The Encyclopedia Americana (1920)/Buchanan, James
BUCHANAN, James, 15th President of
the United States: b. near Mercersburg, Pa.,
23 April 1791; d. at Wheatland, near
Lancaster, Pa., 1 June 1868. The Buchanans
were a Scotch-Irish family of recent migration;
James was the second of 11 children.
He received a good education for that
time in the schools of Mercersburg and at
Dickinson College, where he was graduated
at the age of 19. He then studied law in
an office in Lancaster, and at the age of 21 was
admitted to the bar. He practised his profession
very little, for almost all of his mature
life was spent in the public service of the

State or of the United States. His public life
began in 1814 with his election to the Pennsylvania
legislature where he served two terms.
In 1821 he began a 10-year period of service
in Congress; in 1832-33 he was Minister to
Russia; from 1834-44 he was United States
senator from Pennsylvania; under President
Polk he was Secretary of State, 1845-49; under
President Pierce he was Minister to England,
1853-56; and from 1857 to 1861 he was President,
the last Democratic President for 24
years. Before he became President his experience
had been mainly in legislative service and
in diplomacy. During the short periods when
not in office his time was yet given largely to
public matters and he continued a keen interest
in current political problems.

In part his absorption in politics was probably
due to the lack of close family ties; he
was never married, his fiancée having died
just before the time set for the wedding. There
was a large family connection, but none of
them except a niece, Harriet Lane, appears
to have come much into his life. He was
quiet, well-mannered; a conservative gentleman
of the old school whose only ambition
was to serve the state. He began his public
career as a Federalist, and as a Federalist he
was elected to the Pennsylvania legislature and
to Congress. He criticised severely the
Democratic-Republican conduct of the War of 1812,
but urged its continuance to a victorious end,
and even enrolled himself in the militia, though
he was not called into service. Monroe's veto
message on the internal improvement bill first
called his attention to the political complications
involved in the nature of the Federal
Union. Buchanan then began a study of American
constitutional law with the result that he
gradually became a Democrat, a believer in the
“strict construction” of the United States
constitution and in the “reserved rights” of the
States. It is difficult for one of the 20th century
to understand the conscientious devotion of
some early American statesmen to the letter
of the law without much regard to the changing
social conditions back of the law. But it was
an age of lawyers; nearly all statesmen and
politicians were trained in law, and naturally
their views of government were legalistic and
theoretical.

Buchanan's 20-year record as congressman
and senator was one of useful but not of
brilliant service. In the House his principal service
was on the judiciary committee, of which he
became chairman in 1829 and which under him
was credited with having accomplished needed
reforms of the Federal judiciary. In general
he supported the policies of President Jackson,
both financial and foreign, but an increasing
tendency on his part toward “strict
construction” is noticeable. He opposed a
Federal bankruptcy law because of its tendency
toward political consolidation and he believed
it would injure the character of the farming
class if the latter were able to disburden
themselves of obligations under the law. He
objected to protective tariffs because they were
at the expense of the agricultural industry.
When the controversies arose over anti-slavery
petitions Buchanan voted to receive them, since
to do so was plainly prescribed by the United States
constitution, but on the other hand he

held that Congress had the authority to keep
incendiary anti-slavery literature out of the
mails and should exercise this right. When
President Tyler broke with the Whig party
and an attack was made upon his use of
the veto power, Buchanan was found defending
the President's constitutional right to influence
legislation by the veto. As senator he
held that the State legislature had the right to
instruct him to vote on all important questions.
In a Senate which contained Clay, Calhoun and
Webster, Buchanan was known as one of the
useful, working members, but he scarcely
attained the first rank.

Buchanan's first connection with foreign
affairs was as Minister to Russia in 1832-33.
At Jackson's request he retired from Congress
to undertake negotiation of treaties with
Russia. He was well received and well liked at
the Russian capital, and succeeded in arranging
a commercial treaty. Disliking the formal
etiquette of the court, he resigned and on his
way home traveled in the western countries of
Europe and in England. In 1844 he was named
by the Pennsylvania Democrats as their candidate
for the Presidency and this, added to his
other qualifications, caused President Polk to
make him Secretary of State. In this position
he handled the ../Oregon Boundary Question/
(q.v.) and the foreign affairs connected with
the annexation of Texas and the ../Mexican War/
(q.v.). Polk and Buchanan developed a vigorous
foreign policy, especially concerning
Latin-America, and in so doing came into conflict
with England and Spain. Buchanan opposed
the activities of England in Central America
and in California and favored the restoration
and strengthening of the Central American
Federation in order to resist the encroachments
of European powers. Believing that Cuba
could not be held by Spain he offered
$100,000,000 for the island. As Secretary of State
Buchanan acquired a reputation as an able
diplomat and left office firmly convinced that
the most important foreign problem for the
United States was the acquisition of Cuba.
President Pierce, having before his inauguration
sought Buchanan's advice in regard to
foreign affairs, was so impressed with his views
that he asked him to accept the English mission,
thus practically accepting the latter's
Latin-American policy. Buchanan accepted reluctantly
because he had an eye to the presidential
campaign of 1856 and because the position of
the United States in the Central American
matters had been embarrased by the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty which in the previous Whig
administration had reversed the policy of Buchanan
and Polk. In London he was successful in
securing a somewhat favorable interpretation of
the treaty and also in a contention over British
enlistment of soldiers in the United States.
But Buchanan attained greater notoriety at
this period by his connection with the so-called
../Ostend Manifesto/ (q.v.). The Pierce
administration was anxious to acquire Cuba, and a new
cause of trouble with Spain had arisen — the
episode of the Black Warrior — so Secretary
Marcy suggested that Buchanan, Soule, Minister
to Spain, and Mason, Minister to France,
should meet for a consultation over the Cuban
situation. The result was the Ostend
Manifesto, which was not made public, however,

until the papers were called for by Congress.
In this report the three ministers suggested
that the United States should offer Spain
$120,000,000 for the island and seize it if Spain
refused, since Cuba as then governed was a
dangerous nuisance from the American
viewpoint.

Buchanan returned from England in 1856
to become a candidate for the Presidency. For
years he had been considered as a presidential
possibility, and in 1852 he was really the strongest
candidate, though Pierce, “a dark horse,”
received the Democratic nomination. He was
stronger than ever with his party and in the
country at large. He was moderate in his
views on the slavery issue, and his attempts to
secure Cuba had gained him some support in
the South. Though he supported the legislation
of 1850 and 1854 relating to the extension
of slavery in the territories he had not been
connected with any of the bitter controversies
over those measures and their results in Kansas.
Pierce now received the support of the majority
of the Southern Democrats, but Buchanan
was easily nominated by the pressure of the
conservative Democrats, North and South, and
at the last received the support of Douglas. He
was undoubtedly the best candidate that the
party could have selected. In the campaign
that followed he emphasized the fact that the
Democracy constituted a national party as
against the new Republican party led by
Fremont which was frankly sectional. In both
sections Buchanan received the support of many
Whigs whose party had been wrecked on the
slavery question. He was elected President by
112 electoral votes from the South and 62
from the North, against 114 from the North
for Fremont, and 8 from Maryland for
Fillmore, the candidate of the American party.
The result showed that the Democratic party
was still a national one but that the danger of
sectionalization was very great. Buchanan
believed it to be his task to check this trend
toward separation.

Buchanan's program as President was to
settle the slavery question according to the
principles of the Compromise of 1850 and the
Kansas-Nebraska legislation of 1854, to supervise
the conduct of foreign affairs himself,
with a vigorous policy against European influence
in Latin-American affairs, to acquire Cuba
if possible, and to prevent any further alienation
of North and South. But he was destined
to fail in the most important of all.

He, as a legalist would do, expected to settle
the Kansas troubles by accepting the
../Lecompton Constitution/ (q.v.) and the ../Dred Scott Decision/
(q.v.). But in this many of his party
would not follow him and he finally broke with
Douglas on the Kansas issue. His desire to
acquire Cuba alienated many Northern
Democrats and the Conservative Whigs who had
supported him in 1856. Fires of the controversy
over slavery fed by the stories from Kansas
would not be extinguished; sectionalization
proceeded rapidly; the John Brown raid in
1859 crystallized Southern and much Northern
opinion; the break with Douglas split the
Democratic party and in the elections of 1860
the sectional alignment was definite. Buchanan
supported the Breckinridge ticket, believing that
the South had been unwisely irritated by such

measures as the “personal liberty” laws and
by the violent anti-slavery agitation. Though
his sympathies were with the South, he denied
that the latter could find a remedy in secession
from the Union in case of Lincoln's election.
When it was known that Lincoln had been
elected Buchanan expected that an attempt at
secession would be made, but hoped that
conservative influences in the South aided by a
considerate attitude of the North would
prevent it or confine the movement to a narrow
area. His conduct of affairs during the last
three months of his administration has been
severely criticized. Even at this day it is
impossible to arrive at a satisfactory estimate of
his policy. When South Carolina began the
secession movement on 20 Dec. 1860, his cabinet
was almost evenly divided in sympathy
between the North and South. He was intensely
anxious to prevent civil war. He denied the
possibility of peaceable secession but held that
under the constitution and laws he had no power
to force a State back into the Union. It would
seem he confused the coercion of a State
with the forcible administration of Federal law.
He would hold and defend all Federal posts
but would inaugurate no policy that might
precipitate war. He asked Congress for
legislation to deal with the situation but secured none,
though the Republicans who controlled the lower
house might have given it had they so desired.
Even so, he appeared to believe that delay
would undermine and weaken the secession
movement. Consequently, he favored the
../Crittenden Compromise/ (q.v.), the ../Virginia Peace Convention/
(q.v.), and other measures designed
to avoid the issue of civil war; though he
refused to give any official recognition to the
Confederacy. Changes in his cabinet during
the last weeks brought in new advisers —
Black, Dix, Stanton and Holt — who stiffened
Buchanan's policy somewhat, but he was glad to
turn over the administration with its
responsibilities to Lincoln before war began. It is
worth noting that for several weeks Lincoln
made little change in policy. Buchanan retired
to Wheatland, where he announced his support
of Lincoln's administration and where he spent
his last years writing a defense of his own
administration. During these years he was
vilified as if he were a traitor, and accused of
cowardice and weakness of character; but in
passing judgment one must remember that
Buchanan, like Andrew Johnson and other
notable Democrats of the strict constructionist
school, was so firmly grounded in his political
principles that it was hardly possible for him
to act otherwise than as he did. Consult
Buchanan, James, ‘Buchanan's Administration
on the Eve of the Rebellion’ (New York 1866);
Curtis, George Ticknor, ‘Life of President
Buchanan’ (2 vols., New York 1883); Moore,
John Bassett, ‘The Works of James Buchanan’
(12 vols., Philadelphia 1908-11); Rhodes, James
Ford, ‘History of the United States, 1850-1871’
(Vols. I-III, New York 1907).

JAMES BUCHANAN