Appleby v. City of New York/Opinion of the Court
The plaintiffs in their writ of error charge that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, has interpreted and enforced the acts of 1857 and 1871 in such a way as to impair the obligation of the contract in their deeds.

The questions we have here to determine are, first, was there a contract; second, what was its proper construction and effect; and, third, was its obligation impaired by subsequent legislation as enforced by the state court? These questions we must answer independently of the conclusion of that court. Of course we should give all proper weight to its judgment, but we cannot perform our duty to enforce the guaranty of the federal Constitution as to the inviolability of contracts by state legislative action unless we give the questions independent consideration. It makes no difference what the answer to them involves, whether it turns on issues of general or purely local law, we cannot surrender the duty to exercise our own judgment. In the case before us, the construction and effect of the contract involved in the deeds and covenants depend chiefly upon the extent of the power of the state and city to part with property under navigable waters to private persons, free from subsequent regulatory control of the water over the land and the land itself. That is a state question, and we must determine it from the law of the state as it was when the deeds were executed to be derived from statutes then in force and from the decisions of the state court then and since made; but we must give our own judgment derived from such sources, and not accept the present conclusion of the state court without inquiry.

Ordinarily this court must receive from the court of last resort of a state its statement of state law as final and conclusive, but the rule is different in a case like this. Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436, 443, 17 L. Ed. 173; University v. People, 99 U.S. 309, 321, 25 L. Ed. 387; New Orleans Water Company v. Louisiana Sugar Company, 125 U.S. 18, 38, 8 S.C.t. 741, 31 L. Ed. 607; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 684, 13 S.C.t. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123; Mobile & Ohio Railroad v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 14 S.C.t. 968, 38 L. Ed. 793; Louisiana Railway & Navigation Co. v. Behrman, 235 U.S. 164, 170, 171, 35 S.C.t. 62, 59 L. Ed. 175; Long Sault Co. v. Call, 242 U.S. 272, 277, 37 S.C.t. 79, 61 L. Ed. 294; Columbia Railway v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236, 245, 43 S.C.t. 306, 67 L. Ed. 629.

We must also consider here what effect the action of the United States in its dominant control over tidal waters for the preservation and promotion of navigation has had in affecting or destroying the rights of the plaintiffs claimed to have been impaired by the acts of 1857 and 1871, and to consider whether such action has rendered the state legislative impairment innocuous and deprived plaintiffs of the right to complain of it.

Upon the American Revolution, all the proprietary rights of the crown and Parliament in and all their dominion over lands under tidewater vested in the several states, subject to the powers surrendered to the national government by the Constitution of the United States. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 S.C.t. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331. The rights of the plaintiffs in error under the two deeds here in question with their covernants are to be determined then by the laws of New York as it was at the time of their execution and delivery. They were not deeds of gift; they were deeds for valuable consideration paid in money at the time, and a large amount of taxes on the lots have been collected from the plaintiffs by reason of their ownership. The principle applicable in the construction of grants of lands under navigable waters in the state of New York was announced by the Supreme Court of Errors in 1829 in Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 21 Am. Dec. 89. In that case, which has always been regarded as a leading one, the commissioners of the Land Office in New York granted without valuable consideration to an upland owner land under water on which he erected a whart after filling in the same. Thereafter the Legislature authorized the erection of a mole or pier in the river for the purpose of constructing a basin for the safety and protection of canal boats, and this mole or pier entirely encompassed the wharf on the side of the water so as to leave no communication between it and the river except through a sloop lock at one extremity of the basin. It was held that the loss sustained by the owner was damnum absque injuria, that the grant only conveyed the land described in it by metes and bounds, and, being in derogation of the rights of the public nothing would be implied.

Chancellor Walworth, speaking for the Court of Errors of the state, said:

'By the common law, the king as parens patriae owned the soil      under all the waters of all navigable rivers or arms of the      sea where the tide regularly ebbs and flows, including the      shore or bank to high-water mark. * * * He held these rights,      not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of his subjects      at large, who were entitled to the free use of the sea, and      all tide waters, for the purposes of navigation, fishing,      etc., subject to such regulations and restrictions as the      crown or the Parliament might prescribe. By Magna Charta, and      many subsequent statutes, the powers of the king are limited,      and he cannot now deprive his subjects of these rights by      granting the public navigable waters to individuals. But      there can be no doubt of the right of Parliament in England,      or the Legislature of this state, to make such grants, when      they do not interfere with the vested rights of particular      individuals. The right to navigate the public waters of the      state and to fish therein, and the right to use the public      highways, are all public rights belonging to the people at      large. They are not the private unalienable rights of each      individual. Hence the Legislature as the representatives of      the public may restrict and regulate the exercise of those      rights in such manner as may be deemed most beneficial to the      public at large: Provided they do not interfere with vested      rights which have been granted to individuals.'

In the case of People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Company, 68 N. Y. 71, the Court of Appeals, speaking of the common law, said (at page 77):

'But while the sovereign can make no grant in derogation of      the common right of passage over navigable waters, Parliament      may do so. * * * But a person claiming a special right in a      navigable river or arm of the sea under a grant by      Parliament, as, for example, a right to obstruct it, or to      interfere in any way with the public easement, must show a clear title. It will not be presumed that the      Legislature intended to destroy or abridge the public right      for private benefit, and words of doubtful or equivocal      import will not work this consequence. * * * (At page 78:)      The state, in place of the crown, holds the title, as trustee      of a public trust, but the Legislature may, as the      representative of the people, grant the soil, or confer an      exclusive privilege in tidewaters, or authorize a use      inconsistent with the public right, subject to the paramount      control of Congress, through laws passed, in pursuance of the      power to regulate commerce, given by the federal      Constitution.'

In that case the question involved the effect of a legislative grant of lands under water, so far as appears without valuable consideration, by the land commission of the state in 1818 to one John Gore on the eastern shore of Staten Island, including the premises thereafter acquired by the New York & Staten Island Ferry Company. The grant extended from low-water mark into the bay a distance of 500 feet, to have and to hold to Gore, his heirs and assigns, as a good and indefeasible estate of inheritance forever, under a statute authorizing the grant of such lands as the commissioners should 'deem necessary to promote the commerce of the state.' It was held that, as there was nothing to show that it was intended to restrict the state in the preservation of the navigation of the river in that 500 feet the grant to Gore might be and was restricted by the subsequent statute of 1857 of the state of New York, providing that it should not be lawful to fill in the land granted with earth or other solid material beyond the bulkhead line established under that law, or by piers that should exceed 70 feet in width, with intervening water spaces of at least 100 feet between them. It was therefore decided that the erection of a clubhouse on the land granted was a purpresture.

It is apparent from these decisions that, under the law of New York when these cases were decided, whenever the Legislature deemed it to be in the public interest to grant a deed in fee simple to land under tidal waters and exclude itself from its exercise as sovereign of the jus publicum (that is, the power to preserve and regulate navigation), it might do so, but that the conclusion that it had thus excluded the jus publicum could only be reached upon clear evidence of its intention and of the public interest in promotion of which it acted.

What is thus declared as the law of New York in these two cases, where it was found that the jus publicum had not been conveyed, is shown in a number of cases in the Court of Appeals, in which the state and its agency, the city, did part with the jus publicum to private owners of land under tidal water, and of wharfage rights thereon, upon adequate compensation and in pursuance of a plan of harbor improvement for the public interest.

In the cases of Duryea v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. 592, and Duryee v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 477, a deed of land under tidal water by the city of New York, with the authority of the state, conferred upon the grantees a fee-simple title with all the privileges of an absolute owner, except as restricted by the covenants and reservations contained in it. The covenants related to the filling of the streets running through the lots, which were excepted from the grant. The grantees had partially filled the water lots, and while this was being done the city with a sewer had flowed the land with the contents of the sewer. The sewer had been placed under a revocable license of the owner, but when the license was withdrawn the city insisted on continuing to use the lots for sewer discharge, and this it was held the city could not do.

In the later case, in 1884, the Court of Appeals, speaking of the deed, said at page 497:

'As we have before seen, the deed conferred upon the grantees      therein the title and absolute ownership of the property      conveyed, subject only to be defeated at the option of the      grantor for a breach of the condition subsequent.

The claim now made, that there was some right or interest in      the property which still remained in the city notwithstanding      its deed, is opposed to the principles declared in our former      decision, and the express language of the conveyance.'

In Towle v. Remsen, 70 N. Y. 303, 308, the Court of Appeals, in dealing with the effect of a deed of New York City of land under tidal waters, said:

'The land under water originally belonged to the crown of      Great Britain, and passed by the Revolution to the state of      New York. The portion between high and low water mark, known      as the tideway, was granted to the city by the early charters      (Dongan Charter, §§ 3 and 14; Montgomerie Charter, § 37), and      the corporation have an absolute fee in the same (Nott v.      Thayer, 2 Bosw. 61). It necessarily follows that the city had      a perfect right, when it granted to the devisees of Clarke,      to make the grant of their portion of the land in fee-simple      absolute. As to the land outside of the tideway, the city      took title under chapter 115 of the Laws of 1807, with a      proviso giving the pre-emptive right to the owners of the      adjacent land in all grants made by the corporation of lands      under water granted by said act. * * * The Legislature left      it to the city to dispose of the interests mentioned upon the      proviso referred to; but it enacted no condition that it      should not dispose of that which it owned in fee simple upon      such terms as it deemed proper, and in the absence of any      such enactment such a condition cannot be implied.'

A deed of this class came before the Court of Appeals in Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129. The state commissioners of the land office, under a law of 1807, granted to the city a strip of land under water in the North River, the westerly line of which was in the river 400 feet west of the low-water mark. The city laid out an extension of West street along this strip, parallel with the river; the westerly line of the street being about 200 feet out in the river west of low-water mark. In 1810 the city granted to Astor, the owner of the adjoining uplands, certain lands under water, including a portion of the strip, the westerly bounds of the grant being 'the permanent line of West street, saving and reserving so much of the same as will be necessary to make West street in accordance with the map or plan.' In consideration of the grant the grantee covenanted to pay certain perpetual rents, to make such wharves as should be necessary to make the portion of West street, within the bounds of the grant, of the width specified, and forever thereafter to maintain and keep them in repair. The city covenated that the grantee should at all times thereafter have the wharfage, from the wharf or wharves to be erected on the west end of the premises granted. Astor constructed West street across the land granted, in accordance with his covenant, and maintained the wharf on the westerly line of said street. Without making compensation to the plaintiff, who succeeded to his title, the city erected a bulkhead outshore from such westerly line and filled up the space between it and the old bulkhead and destroyed the use of the wharf. It was contended that the city and state could not part with the power to preserve and regulate navigation in the water between the wharf and the 200 feet beyond owned by the city. The Court of Appeals held that the covenant as to the wharf which the city made to Astor in the deed was a grant of an incorporeal hereditament of wharfage, which the city or state could not impair; that the city acquired by its grant from the state the right to fill up the land granted, to build wharves thereon, and to receive wharfage; that whatever property rights it thus acquired it could convey to individuals; that by its grant to Astor the city conveyed, not only the land, excepting the part covered by West street, but also the right of wharfage; that an easement (i. e., a perpetual right of free access to the wharf across West street over the land of the city) therein passed by necessary implication; that the city had the right to grant such easement; that the Legislature could not by the act in question authorize a destruction or impairment of this easement without compensation to the owner; and that therefore the action for damages was maintainable.

In the course of his opinion for the court, Judge Earl, speaking of the power of the city conferred upon it by the state, said (at page 144):

'Here, taking the language of the charters and grants, the      course of legislation, and all the statutes in pari materia,      the situation of the lands granted and the use to which many      portions of them had, with the knowledge and consent of the      Legislature, been from time to time devoted, it is very clear      that the lands under water around the city were conveyed to      it in fee, to enable it to fill them up as the interest of      the city might require, and to regulate and control the      wharves and wharfage. We think it equally clear that whatever      title and property rights the city thus obtained it could      transfer and convey to individuals. Having the power to      extend the ripa around the city, and thus make dry land, it      could authorize any individual to do it. Whatever wharves and      docks it could build, it could authorize individuals to      build; and whatever wharfage it could take, it could      authorize individuals to take. Its dominion over the lands      under water, certainly for the purposes indicated in the      preamble contained in section 15 above cited, was complete.'

Speaking of the wharfage granted the judge said (at page 152):

'An easement for access to the wharf over the adjacent land      of the city under water passed by necessary implication.      Without the easement the wharf would be of no use, there could be no wharfage, and the grant as to the      wharf and wharfage would be futile. The grant was made for an      adequate valuable consideration. It was not made solely or      primarily for the benefit of the grantee, but primarily for      the benefit of the city, in pursuance of a policy for      improving its harbor and furnishing its treasury. Under such      circumstances there is no rule of construction which can      confine the grant to the metes and bounds mentioned in the      deed. If the city had owned this wharf and granted it, the      right to wharfage and an easement for access to the wharf      over the adjacent land of the city under water would have      passed by necessary implication as incidents and      appurtenances of the thing granted. * * * So it would seem      that a grant of the right to build and forever maintain a      wharf upon the land of the city would upon the same principle      carry with it the right to take the wharfage and have access      to the wharf. In addition to the right to build and maintain      the wharf, however, here there was on the part of the city an      express grant of the wharfage, and it must have been the      intention of the parties that the grantee should have open      water in front of his wharf for the accommodation of vessels      that the wharfage which was granted to him might be earned.'

The necessary effect of the Langdon Case, which has always been a leading authority in the state of New York, is that a grant upon a valuable consideration of the easement of wharfage related to land under water conveyed by the city by authority of the state, for the purpose of promoting commerce and the harbor of the city, taken away from the city and state the power to regulate navigation in any way which would interfere with or obstruct the grant, and that, if the city desired in the interest of navigation to obstruct such easement, it must acquire it by condemnation. If it may do this, it follows necessarily that it may by an absolute deed of land under water, with the right of the grantee to fill it, part with its own power to regulate the navigation of water over this land which would interfere with its ownership and enjoyment by the grantee.

The Langdon Case was approved and followed in the case of Williams v. City of New York, 105 N. U. 419, 11 N. Ed. 829. In that case, the city under New York laws of 1813 and 1857 was held to have received authority from the state to fill in the east side of the Hudson River from an existing bulkhead to Thirteenth avenue with a new bulkhead there. The city made a grant to a private person of the land under water some 80 feet, with a requirement that he fill it in and build the new bulkhead with wharfage on the outer bulkhead. It was held that he took a fee, that he had an easement for the approach of vessels in its front, and that the property thus granted him could not be taken by the city for the public use without compensation. The court said in that case:

'The authority thus given being commensurate with the      municipal limits, involved a grant of so much of the land of      the state under water as those wharves would occupy if the      city's choice of location required such appropriation. This      right was tantamount to an ownership. It embraced the entire      beneficial interest, and was inconsistent with any title      remaining in the state. The wharf when built completely      occupied the land under water, and might be built, if need      be, of stone and earth. All use for the floating of vessels      disappeared, so far as it occupied the water. The new and      substituted use created by the city or its grantees belonged      wholly to them, for the entire benefit, in the form of      shippage, wharfage, and cranage, was given to them. There was      never any restraint put upon this general grant, and the      ownership involved, where the plans carried the wharves on to      the state's land in the stream, except the limitation of      exterior lines beyond which the authority should not go, or that imposed by general plans agreed upon by both parties.      * * *

'So that, when the state granted to the city wharf rights      which might extend into the deep water covering its own land,      it granted two things: Property in the land covered by the      wharf and occupied by it, and an easement for approach of      vessels in its front. That easement the state by its own sole      action could not take away or destroy without awarding      adequate compensation.'

The same principle was announced in Mayor v. Law, 125 N. Y. 380, 26 N. E. 471.

In People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N. Y. 459, 113 N. E. 521, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1099, it was held that where the state, through its land commissioners, unqualifiedly granted to defendants lands in navigable waters between high and low water marks, the exclusive use and right of possession vested in the grantee. Hogan, Cardozo, and Seabury, Judges, dissented. The ruling went to the extent of deciding that fences, barriers, platforms, pavilions, and other structures of a private amusement park constructed by the grantee on lands under navigable water between high and low water mark, although an interference with the public use of and access to such lands, could not be enjoined where the grant of such lands was unqualified.

In that case at pages 479, 480 (113 N. E. 526), the court said:

'During all our history the Legislature and the courts have      recognized that the public interest may require or at least      justify a limited restriction of the boundaries of navigable      waters. The public interest may require the building of docks      and piers to facilitate approach to the channel of such      navigable waters. The beneficial enjoyment of land adjoining      the channel of public waters may require or at least justify      the conveyance of lands below high water on which to erect      buildings. As in England the crown and Parliament can without      limitation convey land under public waters, so in this state      land under water below high-water mark can be conveyed by the      Legislature, or in accordance with constitutional and      legislative direction. Where the state has conveyed lands      without restriction, intending to grant a fee therein for      beneficial enjoyment, the title of the grantee, except as      against the rights of riparian or littoral owners, is      absolute, and unless the grant is attacked for some reason      recognized as a ground for attack by the courts, or the use      thereof is prevented by the federal government, there is no      authority for an injunction against its legitimate use.'

The Duryea and the Langdon Cases rest on the delegation by the state to the city of the state's sovereign right to control navigation or the jus publicum in the land to be disposed of by the city to private owners in pursuit of the promotion of filling land under water to a ripa or exterior line, and of the construction of docks to make a harbor. The rights of such private owners come, not from riparian rights, or gratuitous statutory grants. They come from a deed absolute of the lots conveyed for a money consideration. The Steeplechase Park Case was a close case, as shown by the dissents, and was not nearly so strong a one for the application of the principle above stated as the case at bar, or the Duryea and Langdon Cases.

If we are right in our conclusion as to the effect of these deeds under the law of New York at the time of their execution, then there can be no doubt that the laws of 1857 and 1871 as enforced in this case impair the contract made by the city with the grantees of these deeds.

Cases cited as contrary to the New York City water lot decisions just considered must be examined, to see whether they involve grants of lots under tidewater by deed absolute in fee simple from the city or state, in consideration of money paid and in promotion of harbor plans or other public purposes.

Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Forty-Second, etc., R. Co., 176 N. Y. 408, 68 N. E. 864, is relied on to show a conclusion adverse to the inferences we have drawn as to the New York law. There the Court of Appeals sustained an order denying an injunction to restrain the city from effecting an extension of Forty-Third street into the Hudson river, sought by one who by deed of the city was given the right to wharfage at the end of Forty-Third street. In the same deed land under water on each side of the street was conveyed to the grantee in fee simple. The court held that the street was held in trust by the city for the public use, and that the grant of wharfage at the end of the street did not carry the fee in the street, but only an easement of wharfage at the end of the street, as the city might extend it into the river, and that, by virtue of covenant in the deed, the grantee, if he would enjoy the wharfage, must erect a new wharf or pier at the new end of the extended street. The grant was not of the fee, but only of an ambulatory easement of wharfage on any extension of the street. But the city was nevertheless thereafter required to condemn this grant of the easement. American Ice Co. v. City of New York, 193 N. Y. 673, 87 N. E. 765, and 217 N. Y. 402, 112 N. E. 170.

The case of Sage v. Mayor, 154 N. Y. 61, 79, 47 N. E. 1096, 38 L. R. A. 606, 61 Am. St. Rep. 592, does not conflict in any way with the Langdon and other cases. That only concerned the right of a riparian owner in the tideway which the city owned and deeded to another. It was held that the riparian owner had no more right to complain of the city's disposition of the tideway for the public interest by deed than had the owner of a United States Patent reaching to high-water mark to complain of the state's disposition of the tideway in Oregon in Shively v. Bowlby, supra.

The cases of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74, 80 N. E. 665, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 326, 11 Ann. Cas. 1, and Barnes v. Midiand R. R. Terminal Co., 193 N. Y. 378, 85 N. E. 1093, 127 Am. St. Rep. 962, concern conflicting rights of riparian owners and of persons with limited grants to put out a wharf without any feesimple title, and seem to us to have no bearing upon the question here.

In Lewis Blue Point Co. v. Briggs, 198 N. Y. 287, 91 N. E. 846, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1084, 19 Ann. Cas. 694, grantees under deeds made before 1700 conveying the excusive right of fishing leased for 10 years the right to plant and cultivate oysters in the navigable waters of the Great South Bay, Long Island, the lessees were held subject to an act of Congress authorizing and directing the dredging of a channel 2,000 feet long and 200 feet wide through their oyster beds without claim for compensation. It was held that they had derived no more right in the fishery than the king had in his private ownership, and he could not convey the right to restrict navigation which he held in trust for the public. The colonial grant, therefore, which was not like a grant from the state, did not exclude the sovereign right to provide for navigation. Moreover, it was a federal right which the owners were opposing, and of course they had to yield. Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121, 39 S.C.t. 56, 63 L. Ed. 162; Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 33 S.C.t. 679, 57 L. Ed. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 232.

It is urged, against our view of what these deeds conveyed of the sovereign power of the state and the ownership of the city at the time of their execution, that it is opposed to the judgment of this Court in Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.C.t. 110, 36 L. Ed. 1018, in which the validity of a grant by the Illinois Legislature to the Illinois Central Railroad Company of more than 1,000 acres in the harbor of Chicago in Lake Michigan was under consideration. It was more than three times the area of the outer harbor, and not only included all that harbor, but embraced the adjoining submerged lands which would in all probability be thereafter included in the harbor. It was held that it was not conceivable that a Legislature could divest the state of this absolutely in the interest of a private corporation, that it was a gross perversion of the trust over the property under which it was held, an abdication of sovereign governmental power, and that a grant of such right was invalid. The limitations on the doctrine were stated by Mr. Justice Field, who delivered the opinion, as follows, at page 452 (13 S.C.t. 118):

'The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters      and in commerce over them may be improved in many instances      by the erection of wharves, docks, and piers therein, for      which purpose the state may grant parcels of the submerged      lands; and, so long as their disposition is made for such      purpose, no valid objections can be made to the grants. It is      grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters, that may      afford foundation for wharves, piers, docks and other      structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels which,      being occupied, do not substantially impair the public      interest in the lands and waters remaining, that are chiefly      considered and sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid      exercise of legislative power, consistently with the trust to      the public upon which such lands are held by the state. But      that is a very different doctrine from the one which would      sanction the abdication of the general control of the state      over lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or      bay, or of a sea or lake. Such abdication is not consistent      with the exercise of that trust which requires the government      of the state to preserve such waters for the use of the      public. The trust devolving upon the state for the public,      and which can only be discharged by the management and      control of property in which the public has an interest      cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The      control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never      be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting      the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of      without any substantial impairment of the public interest in      the lands and waters remaining. It is only be observing the      distinction between a grant of such parcles for the      improvement of the public interest, or which when occupied do      not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and      waters remaining, and a grant of the whole property in which the public is interested, that      the language of the adjudged cases can be reconciled.'

That case arose in the Circuit Court of the United States, and the conclusion reached was necessarily a statement of Illinois law, but the general principle and the exception have been recognized the country over and have been approved in several cases in the state of New York.

In Coxe v. State, 144 N. Y. 396, 39 N. E. 400, a company was created to reclaim and drain all or any portion of the wet or overflowed lands and tidewater marshes on or adjacent to Staten Island and Long Island, except such portions of the same as were included within the corporate limits of any city, upon the deposit of $25,000 and the payment to the state of a sum to be fixed by a commission after doing the work. This was a suit to recover a $25,000 deposit because the Attorney General had decided the law to be unconstitutional. The court followed the Illinois Central Railroad Case, and held the law invalid, but said:

'For every purpose which may be useful, convenient, or      necessary to the public, the state has the unquestionable      right to make grants in fee or conditionally for the      beneficial use of the grantee, or to promote commerce      according to their terms. The extensive grant to the city of      New York of the lands under water below the shore line around      Manhattan Island clearly comes within this principle, since      it was a grant to a municipality, constituting a political      division of the state, for the promotion of the commercial      prosperity of the city, and consequently of the people of the      state'-citing Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129.

'The title which the state holds and the power of disposition      is an includent and part of its sovereignty, that cannot be      surrendered, alienated, or delegated, except for some public      purpose, or some reasonable use which can fairly be said to      be for the public benefit.' The same rule and exception are laid down in Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N. Y. 1, 105 N. E. 849, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56, where the Legislature of New York attempted to give complete control of the navigation of the St. Lawrence river in the region of Long Sault Rapids, to a private corporation and abdicate its sovereign function. The court held the grant invalid, but said in stating the exception:

'The power of the Legislature to grant land under navigable      waters to private persons or corporations for beneficial      enjoyment has been exercised too long and has been affirmed      by this court too often to be open to serious question at      this late day'

-citing Lansing v. Smith, supra; People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Company, supra; and Langdon v. Mayor, supra; and added:

* * * The contemplated use, however, must be reasonable and      one which can fairly be said to be for the public benefit or      not injurious to the public.'

There is an interesting discussion of the same exception by Chief Justice Bartlett in People v. Steeplechase Park, supra, at page 482 (113 N. E. 521), in which he cites United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 406, 23 S.C.t. 606, 47 L. Ed. 865, and emphasizes the distinction between the Illinois Central, the Coxe, and Long Sault Cases and grants like those we are considering. It is clear that the ruling in those cases has no application here.

But it is said, and the court below held, that the fee simple granted by the deeds in this case did not exclude the right of the city to regulate and preserve navigation over the waters covering the land conveyed until they were filled, and that this distinguishes the Duryea, Langdon, and other cases, in which the filling had taken place, from the present one.

The suggestion that rights of ownership in lands under water, conveyed by the city by such a deed in fee simple, are restricted, and the city's control of navigation of the water over them remains complete until they are filled, cannot be accepted without qualification in respect to grants which are intended to part both with the jus publicum and jus privatum, as we have found these deeds to do. The suggestion does not find support in the case of First Construction Co. of Brooklyn v. State, 221 N. Y. 295, 116 N. E. 1020, cited to sustain it. In that case, Beard was an upland owner whose land bordered on Gowanus Bay. The Legislature in three acts granted to a private person the right to build wharves and fill in lands in a salt meadow marsh and mud flats partially submerged at high tides. The court (Hiscock, C. J.), in stating the case, said:

'It may be stated generally that none of them (the      legislative acts) did more than grant to Beard and others the      privilege to build wharves, etc., and fill in lands; none of      them purported in terms to grant and convey the title to      lands under water included with him the area now      appropriated, and none of them was passed by a two-thirds      vote.'

It was held that no title could pass, because it was a gratuity, and no grant could be made under the Constitution without a two-thirds vote of the Legislature, which was not here, and that it was only a privilege or franchise, which could not ripen into a title until the land was filled. It does not bear on the case here, except in the necessary inference, from the treatment of the matter in the opinion, that, if title had passed, filling was not necessary to vest full fee simple in the grantee.

Of course we do not intend to say that under such deeds as these, as long as water connected with the river remains over the land conveyed and to be filled, navigation may not go on and boats may not ply over it, and that incident to such use occasional mooring may not take place. But it is a very different thing to say that the city, which has parted with the jus publicum and jus privatum over such water lots, remains in unrestricted control of navigation, with the right to dredge them, or appropriate the water over them as a slip or regular mooring place for its adjoining piers, in the doing of a great business, largely excluding plaintiffs and all others from use of the water over those lots for the constant private use of the city's tenants for its profit. This distinction and conclusion is borne out by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Re Mayor of the City, 193 N. Y. 503, 87 N. E. 759, where the court was dealing with the question of the elements of value of a pier right in the Hudson river, granted by the city to an individual in a deed with covenants quite like those in this case when the pier adjoined an unfilled water lot of the city. The court said:

'The deed of the pier right cannot be construed as conferring      any right of access from or over the lands which the city      might at its pleasure cause to be filled in. It is obvious,      of course, that so long as this territory was not filled in      it served the purposes of access to the pier, but that was      merely a privilege by sufferance and not a legal right.'

The evidence shows that two slips between the city piers at Thirty-Ninth street and Fortieth street, and those between Fortieth street and Forty-First street are usually blocked with coal barges, with railroad floats carrying box cars on them, with cattle boats using a runway for cattle at the side of the piers, and all are being moored in the slips for the use and benefit of the lessees and other tenants of the city for the pecuniary profit of the city. This and the dredging of the soil of the plaintiffs certainly are more than a privilege of sufferance. Whittaker v. Burhans, 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 237; Wall v. Pittsburgh Harbor Co., 152 Pa. 427, 25 A. 647, 34 Am. St. Rep. 667.

The wharfage rights of the city at the piers in Thirty-Ninth, Fortieth, and Forty-First streets as far at Thirteenth avenue under the deeds before us cover only the ends of those piers and not their sides. This is clear, because the grantees of the deeds were vested with the wharfage on Thirteenth avenue along the river extending from Thirty-Ninth street to Forty-First street, except that at the ends of the cross streets. In this state of the case, the rights of the city, having parted with the sovereign regulation of navigation in the water over these lots, are not different from those of the owner of the upland, who builds out his pier to deep water. His right is limited to the front or end of the pier for his private use.

Judge Cullen, in Jenks v. Miller, 14 App. Div. 480, 43 N. Y. S. 932, points out that:

'Though the owner of adjacent upland has the right of access      to the river and also the right to construct a proper pier      therein, he has no easement or interest in the lands under      water in front of the adjacent proprietors. The riparian      right of access, so far as it is a proper right incident to      the ownership of the upland, is strictly a right of access by      the front.'

The same principle is approved in Consumers' Coal & Ice Company v. City of New York, 181 App. Div. 388, 394, 169 N. Y. S. 92, where it said that privately owned land under public waters is subject to the navigation of vessels over it, but cannot be appropriated by others to enlarge the berths at private piers. Compare Keyport Steamboat Co. v. Transportation Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 511, 515; United States v. Bain, 24 Fed. Cas. 940, No. 14,496.

Our conclusions are that Appleby and Latou were vested with the fee-simple title in the lots conveyed, and, with a grant of the wharfage at the ends of the lots on the river, that with respect to the water over those lots and the wharfage the state and the city had parted with the jus publicum and the jus privatum, and that the city can only be revested with that by a condemnation of the rights granted.

What, then, is the effect upon the rights of the parties of the fact that the grantees only filled the part of lots conveyed east of Twelfth avenue? The plaintiffs are not in default in this because there was no covenant on their part to fill. Duryea v. Mayor, supra, at page 596; Id., 96 N. Y. 477, 496; Mayor v. Law, supra, at page 391 (26 N. E. 471). The filling was left to their convenience. They were not in default with reference to filling in the streets and avenues, because their covenant to do so was only on condition that the city should require it, and only when it did so. The reason for their delay in filling the remainder of the lot beyond Twelfth avenue was doubtless due to the passage of the act of 1857 and of the act of 1871, and their reasonable expectation that the city would condemn their rights, and expectation that was confirmed by the condemnation proceeding which was directed to be begun in 1890 by the dock commission, and was begun in 1894, and remained without prosecution, and operated as a dead hand upon this property for 20 years, until 1914, when the city discontinued it. Thereupon this suit was promptly brought.

The rights of the plaintiff with reference to the use of the water over their lots lying between the bulkhead line and Twelfth avenue are not affected by the order of the Secretary of War. The evidence shows that for 100 feet or more inside the line the water over these lots is made part of the slip and city mooring place for the city's pier; that in order to adapt it to such a purpose the soil in the lots is being constantly dredged, the dredging having increased the depth of the water from 3 feet to 16 and 20 feet. This has been done by the city on the assumption that, because it is water connected with the river, the city may improve its navigation. As the city has parted with the jus publicum in respect to these lots, it may not exercise this power, and must be content with sailing over it with boats as it finds it. The dredging of the mud in those lots to a depth of 15 feet is a trespass upon the plaintiffs' rights. They have a right at their convenience to fill both lots from the bulkhead line easterly to Twelfth avenue and beyond. And we know from a record in a related case, argued with this and to be decided this day (271 U.S. 403, 46 S.C.t. 581, 70 L. Ed. 1009), that they have applied for permission to fill the lots and are pressing their right to do so. So, too, the use of the water over these lots inside the bulkhead line for mooring places, berths, or slips by the city and its tenants, as we have shown, violates the rights of the plaintiffs. They are entitled to an injunction against both.

The order of the Secretary of War of 1890 fixing the bulkhead line 150 feet west of Twelfth avenue, and allowing pier extensions far beyond Thirteenth avenue, to 700 feet from the bulkhead line, does not take away the right of the plaintiffs to object to the city's dredging their lots, or to its using the water over their lots for what is in effect an exclusive slip and mooring place. The order did not restore to the city the power as against these plaintiffs to regulate navigation over their lots, and so did not make the act of 1857 and the act of 1871 with respect to the spacing of 100 feet between piers and for mooring places adjoining the piers effective to defeat those deeds. The action of the city in making these deeds and covenants was, of course, subject to the dominant right of the government of the United States to control navigation; but the exercise of that dominant right did not revest in the city a control and proprietary right which it had parted with by solemn deed and covenant to these plaintiffs.

The only just and possible result of the Secretary of War's order is that the enjoyment by the plaintiffs of their rights under the deeds is qualified to the extent of a compliance with it without conferring any affirmative power upon the city to detract from the rights which it had granted. The plaintiffs are prevented from solidly filling between the buikhead line and Thirteenth avenue, but the order expressly authorizes the substitution for such filling of the construction of piers on piling driven into the lots of the plaintiffs. To whom is given the right to build piers over these lots? The government does not attempt to take it away from the owners of the lots. It does not attempt to vest it in the city. It could not do so if it would. The right must reside in those who have the ownership of the land under the water and who until the Secretary had made his order were entitled by their grants to use the solid filling up to the line of Thirteenth avenue, without reference to the bulkhead lines or to the 100 feet spacing between the piers under the acts of 1857 or 1871.

The lots have been bought and paid for, subject only to control by the general government in the interest of navigation. The general government, through its agent, says it does not require open water for navigation, but is sufficiently satisfied by piers on piles extending over the water. The city has by deed granted to the Applebys the wharfage and cranage rights upon these lots. What is there to prevent the Applebys, by the construction of piers on piles over their lots, in conformity to the Secretary of War's order, from enjoying the profit from that wharfage?

It thus is seen that the limitations on the right of the city to use the water over the lots outshore from the bulkhead line are no different from what they are inshore of the bulkhead line. The right of the city in respect to the use of the water over the lots beyond the bulkhead line is, as is said in Re Mayor of the City, supra, already quoted, merely a privilege by sufferance, and not a legal right, and lasts only until these lots may be covered by piers on piles, as allowed by the Secretary of War.

The plaintiffs are therefore entitled also to an injunction to prevent the dredging of their lots by the city from the bulkhead line to Thirteenth avenue, and also to prevent the continued use of the water over their lots in that same extent as a slip or permanent mooring place for the adjoining piers of the city. They are also entitled to a specific injunction against the overhanging platform which was put out by the city for its tenants on the north side of the Thirty-Ninth street pier.

The application of the acts of 1857 and 1871 by the courts of New York would reduce the rights which were intended to be conveyed in these deeds to practically nothing, and would leave the grantees only the privilege of paying taxes for something quite unsubstantial. The qualification of those rights by the order of the Secretary of War still leaves value in the deeds, if the acts of 1857 and 1871 are invalid, as we hold them to be when applied as they have been in this case.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of New York is reversed for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

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