Chapter: CHAPTER. I. AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT


Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse,

(<i>1</i>). That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by
positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or
dominion over the world, as is pretended:

(<i>2</i>). That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it:

(<i>3</i>). That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive
law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may
arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could
not have been certainly determined:

(<i>4</i>). That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which
is the eldest line of Adam's posterity, being so long since utterly
lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there
remains not to one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest
house, and to have the right of inheritance:

All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is
impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or
derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be
the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal
jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that
all government in the world is the product only of force and violence,
and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where
the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder
and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers
of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out
another rise of government, another original of political power, and
another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what
Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what
I take to be political power; that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a
subject may be distinguished from that of a FATHER over his children, a
MASTER over his servant, a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over his
slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the
same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may
help us to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a
family, and a captain of a galley.

Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws with
penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the
regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the
community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the
commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public
good.

 Locke opens the Second Treatise by referring to the First Treatise, in which he refuted Sir Robert Filmer's arguments upholding the political theory of patriarchalism, or, the divine right of kings. Filmer claimed that God gave Adam authority and dominion over the world, but Locke disagreed. He noted that it was impossible to find the actual heirs of Adam who had, according to Filmer, this right of succession to the throne. The lines of descendants from Adam cannot be determined because this information has been lost in history. All of the families and households and nations in the world have an equal claim to this power and inheritance; no one individual or family can actually prove that they are entitled to authority because they are Adam's legitimate heirs. Locke's First Treatise and its manifold rebuttals of Filmer's propositions being thus clear, he reaffirms that Adam's "private dominion and paternal jurisdiction" are not the basis of political power. Filmer's theory may lead some to view government as merely derived from violence and force, and believe human beings dwell in a state no better than that of the animals with a perpetual threat of descent into chaos and conflict. Since he cannot accurately explain the rise of government and who is and who should be the authority, Locke will spend the rest of the Second Treatise addressing these questions. Locke takes care to distinguish political power from that of the power of a father over his child, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife, and a lord over his slave. Even though one man may exercise multiple or even all of these powers at a time, it is important to understand the distinctions between them. Locke's definition of political power is thus: the power to make laws and to define the punishments for greater and lesser crimes, regulate and secure property, carry out the laws, defend the commonwealth from foreign threats, and exercise the aforementioned powers only for the public good.

