Chapter: The Executive Department Further Considered

From The Independent Journal. Saturday, March 15, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous
Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The
enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least
hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they
can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the
condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a
leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential
to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is
not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to
the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed
combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice;
to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of
ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in
Roman history, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge
in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of
Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who
aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the
community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as
against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and
destruction of Rome.

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this
head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government.
A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a
government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in
practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in
the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire,
what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they
be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the
republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the
plan which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first,
unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its
support; fourthly, competent powers.

The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are,
first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for
the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views,
have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature.
They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary
qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable
to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety,
considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and
best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure
their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision,
activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the
proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the
proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is
increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in
two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it
ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and
co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the
first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we
shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. New
York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which
have intrusted the executive authority wholly to single men.(1) Both
these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their
partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most
numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections,
and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this
head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be
enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen that the Achaeans,
on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman
history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the
dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who
were at times substituted for the Consuls. But it gives us no specimens
of any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance
of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissensions between them
were not more frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until
we advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost
continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the
circumstances of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a
division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in a
perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of their
ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were generally
chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal
interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. In
addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had
considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established
custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between themselves
by lot--one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its
environs, the other taking the command in the more distant provinces.
This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing
those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the
peace of the republic.

But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves
purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much
greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the
Executive, under any modification whatever.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or
pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a
public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity
and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even
animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most
bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen
the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and
operation of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail
the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality
of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures
of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state.
And what is still worse, they might split the community into the
most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the
different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in
planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom
they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened
to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an
indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in
honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the
success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men
of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking,
with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes
carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed
to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who
have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting
to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its
consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable
frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source
just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the
legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce
them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they
may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision
is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the
jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they
may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation
and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When
a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That
resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable
circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in
the executive department. Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no
point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken
the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the
first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract
those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary
ingredients in its composition--vigor and expedition, and this without
any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of
the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would
be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight
to the first case supposed--that is, to a plurality of magistrates of
equal dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which are not
likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with
equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a council, whose
concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the
ostensible Executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to
distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such
cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone
be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a
spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

(But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive,
and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it
tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of
two kinds--to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important
of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will
much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any
longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to
legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the
difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible,
amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the
punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures,
ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much
dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion
is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may
have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so
complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had
different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon
the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable
to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is
truly chargeable.)(E1)

(But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive,
and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it
tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.

Responsibility is of two kinds--to censure and to punishment. The first
is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man,
in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him
unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to
make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the
Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often
becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the
blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious
measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with
so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public
opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances
which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are
sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors
who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may
clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may
be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have
been incurred is truly chargeable.)(E1)

"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their
opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the
point." These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true
or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or
incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the
transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake
the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between the
parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so
much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct
of any of those parties?

In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled
with a council--that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen
the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous
appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed,
have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety
of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the
governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged
it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss
to determine, by whose influence their interests have been committed
to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to
individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the
Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities
they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first,
the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on
account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a
number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and,
second, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the
misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal
from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.

In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which
has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable
for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can
be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional
council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give.
Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive
department an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there
the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are
answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his
own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard
the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally
responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British
Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to
apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great
Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of
the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the
national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it
would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and
necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained
in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of
republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a
number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to
be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that
side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite
side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive
power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a
writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and
ingenious," that "the executive power is more easily confined when it
is ONE";(2) that it is far more safe there should be a single object for
the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all
multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to
liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security
sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is unattainable.
Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they
are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and
influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty,
than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power,
therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to
admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common
enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and
more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one
man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more
narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so
great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The
Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number,(3) were more to be
dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No
person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than
that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of
the council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy
combination; and from such a combination America would have more to
fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a
magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally
nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the
instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to
his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident
that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal
end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must
be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would
form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be
incurred for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior
to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent
man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the result of
experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the
best of the distinguishing features of our constitution.

PUBLIUS

1. New York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing
to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor may consult. But
I think, from the terms of the constitution, their resolutions do not
bind him.

2. De Lolme.

3. Ten.

E1. Two versions of these paragraphs appear in different editions.

 Many people think that a vigorous and strong president is incompatible with a republican form of government. Hamilton, however, does not agree. An energetic and forceful president is essential to good government. National defense, sound administration of the law, and the protection of property rights all depend upon the vitality of the Presidency. In addition, an energetic president best protects liberty when faction, anarchy, and the excessive ambitions of others threaten it. Anyone familiar with Roman history knows that it was often the Roman dictator who prevented the fall of the council. Men agree that the president should be strong. What, then constitutes strength and energy? What characteristics do we look for? Can sufficient strength in the Presidency be combined with the principles of republican government? An energetic executive branch must be characterized by unity, sufficient powers, and a certain degree of secrecy. For these reasons, one chief executive is better than two or more. Two people, granted equal power and authority, are bound to differ. Personal ambition can never be totally subdued, and a dual presidency would be marked by dissension, weakened authority, and the growth of conflicting factions. It is unnecessary and unwise to establish an executive branch that would make this form of divisiveness possible and likely. Conflict and argument are dangerous in the executive branch where decisions must be prompt; in the Congress, on the other hand, differences of opinion force discussion and deliberation. This is quite proper in the legislative branch and helps to prevent coercion by majority. The function of the legislature is to pass laws; once a law is passed, effective opposition comes to an end. But the executive branch is charged with the execution of the laws; a law once passed should be executed promptly. Furthermore, in case of war, when so much depends upon a strong presidency, divisiveness could destroy the national security. The same arguments against having two presidents can be made in opposition to an executive council. In either a plural or council form of executive, faults and defects are more easily concealed, and no person can be held responsible. The American president, unlike the English king, must not be immune from censure, accountability, or punishment. The English king is not held responsible for his administration, and his person is sacred. Sometimes a king forms a council to act as a buffer between him and his subjects. But such a council in no way diminished the king's power; he is not even bound by the resolutions the council passes. The council functions as a public relations body while, at the same time, it protects the king in his absolute power. In conclusion, Hamilton claims that there is the matter of expense. Those who recommend a council form of executive admit that the council should be large. That being so, the salaries of the council members would constitute too great an expense for the nation to tolerate. Second, before the Constitution was written, intelligent men agreed that New York's single executive was one of the most admirable features of state government.

