Lake Shore Railway Company v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence/Opinion of the Court
This action was commenced before a justice of the peace of the county of Cuyahoga, Ohio, to recover the penalty prescribed by section 3320 of the Revised Statutes of that state.

That section is a part of a chapter relating to railroad companies, and, as amended by the act of April 13, 1889, provides:

'Each company shall cause three, each way, of its regular trains carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop at a station, city or village, containing over three thousand inhabitants, for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers; if a company, or any agent or employee thereof, violate, or cause or permit to be violated, this provision, such company, agent or employee shall be liable to a forfeiture of not more than one hundred nor less than twenty-five dollars, to be recovered in an action in the name of the state, upon the complaint of any person, before a justice of the peace of the county in which the violation occurs, for the benefit of the general fund of the county; and in all cases in which a forfeiture occurs under the provisions of this section, the company whose agent or employee caused or permitted such violation shall be liable for the amount of the forfeiture, and the conductor in charge of such train shall be held, prima facie, to have caused the violation.' Laws Ohio 1889, vol. 86, p. 291; Rev. St. Ohio 1890, § 3320.

The case was removed for trial into the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, in which a judgment was rendered against the railroad company for the sum of $100. Upon writ of error to the circuit court of that county, the judgment was affirmed, and the judgment of the latter court was affirmed by the supreme court of Ohio.

The facts upon which the case was determined in the state court were as follows:

The plaintiff, Lawrence, is a resident of West Cleveland, a municipal corporation of Ohio having more than 3,000 inhabitants.

The defendant railway company is a corporation organized under the respective laws of Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois, and owns and operates a railroad located partly within the village of West Cleveland. Its line extends from Chicago, through those states, to Buffalo.

On the 9th day of October, 1890, as well as for some time prior thereto and thereafter, the company caused to run daily both ways over its road, within the limits of West Cleveland, three or more regular trains carrying passengers; and on that day (which was not Sunday) it did not stop or cause to be stopped within that village more than one of such trains each way long enough to receive or let off passengers.

On the day above named, and after that date, the company was engaged in carrying both passengers and freight over its railroad from Chicago, and other stations in Indiana and Michigan, through each of said several states, to and into New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, and to Buffalo, and from Buffalo, through said states, to Chicago. It did not on that day, nor shortly prior thereto, nor up to the commencement of the present suit, run daily both ways or either way, over said road through the village of West Cleveland, three regular trains, nor more than one regular train each way carrying passengers 'which were not engaged in interstate commerce, or that did not have upon them passengers who had paid through fare, and were entitled to ride in said trains going in the one direction from the city of Chicago to the city of Buffalo, through the states of Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and those going the other direction from the city of Buffalo, * * * through said states, to the city of Chicago.'

On or about the day named, the company operated but one regular train carrying passengers each way that was not engaged in carrying such through passengers, and that train did stop at West Cleveland on that day for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers.

The through trains that passed westwardly through West Cleveland on the 9th day of October, 1890, were a limited express train, having two baggage and express cars, one passenger coach, and three sleepers, from New York to Chicago; a fast mail train, having five mail cars, one passenger coach, and one sleeper, from New York to Chicago; and a train having one mail car, two baggage and express cars, four passenger coaches, and one sleeper, from Cleveland to Chicago. The trains running eastwardly on the same day through West Cleveland were a limited express train  having one baggage and express car, and three sleepers, from Chicago to New York; a train having one baggage and express car, three passenger coaches, and two sleepers, from Chicago to New York; a train having one mail car, two baggage and express cars, and seven passenger coaches, from Chicago to Buffalo; and a train having three mail cars and one sleeper, from Chicago to New York.

The average time required to stop a train of cars, and receive and let off passengers, is three minutes.

The number of villages in Ohio containing 3,000 inhabitants through which the above trains passed on the day named were 13.

The trial court found as a conclusion of law that, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States, the statute of Ohio was not a regulation of commerce among the states, and was valid until congress acted upon the subject. This general view was affirmed by the circuit court of Cuyahoga county, and by the supreme court of Ohio.

The plaintiff in error contends that, as the power to regulate interstate commerce is vested in congress, the statute of Ohio, in its application to trains engaged in such commerce, is directly repugnant to the constitution of the United States.

In support of this contention, it insists that an interstate railroad carrier has the right to start its train at any point in one state, and pass into and through another state, without taking up or setting down passengers within the limits of the latter state. As applied to the present case, that contention means that the defendant company, although an Ohio corporation deriving all its franchises and privileges from that state, may, if it so wills, deprive the people along its line in Ohio of the benefits of interstate communication by its railroad; in short, that the company, if it saw fit to do so, could, beyond the power of Ohio to prevent it, refuse to stop within that state trains that started from points beyond its limits, or even trains starting in Ohio destined to places in other states.

In the argument at the bar, as well as in the printed brief of counsel, reference was made to the numerous cases in this court adjudging that what are called the police powers of the states were not surrendered to the general government when the constitution was ordained, but remained with the several states of the Union. And it was asserted with much confidence that, while regulations adopted by competent local authority in order to protect or promote the public health, the public morals, or the public safety have been sustained where such regulations only incidentally affected commerce among the states, the principles announced in former adjudications condemn, as repugnant to the constitution of the United States, all local regulations that affect interstate commerce in any degree if established merely to subserve the public convenience.

One of the cases cited in support of this position is Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 303, 308, 317, 16 Sup. Ct. 1086, which involved the validity of a statute of Georgia providing that, 'if any freight train shall be run on any railroad in this state on the Sabbath Day (known as Sunday), the superintendent of such railroad company, or the officer having charge of the business of that department of the railroad, shall be liable for indictment for a misdemeanor in each county through which such trains shall pass, and on conviction shall be punished: * * * provided, always, that whenever any train on any railroad in this state, having in such train one or more cars loaded with live stock, which train shall be delayed beyond schedule time, shall not be required to lay over on the line of road or route during Sunday, but may run on to the point where, by due course of shipment or consignment, the next stock pen on the route may be, where said animals may be fed and watered, according to the facilities usually afforded for such transportation. And it shall be lawful for the freight trains on the different railroads in th § state, running over said roads on Saturday night, to run through to destination: provided, the time of arrival, according to the schedule by which the train or trains started on the trip, shall not be later than eight o'clock on Sunday morning.' This court said: 'The well-settled rule is that if a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution.'

The contention in that case was that the running of railroad cars laden with interstate freight was committed exclusively to the control and supervision of the national government; and that, although congress had not taken any affirmative action upon the subject, state legislation interrupting interstate commerce even for a limited time only, whatever might be its object, and however essential such legislation might be for the comfort, peace, or safety of the people of the state, was a regulation of interstate commerce, forbidden by the constitution of the United States.

After observing that the argument in behalf of the defendant rested upon the erroneous assumption that the statute of Georgia was such a regulation of interstate commerce as was forbidden by the constitution without reference to affirmative action by congress, and not merely a statute enacted by the state under its police power, and which, although in some degree affecting interstate commerce, did not go beyond the necessities of the case, and therefore was valid, at least until congress intervened, this court, upon a review of the adjudged cases, said: 'These authorities make it clear that the legislative enactments of the states, passed under their admitted police powers, and having a real relation to the domestic peace, order, health, and safety of their people, but which, by their necessary operation, affect to some extent or for a limited time the conduct of commerce among the states, are yet not invalid by force alone of the grant of power to congress to regulate such commerce, and, if not obnoxious to some other constitutional provision or destructive of some right secured by the fundamental law, are to be respected in the courts of the Union until they are superseded and displaced by some act of congress passed in execution of the power granted to it by the constitution. Local laws of the character mentioned have their source in the power which the states reserved, and never surrendered to congress, of providing for the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and are not, within the meaning of the constitution, and considered in their own nature, regulations of interstate commerce simply because, for a limited time or to a limited extent, they cover the field occupied by those engaged in such commerce. The statute of Georgia is not directed against interstate commerce. It establishes a rule of civil conduct applicable alike to all freight trains, domestic as well as interstate. It applies to the transportation of interstate freight the same rule precisely that it applies to the transportation of domestic freight.' Again: 'We are of opinion that such a law, although in a limited degree affecting interstate commerce, is not for that reason a needless intrusion upon the domain of federal jurisdiction, nor strictly a regulation of interstate commerce, but, considered in its own nature, is an ordinary police regulation designed to secure the well-being and to promote the general welfare of the people within the state by which it was established, and therefore not invalid by force alone of the constitution of the United States.'

It is insisted by counsel that these and observation to the same effect in different cases show that the police powers of the states, when exerted with reference to matters more or less connected with interstate commerce, are restricted in their exercise, so far as the national constitution is concerned, to regulations pertaining to the health, morals, or safety of the public, and do not embrace regulations designed merely to promote the public convenience.

This is an erroneous view of the adjudications of this court. While cases to which counsel refer involved the validity of state laws having reference directly to the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, in no one of them was there any occasion to determine whether the police powers of the states extended to regulations incidentally affecting interstate commerce, but which were designed only to promote the public convenience or the general welfare. There are, however, numerous decisions by this court to the effect that the states may legislate with reference simply to the public convenience, subject, of course, to the condition that such legislation be not inconsistent with the national constitution, nor with any act of congress passed in pursuance of that instrument, nor in derogation of any right granted or secured by it. As the question now presented is one of great importance, it will be well to refer to some cases of the latter class.

In Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 729, which involved the validity of a state enactment authorizing the construction of a permanent bridge over the Schuylkill river within the limits of Philadelphia, and which bridge in fact interfered with the use of the river by vessels of a certain size which had been long accustomed to navigate it, the court said: 'It must not be forgotten that bridges, which are connecting parts of turnpikes, streets, and railroads, are means of commercial transportation, as well as navigable waters, and that the commerce with passes over a bridge may be much greater than would ever be transported on the water it obstructs. It is for the municipal power to weigh the considerations which belong to the subject, and to decide which shall be preferred, and how far either shall be made subservient to the other. The states have always exercised this power, and, from the nature and objects of the two systems of government, they must always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in all cases, to the paramount authority of congress, whenever the power of the states shall be exerted within the sphere of the commercial power which belongs to the nation.'

So, in Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459, 464, which was a case where obstructions-piers and booms-had been placed under the authority of the state of Wisconsin in the Chippewa river, one of the navigable waters of the United States, it was said: 'There are within the state of Wisconsin, and perhaps other states, many small streams navigable for a short distance from their mouths in one of the great rivers of the country, by steamboats, but whose greatest value in water carriage is as outlets to saw logs, sawed lumber, coal, salt, etc. In order to develop their greatest utility in that regard, it is often essential that such structures as dams, booms, piers, etc., should be used, which are substantial obstructions to general navigation, and more or less so to rafts and barges. But to the legislature of the state may be most appropriately confided the authority to authorize these structures where their use will do more good than harm, and to impose such regulations and limitations in their construction and use as will best reconcile and accommodate the interest of all concerned in the matter. And, since the doctrine we have deduced from the cases recognizes the right of congress to interfere and control the matter whenever it may deem it necessary to do so, the exercise of this limited power may all the more safely be confided to the local legislatures.'

The same principles were announced in Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 683, 2 Sup. Ct. 185. That case involved the validity of a certain local ordinance regulating the opening and closing of bridges over the Chicago river within the limits of the city of  hicago. That ordinance required the bridges to be closed at certain hours of the day, so as not to obstruct the passage over them of vast numbers of operatives and other people going to and from their respective places of business. It was conceded that, by the closing of the bridges at those hours, vessels were obstructed in their use of the river. This court in that case said: 'The Chicago river and its branches must therefore be deemed navigable waters of the United States, over which congress, under its commercial power, may exercise control to the extent necessary to protect, preserve, and improve their free navigation. But the states have full power to regulate, within their limits, matters of internal police, including in that general designation whatever will promote the peace, comfort, convenience, and prosperity of their people. This power embraces the construction of roads, canals, and bridges, and the establishment of ferries; and it can generally be exercised more wisely by the states than by a distant authority. They are the first to see the importance of such means of internal communication, and are more deeply concerned than others in their wise management. Illinois is more immediately affected by the bridges over the Chicago river and its branches than any other state, and is more directly concerned for the prosperity of the city of Chicago, for the convenience and comfort of its inhabitants, and the growth of its commerce. And nowhere could the power to control the bridges in that city, their construction, form, and strength, and the size of their draws, and the manner and times of using them, be better vested than with the state, or the authorities of the city upon whom it has devolved that duty. When its power is exercised so as to unnecessarily obstruct the navigation of the river or its branches, congress may interfere and remove the obstruction. If the power of the state and that of the federal government come in conflict, the latter must control, and the former yield. This necessarily follows from the position given by the constitution to legislation in pursuance of it, as the supreme law of the land. But, until congress acts on the subject, the power of the state over bridges across its navigable streams is plenary.' It was consequently adjudged that the city ordinance was not to be deemed such a regulation of interstate commerce as, in the absence of national legislation, should be deemed invalid.

In Cardwell v. Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 208, 5 Sup. Ct. 423, it was held that a statute of California authorizing a bridge without a draw or opening for the passage of vessels to be constructed over a navigable water of the United States within that state was not, in the absence of legislation by congress, to be deemed repugnant to the commerce clause of the constitution. The court, referring to prior cases, said: 'In these cases the control of congress over navigable waters within the states, so as to preserve their free navigation under the commercial clause of the constitution, the power of the states within which they lie to authorize the construction of bridges over them until congress intervenes and supersedes their authority, and the right of private parties to interfere with their construction or continuance, have been fully considered, and we are entirely satisfied with the soundness of the conclusions reached. They recognize the full power of the states to regulate within their limits matters of internal police, which embraces, among other things, the construction, repair, and maintenance of roads and bridges, and the establishment of ferries; that the states are more likely to appreciate the importance of these means of internal communication, and to provide for their proper management, than a government at a distance; and that, as to bridges over navigable streams, their power is subordinate to that of congress, as an act of the latter body is, by the constitution, made the supreme law of the land; but that until con ress acts on the subject their power is plenary. When congress acts directly with reference to the bridges authorized by the state, its will must control so far as may be necessary to secure the free navigation of the streams.' The doctrines of this case were reaffirmed in Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 7 Sup. Ct. 313.

In Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650, 662, 16 Sup. Ct. 934, the question was presented whether a state enactment requiring telegraph companies with lines of wires wholly or partly within the state to receive telegrams, and, on payment of the charges thereon, to deliver them with due diligence, was not a regulation of interstate commerce when applied to interstate telegrams. We held that such enactments did not in any just sense regulate interstate commerce. It was said in that case: 'While it is vitally important that commerce between the states should be unembarrassed by vexatious state regulations regarding it, yet, on the other hand, there are many occasions where the police power of the state can be properly exercised to insure a faithful and prompt performance of duty within the limits of the state upon the part of those who are engaged in interstate commerce. We think the statute in question is one of that class, and, in the absence of any legislation by congress, the statute is a valid exercise of the power of the state over the subject.'

So, in Richmond & A. R. Co. v. R. A. Patterson Tobacco Co., 169 U.S. 311, 315, 18 Sup. Ct. 335, it was adjudged that a statute of Virginia defining the obligation of carriers who accepted for transportation anything directed to points of destination beyond the termini of their own lines or routes was not, in its application to interstate business, a regulation of interstate commerce, within the meaning of the constitution. This court said: 'Of course, in a latitudinarian sense, any restriction as to the evidence of a contract, relating to interstate commerce, may be said to be a limitation on the contract itself. But this remote effect, resulting from the lawful exercise by a state of its power to determine the form in which contracts may be proven, does not amount to a regulation of interstate commerce.' And the court cited in support of its conclusion the case of Railway Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133, 137, 18 Sup. Ct. 289, which involved the validity of state regulations as to the liability of carriers of passengers, and in which it was said: 'They are not in themselves regulations of interstate commerce, although they control in some degree the conduct and liability of those engaged in such commerce. So long as congress has not legislated upon the particular subject, they are rather to be regarded as legislation in aid of such commerce, and as a rightful exercise of the police power of the state to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its limits.'

Now, it is evident that these cases had no reference to the health, morals, or safety of the people of the state, but only to the public convenience. They recognized the fundamental principle that, outside of the field directly occupied by the general government under the powers granted to it by the constitution, all questions arising within a state that relate to its internal order, or that involve the public convenience or the general good, are primarily for the determination of the state, and that its legislative enactments relating to those subjects, and which are not inconsistent with the state constitution, are to be respected and enforced in the courts of the Union if they do not by their operation directly entrench upon the authority of the United States, or violate some right protected by the national constitution. The power here referred to is-to use the words of Chief Justice Shaw-the power 'to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be  or the good and welfare of the commonwealth and of the subjects of the same.' Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 85. Mr. Cooley well said: 'It cannot be doubted that there is ample power in the legislative department of the state to adopt all necessary legislation for the purpose of enforcing the obligations of railway companies as carriers of persons and goods to accommodate the public impartially, and to make every reasonable provision for carrying with safety and expedition.' Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) p. 715. It may be that such legislation is not within the 'police power' of a state, as those words have been sometimes, although inaccurately, used. But, in our opinion, the power, whether called 'police,' 'governmental,' or 'legislative,' exists in each state, by appropriate enactments not forbidden by its own constitution or by the constitution of the United States, to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its jurisdiction, and therefore to provide for the public convenience and the public good. This power in the states is entirely distinct from any power granted to the general government, although, when exercised, it may sometimes reach subjects over which national legislation can be constitutionally extended. When congress acts with reference to a matter confided to it by the constitution, then its statutes displace all conflicting local regulations touching that matter, although such regulations may have been established in pursuance of a power not surrendered by the states to the general government. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243; Railway Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 626, 18 Sup. Ct. 488.

It is not contended that the statute in question is repugnant to the constitution of the United States when applied to railroad trains carrying passengers between points within the state of Ohio. But the contention is that to require railroad companies, even those organized under the laws of Ohio, to stop their trains or any of them carrying interstate passengers at a particular place or places in the state for a reasonable time, so directly affects commerce among the states as to bring the statute, whether congress has acted or not on the same subject, into conflict with the grant in the constitution of power to regulate such commerce. That such a regulation may be in itself reasonable, and may promote the public convenience or subserve the general welfare, is, according to the argument made before us, of no consequence whatever; for, it is said, a state regulation which to any extent or for a limited time only interrupts the absolute, continuous freedom of interstate commerce is forbidden by the constitution, although congress has not legislated upon the particular subject covered by the state enactment. If these broad propositions are approved, it will be difficult to sustain the numerous judgments of this court upholding local regulations which in some degree or only incidentally affected commerce among the states, but which were adjudged not to be in themselves regulations of interstate commerce, but within the police powers of the states and to be respected so long as congress did not itself cover the subject by legislation. Cooley v. Board, 12 How. 299, 320; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 104; Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. R. & S. S.C.o. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 463, 6 Sup. Ct. 1114; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 564; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96, 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 28; Hennington v. Georgia, above cited; Railway Co. v. Haber, above cited; and New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 631, 632, 17 Sup. Ct. 418,-were all cases involving state regulations more or less affecting interstate or foreign commerce, but which were sustained upon the ground that they were not directed against nor were direct burdens upon interstate or foreign commerce, and having been enacted only to protect the public safety, the public health, or the public morals, and having a real, substantial relation to the public ends intended to be accomplished thereby, were not to be deemed absolutely forbidden because of the mere grant of power to congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, but to be regarded as only incidentally affecting such commerce, and valid until superseded by legislation of congress on the same subject.

In the case last cited (New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York) the question was as to the validity, when applied to interstate railroad trains, of a statute of New York forbidding the heating of passenger cars in a particular mode. This court said: 'According to numerous decisions of this court sustaining the validity of state regulations enacted under the police powers of the state, and which incidentally affected commerce among the states and with foreign nations, it was clearly competent for the state of New York, in the absence of national legislation covering the subject, to forbid, under penalties, the heating of passenger cars in that state by stoves or furnaces kept inside the cars of suspended therefrom, although such cars may be employed in interstate commerce. While the laws of the states must yield to acts of congress passed in execution of the powers conferred upon it by the constitution (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211), the mere grant to congress of the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states did not, of itself and without legislation by congress, impair the authority of the states to establish such reasonable regulations as were appropriate for the protection of the health, the lives, and the safety of their people. The statute in question had for its object to protect all persons traveling in the state of New York on passenger cars moved by the agency of steam against the perils attending a particular mode of heating such cars. * * * The statute in question is not directed against interstate commerce. Nor is it, within the necessary meaning of the constitution, a regulation of commerce, although it controls in some degree the conduct of those engaged in such commerce. So far as it may affect interstate commerce, it is to be regarded as legislation in aid of commerce, and enacted under the power remaining with the state to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its limits. Until displaced by such national legislation as congress may rightfully establish under its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, the validity of the statute, so far as the commerce clause of the constitution of the United States is concerned, cannot be questioned.'

Consistently with these doctrines, it cannot be adjudged that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional. The power of the state, by appropriate legislation, to provide for the public convenience, stands upon the same ground precisely as its power by appropriate legislation to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety. Whether legislation of either kind is inconsistent with any power granted to the general government is to be determined by the same rules.

In what has been said, we have assumed that the statute is not in itself unreasonable; that is, it has appropriate relation to the public convenience, does not go beyond the necessities of the case, and is not directed against interstate commerce. In Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 473, reference was made to some decisions of state courts in relation to statutes prohibiting the introduction into a state of cattle having infectious diseases, and in which it was contended that it was for the legislature, and not for the courts, to determine whether such legislation went beyond the danger to be apprehended, and was therefore something more than the exertion of the police power. This court said that it could not concur in that view; that, as the police power of a state cannot obstruct either foreign or interstate commerce 'beyond the necessity for its exercis ,' it was the duty of the courts to guard vigilantly against 'needless intrusion' upon the field committed by the constitution to congress. As the cases above cited show, and as appears from other cases, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a state enactment is always an element in the general inquiry by the court whether such legislation encroaches upon national authority, or is to be deemed a legitimate exertion of the power of the state to protect the public interests or promote the public convenience.

In our judgment, the assumption that the statute of Ohio was not directed against interstate commerce, but is a reasonable provision for the public convenience, is not unwarranted. The requirement that a railroad company whose road is operated within the state shall cause three each way of its regular trains carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop at any station, city, or village of 3,000 inhabitants for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers, so far from being unreasonable, will greatly subserve the public convenience. The statute does not stand in the way of the railroad company running as many trains as it may choose between Chicago and Buffalo, without stopping at intermediate points, or only at very large cities on the route, if, in the contingency named in the statute, the required number of trains stop at each place containing 3,000 inhabitants long enough to receive and let off passengers. It seems from the evidence that the average time required to stop a train and receive and let off passengers is only three minutes. Certainly, the state of Ohio did not endow the plaintiff in error with the rights of a corporation for the purpose simply of subserving the convenience of passengers traveling through the state between points outside of its territory. 'The question is no longer an open one,' this court said in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 657, 10 Sup. Ct. 965, 'as to whether a railroad is a public highway, established primarily for the convenience of the people, and to subserve public ends, and therefore subject to governmental control and regulation. It is because it is a public highway, and subject to such control, that the corporation by which it is constructed, and by which it is to be maintained, may be permitted, under legislative sanction, to appropriate property for the purpose of a right of way, upon making just compensation to the owner, in the mode prescribed by law.' In the construction and maintenance of such a highway under public sanction, the corporation really performs a function of the state. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544, 18 Sup. Ct. 418. The plaintiff in error accepted its charter, subject necessarily to the condition that it would conform to such reasonable regulations as the state might from time to time establish that were not in violation of the supreme law of the land. In the absence of legislation by congress, it would be going very far to hold that such an enactment as the one before us was in itself a regulation of interstate commerce. It was for the state to take into consideration all the circumstances affecting passenger travel within its limits, and, as far as practicable, make such regulations as were just to all who might pass over the road in question. It was entitled, of course, to provide for the convenience of persons desiring to travel from one point to another in the state on domestic trains. But it was not bound to ignore the convenience of those who desired to travel from places in the state to places beyond its limits, or the convenience of those outside of the state who wished to come into it. Its statute is in aid of interstate commerce of that character. It was not compelled to look only to the convenience of those who desired to pass through the state without stopping. Any other view of the relations between the state and the corporation created by it would mean that the directors of the corporation could manage i § affairs solely with reference to the interests of the stockholders, and without taking into consideration the interests of the general public. It would mean, not only that such directors were the exclusive judges of the manner in which the corporation should discharge the duties imposed upon it in the interest of the public, but that the corporation could so regulate the running of its interstate trains as to build up cities and towns at the ends of its line or at favored points, and by that means destroy or retard the growth and prosperity of those at intervening points. It would mean also that, beyond the power of the state to prevent it, the defendant railway company could run all its trains through the state without stopping at any city within its limits, however numerous its population, and could prevent the people along its road within the state who desired to go beyond its limits from using its interstate trains at all, or only at such points as the company chose to designate. A principle that in its application admits of such results cannot be sanctioned.

We perceive in the legislation of Ohio no basis for the contention that the state has invaded the domain of national authority or impaired any right secured by the national constitution. In the recent case of Jones v. Brim, 165 U.S. 180, 182, 17 Sup. Ct. 282, it was adjudged that embraced within the police powers of a state was the establishment, maintenance, and control of public highways, and that, under such powers, reasonable regulations incident to the right to establish and maintain such highways could be established by the state. And the state of Ohio, by the statute in question, has done nothing more than to so regulate the use of a public highway established and maintained under its authority as will reasonably promote the public convenience. It has not unreasonably obstructed the freedom of commerce among the states. Its regulations apply equally to domestic and interstate railroads. Its statute is not directed against interstate commerce, but only incidentally affects it. It has only forbidden one of its own corporations from discriminating unjustly against a large part of the public for whose convenience that corporation was created, and invested with authority to maintain a public highway within the limits of the state.

It has been suggested that the conclusion reached by us is not in accord with Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488, Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 556, 7 Sup. Ct. 4, and Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 153, 154, 16 Sup. Ct. 1096, in each of which cases certain state enactments were adjudged to be inconsistent with the grant of power to congress to regulate commerce among the states.

In Hall v. De Cuir a statute of Louisiana relating to carriers of passengers within that state, and which prohibited any discrimination against passengers on account of race or color, was held-looking at its necessary operation-to be a regulation of and a direct burden on commerce among the states, and therefore unconstitutional. The defendant, who was sued for damages on account of an alleged violation of that statute, was the master and owner of a steamboat enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States for the coasting trade, and plying as a regular packet for the transportation of freight and passengers between New Orleans, La., and Vicksburg, Miss., touching at the intermediate landings both within and without Louisiana, as occasion required. He insisted that it was void as to him because it directly regulated or burdened interstate business. The court distinctly recognized the principle upon which we proceed in the present case,-that state legislation relating to commerce is not to be deemed a regulation of interstate commerce simply because it may to some extent or under some circumstances affect such commerce. But, speaking by Chief Justice Waite, it said: 'We think it may be safely said that state legislation which seeks to impose a direct b rden upon interstate commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of congress. The statute now under consideration, in our opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon the business through the local instruments to be employed after coming within the state, but directly upon the business as it comes into the state from without or goes out from within. While it purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the state, it must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the management of his business throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the state, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a greater or less degree those taken up without and brought within, and sometimes those taken up and put down without. A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the state must, when the boat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board afterwards, if the law is enforced. It was to meet just such a case that the commercial clause in the constitution was adopted. The river Mississippi passes through or along the borders of 10 different states, and its tributaries reach many more. * * * No carrier of passengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a state line his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regulations by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of his route is a necessity in his business; and, to secure it, congress, which is untrammeled by state lines, has been invested with the exclusive legislative power of determining what such regulations shall be. If this statute can be enforced against those engaged in interstate commerce, it may be as well against those engaged in foreign; and the master of a ship clearing from New Orleans for Liverpool, having passengers on board, would be compelled to carry all, white and colored, in the same cabin during his passage down the river, or be subject to an action for damages, 'exemplary as well as actual,' by any one who felt himself aggrieved because he had been excluded on account of his color.' The import of that decision is that, in the absence of legislation by congress, a state enactment may so directly and materially burden interstate commerce as to be in itself a regulation of such commerce. We cannot perceive that there is any conflict between the decision in that case and that now made. The Louisiana statute, as interpreted by the court, embraced every passenger carrier coming into the state. The Ohio statute does not interfere at all with the management of the defendant's trains outside of the state, nor does it apply to all its trains coming into the state. It relates only to the stopping of a given number of its trains within the state at certain points, and then only long enough to receive and let off passengers. It so manifestly subserves the public convenience, and is in itself so just and reasonable, as wholly to preclude the idea that it was, as the Louisiana statute was declared to be, a direct burden upon interstate commerce, or a direct interference with its freedom.

The judgment in Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois is entirely consistent with the views herein expressed. A statute of Illinois was construed by the supreme court of that state as prescribing rates not simply for railroad transportation beginning and ending within Illinois, but for transportation between points in Illinois and points in other states under contracts for continuous service covering the entire route through several states. Referring to the principle contained in the statute, this court held that, if restricted to transportation beginning and ending within the limits of the state, it might be very just and equitable, but  hat it could not be applied to transportation through an entire series of states without imposing a direct burden upon interstate commerce forbidden by the constitution. In the case before us there is no attempt upon the part of Ohio to regulate the movement of the defendant company's interstate trains throughout the whole route traversed by them. It applies only to the movement of trains while within the state, and to the extent simply of requiring a given number, if so many are daily run, to stop at certain places long enough to receive and let off passengers.

Nor is Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois inconsistent with the views we have expressed. In that case a statute of Illinois was held, in certain particulars, to be unconstitutional (although the legislation of congress did not cover the subject), as directly and unnecessarily burdening interstate commerce. The court said: 'The effect of the statute of Illinois, as construed and applied by the supreme court of the state, is to require a fast mail train, carrying interstate passengers and the United States mail, from Chicago in the state of Illinois to places south of the Ohio river, over an interstate highway established by authority of congress, to delay the transportation of such passengers and mails, by turning aside from the direct interstate route, and running to a station three miles and a half away from a point on that route, and back again to the same point, and thus traveling seven miles which form no part of its course, before proceeding on its way; and to do this for the purpose of discharging and receiving passengers at that station, for the interstate travel to and from which, as is admitted in this case, the railway company furnishes other and ample accomodation. This court is unanimously of opinion that this requirement is an unconstitutional hindrance and obstruction of interstate commerce, and of the passage of the mails of the United States.' Again: 'It may well be, as held by the courts of Illinois, that the arrangement made by the company with the post-office department of the United States cannot have the effect of abrogating a reasonable police regulation of the state. But a statute of the state, which unnecessarily interferes with the speedy and uninterrupted carriage of the mails of the United States, cannot be considered as a reasonable police regulation.' The statute before us does not require the defendant company to turn any of its trains from their direct interstate route. Besides, it is clear that the particular question now presented was not involved in Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois; for it is stated in the court's opinion that 'the question whether a statute which merely required interstate railroad trains, without going out of their course, to stop at county seats, would be within the constitutional power of the state, is not presented, and cannot be decided, upon this record.' The above extracts show the full scope of that decision. Any doubt upon the point is removed by the reference made to that case in Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427, 431, 17 Sup. Ct. 627.

It has been suggested also that the statute of Ohio is inconsistent with section 5258 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, authorizing every railroad company in the United States operated by steam, its successors and assigns, 'to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges, and ferries all passengers, troops, government supplies, mails, freight, and property on their way from any state to another state, and to receive compensation therefor, and to connect with roads of other states so as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the same to the place of destination.' In Railway Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 638, 18 Sup. Ct. 488, above cited, it was held that the authority given by that statute to railroad companies to carry 'freight and property' over their respective roads from one state to another state did not authorize a railroad company to carry into a state cattle known  or which by due diligence might be known, to be in such condition as to impart or communicate disease to the domestic cattle of such state; and that a statute of Kansas prescribing as a rule of civil conduct that a person or corporation should not bring into that state cattle known, or which by proper diligence could be known, to be capable of communicating disease to domestic cattle, could not be regarded as beyond the necessities of the case, nor as interfering with any right intended to be given or recognized by section 5258 of the Revised Statutes. And we adjudge that the above statutory provision was not intended to interfere with the authority of the states to enact such regulations, with respect at least to a railroad corporation of its own creation, as were not directed against interstate commerce, but which only incidentally or remotely affected such commerce, and were not in themselves regulations of interstate commerce, but were disigned reasonably to subserve the convenience of the public.

Imaginary cases are put for the purpose of showing what might be done by the state that would seriously interfere with or discriminate against interstate commerce, if the statute in question be upheld as consistent with the constitution of the United States. Without stopping to consider whether the illustrations referred to are apposite to the present inquiry, it is sufficient to say that it is always easy to suggest extreme cases for the application of any principle embodied in a judicial opinion. Our present judgment has reference only to the case before us, and when other cases arise in which local statutes are alleged not to be legitimate exertions of the police powers of the state, but to infringe upon national authority, it can then be determined whether they are to be controlled by the decision now rendered. It would be impracticable, as well as unwise, to attempt to lay down any rule that would govern every conceivable case that might be suggested by ingenious minds.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the supreme court of Ohio is affirmed.

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