Seaboard Air Line Railway v. North Carolina/Opinion of the Court
Pertinent provisions of 'An act to secure the enforcement of the laws against the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors' established by the General Assembly of North Carolina March 3, 1913 (Pub. Laws 1913, c. 44, p. 76), are copied in the margin.  Section 5 requires railroad companies to keep a separate book in which shall be entered the name of every person to whom intoxicating liquor is shipped, together with amount, kind, date of receipt, etc., to be followed by the consignee's signature acknowledging delivery. And it further provides that the book shall be open for inspection by any officer or citizen, and makes failure so to do a misdemeanor.

Plaintiff in error was indicted at the May term, 1914, superior court, Wake county, upon a charge of violating section 5 by refusing, in the preceding January, to permit a citizen to inspect its record showing shipments of spirituous and malt liquors transported from Virginia into that county, 'said record containing the names of the consignee, consignor, date of receipt and delivery of said shipments, and to whom delivered.'

The jury returned a special verdict in which they found:

'That R. L. Davis, on a date prior to the starting of this      prosecution, he being at that time a citizen of the county of      Wake, state of North Carolina, went to the office of the      defendant company during its business hours, and while said      office was open, and demanded of the agent that he be allowed      to inspect the book kept by the defendant showing shipments      of liquor from points outside of the state of North Carolina      to the city of Raleigh;' 'the agent of the defendant stated      that he was instructed to and did refuse to allow * * * the      inspection;' 'Davis had no legal process and did not make any      demand under any legal process, and at the time of the      alleged demand he was neither a state not federal officer of      any kind of any state or territory;' 'he was seeking      information from said book for the purpose of prosecuting      persons suspected of violating the law of North Carolina;'      and 'was seeking general information as to shipments of      whisky into the city of Raleigh from points in another state,      and that he had in his mind specially an effort to see what      evidence could be procured against one or more specific      parties in the city of Raleigh, meaning by the words 'general      information' that he was seeking to ascertain who were the      consignees of liquor and the quantities they were receiving,      for the purpose of prosecuting such parties as may be charged      or suspected with the violation of the prohibition laws of the state;' and that he 'had no      authority except that which existed, if any, by virtue of the      fact that he was at that time a citizen of the state.'

Upon this special verdict the state Supreme Court adjudged plaintiff in error guilty as charged, 169 N. C. 295, 84 S. E. 283, and it now maintains the judgment is erroneous, for reasons following:

I. Section 5, c. 44, is void because an attempt by the state to regulate interstate commerce, in that it imposes as a condition precedent to delivery that the carrier shall keep a separate book containing name of person to whom liquor is shipped, amount and kind received, date of receipt and delivery, by whom and to whom delivered; and the consignee is required to receipt therefor before delivery.

II. In order to comply with section 5 by permitting records of interstate shipments of liquor to be inspected by a mere citizen, the carrier would necessarily violate the provisions of section 15, Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended June 18, 1910 (36 Stat. 539, 551, 553 [Comp. St. 1916, § 8583, pars. 6, 7]), which prohibit such action exdept under circumstances specified. (These are copied below.) 

III. The Webb-Kenyon Law (Act of Congress March 1, 1913, entitled 'An act divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain cases,' 37 Stat. 699) cannot affect the application of these principles to shipments destined to points in Wake county, because it relates to liquors intended to be received, possessed, sold or used in violation of state law; and to receive or possess liquor in any quantity in that county is not unlawful.

For some years it has been the established policy of North Carolina 'approved by popular vote and expressed and enforced by the general and many local statutes, that, except in very restricted instances, the manufacturing and sale of intoxicating liquors shall not be allowed.' Smith v. Express Company (1914) 166 N. C. 155, 157, 82 S. E. 15, 16. Since our decision in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 320, 324, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 184 (61 L. Ed. 326, L. R. A. 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845), it has not been open to serious question that the Webb-kenyon Law is a valid enactment; that 'its purpose was to prevent the immunity characteristic of interstate commerce from being used to permit the receipt of liquor through such commerce in states contrary to their laws, and thus in effect afford a means by subterfuge and indirection to set such laws at naught'; and that under it a state may inhibit shipments therein of intoxicating liquors from another by a common carrier although intended for the consignee's personal use where such use is not actually forbidden. Plainly, therefore, after that enactment nothing in the laws or Constitution of the United States restricted North Carolina's power to make shipment of intoxicants into Wake county a penal offense irrespective of any personal right in a consignee there to have and consume liquor of that character.

The challenged act instead of interposing an absolute bar against all such shipments, as it was within the power of the state to do, in effect permitted them upon conditions intended to secure publicity, to the end that public policy might not be set at naught by subterfuge and indirection. The greater power includes the less.

The provisions of section 15, Act to Regulate Commerce, here relied on were intended to apply to matters within the exclusive control of the federal government; and when by a subsequent act Congress rendered interstate shipments of intoxicating liquors subject to state legislation, those provisions necessarily ceased to be paramount in respect of them.

The judgment of the court below is Affirmed.

Mr. Jstice VAN DEVANTER dissents. 

Notes

'Section 15. * * *

'It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, or any officer, agent, or employe of such common carrier, or for any other person or corporation lawfully authorized by such common carrier to receive information therefrom, knowingly to disclose to or permit to be acquired by any person or corporation other than the shipper or consignee, without the consent of such shipper or consignee, and information concerning the nature, kind, quantity, destination, consignee, of such shipper or consignee, any information concerning to such common carrier for interstate transportation, which information may be used to the detriment or prejudice of such shipper or consignee, or which may improperly disclose his business transactions to a competitor; and it shall also be unlawful for any person or corporation to solicit or knowingly receive any such information which may be so used: Provided, that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent the giving of such information in response to any legal process issued under the authority of any state or federal court, or to any officer or agent of the government of the United States, or of any state or territory, in the exercise of his powers, or to any officer or other duly authorized person seeking such information for the prosecution of persons charged with or suspected of crime; or information given by a common carrier to another carrier or its duly authorized agent, for the purpose of adjusting mutual traffic accounts in the ordinary course of business of such carriers.

'Any person, corporation, or association violating any of the provisions of the next preceding paragraph of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and for each offense, on conviction, shall pay to the United States a penalty of not more than one thousand dollars.'