Sandberg v. McDonald/Opinion of the Court
This case brings before us for consideration certain features of the so-called 'Seaman's Act.' Act March 4, 1915, c. 153, 38 Stat. 1165. The act is entitled:

'An act to promote the welfare of American seamen in the      merchant marine of the United States; to abolish arrest and imprisonment as a      penalty for desertion and to secure the abrogation of treaty      provisions in relation thereto; and to promote safety at      sea.'

It contains numerous provisions intended to secure better treatment of seamen, and to secure for them better conditions of service.

The libel charges a demand in Mobile, Alabama, for one-half part of the wages then earned by the seamen, and the refusal of the master to pay the amount which the libelants claimed to be due. The master paid each of them what he conceived to be due, deducting certain advances made to the men at Liverpool, England, where the seamen were signed.

The Talus is a British ship and the libelants and petitioners citizens or subjects of nations other than the United States and at the time of employment by the ship and before boarding her they received certain advances at Liverpool by the ship or its agents, a practice usual and customary and not forbidden by the laws of Great Britain. The advance did not, as to any libelant, exceed the amount of a month's wages.

The libelants boarded the ship at Dublin, Ireland, December 1, 1916, and remained in her service until they left her at Mobile, Alabama.

The ship arrived in American waters on February 11, 1917, off Port Morgan, from whence she proceeded immediately to Mobile, where she remained until after February 24th, and unloaded and loaded cargoes. During the voyage and at Mobile prior to February 22d, libelants received certain payments from the ship in cash and in articles purchased from it.

On February 22d libelants demanded of the master of the ship payment of one-half of the wages earned by them to that date. The master then paid to them a sum which, with the cash paid them and the price of the articles purchased as stated above, together with the advances made in Liverpool, equaled or exceeded the one-half of the wages then earned by each of them from the commencement of his service for the ship. It was less, however, than such one-half wages if the advances at Liverpool had not been included in the credits. The master claimed that those advances should be deducted from the one-half wages, and did deduct them, and the sum or sums paid by the master to the libelants exceeded the amount of wages earned by them for the eleven days the ship had been in American waters. The libelants quit the ship February 24, 1917, and were logged as deserters on the same day.

Under the foregoing statement of facts the question for decision is: Was the master entitled to make deduction from the seamen's pay in the amount of the advancements made at Liverpool? The District Court held that these advancements could not be deducted. 242 Fed. 954. The Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion. 248 Fed. 670, 160 C. C. A. 570. The pertinent section of the act for consideration reads:

'Sec. 10. (a) That it shall be, and is hereby, made unlawful      in any case to pay any seaman wages in advance of the time      when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance      wages, or to make any order, or note, or other evidence of      indebtedness therefor to any other person, or to pay any      person, for the shipment of seamen when payment is deducted      or to be deducted from a seaman's wages. Any person violating      any of the foregoing provisions of this section shall be      deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be      punished by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $100,      and may also be imprisoned for a period of not exceeding six      months, at the discretion of the court. The payment of such      advance wages or allotment shall in no case except as herein      provided absolve the vessel or the master or the owner thereof from the full payment of wages after the same      shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a      libel suit or action for the recovery of such wages. If any      person shall demand or receive, either directly or      indirectly, from any seaman or other person seeking      employment, as seaman, or from any person on his behalf, any      remuneration whatever for providing him with employment, he      shall for every such offense be deemed guilty of a      misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned not more than six months      or fined not more than $500.

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'(e) That this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels      while in the waters of the United States, as to vessels of      the United States, and any master, owner, consignee, or agent      of any foreign vessel who has violated its provisions shall      be liable to the same penalty that the master, owner, or      agent of a vessel of the United States would be for similar      violation.

'The master, owner, consignee, or agent of any vessel of the      United States, or of any foreign vessel seeking clearance      from a port of the United States, shall present his shipping      articles at the office of clearance, and no clearance shall      be granted any such vessel unless the provisions of this      section have been complied with.'

The genesis and history of this legislation is found in U.S.C.ompiled Statutes 1916, volume 7, section 8323, annotated.

The Dingley Act of June 26, 1884 (c. 121, 23 Stat. 55, 56), which is the origin of this section, contains terms much like those found in this act. That statute, as the present one, in the aspect now before us, was intended to prevent the evils arising from advanced payments to seamen, and to protect them against a class of persons who took advantage of their necessities and through whom vessels were obliged to provide themselves with seamen. These persons obtained assignments of the advanced wages of sailors. In many instances this was accomplished with little or no service to the men who were obliged to obtain employment through such agencies. In the Dingley Act it was made unlawful to pay seamen's wages before leaving the port at which he was engaged. In the present act it is made unlawful to pay seamen's wages in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same. The Act of 1884 by its terms applied as well to foreign vessels as to the vessels of the United States, and masters of foreign vessels violating the law were refused clearance from any port of the United States. The present statute is made to apply as well to foreign vessels while in the waters of the United States as to vessels of the United States.

In the present statute, in the section from which we have just quoted, masters, owners, consignees, or owners of foreign vessels are made liable to the same penalties as are the like persons in case of vessels of the United States. Such persons in case the vessels are those of the United States or foreign vessels, seeking clearance in ports of the United States, are required to present their shipping articles at the office of clearance, and no clearance is permitted unless the provisions of the statute are complied with.

The Act of 1884 came before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in the case of The State of Maine, 22 Fed. 734. In a clear and well-reasoned opinion by Judge Addison Brown the law was held not to apply to the shipment of seamen on American vessels in foreign ports. After some amendments in 1898, not important to consider in this connection, the matter came before this court in the case of Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L. Ed. 1002, and it was held to apply to a British vessel shipping seamen at an American port, and, furthermore, that the act, as thus applied to a foreign vessel in United States waters, was constitutional.

While the Seaman's Act of 1915 contains many provisions for the amelioration of conditions as to employment and care of seamen, in the aspect now involved we have called attention to the state of legislation and judicial decision when that act was passed. Did Congress intend to make invalid the contracts of foreign seamen so far as advance payments of wages is concerned, when the contract and payment was made in a foreign country where the law sanctioned such contract and payment? Conceding for the present purpose that Congress might have legislated to annul such contracts as a condition upon which foreign vessels might enter the ports of the United States, it is to be noted, that such sweeping and important requirement is not found specifically made in the statute. Had Congress intended to make void such contracts and payments a few words would have stated that intention, not leaving such an important regulation to be gathered from implication. There is nothing to indicate an intention, so far as the language of the statute is concerned, to control such matters otherwise than in the ports of the United States. The statute makes the payment of advance wages unlawful and affixes penalties for its violation, and provides that such advancements shall in no cases except as in the act provided, absolve the master from full payment after the wages are earned, and shall be no defense to a libel or suit for wages. How far was this intended to apply to foreign vessels? We find the answer if we look to the language of the act itself. It reads that this section shall apply to foreign vessels 'while in the waters of the United States.'

Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the law-making power has jurisdiction. American Banana Company v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047. In Patterson v. Bark Eudora, supra, this court declared such legislation as to foreign vessels in United States ports to be constitutional. We think that there is nothing in this section to show that Congress intended to take over the control of such contracts and payments as to foreign vessels except while they were in our ports. Congress could not prevent the making of such contracts in other jurisdictions. If they saw fit to do so, foreign countries would continue to permit such contracts and advance payments no matter what our declared law or policy in regard to them might be as to vessels coming to our ports.

In the same section, which thus applies the law to foreign vessels while in waters of the United States, it is provided that the master, owner, consignee, or agent of any such vessel, who violates the provision of the act, shall be liable to the same penalty as would be persons of like character in respect to a vessel of the United States. This provision seems to us of great importance as evidencing the legislative intent to deal civilly and criminally with matters in our own jurisdiction. Congress certainly did not intend to punish criminally acts done within a foreign jurisdiction, a purpose so wholly futile is not to be attribution to Congress. United States v. Freeman, 239 U.S. 117, 120, 36 Sup. Ct. 32, 60 L. Ed. 172. The criminal provision strengthens the presumption that Congress intended to deal only with acts committed within the jurisdiction of the United States.

It is true the act provides for the abrogation of inconsistent treaty provisions, but this provision has ample application treating the statute to mean what we have here held to be its proper construction. It abolishes the right of arrest for desertion. It gives to the civil courts of the United States jurisdiction over wage controversies arising within our jurisdiction. These considerations amply account for the treaty provision. See Treaties in Force, Ed. 1904, index p. 969.

It is said that the advances in foreign ports are against the policy of the United States and, therefore, not to be sanctioned here. As we have construed this section of the statute, no such policy as to foreign contracts legal where made, is declared.

We have examined the references in the briefs of counsel to the reports and proceedings in Congress during the progress of this legislation so far as the same may have weight in determining the construction of this section of the act. We find nothing in them, so far as entitled to consideration, which requires a different meaning to be given the statute. We may add that the construction now given has the sanction of the Executive Department as shown in Instructions to Consular Officers, promulgated through the medium of the State Department.

We are of opinion that the Circuit Court of Appeals reached the right conclusion as to the meaning and interpretation of this section of the act, and its judgment is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice McKENNA, with whom concur Mr. Justice HOLMES, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, and Mr. Justice CLARKE, dissenting. 

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