The Presidents of the United States, 1789-1914/James Buchanan
, fifteenth president of the
United States, born near Mercersburg, Pa., April
23, 1791; died in Lancaster, Pa., June 1, 1868.
The days of his youth were those of the nation's
youth; his public career of forty years saw all our
great extensions of boundary on the south and west,
acquired from foreign powers, the admission of
thirteen new states, the development of many
important questions of internal and foreign policy,
and the gradual rise and final culmination of a
great and disastrous insurrection. He was
educated at a school in Mercersburg and at Dickinson
college, Pa., where he was graduated in 1809. He
began to practise law in Lancaster in 1812. His
early political principles were those of the federalists,
who disapproved of the war; yet, as he
himself said, “he thought it was the duty of every
patriot to defend the country, while the war was
raging, against a foreign enemy.” His first public
address was made at the age of twenty-three,
on the occasion of a popular meeting in Lancaster
after the capture of Washington by the British in
1814. He urged the enlistment of volunteers for

the defence of Baltimore, and was among the first
to enroll his name. In October of the same year
he was elected to the house of representatives in
the legislature of Pennsylvania for Lancaster
County.

Peace was proclaimed early in 1815, and on July
4 Mr. Buchanan delivered an oration before the
Washington association of Lancaster. In it he
spoke of the war as “glorious, in the highest
degree, to the American character, but disgraceful in
the extreme to the administration.” The speech
excited much criticism, and in later life he said that
“it contained many sentiments which he regretted,
but that at the same time it could not be denied
that the country was wholly unprepared for war
at the period of its declaration, and the attempt
to carry it on by means of loans, without any resort
to taxation, had well nigh made the government
bankrupt.” He was again elected to the legislature
in October, 1815, and at the close of that
session he retired to the practice of his profession,
in which he gained early distinction, especially in
the impeachment of a judge, whom he successfully
defended. His intention at this time was not to
re-enter public life, but the death of a young lady
to whom he was engaged caused him to seek change
and distraction of thought, and he accepted a
nomination to congress, and was elected in 1820 for a
district composed of the counties of Lancaster,

York, and Dauphin, taking his seat in December,
1821. He was called a federalist, but the party
distinctions of that time were not very clearly
defined, and Mr. Buchanan's political principles, as
a national statesman, were yet to be formed. Mr.
Monroe had become president in 1817, and held
that office during two terms, his administration
being called “the era of good feeling.” The excitement
and animosities of the war of 1812 had
subsided, and when Mr. Buchanan entered congress
there was no sectionalism to disturb the repose of
the country. Questions of internal policy soon
arose, however, and he took an able part in many
important debates. Mr. Monroe's veto of a bill
imposing tolls for the support of the Cumberland
road, for which Mr. Buchanan had voted,
produced a strong effect upon the latter's
constitutional views. It was the first time that his mind
had been brought sharply to the consideration of
the question in what mode “internal improvements”
can be effected by the general government, and
consequently he began to perceive the dividing line
between the federal and the state powers.

Mr. Buchanan remained in the house of
representatives ten years — during Mr. Monroe's second
term, through the administration of John Quincy
Adams, and during the first two years of Jackson's
administration. In December, 1829, he became
chairman of the judiciary committee of the house,

and as such introduced a bill to amend and extend
the judicial system of the United States, by including
in the circuit-court system six new states, and
by increasing the number of judges of the supreme
court to nine. His speech in explanation of this
measure — which was not adopted at the time — was
as important as any that has been made upon the
subject. Another measure, evincing a thorough
knowledge and very accurate views of the nature
of our mixed system of governments, was a
minority report, presented by him as chairman of
this committee, against a proposition to repeal the
25th section of the Judiciary act of 1789, which
gave the supreme court appellate jurisdiction, by
writ of error to the state courts, in cases where the
constitution, treaties, and laws of the United
States are drawn in question. This report caused
the rejection of the bill by a vote of 138 to 51.
During Mr. Adams's term the friends of the
administration began to take the name of national
republicans, while the opposing party assumed the
name of democrats. Mr. Buchanan was one of the
leaders of the opposition in the house of representatives.
He was always a strong supporter and warm
personal friend of Gen. Jackson.

At the close of the 21st congress in March, 1831,
it was Buchanan's wish to retire from public life,
but, at the request of Gen. Jackson (who had
become president in 1829), he accepted the mission

to Russia. He embarked from New York in a
sailing-vessel on April 8, 1832, and arrived at St.
Petersburg about the middle of June. The chief
objects of his mission were the negotiation of a
commercial treaty that should promote an increase
of the commerce between Russia and the United
States by regulating the duties to be levied on the
merchandise of each country by the other so far
as to prevent undue discrimination in favor of the
products of other countries; to provide for the residence
and functions of consuls, etc.; and also the
negotiation of a treaty respecting the maritime
rights of neutral nations on the principle that “free
ships make free goods.” The Russian minister for
foreign affairs at this time was Count Nesselrode.
He favored the treaty of commerce, and, though
there was much opposition to it from some
members of the Russian ministry, it was finally
concluded on December 18, 1832. The negotiation
concerning a treaty on maritime rights was not
successful, because, as Mr. Buchanan wrote, “Russia
is endeavoring to manage England at present, and
this is an unpropitious moment to urge her to adopt
principles of public law which would give offence
to that nation, and which would in any way abridge
her own belligerent rights.” His attractive
manners and evident sincerity of character produced
their effect on the Russians, especially the emperor
and empress; and he wrote home: “I flatter myself

that a favorable change has been effected in his [the
emperor's] feelings toward the United States since
my arrival”; and at his audience of leave the
emperor told him to tell Gen. Jackson to send him
another minister exactly like himself. He wrote
to President Jackson: “Your foreign policy has
had no small influence on public opinion throughout
Europe.” Of Russia and the emperor Mr.
Buchanan wrote: “There is no freedom of the
press, no public opinion, and but little political
conversation, and that very much guarded; in short,
we live in the calm of despotism, though the
Emperor Nicholas [I.] is one of the best of
despots. Coming abroad can teach an American
no other lesson but to love his country, its institutions,
and its laws better, much better than he did
before. I have not yet learned to submit patiently
to the drudgery of etiquette. Foreign ministers
must drive a carriage and four with a postilion.”

He left St. Petersburg on August 8, 1833, spent
a short time in Paris and London, and reached
home in November, The next year was spent in
private occupations in Lancaster, except that he
was one of the commissioners appointed by
Pennsylvania to arrange with commissioners from New
Jersey concerning the use of the waters of Delaware
river. On December 6, 1834, the legislature
of Pennsylvania elected him to the U. S. senate
to succeed Mr. Wilkins, who had been appointed

minister to Russia. This office was acknowledged
by Mr. Buchanan afterward to be “the only public
office he desired to occupy.” He took his seat
December 15. He held very strongly the doctrine
of instruction — that is, the right of a state
legislature to direct the vote of a senator of the state
in congress, and the duty of the senator to obey.
There has never been a period in the history of the
senate when more real power of debate was
displayed, or when public measures were more thoroughly
considered, than at this time. President
Jackson's celebrated proclamation against nullification,
and his removal of the public deposits from
the bank of the United States into certain selected
state banks, had been made during Mr. Buchanan's
residence abroad. Jackson enjoyed great
popularity and influence throughout the country, but
a large majority of the senate were opposed to his
financial measures. This opposing party, the old
“national republicans” of John Quincy Adams's
administration, were now called whigs, and
included Mr. Clay, Mr. Webster, Mr. Clayton, of
Delaware, Mr. Ewing, of Ohio, and Mr. Frelinghuysen
and Mr. Southard, of New Jersey. Among
the Jackson men, or democrats, were Mr.
Buchanan, Mr. Wright, of New York, Mr. Benton,
of Missouri, and Mr. King, of Alabama. Mr.
Calhoun stood apart from both the political parties,
a great and powerful debater who had been
vice-president,
and who was now senator from the
“nullifying” state of South Carolina.

One of the first debates in which Mr. Buchanan
took part in the senate (and one that has not yet
lost its interest) was upon a bill requiring the president,
when making a nomination to fill a vacancy
occasioned by the removal of any officer, to state
the fact of such removal and to render reasons for
it. Mr. Buchanan opposed it. He contended that
the constitution only made the consent of the senate
necessary in the appointment of officers by the
executive, not in their removal, that, if such
consent were required, long and dangerous delays
might occur when the senate was not in session;
and that, if the president must assign reasons for
removals, these reasons must be investigated, much
time would be consumed, and the legislative branch
of the government would thus exercise functions
to which it has no claim. Another great discussion
into which Mr. Buchanan entered related to the
refusal of the legislative chambers of France to
pay a certain sum that had been promised in 1831
by a convention between the United States and
the government of King Louis Philippe for the
liquidation of certain claims of American citizens
against France. The United States waited three
years in vain for the payment of this money; and
finally, in January, 1836, the president
recommended to congress a partial non-intercourse with

France. Mr. Buchanan made a long and earnest
speech, contending against Webster and Clay, in
support of this measure, insisting that “there is a
point in the intercourse between nations at which
diplomacy must end and a nation must either
consent to abandon her rights or assert them by force.”
There was some danger for a time of war with
France, but eventually Great Britain made an offer
of mediation and the difficulty was amicably
adjusted.

In January, 1837, Mr. Buchanan delivered a
speech that may be regarded as his ablest effort
in the senate. It was in support of Col. Benton's
“expunging” resolution, which proposed to cancel
in the journal of the senate Mr. Clay's resolution
of censure against President Jackson for his
removal of the public deposits from the bank of the
United States. In this argument Mr. Buchanan
separated, in a remarkable degree, that which was
personal and partisan in the controversy from the
serious questions involved. He contended that the
censure passed by the senate in 1834 upon the president
was unjust, because he had violated no law;
and that the senate, in recording such a mere
censure, adopted in its legislative capacity, had
rendered itself incompetent to perform its high
judicial function of impeachment. He concluded
with a very ingenious and elaborate criticism of the

word “expunge.” The “expunging” resolution was
adopted by a party vote.

Toward the end of Jackson's administration the
subject of slavery began to be pressed upon the
attention of congress by petitions for its abolition
in the District of Columbia. One memorial on this
subject was presented by Mr. Buchanan himself
from some Quakers in his own state. Mr.
Calhoun and others objected to the reception of these
petitions. Mr. Buchanan, though he disapproved
of slavery, yet contended that congress had no
power under the constitution to interfere with
slavery within those states where it existed, and that
it would be very unwise to abolish it in the District
of Columbia — “a district carved out of two
slave-holding states and surrounded by them on all
sides”; but, nevertheless, he also contended, in a
long and forcible speech, for the people's right of
petition and the duty of congress, save under
exceptional circumstances, to receive their petitions.
In June, 1836, Mr. Buchanan argued, against Mr.
Webster, for a bill, introduced in conformity with
a special recommendation from President Jackson,
prohibiting the circulation through the mails of
incendiary publications on the subject of slavery.
In a very sarcastic speech against a bill to prevent
the interference of certain federal officers with
elections, even in conversation, Mr. Buchanan thus
expressed his political faith: “I support the president

because he is in favor of a strict and limited
construction of the constitution, according to the true
spirit of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions. I
firmly believe that if this government is to remain
powerful and permanent it can only be by never
assuming doubtful powers which must necessarily
bring it into collision with the states. I oppose the
whig party, because, according to their reading of
the constitution, congress possesses, and they think
ought to exercise, powers which would endanger
the rights of the states and the liberties of the
people.”

The most important and far-reaching of President
Jackson's executive measures was his veto
in 1832 of a bill for renewing the charter of the
bank of the United States. Jackson removed the
national deposits into certain state banks, which
produced financial distress throughout the land.
Mr. Buchanan was conspicuous in the senate as a
supporter of Jackson's financial policy throughout
his administration and that of his successor,
Mr. Van Buren, of the same party. Mr. Buchanan
had been re-elected to the senate in January, 1837,
by a very large vote and for a full term, his first
election having been to a vacancy, and he was the
first person that had ever received a second election
from the legislature of Pennsylvania. In 1839 Mr.
Van Buren offered Mr. Buchanan the
attorney-generalship, which Mr. Grundy had resigned. Mr.

Buchanan answered that he “preferred his position
as a senator from Pennsylvania; that nothing could
induce him to waive this preference except a sense
of public duty, and that he felt that he could render
a more efficient support to the principles” of the
administration “on the floor of the senate than he
could in an executive office.” The great
commercial distress of the country produced, in the
elections of 1840, a political revolution, and on
March 4, 1841, the whigs came into power under
President Harrison. His death in April placed
in the executive chair Mr. Tyler, who proved to
be opposed to a national bank, and vetoed two bills:
the first for a national bank, and the second for a
“Fiscal Corporation of the United States.” Mr.
Clay made frequent attacks upon Mr. Tyler's
vetoes, and even proposed a joint resolution for
an amendment of the constitution requiring but a
bare majority, instead of two thirds, of each house
of congress to pass a bill over the president's
objections.

Mr. Buchanan, on February 2, 1842, replied to
Mr. Clay in a speech that may be ranked very
high as an exposition of one of the most important
parts of our political system. He showed that the
president's veto was the people's safeguard,
through the officer who “more nearly represents a
majority of the whole people than any other branch
of the government,” against the encroachments of

the senate. The veto power “owes its existence,”
said he, “to a revolt of the people of Rome against
the tyrannical decrees of the Roman senate. The
president of the United States, elected by his
fellow-citizens to the highest official trust in the
country, is directly responsible to them for the
manner in which he shall discharge his duties; and
he will not array himself, by the exercise of the
veto power, against a majority in both houses of
congress, unless in extreme cases, where, from
strong convictions of public duty, he may be willing
to draw down upon himself their hostility.”
Mr. Buchanan was one of those that opposed the
ratification of the treaty with England negotiated
by Mr. Webster and Lord Ashburton in 1842. In
1843 he was elected to the senate for a third term,
and in 1844 his name was brought forward as the
democratic candidate of Pennsylvania for the
presidential nomination; but before the national
convention met he withdrew in order that the whole
strength of the party might be concentrated upon
one candidate. James K. Polk was elected; he
asked Mr. Buchanan to become his secretary of
state, and the invitation was accepted.

In this responsible position Mr. Buchanan had
two very important questions to deal with, and they
required the exercise of all his political tact and
indefatigable industry. One was the settlement of
the boundary between the territory of Oregon and

the British possessions. The other was the
annexation of Texas, which resulted in the Mexican
war. Texas had been for nine years independent
of Mexico, and now sought admission into our
union. The difficulties that attended this question
were, on the one hand, the danger of increasing the
excitement, already considerable, against slavery
(for Texas would be a slave-holding state); and,
on the other, the danger of interference on the part
of England if Texas should remain independent
and resume her war with Mexico. The adoption
by Texas of the basis of annexation proposed by
the United States was followed by the refusal of
the Mexican government to receive Mr. Slidell,
sent by Mr. Polk as envoy extraordinary, with the
object of avoiding a war and to settle all questions
between the two countries, including the western
boundary of Texas. The result of the Mexican
war was the cession to the United States of
California and New Mexico and the final settlement
of the Texan boundary.

The policy of Mr. Polk's administration toward
the states of Central America and on the subject
of the Monroe doctrine was shaped by Mr.
Buchanan very differently from that adopted by
the succeeding administration of Gen. Taylor,
whose secretary of state was Mr. Clayton, the
American negotiator of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
with Great Britain. Acting under Mr. Buchanan's

advice, President Polk, in his first annual message,
in December, 1845, reasserted the Monroe doctrine
that no European nation should henceforth be
allowed by the United States to plant any colony
on the American continent or to interfere in any
way in American affairs. This declaration was
intended to frustrate the attempts of England to
obtain a footing in the then Mexican province of
California by an extensive system of colonization.
England's aims were defeated for the time. Two
years afterward, when the Mexican war was drawing
to a close, Mr. Buchanan turned the attention
of President Polk to the encroachments of the
British government in Central America, under the
operation of a protectorate over the kingdom of the
Mosquito Indians. Great disturbances followed in
Yucatan, and the Indians began a war of extermination
against the whites. If not actually incited
by the British authorities, the savages were known
to be supplied with British muskets. The whites
were reduced to such extremities that the authorities
of Yucatan offered to transfer the dominion and
sovereignty of the peninsula to the United States,
as a consideration for defending it against the
Indians, at the same time giving notice that if this
offer should be declined they would make the same
proposition to England and Spain. The president
recommended to congress the appeal of Yucatan,
but declined to recommend the adoption of any

measure with a view to acquire the dominion and
sovereignty over the peninsula. In April, 1847,
the United States appointed a chargé d'affaires
to Guatemala, and Mr. Buchanan instructed him
to “promote, by his counsel and advice, should suitable
occasions offer, the reunion of the states that
formed the federation of Central America; to cultivate
the most friendly relations with Guatemala
and the other states of Central America; and to
communicate to the state department all the
information obtainable concerning the British
encroachments upon the Mosquito kingdom.”

The new chargé was prevented from reaching
Guatemala until late in Mr. Polk's administration,
and the plan wisely conceived by Mr. Buchanan
was not carried out. In the meantime the British
government seized upon the port of San Juan de
Nicaragua, the only good harbor along the coast.
Instead of carrying out the policy of President
Polk and Mr. Buchanan, the administration of
President Taylor, without consulting the states of
Central America, entered in 1850 into the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, the ambiguous language of which
soon gave rise to such complications and misunderstandings
between England and the United States
that Mr. Buchanan was obliged to go, subsequently,
as minister to London, to endeavor to
unravel them. Instead of a simple provision
requiring Great Britain absolutely to recede from

the Mosquito protectorate, and to restore to
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica their respective
territories, the treaty declared that neither of the
parties should “make use of any protection which
either affords or may afford, or any alliance which
either has or may have, to or with any state or people,
for the purpose of erecting or maintaining any
fortifications, or of occupying, fortifying, or
colonizing any part of Central America, or of assuming
or exercising any dominion over the same.” It
soon became the British construction of this clause
that it recognized the existence of the Mosquito
protectorate for all purposes other than those
expressly prohibited; and down to the time when Mr.
Buchanan was sent by President Pierce as minister
to England this claim was still maintained.

On the accession of the whig party to power
under Taylor, in March, 1849, Mr. Buchanan
retired for a time from official life. His home, from
the age of eighteen, had been the city of Lancaster,
where he owned a house. In the autumn of 1848
he purchased a small estate of twenty-two acres,
known as Wheatland, about a mile from the town.
The house was a substantial brick mansion, and,
on Mr. Buchanan's retirement from the cabinet,
this became his permanent abode when he was not
occupying an official residence in London or in
Washington. Mr. Buchanan never married. The
death of the lady whom he had intended to marry

was a deep and lasting sorrow. The loss of his
sister, Mrs. Lane, in 1839, and of her husband two
years later, gave him the care of their four children;
and the youngest of these, afterward widely
known as Miss Harriet Lane, became an inmate
of his household. James Buchanan Henry, the son
of another sister, who died about the same time,
was also taken into his family; and these two
cousins were brought up by their uncle with the
most wise and affectionate care. Mr. Buchanan's
letters to his niece, begun when she was a school
girl, and, after Miss Lane had grown up, written
almost daily during her absences from him, give a
charming picture of his private life.

WHEATLAND, NEAR LANCASTER, PA., THE HOME OF JAMES BUCHANAN

During the few years of Mr. Buchanan's
unofficial life, passed chiefly at Wheatland, he does
not appear to have devoted much time to the law.
His correspondence was large; and this, with a
constant and lively interest in public affairs,
rendered him, even in retirement, very busy. He
lent considerable influence to his party as a private
individual; but his exertions were not marked by
purely partisan feeling. He strenuously opposed
the Wilmot proviso, which aimed at excluding
slavery from all newly acquired territory; and
favored Mr. Clay's “Compromise Measures of
1850,” which provided for the admission of
California as a free state, and the abolition of the slave-trade
in the District of Columbia; but, by the

fugitive slave law, secured the return to their
owners of slaves that had escaped into free states.
He wrote many influential public letters, in one of
which he declared that “two things are necessary to
preserve the union from danger: 1. Agitation in
the north on the subject of southern slavery must
be rebuked and put down by a strong and enlightened
public opinion; 2. The fugitive slave law must
be enforced in its spirit.”

In the presidential election of 1852 Mr.
Buchanan was a candidate for the democratic
nomination; but Gen. Franklin Pierce received the
nomination and was elected. The most important
service rendered by Mr. Buchanan to his party in
this election — and with him a service to his party
was alike a service to his country — was a speech
made at Greensburgh, Pa., in October, 1852, in
opposition to the election of Gen. Winfield Scott,
the whig candidate. This speech exhibited in a
very clear light the whole political history of that
period, and asserted a principle which he said ought
to be an article of democratic faith: “Beware of
elevating to the highest civil trust the commander
of your victorious armies,” drawing a distinction
between one “who had been a man of war, and
nothing but a man of war from his youth upward,”
and such as had been “soldiers only in the day and
hour of danger, when the country had demanded
their services, and who had already illustrated high

civil appointments”; and then criticising exhaustively
each of Gen. Scott's avowed political
opinions, and quoting Mr. Thurlow Weed, “one
of Gen. Scott's most able supporters,” as acknowledging
that “there was weakness in all Scott said
or did about the presidency.”

When, in 1853, Franklin Pierce became president,
he appointed Mr. Buchanan minister to
England. Buchanan, though social in his nature, was
a man of simple republican tastes, and the formality
and etiquette of life at a foreign court, never
agreeable, now, at the age of sixty-two, appeared
to him particularly distasteful; besides, he
considered that his duty to his young relatives as well
as to his only surviving brother, a clergyman in
delicate health, required his presence at home. But
with Mr. Buchanan duty to his country always
outweighed every other consideration, and Mr.
Pierce's urgent appeal to him to accept what was
at that time a very important mission at length
prevailed. Mr. Buchanan sailed for England from
New York on August 5, 1853, and landed in Liverpool
on the 17th. There were three important
questions to be settled with England at this time:
the first related to the fisheries; the second was the
desire of England to establish reciprocal free trade
in certain enumerated articles between the United
States and the British North American provinces,
and thus preserve their allegiance and ward off

the danger of their annexation to the United
States; and this Mr. Buchanan was very desirous
to use as a powerful lever to secure the third point,
which the United States earnestly desired, viz., the
withdrawal of all British dominion in Central
America, and the recognition of the Monroe
doctrine, which the Clayton-Bulwer treaty had not
firmly established.

President Pierce considered it best that the
reciprocity and fishery questions should be settled at
Washington; but Mr. Buchanan was intrusted with
the negotiation of the Central American question
in London. Mr. Buchanan's main object was to
develop and ascertain the precise difference
between the two governments in regard to the
construction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, but the
Crimean war so long delayed the negotiations with
this country that nothing could be accomplished
while he remained in England. As the war
approached and when it was finally declared, the
principles of neutrality, privateering, and many other
topics came within the range of the discussion; and
it was very much in consequence of the views
expressed by Mr. Buchanan to Lord Clarendon, and
by the latter communicated to the British cabinet,
that the course of England toward neutrals during
that war became what it was. When Lord
Clarendon, in 1854, presented to Mr. Buchanan
a projet for a treaty between Great Britain,

France, and the United States, making it piracy
for neutrals to serve on board of privateers cruising
against the commerce of either of the three
nations when such nation was a belligerent, the very
impressive reasons that Mr. Buchanan opposed to
it caused it to be abandoned. An American minister
at the English court, at periods of exciting and
critical questions between the two nations, is very
likely to experience a considerable variation in the
social barometer. But the strength of Mr.
Buchanan's character, and the agreeable personal
qualities which were in him united with the gravity
of years and an experience of a very uncommon
kind, overcame at all times any tendency to social
unpleasantness that might have been caused by
national feelings excited by temporary causes.
Throughout his residence in England Mr.
Buchanan was treated with marked attention, not only
by society in general, but the queen and the prince
consort. Miss Lane joined him in the spring of
1854, and remained with him until the autumn of
1855.

Mr. Buchanan arrived in New York in April,
1856, and there met with a public reception from
the authorities and people of the city that evinced
the interest that now began to be everywhere
manifested in him as the probable future president.
Prior to the meeting of the national democratic
convention at Cincinnati in June, 1856, there was

lack of organization on the part of Mr. Buchanan's
political friends; and Mr. Buchanan himself,
though willing to accept the nomination, made no
efforts to secure it, and did not believe that he
would receive it. The rival claimants were President
Pierce and Senator Douglas, of Illinois.
Chiefly through the efforts of Mr. Slidell, Mr.
Buchanan was nominated. By this time the whig
party had disappeared, the old party lines were
obliterated, and the main political issue had come
to be the question of slavery or no slavery in the
territories. The anti-slavery party now called
themselves republicans, and their candidate was
Gen. Frémont. The result of the election shows,
with great distinctness, the following facts: 1.
That Mr. Buchanan was chosen president because
he received the electoral votes of the five free states
of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois,
and California (sixty-two in all), and that without
them he could not have been elected. 2. That his
southern vote (that of every slave-holding state
excepting Maryland) was partly given to him
because of his conservative opinions and position, and
partly because the candidate for the vice-presidency,
Mr. Breckinridge, was a southern man. 3.
That Gen. Frémont received the electoral vote of
no southern state, and that this was due partly to
the character of the republican party, and partly
to the fact that the republican candidate for the

vice-presidency, Mr. Dayton, of New Jersey, was
a citizen of a non-slave-holding state. Gen. Frémont
himself was nominally a citizen of California.

This election, therefore, foreshadowed the
sectional division that would be almost certain to happen
in the next one if the four years of Mr.
Buchanan's administration should not witness a
subsidence in the sectional feelings between the north
and the south. It would only be necessary for the
republicans to wrest from the democratic party the
five free states that had voted for Mr. Buchanan,
and they would elect the president in 1860.
Whether this was to happen would depend upon
the ability of the democratic party to avoid a
rupture into factions that would themselves be
representatives of irreconcilable dogmas on the subject
of slavery in the territories. Hence it is that Mr.
Buchanan's course as president, for the first three
years of his term, is to be judged with reference to
the responsibility that was upon him so to conduct
the government as to disarm, if possible, the
antagonism of section to section. His administration
of affairs after the election of Mr. Lincoln is to
be judged simply by his duty as the executive in
the most extraordinary and anomalous crisis in
which the country had ever been placed.

Mr. Buchanan was inaugurated on March 4,
1857. The cabinet, which was confirmed by the
senate on March 6, consisted of Lewis Cass, of

Michigan, secretary of state; Howell Cobb, of
Georgia, secretary of the treasury; John B. Floyd,
of Virginia, secretary of war; Isaac Toucey, of
Connecticut, secretary of the navy; Aaron V.
Brown, of Tennessee, postmaster-general; Jacob
Thompson, of Mississippi, secretary of the interior;
and Jeremiah S. Black, of Pennsylvania, attorney-general.
The internal affairs of the country during
Buchanan's administration occupied so much
of the public attention at the time, and have since
been a subject of so much interest, that his management
of our foreign relations has been quite
obscured. The wisdom displayed in this branch of
his duties was such as might have been expected
from one who had had his previous experience in
the state department and in important diplomatic
posts. His only equals in the executive office in
this respect have been Mr. Jefferson and Mr. John
Quincy Adams. During an administration fraught
with the most serious hazards to the internal relations
of the states with each other, he kept steadily
in view the preservation of peace and good will
between the United States and Great Britain,
while he abated nothing from our just claims or
our national dignity. He left to his successer no
unsettled question between these two nations that
was of any immediate importance, and he also left
the feeling between them and their respective
governments
in a far better condition than he found it
on his accession to the presidency.

The long-standing and dangerous question of
British dominion in Central America, in the hope
of settling which Mr. Buchanan had accepted the
mission to England, was still pending, but it was
at length amicably and honorably settled, under his
advice and approbation after he became president,
by treaties between Great Britain and the two
Central American states, in accordance with the American
construction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
Another subject of contention that had long
existed between the two countries was removed by
President Buchanan in a summary and dignified
way. The belligerent right of search had been
exercised by Great Britain in the maritime war of
1812. In process of time she undertook to assert
a right to detain and search, on the high seas, in
time of peace, merchantmen suspected of being
engaged in the slave-trade. In 1858 she despatched
some cruisers with such orders to the coast of Cuba
and the Gulf of Mexico. President Buchanan,
always vigilant in protecting the commerce of the
country, but mindful of the importance of preventing
any necessity for war, remonstrated to the
English government against this violation of the freedom
of the seas. Then he sent a large naval force
to the neighborhood of Cuba with instructions
“to protect all vessels of the United States on the

high seas from search or detention by the vessels
of war of any other nation.” The effect was most
salutary. The British government receded, abandoned
the claim of the right of search, and recognized
the principle of international law in favor of
the freedom of the seas.

During the whole of Mr. Buchanan's administration
our relations with Mexico were in a
complicated and critical position, in consequence of the
internal condition of that country and of the danger
of interference by European powers. Great
outrages were committed in Mexico upon our citizens
and their property, and their claims against
that government exceeded $10,000,000. Mr.
Buchanan recommended to congress to send assistance
to the constitutional government in Mexico,
which had been forcibly superseded by military rule,
but which still held the allegiance of the majority
of the people, and to enforce redress for the wrongs
of our citizens. He saw very clearly that, unless
active measures should be taken by the government
of the United States to reach a power with which
a settlement of all claims and difficulties could be
effected, some other nation would undertake to
establish a government in Mexico, and the United
States would then have to interfere, not only to
secure the rights of their citizens, but to assert the
principle of the Monroe doctrine. He also
instructed the Mexican minister, Mr. McLane, to

make a “Treaty of Transit and Commerce” and a
“convention to enforce treaty stipulations, and to
maintain order and security in the territory of the
republics of Mexico and the United States.” But
congress took no notice of the president's
recommendation, and refused to ratify the treaty and the
convention. Mexico was left to the interference of
Louis Napoleon; the establishment of an empire,
under Maximilian, followed, for the embarrassment
of President Lincoln's administration while we
were in the throes of our civil war, and the claims
of American citizens were to all appearance indefinitely
postponed.

Our relations with Spain were also in a very
unsatisfactory condition at the beginning of Mr.
Buchanan's term. There were many just claims of
our citizens against the Spanish government for
injuries received in Cuba, and Mr. Buchanan
succeeded in having a “convention concluded at
Madrid in 1860, establishing a joint commission for
the final adjudication and payment of all the
claims of the respective parties.” The senate
refused to ratify this convention also, probably
because of the intense excitement against slavery,
the convention having authorized the presenting
before the commissioners of a Spanish claim against
the United States for the value of certain slaves.
In the settlement of claims against the government
of Paraguay the president's firm policy was
seconded
by congress, and he was authorized to send
a commissioner to that country accompanied by “a
naval force sufficient to exact justice should nego
tiation fail.” This was entirely successful; full
indemnification was obtained without any resort to
arms. Mr. Buchanan's negotiations with China,
conducted through William B. Reed as minister,
were also successful; a treaty was concluded in
1858, which established very satisfactory commercial
relations with that country and secured the
liquidation of all claims. June 22, 1860, Mr.
Buchanan vetoed a bill “to secure homesteads to actual
settlers in the public domain, and for other
purposes.” The other purposes contemplated
donations to the states. The ground of the veto was
that the power “to dispose of” the territory of the
United States did not authorize congress to donate
public lands to the states for their domestic
purposes. In the senate the bill failed to receive the
two thirds majority necessary to pass it over the
veto.

In internal affairs the preceding administration
of President Pierce had left a legacy of trouble to
his successor in the repeal of the Missouri compromise,
which was followed by a terrible period of
lawlessness and bloodshed in Kansas, under what
was called “squatter sovereignty,” the slavery and
the anti-slavery parties among the settlers struggling
for supremacy. The pro-slavery party
sustained
the territorial government and obtained
control of its legislature. The anti-slavery party
repudiated this legislature and held a convention at
Topeka to institute an opposition government.
Congress had recognized the authority of the
territorial government, and Mr. Buchanan, as president,
had no alternative but to recognize and uphold it
also. The fact that the legislature of that government
was in the hands of the pro-slavery party
made the course he adopted seem as if he favored
their pro-slavery designs, while, in truth, he had no
object to subserve but to sustain, as he was officially
obliged to sustain, the government that congress
had recognized as the lawful government of the
territory. Now, throughout the north, the press
and the public began to teem with denunciation of
the new president, who had not allowed
revolutionary violence to prevail over the law of the land,
and this was kept up throughout his administration.
The anti-slavery party gained ground, and the
election of 1860 resulted in the triumph of Mr.
Lincoln.

Mr. Buchanan was a conservative and far-seeing
man, who, though opposed to slavery, believed that
the blind and fanatical interference of the northern
abolitionists in the domestic affairs of the southern
states would excite the latter in a manner dangerous
to the peace and prosperity of the union. His
messages constantly recommended conciliatory
legislative
measures; but congress paid no attention to
his advice. Finally the election of Mr. Lincoln was
seized upon as the signal in South Carolina for the
breaking out of her old doctrine of secession. She
passed her ordinance of secession on December 20,
1860. Mr. Buchanan never for a moment admitted
that a state had any power to secede from the union.
South Carolina had once and forever adopted and
ratified the constitution of the United States, and
he maintained that she had by this act permanently
resigned certain powers to the federal government,
and that she could not, by her own will and without
the consent of the other states, resume those
powers and declare herself independent. She could,
if actually oppressed by the general government,
seek to redress her wrongs by revolution; but never
by secession. He refused to receive, in their
assumed official capacity, the commissioners sent by
South Carolina, in December, 1860, to treat with
him as with a foreign power.

In October, 1860, before the election, Mr.
Buchanan received from Gen. Scott, the general-in-chief
of the army, a communication saying that, in
the event of Mr. Lincoln's election, Gen. Scott
anticipated that there would be a secession of one
or more of the southern states; and that, from the
general rashness of the southern character, there
was danger of a “preliminary” seizure of certain
southern forts. This paper became known as

“General Scott's Views.” It was the foundation,
at a later period, of a charge that President
Buchanan had been warned by Gen. Scott of the
danger of leaving the southern forts without sufficient
garrisons to prevent surprises, and that he
had neglected this warning. Mr. Buchanan, who
had publicly denied the right of secession, could not
furnish the southern states with any justification of
such a proceeding by prematurely re-enforcing the
forts as if he anticipated secession. But, even if
the president had wished to adopt such a measure,
there were, as Gen. Scott himself said, but five
companies of regular troops, or 400 men, available
for the garrisoning of nine fortifications in six
highly excited southern states. The remainder of
the army was scattered over the western plains.
Scott's views were clearly impracticable, and
produced no impression upon the president's mind.

Mr. Buchanan has been often and severely
reproached for a “temporizing policy” and a want
of such vigor as might have averted the civil war;
but the policy of Mr. Lincoln's administration, until
after the attack on Fort Sumter, was identical with
that of Mr. Buchanan. In his annual message of
December 5, 1860, Mr. Buchanan stated clearly
and forcibly his denial of the right of secession,
and also his conviction that if a state should adopt
such an unconstitutional measure the federal
government had no power, under the constitution, to

make aggressive war upon her to compel her to
remain in the union; but at the same time drawing
a definite distinction between this and the right of
the use of force against individuals, in spite of
secession, in enforcing the execution of federal laws
and in the preservation of federal property. This
doctrine met the secessionists upon their own
ground; for it denied that a state ordinance of
secession could absolve its people from obeying the
laws of the United States. Mr. Buchanan thus
framed the only justifiable basis of a civil war, and
left upon the records of the country the clear line
of demarcation that would have to be observed by
his successor and would make the use of force, if
force must be used, a war, not of aggression, but
of defence.

In order to disarm all unreasonable opposition
from the south, Mr. Buchanan urged upon
congress the adoption of an “explanatory amendment”
of the constitution, which should effectually secure
to slave-holders all their constitutional rights.
From all parts of the country, north and south, he
received private letters approving, on various
grounds, the tone of the message; but nearly the
whole of the republican party saw fit to treat it as
a denial by the president of any power to enforce
the laws against the citizens of a state after secession,
and even after actual rebellion; while this very
power, emphatically stated as it was in the message,

was made by the secessionists their ground of
attack. It was the great misfortune of Mr.
Buchanan's position that he had to appeal to a
congress in which there were two sectional parties
breathing mutual defiance; in which broad and
patriotic statesmanship was confined to a small body
of men, who could not win over to their views a
sufficient number from either of the parties to make
up a majority upon any proposition whatever. In
the hope of preventing the secession of South Carolina,
the president sent Caleb Cushing to Charleston,
with a letter to Gov. Pickens, urging the people
of the state to await the action of congress.

[ Fac-simile letter from James Buchanan to Aaron V. Brown ]

After the actual secession of South Carolina, Mr.
Buchanan's two great objects were: 1. To confine
the area of secession, so that if there was to be a
southern confederacy it might comprehend only
the cotton states, which were most likely to act
together. 2. To induce congress to prepare for a
civil war in case one should be precipitated. While
he made it apparent to congress that at that time
he was without the necessary executive powers to
enforce the collection of the revenue in South Carolina,
he did not fail to call for the appropriate
powers and means. But at no time during that
session did a single republican senator (and the
republicans had a majority in the senate), in any
form whatever, give his vote or his influence for
any measure that would strengthen the hands of

the president either in maintaining peace or in
executing the laws of the United States. Whatever
was the governing motive for their inaction, it never
can be said that they were not seasonably warned
by the president that a policy of inaction would be
fatal. That policy not only crippled him, but crippled
his successor. When Mr. Lincoln came into
office, seven states had already seceded, and not a
single law had been put upon the statute-book that
would enable the executive to meet such a condition
of the union.

Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, had introduced
into the senate a resolution, which became known
as the “Crittenden Compromise,” providing in
substance for a restoration of the Missouri
compromise-line of 36° 30'; and it was proposed that this
question should be referred to a direct vote of the
people in the several states. On January 8, 1861,
Mr. Buchanan sent a special message to congress,
strongly recommending the adoption of this
measure; but it produced no effect. During the
last three months of his term there were several
changes in his cabinet. Mr. Cobb resigned his
portfolio on December 8, 1860, and Mr. Thomas,
who succeeded him as secretary of the treasury, also
resigned on January 11, their sympathies being
with the secessionists. This department was then
taken by Gen. John A. Dix. Mr. Thompson,
secretary of the interior, resigned on January 8,

also because he was a southern man, and the duties
of this office were subsequently performed by Moses
Kelly, chief clerk. Gen. Cass and Gov. Floyd
resigned their offices in December; Judge Black was
transferred from the attorney-generalship to the
state department, and Edwin M. Stanton became
attorney-general. Joseph Holt succeeded Secretary
Floyd in the war department.

The two critical questions which it was important
that the president should correctly and consistently
decide were, whether he was to receive in their
assumed official character any commissioners sent
by the southern states as to a foreign power, and
whether re-enforcements should be sent to Maj.
Anderson at Fort Sumter, or to any other southern
fort. Mr. Buchanan always refused to receive both
the South Carolina commissioners and also Mr.
Crawford, the first of the commissioners from the
confederate government at Montgomery, who
arrived in Washington just before the close of his
term; he thus left the new president entirely free
to act as he saw best, and entirely untrammelled
by any previous pledges. As to re-enforcements
for southern forts, Maj. Anderson was instructed
to report to the government any necessity for assistance,
and in the meantime an expedition was fitted
out at New York and held in readiness to sail at
an hour's notice. Until the close of Mr. Buchanan's
administration, Maj. Anderson considered himself

sufficiently strong, and agreed with the president
that any unnecessary movement of troops would be
regarded by the south as a menace and would provoke
hostilities. Mr. Buchanan would not initiate
a civil war; his policy was entirely defensive; and
yet he did all that he could, constitutionally, to
avert a war. It has often been asked, Why did
Mr. Buchanan suffer state after state to go out of
the union? Why did he not call on the north for
volunteers, and put down rebellion in its first stage?
The president had no power to call for volunteers
under any existing law; congress, during the whole
winter, refused to pass any law to provide him with
men or money. In the application of all the means
that he had for protecting the public property, he
omitted no step that could have been taken with
safety, and, at the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln,
Maj. Anderson not only held Fort Sumter, but
had held it down to that time in perfect confidence
that he could maintain his position.

On March 9, 1861, Mr. Buchanan returned to
his home at Wheatland, rejoicing to be free from
the cares of a long and responsible public life, and
welcomed by an immense gathering of his neighbors
and the citizens of Lancaster. Here he lived
quietly for the remaining seven years of his life,
taking, however, a lively interest in public affairs,
and always supporting, with his influence, as a
private citizen, the maintenance of the war for the

restoration of the union. His health was generally
good throughout his whole life. After his final
return to Wheatland he began to be attacked
occasionally by rheumatic gout, and this malady at last
terminated his life in his seventy-eighth year. His
remains were interred in a cemetery near
Lancaster. No man was ever treated with greater in
justice than he was during the last seven years of
his life by a large part of the public. Men said he
was a secessionist; he was a traitor; he had given
away the authority of the government; he had been
weak and vacillating; he had shut his eyes when
men about him, the very ministers of his cabinet,
were plotting the destruction of the union; he was
old and timid; he might have crushed an incipient
rebellion, and he had encouraged it. But he
bore all this with patience and dignity, forbearing
to say anything against the new administration,
and confident that posterity would acknowledge
that he had done his duty.

In 1862 he was attacked by Gen. Scott, who made
several statements concerning the president's
management of the Fort Sumter affairs during the last
winter of his administration, which Mr. Buchanan
successfully refuted. Mr. Buchanan's loyalty to
the constitution of the United States was
unbounded. He was not a man of brilliant genius,
nor did he ever do any one thing to make his name
illustrious and immortal, as Webster did when he

defended the constitution against the heresy of
nullification. But in the course of a long, useful,
and consistent life filled with the exercise of talents
of a fine order and uniform ability, he had made
the constitution of his country the object of his
deepest affection, the constant guide of all his public
acts. He published a vindication of the policy
of his administration during the last month of his
term, “Buchanan's Administration” (New York,
1866). See “Life of President Buchanan,” by
George Ticknor Curtis (2 vols., 1883).

 was born in Mercersburg,
Pa., in 1833. She was the daughter of Elliott
T. Lane and his wife, June Buchanan, who, dying,
left her to the care of her uncle, James Buchanan.
She was educated at the Roman Catholic convent
in Georgetown, D. C., and, on the appointment of
Mr. Buchanan to the English mission in 1853,
accompanied him to London, where she dispensed
the hospitalities of the embassy. During his term
as chief magistrate she was mistress of the White
House, over which she presided with grace and
dignity, receiving, among other distinguished
guests, the Prince of Wales and his large party.
In 1866 she married Elliott Johnston, of Maryland,
and after that event resided in Baltimore,
Washington, and at Wheatland, surviving her husband

and their two sons. Mrs. Johnston died in
Washington July 3, 1903, bequeathing the bulk of her
fortune to the Cathedral of the Protestant Episcopal
Church of that city.