Ford Motor Company v. United States Commercial Investment Trust Corporation/Opinion of the Court
These cases were brought here on appeal, prior to the revision of Title 28, United States Code, under what was § 345 and since September 1 has become § 2101 of that Title, to review final decrees of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana in a suit in equity brought by the United States under § 4 of the Sherman Law, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 36 Stat. 1167, 15 U.S.C. § 4, 15 U.S.C.A. § 4. The cases present another phase of a multifarious litigation which has been occupying the attention of the federal judicial system for more than a decade. United States v. General Motors Corp., D.C.N.D.Ind., 26 F.Supp. 353; United States v. General Motors Corp., 7th Cir., 121 F.2d 376, certiorari denied 314 U.S. 618, 62 S.Ct. 105, 86 L.Ed. 497, rehearing denied 314 U.S. 710, 62 S.Ct. 178, 86 L.Ed. 566; United States v. General Motors Corp., D.C.N.D.Ill., 2 F.R.D. 346; United States v. General Motors Corp., D.C.N.D.Ill., 2 F.R.D. 528; Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 314 U.S. 583, 62 S.Ct. 356, 86 L.Ed. 471, rehearing denied 314 U.S. 716, 62 S.Ct. 476, 86 L.Ed. 570; Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 62 S.Ct. 1146, 86 L.Ed. 1668. An analytical summary of this litigation will make clear the immediate issues before us and, indeed, largely dispose of them.

On May 27, 1938, indictments were returned in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, against the three leading automobile manufacturers and the companies which financed the sale of their automobiles. One indictment was against the present appellants, Ford Motor Company, and Commercial Investment Trust Corporation, Commercial Investment Trust, Inc., and Universal Credit Corporation, these three referred to collectively as CIT; another against Chrysler Corporation and Commercial Credit Company; a third against General Motors Corporation and its subsidiary, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, to be abbreviated as GMAC. The indictments charged the automobile manufacturers and the jointly named finance companies with violations of the Sherman Law by influencing dealers who sold the automobiles of the respective manufacturers to give the finance companies the business of financing the dealers' wholesale purchases and retail sales of automobiles.

Following these charges, negotiations were set afoot to secure the elimination through consent decrees of the practices described in the indictments. As to the Ford and Chrysler groups, the Government, on November 7, 1938, filed suits in equity and arranged for the dismissal of their indictments. (For present purposes we are not further concerned with Chrysler.) Although Ford and CIT formally resisted the complaint, denying its allegations and pleading affirmative defenses, negotiations for a consent decree proceeded. Efforts toward an amicable settlement with General Motors and GMAC failed. The Government therefore pressed the criminal charges against them. In view of the competitive conditions in the automobile industry it obviously became of crucial importance to Ford not to consent to any restraints beyond those which would fall upon General Motors through the contingencies of litigation against it. But it would not have been enough merely to provide that restraints which Ford accepted should eventually be lifted to the extent not imposed upon General Motors at some remote time defined merely by the vicissitudes of litigation. Protection against competitive disadvan tage, the appropriateness of which the Government recognized, required a time certain at the end of which the restraints against Ford would expire if General Motors were still free of them.

Accordingly, the consent decree, entered on November 15, 1938, assured Ford essential equality of position with the unconsenting General Motors by two explicit conditions. Their terms are fully set out in the margin;  their essence can be briefly summarized. Paragraph 12 forbids Ford from acquiring control of any finance company. After enumerating various forbidden forms of financial interest, the paragraph provides that, if the Government should not have obtained a final decree against General Motors by January 1, 1941, requiring it to divest itself of all interest in GMAC, its affiliated finance company, the prohibition against Ford would cease. The second express condition, designed to relieve from restraints imposed by earlier paragraphs in the decree against various means of influencing dealers to patronize CIT, is found in paragraph 12a. That paragraph addressed itself to the possible eventualities of the criminal proceeding against General Motors and GMAC: (1) Its termination with a result other than a judgment of conviction; (2) a general verdict of guilty; (3) a special verdict of guilty; (4) a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Upon the first contingency all restrictive terms of the decree against Ford would be suspended until similar restraints were imposed upon General Motors and GMAC. The second was to be 'deemed to be a determination of the illegality of any agreement, act or practice of General Motors Corporation which is held by the trial court, in its instructions to the jury, to constitute a proper basis for the return of a general verdict of guilty.' The third and fourth were, respectively, to be deemed determinations of the illegality of 'any agreement, act or practice' which was their subject matter.

These provisions furnish a litmus-paper test for determining what restraints survive the result of the proceeding against General Motors and GMAC. What was not illegal for General Motors was not longer to be prohibited to Ford. The sword of justice was to strike both alike. Paragraph 12a further defines how and when the restraints were to be relaxed. Sub-paragraph (3) provides that after the entry of a decree against General Motors, or after the entry of a judgment of conviction in the pending criminal proceedings 'or after January 1, 1940 (whichever date is earliest), the court upon application of any respondent from time to time will enter orders' suspending any restraint against it (with exceptions not now relevant) 'to the extent that it is not then imposed, and until it shall be imposed, in substantially identical terms' upon General Motors or GMAC.

On November 17, 1939, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty against General Motors, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment upon that verdict, 121 F.2d 376, and this Court denied further review. 3114 U.S. 618, 62 S.Ct. 105, 86 L.Ed. 497; 314 U.S. 710, 62 S.Ct. 178, 86 L.Ed. 566.

On October 4, 1940, the Government finally brought a suit in equity against General Motors seeking divestiture of its control of GMAC. But it was then too late for a decree to be entered before the lapse of Ford's agreement not to become affiliated with a finance company. On December 21, 1940, therefore, the Government made a motion asking to have paragraph 12 modified by moving forward the date when the prohibition against affiliation would expire if a decree against General Motors had not then been entered. Each year after that, as the new deadline came near the Government made a new motion to have it extended, and year after year Ford consented to the extension. On December 31, 1945, the Government again moved to have the prohibition against affiliation extended, this time to January 1, 1947. Ford now resisted the motion, and on May 4, 1946, both Ford and CIT filed motions of their own. They asked the District Court to suspend sub-paragraph (i) and (k) of paragraph 6 and sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 7 and to modify sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 6 on the ground that the practices enjoined by these provisions of the decree were not 'held by the trial court, in its instructions to the jury, to constitute a proper basis for the return of a general verdict of guilty.' Ford also moved that 'an order be entered pursuant to paragraph 12 * * * that nothing therein shall preclude the Manufacturer from acquiring and retaining ownership of and/or control over or interest in any finance company * * *.' The District Court denied the motions by Ford and CIT and granted the Government's motion for extension of the prohibition against affiliation to January 1, 1947. The present appeals followed. Although the particular extension of paragraph 12 appealed from has expired, the equity suit against General Motors has not yet been set down for trial and the Government's motion for a further extension has been held in abeyance pending the outcome of these appeals. It is not a moot question therefore whether the District Court properly granted the extension to January 1, 1947. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 433, 452, 31 S.Ct. 288, 294, 55 L.Ed. 283; Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 514 516, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310.

The restraints imposed against Ford by sub-paragraphs 6(e), 6(i), 6(k) and 7(d) must survive the outcome of the conviction against General Motors if the language of the trial judge's charge to the jury in the criminal prosecution of General Motors can fairly be equated with the language of those sub-paragraphs. If, on the other hand, the judge's charge falls short of holding illegal what those sub-paragraphs proscribed, appellants are entitled to a suspension of sub-paragraphs 6(i), 6(k) and 6(d) and a modification of sub-paragraph 6(e).

First, then, to summarize the contents of these provisions of the decree.  Sub-paragraph 6(i) precludes Ford from arranging with CIT or any other finance company 'that an agent of the Manufacturer and an agent of the finance company shall together be present with any dealer or prospective dealer for the purpose of influencing the dealer to patronize' the finance company. Sub-paragraph 6(k) provides that 'the Manufacturer shall not recommend, endorse or advertise the Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company or companies to any dealer or to the public * * *.' Sub-paragraph 7(d), the counterpart of 6(i), is directed against CIT. Sup-paragraph 6(e) restrains Ford from establishing 'any practice, procedure or plan for the retail or wholesale financing of automobiles for the purpose of enabling Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company or companies to enjoy a competitive advantage in obtaining the patronage of dealers' not equally available to any other finance company. Modification of this sub-paragraph is asked only to the extent necessary to permit them freedom to act in a manner otherwise permissible, if suspension of sub-paragraphs 6(i), 6(k) and 7(d) is granted.

This brings us to the trial judge's instructions, which, insofar as relevant, are fully set forth below.  Their plain effect is to draw a line between such practices as cancellation of a dealer's contract, or refusal to renew it, or discrimination in the shipment of automobiles, as a means of influencing dealers to use GMAC, all of which fall within the common understanding of 'coercion,' and other practices for which 'persuasion,' 'exposition' or 'argument' are fair characterizations. As a mere matter of interpreting language, the Government hardly challenges the fitness of the terms 'persuasion,' 'exposition' or 'argument,' which the jury was charged were open to General Motors, to cover acts such as arranging for the presence of agents of both Ford and CIT with a view to putting the claims of CIT to a dealer or recommending, endorsing, and advertising CIT to a dealer. But all these acts were specifically forbidden Ford by the consent decree. The Government's insistence is that since the indictment charged that advertising, endorsement and recommendation violated the Sherman Law and since evidence was introduced to support the charge, the jury might have found General Motors and GMAC guilty of 'coercion' at least partly on the basis of that evidence. But sub-paragraph 12(a)(2) was not designed to authorize speculative reconstruction of the jury's process in reaching its verdict. It provided a definite standard for ascertaining what rules of law were at a future date to be made binding on a competitor of Ford. The rules which the trial judge formulated against General Motors were thereafter to be the rules of law against Ford. The trial judge used the word 'coercion' to summarize practices which, if the jury found them to exist, would call for a verdict against General Motors. He used the words 'persuasion,' 'exposition' and 'argument' to describe conduct which, in common usage, is not 'coercion' and therefore would not support such a verdict. Nothing in other portions of the judge's charge erases or blurs this line of distinction. The restraints imposed by the paragraphs appellants seek to have suspended are properly described by the terms 'exposition,' 'persuasion' and 'argument.' So long as these paragraphs remain in effect and so long there is no comparable decree enjoining their substance against General Motors and GMAC, Ford and CIT cannot do without risk of violating the consent decree that which General Motors and GMAC are free to do. Only a lawyer who is obtuse or reckless would advise Ford and CIT that they would subject a dealer to 'persuasion,' 'exposition' or 'argument' without the hazard of contempt of the paragraphs under discussion. Thus the conditions have been fulfilled which entitled Ford and CIT to suspension of the restraints imposed by those terms of the decree.

There remains for consideration the question whether the District Court properly extended the prohibition against affiliation between Ford and a finance company. This was the sixth time that the Government had applied for extension. The equity suit begun more than six years earlier had not yet been brought to trial. The court was faced at the same time with a motion for suspension of the prohibition against affiliation which was made by appellants under the express provision of paragraph 12 reserving the right to such a motion. The court denied the appellant's motion and granted the Government's on the ground, (1) that the 'time clause' of paragraph 12 was subsidiary to the 'main purpose' of paragraph 12 which was (68 F.Supp. 828) 'to provide that the test of the permanancy of the bar against affiliation was to abide the outcome of the civil antitrust suit against General Motors Corporation,' and (2) 'That the purpose and intent of the decree will be carried out if Ford Motor Company is given the opportunity at any future time to propose a plan for the acquisition of a finance company, and to make a showing that such plan is necessary to prevent Ford Motor Company from being placed at a competitive disadvantage * * *.'

The Government seeks to support these conclusions by insisting on a mechanical application of the decision in Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 62 S.Ct. 1146, 86 L.Ed. 1668, involving a parallel prohibition against Chrysler. The Chrysler case was decided on June 1, 1942. In the intervening years the factors of the problem have drastically changed. More than nine years have elapsed since the criminal prosecution against General Motors was concluded; what was at the time of the Chrystler decision a two-year delay in obtaining a civil decree against General Motors has now stretched into a ten-year delay. Even then, six and a half years ago, this Court characterized the District Court's finding that the Government had proceeded 'diligently and expeditiously' as 'markedly generous.' 316 U.S. at page 563, 62 S.Ct. at page 1150, 86 L.Ed. 1668. At that time the Court also found support for the District Court in the fact that 'the complete cessation of the manufacture of new automobiles and light trucks has drastically minimized the significance of the competitive factor.' Id., 316 U.S. at page 564, 62 S.Ct. at page 1150. But circumstances that were found extenuating on behalf of the Government two years after the entry of the decree are hardly compelling ten years afterward. While a showing that continuance of the bar against affiliation would cause competitive disadvantage may not, as a practical matter, unreasonably have been called for at a time when competition in the industry was completely suspended during the indeterminate period of war, the resumption of full-scale competition makes such a showing unnecessary. And this is unaffected by the fact that automobiles are still in short supply. The appe lants agreed for a limited term to refrain from pursuing conduct which, in the absence of an adjudication that it was illegal, they were otherwise free to pursue and which General Motors has always been free to pursue. There has been no such adjudication and successive extensions of the term have expired. The crucial fact now is not the degree of actual disadvantage but the persistence of an inequality against which the appellants had secured the Government's protection. Yet the Government seeks a change in the express terms of the decree which would perpetuate that inequality. The Government has not sustained the burden of showing good cause why a court of equity should grant relief from an undertaking well understood and carefully formulated. If the Government seeks to outlaw possible arrangements by Ford with a finance corporation, it must establish its case in court against Ford as against General Motors and not draw on a consent which by its very terms is not available.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice MURPHY and Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting. 

Notes

'They have a right to determine whom they will sell their cars to, and they have a right to determine whom they will not sell their cars to because cars are their product and they are their property and no law compels them to sell them to any man they don't want to sell them to; but that is not the charge in this case. The charge is not that by having difficulty in contracts in itself, these defendants did anything wrong; it is not charged here that to recommend the use of GMAC there is anything wrong; it is not charged here that cancellation for cause is anything wrongful; but the Government's theory in this case is irrespective of these contracts and independent of them and outside of them the conditions have been asserted that they, under the designation of those to the grand jurors unknown, the actions have been such that the possibility, the ability to cancel, the ability to refuse to renew a contract, have been used as clubs upon the dealers to force them to use GMAC and that these acts that are complained of were acts that were used to force the dealers to use GMAC, the Government insists that these acts inspired by that motive have been such as to result in cancellations that otherwise would not have occurred; in discriminations that would not otherwise have occurred in the shipment of cars in interstate commerce and in refusals to renew that would not otherwise have occurred, and in the use of GMAC when it otherwise would not have been used.

'In other words, the Government has no right to complain, and it may not complain of the defendants' right to limit its sales of cars to persons whom it may select, its right to determine who it shall sell to, its rights to determine upon what terms it will sell, its right to pick its own dealers.

'It can only complain if the defendants do sufficient of these acts charged in the indictment as constitute duress upon the dealer to accomplish a result that would have otherwise not have been accomplished, and to make a dealer do something that he would not have done of his own free will.

'That; almost, is the question in this case-whether the dealer could act as a freeman; whether he could act of his own free will.

'The defendants say:

"We never imposed any restrictions upon that freedom of action.'

'The Government says it did and there is that question. If it did-if the defendants did that sort of thing-and if it resulted in an unreasonable restriction and unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce, then you would have a right to find them guilty.

'If they did not do it, this lawsuit is at an end, and that is a question which you have got to decide.

'You know, you have heard of the terms:

'Exposition;

'Persuasion;

'Argument;

'Coercion.

'They are different steps. They are graduated steps that I suppose every salesman goes through, except perhaps the last.

'In Exposition one may expound the merits of that which he has to sell; he may explain its nature and by his exposition make a clear picture of what he has.

'By persuasion he may endeavor to persuade the person to whom he is talking to accept that which he has to offer.

'There is little advancement in his further progress, to argue.

'Persuasion means something softer than argument, perhaps, but he may argue with him, and argue with him the respective merits of his product and other products being offered to the person to whom he makes his offer.

'All of these are proper.

'He may not go beyond that and use something that it within his power to use as a club to coerce the person to accept that which he has to offer.

'You must remember that, after all, this coercion, if you find that coercion exists, then the ultimate question is; Has that resulted in unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce? And that is a question for you to determine from all of the evidence.' Quite apart from Ford's and CIT's consent to forego the opportunities outlawed by sub-paragraphs 6(e), (i), (k) and 7(d), the Government urges that a court of equity should refuse to suspend or modify them by claiming that the practices restrained by those paragraphs are in any event illegal under the Sherman Law. But since this has neither been admitted nor proven, and since ascertainment of illegality under the Sherman Law normally depends on the circumstances of a particular situation and the inferences they yield, the appellants have a right to insist that, so long as interdiction of these practices has not been decreed against General Motors, the Government be put to its proof. The lifting of the restraints imposed by the consent decree does not, of course, affect the liability of Ford for any violations of the Sherman Law that the Government may establish in court. Moreover, to the extent that such restraints may at some future date be imposed on General Motors, they will, by sub-paragraph 12a(3) equally fetter Ford.