Ewing v. United States ex rel Fowler Car Company/Opinion of the Court
The case is not in broad compass. It depends upon a few simple elements. Section 4904, Rev. Stat. Comp. Stat. 1913, § 9449, provides: 'Whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application, or with an unexpired patent, he shall give notice thereof to the applicants, or applicant and patentee, as the case may be, and shall direct the primary examiner to proceed to determine the question of priority of invention. And the Commissioner may issue a patent to the party who is adjudged the prior inventor, unless the adverse party appeals from the decision of the primary examiner, or of the board of examiners-in-chief, as the case may be, within such time, not less than twenty days, as the Commissioner shall prescribe.'

The duty prescribed by this section and the other duties of the Commissioner, it was provided (Rev. Stat. § 483, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 745), might be regulated by rules established by the Commissioner, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. And rules were established. They define an interference to be a proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of invention between two or more parties claiming the same patentable invention (rule 93), and provide that an interference shall be declared between two or more original applications containing conflicting claims (rule 94). Before the declaration of an interference all preliminary questions must be settled by the primary examiner, the issue clearly defined, and the claims put in such condition that they will not require alteration (rule 95). Whenever the claims of the co-pending applications differ in phraseology they must be brought to expression substantially in the same language, and claims may be suggested to the applicants, and, if not followed, the invention covered by them shall be considered as disclaimed. The declaration of an interference will not be delayed by the failure of a party to put his claim in condition for allowance (rule 96). Each party to the interference will be required to file a concise statement, under oath, showing (1) the date of original conception of his invention, (2) the date upon which a drawing of it was made, (3) the date of its disclosure to others, (4) the date of its reduction to practice, (5) the extent of its use, and (6) the date and number of any foreign application. If a drawing has not been made or the invention has not been reduced to practice or disclosed to others or used to any extent, the statement must specifically disclose these facts (rule 110).

Priority of invention is necessarily the essential thing, and to determine it, interference proceedings are provided. But are they considered as a matter of course on the mere assertion or appearance of a conflict? Upon the answer to the question the controversy here turns. The Commissioner contends for a negative answer and supports the contention by the language of § 4904 (Comp. Stat. 1913, § 9449), reinforced by the assertion that there is no necessity for proceedings to determine what is already apparent, as in the pending case, by the admission of respondent. The mere fact of asserted antagonism does not put the proceedings in motion, is the contention. There must be the precedent and superintending judgment of the Commissioner. The law requires, it is said, his opinion to be exercised upon the effect of a conflict in applications, and such, indeed, is the language of § 4904 (Comp. Stat. 1913, § 9449). It provides that 'whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application . . . he shall give notice thereof . . . and shall direct the primary examiner to proceed to determine the question of priority of invention.'

In opposition to this view petitioner replies that the only fact upon which the Commissioner is to exercise an opinion is the fact of the conflict in the applications; and, that fact ascertained, the duty is imperative upon the Commissioner to declare an interference. 'Interference, it is said, is a question of fact; it exists or it does not exist. If it exists, then priority must be determined in the way pointed out by the statute and rules.' Other conditions than priority in time determine priority of invention, it is insisted; that the rules of the Patent Office and the motions for which they provide contemplate such conditions; and that in twenty-five years of practice under them 'the question of interference, in fact, the question of seniority of the parties, the patentability of the claim to one or the other, and a number of other questions became inter partes, and it often happens that the interference is dissolved because of mistake in declaring it, or the burden of proof shifted on the ground that the senior party is not entitled to his original filing date as his effective date for the reason that he did not disclose the invention in his case as originally filed, or that his application discloses an inoperative embodiment of the invention, or that he was not entitled to make the claims, or that the junior party had an earlier filed case disclosing the invention, or that the issues as formed did not apply to the structures of the two parties.'

The result of the practice is declared to be that it 'provides a judgment of record based solely upon an ex parte consideration by the Commissioner, and affords each of the parties an opportunity to contest the right of the other party to a judgment.'

If there are such possibilities in some interferences, they are precluded in petitioner's case. Seven claims of a prior application were adduced by the Commissioner as making a conflict with the invention claimed by petitioner. The latter, through its attorney, adopted six of the claims and directed that they be inserted in its application. It did not intimate the existence of any circumstances which would overcome the priority of invention as determined by the difference in times of the conceptions of the contending applicants.

The conceptions were thus established to be identical and that that of Fowler did not come to him until some months after the filing of the other application. And it is to be observed that the priority was complete. There was not only the precedent conception, but there was its expression in claims; and that it was practical, a useful gift to the world, petitioner concedes by adopting the claims. There were, therefore, all of the elements of a completed invention, -one perfected before the filing of petitioner's application, -all that the preliminary statement required by rule 110 could disclose.

This, then, was the situation presented to the Commissioner. There was nothing shown to change it, there is nothing alleged in the petition for mandamus to change it, and there is only urged that an experience of twenty-five years has demonstrated that, in interference proceedings, circumstances may be shown that determine against the date of filing or the claim of invention.

If it could be conceded that there is antagonism between § 4904 (Comp. Stat. 1913, § 9449) and the rules, the former must prevail. United States ex rel. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U.S. 543, 565, 48 L. ed. 555, 563, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 416. But there is no antagonism. The former provides that 'whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application . . . he . . . shall direct the primary examiner to proceed to determine the question of priority of invention.' The section, therefore, commits to the opinion (judgment) of the Commissioner the effect of an application upon a pending one,-whether it will interfere with a pending one; something more, therefore, than the fact of two applications,-something more than the mere assertion of a claim. The assertion must be, in the opinion of the Commissioner, an interference with another. And it is this other that is first in regard, not to be questioned except at the instance of the Commissioner by an exercise of judgment upon the circumstances. And there is no defeat of ultimate rights; there may be postponement of their assertion remitted to a suit in equity under § 4918 (Comp. Stat. 1913, § 9463).

But, anterior to such relief, petitioner contends that 'there is a fundamental and basic right of opposition on the part of any applicant, whether junior or senior, to prevent the wrongful grant of a patent to his opponent.' It is further contended that the declaration of an interference and the motions which are permitted to be made under the rules 'provide a judgment of record based solely upon an ex parte consideration by the Commissioner, and affords each of the parties an opportunity to contest the right of the other party to a judgment.' There indeed seems to be a less personal right claimed,-the right of opposition in the interest of the public, displacing the superintendency of the Commissioner constituted by the law. It is to be remembered that the law gives the Commissioner both initial and final power. It is he who is to cause the examination of an asserted invention or discovery and to judge of its utility and importance;  it is he who is to judge (be of opinion) whether an application will interfere with a pending one;  and it is he who, after an interference is declared and proceedings had, is the final arbiter of its only controversy, priority of invention. 

The contentions of petitioner put these powers out of view, put out of view the fact that the so-called 'judgment of record' is, as the action of the Commissioner may be said to be, but a matter of administration. A suit in equity may follow and be instituted by either party, and even in it nothing can be determined but priority of invention. 'There is but one issue of fact in an interference suit. That issue relates to the dates wherein the interfering matter was respectively invented by the interfering inventors. If the complainant's invention is the older, the defendant's interfering claim is void for want of novelty. And the complainant's interfering claim is void for want of novelty if the defendant's invention is found to antedate the other.' Walker, Patents, 3d ed. § 317.

Such suit, therefore, is the judicial remedy the law provides. Section 4904 (Comp. Stat. 1913, § 9449) concerns and regulates the administration of the Patent Office, and the utility of the discretion conferred upon the Commissioner is demonstrated by his answer in this case.

Judgment reversed and case remanded with instructions to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and direct it to discharge the rule and dismiss the petition. 

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