power to the legislative, and cannot resume it. But if they
have set limits to the duration of their legislative, and made this
supreme power in any person, or assembly, only temporary; or else, when
by the miscarriages of those in authority, it is forfeited; upon the
forfeiture, or at the determination of the time set, it reverts to the
society, and the people have a right to act as supreme, and continue the
legislative in themselves; or erect a new form, or under the old form
place it in new hands, as they think good.


FINIS.

 Locke takes up the subject of the dissolution of government, first distinguishing between the dissolution of society and the dissolution of government. Society is destroyed by foreign conquest; the union that brought men from the state of nature into a commonwealth is now dissolved and they are returned to the previous state. The societies are scattered and subdued. When a society is destroyed, its government is destroyed as well; it would make no sense for government to persist without its foundation of society. Locke now discusses the ways in which government can be dissolved. The first is when the legislature is altered, for it is the will of society and the body in which all members are combined into one. The constitution's creation of the legislature was the commonwealth's first and most important act, and the people authorized it. Whenever a legislature makes laws without authority, the people do not need to obey and can take it upon themselves to form a new legislature. A commonwealth's legislative power is one of three styles: the first is a single hereditary person with absolute power; the second is an assembly of hereditary nobility; and the third is an assembly of elected representatives chosen by the people. In the first, the legislative is changed when the absolute monarch goes outside the bounds of the law and either makes new laws or subverts old laws. It is also changed when the prince prohibits the legislature from meeting and debating, alters the election rules without the consent and against the common interest of the people, or delivers the people to a foreign power. It is clearly the prince's fault that the legislature is changed and the government dissolved, because only he has the power and pretense of authority to make these sorts of changes. A government can also be dissolved when its executive power neglects its job and does not execute or enforce the law. The commonwealth devolves into anarchy. Clearly when there is no administration of justice and the laws cannot be carried out for the public good, government no longer exists. When the executive uses force or bribery to corrupt the representatives or uses threats and promises to get them to accede to his wishes, he is ruining the legislature and destroying the government. This is a breach of trust with the people. Some may fear that when the people set up a new legislative power because the old one has violated the compact between government and the governed that this new government will also fall into ruin, and rather quickly at that. Locke counsels these critics to remember that the people are not easily swayed from their old forms and traditions and the things they are accustomed to; they rarely want to do away with their old constitutions and rarely choose a new form of government that is vastly different from the previous. Locke takes up the question of whether or not this ability to form a new legislature when the old one is no longer valid will result in frequent rebellions and revolution. He does not believe so for multiple reasons. One of these is that such revolutions do not occur every single time one mistake or inconvenience or instance of human weakness occurs. It is natural for a government to err occasionally. However, when a long series of wrongs all tending toward the violation of the people's liberty occur, then they have the right to rise up and replace the old government with a new government whose purpose is the fundamental goal of all government, to preserve the public good. A poor ruler is worse than the state of nature or even anarchy. Another reason is that the new legislature is the best way to prevent a rebellion in the first place. Rebellion is not opposition to the person but to the authority, which is founded by the constitution and laws of the government. Those who transgress the laws or refuse to heed them are the true rebels. The best way to prevent the authority from abusing power is to show them the danger and injustice in doing so. Thus, when the legislative power is changed or the legislators act contrary to their established role, then they are guilty of rebellion. In fact, when they take away the power that the people invested in the legislature, or introduce a power that was not given, these guilty parties are also guilty of introducing the people to a state of war. It would be absurd to believe that a people would simply allow their government to invade their property or liberty. It is just as absurd to allow a thief to rob one's house without resisting in some fashion. A literary example that also elucidates Locke's point is that of Ulysses and Polyphemus; Ulysses and his companions were passively obedient and submissive but were devoured by the giant for their patient sufferance. If the point of government is to preserve mankind, it is natural that the people should oppose rulers who do not keep this end in focus. Locke alludes to a point he made in the previous chapter regarding a few dissatisfied or suffering men and the unlikelihood that these men would be able to stir the entire commonwealth into rebellion against their ruler. If the majority, however, find themselves aggrieved, then they have the right to rebel. Locke states that he believes anyone who causes the destruction of a government with all of its violence and desolation, whether it be the authority figure or private subjects, is guilty of the highest crime. It is illogical to claim that private subjects and foreigners can be punished for using force on another man's property but magistrates cannot. Greater privileges and advantages do not allow the breaking of the law. Locke now uses the writings of William Barclay, a 17th century Scottish jurist, to discuss his views on the power of kings and the dissolution of government. Passages from Barclay's book, De Regno et Regali potestate , which was dedicated to Henry VI and is a treatise upholding the divine right of kings, are quoted in Latin at length by Locke and then translated into English. In the first quote Locke uses, Barclay concedes that the people should not be expected to let a king ravage their lands and harm their families. Self-defense is part of the law of nature, and if a king tyrannizes his people, they have the right to rebel. They should not, however, attack their prince- resistance is only to the present offense and should not be used to revenge past wrongs. Resisting the monarchy is permissible, but Barclay does note that it must be done with reverence and cannot be comprised of retribution or punishment. Locke finds it absurd, however, that the people are to resist without sword in hand, for how will their assault succeed? He does not agree with Barclay that the resistance should be characterized by reverence because it would never come to fruition. Locke also disputes Barclay's assertion that an inferior can never punish a superior by noting that once a tyrant has used force against his people, he is in a state of war with them and all notion of inferior vs. superior is irrelevant now. Locke then quotes and translates Barclay on two ways in which a king can cease to be king. The first is if he completely lays waste to and ruins the kingdom, such as the Roman emperors Nero and Caligula. The second is if he makes himself dependent on another and places his people under the dominion of a foreign nation. He has given up any right to the people's obedience and they are now free. Locke sees these two cases as similar to the situations he detailed earlier in the chapter, but explains that the main disparity between the two is that Barclay does not identify the same underlying problem with the king's actions: that he violated the trust of his people. Locke mentions several other names of men whose writings espouse similar principles; these men include Bilson, Bracton, Fortescue, and the author of the Mirrour. Locke once again turns to the assumption that ill-affected and contentious men will spread dissension throughout the commonwealth. He believes that the people as a whole will prevent this from occurring because their welfare is concerned. In terms of who shall judge whether a magistrate or legislature has tended toward tyranny, the people should indeed be the judge. However, the ultimate judge is God and he will determine whether the people were right to rebel against their sovereign. Locke believes that the people should be the judge at first because they were the ones who initially placed their trust in their ruler. If the ruler refuses judgment and a state of war persists between himself and his people, then God will be the only judge left. Conclusively, the power men retained in the state of nature was relinquished once they consented to join a commonwealth. The power that they placed within the legislature can never be theirs again. However, if this power was to be only temporary, or the ruler transgressed the laws of the commonwealth and violated the people's trust, then the people's obedience is forfeited and they have the right to take over the legislature, create a new one, or place the power in new hands.

