Seymour v. Freer (75 U.S. 202)/Dissent Field
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the following dissenting opinion.

Mr. Justice NELSON, Mr. Justice GRIER, and myself dissent from the judgment of a majority of the court in this case.

The decrees appealed from are founded upon the theory that, by the agreement of May, 1835, Price and Seymour became copartners, and that the property purchased was copartnership property. The interlocutory decree declares that Price, by virtue of that agreement, 'was entitled, as an equal copartner in the property, to one equal half of the profits made, or to be made, from the sale of the lands;' that the lands were purchased by Price as an 'investment on joint account of himself and said Seymour,' and that the sales made, and to be made, were 'to be deemed and taken as made, and to be made, on joint account.' And in the final decree the court administers the property on what it declares to be 'just partnership principles.' It provides for the payment out of the fund of all the costs and expenses, and that 'the balance which shall remain [of the funds then on hand], being clear profits of the partnership land purchase and sale up to the present time, be equally divided.' And it speaks of 'closing and settling the partnership land accounts, so far as the sales and collections have progressed.'

And the case was presented to this court both in the oral and printed arguments of counsel upon the question whether a copartnership was created between Price and Seymour by the agreement of 1835, or any interest vested in Price in the lands purchased.

We shall consider at some length both parts of this question, and in disposing of them, we shall dispose, in our judgment, of the entire merits of the case.

We do not consider the agreement as creating any partnership between the parties, or as vesting in Price any interest, legal or equitable, in the lands purchased. It provides simply for services to be rendered by Price for Seymour, and a contingent compensation to be made to him for such services. It stipulates on the part of Price, that he shall devote his time and best judgment to the selection and purchase of land to an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars, in certain designated States and Territories, or in such of them as he may find most advantageous to the interest of Seymour; that the purchases shall be made during the then existing year, and that the contracts of purchase shall be made and the conveyances taken in the name of Seymour; and on the part of Seymour, that he shall furnish the five thousand dollars, that the lands purchased shall be sold within five years afterwards, and that of the profits made by such purchase and sale, one-half shall be paid to Price, and be in full for his services and expenses. And as if to prevent any possible misconstruction, the agreement closes with a declaration that no payment for those services or expenses shall be made except from such profits.

By the express terms of the agreement the ownership of the property was to be in Seymour; the lands were to be selected and purchased for his general interest, and the title was to be taken in his name. The special interest of Price was only in the profits as a means of compensation for his services; and the interest was not in profits which might be made at any time, upon any future sale, however remote, but upon a sale within five years. He was to receive for his compensation one-half that might be realized above cost, interest, and taxes, from the rise of the property within that period. If language is to be interpreted in its natural and ordinary sense, the contract means that, and means nothing more nor less. The purchases, it says, shall be made during the present year. The sale shall be made within five years from that time, and one-half the profits from such purchase and sale, not from purchases or sales made at any other time, shall be paid to Price, not as profits, but as compensation for his services.

The provision for the sale in five years was not merely directory and modal, which might be waived by Price without affecting his rights. The subsequent clauses securing a compensation to him are limited to a sale within the period designated. He was to have half of the profits arising upon such sale; the moiety of the profits made upon such sale was to be in full for his compensation, and he was not to receive anything for services or expenses, except a participation in the profits made 'as aforesaid.'

To one who is familiar with the history of the growth of the West, there is nothing singular or even unusual in a contract of this kind. With the immense tide of immigration setting in that direction, lands of comparatively little value one day sometimes in a few months become the sites of villages and cities, and the source of affluence to their possessors. It is not strange, therefore, that in 1835, a year somewhat noted for its speculative tendencies, a gentleman of capital should propose to one of energy and experience in such matters, that he advance the money, and the latter invest it in lands in the States and Territories of the West, 'on or near the sites, or expected sites, of towns or places of business,' upon a consideration that the latter should receive by way of compensation one-half of the profits which might be made from the rise of the property in value within a designated period.

Nor is there anything in contracts of this character which imposes the obligations or confers the rights of copartners between the parties. There is no copartnership where the relationship between the parties is that of master and servant, or of employer and employee, though the compensation of the latter may be in proportion to the profits, or be paid entirely out of them. Under some circumstances parties thus receiving a portion of the profits may be held, as respects third persons, subject to the liabilities of partners; but as between themselves, and in the adjustment of their respective rights, no such relation obtains. This has been settled law for more than half a century. Thus, in Hesketh v. Blanchard,  decided in 1803, the plaintiff had furnished goods purchased by him on credit, to one Robinson, the testator of the defendants, to take to Africa for purposes of trade, upon an agreement that if any profit should arise from the adventure, he should have one-half for his trouble. The plaintiff having paid for the goods, brought an action for the amount. It was objected in defence, that as the parties were to divide the profits, if any, they must be equally liable for any loss, and that, therefore, a partnership was constituted between them. But the objection was not sustained, and Lord Ellenborough said that 'Quoad third parties it [the agreement] was a partnership, for the plaintiff was to share half the profits; but as between themselves, it was only an agreement for so much as a compensation for the plaintiff's trouble, and for lending Robinson his credit.'

In Hazard v. Hazard,  this doctrine was applied to a case where one of two parties agreed to devote his time to the management of the concerns of factories belonging to the other party, for one-fourth of the profits of the business for the first year, and one-third of the profits for each year after until the expiration of the agreement, which portion of the profits was to be the sole reward for his services. It was held that there was no partnership between the parties. 'A mere participation in the profits,' said Mr. Justice Story, 'will not render the parties partners inter sese, whatever it may do as to third persons, unless they so intend it. If A. agrees to give B. one-third of the profits of a particular transaction or business for his labor and services therein, that may make both liable to third persons as partners, but not as between themselves;' and he refers in support of the doctrine to the case already cited of Hesketh v. Blanchard.

Similar adjudications have been repeatedly made, we believe, in the highest courts of every State in the Union. Some slight differences exist in them as to the extent in which a participation in the profits of a business, by way of compensation, will render a party liable as a partner to third persons; but there is entire concurrence in the conclusion that such participation alone does not create a partnership between the parties.

In Denny v. Cabot and others,  the question presented to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts was, whether the defendant Cooper was a partner with Cabot, Appleton & Co. The agreement between them was substantially this: Cabot, Appleton & Co. were to furnish Cooper stock to be manufactured into cloth at his mill on their account, and Cooper was to manufacture the cloth and deliver it to them, and was to receive from them a stipulated sum per yard, and one-third part of the net profits of the business. It was held that the parties were not partners, either between themselves or as to third persons; that the agreement only provided the manner in which the compensation to Cooper for his services in manufacturing the cloth was to be ascertained, and that he had no title to any share of the cloth or any lien thereon.

In Loomis v. Marshall,  a case, in some respects, similar to that of Denny v. Cabot, was before the Supreme Court of Connecticut, and the liability of a party who receives a portion of the profits of a business as compensation for his services was very elaborately and ably considered. The agreement in the case was substantially this: A. was to furnish B., who occupied a factory, a supply of wool for two years, to be manufactured into cloths. B. agreed to manufacture the cloths, and to devote the use of the factory to that purpose, and the net proceeds of the cloths, after deducting incidental expenses and charges of sale, were to be divided so that A. should have fifty-five per cent. and B. forty-five per cent. The cost of the warp used, and the expense of insurance on the wool or cloths, were to be borne by them in the same ratio, and in case of destruction of wool or cloth by fire, the amount received from the insurance was to be divided between them, according to the loss of each. It was held that the agreement did not create a partnership between the parties; that the case was properly referable to that class of cases in which one party receives a share of the profits or avails as a compensation for services rendered, labor performed, and expenses incurred in the business; and the court observed, that if it should hold that the agreement constituted a partnership, it would change the existing law as to factors, brokers, agents, shipmasters, and seamen, who share in the profits by way of compensation, or in lieu of wages, and introduce great perplexity in the adjustment of their legal rights and remedies.

Now, if a party does not become a partner with others in business, general or special, as is above clearly established by the authorities, from the fact that by way of compensation he participates with them in the profits of the business, it follows that he does not, by reason of such participation, acquire any interest, legal or equitable, in the property which constitutes the basis of the business. It is only upon the theory that the services rendered by one party are to be considered as an equivalent to the capital advanced by the other, that a common interest of both in the property can be asserted. This theory, not resting upon any solid foundation, the inference deduced therefrom, of course, fails. The sharing of the profits not changing the relation of the party as agent to the one who furnishes the capital, the ownership of the property acquired by such capital is not affected. The case of Smith v. Watson  is conclusive upon this point. In that case, one Sampson (whose assignees in bankruptcy were the plaintiffs) employed one Gill, a broker, to purchase whalebone, and, by agreement, was to pay him one-third of the profits made on the sale of it for his trouble. The defendants were bankers, with whom Sampson kept his account; and the suit was brought to recover an amount in the defendant's hands, which was the proceeds of a bill drawn by Sampson on account of a parcel of whalebone which he had sold. Gill claiming to be a partner of Sampson, by means of the agreement, indemnified the bankers and received the money. It was held that the plaintiffs, as assignees of Sampson, were entitled to recover. Bayley, J., said:

'A right to share in the profits of a particular adventure may have the effect of rendering a person liable to third persons as a partner in respect of transactions arising out of the particular adventure, in the profits of which he is to participate; but it does not give him any interest in the property itself which was the subject-matter of the adventure. Gill's right to claim property in the whalebone must arise out of the terms of the bargain with Sampson; and looking to them, it appears clearly that it was not joint property. It may be assumed that it was purchased in the name of Sampson only, for Gill was a mere agent, and was to have a proportion of the profits in lieu of brokerage. Considering the question in this view, I am clearly of opinion that Gill had no property in the whalebone, or in the proceeds of the bill.'

'Assuming it to have been agreed between Sampson and Gill that the latter should make purchases of whalebone, and in lieu of brokerage, should have one-third of the profits arising out of the sales, and that he should even bear a certain proportion of the losses, I am of opinion that although such an agreement might make Gill liable as a partner to third persons, yet that it did not vest in him any interest in the whalebone purchased with the money of Sampson. Such an agreement would not convert that which was obtained by the separate property of Sampson into the joint property of Sampson and Gill. It may be collected from the evidence, that the latter did not furnish any part of the money required to pay for the whalebone, and that the contracts for sale were made not in his name, but in that of Sampson, for Gill was to act as a broker only, and to receive a share of the profits in lieu of his brokerage. The money paid for the whalebone being, therefore, Sampson's separate property, and the contracts being made in his name as the purchaser, the property in the thing purchased would vest, by virtue of the contracts, in him alone.'

There is no difference in principle between this case and the one under consideration. Price was employed to purchase land, and Gill was employed to purchase whalebone. Price was to receive one-half of the profits made upon a sale of the land for his services and expenses, and Gill was to receive one-third of the profits on the sale of the whalebone for his trouble. Gill was held not to be a partner with Sampson who employed him, or to have any joint interest with him in the whalebone; and upon the same principle it should be held, in our judgment, that Price was not a partner with Seymour, and did not possess any joint interest with him, in the land purchased.

If the decision in the case of Smith v. Watson is sound law, and it has not, that we are aware of, ever been questioned, but, on the contrary, has been uniformly approved by the highest courts of England and of the United States, it is impossible for the complainants to sustain the present suit. The suit proceeds and the decree is rendered, as we have here already stated, upon the theory that Price and Seymour were copartners, and that the property purchased was copartnership property.

We have shown, as we think conclusively, that Price was not a copartner with Seymour under the contract between them, and that he did not possess any interest with him in the lands purchased, but that the lands constituted the separate property of Seymour. Price was, it is true, interested in the profits to be made in the sale of the land, according to the terms of the agreement. It was not, however, the interest of a partner, but the interest which every party to an executory contract has in having the stipulations in his favor performed by the other party. A personal action against the delinquent party, or his personal representatives, is the remedy for the breach of an agreement of this character. Resort can be had to equity only when special circumstances intervene to render the action at law unavailable. Undoubtedly Price could have maintained an action at law against the representatives of Seymour had a sale of the property been refused within the five years specified in the agreement, and recovered, as damages, a sum equal to one-half the difference between the value of the property and the amount of its cost, interest thereon, and expenses. That he did not institute any such action, or make any claim upon them, is explained by the admission accompanying the record, that the property was at that time unsalable, and that it was uncertain whether, if a sale could have been made, it would have brought enough to repay the original investment and interest. The subsequent conduct of Price shows very clearly that he regarded his right to compensation dependent upon the possibility of effecting a sale at a profit at that time. He lived until July, 1854, more than fourteen years after the expiration of the five years, and he never asserted any claim under the contract. He never requested that the lands be sold, or asserted any interest in them or their proceeds. He uniformly treated the contract as at an end, and the heirs of Seymour as the exclusive owners of the land and its proceeds. He subsequently acted as agent for them in paying taxes upon the property. He lived near the property, and it was natural that he should be employed for that purpose. But if funds, even of trifling amounts, were not forwarded to him, he did not advance the money, but allowed the property to be sold. It is difficult to reconcile this conduct with the theory that he considered himself at the time as having a claim either upon the land or its proceeds. And it is still more difficult to account for his entire silence to all the world, to his own relatives and agents, as well as to the heirs of Seymour, respecting any claim upon the property or its proceeds, if he considered that in fact he possessed any. It remained for the administrator of his estate, nearly three years after his death, to discover that he possessed, during his life, unknown to himself, large and valuable interests in property which he had purchased for others, and in their name, twenty-two years before. The claim now asserted is contrary to the express terms of the contract, and the construction given to it by Price himself. And even the administrator acted as agent for the heirs in paying taxes upon the property and in negotiating sales for them until he made the discovery of the supposed rights of his intestate.

It is urged as an objection to the case made by the defendants that they did not produce the letters of Price to them. It is assumed without any intimation to that effect on the part of the complainant, that these letters might have contained, and not being produced, must be presumed to have contained something against the interests of the defendants. The objection may be answered by the suggestion that the complainant did not produce the letters of the heirs of Seymour to Price. If they had contained any recognition of the claim now asserted on behalf of Price's estate, there can be no doubt that they would have been brought forth. If it be proper to invoke presumptions in respect to the contents of papers not produced, even when not called for, the presumption against the claim of the complainant must be regarded as very great. It is highly improbable that no allusion would be made by the heirs of Seymour to the interest of Price in the property, or to his claiming an interest, during a correspondence of fourteen years, if, in truth, he possessed or claimed any.

The case of Stow v. Robinson,  decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, presents similar features to the one under consideration, and is authority upon the point, that the remedy of Price, if a sale within the five years had been refused, was at law, for breach of the contract, and not in equity. The case was this: Robinson was the owner of a block of land in or near Chicago, and it was agreed between him and one Rathway that the block should be subdivided, and that Rathway should dispose of the lots for one-fourth cash, the remainder to be secured by notes payable in one, two, and three years, with interest, Robinson to give bonds for deeds on receiving the notes, and to execute conveyances when the notes were paid. Out of the proceeds obtained Robinson was to receive the purchase-money of the block, with interest, and the balance was to be equally divided between the parties; and for his share upon this division Rathway was to plat, survey, or subdivide the block, and advertise and sell the same at his own expense. Rathway, under the agreement, subdivided the block into lots, and sold a portion of them, when Robinson stopped the sale, and refused to allow any further sale, or to execute any more title-papers. Rathway having died, his heirs and personal representatives filed their bill to compe a performance of the agreement. The court held that by the agreement Rathway did not acquire any vested interest in the land itself, and if he was prevented from executing his part of the agreement, he had his remedy by an action at law for damages, and that his remedy was clearly not in equity.

The difference between this case and the one under consideration is circumstantial; the principle is the same in both. The services rendered in each were the meritorious cause for the compensation to be made by the owner of the land. In the case cited it was the platting, surveying, subdividing, advertising, and selling the land; in the case at bar it was the selection and purchase of the land. The difference in the services is not material. The contract stipulating for the services in the case cited created in Rathway no interest in the land held by Robinson; and for the same reason the contract in the case at bar, in our judgment, created in Price no interest in the land held by Seymour. If Price possessed no such interest, there can be no pretence that the land was subject to any trust for his benefit.

In our judgment the decree below should be reversed and the bill dismissed.

Notes