Karrick v. Hannaman/Opinion of the Court
Much of the argument for the appellant was devoted to a discussion of conflicting evidence, which is not open to examination by this court, its authority upon appeal from the supreme court of a territory being limited to the question whether the facts found by that court support its judgment. Haws v. Mining Co., 160 U.S. 303, 16 Sup. Ct. 282; Harrison v. Perea (just decided) 18 Sup. Ct. 129.

The principal question of law discussed in the opinion of the supreme court of the territory, and at the ar ument in this court, was whether a partnership which, by the co-partnership articles, is to continue for a specified time, can be dissolved by one partner at his own will, without the assent of the other, before the expiration of that time.

It is universally conceded that a contract of partnership, containing no stipulation as to the time during which it shall* continue in force, does not endure for the life of the partners, or of either of them, nor for any longer time than their mutual consent, but may be dissolved by either partner at his own will, at any time. Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 49; Crawshay v. Maule, 1 Swanst. 495; Neilson v. Iron Co., 11 App. Cas. 298; 3 Kent, Comm. 53; Story, Partn. § 269.

Upon the question how far the status or relation of a partnership, which by the partnership agreement is to continue for a certain number of years, can be determined by one partner without the consent of the other before the expiration of that time, there has been some difference of opinion.

The principal reasons and authorities in favor of the position that a contract of partnership for a definite time cannot be dissolved at the mere will of one partner are stated or referred to in the opinion of the supreme court of the territory in this case, reported in 9 Utah, 236, 33 Pac. 1039.

Those which support the opposite view may be summed up as follows: A contract of partnership is one by which two or more persons agree to carry on a business for their common benefit, each contributing property or services, and having a community of interest in the profits. It is, in effect, a contract of mutual agency, each partner acting as a principal in his own behalf and as agent for his co-partner. Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611, 12 Sup. Ct. 972. Every partnership creates a personal relation between the partners, rests upon their mutual consent, and exists between them only. Without their agreement or approval, no third person can become a member of the partnership, either by act of a single partner or by operation of law; and the death or bankruptcy of a partner dissolves the partnership. 3 Kent, Comm. 25, 55, 58; Wilkins v. Davis, 2 Low. 511, Fed. Cas. No. 17,664. So, an absolute assignment by one partner of all his interest in the partnership to a stranger dissolves the partnership, although it does not make the assignee a tenant in common with the other partners in the partnership property. Bank v. Carrolton R. R., 11 Wall. 624, 628; Marquand v. Manufacturing Co., 17 Johns. 525, 528, 535. No partnership can efficiently or beneficially carry on its business without the mutual confidence and co-operation of all the partners. Even when, by the partnership articles, they have covenanted with each other that the partnership shall continue for a certain period, the partnership may be dissolved at any time, at the will of any partner, so far as to put an end to the partnership relation and to the authority of each partner to act for all, but rendering the partner who breaks his covenant liable to an action at law for damages, as in other cases of breaches of contract. Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. 513, 538; 3 Kent, Comm. 54, 55, 62; Cape Sable Co.'s Case, 3 Bland, 606, 674; Monroe v. Conner, 15 Me. 178, 180; Mason v. Connell, 1 Whart. 381, 388; Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 168, 176; Blake v. Dorgan, 1 Greene (Iowa) 537, 540; Solomon v. Kirkwood, 55 Mich. 256, 259, 260, 21 N. W. 336. According to the authorities just cited, the only difference, so far as concerns the right of dissolution by one partner, between a partnership for an indefinite period and one for a specified term, is this: In the former case, the dissolution is no breach of the partnership agreement, and affords the other partner no ground of complaint. In the latter case, such a dissolution before the expiration of the time stipulated is a breach of the agreement, and, as such, to be compensated in damages; but in either case the action of one partner does actually dissolve the partnership.

A court of equity  doubtless, will not assist the partner breaking his contract to procure a dissolution of the partnership, because, upon familiar principles, a partner who has not fully and fairly performed the partnership agreement on his part has no standing in a court of equity to enforce any rights under the agreement. Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339, 358. But, generally speaking, neither will it interfere at the suit of the other partner to prevent the dissolution, because, while it may compel the execution of articles of partnership so as to put the parties in the same position as if the articles had been executed as agreed, it will seldom, if ever, specifically compel subsequent performance of the contract by either party, the contract of partnership being of an essentially personal character. Batten, Spec. Perf. 165-167; Lindl. Partn. bk. 3, c. 10, § 4; Pom. Spec. Perf. § 290; Scott v. Rayment, L. R. 7 Eq. 112; Satterthwait v. Marshall, 4 Del. Ch. 337, 354; Reed v. Vidal, 5 Rich. Eq. 289; Somerby v. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279, 287. Especially where, by the partnership agreement, as in the case at bar, the defendant is to supply all or most of the capital, and the plaintiff is to furnish his personal services, the agreement cannot be specifically enforced against the plaintiff, and will not be enforced against the defendant. Stocker v. Wedderburn, 3 Kay & J. 393, 404; Buck v. Smith, 29 Mich. 165.

In the somewhat analogous case of a contract of hiring and service, it is well settled that a court of equity cannot compel the performance of the service, although it may in some cases enforce a negative stipulation not to serve any third person within the time agreed. Dietrichsen v. Cabburn, 2 Phil. Ch. 52, 59, and cases cited; Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 604; Wolverhampton & W. Ry. Co. v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 16 Eq. 433, 440; Chemical Co. v. Hardman (1891) 2 Ch. 416; Davis v. Foreman (1894) 3 Ch. 654; 13 Law Rev. Quart. 306; Tobey v. Bristol Co., 3 Story, 800, 824, Fed. Cas. No. 14,065.

We are not prepared, therefore, to assent to the opinion of the court below that a partnership for a definite time cannot be dissolved by one partner at his own will, and without the consent of his co-partner, within that time; and, consequently, that the partnership between these parties was not dissolved on February 1, 1888, when the defendant assumed exclusive possession and control of the business and property of the partnership, and excluded the plaintiff from any participation therein. But it is unnecessary to express an opinion upon this point, because, however it might be decided, it would not affect the conclusion in favor of the plaintiff in the present case.

Even if the partnership should be considered as having been actually dissolved at that date, yet the dissolution did not put an end to the plaintiff's right to his share in the property and the profits of the partnership. In a case in which both parties, in their pleadings, assumed the partnership to have been dissolved, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, held that drunkenness and dishonesty on the part of one partner, and his consequent exclusion from the business, did not authorize his co-partner, 'of his own motion, to treat the partnership as ended, and to take himself all the benefits of their joint labors and joint property,' or exempt him from responsibility to account to the excluded partner. Ambler v. Whipple, 20 Wall. 546, 555, 557. And, in a later case, the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Woods, said: 'However the question may be decided, whether one partner may by his own mere will dissolve a partnership formed for a definite purpose or period, it is clear that upon such a dissolution one partner cannot appropriate to himself all the partnership assets, or turn over the share of his partner to another with whom he proposes to form a new partnership.' Pearce v. Ham, 113 U.S. 585, 593, 5 Sup. Ct. 676.

A partner who assumes to dissolve the partnership before the end of the  erm agreed on in the partnership articles is liable, in an action at law against him by his co-partner for the breach of the agreement, to respond in damages for the value of the profits which the plaintiff would otherwise have received. Bagley v. Smith, 10 N. Y. 489; Dennis v. Maxfield, 10 Allen, 138. In a court of equity, a partner who, after a dissolution of the partnership carries on the business with the partnership property, is liable, at the election of the other partner or his representative, to account for the profits thereof, subject to proper allowances. Ambler v. Whipple and Pearce v. Ham, above cited; Hartman v. Woehr, 3 C. E. Green (18 N. J. Eq.) 383; Freeman v. Freeman, 136 Mass. 260; Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 369, 34 N. E. 205; 3 Kent, Comm. 64.

In the case at bar, by the terms of the agreement in writing, dated February 3, 1886, under which the partnership was formed, it was to continue for five years,-that is to say, until February 3, 1891. The plaintiff was to contribute $5,000, and the defendant $20,000, to the capital. The defendant lent the plaintiff the sum of $5,000, for which the plaintiff gave his promissory note, payable at the end of the five years. The plaintiff was to have the general management of the business. Each partner might draw out not exceeding $125 a month for personal expenses. The profits and losses were to be shared equally, and neither partner was to have any other compensation for services; and their title in the partnership property was to be in proportion to their contributions to the capital.

By the facts found by the courts of the territory, it appears that the business was carried on according to the agreement for two years, or until February 1, 1888; that the defendant then took exclusive possession of the property and the business of the partnership, and thenceforth carried on the business profitably and for his own benefit, and excluded the plaintiff from any participation in the business or the profits, although the plaintiff was, as he informed the defendant, ready and willing to perform his part of the partnership agreement; and the defendant, on January 1, 1890, a year before the expiration of the term agreed on, and without the plaintiff's knowledge or assent, sold out and delivered to a stranger all the property of the partnership.

The judgment of the court of first instance charged the defendant with the amount of capital paid by the plaintiff into the partnership, deducting, however, the whole amount of the plaintiff's promissory note payable to the defendant at the end of the term of five years, and further charged the defendant with half of the net profits of the business during the two years that he carried it on, after ousting the plaintiff, and before selling out to a stranger, and with half of the wrongful disbursements of the defendant afterwards. The supreme court of the territory, affirming the judgment in other respects, held that, as by the agreement of partnership each partner was permitted to draw out a certain sum monthly for personal expenses, the defendant was entitled to such an allowance monthly for the two years during which he conducted the business, and the same should be deducted from the profits to be accounted for, and the judgment in favor of the plaintiff reduced accordingly. The court made no such allowance to the plaintiff; and, in accordance with the partnership articles, neither partner was allowed any compensation for his services other than his half of the profits.

It does not appear to have been suggested by the defendant in either of the courts of the territory, and could not successfully be contended, that, in estimating the damages or the profits which the plaintiff was entitled to recover, any deduction should be made by reason of his not having performed during those two years the services, as manager of the business, which he had agreed by the partnership articles to perform. No finding as to the value of such services was made or requeste ; and the defendant himself, not only refused to let the plaintiff, as he offered to do, perform them during those two years, but, in his answer and at the hearing before the referee, insisted that the plaintiff's services as manager were of no benefit to the partnership.

The result is that, whether the partnership should or should not be considered to have been dissolved when the defendant ousted the plaintiff and assumed the exclusive possession and control of the property and business of the partnership, the defendant has shown no ground for reversing or modifying the final decree of the supreme court of the territory.

Decree affirmed. 

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