Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Company/Opinion of the Court
In December, 1915, petitioner was employed by respondent, a Delaware corporation as fireman on board the steamship J. L. Luckenbach, which it then operated and controlled. While at sea, twenty-four hours out from New York, the port of destination, petitioner undertook to perform certain duties on deck during a heavy wind; a wave came aboard, knocked him down and broke his leg. He received due care immediately; when the vessel arrived at destination he was taken to the marine hospital, where he remained for three months; during that time it became necessary to amputate his leg. After discharge from the hospital, claiming that his injuries resulted from the negligence and an improvident order of a superior officer, he instituted a common-law action in Supreme Court, New York county, demanding full indemnity for damage sustained. The cause was removed to the United States District Court because of diverse citizenship. Counsel did not question seaworthiness of ship or her appliances, and announced that no claim was made for maintenance, cure, or wages. At conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the court directed verdict for respondent, and judgment thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 243 Fed. 536, 156 C. C. A. 234. The latter court said:

'The contract of a seaman is maritime, and has written into      it those peculiar features of the maritime law that were      considered in the case of The Osceola [[[189 U.S. 158]], 23 Sup.      Ct.  83, 47 L. Ed. 760]; and although, because of these      peculiarities, such contracts are almost invariably litigated      in admiralty courts, still the contract must be the same in      every court, maritime or common law. The only difference      between a proceeding in one court or the other would be that      the remedy would be regulated by the lex fori. If a seaman,      who had been locked up or put in irons for disobedience of      orders, were to sue the master for damages in a court of      common law, he could not recover like a shore servant, such      as a cook or chauffeur, who had received the same treatment.      So a seaman, bringing suit in a common-law court for personal      injuries, could recover, even if guilty of contributory      negligence, although a shore servant suing in the same court      could not; and a seaman suing in a common-law court for      personal injuries could recover (except in the case of      unseaworthiness of the vessel or failure to give proper care      and medical attention) only wages to the end of the voyage      and the expenses for maintenance and cure for a reasonable      time thereafter, whereas in a similar case a shore servant      would be entitled to recover full indemnity. Therefore, by      virtue of the inherent nature of the seaman's contract, the      defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory      negligence were totally immaterial considerations in this case; the sole question for the jury      to determine being whether the plaintiff was entitled to      recover because he had not received from the defendant his      wages to the end of the voyage and the expense for his      maintenance and cure for a reasonable time thereafter.

'Has Congress changed the situation by section 20 of the      Seamen's Act [chapter 153, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185, Comp. St.      1916, § 8337a], as the plaintiff contends? He argues that the      act makes the master a fellow servant of the seaman, and      therefore that Congress intended to make the relation between      the seaman and all the officers throughout the same as at      common law. But the Supreme Court, in the case of The      Osceola, supra, while reserving the question whether the      master and seaman were fellow servants, held that it made no      difference whatever in respect to the liability of the      shipowners for an improvident order of the master which      resulted in personal injuries to the seaman. * * *

'It follows that whether the master and seaman are fellow      servants or not is quite immaterial in the case of a suit for      injuries resulting from an improvident order of the master.      For this reason the court was right in directing a verdict      for the defendant, and the judgment is affirmed.'

In The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175, 23 Sup. Ct. 483, 487 (47 L. Ed. 760), a libel in rem to recover damages for personal injuries to a seaman while on board and alleged to have resulted from the master's negligence, speaking through Mr. Justice Brown, we held:

'1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a      seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship,      to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages,      at least so long as the voyage is continued.

'2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and      American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of      the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper      appliances appurtenant to the ship. Scarff v. Metcalf, 107 N.      Y. 211 [13 N. E. 796, 1 Am. St. Rep. 807].

'3. That all the members of the crew, except perhaps the      master, are, as between themselves, fellow servants, and      hence seamen cannot recover for injuries sustained through      the negligence of another member of the crew beyond the      expense of their maintenance and cure.

'4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity      for the negligence of the master, or any member of the crew,      but is entitled to maintenance and cure, whether the injuries      were received by negligence or accident.'

After reference to article 1, § 8, and article 3, § 2, of the Constitution, we declared in Souther  Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215, 216, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 528 (61 L. Ed. 1086, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900):

'Considering our former opinions, it must now be accepted as      settled doctrine that, in consequence of these provisions,      Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the      maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country. * *      * And further, that in the absence of some controlling      statute, the general maritime law, as accepted by the federal      courts, constitutes part of our national law, applicable to      matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'

Concerning extent to which the general maritime law may be changed, modified or affected by state legislation, this was said:

'No such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential      purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material      prejudice to the characteristic features of the general      maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and      uniformity of that law in its international and interstate      relations. This limitation, at the least, is essential to the      effective operation of the fundamental purposes for which      such law was incorporated into our national laws by the      Constitution itself. These purposes are forcefully indicated      in the foregoing quotations from The Lottawanna,' 21 Wall.      558, 575 (22 L. Ed. 654).

'One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must      have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and      operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could      not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of      maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several      states, as that would have defeated the uniformity and      consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects      of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the      states with each other or with foreign states.'

The work about which petitioner was engaged is maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the injuries received were likewise maritime and the parties' rights and liabilities were matters clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction. Atlantic Transportation Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 59, 60, 34 Sup. Ct. 733, 58 L. Ed. 1208, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1157. And unless in some way there was imposed upon the owners a liability different from that prescribed by maritime law, petitioner could properly demand only wages, maintenance and cure. Under the doctrine approved in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, no state has power to abolish the well-recognized maritime rule concerning measure of recovery and substitute therefor the full indemnity rule of the common law. Such a substitution would distinctly and definitely change or add to the settled maritime law; and it would be destructive of the 'uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the states with each other or with foreign states.'

Two acts of Congress are relied upon, and it is said that under each petitioner has the right to recover full indemnity according to the common law. They are: (1) Section 9, Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76, 77, whereby District Courts of the United States were given exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 'saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it' (Judicial Code, §§ 24, 256 [Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1092, 1160; Comp. St. 1916, §§ 991(9), 1233]); and (2) section 20 of Act to Promote the Welfare of American Seamen, approved March 4, 1915, c. 153, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185, which provides:

'That in any suit to recover damages for any injury sustained      on board vessel or in its service seamen having command shall      not be held to be fellow servants with those under their      authority.'

The precise effect of the quoted clause of the original Judiciary Act has not been delimited by this court and different view  have been entertained concerning it. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen we definitely ruled that it gave no authority to the several states to enact legislation which would work 'material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.' In The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 431 (18 L. Ed. 397), we said:

'That clause only saves to suitors 'the right of a common-law      remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.' It is      not a remedy in the common-law courts which is saved, but a      common-law remedy. A proceeding in rem, as used in the      admiralty courts, is not a remedy afforded by the common law;      it is a proceeding under the civil law.'

And in Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 644, 648, 20 Sup. Ct. 824, 827 (44 L. Ed. 921):

'Some of the cases already cited recognize the distinction      between a common-law action and a common-law remedy. Thus in      The Moses Taylor, * * * it is said of the saving clause of      the Judiciary Act: 'It is not a remedy in the common-law      courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy." 'If the suit be in personam against an      individual defendant, with an auxiliary attachment against a      particular thing, or against the property of the defendant in      general, it is essentially a proceeding according to the      course of the common law, and within the saving clause of the      statute * * * of a common-law remedy. The suit in this case      being one in equity to enforce a common-law remedy, the state      courts were correct in assuming jurisdiction.'

The distinction between rights and remedies is fundamental. A right is a well founded or acknowledged claim; a remedy is the means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury. Bouvier's Law Dictionary. Plainly, we think, under the saving clause a right sanctioned by the maritime law may be enforced through any appropriate remedy recognized at common law; but we find nothing therein which reveals an intention to give the complaining party an election to determine whether the defendant's liability shall be measured by common-law standards rather than those of the maritime law. Under the circumstances here presented, without regard to the court where he might ask relief, petitioner's rights were those recognized by the law of the sea.

Section 20 of the Seamen's Act declares 'seamen having command shall not be held to be fellow servants with those under their authority,' and full effect must be given this whenever the relationship between such parties becomes important. But the maritime law imposes upon a shipowner liability to a member of the crew injured at sea by reason of another member's negligence without regard to their relationship; it was of no consequence therefore to petitioner whether or not the alleged negligent order came from a fellow servant; the statute is irrelevant. The language of the section discloses no intention to impose upon shipowners the same measure of liability for injuries suffered by the crew while at sea as the common law prescribes for employers in respect of their employes on shore.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice HOLMES concurs in the result.

Mr. Justice PITNEY, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, and Mr. Justice CLARKE, dissent. 

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