Jackson v. The Archimedes/Opinion of the Court
This case presents the question whether section 10 of the Dingley Act of 1884,  as amended by the Seamen's Act of 1915  and the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,  applies to the payment of advance wages to seamen on a foreign vessel in a foreign port.

The petitioners are British seamen, who shipped at Manchester, England, in May, 1922, on the Archimedes, a British vessel, for a round trip voyage to New York and return. When they signed the shipping articles they received advances on account of wages, which were customary and sanctioned by the British law. On June 1, the vessel arrived in New York. On June 3, they applied for and received from the master further payments on account of wages which, with the advances made in England, exceeded one-half of the wages then earned and unpaid. On June 8, while still in port, they made a formal demand upon the master for one-half of the wages then earned and unpaid disregarding the advances made in England. This having been refused, they left the vessel and filed this libel in the District Court, claiming that under R. S. § 4530,  they were entitled to the full wages earned at the time of the demand, without deducting the advances made in England, since these advances were invalidated by section 10 of the Dingley Act, as amended, and should be disregarded in computing the amount of wages due. On the hearing the court dismissed the libel on the ground that the Act does not prohibit advances to seamen on foreign vessels in foreign ports, and such advances cannot be treated as invalid and disregarded when wages are demanded in this country. 10 F.(2d) 234. This was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the opinion of the District Judge. 11 F.(2d) 1000.

To understand rightly the effect of the amendment made by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920-the controlling question in this case-it is necessary to consider first the amendment previously made by the Seamen's Act of 1915 and the decisions by this Court in reference thereto.

By section 11 of the Seamen's Act (Comp. St. § 8323), section 10 of the Dingley Act was amended so as to read as follows:

'Sec. 10(a). That it shall be * * * unlawful in any case to      pay any seaman wages in advance of the time when he has      actually earned the same. * * * Any person violating any of      the foregoing provisions of this section shall be deemed      guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be      punished by a fine * * * and may also be imprisoned. * * *      The payment of such advance wages * * * shall in no case      except as herein provided absolve the vessel or the master *      * * from the full payment of wages after the same shall have      been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel suit      or action for the recovery of such wages. * * *

'(e) That this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels      while in waters of the United States, as to vessels of the      United States, and any master * * * of any foreign vessel who      has violated its provisions shall be liable to the same      penalty that the master, * * * of a vessel of the United      States would be for similar violation. The master * * * of      any vessel of the United States, or of any foreign vessel      seeking clearance from a port of the United States, shall      present his shipping articles at the office of clearance, and      no clearance shall be granted any such vessel unless the      provisions of this section have been complied with.'

It was held by this Court in Sandberg v. McDonald (1918) 248 U.S. 185, 195, 39 S.C.t. 84, 86 (63 L. Ed. 200), that section 11 of the Seamen's Act did not render invalid the contracts of foreign seamen as to the advance payment of wages made by a foreign vessel in a foreign country in which the law sanctioned such contract and payment; and that when they made demand in this country for the payment of half wages, the master was entitled to deduct the advances made in the foreign country. In so holding, the Court said:

'Conceding for the present purpose that Congress might have      legislated to annual such contracts as a condition upon which      foreign vessels might enter the ports of the United States,      it is to be noted, that such sweeping and important      requirement is not found specifically made in the statute.      Had Congress intended to make void such contracts and      payments a few words would have stated that intention, not      leaving such an important regulation to be gathered from      implication. There is nothing to indicate an intention, so      far as the language of the statute is concerned, to control      such matters otherwise than in the ports of the United      States. The statute makes the payment of advance wages      unlawful and affixes penalties for its violation, and      provides that such advancements shall in no cases, except as      in the act provided, absolve the master from full payment      after the wages are earned, and shall be no defense to a      libel or suit for wages. How far was this intended to apply      to foreign vessels? We find the answer if we look to the      language of the act itself. It reads that this section shall      apply to foreign vessels 'while in waters of the United      States.' Legislation is presumptively territorial and      confined to limits over which the law-making power has      jurisdiction. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.      S. 347, 357 (29 S.C.t. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Cas.      1047). * * * We think that there is nothing in this section      to show that Congress intended to take over the control of      such contracts and payments as to foreign vessels except      while they were in our ports. Congress could not prevent the      making of such contracts in other jurisdictions. If they saw      fit to do so, foreign countries would continue to permit such contracts and advance payments      no matter what our declared law or policy in regard to them      might be as to vessels coming to our ports. In the same      section, which thus applies the law to foreign vessels while      in waters of the United States, it is provided that the      master * * * of any such vessel, who violates the provisions      of the act, shall be liable to the same penalty as would be      persons of like character in respect to a vessel of the      United States. This provision seems to us of great importance      as evidencing the legislative intent to deal civilly and      criminally with matters in our own jurisdiction. Congress      certainly did not intend to punish criminally acts done      within a foreign jurisdiction; a purpose so wholly futile is      not to be attributed to Congress. United States v. Freeman,      239 U.S. 117, 120 (36 S.C.t. 32, 60 L. Ed. 172). The      criminal provision strengthens the presumption that Congress      intended to deal only with acts committed within the      jurisdiction of the United States.'

On the same day, in Neilson v. Rhine Shipping Co., 248 U.S. 205, 39 S.C.t. 89, 63 L. Ed. 208, it was likewise held, upon the same general considerations, that the Seamen's Act of 1915 did not make invalid advances that had been made to seamen by the master of an American vessel in a foreign port.

And later, in Strathearn S. S.C.o. v. Dillon (1920) 252 U.S. 348, 355, 40 S.C.t. 350, 352 (64 L. Ed. 607), in distinguishing section 4 of the Seamen's Act (Comp. St. § 8322)-which in express terms declared that contracts denying seamen the right to demand half of their earned wages at ports reached in the course of a voyage, should be void, and gave seamen on foreign vessels while in American harbors the right to enforce its provisions ion the courts of the United States -from section 11 of the Act dealing with advance wages, this Court said:

'In the case of Sandberg v.

McDonald * * * we found no purpose manifested by Congress in      section 11 to interfere with wages advanced in foreign ports      under contracts legal where made. That section dealt with      advancements, and contained no provision such as we find in      section 4. Under Section 4 all contracts are avoided which      run counter to the purposes of the statute. Whether      consideration for contractual rights under engagements      legally made in foreign countries would suggest a different      course is not our province to inquire. It is sufficient to      say that Congress has otherwise declared by the positive      terms of this enactment. * * *'

The libelants concede that under section 11 of the Seamen's Act, as interpreted by this Court in the Sandberg Case, it would have been necessary to deduct the advances that had been made in England in computing the wages due them when the demand was made in this country, but insist that the law was thereafter changed in this respect by the amendment made by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.

By section 32 of the Merchant Marine Act, section 10 of the Dingley Act was further amended so as to make the third sentence of paragraph (a) dealing generally with advance payments, read as follows:

'The payment of such advance wages * * * whether made within      or without the United States or territory subject to the      jurisdiction thereof, shall in no case except as herein      provided absolve the vessel or the master * * * from the full      payment of wages after the same shall have been actually      earned, and shall be no defense to a libel suit or action for      the recovery of such wages.'

This amendment made no change in any other part of paragraph (a), or in paragraph (e) referring to foreign vessels, which remained in full force.

The libelants contend that in making this amendment Congress intended to meet the effect of the decisions in both the Sandberg and Neilson Cases, and to extend the prohibition of advance wages to foreign vessels in foreign ports, as well as to American vessels in foreign ports.

We cannot sustain this contention. That this amendment expressed no intention to extend the provisions of the statute to advance payments made by foreign vessels while in foreign ports, is plain. This Court had pointed out in the Sandberg Case that such a sweeping provision was not specifically made in the statute, and that had Congress so intended, 'a few words would have stated that intention, not leaving such an important regulation to be gathered from implication.' The amendment, nevertheless, not only contained no such specific statement, but made no reference whatever to foreign vessels; left unchanged and in full force all of paragraph (e) which alone referred to foreign vessels, including the specific provision which, as held in the Sandberg Case, indicated that the prohibition of advance wages was intended to apply to foreign vessels only while in waters of the United States; made no change in the criminal provisions which strengthened the presumption that Congress intended to deal only with acts committed within the jurisdiction of the Unites States; and merely inserted the phrase 'whether made within or without the United States or territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof' in paragraph (a) which made no reference to foreign vessels. This phrase, read in the light of the context, is given full effect when applied to American vessels; and thus construed is entirely consistent with the provision in paragraph (e) relating to foreign vessels while in American waters. In short, the language of the amendment indicates no intention to extend the prohibition of the statute to advance wages paid by foreign vessels while in foreign ports. Nor can such an intention be 'gathered from implication,' or from anything in the legislative history of the amendment, in which no reference was made to foreign vessels.

The decree is affirmed. 

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