United States v. National City Lines (334 U.S. 573)/Dissent Frankfurter
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, dissenting.

This is an equity suit for violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Law, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The same defendants were indicted in the same court for the same transactions under the criminal provisions of the Sherman Law. That court transferred the criminal proceedings from the Southern District of California to the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois because it was 'in the interest of justice' to order the transfer. In doing so, the court below was obedient to Rule 21(b)  of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. following section 687, formulated by this Court and having the force of law. 327 U.S. 823 et seq  With convincing particularity the District Court set forth its reasons for making this transfer.  After the transfer of the criminal case, the court granted the motion now before us, dismissing the equity suit 'in the interest of justice, just as the same facts in the companion criminal prosecution required its transfer to another district.' D.C., 7 F.R.D. 456, 465.

Is it not incongruous that that which 'the interest of justice' demanded in the criminal prosecution is beyond the power of a court in a civil suit against the same defendants on the same transactions? 

Of course Congress may leave no choice to a court to entertain a suit even though it is vexatious and oppressive for the plaintiff to choose the particular district in which he pursues his claim. But such limitation upon the power of courts to administer justice ought not to be lightly drawn from language merely conferring jurisdiction. The manner in which jurisdictional provisions are appropriately to be read is illustrated by our decision in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. State of Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 60 S.Ct. 39, 84 L.Ed. 3, where this Court recognized 'considerations of convenience, efficiency and justice' even when a State invoked the Court's original jurisdiction in what was concededly a justiciable controversy. 308 U.S. at page 19, 60 S.Ct. at page 43, 84 L.Ed. 3. I do not find in the scheme of the anti-trust acts and of their relevant legislative history the duty to exercise jurisdiction so imperative as to preclude judicial discretion in refusing to entertain a suit where 'the interest of justice' commands it.

Defendants in an anti-trust suit may no doubt attempt to resort to delay tactics by motions claiming unfairness of a particular forum. Neither must we be indifferent to the potentialities of unfairness in giving the Government a wholly free hand in selecting its forum so long as technical requirements of venue are met. See, e.g., The Railway Shopmen's Strike Case (United States v. Railway Employees' Department of American Federation of Labor) D.C., 283 F. 479. All parties to a litigation tend to become partisans, and confidence in the fair administration of justice had better be rested on exacting standards in the quality of the federal judiciary. Federal judges ought to be of a calibre to be able to thwart obstructive tactics by defendants and not be denied all power to check attempted unfairness by a too zealous Government.

I find nothing in the anti-trust acts comparable to the considerations which led this Court to conclude that the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., were designed to give railroad employees a privileged position n  bringing suits under that Act. See, especially, concurring opinion in Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 705, 62 S.Ct. 827, 831, 86 L.Ed. 1129, 146 A.L.R. 1104.

I am of opinion that the District Court had power to entertain the motion on the basis of which it entered the judgment.

Mr. Justice BURTON joins this dissent. 

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