Sixto v. Sarria/Opinion of the Court
It is evident from the foregoing statement of facts that the controversy, as it appeared in the United States district court, was resolved into the question whether Adolfo Sixto, who had been duly adjudged the coheir with Maria Belen of Manuel Sixto, deceased, was entitled to recover one half of the amount due on the mortgage debt which the defendant Sarria claimed to have discharged by legal payments. The recovery sought was for one half of the four instalments of purchase money due respectively on the 15th day of May in the years from 1893 until 1896, inclusive. The defendant interposed different defenses to different instalments of the debt. We will proceed to consider them, together with the charge and rulings of the court concerning the same.

Referring to the first and second instalments, we find it to be the contention of the plaintiff in error that Maria Belen, having been adjudged heir ab intestato under a decree which expressly reserved the rights of third parties, no payment could have been lawfully made to her as against the rights of the plaintiff in error, and that if any such payment was made it was subject to the risk that the subsequent-established rights of the plaintiff in error might entitle him to recover from Sarria one half of such payments. Upon this subject the court charged the jury:

"On February 15, 1894, she [Maria Belen] having been declared the heir, the entry was made of that fact in the registry (of property). I say to you, as a matter of law, that that declaration of her heirship was without prejudice to the rights of third parties,-and that meant that if any other person showed himself afterwards to be an heir he was entitled to a proper proportion of the estate; but to far as a collection of debts, and so far as a proper attention to the assets were concerned and the control of them, she became entitled to attend to that."

Upon the same subject the plaintiff in error had requested the court to charge:

"As the ex parte decree declaring Belen Sixto the heir of Manuel Sixto expressly saved the rights of third parties, that was notice to the defendant that any payment made to her was made at his peril as against the other true heirs; and, as defendant was not required by any legal authority to pay the first two payments to Belen Sixto, and as the plaintiff is shown in truth to have been an equal heir with Belen Sixto, the plaintiff is entitled to recover one half of those two payments."

So far as this contention is concerned, we think the court below was right. The sections of the Code of Porto Rico (War Department translation) under which Maria Belen was declared the heir ab intestato of Manuel Sixto are as follows:

"976. After the measures indispensable for the security of the property prescribed in the foregoing section have been taken, and without prejudice to including in the same proceedings the making of the inventory, the designation of heirs ab intestato shall be proceeded with in a separate record.

"977. This designation may also be made at the instance of the interested parties, without the necessity of previously taking the steps mentioned, in cases in which they are not necessary and in which the institution of intestate proceedings is not requested.

"978. Heirs ab intestato, who are descendants of the deceased, may obtain a declaration of their rights by proving, which the proper documents or with the evidence obtainable, the death of the person whose estate is in question, their relationship to the same, and with the evidence of witnesses that said person died intestate, and that they, or the persons whom they designate, are his only heirs.

"The services of a solicitor or attorney are not necessary in order to present this claim.

"979. The deputy public prosecutor shall be cited to appear at said proceeding, to whom the record shall afterward be referred for the period of six days for his report thereon.

"Should he find the proof insufficient, a hearing shall be granted to the interested parties in order that they may cure the defect.

"When the deputy public prosecutor requests it, or the judge considers it necessary, the documents presented shall be compared with the originals.

"980. When the foregoing steps have been taken, the judge shall, without further proceedings, make a ruling designating the heirs ab intestato should he deem it proper, or he may refuse to make such declaration, reserving the rights of the claimants to institute an ordinary action. This ruling may be appealed from both for review and a stay of proceedings. . . .

"1000. After the declaration of heirs ab intestato has been made by a final judgment or ruling, the proceedings shall be continued according to the procedure prescribed for testamentary proceedings.

"1001. The judge shall order that there be delivered to the heirs instituted all the property, books, and papers of the intestate, and that the administrator render an account of his administration to them, the judicial intervention ceasing."

It is argued that this appointment of the heir ab intestato is subject to the limitation that the rights of the heir are not fixed until five years have elapsed from the date of the designation by the court proceedings, and in support of this contention certain articles of the Mortgage Law of Porto Rico are cited:

"2. In the registries mentioned in the preceding article shall be recorded:

"1. Instruments transferring or declaring ownership of realty, or of property rights thereto.

"2. Instruments by which rights of use, use and occupancy, emphyteusis, mortgage, annuity, servitudes, and any others by which estates are created, acknowledged, modified, or extinguished. . . .

"23. The instruments mentioned in articles 2 and 5, which are not duly recorded or entered in the registry, cannot prejudice third persons.

"The record of real property and property rights acquired through an inheritance or legacy shall not prejudice third persons until five years have elapsed since the date thereof, excepting in cases of testate or intestate inheritances, legacies, and additions thereto, when left to legal heirs.

"381. Property acquired through inheritance or legacy cannot be cleared until five years have elapsed from the date of their record in the registry."

But we think this limitation of five years was intended to permit such heirs at law or parties beneficially interested in the estate to assert their rights as against the heir and the property in his hands, and to prevent its transfer except subject to the right of such persons to assert their claims within the permitted limitation. We are here dealing with the right to collect the assets, and the Code provides-§§ 1000, 1001-that after the designation of the heir or heirs ab intestato by a final judgment or ruling of the court the proceedings shall be continued according to the procedure prescribed for testamentary proceedings, and the judge may order that all the property, books, and papers of the intestate be turned over to the heirs, and that the administrator render his account of his administration of the estate, and thereupon judicial intervention shall cease. It seems to us manifest that the effect of these proceedings is to permit the heir ab intestato, after such final decision, to receive and collect the estate. If may be that others will establish an interest in the property for which the heir will have to respond, and it is specially provided that, for the purpose of transfer, property shall not be deemed clear until after five years have elapsed. But this does not require that the collection of debts shall be delayed for a like period, or that they shall be paid to the legally declared heir or heirs, upon pain of being required to respond to others who may, within the limitation permitted, establish a right to the property. Such construction would seem to be unreasonable, and we are cited to no authority that goes to that extent. It is opposed to the practice of the civil law, upon which the Code of Porto Rico is based, in which system the heir by intestacy corresponded with the commonlaw administrator, except that the Roman heir was entitled to administer both the real and personal estate. Story, Confl. L. § 508.

In the present case the first instalment was due on May 15, 1893, and was paid into the court of first instance according to its order, and a receipt given therefor under the seal of the court, on June 22, 1893. This was done before any proceedings were instituted by the plaintiff in error. The payment was made under the order of the court, and we see no reason why the defendant in error should not be discharged thereby.

As to the second instalment, other considerations apply. Sarria testified that while this instalment fell due on May 15, 1894, he paid the same on April 1, 1894, to Maria Belen, which payment, he says, was solemnized by a notarial act duly acknowledged. As to this payment, the court in its charge took the view that the contentious suit of Adolfo Sixto was not commenced until April 4, 1894, of which fact Sarria was not notified until June 5, 1894, and therefore Maria Belen had the right to collect this payment. The suit of April 4, 1894, was the one begun by Adolfo Sixto after the decision against him in the court of first instance, holding that he could only contest the right of Maria Belen by a contentious proceeding, from which the plaintiff in error took an appeal, but abandoned the same, and on April 4, 1894, amended the suit to a contentious proceeding, making Maria Belen a party defendant, and seeking for an order to the registrar to make a cautionary order touching the property in controversy, and also an order to the defendant in error requiring him to retain at the disposition of the court whatever sums he owed to the estate of Manuel Sixto, deceased. On the day of the beginning of this contentious suit, Sarria paid to Maria Belen, anticipating the maturity of the instalment by more than a month, the amount which would have fallen due on the 15th day of May following.

We think that, in view of the testimony produced, the validity of this payment should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions. The plaintiff testified that he was known to the defendant, and that the latter was well aware that he was a son of Manuel Sixto, deceased. The proceeding to declare his rights had been begun. It is evident from a letter written to him on November 11, 1892, by Maria Belen, that she recognized the plaintiff in error as her brother, for in this letter she announces the death of "our beloved father," subscribed herself as "sister," and requests Sixto to come over to Vieques at once, as his presence was necessary in order to collect money coming from the estate. Under these circumstances, the question of whether Sarria had notice of the plaintiff in error's rights and demands, and whether this was a valid payment, or was made in anticipation of the possible claims of Adolfo Sixto, with intent to deprive him of his rights, should have been left to the jury, instead of the instruction given, which practically required a finding for the defendant in error.

As to the third and fourth instalments, the defendant claims to have paid these to one Roig. It appears that these alleged payments to Roig were evidenced by certain notarial instruments, which became of record in the office of the registrar of deeds, and, as is recited in that record, Roig appears to have been the declared purchaser of the third and fourth instalments by assignment from Maria Belen, and the court of first instance, on April 25, 1896, at the instance of Sarria, permitted him to withdraw the third instalment, and declared Roig entitled to collect the third and fourth instalments. Upon this subject the court charged the jury:

"In this contentious suit by Adolfo Sixto against Belen, this defendant, Sarria, was ordered on June 2, 1894, to pay into court whatever money he might be owing. That order was served on Sarria on June 5, 1894, and afterwards that court decided that Sixto, the plaintiff in this suit, was not entitled to attach this money. He obtained an appeal from that judgment, but not from that portion of it that canceled the annotation made in the registry of deeds of the attachment of that fund. Subsequently, on November 17, 1894, an appeal was allowed in the upper court from that portion of it, but no notice was given as to Sarria, who was merely a garnishee in the suit, and who had received no notice not to pay over the money until the lower court decided whether he had the right to pay it over. Between the time the court decided the attachment and the time the appeal was allowed in the upper court, Belen Sixto assigned to Roig the third and fourth instalments. I say to you, as a matter of law, that there was nothing to hinder her from doing that at that time; she had, in law, the right to do it."

The counsel for the plaintiff requested the court, upon the same subject, to charge:

"As it is shown by the uncontradicted evidence that the judge of the court of first instance of Humacao was entirely without authority or jurisdiction to issue his order on August 30, 1894, directing the registrar to make annotation on his books of said order, said order to the registrar was void, and the annotation made by the registrar was void, and the former annotation remained in force, which was notice to all the world, including this defendant, that the plaintiff had an interest in those payments such as might be declared by the court; and, the court having afterwards decided that the plaintiff here is entitled to a one-half interest in said estate, the plaintiff is now entitled to recover one half of the last two payments, with interest."

It appears that Adolfo Sixto was not a party to the suit between Roig and Sarria, in which it is declared that Roig was held entitled to recover the third instalment, and if Sarria had notice of the pendency of the suit to establish the rights of Adolfo Sixto, in such wise as to be bound by the result thereof, he could not prevent Sixto's recovering an interest in the property by wrongfully paying it over in the proceedings to which the plaintiff in error was not a party. The court below seems to have given its charge upon this subject upon the theory that the order of August 30, 1894, was not appealed from in such wise as to prevent Sarria from paying the third and fourth instalments to the assignee, Roig, and it is said that he was merely a garnishee in the suit, and had then received no notice not to pay over the money until the lower court had decided whether he had the right to pay it over. The payment of the third and fourth instalments was made to Roig by permitting Sarria, in the court of first instance, to withdraw the instalment which he had paid into court under the order of June 2, 1894. These instalments were paid to Roig on May 16, 1896, but in the attitude of the suit then pending to establish the rights of Adolfo Sixto, and Sarria's knowledge thereof, could the latter legally make these payments so as to conclude the rights of the plaintiff in error? It is true that the lower court on August 30, 1894, had held in favor of Maria Belen, vacating the notice sent to Sarria and the cautionary notices to the registrar and the plaintiff in error had prayed an appeal "in both effects,"-i. e., for a review of the order and a stay of proceedings,-but was refused an appeal in the latter aspect, from which refusal he also appealed, and this was the attitude of the case at the time of the alleged purchase by Roig on September 11, 1894. On November 17, 1894, the audiencia considered the application of Sixto for the enlargement of the appeal, and held that such allowance was wrongfully denied in the lower court, and ordered that the appeal be "considered as having been taken for both effects." On the 8th of January, 1895, Sarria was notified of this order, and appeared and asked that a clear and detailed statement be given him "as to what he has to comply with." Thereupon a new explanatory order was directed to Sarria, informing him that the previous requisition meant the ratification of the one previously directed to him by the court, "in order that the sums which he owed from that time to Mr. Manuel Sixto should not be delivered by him except to the court in order to deposit the same in the royal treasury." This order was duly served on Sarria on February 5, 1895.

On November 29, 1895, the audiencia heard the appeal, and, reversing the order of August 30, declared the order of June 2, 1894, in full force, whereby the cautionary entry was ordered to be made by the registrar of property, and the notification ordered to Sarria to hold the payments on the mortgage, or pay the same into the treasury, to abide the order of the court.

The registrar refused to comply, assigning as a reason that the encumbrance had been assigned to third parties, and that the mortgage law did not justify such an order. Subsequent proceedings resulted in the final decree of the military court deciding the merits of the controversy in favor of Sixto. The decision of November 29, 1895, was also notified to Sarria, and on May 4, 1896, the entry of the court discloses:

"On May 4, 1896, appeared Mr. Laureano Sarria y Gonzalez and stated: That, having received notice that the instalment of the mortgage had been transferred to Mr. Antonio Roig, who has recorded said transfer in the registry of property, and supposing that he will proceed to collect the same judicially, as he did the previous instalment, he is unable to accept the notification, and he will appear before the audiencia in the premises."

Over the objection of the plaintiff in error, Sarria was permitted to testify that he paid the instalment to Roig by order of the audiencia. But the plaintiff in error was not a party to such proceeding, if it had been legally proved, and of course could not be concluded by it. On being notified that the order of June 2, 1894, was in full force, requiring him to hold the funds, while Sarria says he is unable to accept the notification, he declares "he will appear before the audiencia in the premises." Instead of so doing, unless the appearance in the Roig case can be so considered, he made application in the court of first instance for a release of the deposited instalment in order to pay it to Roig, and that court made the order, although it had been notified of the decision of the audiencia of November 29, 1895. This order could have no effect on the rights of the plaintiff in error, nor can it protect Sarria, who acted in the face of knowledge of the decision of the higher court, instead of appearing in that court at the suit of Sixto, and having the rights of Roig and the contesting heirs determined. We conclude that the plaintiff in error had the right to recover his share of the third and fourth instalments, notwithstanding the alleged transfers and payments to Roig, and the alleged decree of the audiencia in a proceeding to which Sixto was not a party.

For error in the court's charge as to the second, third, and fourth instalments, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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