Chapter: CHAPTER. XV. OF PATERNAL, POLITICAL, AND DESPOTICAL POWER, CONSIDERED TOGETHER.


Sect. 169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately
before, yet the great mistakes of late about government, having, as I
suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another,
it may not, perhaps, be amiss to consider them here together.

Sect. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing but that
which parents have over their children, to govern them for the
children's good, till they come to the use of reason, or a state of
knowledge, wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule,
whether it be the law of nature, or the municipal law of their country,
they are to govern themselves by: capable, I say, to know it, as well as
several others, who live as freemen under that law. The affection and
tenderness which God hath planted in the breast of parents towards their
children, makes it evident, that this is not intended to be a severe
arbitrary government, but only for the help, instruction, and
preservation of their offspring. But happen it as it will, there is, as
I have proved, no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and
death, at any time, over their children, more than over any body else;
neither can there be any pretence why this parental power should keep
the child, when grown to a man, in subjection to the will of his
parents, any farther than having received life and education from his
parents, obliges him to respect, honour, gratitude, assistance and
support, all his life, to both father and mother. And thus, 'tis true,
the paternal is a natural government, but not at all extending itself to
the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political. The power of the
father doth not reach at all to the property of the child, which is only
in his own disposing.

Sect. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which every man
having in the state of nature, has given up into the hands of the
society, and therein to the governors, whom the society hath set over
itself, with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for
their good, and the preservation of their property: now this power,
which every man has in the state of nature, and which he parts with to
the society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to
use such means, for the preserving of his own property, as he thinks
good, and nature allows him; and to punish the breach of the law of
nature in others, so as (according to the best of his reason) may most
conduce to the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind. So that
the end and measure of this power, when in every man's hands in the
state of nature, being the preservation of all of his society, that is,
all mankind in general, it can have no other end or measure, when in the
hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that society in
their lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute,
arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as
possible to be preserved; but a power to make laws, and annex such
penalties to them, as may tend to the preservation of the whole, by
cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that they
threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful. And
this power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the
mutual consent of those who make up the community.

Sect. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one
man has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases. This
is a power, which neither nature gives, for it has made no such
distinction between one man and another; nor compact can convey: for man
not having such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give
another man such a power over it; but it is the effect only of
forfeiture, which the aggressor makes of his own life, when he puts
himself into the state of war with another: for having quitted reason,
which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common
bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and
having renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of
the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where he has
no right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by
making force, which is their's, to be his rule of right, he renders
himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and the rest of
mankind, that will join with him in the execution of justice, as any
other wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither
society nor security*. And thus captives, taken in a just and lawful
war, and such only, are subject to a despotical power, which, as it
arises not from compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the
state of war continued: for what compact can be made with a man that is
not master of his own life? what condition can he perform? and if he be
once allowed to be master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary
power of his master ceases. He that is master of himself, and his own
life, has a right too to the means of preserving it; so that as soon as
compact enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits his absolute power,
and puts an end to the state of war, who enters into conditions with his
captive.

(*Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious brute that
is destructive to their being.)

Sect. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to
parents for the benefit of their children during their minority, to
supply their want of ability, and understanding how to manage their
property. (By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to
mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods.)
Voluntary agreement gives the second, viz. political power to governors
for the benefit of their subjects, to secure them in the possession and
use of their properties. And forfeiture gives the third despotical power
to lords for their own benefit, over those who are stripped of all
property.

Sect. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and the
different ends of these several powers, will plainly see, that paternal
power comes as far short of that of the magistrate, as despotical
exceeds it; and that absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from
being one kind of civil society, that it is as inconsistent with it, as
slavery is with property. Paternal power is only where minority makes
the child incapable to manage his property; political, where men have
property in their own disposal; and despotical, over such as have no
property at all.

 The history of mankind is filled with wars and conquest. While some may have mistaken conquest for the consent of the people, it is not actually the same thing as setting up a government. Even if a conqueror does destroy one commonwealth's government, he cannot set up a new one until the people consent. An unjust conqueror will never have the right to the people he exercised force over. For example, just because a man is robbed and the deeds to his house are stolen does not mean the thief has a lawful right to such deeds. There are earthly remedies to seek in this case, but if those are denied to the man who was robbed, he must have patience and appeal to heaven. Similarly, the conquered people have no earthly adjudicator and must look to heaven. Unjust conquerors are never entitled to the obedience and allegiance of those they conquered. Locke now turns to lawful conquests and discusses several important points. The first is that the conqueror does not have any power over those who did the conquering with him. Anyone on the same side is equal and most of the time the terms were set out regarding spoils before the conquest began. The example of William the Conqueror is used; the Saxons and Britons in England became his lawful subjects but those Normans who did the conquering with him were assuredly not under his dominion. If for some reason a new government is never formed, the conqueror only has the submission of those who forfeited their lives by fighting against him, but not their property or the lives of those who did not engage in the war. The second point is that when a people's governor makes an unjust war, they are not held responsible for his actions because they never gave him power to do unjust things. They are only guilty if they give him permission or they aided and abetted him in his conquest; if they did neither they are completely innocent. The third point concerns the just conqueror's right to the conquered. He has an absolute power over their lives because they made war against him and thus forfeited those lives. However, he does not have a right to their possessions. Locke concedes that this may sound strange because in most countries in the world, it is assumed that the conquerors have the right to the land and possessions of those they conquered. He attempts to explain his point further. It is only the use of force that puts a man into the state of war with another; this man is no better than the beasts of the earth because he has relinquished reason and forfeited his life. Importantly, a father's transgressions and violence do not extend to his innocent children. They are not held accountable for his actions. Thus, when a conqueror subdues a man he has no right to his property or that of his wife and children because the use of force is what allowed him to forfeit his life. A man's estate can only be touched in order to make reparations or pay for the cost of the war. Locke reiterates that the innocent wife and children of a man who forfeited his life in a state of war are to be left alone. Their lives are their own. However, what should be done if a child has title to his father's estate but the conqueror desires that estate as a form of reparation? The conqueror should leave enough for the family to survive because it would violate the fundamental law of nature that mankind should be preserved. A conqueror should never harm future generations by destroying their land for more than two seasons' worth. Money is not sufficient for damages because it is not of nature; it is completely arbitrary and may differ from kingdom to kingdom. Any of the men who assisted the conqueror in his war and any of the conquered citizens who did not engage in the conflict are free from obedience to the conqueror, and may, if they choose, form a new government. It has been observed, however, that the conqueror often forces these individuals at the point of a sword to join his government, but this violates natural law and they are not bound to this tyrant. Another situation Locke considers is when all members of the body politic engaged in the war against the conquering forces. Their children's lives are still free from the conqueror's dominion unless they consent to be governed by him. All men are born with the double right of freedom to his person and the right to inherit his father's goods. By the right to freedom of his person, a man is not subject to the government of a place just because he was born under its jurisdiction. He can decide to leave and join a different government if he desires. By the right to inherit his father's property, a child is still the inheritor of the land that belonged to his subdued father. Locke uses the example of the Grecian Christians who were descendants of the ancient possessors of their country but who were now oppressed by Turkish conquerors. These Christians had a right to their property and did not owe the Turks their allegiance. Men never owe a government allegiance unless they consent to it, and they cannot consent to it unless they are in a complete state of freedom to do so. Established laws must then protect them and their property, and if this is not the case then they can still be said to reside in a state of war. If a conqueror grants tracts of land to own permanently or to rent to his subjects, he does not have the right to take this land away from them. Above all, a prince must obey the eternal and fundamental laws of nature and God. If he conquers a kingdom, he has a right to the lives of those that made war against him, but does not gain these men's possessions or the possessions and lives of their wives and children. Locke concludes with historical and biblical examples of just and unjust conquerors. In chapter XVII, Locke turns briefly to the subject of usurpation. He writes that usurpation can never said to be just or right. The usurper adds tyranny to his usurpation because he is not changing the type of government, merely extending his power beyond the lawful boundaries that the legitimate rulers established. The people of that commonwealth chose the person or persons in whom they wanted to instill power; this was one of their fundamental rights in forming a government. For anyone to usurp the power that is lawfully bestowed is to violate the law of nature. He will never be a legitimate ruler until the people consent and confirm his power.

