Butte City Water Company v. Baker/Opinion of the Court
'We are therefore left entirely to the laws of the United States and the laws of Colorado on the subject. And the laws of the United States do not prescribe any time in which the excavations necessary to enable the locator to prepare and record a certificate shall be made. That is left to the legislation of the state, which, as we have stated, prescribes sixty days for the excavations upon the vein from the date of discovery, and thirty days afterwards for the preparation of the certificate and filing it for record. In the judgment of the legislature of that state this was reasonable time.'

Kendall v. San Juan Silver Min. Co. 144 U.S. 658, 36 L. ed. 583, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 779, turned on the question of compliance by the locator with a regulation prescribed by the statutes of Colorado concerning the record of locations, and the decision was that a failure to comply rendered the attempted location invalid. In Shoshone Min. Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 44 L. ed. 864, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 726, it was held that a suit brought in support of an adverse claim was not one of which a Federal court necessarily had jurisdiction, because, as said (p. 508, L. ed. p. 865, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 727):

'In a given case the right of possession may not involve any question under the Constitution or laws of the United States, but simply a determination of local rules and customs, or state statutes, or even only a mere matter of fact.'

Other cases containing similar recognition might also be cited.

The validity of such state legislation has been affirmed by the supreme courts of several states. See, in addition to the present case, Wolfley v. Lebanon Min. Co. 4 Colo. 112; O'Donnell v. Glenn, 8 Mont. 248, 19 Pac. 302; Metcalf v. Prescott, 10 Mont. 283, 293, 25 Pac. 1037; Purdum v. Laddin, 23 Mont. 387, 59 Pac. 153; Sisson v. Sommers, 24 Nev. 379, 77 Am. St. Rep. 815, 55 Pac. 829; Copper Globe Min. Co. v. Allman, 23 Utah, 410, 64 Pac. 1019; Northmore v. Simmons, 38 C. C. A. 211, 97 Fed. 386.

In 1 Lindley on Mines, 2d ed. § 249, the author says:

'State statutes in reference to mining rights upon the public domain must, therefore, be construed in subordination to the laws of Congress, as they are more in the nature of regulations under these laws than independent legislation.

'State and territorial legislation, therefore, must be entirely consistent with the Federal laws, otherwise it is of no effect. The right to supplement Federal legislation, conceded to the state, may not be arbitrarily exercised; nor has the state the privilege of imposing conditions so onerous as to be repugnant to the liberal spirit of the congressional laws. On the other hand, the state may not, by its legislation, dispense with the performance of the conditions imposed by the national law, nor relieve the locator from the obligation of performing, in good faith, those acts which are declared by it to be essential to the maintenance and perpetuation of the estate acquired by location. Within these limits the state may legislate.'

What is the ground upon which the validity of these supplementary regulations prescribed by a state is challenged? It is insisted that the disposal of the public lands is an act of legislative power, and that it is not within the competency of a legislature to delegate to another body the exercise of its power; that Congress alone has the right to dispose of the public lands, and cannot transfer its authority to any state legislature or other body. The authority of Congress over the public lands is granted by § 3, article 4, of the Constitution, which provides that 'the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.' In other words, Congress is the body to which is given the power to determine the conditions upon which the public lands shall be disposed of. The nation is an owner, and has made Congress the principal agent to dispose of its property. Is it inconceivable that Congress, having regard to the interests of this owner, shall, after prescribing the main and substantial conditions of disposal, believe that those interests will be subserved if minor and subordinate regulations are intrusted to the inhabitants of the mining district or state in which the particular lands are situated? While the disposition of these lands is provided for by congressional legislation, such legislation savors somewhat of mere rules prescribed by an owner of property for its disposal. It is not of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term, and, as an owner may delegate to his principal agent the right to employ subordinates, giving to them a limited discretion, so it would seem that Congress might rightfully intrust to the local legislature the determination of minor matters respecting the disposal of these lands.

Further, § 2324 distinctly grants to the miners of each mining district the power to make regulations, and the validity of this grant has been expressly affirmed by this court. In Jackson v. Roby, 109 U.S. 440, 441, 27 L. ed. 990, 991, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, we said:

'The act of Congress of 1866 gave the sanction of law to these rules of miners, so far as they were not in conflict with the laws of the United States. 14 Stat. at L. 251, chap. 262, § 1. Subsequent legislation specified with greater particularity the modes of location and appropriation and extent of each mining claim, recognizing, however, the essential features of the rules framed by miners, and, among others, that which required work on the claim for its development as a condition of its continued ownership.' See also Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U.S. 527, 28 L. ed. 1113, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 560, in which (p. 535, L. ed. p. 1116, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 564,) is this declaration:

'And although since 1866 Congress has, to some extent, legislated on the subject, prescribing the limits of location and appropriation and the extent of mining ground which one may thus acquire, miners are still permitted, in their respective districts, to make rules and regulations not in conflict with the laws of the United States or of the state or territory in which the districts are situated, governing the location, manner of recording, and amount of work necessary to hold possession of a claim.'

Now, if Congress has power to delegate to a body of miners the making of additional regulations respecting location, it cannot be doubted that it has equal power to delegate similar authority to a state legislature.

Finally, it must be observed that this legislation was enacted by Congress more than thirty years ago. It has been acted upon as valid through all the mining regions of the country. Property rights have been built up on the faith of it. To now strike it down would unsettle countless titles and work manifold injury to the great mining interests of the Far West. While, of course, consequences may not determine a decision, yet, in a doubtful case, the court may well pause before thereby it unsettles interests so many and so vast,-interests which have been built up on the faith, not merely of congressional action, but also of judicial decisions of many state courts sustaining it, and of a frequent recognition of its validity by this court. Whatever doubts might exist if this matter was wholly res integra, we have no hesitation in holding that the question must be considered as settled by prior adjudications, and cannot now be reopened.

The Montana statute (Montana Codes Annotated, § 3612), among other supplementary regulations, provided that the declaratory statement filed in the office of the clerk of the county in which the lode or claim is situated must contain 'the dimensions and location of the discovery shaft, or its equivalent, sunk upon lode or placer claims,' and 'the location and description of each corner, with the markings thereon.' A failure to comply with these regulations was the ground upon which the supreme court of Montana held the location invalid. It is contended that these provisions are too stringent, and conflict with the liberal purpose manifested by Congress in its legislation respecting mining claims. We do not think that they are open to this objection. They certainly do not conflict with the letter of any congressional statute; on the contrary, are rather suggested by § 2324. It may well be that the state legislature, in its desire to guard against false testimony in respect to a location, deemed it important that full particulars in respect to the discovery shaft and the corner posts should be, at the very beginning, placed of record. Even if there were no danger of false testimony, it was not unreasonable to guard against the resurrection of incomplete locations when, by subsequent explorations, mining claims of great value have been uncovered.

We see no error in the rulings of the Supreme Court of Montana, and its judgment is affirmed. 

Notes