Houston Coal Company v. United States/Opinion of the Court
This cause went off below on motion to dismiss the petition and the record presents a question of jurisdiction only. Judicial Code, § 238 (Comp. St. § 1215). Did the District Court have authority to hear and determine the issues tendered by plaintiff in error? The point is not free from difficulty; but, after considering the contending views, the conclude there was jurisdiction and that the judgment to the contrary must be reversed.

Purporting to proceed under authority granted by section 10  of the Lever Act, approved August 10, 1917 (40 Stat. 276, c. 53, [Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3115 1/8ii]), the President, acting through the Secretary of the Navy, requisitioned coal belonging to the plaintiff in error and paid therefor $4 per ton, just compensation as ascertained by him. Alleging that this was received under protest, because of duress, and with express reservation of the right to demand more, the Coal Company instituted the original action to recover the difference between the amount received and what it claimed to be just compensation. The court held that section 10 did not grant permission to sue the United States therein to one who has received the amount determined by the President for requisitioned articles, and that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues which the petition presented.

The Lever Act was passed in view of the constitutional provision inhibiting the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. It vested the President with extraordinary powers over the property of individuals which might be exercised through an agent at any place within the confines of the Union with many consequent hardships. As heretofore pointed out, United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 41 Sup. Ct. 569, 65 L. Ed. 1084, by deliberate purpose the diffe ent sections of the act provide varying remedies for owners-some in the District Courts and some in the Court of Claims.

It reasonably may be assumed that Congress intended the remedy provided by each section should be adequate fairly to meet the exigencies consequent upon contemplated action thereunder and thus afford complete protection to the rights of owners. Considering this purpose and the attending circumstances, we think section 10 should be so construed as to give the District Courts jurisdiction of those controversies which arise directly out of requisitions authorized by that section.

Reversed. 

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