Berger v. United States (255 U.S. 22)/Opinion of the Court
Section 21 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 988) provides as follows:

'Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or      criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge      before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard      has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in      favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be      designated in the manner prescribed in the section last      preceding, or chosen in the manner prescribed in section      twenty-three, to hear such matter. Every such affidavit shall      state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias      or prejudice exists, * * * No party shall be entitled in any      case to file more than one such affidavit; and no such      affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a certificate      of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are      made in good faith. The same proceedings shall be had when      the presiding judge shall file with the clerk of the court a      certificate that he deems himself unable for any reason to      preside with absolute impartiality in the pending suit or      action.'

February 2, 1918, there was returned into the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, an indictment against plaintiffs in error (it will be convenient to refer to them as defendants), charging them with a violation of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917, known as the Espionage Act (40 Stat. 217, c. 30).  In due time they invoked section 21 by filing an affidavit charging Judge Landis, who was to preside at the trial, with personal bias and prejudice against them, and moved for the assignment of another judge to preside at the trial. The motion was denied and upon the trial defendants were convicted and each sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. From the judgment and sentence they took the case to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. That court, reciting that certain questions of law under section 21 have arisen upon the affidavit and motion upon which the court is in doubt and upon which it desires the advice and instructions of this court, certifies questions of the sufficiency of the affidavit and the duty of the judge thereunder, and also certifies the affidavit and other proceedings upon such motion.

The affidavit, omitting formal and unnecessary parts, is as follows:

Petitioners [defendants] represent 'that they jointly and      severally verily believe that his honor Judge Kenesaw      Mountain Landis has a personal bias and prejudice against      certain of the defendants, to wit, Victor L. Berger, William      F. Kruse and Adolph Germer, defendants in this cause, and      impleaded with J. Louis Engdahl and Irwin St. John Tucker,      defendants in this case. That the grounds for the      petitioners' beliefs are the following facts: That said      Adolph Germer was born in Prussia, a state or province of      Germany; that Victor L. Berger was born in Rehback, Austria;      that William F. Kruse is of immediate German extraction; that      said Judge Landis is prejudiced and biased against said      defendants because of their nativity, and in support thereof      the defendants allege, that, on information and belief, on or      about the 1st day of November said Judge Landis said in      substance: 'If anybody has said anything worse about the      Germans than I have I would like to know it so I can ust it.'      And referring to a German who was charged with stating that      'Germany had money and plenty of men and wait and see what      she is going to do to the United States,' Judge Landis said      in substance: 'One must have a very judicial mind, indeed,      not to be prejudiced against the German-Americans in this      country. Their hearts are reeking with disloyalty. This      defendant is the kind of a man that spreads this kind of      propaganda, and it has been spread until it has affected      practically all the Ger mans in this country. This same kind of excuse of the      defendant offering to protect the German people is the same      kind of excuse offered by the pacifists in this country, who      are against the United States and have the interests of the      enemy at heart by defending that thing they call the Kaiser      and his darling people. You are the same kind of a man that      comes over to this country from Germany to get away from the      Kaiser and war. You have become a citizen of this country and      lived here as such, and now when this country is at war with      Germany you seek to undermine the country which gave you      protection. You are of the same mind that practically all the      German-Americans are in this country, and you call yourselves      German-Americans. Your hearts are reeking with disloyalty. I      know a safe-blower, he is a friend of mine, who is making a      good soldier in France. He was a bank robber for nine years,      that was his business in peace time, and now he is a good      soldier, and as between him and this defendant, I prefer the      safeblower.'

'These defendants further aver that they have at no time      defended the Kaiser, but on the contrary they have been      opposed to an autocracy in Germany and every other country;      that Victor L. Berger, defendant herein, editor of the      Milwaukee Leader, a Socialist daily paper, Adolph Germer,      national secretary of the Socialist party, William F. Kruse,      editor of the Young Socialists Magazine, a Socialist      publication, and J. Louis Engdahl disapproved the entrance of      the United States into this war.

'Your petitioners further aver that the defendants Tucker and      Engdahl were born in the United States and were not born in      enemy countries, and are not immediate descendants of persons      born in enemy countries, but verily believe because they are      impleaded with Berger, Kruse and Germer that they as well as      Berger, Germer and Kruse cannot receive a fair and impartial      trial, and that the prejudice of said Judge Landis against      said Berger, Germer and Kruse would prejudice the defense of said      defendants Tucker and Engdahl impleaded in this case.'

The affidavit was accompanied by the certificate of Seymour Stedman, attorney for defendants, that the affidavit and application were made in good faith.

(1) Is the aforesaid affidavit of prejudice sufficient to invoke the operation of the act which provides for the filing of affidavit of prejudice of a judge?

(2) Did said Judge Landis have the lawful right to pass upon the sufficiency of the said affidavit of his prejudice, or upon any question arising out of the filing of said affidavit?

(3) Upon the filing of the said affidavit of prejudice of said Judge Landis, did the said judge have lawful right and power to preside as judge on the trial of plaintiffs in error upon said indictment?

The basis of the question is section 21, and the primary question under it is the duty and power of the judge, whether the filing of an affidavit of personal bias or prejudice compels his retirement from the case or whether he can exercise a judgment upon the facts affirmed and determine his qualification against them and the belief based upon them?

These alternatives present the contentions in the case. Defendants contend for the first; the United States contends for the second. The assertion of defendants is that the mandate of the section is not subject to the discretion or judgment of the judge. The assertion of the United States is that the motion and its supporting affidavit, like other motions and their supporting evidence, are submitted for decision and the exercise of the judicial judgment upon them. In other words, the action of the affidavit is not 'automatic,' to quote the Solicitor General, but depends upon the substance and merit of its reasons and the truth of its facts, and upon both the judge has jurisdiction to pass. The issue is therefore precise, and while not in broad compass is practically of first impression as now presented.

In Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, 32 Sup. Ct. 753, 56 L. Ed. 1147, the section was referred to but not passed upon. In Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, 33 Sup. Ct. 1007, 57 L. Ed. 1379, the phase of the section presented here was not presented. There proceedings in bankruptcy had progressed to a decree of adjudication, and the judge who had conducted them was charged by certain creditors with bias and prejudice based on his rulings in the case. Such use of section 21 was disapproved. 'It was never intended,' it was said, 'to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings made, for such rulings are reviewable otherwise, but to prevent his future action in the pending cause.' As pertinent to the comment and to the meaning of section 21, we may say, that Judge Chatfield, against whom the affidavit was directed, said that he felt that the intention of section 21 was 'to cause a transfer of the case without reference to the merits of the charge of bias,' and he did so immediately, in order, as he said, 'that the application of the creditors' might 'be considered as speedily as possible by such judge as' might 'be designated.' Another judge was designated and to restrain action by the latter and vacate the orders that he had made, and to command Judge Chatfield to resume jurisdiction, mandamus was sought. It was denied. The case establishes that the bias or prejudice which can be urged against a judge must be based upon something other than rulings in the case.

The cases at circuit in which section 21 was considered have not much guidance. They, however, deserve attention. Ex parte N. K. Fairbank Co. (D. C.) 194 Fed. 978, may be considered as expressing power in the presiding judge to pass upon the sufficiency of the facts affirmed. In Ex parte Glasgow (D. C.) 195 Fed. 780, the question came up upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus and it appeared that the affidavit of bias was not filed until after trial of the case and when the court was about to pass upon a motion in arrest of judgment and new trial. It was held that section 21 was not applicable at such stage of the proceedings. Henry v. Speer, 201 Fed. 869, 120 C. C. A. 107, was a petition for mandamus to require an affidavit of bias against District Judge Speer to be certified to the senior circuit judge that the latter might determine its sufficiency, and to restrain Judge Speer from exercising jurisdiction of the case. The writ was refused on the ground that the affidavit did not conform to section 21 in that it omitted to charge 'personal' bias, a charge of such bias, it was held, being a necessary condition. The court (Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit) by Judge Meek, said:

'Upon the making and filing by a party of an affidavit under      the provisions of section 21, of necessity there is imposed      upon the judge the duty of examining the affidavit to      determine whether or not it is the affidavit specified and      required by the statute and to determine its legal      sufficiency. If he finds it to be legally sufficient then he      has no other or further duty to perform than that prescribed      in section 20 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 987). He is      relieved from the delicate and trying duty of deciding upon      the question of his own disqualification.'

This comment sustains defendants' view of section 21 and marks a distinction between determining the legal sufficiency of the affidavit and passing upon the truth of its statements, a distinction to which we shall presently advert.

The cases (one being excepted), to the extent they go, militate against the contention of the government, and they have confirmation in the words of the section. Their declaration is that--

'Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or      criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge      before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard      has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any opposite party to the      suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but      another judge shall be designated * * * to hear such matter.'

There is no ambiguity in the declaration and seemingly nothing upon which construction can be exerted-nothing to qualify or temper its words or effect. It is clear in its permission and direction. It permits an affidavit of personal bias or prejudice to be filed and upon its filing, if it be accompanied by certificate of counsel, directs an immediate cessation of action by the judge whose bias or prejudice is averred, and in his stead, the designation of another judge. And there is purpose in the conjunction; its elements are complements of each other. The exclusion of one judge is emphasized by the requirement of the designation of another.

But it is said that there is modification of the absolutism of the quoted declaration in the succeeding provision that the 'affidavit shall state the facts and reasons for the belief' of the existnece of the bias or prejudice. It is urged that the purpose of the requirement is to submit the reality and sufficiency of the facts to the judgment of the judge and their support of the averment or belief of the affiant. It is in effect urged that the requirement can have no other purpose, that it is idle else, giving an automatism to the affidavit which overrides everything. But this is a misunderstanding of the requirement. It has other and less extensive use as pointed out by Judge Meek in Henry v. Speer, supra. It is a precaution against abuse, removes the averments and belief from the irresponsibility of unsupported opinion, and adds to the certificated of counsel the supplementary aid of the penalties attached to perjury. Nor do we think that this view gives room for frivolous affidavits. Of course the reasons and facts for the belief the litigant entertains are an essential part of the affidavit, and must give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impedeimpartiality of judgment. The affidavit of defendants has that character. The facts and reasons it states are not frivolous or fanciful, but substantial and formidable, and they have relation to the attitude of Judge Landis' mind toward defendants.

It is, however, said, that the assertion and the facts are stated on information and belief and that hence the affidavit is wholly insufficient, section 21 requiring facts to be stated 'and not merely belief.' The contention is that 'the court is expected to act on the affidavit itself' and that therefore 'the act of Congress requires facts-not opinions, beliefs, rumors or gossip.' Ex parte American Steel Barrel Company, supra, is cited for the contention. We do not know what counsel means by 'opinions, beliefs, rumors or gossip.' The belief of a party the section makes of concern and if opinion be nearer to or farther from persuasion than belief, both are of influence and universally regarded as of influence in the affairs of men and determinative of their conduct, and it is not strange that section 21 should so regard them.

We may concede that section 21 is not fulfilled by the assertion of 'rumors of gossip,' but such disparagement cannot be applied to the affidavit in this case. Its statement has definite time and place and character, and the value of averments on information and belief in the procedure of the law is recognized. To refuse their application to section 21 would be arbitrary and make its remedy unavailable in many, if not in most cases. The section permits only the affidavit of a party, and Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., supra, decides, that it must be based upon facts antedating the trial, not those occurring during the trial. In the present case the information was of a definite incident, and its time and place were given. Besides, it cannot be the assumption of section 21 that the bias or prejudice of a judge in a particular case would be known by everybody, and necessarily, therefore, to deny to a party the use of information received from others is to deny to him at times the benefit of the section.

We are of opinion, therefore, that an affidavit upon information and belief satisfies the section and that upon its filing, if it show the objectionable inclination or disposition of the judge, which we have said is an essential condition, it is his duty to 'proceed no further' in the case. And in this there is no serious detriment to the administration of justice nor inconvenience worth of mention, for of what concern is it to a judge to preside in a particular case; of what concern to other parties to have him so preside, and any serious delay of trial is avoided by the requirement that the affidavit must be filed not less than ten days before the commencement of the term.

Our interpretation of section 21 has therefore no deterring consequences, and we cannot relieve from its imperative conditions upon a dread or prophecy that they may be abusively used. They can only be so used by making a false affidavit, and a charge of and the penalties of perjury restrain from that-perjury in him who makes the affidavit; connivance therein of counsel, thereby subjecting him to disbarment. And upon what inducement and for what achievement-no other than trying the case by one judge rather than another, neither party or counsel having voice or influence in the designation of that other; and the section in its care permits but 'one such affidavit.'

But if we concede, out of deference to judgments that we respect, a foundation for the dread, a possibility to the prophecy, we must conclude Congress was aware of them and considered that there were countervailing benefits. At any rate we can only deal with it as it is expressed and enforce it according to its expressions. Nor is it our function to approve or disapprove it, but, we may say, that its solicitude is that the tribunals of the country shall not only be impartial in the controversies submitted to them but shall give assurance that they are impartial, free, to use the words of the section, from any 'bias or prejudice' that might disturb the normal course of impartial judgment. And to accomplish this end the section withdraws from the presiding judge a decision upon the truth of the matters alleged. Its explicit declaration is that upon the making and filing of the affidavit, the judge against whom it is directed 'shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be designated in the manner prescribed in * * * section twenty-three to hear such matter.' And the reason is easy to divine. To commit to the judge a decision upon the truth of the facts gives chance for the evil against which the section is directed. The remedy by appeal is inadequate. It comes after the trial and if prejudice exist it has worked its evil and a judgment of it in a reviewing tribunal is precarious. It goes there fortified by presumptions, and nothing can be more elusive of estimate or decision than a disposition of a mind in which there is a personal ingredient.

After overruling the motion of plaintiffs for his displacement Judge Landis permitted to be filed a stenographic report of the incident and language upon which the motion was based. We, however, have not discussed it because under our interpretation of section 21 it is excluded from consideration.

We come then to the questions certified and to the first we answer, Yes; that is, that the affidavit of prejudice is sufficient to invoke the operation of the act. To the second we answer that to the extent we have indicated, Judge Landis had a lawful right to pass upon the sufficiency of the affidavit. To the third we answer, No; that is, that Judge Landis had no lawful right or power to preside as judge on the trial of defendants upon the indictment.

So ordered.

Mr. Justice DAY dissenting. 

Notes