Chapter: Concluding Remarks

From MCLEAN's Edition, New York. Wednesday, May 28, 1788

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers,
announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for
discussion two points: "the analogy of the proposed government to your
own State constitution," and "the additional security which its adoption
will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property." But
these heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted in the progress
of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do any thing
more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been heretofore said,
which the advanced stage of the question, and the time already spent
upon it, conspire to forbid.

It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention
to the act which organizes the government of this State holds, not
less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real
excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects are the
re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the omission
of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision respecting the
liberty of the press. These and several others which have been noted
in the course of our inquiries are as much chargeable on the existing
constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the Union; and
a man must have slender pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the
latter for imperfections which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the
former. Nor indeed can there be a better proof of the insincerity
and affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of the plan of the
convention among us, who profess to be the devoted admirers of the
government under which they live, than the fury with which they have
attacked that plan, for matters in regard to which our own constitution
is equally or perhaps more vulnerable.

The additional securities to republican government, to liberty and
to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under
consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation
of the Union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on
the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who may acquire
credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the
despots of the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign
intrigue, which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and
facilitate; in the prevention of extensive military establishments,
which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a
disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of
government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles
of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition of those
practices on the part of the State governments which have undermined the
foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust in
the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost
universal prostration of morals.

Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to
myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at
least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you
respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted. I
have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously
avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political
disputants of all parties, and which have been not a little provoked
by the language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The
charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which has
been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan,
has something in it too wanton and too malignant, not to excite the
indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the
calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy,
the well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire the
disgust of all sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments and
misrepresentations which have been in various ways practiced to keep
the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand
the reprobation of all honest men. It is not impossible that these
circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of
expression which I did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently
felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former
has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been
neither often nor much.

Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these
papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily vindicated
from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has not been shown to
be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary to the public safety
and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer these questions to himself,
according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to act
agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judgment. This is a
duty from which nothing can give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he
is called upon, nay, constrained by all the obligations that form
the bands of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial
motive, no particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary
passion or prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his
posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him beware
of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the object upon
which he is to decide is not a particular interest of the community, but
the very existence of the nation; and let him remember that a majority
of America has already given its sanction to the plan which he is to
approve or reject.

I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the arguments
which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and that I am
unable to discern any real force in those by which it has been opposed.
I am persuaded that it is the best which our political situation,
habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the revolution has
produced.

Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a
claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small triumph
to its enemies. "Why," say they, "should we adopt an imperfect
thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is irrevocably
established?" This may be plausible enough, but it is only plausible. In
the first place I remark, that the extent of these concessions has been
greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounting to an admission
that the plan is radically defective, and that without material
alterations the rights and the interests of the community cannot be
safely confided to it. This, as far as I have understood the meaning of
those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion of their sense.
No advocate of the measure can be found, who will not declare as his
sentiment, that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part,
is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and
circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as promises
every species of security which a reasonable people can desire.

I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme of
imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national affairs, and
to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments, in the
chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect
work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all
collective bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors
and prejudices, as of the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals
of whom they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen
distinct States in a common bond of amity and union, must as necessarily
be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How
can perfection spring from such materials?

The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately published
in this city,(1) are unanswerable to show the utter improbability
of assembling a new convention, under circumstances in any degree so
favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late convention met,
deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there used,
as I presume the production itself has had an extensive circulation.
It is certainly well worthy the perusal of every friend to his country.
There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of amendments
still remains to be considered, and in which it has not yet been
exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first
taking a survey of it in this aspect.

It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it will
be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the
Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it
becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new
decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the
Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If,
on the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified
by all the States as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be
effected by nine States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to
nine(2) in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original
adoption of an entire system.

This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must
inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen
independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions
of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged
with its original formation, very different combinations of the
parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on
one question, may become the minority on a second, and an association
dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the
necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to
compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the
compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and
casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The degree
of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of
particulars and the number of parties.

But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be
a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would
then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any
other point--no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number
would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently,
whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a
particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There
can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecting an
amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete
Constitution.

In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been
urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national
government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of
the authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part I
acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon
mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the
organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on
this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just
stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account.
The intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate,
independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and
integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the national
rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable
expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further
consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the
observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever
nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth
article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged "on the application of
the legislatures of two thirds of the States (which at present amount
to nine), to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be
valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when
ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by
conventions in three fourths thereof." The words of this article are
peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention." Nothing in this
particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence,
all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in
air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or
three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may affect
local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty
in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty
or security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the
State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the
national authority.

If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself
deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances
in which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical
demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light with me,
however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety
of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their own object.

The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the
Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the
truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid and
ingenious: "To balance a large state or society (says he), whether
monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great
difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the
mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many
must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must guide their labor; TIME must
bring it to perfection, and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct
the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials
and experiments."(3) These judicious reflections contain a lesson of
moderation to all the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put
them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual
alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the military
despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not
likely to obtain, but from TIME and EXPERIENCE. It may be in me a defect
of political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an
equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a
longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A NATION,
without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle.
The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the
voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY, to the completion of
which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to
no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an
enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and after having
passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the
course. I dread the more the consequences of new attempts, because I
know that POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are enemies
to a general national government in every possible shape.

PUBLIUS

1. Entitled "An Address to the People of the State of New York."

2. It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds may set on foot the
measure, three fourths must ratify.

3. Hume's Essays, Vol. I, p. 128: "The Rise of Arts and Sciences."

 In this concluding Federalist Paper, Hamilton begins by telling his readers that he will not discuss the remaining two points in his outline, "the analogy of the proposed governments to the states," and "the additional security which this adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property," because he has already said all that he has to about these subjects. He continues that the Constitution has much in similar to the New York state government, especially in consideration of its defects, including the ability of the president to be reelected, "the want of a council, the omission of a formal bill of rights, and the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the press." It is ironic that the strongest opponents of the Constitution say that they are happy with the laws of their state, especially because its Constitution contains the same vulnerabilities. Hamilton proceeds to ask the rhetorical question of whether or not the Constitution has been vindicated from the critic's attacks. Although each man must ask this for himself, Hamilton believes that this duty must be taken extremely seriously, because there will be no excuse for the wrong decision, a vote that has grave consequences for the future of the nation. He heeds the individual man to remember not only the magnitude of the decision, but also the fact that the majority of the nation has already approved the Constitution. Continuing, Hamilton admits, "Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small triumph." They ask why they should not make the Constitution perfect before it is adopted. Hamilton answers this critique by claiming that no one can be found who does not believe that the "system is good," and that delay is useless and will only prolong the precarious situation of the nation. In addition, Hamilton contends "I never hope to see a perfect work for imperfect men." It is improbable to have another convention, but Hamilton believes that the subject of amendments has yet to be considered in The Federalist Papers. Hamilton believes that future amendments will be much easier to obtain than changing the Constitution. Amendments, unlike the Constitution itself, will be easier to pass because no compromise or negotiation will be necessary because it will be a singular proposition and not a whole document, like the Constitution. Hamilton concludes by quoting David Hume, "to balance a large state or society, whether monarchial or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must united in the work; experience must guide their labor; time must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into their first trials and experiments." Hamilton concludes strongly, saying, "a country without a national government is, in my view, an awful spectacle." On the other hand, a Constitution, established by the people, "is a prodigy," something that he looks forward to with "trembling anxiety." He dreads the consequences of new attempts because men and states are enemies to national governments in every state.

