Madsen v. Kinsella/Opinion of the Court
The principal question here is whether a United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany had jurisdiction, in 1950, to try a civilian citizen of the United States, who was the dependent wife of a member of the United States Armed Forces, on a charge of murdering her husband in violation of § 211 of the German Criminal Code. The homicide occurred in October, 1949, within the United States Area of Control in Germany. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that such court had that jurisdiction.

The present proceeding originates with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner, Yvette J. Madsen, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, seeking her release from the Federal Reformatory for Women in West Virginia where she is serving a sentence imposed by a United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany. She contends that her confinement is invalid because the court which convicted and sentenced her had no jurisdiction to do so. The District Court, after a hearing based on exhibits and agreed facts, discharged the writ and remanded petitioner to the custody of the respondent warden of the reformatory. D.C., 93 F.Supp. 319. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 4 Cir., 188 F.2d 272. Because of the importance and novelty of the jurisdictional issues raised, we granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 865, 72 S.Ct. 115.

I. Petitioner's status in Germany.-Petitioner is a native-born citizen of the United States who lawfully entered the American Zone of Occupied Germany in 1947 with her husband, Lieutenant Madsen of the United States Air Force. In 1949, she resided there, with him, in a house requisitioned for military use, furnished and maintained by military authority. She was permitted to use the facilities of the United States Army maintained there for persons in its service and for those serving with or accompanying the United States Armed Forces. In brief, her status was that of a civilian dependent wife of a member of the United States Armed Forces which were then occupying the United States Area of Control in Germany.

October 20, 1949, following her fatal shooting of her husband at their residence at Buchschleg, Kreis Frankfurt, Germany, she was arrested there by the United States Air Force Military Police. On the following day, before a 'United States Military Government Court,'  she was charged with the murder of her husband in violation of § 211 of the German Criminal Code.  In February, 1950, she was tried by 'The United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany, Fourth Judicial District.'  That court was composed of three United States civilians, two of whom had been appointed as district judges and one as a magistrate by or under the authority of the Military Governor of the United States Area of Control.  The court adjudged her guilty and sentenced her to 15 years in the Federal Reformatory for Women at Alderson, West Virginia, or elsewhere as the Secretary of the Army might direct. In May, the 'Court of Appeals of the United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany,' composed of five United States civilians appointed by the Military Governor of the Area,  affirmed the judgment but committed her to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative. The Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons designated the Federal Reformatory for Women at Alderson, West Virginia, as the place for her confinement. 

II. Both United States courts-martial, and United States Military Commissions or tribunals in the nature of such commissions, had jurisdiction in Germany in 1949-1950 to try persons in the status of petitioner on the charge against her. Petitioner does not here attack the merits of her conviction nor does she claim that any non-military court of the United States or Germany had jurisdiction to try her.  It is agreed by the parties to this proceeding that a regularly convened United States general court-martial would have had jurisdiction to try her. The United States, however, contends, and petitioner denies, that the United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany, which tried her, also had jurisdiction to do so. In other words, the United States contends that its courts-martial's jurisdiction was concurrent with that of its occupation courts, whereas petitioner contends that it was exclusive of that of its occupation courts.

The key to the issue is to be found in the history of United States military commissions  and of United States occupation courts in the nature of such commissions. Since our nation's earliest days, such commissions have been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many urgent governmental responsibilities related to war.  They have been called our commonlaw war courts.  They have taken many forms and borne many names.  Neither their procedure nor their jurisdiction has been prescribed by statute. It has been adapted in each instance to the need that called it forth. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 18-23, 66 S.Ct. 340, 349-351, 90 L.Ed. 499.

In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's power, it appears that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, he may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions, and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions, in territory occupied by Armed Forces of the United States. His authority to do this sometimes survives cessation of hostilities.  The President has the urgent and infinite responsibility not only of combating the enemy but of governing any territory occupied by the United States by force of arms.  The policy of Congress to refrain from legislating in this uncharted area does not imply its lack of power to legislate. That evident restraint contrasts with its traditional readiness to 'make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; * * *.'  Under that clause Congress has enacted and repeatedly revised the Articles of War which have prescribed, with particularity, the jurisdiction and procedure of United States courts-martial.

Originally Congress gave to courts-martial jurisdiction over only members of the Armed Forces and civilians rendering functional service to the Armed Forces in camp or in the field.  Similarly the Articles of War at first dealt with nonmilitary crimes only by surrendering the accused to the civil authorities. Art. 33, American Articles of War of 1806, Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents (22d ed. 1920 reprint) 979. However, in 1863, this latter jurisdiction was enlarged to include many crimes 'committed by persons who are in the military service of the United States * * *.'  Still it did not cover crimes committed by civilians who, like petitioner, were merely accompanying a member of the Armed Forces.

Finally, in 1916, when Congress did revise the Articles of War so as to extend the jurisdiction of courts-martial to include civilian offenders in the status of petitioner, it expressly preserved to 'military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals' all of their existing concurrent jurisdiction by adding a new Article which read in part as follows:

'II. COURTS-MARTIAL.

'C. JURISDICTION.

'Art. 15. Not exclusive.-The provisions of these articles      conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions,      provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent      jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by the      law of war may be lawfully triable by such military      commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.' 39      Stat. 651, 652, 653. 

Article 15 thus forestalled precisely the contention now being made by petitioner. That contention is that certain provisions, added in 1916 by Articles 2 and 12 extending the jurisdiction of courts-martial over civilian offenders and over certain nonmilitary offenses, automatically deprived military commissions and other military tribunals of whatever existing jurisdiction they then had over such offenders and offenses. Articles 2 and 12, together, extended the jurisdiction of courts-martial so as to include 'all persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States * * *.'  The 1916 Act also increased the nonmilitary offenses for which civilian offenders could be tried by courts-martial.  Article 15, however, completely disposes of that contention. It states unequivocally that Congress has not deprived such commissions or tribunals of the existing jurisdiction which they had over such offenders and offenses as of August 29, 1916. 39 Stat. 653, 670. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 340, 90 L.Ed. 499, and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 1, 87 L.Ed. 3.

The legislative history strengthens the Government's position. During the consideration by Congress of the proposed Articles of War, in 1916, Judge Advocate General of the Army Crowder sponsored Article 15 and the authoritative nature of his testimony has been recognized by this Court. In re Yamashita, supra, 327 U.S. at page 19 note, and at pages 65, 67-71, 66 S.Ct. at pages 350, 371-374. Before the Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs he said:

'Article 15 is new. We have included in article 2 as subject      to military law a number of persons who are also subject to      trial by military commission. A military commission is our      commonlaw war court. It has no statutory existence, though it      is recognized by statute law. As long as the articles      embraced them in the designation 'persons subject to military      law,' and provided that they might be tried by court-martial,      I was afraid that, having made a special provision for their      trial by court-martial, it might be held that the provision      operated to exclude trials by military commission and other      war courts; so this new article was introduced. * * *'

'It just saves to these war courts the jurisdiction they now      have and makes it a concurrent jurisdiction with      courts-martial, so that the military commander in the field      in time of war will be at liberty to employ either form of      court that happens to be convenient.' S.Rep.No. 130, 64th      Cong., 1st Sess. 40. 

The concurrent jurisdiction thus preserved is that which 'by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.' (Emphasis supplied.) 39 Stat. 653, 41 Stat. 790, 10 U.S.C. § 1486, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1486. The 'law of war' in that connection includes at least that part of the law of nations which defines the powers and duties of beligerent powers occupying enemy territory pending the establishment of civil government.  The jurisdiction exercised by our military commissions in the examples previously mentioned extended to nonmilitary crimes, such as murder and other crimes of violence, which the United States as the occupying power felt it necessary to suppress. In the case of In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20, 66 S.Ct. 340, 350, following a quotation from Article 15, this Court said, 'By thus recognizing military commissions in order to preserve their traditional jurisdiction over enemy combatants unimpaired by the Articles, Congress gave sanction, as we held in Ex parte Quirin, to any use of the military commission contemplated by the common law of war.'  The enlarged jurisdiction of the courts-martial therefore did not exclude the concurrent jurisdiction of military commissions and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions.

III. The United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany were, at the time of the trial of petitioner's case, tribunals in the nature of military commissions conforming to the Constitution and laws of the United States.-Under the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces occupying a certain area of Germany conquered by the allies, the system of occupation courts now before us developed gradually. The occupation courts in Germany are designed especially to meet the needs of law enforcement in that occupied territory in relation to civilians and to nonmilitary offenses. Those courts have been directed to apply the German Criminal Code largely as it was theretofore in force. (See Appendix, infra, 72 S.Ct. 711 et seq., entitled 'Chronology of Establishment of United States Military Government Courts and Their Jurisdiction Over Civilians in the United States Area of Control in Germany 1945 1950.') The President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, in 1945 established, through the Commanding General of the United States Forces in the European Theater, a United States Military Government for Germany within the United States Area of Control. Military Government Courts, in the nature of military commissions, were then a part of the Military Government. By October 20, 1949, when petitioner was alleged to have committed the offense charged against her, those courts were known as United States Military Government Courts. They were vested with jurisdiction to enforce the German Criminal Code in relation to civilians in petitioner's status in the area where the homicide occurred.

September 21, 1949, the occupation statute had taken effect. Under it the President vested the authority of the United States Military Government in a civilian acting as the United States High Commissioner for Germany. He gave that Commissioner 'authority, under the immediate supervision of the Secretary of State (subject, however, to consultation with and ultimate direction by the President), to exercise all of the governmental functions of the United States in Germany (other than the command of troops) * * *.' Executive Order 10062, June 6, 1949, 22 U.S.C.A. § 901 note, 14 Fed.Reg. 2965, Appendix, 72 S.Ct. 713; Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Staff Announcement No. 1, September 21, 1949, Appendix, 72 S.Ct. 714. Under the Transitional Provisions of Allied High Commission, Law No. 3, Article 5, 14 Fed.Reg. 7458, Appendix, 72 S.Ct. 714, preexisting legislation was applied to the appropriate new authorities. Finally by Allied High Commission, Law No. 1, Article 1, 15 Fed.Reg. 2086, Appendix, 72 S.Ct. 715, effective January 1, 1950, the name of the 'United States Military Government Courts for Germany' was changed to 'United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany.' They derived their authority from the President as occupation courts, or tribunals in the nature of military commissions, in areas still occupied by United States troops. Although the local government was no longer a 'Military Government,' it was a government prescribed by an occupying power and it depended upon the continuing military occupancy of the territory.

The government of the occupied area thus passed merely from the control of the United States Department of Defense to that of the United States Department of State. The military functions continued to be important and were administered under the direction of the Commander of the United States Armed Forces in Germany. He remained under orders to take the necessary measures, on request of the United States High Commissioner, for the maintenance of law and order and to take such other action as might be required to support the policy of the United States in Germany. Executive Order 10062, supra.

The judges who served on the occupation courts were civilians, appointed by the United States Military Governor for Germany, and thereafter continued in office or appointed by the United States High Commissioner for Germany. Their constitutional authority continued to stem from the President. The members of the trial court were designated by the Chief Presiding District Judge as a panel to try the case. The volume of business, the size of the area, the number of civilians affected, the duration of the occupation and the need for establishing confidence in civilian procedure emphasized the propriety of tribunals of a nonmilitary character.  With this purpose, the Military Government Courts for Germany, substantially from their establishment, have had a less military character than that of courts-martial.  In 1948, provision was made for the appointment of civilian judges with substantial legal experience. The rights of individuals were safeguarded by a code of criminal procedure dealing with warrants, summons, preliminary hearings, trials, evidence, witnesses, findings, sentences, contempt, review of cases and appeals.  This subjected German and United States civilians to the same procedures and exhibited confidence in the fairness of those procedures. 

It is suggested that, because the occupation statute took effect September 21, 1949, whereas the crime charged occurred October 20, 1949, the constitutional authority for petitioner's trial by military commission expired before the crime took place. Such is not the case. The authority for such commissions does not necessarily expire upon cessation of hostilities or even, for all purposes, with a treaty of peace. It may continue long enough to permit the occupying power to discharge its responsibilities fully. Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 29 S.Ct. 608, 53 L.Ed. 989; Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 124, 21 S.Ct. 302, 307, 45 L.Ed. 448; Burke v. Miltenberger, 19 Wall. 519, 22 L.Ed. 158; Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How. 176, 15 L.Ed. 891; Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 14 L.Ed. 889. 

IV. Petitioner and the offense charged against her came within the jurisdiction assigned to the court which tried her. Under United States Military Government Ordinance No. 31, August 18, 1948, Article 7, 14 Fed.Reg. 126, Appendix, infra, 72 S.Ct. p. 712, the United States gave its Military Government District Courts 'criminal jurisdiction over all persons in the United States Area of Control except persons, other than civilians, who are subject to military, naval or air force law and are serving with any forces of the United Nations.' It thus excepted from the jurisdiction of those occupation courts military men and women who were subject to military law but expressly gave those courts jurisdiction over civilian men and women who were subject to military law. Article of War 2(d) further defined 'any person subject to military law' as including 'all persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States * * *.'  This included petitioner.

Article 7 of United States Military Government Ordinance No. 31 further provided, however, that 'No person subject to military law of the United States shall be brought to trial for any offense except upon authorization of the Commander-in-Chief, European Command.' 14 Fed.Reg. 126, Appendix, infra, 72 S.Ct. p. 712. That authorization appears in the official correspondence relating to the case of Wilma B. Ybarbo. The correspondence includes a written endorsement from the proper authority, dated December 11, 1948, covering not only the Ybarbo case but also the case 'of any dependent of a member of the United States Armed Forces * * *.' See Appendix, infra, 72 S.Ct. p. 713.

The applicability of the German Criminal Code to petitioner's offense springs from its express adoption by the United States Military Government. The United States Commanding General, in his Proclamation No. 2, September 19, 1945, stated that, except as abrogated, suspended or modified by the Military Government or by the Control Council for Germany, 'the German law in force at the time of the occupation shall be applicable in each area of the United States Zone of Occupation * * *.' 12 Fed.Reg. 6997, Appendix, infra, 72 S.Ct. p. 711.  Section 211 of the German Criminal Code accordingly was applicable to petitioner on October 20, 1949. The United States also expressly required that its civilians be tried by its occupation courts rather than by the German courts. United States Military Government Law No. 2, German courts, Art. VI(i)(c) and (d), 12 Fed.Reg. 2191, 2192, Appendix, infra, 72 S.Ct. p. 712. United States Military Government Ordinance No. 2, Art. II(2)(iii), 12 Fed.Reg. 2190-2191, Appendix, infra, 72 S.Ct. p. 711.

The jurisdiction of the United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany to try petitioner being established, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the discharge of the writ of habeas corpus for petitioner's release from custody is affirmed.

Affirmed.

APPENDIX.

Chronology of Establishment of United States Military Government Courts and Their Jurisdiction Over Civilians in the United States Area of Control in Germany 1945-1950.

(Emphasis supplied throughout except in headings.)

1. June 5, 1945.-Allied Powers assumed 'supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany.' Declaration by Commanding Generals representing the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the French Provisional Government, THE AXIS IN DEFEAT-A Collection of Documents on American Policy Toward Germany and Japan, published by the United States Department of State, p. 63.

2. July 14, 1945.-Commanding General, United States Armed Forces in Europe, established a Military Government under his authority in the United States Zone of Occupation-Military Government-United States Area of Control, Proclamation No. 1, 12 Fed.Reg. 6997.

3. September 19, 1945.-Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater, proclaimed:

'Article II. Except as heretofore abrogated, suspended or      modified by Military Government or by the Control Council for      Germany, the German law in force at the time of the      occupation shall be applicable in each area of the United      States Zone of Occupation, until repealed by, or superseded      by a new law enacted by the Control Council for Germany, or      by Military Government or the states hereby constituted or by      other competent authority.' Military Government-United States      Area of Control, Proclamation No. 2, 12 Fed.Reg. 6997.

4. 1946.-Military Government Courts, as distinguished from courts-martial, were given jurisdiction over all persons in the occupied territory, including civilians subject to military law and over offenses under the laws of the occupied territory.

'* * * Article II; jurisdiction. (1) Military Government      courts shall have jurisdiction over all persons in the      occupied territory except persons other than civilians who      are subject to military, naval or air force law and are      serving under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, or any      other Commander of any forces of the United Nations.

'(2) Military Government Courts shall have jurisdiction over:

'(i) All offences against the laws and usages of war.

'(ii) All offences under any proclamation, law, ordinance,      notice or order issued by or under the authority of the      Military Government or of the Allied Forces.

'(iii) All offences under the laws of the occupied territory      or of any part thereof.' United States Military Government      Ordinance No. 2, Military Government Courts, 12 Fed.Reg. 2190      2191.

5. 1946.-German courts were denied jurisdiction in certain criminal cases, including those involving any national of the United Nations or any dependent accompanying any of the Armed Forces of any of the United Nations.

'* * * Article VI; limintations on jurisdiction. (1) Except      when expressly authorized by Control Council or Military      Government Law, ordinance or regulation, or by order of the      Director of Military Government of the appropriate Land, no      German court shall assert or exercise jurisdiction in the      following cases or classes or (of) cases:

'(i) Criminal cases involving:

'(a) Any of the United Nations, or

'(b) The Armed Forces of any of the United Nations, or

'(c) Any person serving with any such Forces or a dependent      accompanying any of them, or

'(d) Any national of the United Nations, or * * *.' United      States Military Government, Law No. 2, German courts, 12      Fed.Reg. 2191, 2192.

6. August 18, 1948.-United States Military Government Courts for Germany established.

'* * * Ordinance No. 31; United States Military Government      Courts for Germany; creation of the courts-(a) Article 1;      judicial system. A system of courts is hereby established for      the United States Area of Control of Germany * * *.

'(c) Article 3; District Courts. (1) A District Court is      hereby established for each judicial district within the      United States Area of Control.

'(3) Each District Court shall consist of one or more      District Judges and one or more Magistrates who shall sit      singly except as provided in subparagraph (5) of this      paragraph.

'(5) A District Court composed of three District Judges or      two District Judges and a Magistrate may hear and decide any      civil or criminal case, and, in the latter, may impose any      lawful sentence including death. A majority of such Court      shall decide any case before it, provided that no sentence of      death shall be imposed except by the unanimous decision of      the Court.

'(8) Where an accused is charged with an offense under German      law, the Court shall be limited to the sentence or other      penal provision of such law.

'JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

'(g) Article 7, jurisdiction of District Courts in criminal      cases. (1) District Courts shall have criminal jurisdiction over all persons in the United States Area      of Control except persons, other than civilians, who are      subject to military, naval or air force law and are serving      with any forces of the United Nations. No person subject to      military law of the United States shall be brought to trial      for any offense except upon authorization of the      Commander-in-Chief, European Command. No member of an Allied      Mission, visiting governmental official, or person subject to      the military law of any country other than the United States,      shall be brought to trial for any offense except upon      authorization of the Military Governor.

'(2) District Courts shall have jurisdiction to hear and      decide cases involving:

'(i) Offenses under legislation issued by or under the      authority of the Allied Control Council;

'(ii) Offenses under United States Military Government      Legislation;

'(iii) Offenses under German law in force in the Judicial      District of the Court.' 14 Fed.Reg. 124, 125, 126.

7. December 11, 1948.-The Commander-in-Chief of the United States European Command endorsement addressed to the Chief Attorney, United States Military Government Courts for Germany:

'Authorization is hereby given for trial of any dependent of      a member of the United States Armed Forces or of any      dependent of a civilian employee of the Department of the      Army for any non-military offenses before the appropriate      Military Government Court established by Military Government      Ordinance No. 31 unless, in a particular case, this      headquarters has directed trial by Court Martial.' Resp.Ex.      4, R. 71.

8. May 12, 1949.-Occupation statute promulgated by Military Governors and Commanders-in-Chief of the Western Zones of Germany to become effective at a later date. It declared that-

'1. During the period in which it is necessary that the      occupation continue * * * (the occupying powers) desire and      intend that the German people shall enjoy self-government to      the maximum possible degree consistent with such occupation.      The Federal State and the participating Laender (states)      shall have, subject only to the limitations in this      Instrument, full legislative, executive and judicial powers      in accordance with the Basic Law and with their respective      constitutions.

'2. In order to ensure the accomplishment of the basic      purposes of the occupation, powers in the following fields      are specifically reserved * * *.

'(e) Protection, prestige, and security of Allied forces,      dependents, employees and representatives, their immunities      and satisfaction of occupation costs and their other      requirements; * * *.' 14 Fed.Reg. 7457.

9. June 6, 1949.-Executive Order 10062 of the President Establishing the Position of United States High Commissioner for Germany:

'2. The United States High Commissioner for Germany,      hereinafter referred to as the High Commissioner, shall be      the supreme United States authority in Germany. The High      Commissioner shall have the authority, under the immediate      supervision of the Secretary of State (subject, however, to      consultation with and ultimate direction by the President),      to exercise all of the governmental functions of the United      States in Germany (other than the command of troops), including representation of the United States on      the Allied High Commission for Germany when established, and      the exercise of appropriate functions of a Chief of Mission      within the meaning of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

'4. In the event that the High Commissioner shall assume his      duties in accordance with this Executive Order prior to the      date that the Military Government of the United States Zone      of Germany is terminated, he shall during such interval      report to the Secretary of Defense, through the Secretary of      the Army, and shall be the United States Military Governor      with all the powers thereof including those vested in the      United States Military Governor under all international      agreements.' 14 Fed.Reg. 2965.

10. September 21, 1949.-Council of Allied High Commission declared occupation statute to be in force as promulgated May 12, 1949. 14 Fed.Reg. 7456.

11. September 21, 1949.-United States High Commissioner for Germany, in accordance with Executive Order 10062, assumed the authority residing in the United States Military Governor and the Office of Military Government for Germany for the governmental functions of the United States in Germany:

'2. The Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany is      hereby established as the agency through which the authority      vested in the U.S. High Commissioner shall be exercised. Its      organization shall be as shown in the attached charts      (including U.S. High Commission Courts, Court of Appeals,      District Courts), and its functions shall be assigned among      its constituent elements as set forth in separate issuances,      effective this date.' Office of the United States High      Commissioner for Germany, Staff Announcement No. 1, Resp.Ex.      1, R. 67, 68.

12. September 21, 1949.-The United States High Commissioner for Germany announced that the United States Courts for Germany, as established by Staff Announcement No. 1 (and previously established as the 'United States Military Government Courts for Germany,' pursuant to United States Military Government Ordinance No. 31) 'form an independent judicial unit responsible directly to the United States High Commissioner. The integrated system provides for district judges and magistrates at the district court level and for a Chief Judge and associate judges of the Court of Appeals.' Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Staff Announcement No. 5, Resp.Ex. 2, R. 69. Similar announcement was made as to the Office of General Counsel and of the Chief Attorney. Staff Announcement No. 6, Resp.Ex. 3, R. 70.

13. September 21, 1949.-'Allied Forces' defined by Allied High Commission:

'In the absence of any indication to the contrary, in      legislation of the Allied High Commission:

'3. The expression 'Allied Forces' shall include-

'(a) The Occupation Authorities.

'(b) The Occupation Forces and their members.

'(c) Non-German nationals, civilian or military, who are      serving with the Occupation Authorities.

'(d) Members of the families and non-German persons in the      service of the persons referred to in subparagraphs (a)(b)      and (c) of this paragraph.' Allied High Commission, Law No.      2, Art. 1, 14 Fed.Reg. 7457.

14. September 21, 1949.-Transitional Provisions proclaimed by Allied High Commission for Germany adapting existing legislation to the provisions of the occupation statute effective September 21, 1949.

'References in any legislation enacted before the entry into      force of the Occupation Statute to the Control Council, the      Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, the Commanding      General, the Armed Forces, Military Government, the Military      Governor and to other authorities shall, where the context so      requires or admits, be deemed to refer to the appropriate      authorities exercising the particular functions mentioned in      such legislation.' Allied High Commission, Law No. 3, 14      Fed.Reg. 7458.

15. November 25, 1949.-Judicial powers were reserved, from the German courts, as to members of families of members of the Occupation Forces, thus bringing them under the jurisdiction of the occupation courts.

'The Council of the Allied High Commission enacts as follows:

'ARTICLE

'Except when expressly authorized, either generally or in      specific cases, by the High Commissioner of the Zone in which      the Court is located, German Courts shall not exercise      criminal jurisdiction:

'(a)(i) Over the allied Forces; * * *' Allied High      Commission, Law No. 13, 15 Fed.Reg. 1056.

16. December 28, 1949 (Effective January 1, 1950).-Occupation courts were changed.

'The United States High Commissioner for Germany enacts as      follows:

'ARTICLE

'Article 1 of United States Military Government Ordinance No.      31, 'United States Military Government Courts for Germany',      is hereby amended by changing the last sentence of said Article to read as      follows:

"The Courts so created shall be known as the United States      Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany."

'ARTICLE

'Article 4 of United States Military Government Ordinance No.      31, 'United States Military Government Courts for Germany',      is hereby amended by changing the first sentence of Section 2      of said Article to read as follows:

'The Court of Appeals shall consist of a Chief Justice and      eight Associate Justices."

'ARTICLE

'Wherever the term 'United States Military Government Courts      for Germany' or the terms 'Chief Judge' or 'Associate Judge'      or 'Associate Judges' of the Court of Appeals are used in any      legislation and regulations now in force, such terms shal be      deemed to refer to the United States Courts of the Allied      High Commission for Germany and the Chief Justice and an      Associate Justice or Associate Justices of the Court of      Appeals of such Courts, respectively.' Allied High      Commission, Law No. 1, 15 Fed.Reg. 2086.

Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting. 

Notes