Wabash Railroad Company v. Flannigan/Opinion of the Court
The opinion of this court, upholding the correctness of the judgment entered by the circuit court of Missouri in favor of Tourville, referred to in the precedings statement, was announced on December 3, 1900. Wabash R. Co. v. Tourville, 179 U.S. 322, 45 L. ed. 210, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 113. The action now under review was begun seventeen days later. In the action which was under review in 179 U.S. the contention on behalf of the railroad company was that, despite the fact that on March 26, 1895, the supreme court of Missouri, on appeal by Tourville, had entered a judgment directing the St. Louis court of appeals to render judgment in favor of Tourville for the full amount of wages earned by him, the railroad company was yet entitled, after the filing in the St. Louis court of appeals of the mandate of the higher court, to offset against the amount of the judgment directed to be entered in favor of Tourville, the sum of the judgment recovered by Flannigan in the attachment suit which had been instituted in Illinois subsequently to the decision of the supreme court of Missouri in Tourville's action. The claim of jurisdiction in this court to review the judgment of the supreme court of Missouri, just referred to, was based upon the contention that the refusal of the Missouri courts to give to the Illinois judgment in favor of Flannigan the effect claimed for it by the railroad company was a denial of the full faith and credit to which that judgment was entitled by virtue of § 1 of article IV. of the Constitution of the United States. As already stated, the present action was begun after the opinion reported in 179 U.S. 322, 45 L. ed. 210, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 113, affirming the judgment of the supreme court of Missouri, was delivered.

The controversy in the present action relates to the same judgments which were under consideration in this court in the prior action, and the purpose of the railroad company in this, as in the previous case, was to limit the amount which might be collected by the holders of the respective judgments against it to a sum which in the aggregate would not be in excess of the indebtedness to Tourville upon his original claim. In substance, therefore, the present action is but an attempt by indirection to do that which the supreme court of Missouri and this court has held in the prior action could not be done.

The constitutional questions now urged on behalf of plaintiff in error are that the dismissal of its petition for interpleader was a denial of full faith and credit to the garnishment judgment rendered by the Illinois court, and that the denial of the relief prayed for also violated the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The objection, last stated, need not be further noticed, as it was asserted for the first time in the petition for the allowance of a writ of error from this court. We think it unavoidably results also that the claim of the protection of the due faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States here relied on is without merit. Nowhere in its petition for interpleader or in the proceedings had thereunder in the Missouri courts did the railroad company set up rights specifically based upon the Illinois judgment, claim for that judgment an effect which, if denied to it, would have impaired its force and effect, nor did the railroad company predicate any right to the relief demanded upon the effect due to the Illinois judgment. The relief asked by the railroad company in substance tended, on the contrary, to lessen the force and effect both of the Missouri and Illinois judgments. It was sought to change the status of the company from that of a general debtor for the amount due upon each judgment, and to engraft upon the judgments a limitation to a single satisfaction out of a specific fund. In its petition the railroad company expressly alleged its inability to determine whether the Illinois or the Missouri judgment possessed a priority of right to payment out of the so-called fund. Clearly, also, even the owner and holder of the Illinois judgment could not, in reason, contend that the judgment of the Missouri court complained of had the effect of denying full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister state. As the settled rule in this court is that where the Federal question asserted to be contained in a record is manifestly lacking all color of merit, the writ of error must be dismissed (Swafford v. Templetion, 185 U.S. 487, 493, 46 L. ed. 1005, 1008, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 783, and cases cited), it results that the writ of error in this case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Writ of error dismissed. 

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