Simon v. Craft/Opinion of the Court
By subdivision 6 of § 787 of the Civil Code of Alabama of 1886, courts of probate in that state are vested with original jurisdiction over the appointment and removal of guardians for minors and persons of unsound mind. Pertinent provisions of the statutes of Alabama relating to the mode of appointment of guardians of persons of unsound mind, contained in said Civil Code, are excerpted in the margin.

In the proceedings to inquire into the sanity of Mrs. Simon the writ which issued to the sheriff was evidently based upon the following clause of § 2393 of the Civil Code of 1886: '2393. The judge of probate . . . must also issue a writ directed to the sheriff to take the person alleged to be of unsound mind, and, if consistent with his health or safety, have him present at the place of trial.'

The invalidity of the proceedings in the inquisition of lunacy which formed the basis of the subsequent proceedings for the sale of the property of Mrs. Simon is in substance predicated on the contention that the writ directed to the sheriff authorized that official to determine whether it was consistent with the health and safety of Mrs. Simon to be present at the trial of the question of her sanity; that the sheriff decided this question against her, and she was detained in custody and not allowed to be present at the hearing on the inquisition. This latter claim, however, is founded upon the return indorsed by the sheriff on the writ directed to him. At the trial below there was no offer to prove, by any form of evidence, that Mrs. Simon was in fact of sound mind when the proceedings in lunacy were instituted, or that she desired to attend, and was prevented from attending, the hearing, or was refused opportunity to consult with and employ counsel to represent her. The entire case is thus solely based on the inferences which are deduced, as stated, from the face of the return of the sheriff. And upon the assumptions thus made it is contended that the statute, as well as the proceedings thereunder, were violative of the clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids depriving anyone of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

It is not seriously questioned that the Alabama statute provided that notice should be given, to one proceeded against as being of unsound mind, of the contemplated trial of the question of his or her sanity. Indeed, it would seem that it was not urged before the supreme court of Alabama that the statutes of that state failed to provide for notice, and that court assumed in its opinion that no question of that character was presented. As a matter of fact, a copy of the writ which issued and which embodied a notice of the date of the hearing of the proceedings in lunacy is shown by the record to have been actually served on Mrs. Simon. As early as 1870 the supreme court of Alabama in Fore v. Fore, 44 Ala. 478, 483, held that the service of the writ upon a supposed lunatic was the notice required by the statute, and brought the defendant into court, and that, if he failed to avail of such matters of defense as he might have, he must suffer the effect of his failure to do so.

We excerpt in the margin the portion of the opinion of the supreme court of Alabama which dealt with the objection that Mrs. Simon was deprived of opportunity to be heard.

The contention now urged is that notice imports an opportunity to defend, and that the return of the sheriff conclusively established that Mrs. Simon was taken into custody, and was hence prevented by the sheriff from attending the inquest or defending through counsel if she wished to do so in consequence of the notice which she received. It seems, however, manifest-as it is fairly to be inferred the state court interpreted the statute-that the purpose in the command of the writ, 'to take the person alleged to be of unsound mind, and, if consistent with her health or safety, have her present at the place of trial,' was to enforece the attendance of the alleged non compos, rather than to authorize a restraint upon the attendance of such person at the hearing. In other words, that the detention authorized was simply such as would be necessary to enable the sheriff to perform the absolute duty imposed upon him by law of bringing the person before the court, if in the judgment of that officer such person was in a fit condition to attend, and hence it cannot be presumed, in the absence of all proof or allegation to that effect, that the sheriff in the discharge of this duty, after serving the writ upon the alleged lunatic, exerted his power of detention for the purpose of preventing her attendance at the hearing, or of restraining her from availing herself of any and every opportunity to defend which she might desire to resort to, or which she was capable of exerting. The essential elements of due process of law are notice and opportunity to defend. In determining whether such rights were denied we are governed by the substance of things, and not by mere form.  Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 44 L. ed. 747, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230. We cannot, then, even on the assumption that Mrs. Simon was of sound mind and fit to attend the hearing, hold that she was denied due process of law by being refused an opportunity to defend, when, in fact, actual notice was served upon her of the proceedings, and when, as we construe the statute, if she had chosen to do so, she was at liberty to make such defense as she deemed advisable. The view we take of the statute was evidently the one adopted by the judge of the probate court, where the proceedings in lunacy were heard, since that court, upon the return of the sheriff, and the failure of the alleged lunatic to appear, either in person or by counsel, in order to protect her interests, entered an order appointing a guardian ad litem 'in the matter of the petition to inquire into her lunacy;' and an answer was filed by such guardian, denying all the matters and things stated and contained in the petition, and requiring strict proof to be made thereof according to law.

It is also urged as establishing the nullity of the appointment of a guardian of the estate of Mrs. Simon, that the proceedings failed to constitute due process of law, because (1) they were special and statutory, and the petition failed to state sufficient jurisdictional facts; (2) a jury was not impaneled as provided by law: and (3) there was no finding in the verdict of the jury or the order entered thereon, ascertaining and determining all the facts claimed to be essential to confer jurisdiction to appoint a guardian. But the due process clause of the 14th Amendment does not necessitate that the proceedings in a state court should be by a particular mode, but only that there shall be a regular course of proceedings in which notice is given of the claim asserted, and an opportunity afforded to defend against it. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236, 44 L. ed. 747, 750, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230, and cases cited. If the essential requisites of full notice and an opportunity to defend were present, this court will accept the interpretation given by the state court as to the regularity, under the state statute, of the practice pursued in the particular case. Tested by these principles, we accept as conclusive the ruling of the supreme court of Alabama that the jury which passed on the issues in the lunacy proceeding was a lawful jury, that the petition was in compliance with the statute, and that the asserted omissions in the recitals in the verdict and order thereon were at best but mere irregularities which did not render void the order of the state court appointing a guardian of Mrs. Simon's estate.

Judgment affirmed. 

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