Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION





The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What

A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do
Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man,
or Assembly Of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right
to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their
Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted For It, as he that
Voted Against It, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of
that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his
own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected
against other men.




The Consequences To Such Institution, Are




I. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of Government




From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and
Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by
the consent of the People assembled.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not
obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And
Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being
thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one,
cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient
to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And
therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave
cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude;
nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man,
or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man,
to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their
Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man
dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man,
which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty
to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him,
they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice.
Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or
punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment,
as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And
because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be
punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust.
And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their
Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also
is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some
body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant,
who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with
God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that
it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly
disposition.




2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited

Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given
to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and
not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the
part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any
pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which
is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is
manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as
one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with
every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as
yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants
as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd,
because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach
thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done
in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular.
Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant
made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of
his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach,
there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns
therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of
Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they
had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraignty by
way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his
Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want
of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and
breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man,
but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands
of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose
actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them
all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then
no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for
no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made
a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such
conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the
Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and
in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that
are kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to
participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.




3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The

Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part. Thirdly,
because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne;
he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented
to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the
rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that
were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore
tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and
therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against
any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore
unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his
consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or
be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might
without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.




4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly Accused By The Subject

Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the
Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that
whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor
ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any
thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose
authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every
particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently
he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that
whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man
but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones
selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne
power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper
signification.




5. What Soever The Soveraigne Doth, Is Unpunishable By The Subject

Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath
Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner
by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is author of the
actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions
committed by himselfe.




6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace

And Defence Of His Subjects

And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of
them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means;
it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the
Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence;
and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do
whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the
preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of discord at home and
Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the
recovery of the same. And therefore,




And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them

Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions
and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently,
on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall,
in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines
of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed
from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth
the well governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and
Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded
but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by
Peace. For Doctrine Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace
and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in
a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of
Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally
received; the contrary Truths may be generally offensive; Yet the most
sudden, and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never
breake the Peace, but onely somtimes awake the Warre. For those men that
are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or
introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace,
but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they live
as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belongeth
therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or
constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to
Peace, thereby to prevent Discord and Civill Warre.




7. The Right Of Making Rules, Whereby The Subject May

Every Man Know What Is So His Owne, As No Other Subject

Can Without Injustice Take It From Him

Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of
prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may
enjoy and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of
his fellow Subjects: And this is it men Call Propriety. For before
constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had
right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this
Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power,
is the Act of the Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of
Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull and Unlawfull
in the actions of subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the
lawes of each Commonwealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law
be now restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which
being the head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were
in these parts the Civill Law.




8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature

And Decision Of Controversies:

Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that
is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise
concerning Law, either Civill, or naturall, or concerning Fact. For
without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one
Subject, against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and
Tuum are in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and
necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting
himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition of Warre; and
contrary to the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.




9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best:

Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and
Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of
Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to
be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the
Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the Power by which the
people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength
of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which
Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command
of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it
Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that
hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.




10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And Ministers,

Both Of Peace, And Warre:

Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all
Councellours, Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and
War. For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the
common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such
Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.




11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No

Former Law hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary:

Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding
with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe he hath
formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge
most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or
deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.




12. And Of Honour And Order

Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon
themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they
value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation,
Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one
another, and diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It
is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the
worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the
Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to
put those Lawes in execution. But it hath already been shown, that not
onely the whole Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the
Judicature of all Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the
Soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to
appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what
signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give to
one another.




These Rights Are Indivisible

These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and which
are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly
of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are
incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of
the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption in
Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the
Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect his Subject be retained. But if
he transferre the Militia, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want
of execution of the Lawes; Or if he grant away the Power of raising
Mony; the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of
doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of
Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall
presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no
effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all
Common-wealths are Instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is
said, "A kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand:" For unlesse this
division precede, division into opposite Armies can never happen. If
there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of
England, that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords,
and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and
fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that disagreed
in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty of
Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Soveraign Right,
that there be few now (in England,) that do not see, that these Rights
are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next
return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and
no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hetherto
been.




And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct

Renouncing Of The Soveraign Power

And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be granted
away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes
renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to
him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he
can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably
annexed thereunto.




The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In The Presence

Of The Power Soveraign

This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the
Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of
Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than
every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of lesse
power than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not
the collective body as one person, then All Together, and Every One,
signifie the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together,
they understand them as one Person (which person the Soveraign bears,)
then the power of all together, is the same with the Soveraigns power;
and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see well enough,
when the Soveraignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch
they see it not; and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in
whomsoever it be placed.

And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be
greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty
is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and
Prince are his Creatures. As in the presence of the Master, the Servants
are equall, and without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the
presence of the Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some lesse,
when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more
than the Starres in presence of the Sun.




Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It,

And The Hurt Proceeds For The Greatest Part From Not

Submitting Readily, To A Lesse

But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very
miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions
of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And
commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy;
and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other
Soveraign Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of
Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all formes, if they be perfect
enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate
of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the
greatest, that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the
people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and
horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute
condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a
coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge: nor
considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign Governours,
proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the
dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth
their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence,
make it necessary for their Governours to draw from them what they can
in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or
sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies. For all men
are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their
Passions and Self-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a
great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely
Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang
over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.

 Phosphorus flares come streaking overhead as the Germans begin pursuit. Six small single-man walkers chase after Alek, shooting phosphorus flares. Alek's crew doesn't understand what's going on until one of the phosphorus flares sticks to the walker--the flare sends constant smoke into the air, making them very easy to track. Uh oh. Because there's no easy way to put out phosphorus, the guys aren't sure what to do until Alek realizes he'll have to hack it off. Which he does, with a two-hundred-year-old family heirloom sword they just happen to have on board. Why is that sword there? We don't know. Then Alek throws the sword into the forest because it's smoking phosphorus. We just hate when that happens to our good swords. Because the Germans believe the smoking sword is the fallen walker, they keep firing at it while Alek and his crew escape.

