Stark v. Wickard/Opinion of the Court
This class action was instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, to procure an injunction prohibiting the respondent Secretary of Agriculture from carrying out certain provisions of his Order No. 4, effective August 1, 1941, dealing with the marketing of milk in the Greater Boston, Massachusetts, area. See Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., 7 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq., and Order 4, United States Department of Agriculture, Surplus Marketing Administration, Title 7, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 904. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and its judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 136 F.2d 786. The respondent War Food Administrator was joined in this court upon a showing that he had been given powers concurrent with those of the Secretary. See Executive Order No. 9334, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 601 note, filed April 23, 1943, 8 F.R. 5423, 5425. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question to the administration of this Act. 320 U.S. 723, 64 S.Ct. 58.

The petitioners are producers of milk, who assert that by §§ 904.7(b)(5) and 904.9 of his Order, the Secretary is unlawfully diverting funds that belong to them. The courts below dismissed the action on the ground that the Act vests no legal cause of action in milk producers, and since the decision below and the argument here were limited to that point, we shall confine our consideration to it.

The district court for the District of Columbia has a general equity jurisdiction authorizing it to hear the suit;  but in order to recover, the petitioners must go further and show that the act of the Secretary amounts to an interference with some legal right of theirs.  If so, the familiar principle that executive officers may be restrained from threatened wrongs in the ordinary courts in the absence of some exclusive alternative remedy will enable the petitioners to maintain their suit; but if the complaint does not rest upon a claim of which courts take cognizance, then it was properly dismissed. The petitioners place their reliance upon such rights as may be expressly or impliedly created by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 and the Order issued thereunder.

Although this Court has previously reviewed the provisions of that statute at length and upheld its constitutionality,  some further reference to it is necessary to an understanding of the producer's interest in the funds dealt with by the Order. 

The immediate object of the Act is to fix minimum prices for the sale of milk by producers to handlers. It does not forbid sales at prices above the minimum. It contains 

Notes

'Sec. 2. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress-

'(1) Through the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture under this title, to establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in inter-

found to be 'approved or favored' either by two-thirds of the producers in number or by volume of the commodity produced. Section 8c(19) authorizes the Secretary to hold a referendum to determine whether producers approve.

'Sec. 8c(13)(B) No other issued under this title shall be applicable to any producer in his capacity as a producer.'

'Sec. 8c(14) Any handler subject to an order issued under this section, or any officer, director, agent, or employee of such handler, who violates any provision of such order (other than a provision calling for payment of a pro rata share of expenses) shall, on conviction, be fined not less than $50 or more than $500 for each such violation, and each day during which such violation continues shall be deemed a separate violation: Provided, That if the court finds that a petition pursuant to subsection (15) of this section was filed and prosecuted by the defendant in good faith and not for delay, no penalty shall be imposed under this subsection for such violations as occurred between the date upon which the defendant's petition was filed with the Secretary, and the date upon which notice of the Secretary's ruling thereon was given to the defendant in accordance with regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (15).'

'Sec. 8c(15) (A) Any handler subject to an order may file a written petition with the Secretary of Agriculture, stating that any such order or any provision of any such order or any obligation imposed in connection therewith is not in accordance with law and praying for a modification thereof or to be exempted therefrom. He shall thereupon be given an opportunity for a hearing upon such petition, in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture, with the approval of the President. After such hearing, the Secretary shall make a ruling upon the prayer of such petition which shall be final, if in accordance with law.

'(B) The District Courts of the United States (including the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia) in any district in which such handler is an inhabitant, or has his principal place of business, are hereby vested with jurisdiction in equity to review such ruling, provided a bill in equity for that purpose is filed within twenty days from the date of the entry of such ruling. Service of process in such proceedings may be had upon the Secretary by delivering to him a copy of the bill of complaint. If the court determines that such ruling is not in accordance with law, it shall remand such proceedings to the Secretary with directions either (1) to make such ruling as the court shall determine to be in accordance with law, or (2) to

take such further proceedings as, in its opinion, the law requires. The pendency of proceedings instituted pursuant to this subsection (15) shall not impede, hinder, or delay the United States or the Secretary of Agriculture from obtaining relief pursuant to section 8a(6) of this title. Any proceedings brought pursuant to section 8a(6) of this title (except where brought by way of counterclaim in proceedings instituted pursuant to this subsection (15)) shall abate whenever a final decree has been rendered in proceedings between the same parties, and covering the same subject matter, instituted pursuant to this subsection (15).'5 Section 2, n. 4, supra.