Charles Warner Company v. Independent Pier Company/Opinion of the Court
These two numbers on our docket present one cause in admiralty. It arose out of a collision between the single screw steamer Gulftrade-429 feet long, 59 foot beam-and two loaded scows which, with two others, were being towed by the tug Taurus upon hawsers astern. The flotilla was about 400 feet long. Both the tug and scows were owned or chartered by petitioner, Charles Warner Company. The Gulftrade was accompanied by the tugs Triton and Churchman, made fast to her port bow and port quarter. They were owned respectively by Independent Pier Company and Alfred E. Churchman. The Triton's master was upon the steamer and commanded the three associated vessels.

The accident occurred in the Schuylkill river near its confluence with the Delaware at 3:00 p. m., October 1, 1923. The weather was fair, tide flood, wind light.

Drawing her tow the Taurus passed slowly up the Delaware with the tide and rounded into the still water of the 200-foot channel of the Schuylkill. The Gulftrade followed under her own power, carrying with her the attending tugs, their engines motionless until the last moment before the collision. Shortly after the flotillas entered the Schuylkill, the Gulftrade for the third time, by a single blast, indicated her desire to pass to starboard-eastward. The Taurus (as she had done twice before while in the Delaware) gave an assenting blast. Attempting to pass in mid-channel, the steamer struck two of the scows and caused material loss.

'The set of the tide swung the tail of the tow to the      eastward and more or less athwart the channel until it had      straightened out. * * * This, however, was a condition which      the steamship was bound to anticipate and doubtless did. What      happened was that the navigator of the ship expecting the tow      would go to the westward and seeing it was so headed assumed      it would be out of his way by the time he reached the passing      point and that a passage up mid-channel would be clear. In      this he miscalculated and hence the collision.'

It declared the steamer guilty of negligence the Taurus without fault, and awarded full damages in favor of petitioner Charles Warner Company primarily against the Independent Pier Company, owner of the Triton, and secondarily against the Gulftrade.

The Circuit Court of Appeals (Independent Pier Co. v. Warner Co., 20 F.(2d) 111) held:

'Under the circumstances, the Taurus was in fault in giving      consent to the Gulftrade to come ahead, relying too much on      her ability to get out of the channel. Evidently the Taurus      miscalculated the situation. So, also, it seems the Gulftrade      was at fault. She was the following vessel. All she had to do      was to hold back, and not run into the scows. She certainly      saw danger ahead when she gave the second signal, and she      certainly saw it more imminent when she gave the third      signal. It was quite clear that she did go ahead, and took an      equal chance with the Taurus on the ability of the latter to      give her free channel-way to pass. The result was a needless      collision.' We cannot conclude that the Taurus was in fault. She was prudently navigated in plain view of the Gulftrade who knew the relevant facts; and by assenting that the latter might pass she certainly did not assume responsibility for the maneuver. At most the Taurus obligated herself to hold her course and speed so far as practicable, to do nothing to thwart the overtaking vessel, and she knew of no circumstances not open to the observation of the Gulftrade which would prevent the latter from going safely by, if prudently navigated. Of course, no ship must ever lead another into a trap. There was ample room for the Gulftrade to pass. But, if not, she should have slowed down and kept at a safe distance. Her fault was the direct and sole cause of the collision.

By the act to adopt regulations for preventing collisions, etc., approved June 7, 1897 (chapter 4, 30 Stat. 96 et seq. (33 USCA § 154 et seq.)), it is provided:

'Art. 18, Rule VIII. When steam vessels are running in the      same direction, and the vessel which is astern shall desire      to pass on the right or starboard hand of the vessel ahead,      she shall give one short blast of the steam whistle, as a      signal of such desire, and if the vessel ahead answers with      one blast, she shall put her helm to port; or if she shall      desire to pass on the left or port side of the vessel ahead,      she shall give two short blasts of the steam whistle as a      signal of such desire, and if the vessel ahead answers with      two blasts, shall put her helm to starboard; or if the vessel      ahead does not think it safe for the vessel astern to attempt      to pass at that point, she shall immediately signify the same      by giving several short and rapid blasts of the steam      whistle, not less than four, and under no circumstances shall      the vessel astern attempt to pass the vessel ahead until such      time as they have reached a point where it can be safely      done, when said vessel ahead shall signify her willingness by      blowing the proper signals. The vessel ahead shall in no case attempt to cross the bow or crowd upon      the course of the passing vessel. * * *

'Art. 23. Every steam vessel which is directed by these rules      to keep out of the way of another vessel shall, on      approaching her, if necessary, slacken her speed or stop or      reverse. * * *

'Art. 24. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules      every vessel, overtaking any other, shall keep out of the way      of the overtaken vessel.' 33 USCA §§ 203, 208, 209.

Under these regulations the duty of the Gulftrade was clear. She should have anticipated the effect of the flood tide in the Delaware upon the flotillas as they rounded into the still water of the Schuylkill and kept herself out of the zone of evident danger.

In Southern Pacific Co. v. Haglund (The Thoroughfare), 277 U.S. 304, 48 S.C.t. 510, 72 L. Ed. 892, we said:

'The Relief was not at fault in accepting the passing signal      of the Thoroughfare. This was merely an assent to the      proposed passage in the rear of the Enterprise, expressing an      understanding of what the Thoroughfare proposed to do and an      agreement not to endanger or thwart it by permitting an      interfering change in the position of the Enterprise. See      Atlas Transp. Co. V. Lee Line Steamers (C. C. A.) 235 F. 492,      495. And the Relief, being in a position to fully carry out      its agreement, was under no obligation to decline the passing      signal because of the approach of the Union on the other side      and to sound instead a warning signal. There was nothing in      the situation to indicate that the approach of the Union      would prevent the Thoroughfare from passing safely, if, as      the Relief had the right to assume, it were navigated with      due care.'

In Atlas Transp. Co. v. Lee Line Steamers, 235 F. 492, 495, the Circuit Court of Appeals (8th C. C. A.) had held:

'The reply of the Josh Cook to the passing signal of the Rees      Lee was no more than an assent to it, at the risk of the vessel proposing it. It expressed an understanding of      what the Rees Lee proposed to do, and an agreement not to      thwart it; but the success of the maneuver was at the risk of      the Rees Lee.'

Whitridge v. Dill, 23 How. 448, 453, 16 L. Ed. 581:

'The vessel astern, as a general rule, is bound to give way,      or to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid a collision.      That rule rests upon the principle that the vessel ahead, on      that state of facts, has the seaway before her, and is      entitled to hold her position; and consequently the vessel      coming up must keep out of the way.'

The steamer Rhode Island, Fed. Cas. No. 11,745:

'The approaching vessel, when she has command of her      movements, takes upon herself the peril of determining      whether a safe passage remains for her beside the one      preceding her, and must bear the consequences of misjudgment      in that respect.'

See also, City of Baltimore (C. C. A.) 282 F. 490, 492; The Pleiades (C. C. A.) 9 F.(2d) 804, 806.

Objections to the decree below were offered by counsel for respondents in their briefs and arguments here. But no application for certiorari was made in their behalf and we confine our consideration to errors assigned by the petitioner. Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 203, 48 S.C.t. 53, 72 L. Ed. 238; Federal Trade Com. v. Pacific Paper Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 66, 47 S.C.t. 255, 71 L. Ed. 534; Webster Co. v. Splitdorf Co., 264 U.S. 463, 464, 44 S.C.t. 342, 68 L. Ed. 792; Alice State Bank v. Houston Pasture Co., 247 U.S. 240, 242, 38 S.C.t. 496, 62 L. Ed. 1096; Hubbard v. Tod, 171 U.S. 474, 494, 19 S.C.t. 14, 43 L. Ed. 246; The Maria Martin, 12 Wall. 31, 40, L. Ed. 251.

The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court is affirmed. The cause will be remanded to the latter court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Reversed. 

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