Crowley v. Christensen/Opinion of the Court
It is undoubtedly true that it is the right of every citizen of the United States to pursue any lawful trade or business, under such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of the same age, sex, and condition. But the possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to be equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is then liberty regulated by law. The right to acquire, enjoy, and dispose of property is declared in the constitutions of several states to be one of the inalienable rights of man; but this declaration is not held to preclude the legislature of any state from passing laws respecting the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of property. What contracts respecting its acquisition and disposition shall be valid, and what void and voidable, when they shall be in writing, and when they may be made orally, and by what instruments it may be conveyed or mortgaged, are subjects of constant legislation. And, as to the enjoyment of property, the rule is general that it must be accompanied with such limitations as will not impair the equal enjoyment by others of their property. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non loedas is a maxim of universal application. For the pursuit of any lawful trade or business the law imposes similar conditions. Regulations respecting them are almost infinite, varying with the nature of the business. Some occupations by the noise made in their pursuit, some by the odors they engender, and some by the dangers accompanying them, require regulations as to the locality in which they shall be conducted. Some by the dangerous character of the articles used, manufactured, or sold, require also special qualifications in the parties permitted to use, manufacture, or sell them. All this is but common knowledge, and would hardly be mentioned were it not for the position often taken, and vehemently pressed, that there is something wrong in principle and objectionable in similar restrictions when applied to the business of selling by retail, in small quantities, spirituous and intoxicating liquors. It is urged that as the liquors are used as a beverage, and the injury following them, if taken in excess, is voluntarily inflicted, and is confined to the party offending, their sale should be without restrictions, the contention being that what a man shall drink, equally with what he shall eat, is not properly matter for legislation. There is in this position an assumption of a fact which does not exist,-that, when the liquors are taken in excess, the injuries are confined to the party offending. The injury, it is true, first falls upon him in his health, which the habit undermines; in his morals, which it weakens; and in the self-abasement which it creates. But, as it leads to neglect of business and waste of property, and general demoralization, it affects those who are immediately connected with and dependent upon him. By the general concurrence of opinion of every civilized and Christian community, these are few sources of crime and misery to society equal to the dram-shop, where intoxicating liquors, in small quantities, to be drunk at the time, are sold indiscriminately to all parties applying. The statistics of every state show a greater amount of crime and misery attributable to the use of ardent spirits obtained at these retail liquor saloons than to any other source. The sale of such liquors in this way has therefore been, at all times, by the courts of every state considered as the proper subject of legislative regulation: Not only may a license be exacted from the keeper of the saloon before a glass of his liquors can be thus disposed of, but restrictions may be imposed as to the class of persons to whom they may be sold, and the hours of the day, and the days of the week, on which the saloons may be opened. Their sale in that form may be absolutely prohibited. It is a question of public expediency and public morality, and not of federal law. The police power of the state is fully competent to regulate the business, to mitigate its evils, or to suppress it entirely. There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a citizen of the state or of a citizen of the United States. As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said, be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority. That authority may vest in such officers as it may deem proper the power of passing upon applications for permission to carry it on, and to issue licenses for that purpose. It is a matter of legislative will only. As in many other cases, the officers may not always exercise the power conferred upon them with wisdom or justice to the parties affected. But that is a matter which does not affect the authority of the state, or one which can be brought under the cognizance of the courts of the United States.

The constitution of California vests in the municipality of the city and county of San Francisco the right to make 'all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.' The supreme court of the state has decided that the ordinance in question, under which the petitioner was arrested, and is held in custody, was thus authorized, and is valid. That decision is binding upon us unless some inhibition of the constitution or of a law of the United States is violated by it. We do not perceive that there is any such violation. The learned circuit judge saw in the provisions of the ordinance empowering the police commissioners to grant or refuse their assent to the application of the petitioner for a license, or, failing to obtain their assent upon application, requiring it to be given upon the recommendation of 12 citizens owning real estate in the block or square in which his business as a retail dealer in liquors was to be carried on, the delegation of arbitrary discretion to the police commissioners, and to real-estate owners of the block, which might be and was exercised to deprive the petitioner of the equal protection of the laws. And he considers that his view in this respect is supported by the decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064. In that case it appeared that an ordinance of the city and county of San Francisco passed in July, 1880, declared that it should be unlawful after its passage 'for any person or persons to establish, maintain, or carry on a laundry within the corporate limits of the city and county of San Francisco without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed either of brick or stone.' The ordinance did not limit the power of the supervisors to grant such consent, where the business was carried on in wooden buildings. It left that matter to the arbitrary discretion of the board. Under the ordinance, the consent of the supervisors was refused to the petitioner to carry on the laundry business in wooden buildings, where it had been conducted by him for over 20 years. He had at the time a certificate from the board of fire wardens that his premises had been inspected by them, and upon such inspection they had found all proper arrangements for carrying on the business, and that all proper precautions had been taken to comply with the provisions of the ordinance defining the fire limits of the city and county; and also a certificate from the health officer that the premises had been inspected by him, and were properly and sufficiently drained, and that all proper arrangements for carrying on the business of a laundry without injury to the sanitary conditions of the neighborhood had been complied with. The limits of the city and county embraced a territory some 10 miles wide, by 15 or more in length, much of it being occupied at the time, as stated by the circuit judge, as farming and pasture lands, and much of it being unoccupied sand-banks, in many places without buildings within a quarter or half a mile of each other. It appeared also that, in the practical administration of the ordinance, consent was given by the board of supervisors to some parties to carry on the laundry business in buildings other than those of brick or stone, but that all applications coming from the Chinese, of whom the petitioner was one, to carry on the business in such buildings were refused. This court said of the ordinance: 'It allows, without restriction, the use for such purposes of buildings of brick or stone; but as to wooden buildings, constituting nearly all those in previous use, it divides the owners or occupants into two classes, not having respect to their personal character and qualifications for the business, nor the situation and nature and adaptation of the buildings themselves, but merely by an arbitrary line, on one side of which are those who are permitted to pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of the supervisors, and on the other those from whom that consent is withheld, at their mere will and pleasure. And both classes are alike only in this: that they are tenants at will, under the supervisors, of their means of living. The ordinance, therefore, also differs from the not unusual case where discretion is lodged by law in public officers or bodies to grant or withhold licenses to keep taverns, or places for the sale of spirituous liquors, and the like, when one of the conditions is that the applicant shall be a fit person for the exercise of the privilege, because in such cases the fact of fitness is submitted to the judgment of the officer, and calls for the exercise of a discretion of a judicial nature.' It will thus be seen that that case was essentially different from the one now under consideration, the ordinance there held invalid vesting uncontrolled discretion in the board of supervisors with reference to a business harmless in itself and useful to the community, and the discretion appearing to have been exercised for the express purpose of depriving the petitioner of a privilege that was extended to others. In the present cause the business is not one that any person is permitted to carry on without a license, but one that may be entirely prohibited or subjected to such restrictions as the governing authority of the city may prescribe.

It would seem that some stress is placed upon the allegation of the petitioner that there were not 12 persons owners of real property in the block where the business was to be carried on. This allegation is denied in the return, which alleges that there were more than 16 such property holders. As the case was heard upon exceptions or demurrer to the return, its averments must be taken as true. At common law no evidence was necessary to support the return. It was deemed to import verity until impeached. Hurd, Hab. Corp. bk. 2, c. 3, §§ 8-10; Church, Hab. Corp. § 122. And this rule is not changed by any statute of the United States. It must therefore be considered as a fact in the case that there were more than 16 owners of real estate in the block. But if the fact were otherwise, and there was not the number stated in the petition, the result would not be affected. If there were no property holders in the block the discretionary authority would be exercised finally by the police commissioners, and their refusal to grant the license is not a matter for review by this court, as it violates no principle of federal law. We, however, find in the return a statement which would fully justify the action of the commissioners. It is averred that, in the conduct of the liquor business, the petitioner was assisted by his wife, and that she was twice arrested for larcenies committed from persons visiting his saloon, and in one case convicted of the offense, and sentenced to be imprisoned, and in the other held to answer. These larcenies alone were a sufficient indication of the character of the place in which the business was conducted for the exercise of the discretion of the police commissioners in refusing a further license to the petitioner. The order discharging the petitioner must be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to take further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

And it is so ordered. 

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