De Beers Consol Mines v. United States/Dissent Douglas
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice MURPHY and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE concur, dissenting.

I think the writ should be dismissed. For I do not think this is a proper case in which to exercise our jurisdiction under § 262 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 377, 28 U.S.C.A. § 377.

Our jurisdiction under § 262 has been fully reviewed by the Chief Justice in United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, decided this day. 325 U.S. 196, 65 S.Ct. 1120. I agree that the exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction was appropriate in that case. For the question presented not only went to the jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain the suit. If the defendants in that suit were right in their contention, a trial on the merits would have frustrated the statutory scheme which Congress had designed for the control of anti-trust activities.

But there is no such extraordinary situation presented here. This is precisely the kind of decree which Congress by the Expediting Act of February 11, 1903, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29, 15 U.S.C.A. § 29, intended should not be brought here for review. With reference to the change made by that Act, Mr. Justice Brandeis speaking for the Court in United States v. California Cooperative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 558, 49 S.Ct. 423, 425, 73 L.Ed. 838, said: 'These provisions governing appeals in general were amended by the Expediting Act so that in suits in equity under the Anti-Trust Act 'in which the United States is complainant' the appeal should be direct to this court from the final decree in the trial court. Thus, Congress limited the right of review to an appeal from the decree which disposed of all matters, see Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 40 S.Ct. 347, 64 L.Ed. 616; and it precluded the possibility of an appeal to either court from an interlocutory decree.'

To allow this appeal is to defeat that policy. Long ago in Bank of Columbia v. Sweeney, 1 Pet. 567, 569, 7 L.Ed. 265, Chief Justice Marshall stated that an allowance of an appeal from an interlocutory ruling where Congress permitted an appeal only from a final judgment would be a 'plain evasion' of the Act of Congress. We made a like ruling only recently in Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 30, 63 S.Ct. 938, 943, 87 L.Ed. 1185, where we said: 'Where the appeal statutes establish the conditions of appellate review an appellate court cannot rightly exercise its discretion to issue a writ whose only effect would be to avoid those conditions and thwart the Congressional policy against piecemeal appeals in criminal cases.'

The present case presents no issue which warrants a departure from that long settled practice. This case raises no question of grave public importance. It is by no means comparable to Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 53 S.Ct. 129, 77 L.Ed. 283, where the interlocutory decree was equivalent to a denial of the absolute right of the government to put the accused on trial. It is wholly unlike the cases cited in United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, supra, where writs were issued under § 262, to review inter ocutory orders which foreclosed the adjudication of rights entrusted to the jurisdiction of a state tribunal or which deprived a party of his basic right of trial by jury. The public importance of the present question is not apparent. The actual hardship imposed upon the defendants is no more than the cost of procuring a bond. It has always been assumed that mere hardship or inconvenience alone was not sufficient to justify resort to the extraordinary course of review by way of § 262. United States Alkali Export Ass'n Inc. v. United States, supra. Is the inconvenience of private litigants to be the newly found ground for evading the Expediting Act?

The reason advanced for departing from the long standing practice is that 'the order was beyond the powers conferred upon the court.' By that test every interlocutory order which is wrong can be reviewed here under § 262. That is novel doctrine. That seems to be the test for the Court says that the order can now be reviewed because it involves 'a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the case.' In other words, we look to the merits and take the case under § 262 if it appears that the District Court exceeded its authority. But it always exceeds its authority when it abuses its discretion. Thus we must now entertain these appeals on interlocutory orders, though Congress said we should not, in order to determine whether the District Court kept within bounds. Certainly Congress knew that some interlocutory orders might be erroneous when it chose to make them non-reviewable. It did not draw the distinction now suggested between interlocutory orders which are an abuse of conceded judicial power and interlocutory orders which otherwise exceed judicial authority. Congress moreover knew that if immediate review of interlocutory orders could not be had, no decision on the merits might be able to 'redress any injury done by the order'. But that was the choice which it made. We should respect it.

The decision, if followed, will open the flood gates to review of interlocutory decrees. It circumvents the policy of Congress to restrict review in these cases to final judgments. 

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