Howitt v. United States/Opinion of the Court
The wartime transportation shortage during the winter of 1943 made it exceedingly difficult to obtain tickets for trains going north from Miami, Florida. Petitioners are three ticket sellers and one diagram clerk who were employed at that time by a railroad at Miami. Petitioners Howitt, Lee, and Dewhurst were charged with, and convicted for, conspiracy to violate the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., in that they conspired to collect and receive unjust and unreasonable charges for passenger transportation in violation of Section 1(5)(a); to receive and collect greater compensation for service from certain persons than that which would be collected from others, in violation of Section 2; to prefer particular persons to the disadvantage of others in violation of Section 3(1); and to collect and receive compensation in excess of that fixed by tariff schedules in violation of Section 6(7). These violations are made a crime by Section 10.  Petitioner O'Rourke was charged with and convicted for committing substantive offenses of the same nature.  The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 5 Cir., 150 F.2d 82. We granted certiorari because this case raises important questions concerning the scope of the Act.

The government charged that there was a working agreement between petitioners and certain local hotel employees under which persons anxious to purchase railroad tickets would, in order to obtain them, pay amounts in excess of published rates either to petitioners directly, or to the hotel employees who in turn would divide the excess payments between themselves and petitioners.  The railroad played no part in these transactions. The government produced a great deal of evidence to support these charges.  Petitioners offered no testimony or other kind of evidence to contradict that produced by the government. Their only contention was raised on demurrer, motion for directed verdict and exception to the charge of the jury. This contention, urged on several different grounds, was that the indictment failed to charge, and the evidence failed to establish a crime, since the Interstate Commerce Act and Section 10 in particular are primarily aimed at railroads and do not make discriminatory and illegal charges by railroad employees for passenger transportation criminally punishable, unless the railroad is itself a party to the conduct. This is still the basis of petitioners' arguments.

It is well established that one of the primary aims of the Interstate Commerce Act and the amendments to it was to establish uniform treatment of users of transportation facilities. See Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 94, 95, 61 S.Ct. 873, 876, 877, 85 L.Ed. 1201. The Act again and again expressly condemns all kinds of discriminatory practices. Railroad employees can accomplish invidious transportation discrimination, whether or not their conduct is approved or participated in by their superiors. Not only do the Act's provisions against discrimination and special favors fail to exempt employees such as petitioners; but section 10 standing alone shows the clearest possible purpose to bar all railroad employees from overcharging for their own or for the railroad's illegitimate gain. The Interstate Commerce Act imposes the same duty on ticket sellers and clerks of common carriers as that imposed on railroad officers or other employees, to treat all the public alike as to the terms and conditions of transportation. Railroad accommodations are thus not to depend upon who will or can pay more because of greater need or a longer purse. See United States v. Estes, D.C., 6 F.2d 902, 905.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 

Notes