The Six Books of Proclus, the Platonic Successor, on the Theology of Plato/Book V
the next place, let us survey another order of Gods, which is called 
intellectual, being indeed conjoined to the orders prior to it, but terminating 
the total progressions of the Gods, converting them to their 
principle, and producing one circle of the primarily-efficient and all-perfect orders. Let us also extend the intellect that is in us to the 
imparticipable and divine intellect, and distinguish the orders and 
diminutions of essence that are in it, according to the narration of 
Plato. 

This intellectual hypostasis therefore of the Gods, is suspended indeed 
from more ancient causes, and is filled from them with total goodness 
and self-sufficiency. But after these causes, it establishes an illustrious 
empire over all secondary natures, binding to its dominion all the partial 
progressions of the Gods. And it is denominated indeed intellectual, 
because it generates an impartible and divine intellect. But it is filled 
from intelligibles, not as from those intelligibles which are co-arranged 
with intellect, nor as with those which are alone divided from intellect 
by the conception of the mind, but as establishing in itself unically all 
multitudes, and occultly containing the evolutions of the Gods into light, 
and the hyparxes of intelligibles. It is likewise allotted the total intellect 
of intellectuals, the variety of beings, and the multiform orders of divine 
natures; and it convolves the end of the whole progression [of the 
Gods] to the one intelligible principle. For intellectuals are converted 
to intelligibles. And some intellectuals indeed are united and firmly 
established prior to the divided Gods; but others are multiplied and 
through conversion are conjoined to primarily-efficient causes. The 
intellectual Gods however proceed from all the Gods prior to them, 
receiving indeed unions from the one that is prior to intelligibles; but 
essences from intelligibles; and being allotted lives all-perfect, connective
and generative of divine natures, from the intelligible and at the same 
time intellectual Gods; but the intellectual peculiarity from themselves. 
They likewise convert to themselves all the divided orders, but establish 
themselves in intelligibles, existing wholly through the whole, pure and 
unknown knowledges, and fervid lives. Besides these things also, they 
are all-perfect essences, producing all secondary natures through subsisting 
from themselves, and being neither diminished by their progression, 
nor receiving an addition by their progeny; but through their own 
never-failing and infinite powers, being the fathers, causes, and leaders of 
all things. Nor are they co-divided with their progeny, nor do they 
depart from themselves in their progressions; but at once, and according 
to union they govern total multitudes, and all orders, and convolve them 
to the intelligible, and to occult good. 

Whether therefore I may speak of life, it is not proper to think that it 
is such a life as we surveyed a little before. For that was imparticipable, 
but this is participated. And that indeed, was generative, but 
this is vivific. But it is not immanifest that these differ from each other. For 
the vivific cause indeed, is also evidently generative; but the 
generative cause is not entirely vivific. For it imparts figure to things  
unfigured, bound to things indefinite, and perfection to things imperfect 
Or whether I may denominate the cause in intellectuals intelligible, it 
must not immediately be conceived to be such an intelligible, as that of 
which we have before spoken. For that was imparticipable, and prior 
to intellectuals, itself pre-existing by itself, and exempt from wholes; not 
being denominated intelligible, as the plenitude of intellect, but as the 
prior-cause of it, and the object of desire and love to it, subsisting 
uniformly uncoordinated with it The intelligible however which is now 
the subject of consideration, is participated, and co-arranged with 
intellect, is multiform, and contains in itself the divided causes of all 
things. Or whether we may call the Gods in this order fathers and 
fabricators, it must be admitted that this paternal and fabricative 
characteristic, is different from the hyparxis of the intelligible fathers. 
For they indeed were generative of whole essences; but these pre-exist 
as the causes of divisible emanations, and of definite productions of form. 
And they indeed contained in themselves powers fabricative of the divine 
progressions; but these separate from themselves prolific causes, and are 
not conjoined to them according to union, but according to a communion 
subordinate to union. For the marriages which are celebrated by 
fables, and the concordant conjunction of divine natures, are in the 
intellectual Gods. But the demiurgic being mingled with the vivific 
effluxions, every genus of the Gods is unfolded into light, both the 
supermundane, and the mundane. This, however, will be hereafter 
discussed. 

 however, we have, in short, surveyed the peculiarity of the 
intellectual Gods, it remains that we should deliver an appropriate theory 
concerning the division of them. For the intellectual order is not one 
and indivisible, but is allotted progressions more various than those of 
the more elevated genera. There will therefore be here also three 
fathers, who divide the whole intellectual essence; one indeed, being 
arranged according to the intelligible, but another according to life, and 
another according to intellect. They also imitate the intelligible fathers, 
who divide the intelligible breadth in a threefold manner, and who are 
allotted a difference of this kind with respect to each other. For one of 
these intellectual fathers proceeds analogous to the first [intelligible] 
father, and is intelligible. But another proceeds analogous to the second 
[intelligible] father, and binds to himself the whole of intellectual life. 
And another proceeds analogous to the third father, and closes the 
whole intellectual, in the same manner as he closes the intelligible 
order. 

But these fathers being three, and the first indeed, abiding in himself, 
but the second proceeding and vivifying all things, and the third glittering 
with fabricative productions, it is evidently necessary, that other 
triple Gods should be conjoined with them; of which, one indeed will 
be the source to the first intellectual God, of stable purity; but another, 
of undefiled progression, to the second God; and another of exempt, 
fabrication, to the third. For in the Gods prior to these, the undefined 
deities were according to cause, through union without separation, and a 
sameness collective of powers which are not in want of the communion 
of these. But in the intellectual Gods, where there is an all-perfect 
separation, as in total orders, and a greater habitude to secondary 
natures, unpolluted deity or power is necessary, which has the ratio of 
sameness, and undeviating subsistence, to the paternal cause, and which 
is co-divided with the fathers, so that each of the undefiled Gods is 
conjoined with a peculiar father. 

These two triads therefore have presented themselves to our view, one 
indeed, of the intellectual fathers, but the other of the undefiled Gods. 
There is however, besides these two, a third other triadic monad, which 
is the cause of separation to intellectuals, and which subsists together 
with the above mentioned triads. For the fathers indeed are the 
suppliers of all essence; but the inflexible Gods, of sameness. But it is 
evidently fit that there should be also the came of separation, and that 
this should be one and at the same time triple, separating the intellectual 
Gods from the above mentioned orders, from themselves, and from 
inferior natures. For why are they the leaders of another order, if they 
are not divided from the first orders? Why are they multiplied, and why 
do they differ from each other in their kingdoms, unless they are 
separated? Why also do they transcend the partial [Gods] unless they 
are also separated from these? The cause of separation therefore, will be 
for us one and a triple monad. But the paternal and undefiled causes will 
be each of them a uniform triad. And what is most paradoxical of all, 
the separative cause is more monadic; but the paternal and also the 
undefiled cause, are each of them more triadic. For the separative 
monad indeed, is the cause of separation to the other monads; but 
the others are the sources of communion and union to it. Hence each 
of these, being separated, becomes triadic; but the separative monad is 
monadic, in consequence of being united by these. For all intellectuals 
pervade through each other, and are in each other, according to a certain 
admirable communion, imitating the union of intelligibles, through being 
present and mingled with each other. The sphere also which is there, is 
the intellectual order, energizing in and about itself, and proceeding into 
itself hebdomatically, being a monad and a hebdomad, the image, if it 
be lawful so to speak, of the all-perfect intelligible monad, and unfolding 
its occult union, through progression and separation. This first progression 
therefore of the intellectual Gods, which is separated by us into 
a heptad, we have perfectly celebrated. 

Other secondary seven hebdomads, however, are to be considered 
under this, which produce as far as to the last of things, the monads of 
this heptad. For each monad is the leader of an intellectual hebdomad 
conjoined with it, and extends this hebdomad from on high, from the 
summit of Olympus, as far as to the last, and terrestrial orders. I say, 
for instance, the first paternal monad, indeed, constitutes seven such 
monads. But the second again constitutes seven vivific monads. And 
the third, seven demiurgic monads. Each likewise of the undefiled 
monads constitutes a number equal to that produced by the fathers. 
And the monad of separation constitutes seven [separative monads]. 
For all these causes proceed in conjunction with each other. And as 
the first triad of the fathers subsists together with the undefiled triad, 
and the divisive monad, after the same manner also, the second triads 
are allotted seven coordinate undefiled triads, and separative monads. 
Whence, therefore, does so great a number of intellectual Gods present 
itself to our view? It is evident, indeed, from what has been said. 
For the first hebdomad, indeed, the cause of the second hebdomads, and 
which has the relation of a monad to them, and which a little before we 
denominated an intellectual sphere, subsists according to the intelligible  
breadth, imitating the paternal nature of it through the paternal triad 
but the eternity of its power, through undefiled sameness; and the 
multitude shining forth in its extremities, through the monad which is 
divisive of wholes. 
The remaining hebdomads, however, which are derived from this, 
proceed according to the intelligible and intellectual 
genera. For each monad, conformably to the summits of those genera, 
constitutes a monad co-arranged with the multitude proceeding from it; 
since every summit is uniform [i. e. has the form of the one,] as we 
have before demonstrated. But according to the middle and third 
progressions of those genera, each monad generates two triads. For 
the separation of them was apparent in the middle and ultimate 
progressions, as we have before observed. 
As, therefore, the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual genera, 
produced the intelligible breadth, which is of a unical nature,
into a triadic multitude, after the same manner also the intellectual monads 
call forth the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual triads, into intellectual
hebdomads. and they constitute indeed the monads which are coarranged with the 
hebdomads, according to the summits of the triads; but the two triads, 
according to the second and third decrements of those triads. Hence 
every hebdomad has the first monad indeed intelligible; but the second 
after this, and which is triadic, intelligible and intellectual; and the 
third triad, which is the next in order, intellectual. All these likewise 
subsist as in intellectuals. For they are characterized according to the 
peculiarity of the constitutive monad. 

In short, the intellectual powers proceed according to the intelligible 
orders; but they constitute these seven hebdomads according to the first 
intellectual orders. For it is indeed necessary that exempt causes should 
be assimilated to the intelligible Gods; but that co-arranged causes, and 
which proceed every where, should be assimilated to the intelligible, and 
at the same time, intellectual Gods; since these also are the first that 
divide the worlds triadically, and pervade as far as to the last of things, 
connectedly containing and perfecting all things. But the intelligible 
Gods contain the causes of wholes uniformly, and occultly. You may 
also say, that the intelligible Gods produce all things uniformly; for 
numbers subsist in them monadically. But the intelligible and intellectual 
Gods produce all things triadically. For the monads in these are 
divided according to number. And what the monad was in the former, 
that number is in the latter. And the intellectual Gods produce all 
things hebdomadically. 
For they evolve the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual triads, 
into intellectual hebdomads, and expand their contracted powers into intellectual variety; since they define multitude itself and variety by numbers 
which are nearest to the monad, for the numbers of the partial are different 
from the numbers of the total orders in the Gods. 
And the whole of. this intellectual number is 
indeed more expanded than the natures prior to it, and is divided into 
more various progressions, yet it does not desert its alliance with the 
monad. For hebdomadic multitude has an abundant affinity with the 
nature of the monad j since it is measured according to it, and primarily 
subsists from it. And the Pythagoreans, when they denominate the 
heptad light according to intellect, evidently admit its hyparxis to be 
intellectual, and on this account suspended from the monad. For the 
unical, which light manifests, is inherent from this in all the divine 
numbers. And thus much concerning the division of these intellectual 
Gods. 

 follows in the next place, that we should adapt the theory of Plato 
to this order, and show that he does not dissent from any of the theological 
dogmas concerning it. Since, therefore, we have demonstrated, that the 
celestial order, which we find in the Cratylus perfectly celebrated, 
possesses the middle bond of the intellectual, and at the same time, 
intelligible Gods, but that under this another order of Gods is immediately 
arranged, as Socrates shows in the Phædrus, called the subcelestial 
arch, and which we have considered as not divided from the 
heaven,—this being the case, what order is it which divides itself from 
the kingdom of the heaven, but is the leader of the intellectual order of 
the Gods, and is primarily the supplier of intellect, according to the 
doctrine of Plato, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, except that which 
the mighty Saturn comprehends? For he calls this God the first and 
most pure intellect. This God, therefore, is the summit of a divine 
intellect, and, as he says, the purest part of it; separating himself indeed 
from the celestial order, but reigning over all the intellectual Gods; 
because be is full of intellect, but of a pure intellect, and is a God 
extended to the summit of the intellectual hypostasis. Hence also, he 
is the father of the mighty Jupiter, and is simply father. For he who is 
the father of the father of all things, is evidently allotted in a much 
greater degree the paternal dignity. Saturn, therefore, is the first 
intellect; but the mighty Jupiter is also an intellect, containing, as 
Socrates says in the Philebus, a royal soul and a royal intellect. 

And these Gods are two intellects, and intellectual fathers; the one, 
indeed, being intellectual; but the other intelligible, in intellectuals. 
For the Saturnian bonds which Socrates mentions in the Cratylus, are 
unific of the intelligence of Jupiter about the intelligible of his father, 
and fill the Jovian intellect with the all-perfect intelligence of the 
Saturnian intellect. And this I think is likewise evident from the 
analogy of souls to Pluto. For as he binds souls about himself, filling 
them with wisdom and intelligence, thus also Saturn being the object of 
desire and love to Jupiter, contains him in himself by indissoluble bonds. 
And these things Socrates indicates in the Cratylus, jesting, and at the 
same time being serious in what he says. The object of desire therefore, 
and the intelligible to Jupiter, is Saturn. 
But the mighty Jupiter himself is a divine and demiurgic intellect. 
Hence, it is necessary that there should be a third other intellectual cause, 
generative of life. 
For Jupiter indeed is the cause of life, as Socrates says, but intellectually 
and secondarily. But we say that life is every where arranged prior to 
intellect. Hence, we must say that the queen Rhea, being the mother 
of Jupiter, but subordinate to the father Saturn, gives completion to this 
middle, existing as a vivific world, and establishing in herself the causes 
of the whole of life. These three paternal orders, therefore, have 
appeared to us in intellectuals: one of them indeed subsisting according 
to the intelligible power of intellectuals; but another according to 
divine and intellectual life; and another according to intellectual 
intellect. For we celebrate the middle deity, herself by herself, as the 
mother of the demiurgus, and of wholes. When, however, we survey 
her together with the extremes, we denominate her a paternal cause, 
as being comprehended in the fathers; and as generating some things 
together with Saturn, but others in conjunction with Jupiter. 

Moreover, Plato following Orpheus, calls the inflexible and undefiled 
triad of the intellectual Gods Curetic, as is evident from what the Athenian 
guest says in the Laws, celebrating the armed sports of the Curetes, 
and their rhythmical dance. For Orpheus represents the Curetes who are 
three, as the guards of Jupiter. And the sacred laws of the Cretans, 
and all the Grecian theology, refer a pure and undefiled life and energy 
to this order. For το κορον to koron, indicates nothing else than the pure 
and incorruptible. Hence, we have before said, that the mighty Saturn, 
as being essentially united to the cause of undefiled purity, is a pure
intellect. The paternal Gods therefore are three, and the undefiled Gods 
also are three. Hence it remains that we should survey the seventh 
monad. 

If, therefore, we consider the fabulous exections, both the Saturnian 
and the Celestial, of which Plato makes mention, and thinks that such 
like narrations should always be concealed in silence, that the arcane truth 
of them should be surveyed, and that they are indicative of mystic conceptions, because these things are not fit for young men to hear,—[if we 
consider these] we may obtain from them what the separative deity is, 
who accomplishes the divisions, and segregates the Saturnian genera 
indeed from the Celestial, and the Jovian from the Saturnian, and who 
separates the whole intellectual order from the natures prior and posterior 
to it, disjoins the different causes in it from each other, and always imparts 
to secondary natures, secondary measures of dominion. 
And let not any one be disturbed, or oppose me on hearing these things. How 
therefore does Plato reject exections, bonds, and the tragical apparatus 
of fables? For he thinks that all such particulars will be condemned by 
the multitude and the stupid, through ignorance of the arcana they contain; 
but that they will exhibit to the wise certain admirable opinions. 
Hence, he indeed does not admit such a mode of fiction, but thinks it 
proper to be persuaded by the ancients who were the offspring of the 
Gods, and to investigate their arcane conceptions. As therefore he 
rejects the Saturnian fables, when they are narrated to Euthyprhon, and 
the auditors of the Republic, yet at the same time admits them in the 
Cratylus, placing about the mighty Saturn and Pluto, other secondary 
bonds,—thus also, I think he forbids exections to be introduced to those 
who know only the apparent meaning of what is said, and does not admit 
that there is illegal conduct in the Gods, and nefarious aggressions of 
children against their parents, but he opposes, and confutes as much as 
possible such like opinions. 
He assents however to their being narrated to those who are able to penetrate 
into the mystic truth, and investigate the concealed meaning of fables, 
and admits the separation of wholes, whether [mythologists] are willing
to denominate them exections for the purpose of concealment, or in whatever 
other way they may think fit to call them.
For bonds and exections are symbols of communion and separation, 
and each is the progeny of the same divine mythology. Nor is there any occasion 
to wonder, if from these things we endeavour to confirm 
the opinion of Plato; but it is requisite to know how the philosophy of 
Plato admits all such particulars, and how it rejects them, and in what 
manner he apprehends they may be the causes of the greatest evils, and 
of an impious life to those that hear them. The seven intellectual Gods 
therefore, will through these conceptions appear to have been thought 
worthy of being mentioned by Plato.

It is, however, I think, necessary syllogistically to collect the progression 
of them according to hebdomads, from images. The demiurgus 
therefore, [in the Timæus] fabricates the soul of the universe an image or 
all the divine orders, in the same manner as he fabricates this sensible 
world an image of intelligibles. And in the first place indeed, he constitutes 
the whole essence of the soul, and afterwards divides it into numbers, 
binds it by harmonies, and adorns it with figures, I mean the rectilinear and 
the circular. After this also, he divides it into one circle and seven circles. 
Whence therefore, are this monad and hebdomad derived, except from 
the intellectual Gods? For figure, number, and true being, are prior to 
them. And as in the fabrication of the soul, after the subsistence of the 
psychical figure, the division of the circles according to the monad and 
hebdomad follows, thus also in the Gods, after intellectual and intelligible 
figure, the intellectual breadth, and that sphere of the Gods succeed. 
The multitude therefore of the seven hebdomads subsist from the divine 
intellectual hebdomad entering into itself. And on this account, the 
demiurgus thus divides the circles in the soul, because he, and every 
intellectual order, produce an intellectual hebdomad from each monad. 
I do not however assert, and now contend, that the seven circles are 
allotted an hyparxis similar to the seven Gods that proceed from the 
demiurgus, but that the demiurgus dividing the soul according to circles, 
introduces number to the sections from the intellectual Gods, I mean the 
monadic and the hebdomadic number. For the monad indeed subsists 
according to the circle of sameness, but the division, according to the 
circle of difference. Shorly after however, it will appear that same and 
different belong to the demiurgic order. 

Farther still, after the division of the circles, the demiurgus assumes some 
things which are symbols of the assimilative, and others which are symbols 
of the liberated Gods, and through these, he refers the soul to these 
orders of the Gods. If therefore figure is prior to the intellectual Gods, 
but the similar and dissimilar are posterior to them, it is evidently necessary 
that the monadic and at the same time hebdomadic, should be 
referred to this order, and that the progression from the monad to the 
hebdomad should pertain to this order. Each therefore of the seven 
intellectual Gods, is the leader of an intellectual hebdomad, as we may 
learn from images. 
There however indeed, the hebdomad is one, and allied to itself. 
But in souls, the circles differ from each other, according 
to the divine peculiarities. For they receive number in such a manner 
as to preserve the proper nature which they are allotted, connectedly 
containing mundane natures, and convolving the apparent by their own 
circles. And thus much concerning these particulars, which afford arguments that are not obscure of the arrangement of them by Plato. 

 however, making another beginning, let us speak about each 
[of the intellectual Gods,] as much as is sufficient to the present theology. 
Let Saturn therefore, the first king of the intellectual Gods, be now celebrated 
by us, who according to Socrates in the Cratylus illuminates the 
pure and incorruptible nature of intellect, and establishing his own all-perfect power in his own summit of intellectuals, abides in, and at the 
same time proceeds from his father [Heaven]. He likewise divides the 
intellectual government from the connective, and establishes the transcendency 
of the other intellectual Gods in connexion with his own; 
but comprehends in himself the intelligible of the demiurgic intellect, 
and the plenitude of beings. Hence the Saturnian bonds, mystically, 
and obscurely signify the comprehension of this intelligible, and a union 
with it. For the intelligible is comprehended in intellect. 

As therefore, the intelligible is indeed exempt from intellect, but intellect 
is said to comprehend it, thus also Jupiter is said to bind bis father. 
And in placing bonds about his father, he at the same time binds himself 
[to him]. For a bond is the comprehension of the things that are bound. 
But the truth is as follows: Saturn is indeed an all-perfect intellect; and 
the mighty Jupiter is likewise an intellect. Each therefore being an 
intellect, each is also evidently an intelligible. For every intellect is 
converted to itself; but being converted to it energizes towards itself; 
Energizing however towards itself, and not towards externals, it is intelligible and at the same time intellectual; being indeed intellectual, so 
far as it intellectually perceives, but intelligible, so far as it is intellectually perceived. Hence also the Jovian intellect is to itself intellect, and 
to itself intelligible. And in a similar manner the Saturnian intellect is 
to itself intelligible, and to itself intellect. But Jupiter indeed is more 
intellect, and Saturn is more intelligible. For the latter is established 
according to the intellectual summit, but the former according to the 
intellectual end. And the one indeed is the object of desire, but the 
other desires. And the one fills, but the other is filled. 

Saturn therefore being intellect and intelligible, Jupiter also is in the 
second place intellect and intelligible. The intellectual however of Saturn 
is intelligible; but the intelligible of Jupiter is intellectual. Jupiter 
therefore, being at the same time intellectual and intelligible, intellectually 
perceives and comprehends himself, and binds the intelligible in 
himself. But binding this in himself, he is said to bind the intelligible 
prior to himself, and to comprehend it on all sides. For entering into 
himself, he proceeds into the intelligible prior to himself, and by the 
intelligible which is in himself, intellectually perceives that which is prior 
to himself. And thus the intelligible is not external to intellect. For 
every intellect possesses that which is in itself without any difference 
with respect to itself. But again, it intellectually perceives in itself that 
which is prior to itself. For every thing which is external to intellect, is 
foreign and adventitious, and pertains to an inferior nature. 
But that which is pre-established in the order of cause, and which pre-exists as the 
object of desire, is in the desiring natures themselves. For being converted 
to, and verging to themselves, they discover the causes of themselves, 
and all more ancient natures. And by how much more perfect 
and uniform the conversion of the desiring natures is about the objects of 
desire, by so much the more are they present with their own desirables. 
Hence every intellect, by intellectually perceiving itself, intellectually 
perceives likewise, all the natures prior to itself. And by how much the 
more it is united to itself, in a so much greater degree it is established in 
the intelligibles prior to itself. For the cause of any being, and which 
is the source of essence or of perfection to it, is not external to that 
being; but that which is subordinate to any being, is external to it, and 
is not the intelligible. On this account also, each of the divine natures is 
unconverted to that which is inferior to itself, but is converted to itself, 
and through itself reverts to that which is more excellent. And the intelligible 
indeed is not inferior to any intellect; but every intellect energizing 
towards itself, and comprehending the intelligibles prior to itself, 
intellectually perceives them. 

Some intelligibles likewise are such as are conjoined with intellect. 
But others are such as are proximately participated by it. And others 
are such as it sees more remotely, and which are more exempt from its 
nature. On this account, the demiurgic intellect is indeed at the same 
time intelligible and intellect, but has the intelligible of his father, which 
he binds as the fable says. He sees however animal itself, which is, 
according to Timæus, the most beautiful of all intelligibles, 
And if the illustrious Amelius, forming such conceptions as these, said 
that intellect is threefold, one being that which is, another that which has, and 
another that which sees, he rightly apprehends the conception of Plato, 
according to my opinion. For it is necessary that the second intellect 
should not only have the intelligible, but that it should be and have the 
intelligible; that it should be indeed the intelligible coordinate with 
itself, but have the intelligible prior to itself, so far as it participates of it. 
And it is necessary that the third intellect should see the intelligible, and 
should also be and have it; that it should see indeed the first intelligible; 
but have that which is proximately beyond itself; and that it should be 
the intelligible which is in itself, and which is conjoined with its own intelligence, 
and should be inseparable from it. 

If therefore, as we said from the beginning, Jupiter intellectually perceives 
his father Saturn, Saturn is indeed intelligible, but Jupiter is 
intellect; being one intelligible himself, but participating of another. 
Hence also Plato does not simply call Saturn intellect, but a pure and 
incorruptible intellect. For he in the intellectual is intelligible. Since 
however, he is not simply intelligible, but as in intellectuals, he is 
intellect, and is himself paternally so, being both father and intellect, and 
having the paternal intellectually. In intelligibles therefore, intellect is 
also father; but in intellectuals father is intellect. Hence Saturn is a 
pure, immaterial and perfect intellect, established above fabrication in 
the order of the desirable. But possessing such a peculiarity as this, he 
is full of all intelligibles intellectually, is as it were exuberant with 
intellections, and establishes twofold genera of Gods, some indeed in 
himself, but others posterior to himself. And he leads forth, indeed, the 
prolific powers of his father Heaven as far as to the last of things; but 
fills the demiurgic order with generative goods. 

 however is the only one of the Gods who is said both to 
receive and give the royal dignity with a certain necessity, and as it 
were violence, cutting off the genitals of his father, and being himself 
castrated by the mighty Jupiter. For he bounds the kingdom of his 
father, and is bounded by the God posterior to himself He is also filled 
from the natures placed above him, but fills the whole fabrication [of the 
universe] with prolific perfection. But separating himself from his father, 
he is exempt from his progeny. Being however one all-perfect intellect, 
he contains in himself the multitude of total intelligibles. And as 
he deifies the intellectual summit, he illuminates all things with intelligible 
light. 

 properly therefore, has this universe twofold lives, periods, and 
convolutions; the one being Saturnian, but the other Jovian, as the 
fable in the Politicus says. And according to one of the periods indeed, 
it produces all goods spontaneously, and possesses an innoxious and 
unwearied life. But according to the other it participates of material 
error, and a very mutable nature. For the life in the world being 
twofold, the one unapparent, and more intellectual, but the other more 
physical and apparent, and the one being defined according to providence, 
but the other proceeding in a disorderly manner according to 
fate;—this being the case, the second life indeed, which is multiform, 
and perfected through nature, is suspended from the Jovian order; but 
the more simple, intellectual, and unapparent life, is suspended from the 
Saturnian order. And these things the Elean guest clearly teaches, 
calling one of the circulations Jovian, but the other, Saturnian; though 
Jupiter also is the cause of the unapparent life of the universe, is the 
supplier of intellect, and the leader of intellectual perfection; but he 
elevates all things to the kingdom of Saturn, and being a leader in 
conjunction with his father, constitutes the whole mundane intellect. 
And if it be requisite to speak the truth clearly, each of the periods 
indeed, I mean the apparent, and the unapparent, participates of both 
these Gods; but the one indeed is more Saturnian, and the other is 
perfected under the kingdom of Jupiter. 

That the mighty Saturn therefore is allotted a kingdom different from 
that of the Gods prior to him, the Elean guest clearly manifests in what 
he asserts prior to the fable. For he says, “We have heard from many 
respecting the kingdom of which Saturn was the founder.” According 
to this wise man therefore, Saturn is one of the royal Gods. Hence also 
he presides over a kingdom different from that of his father. And while 
his father connectedly contains the middle centres of the intelligible and 
intellectual Gods, he is the leader of the intellectual orders and supplies 
all intellectual life, first indeed, to the Gods, but secondarily to the 
natures more excellent than ours, and in the last place to partial souls, 
when they are able to be extended to the Saturnian place of survey. 
For this universe, and all the mundane Gods, always possess this twofold life, 
and imitate the Saturnian intelligence indeed through unapparent 
and intellectual energy, but the demiurgic intellect of Jupiter, through 
a providential attention to secondary natures, and in short, through the 
visible fabrication. But partial souls at one time energize intellectually, 
and consecrate themselves to Saturn, but at another time after a Jovian 
manner, and pay a providential attention to secondary natures, without 
restraint. When however they revolve analogous to those deities 
[Saturn and Jupiter] they intellectually perceive intelligibles, and dispose 
sensibles in an orderly manner, and live both these lives, in the same 
manner as the Gods and the more excellent genera. For their periods 
are twofold; one being intellectual, but the other providential. Their 
paradigms also are twofold; the Saturnian intellect being the paradigm 
of the one, but the Jovian intellect of the other. For the mighty Jupiter 
himself has a twofold energy, containing indeed intelligibles in intellect, 
but adorning sensibles by demiurgic production. 

Since however the circulations are twofold, not only in wholes, but 
also in partial souls, the Elean guest says that in the Saturnian period, 
the generation of these souls is not from each other, as in men which are 
the objects of sensible inspection, nor as the first man with us is alone 
earth-begotten, so in partial souls one first soul is the offspring of man, 
but all of them are earth-begotten. For they are elevated from ultimate 
end terrestrial bodies, and embrace an unapparent, relinquishing a sensible 
life. He also says that neither do they verge to old age, and change 
from being younger to becoming older; but on the contrary, they are 
rendered more vigorous, proceed intellectually in a way contrary to 
generation, and as it were, divest themselves of the variety of life with 
which in descending they became invested. Hence likewise all the 
symbols which are adapted to youth are present with these souls, when 
they pass into this condition, such as a privation of hair, and a smoothness 
of the cheek instead of hoariness and beards. For they lay aside 
every thing which adheres to them from generation. But being situated 
there with Saturn, and living the life which is there, he says that there 
are abundance of fruits from trees, and many other [vegetable] substances, 
which the earth spontaneously produces. Being likewise naked, 
and without coverlets, they are for the most part fed in the open air; for 
they have a temperament of the seasons which is always the same. But 
they make use of soft beds, grass in abundance being produced for them 
from the earth. Souls therefore derive these and such like goods from 
this mighty God, in the Saturnian period. For they are thence filled 
indeed with vivific goods, and gather intellectual fruits from wholes; but 
do not procure for themselves perfection and blessedness, from partial 
energies. For doxastic nutriment indeed has divisible and material, 
conceptions; but intellectual nutriment has pure, impartible, and native 
conceptions, which the spontaneous obscurely signifies. 

The production from the earth also signifies the prolific intellect of the 
Gods, which imparts to souls by illumination perfection and self-sufficiency. For on account of the exuberant abundance of good, they 
are able to impart an influx of it, according to the measure of felicity 
adapted to them. Hence, they are neither covered with garments, as 
when they proceeded into generation, nor have they superabundant 
additions of life, but they are purified themselves by themselves from all  
composition and variety, and extending their intellect to total good, they 
participate of it from the intellectual father, being guarded by the 
intellectual Gods, and receiving from them the measures of a happy life. 
They likewise pass through the whole of their existence with facility, lead 
a sleepless and pure life, being established in the generative powers of 
intelligibles; and being filled with intellectual goods, and nourished with 
immaterial and divine forms, they are said to live a life under Saturn. 

, therefore, this God is the leader of all intellectual life, and 
every intellect as well that which is imparticipable, as that which is 
participable proceeds from this cause, hence it belongs to this mighty 
God to feed in a distributed manner, and to nourish souls. For because 
indeed he is intelligible in intellectuals, he nourishes souls, and souls are 
called the nurselings of Saturn. But because he does not fill them with 
first, and unical intelligibles, but with those that are multiplied by his 
own cause of separation, he is said to feed them distributedly, and as it 
were in a divided manner. And do you not see how through these 
things, this God appears to be coordinate to the first triad of the 
intelligible and intellectual Gods? For as Socrates,in the Phædrus, says, 
that souls are nourished in the supercelestial place, and in the intelligible 
meadow, so the Elean guest asserts that the souls that are fed under 
Saturn, are filled with intelligible goods. And it is not at all wonderful 
if souls are perfected by both these; intellectually indeed, under the 
kingdom of Saturn; but intelligibly under the order of the first intellectual 
Gods. For this God himself is nourished by that order. And 
on this account he is allotted a leading and primary transcendency in 
intellectuals, because they are filled from that order [through him] with 
occult and unapparent powers. And he is that among the intellectual 
fathers, which the order of the first intellectual Gods is in the intelligible 
and at the same time intellectual orders. Hence the intelligible every 
where becomes nutriment to ascending souls, but the connexion with it 
is effected through the second and third Gods. 

As therefore, the demiurgic order elevates souls to the Saturnian place 
of survey, thus also the Saturnian order elevates them to the subcelestial 
arch. For having made many and blessed discursive energies in the 
kingdom of Saturn, they are again extended from hence to the perfective, 
and from thence to the celestial triad, from which contemplating 
the supercelestial place, they are now ineffably conjoined with the 
supreme goods of intelligibles. And after this manner the second orders 
always connect souls with the orders prior to them. Hence also, the 
theurgic art imitating the unapparent periods of souls, arranges initiations 
in the mysteries of the second Gods, prior to the more sublime mysteries. 
And through these, it causes us to pass to the intelligible place of survey. 
These things, therefore, Plato indicates concerning the Saturnian life, and 
the polity of souls under Saturn, not in the Politicus only, but also in 
the discourses of the Athenian guest. For in the fourth book of the 
Laws he celebrates the life under Saturn, obscurely signifying the 
undefiled nature, the facility, plenitude, and self-sufficiency of that 
energy, through fabulous fictions. 

, however, it be requisite from these things, and from all the mystic 
discipline concerning this God, to consider and discuss the orders which  
he constitutes in wholes, in the first place, we must direct our attention 
to the three kings mentioned in the Gorgias, who distributing the 
kingdom of Saturn were produced by him, as being allotted in a divided 
manner a uniform and impartible dominion, and over whom he places 
the divine law, which is the cause of distribution according to intellect, 
both to the Gods themselves, and to all the natures posterior to the 
Gods. In the second place we must consider the rulers and kings 
mentioned in the Laws, who are said to preside over the different 
allotments of souls, and who are not men, but dæmons of a more divine 
and excellent genus, who distribute to souls the measures of good, cut 
off their generation-producing lives, restrain their disorderly lation, retain 
them in the intelligible, and comprehend them in the kingdom of Saturn. 
In the third place, therefore, we must direct our attention to the dæmon 
Gods, who preside over the parts of the world, and the herds [of souls] 
that are in it, as the Elean guest says in the Politicus, and who at one 
time come into contact with the objects of their government, and 
distribute to them intellectual, and all unapparent goods, but at another 
time withdraw themselves from the physical life of the world, recur to 
their own place of survey, and imitate the exempt transcendency of the 
demiurgus and father of the universe. 

But after these things, we must survey the twofold circulations of the 
mundane Gods, viz. the Saturnian and the Jovian; for these Gods 
always have each of these, as the fable says in the Politicus. For it is 
evident that the mutation of the stars and the sun takes place in each of 
the revolutions. This period, therefore, being twofold, it is obvious to 
every one that the periods are full of Saturnian goods, and participate of 
the Saturnian series. And not only the mundane Gods, but likewise all 
the, more excellent genera that follow the Gods, energize according to 
both these energies, and revolve according to the twofold circulations, 
through which souls also sometimes participate of an intellectual life, 
and proceed in this path, exchanging for sense intellect as the leader of 
their motion and circulation. Saturn, therefore, extends his kingdom 
supernally from the first Gods, as far as to partial souls, perfects all 
things, and fills them with intellectual goods, distributing to different 
natures different measures of good. For on account of this, law also 
subsists with him, as Socrates says in the Gorgias: “This law therefore 
was in the time of Saturn, and always was, and now is, among the 
Gods.” For law is the distribution of intellect; but this God is the 
first, most pure, and incorruptible intellect. 

If, however, this God is the primary leader of all division, and is the 
origin of intellectual separation, it is necessary on this account, that law 
should be with him, which distinguishes the orders of beings, divides 
the intellectual genera, and separates all forms according to a well-ordered progression; but imparts to all things by illumination the 
measure of hyparxis, connecting the order which is in them, preserving 
the boundaries of divine distribution immutable, and possessing the same 
dignity in the kingdom of Saturn, and in intellectuals, as Adrastia in the 
supercelestial place, and in the intelligible, and at the same time, 
intellectual orders. For from each of them an immutable guard, and the 
progression of order to all things are generated. But they differ from, 
each other, because law indeed divides the one into multitude, defines 
the measures of intellectual subsistence, and distributes to every thing an 
appropriate good, producing the different measures of beings from the 
one [Saturnian] intellect. But Adrastia abiding in the intelligible, 
guards all things uniformly, and preserves total order in a firm undeviating 
manner, exempt from all division. Law, therefore, is a certain 
God which divides divine forms, and definitely imparts to every thing 
that which is adapted to it according to the plenitude proceeding from 
one uniform cause; and it is also co-existent with the Saturnian order, 
in which the separations of beings, and the all-perfect progression of 
forms first subsist. Hence the demiurgus likewise looking to this 
conducts all things according to law, and constitutes mundane providence 
an image of the union of the father; but fate and the fatal laws, 
an image of the division according to law. Souls, therefore, live 
according to law; in the Jovian period indeed being governed conformably 
to the laws of Fate; but in the Saturnian period living 
according to divine law they are subservient to the multitude [of divine 
forms] and are extended to the one cause of all; and ascending to the 
intelligible place of survey, they are subjected to the sacred law of 
Adrastia. For this law extends from on high as far as to the last of 
things, and defines to souls the measures of whole periods, as Socrates 
says in the Phædrus. Who therefore this greatest God is, and what the 
goods are of which he is the cause to souls, and prior to these, to Gods 
and dæmons, the leaders of souls, let it, from these things be manifest. 

 however, theologists assert that an exemption from old age 
pertains to this order, as the Barbarians say, and Orpheus the theologist 
of the Greeks, (for he mystically says that the hairs of the face of Saturn 
are always black, and never become hoary) I admire the divinely-inspired 
intellect of Plato which unfolds the same things concerning this God 
those who proceed in his steps. For he says that souls in the Saturnian period abandon old age, but return to youth, and remove from themselves 
hoariness, but have black hair. For he says that the white hairs 
of the more elderly become black; but the cheeks of those that have 
beards being rendered smooth, they are restored to the past season [of 
youth.] These things indeed are asserted by the Elean guest; 
similar to which are the assertions of Orpheus concerning this God. 
─────────── under Saturnian Jove Men liv’d immortal; moist and fragrant hair From the pure chin then sprouted, nor was mix’d With the white flower that marks infirm old age; But in its stead, a florid down appeared. 
In these verses he delivers the similitude of Saturnian souls to this 
God. For he says that they remove from the view the old age which 
they had acquired from generation and abandon material imbecility; and  
that they exert the juvenile and vigorous life of intellect; For it is no 
otherwise lawful for them to be assimilated to the God who is exempt 
from old age, than through intellectual puberty, and undefiled power; 
But the cause of this is, that king Saturn himself is the source of the 
unallured Gods, and the inflexible triad. Hence he is, as Socrates 
says, a pure intellect. 
For he is at the same time the intellect of the undefiled order, ranking as a summit, 
and riding as in a vehicle in the flourishing and vigorous Gods that govern wholes. 
The souls also which are sent to him, wonderfully advance, in conjunction 
with intellectual energy, in vigour, and in a power undeviating, and free from 
any tendency to matter. 
Partial souls therefore, when they change their periods, at one 
time proceed to a more juvenile, and at another, to a more aged condition. 
But whole souls always live according to both these periods, and 
are conversant with Saturn according to the unapparent period, but govern 
the universe in conjunction with Jupiter, according to visible providence, 
at once receiving an increase according to both these periods, 
and becoming at one and the same time both older and younger. And 
this is what Parmenides indicates when he says, that the one proceeding 
according to time becomes at once younger and older. These things 
however, will hereafter be more manifest. 

 therefore brought to an end the information concerning the 
king of the intellectual Gods, it evidently follows that we should in the 
next place celebrate the queen Rhea. For both Plato and Orpheus assert 
that she is the mother of the demiurgus of wholes, but a divinity posterior 
to Saturn. Thus therefore, we must speak concerning her. The stable 
and united cause of all intellectuals, and the principal and original 
monad, abiding in herself, unfolding into light all intellectual multitude, 
and again convolving it into herself, and embosoming her progeny, and 
the causes of wholes that emerge from her, analysing as it were after 
division the natures that are divided, and being paternally allotted the 
highest kingdom in intellectuals,—this being the case, the vivific Rhea 
proceeds as the second from her proper principle, being allotted a maternal order in the whole paternal orders, and producing the demiurgus, 
of wholes, prior to other Gods, and the immutable guard of the Gods, For 
this Goddess is the middle centre of the paternal intellectual triad, and the 
receiving bosom of the generative power which is in Saturn, calling forth 
indeed, to the generation of wholes, the causes which abide in him, but 
unfolding definitely all the genera of the Gods. And being filled indeed 
from the father prior to her with intelligible and prolific power, but filling 
the demiurgus and father subsisting from her, with vivific abundance. 
Whence also the demiurgus is the cause of life to all things, as containing 
in himself the plenitude of intellectual life, and extending to all things 
the prolific cause of his mother. For as the middle Goddess multiplies 
the uniform powers of Saturn, and produces and causes them to preside 
over secondary natures, so the third father, at, one and the same time 
unfolds, divides, and produces as far as to the last of things, the all-perfect abundance of the Saturnian monad, and the dyadic generation 
of the mother Rhea, so as not to leave the most material and disorderly 
part of the universe destitute of the power of Saturn. 

This Goddess therefore, being the middle of the two fathers, one of 
which collects, but the other divides intellectual multitude, and the one 
through transcendency desiring to abide and to be established in himself, 
but the other hastening to produce, generate and fabricate all things, she 
educes indeed into herself, the demiurgic causes of wholes, but imparts 
her own proper power to secondary natures, in unenvying abundance. 
Hence also Plato assimilates her prolific exuberance to streams, as Socrates 
says in the Cratylus, evinces that this Goddess is a certain flux, 
and in what he asserts of her obscurely shows nothing else than her fontal 
nature, and a power unically comprehensive of the divisible rivers of 
life. For the first-effective flux is fontal; which also Socrates indicating 
in this Goddess, shortly after clearly says that the name of Tethys is the 
name of a fountain. Why therefore, is it any longer necessary to doubt 
about these things, and to say where does Plato make mention of fontal 
Gods? For he himself denominates the causes of the subsistence of all 
the Gods fontal fluxions. And besides this, if he admits that the mundane 
soul is the fountain and principle of life, because it proceeds both 
from an impartible and partible vivification, how is it possible that he 
should not in a much greater degree and more truly call the Goddess 
who comprehends in herself all life, fontal? 

Concerning names however, it is not, I think, at all proper to contend, 
but we should survey the orders themselves of the first effective Gods, 
and see how Plato following theologists copiously unfolds them to us, 
celebrating after the Saturnian monad the kingdom of Rhea, constituting 
from these the demiurgus of wholes, and all the multitude of Gods which 
is woven together with him. For this Goddess binding together the breadth 
of intellectuals, and embosoming total life, emits all the intellectual 
powers in herself of the rivers of life; and by the summit of herself 
indeed, is conjoined to the first father, and together with him generates 
wholes, and the genera of Gods that abide in him; but by her extremity 
is connascent with fabrication, and according to a kindred conjunction 
with fabrication, constitutes all the orders of Gods that are prior to the 
world, and that are in the world. Hence there also the causes of the 
demiurgi of wholes primarily subsist, and the more partial genera of 
life: and the union and total deity of all these, is at once exempt from 
the plenitudes of herself, and is at once co-arranged with them. 

Thus therefore, she is both uniform and multiform, one and simple, 
though being self-perfect, she is a vivific world, proceeding from on high 
as far as to the last of things, and as far as to the extremities of the 
universe, giving subsistence to the vivific powers of the breadth of life. 
Hence also Plato refers the vivific Cause of wholes to this Goddess, and 
through the last gifts of this divinity, indicates her total energy; which 
primarily indeed fills the whole demiurgus with intellectual and prolific 
power, but secondarily perfects all the genera of, the Gods with the 
intellectual fruits of herself. According to a third order also, her total 
energy nourishes the souls that are the attendants of the Gods, with the 
rivers of divine perfection. And in the last orders, it imparts to mortal 
animals the gift of nature. This therefore so, I think, more known than 
every thing to those who admit that things divine are beyond the works 
of nature. 

That however, which it is more fit the lovers of the contemplation of 
truth should consider, I say, is this, that Plato divides Ceres from the 
whole vivific deity, and coarranges her, at one time with Proserpine, at 
another with Juno, and at another with the progeny of Jupiter, as we 
may learn in the Cratylus. In which dialogue indeed, he co-arranges 
Rhea with Saturn, but connects a certain common investigation and 
theory about Ceres, Jupiter, and Juno. In the Laws likewise celebrating 
the legislative Goddesses, he refers the whole of a legitimate life 
to the union of Ceres and Proserpine; since according to Orpheus this 
middle Goddess being conjoined with Saturn by her summit, is called 
Rhea; but producing Jupiter, and together with Jupiter unfolding the 
whole and partial orders of the Gods, she is called Ceres. And all the 
order of middle life is comprehensive of the other Titanidæ, and likewise 
of Ceres. For it preestablished this monad as a middle collective of all 
the orders in it, both those that are occult, and those that are divided 
about the generative powers of the Goddess. Each of these powers, 
however, are triple. And this monad indeed conjoins the superior triad 
to Saturn, but weaves the inferior, together with the demiurgic order. 
It also evinces that the Cerealian monad being the middle, is coarranged 
with, and is at the same time exempt from the demiurgus of wholes. For 
in conjunction with the whole order it constitutes, and together with 
Jupiter generates Proserpine. And thus we have celebrated the primogenial 
Goddess who is the middle of the fathers. 

 however, after this Goddess, the demiurgus of wholes is in the  
third place to be celebrated, according to the order which he is allotted 
in the intellectual Gods, peculiarly unfolding for this purpose all the truth 
concerning him. And in the first place, we must remember that it is 
necessary the peculiarity of this third father should be demiurgic; and thus 
in the next place, following Plato, we must direct our attention to other 
particulars [respecting this God]. The first of the intellectual Gods 
therefore, who is parturient with multitude, who is the leader and source 
of all separation, and who separates himself from the uniform and first 
Gods, but generates the divided principles of wholes,—this God again 
converts his progeny to himself, and weaves together these parts with his 
own sameness, and exhibits himself as one intelligible world in intellectuals, 
bringing forth in himself, and retaining with himself his own offspring. 
But the second of the intellectual deities, is the vivific Goddess, who 
brings forth indeed in conjunction with the first intellectual God, occult 
multitude, (for she is conjoined to him according to supreme transcendency) 
but cannot endure to remain in this mode of generating, and in 
Collecting the separation of wholes into unseparated union. Hence she 
separates the third intellect from the [first] father; but produces the  
multitude of the Gods, and of intellectual reasons, and fills the demiurgus 
with generative power. If, therefore, the first intellectual God is parturient 
with the generation of wholes; but the prolific vivification of the 
intellectual orders causes this generation to shine forth;—it is evident 
that the intellect of the intellectual fathers according to his own order, 
produces and adorns all things, and calls forth indeed, the occult nature 
of his father, into separation and progression, but prepares total vivification 
to send forth the rivers of itself, as far as to the last of things. For it is 
every where the peculiarity of intellect to divide and unfold multitude, 
the plenitudes of life, and the unions of intelligibles. Intelligible 
intellect however contains multitude uniformly, or according to the form 
of one; for multitude preexists in the intelligible according to cause. 
But the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual intellect, has 
indeed secondary measures of union, but is exempt from all perfect 
separation, abiding in the first principles of wholes. And intellectual, 
intellect is the source of all division, and of the subsistence of partial 
natures; since it preestablishes in itself all the multitude of forms, and 
this not tetradically only, as intelligible intellect, but it possess we 
all-perfect intellectual cause of all forms. It is necessary therefore that 
the whole demiurgic principles should pertain to this intellect, that all 
the demiurgic Gods should proceed from this one third father, and that 
this should be the demiurgus of wholes. For as the first of paradigms 
co-subsists in intelligible intellect, and in the third triad and the first 
father, so likewise we must place the first demiurgic monad in intellectual 
intellect, and the third father of the intellectual Gods. For on 
this account also the demiurgic is conjoined with the paradigmatic cause, 
according to the analogy which each is allotted among the fathers; one 
indeed in intelligibles, but the other in intellectuals. For one is the 
boundary of the intelligible, but the other of the intellectual order. But 
this is evident from what has been before said. 

Farther still, fabrication being fourfold, and one indeed adorning 
wholes totally, another adorning wholes but partially, another adorning 
parts, but totally, and another weaving parts together with wholes, 
partially,—this being the case, it is evident that the cause of wholes 
which is the cause of them uniformly and indivisibly, is the most ancient 
of all the causes. It is necessary however, that this cause should either 
be prior to, or in, or posterior to the intellectual Gods. Where therefore 
shall we place it? For all the parts which are constituted by intellectuals
are more partial than the one and total fabrication. For the division of 
wholes into three, and the leaders of divisible production, present themselves to the view in these orders. The natures therefore, that are prior 
to intellectuals, are defined according to other peculiarities of the Gods, 
as was before shown, and in short, they subsist according to union and 
are expanded above the separation of intellectual forms. 

 remains therefore that the one demiurgus of wholes must be arranged 
in intellectuals. But if indeed, he is the first father, he will be intelligible, 
will contain his progeny in himself, and will be the collector of separation. 
How therefore, does he divide the worlds? How does he generate the 
multitudes of mundane natures? How does he speak to all the junior 
demiurgi at once? For the first father is uncoordinated with the whole 
number of mundane natures, and also converts his first progeny to 
himself, flying as it were from multitude to union, and. hastily withdrawing 
himself from all-various separation into intelligible transcendency. 
But if the one demiurgus of wholes is the vivific order, all things 
indeed, will be full of life, on account of the whole demiurgus. And the 
cause of souls, according to a probable reason will here become apparent 
subsisting prior to multitude. But how will he convert all things to 
himself? How is he called demiurgus and father? For the vivific deity, 
herself by herself, has a maternal dignity among the Gods, and is the 
supplier of progression to all things. But to produce forms, and to 
convert, are the. illustrious and peculiar good of intellect. Neither 
therefore, is the demiurgus of wholes in the supermundane order. 
For all the natures there are partial, and either partially preside over wholes, 
or comprehend the productions of parts totally. Nor is he in intelligibles. 
For all the Gods there are fathers; and no one there is called 
demiurgus and father. But the divine orders antecedently comprehend 
all things in a manner perfectly occult and unical. Nor is he in the 
intelligible and at the same time intellectual order. For to collect, 
connect, and perfect multitudes, is not the province of the demiurgic 
peculiarity. For this is the source of separation, and the production of 
forms, glittering with intellectual sections. But the intelligible and at 
the same time intellectual Gods, extend intellectual multitudes to the 
union of intelligibles. Nor again, is it possible to admit that the demiurgic 
cause is in the first or second order of intellectuals. 
For the summit of intellectuals is imparticipable by mundane natures, and is 
rather proposed to them in the order of the desirable; but is not 
productive of them. Hence, all the Gods in the world are elevated to 
the Saturnian place of survey; but proceed from another secondary 
principle, and through it are converted and conjoined to the exempt 
kingdom. And the middle centre being vivific, is not defined according 
to the paternal characteristic. For the generative very much differs from 
the paternal, and the vivific from the demiurgic genus; so far, I think, 
as the principles of the whole orders, I mean bound and infinity, differ 
from each other. For the demiurgic and paternal order is referred to 
bound; but all vivific and generative power, to infinity. 

 therefore, at those interpreters of Plato, who do not make 
one fabrication but many, who assert that there are three demiurgi of 
wholes, and pass at one time to the second, and at another to the third 
demiurgus; and who divide what is said in the Timæus, and think fit to 
refer some of the assertions to one, but others to another cause. For that 
there is a demiurgic triad, and another multitude of Gods characterized 
according to the producing cause, I also admit, and think it will be 
granted by Plato. It is necessary however in each order prior to the 
triad, and prior to every multitude, that there should be a preexistent 
monad. 
For all the orders of the Gods originate from a monad; 
because each of the whole orders is assimilated to the whole progression 
of the Gods. As therefore the subsistence of the Gods has the cause of 
its generation from the imparticipable one, thus also it is necessary that 
the perfect orders in the Gods, should have a preexistent monad, and a 
first-effective principle. According to the same reasoning, all the vivific 
progressions are suspended from one vivification, and the demiurgic 
orders are extended to one fabrication. And it is not proper that there 
should be multitude without the monad. For, there will neither be 
coarrangement, nor a division of multitude according to intellect, unless 
the one and whole preexist. For on this account prior to all the divine 
progressions, the order of wholeness subsists, in order that it may comprehend 
parts, and may define them in, and about itself. 

How therefore neglecting whole in fabrication, can we survey demiurgi 
divided according to parts? Though Plato himself thinks with respect to 
the paradigm of the universe, that the world should not be assimilated to 
any thing which naturally subsists in the form of a part, but to all perfect 
animal; and on this account he demonstrates that the world is only-begotten, because its paradigm is one. For if it were not one, but many 
paradigms, again it would be necessary that there should be another 
animal about it, of which it would be a part, and it would be more right 
to assert that the world is no longer similar to the many paradigms, but 
to that which comprehends them. For it is necessary that the one 
paradigm should precede the many, in the same manner as the one good 
subsists prior to participated goods, and that the whole world should be 
the image of one paradigm prior to many. For whether it is alone the 
image of many paradigms, whence will the world be one and a whole? 
And how is it possible it should not be more dishonourable than its parts? 
For these indeed, are assimilated to intelligibles, but the whole world is 
similar to no one of real beings. Or whether all the world subsists from 
a certain intelligible paradigm, if indeed there are many paradigms of one 
world, these also will be similar to each other, if they are the causes of 
the same image. It is necessary therefore, that sameness should be 
communicated to these from one form; or again, the world will be more 
venerable than its paradigms according to union. But if the paradigm is 
one, after the same manner also the demiurgic cause is one. For as 
there is one image from one paradigm, thus also the progeny being one, 
derives its subsistence from one demiurgus and father. For it is 
necessary that the paradigmatic cause should either be the same with the 
demiurgus, and should be established in him, or that it should be prior to 
the demiurgus, as we say it is, or that it should be posterior to the 
demiurgus, as some think proper to assert. 

If however, the paradigm and the demiurgus are the same, the demiurgus 
will be one according to Plato. For the paradigm is only-begotten, as 
he demonstrates. But if the demiurgus exists prior to the paradigm, 
which it is not lawful to assert, but the paradigm is one, much more will 
the demiurgus be one. For the causes which are more elevated are 
allotted a more uniform hypostasis; since also the first cause of wholes is 
one. And if the paradigmatic cause has indeed the first order in beings, 
but the demiurgic cause the second order, and this universe the last 
order, being the resemblance of the former, and the progeny of the latter, 
how is it possible since the extremes are monadic, the middle multitude 
should be without the monad? For it is necessary that the paradigm 
being intelligible, should impart by illumination a greater degree of 
union to the universe than the demiurgic cause* And as the paradigm 
being only-begotten, comprehends in itself the first paradigms, after the 
same manner it is necessary that the demiurgic monad should be comprehensive 
of many demiurgi. For if the world derives its only-begotten 
subsistence from the paradigm, but through the demiurgus, the demiurgus also 
is indeed entirely one.

Farther still, I think that those who are the patrons of this opinion 
should direct their attention to that assertion of Socrates, that it is every 
where fit the many should be comprehended in the one. For on account 
of this we admit the hypothesis of forms [or ideas], and prior to other 
things we preestablish intellectual monads. How therefore are intellectual 
forms extended to one principle, and how do each of them proceed 
from one demiurgic cause, but the whole demiurgic form is multiplied, 
and divided prior to the indivisible monad? For it is necessary that as 
all equals, whether they are intellectual, or psychical, or sensible, should 
be suspended from one first equality, all beautiful things, from beauty 
itself, and the many every where, from primary beings, thus also it is 
necessary that the multitude of demiurgi should be suspended from one 
fabrication, and should subsist about one demiurgic monad. For how 
can it be lawful to leave the one in forms rather than in the Gods? For 
forms indeed, have their hypostasis mingled with multitude; but the 
Gods are defined according to union itself. If therefore all the multitudes 
of forms are the progeny of monads, much more are the orders of 
the Gods allotted peculiarities which originate from monads, and which 
through monads are inherent in multitudes. But if this be the case, it is 
necessary that the whole demiurgus should subsist prior to the multitude 
of demiurgi, and that the three demiurgi should distribute the one cause 
of the generation of the universe. 

Again therefore we assert from the beginning that it is necessary the 
demiurgic principle should either be one, or many, or one, and many. 
But if indeed, it is one alone, and the multitude in the world, and the 
different order which it contains subsist similarly from one demiurgic 
principle, how are mortal and immortal natures the progeny of the same 
cause without a medium? For all the natures that proceed from the one 
fabrication are immortal. But if the demiurgic principle is many only, 
whence is the common form of hyparxis communicated to the multitude, 
if it does not originate from one? For as the final cause is one, viz. the 
good, as the paradigmatic cause is one, viz. animal itself, and as the world 
is a generated one, thus also after the same manner, the demiurgic cause 
is one. 
But if there are one and many demiurgic principles, whether 
does the one principle belong to partial or to total genera? If however, it 
belongs indeed to partial genera, bow is it extended to the first and 
intelligible paradigm? For the supermundane genera subsist about the 
intellectual Gods, and according to intellectual paradigms. For being 
partial, they entirely assimilate the natures posterior to themselves to 
intellectuals, co-ordinately to themselves. Or how will it any longer 
preserve the union of total fabrication which produces wholes totally? 
For a thing of this kind pertains to no partial nature; but it belongs to a 
partial principle, to produce parts either totally or partially, as we before 
observed. 
But if the demiurgic principle belongs to the total orders, it 
is necessary that it should either be intelligible or intellectual, or intelligible 
and intellectual. If however, it is of an intelligible nature, how is 
it divisive of wholes? How is it co-arranged with mundane natures? 
How is it said to fashion the universe? How from the genera of being 
does it produce soul, and the natures posterior to soul? For [on this 
hypothesis] we must admit that all these are in intelligibles, viz. figure, 
the genera of being, and these divided, the similar and the dissimilar, 
and other things through which the demiurgic principle constitutes the 
whole world. But if the demiurgic principle is of an intelligible and at 
the same time intellectual nature, how does he produce participated 
intellect? How does he separate the multiform orders of souls? How
does he divide the parts, or the circles that are in them? For that which 
is generative of participated intellect, is imparticipable intellect. And 
that which has the power of dividing multitude will not [on this 
hypothesis] differ from that which connects the total genera of the 
Gods. 
And in short, the demiurgus of wholes, is called by Timæus 
intellect, and is frequently said to see, to discover, and to reason, but he 
is no where denominated by him intelligible and at the same time 
intellectual. For the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, 
divide all things triadically. But the demiurgus, at onetime indeed, 
divides the world into five parts, and at another divides the circles of the 
soul into hebdomads, that he may generate either the celestial spheres, 
or the seven parts of the soul. We must say therefore, that he is entirely 
secondary to the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, and 
he is the cause of secondary goods to the world. But we must refer to 
those Gods the cause of united forms and reasons. That the demiurgic 
intellect however, is an intellectual God, is I think through these things 
sufficiently apparent at present. 

 Plato appears to me to have indicated the peculiarity of this 
God in a remarkable manner, by calling him intellect, and asserting that 
be sees intelligibles, but admitting that they are visible to him according 
to nature. For that which is truly intellect, and which establishes itself 
according to this hyparxis, is intellectual intellect. For intelligible intellect 
also, is indeed simply intelligible, and is of that allotment; but is  
said to be intellect, as being the cause of every intellectual nature. 
And the intellect of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual 
Gods, has not its own nature unmingled with the intelligible. But intellectual 
intellect alone, is peculiarly intellect, being allotted the intellectual 
itself in intellectuals; just as the most principal of intelligibles, is 
primarily, the first, and the highest intelligible, which we denominate the 
one being, and that which is occultly being. This therefore is that which 
is simply intelligible. But that which is simply intellect is intellectual intellect. For the intelligible indeed possesses the summit, but 
intellect the end of wholes. And the intermediate natures partly pertain 
to the intelligible, and partly to intellect, and the intellectual nature. 
And the intelligibles indeed, that are primarily so, possess intellect according 
to cause; but the first of intellectuals have the intelligible 
according to participation; and the natures that are collective of these, 
conjoin the intelligible and intellectual peculiarity together. Since, 
therefore, Timæus also calls the demiurgus intellect indefinitely, and 
neither denominates him life, nor intelligible, in consequence of his peculiarity being alone intellectual, it is certainly necessary that he should 
be established at the end of the intellectual Gods. 

For there intellect is intellect itself, and is not such an intellect as 
the Saturnian is. For Saturn also is intellect, but he is a pure and incorruptible intellect, which manifests his supreme empire in intellectuals, 
transcending the whole intellectual Gods. But the demiurgus is simply 
intellect. As therefore, the simply intelligible is the first of intelligibles, 
so that which is simply intellect, is the last of intellectuals. For all 
things are in each of the orders. For in intelligibles life and intellect 
preexist; and in the breadth of life, there are similarly life and intellect. 
And in intellectuals there is each of the rest. But in intelligibles indeed, 
being is according to essence, but life and intellect are according to 
cause. In intellectuals, intellect indeed is according to essence, but being 
and life are according to participation. And in the intermediate natures, 
intellect is according to cause, but being is according to participation, 
and life according to essence. 
As therefore, that which is most vital in life is the middle, 
and as that which is especially intelligible is the 
summit in being, so in intellectuals, the extremity is that which is most 
intellectual. Hence if there is a certain intellect which is simply intellect, 
and a perceiving intellect, this is intellectual intellect, which Plato 
denominating the demiurgus unfolds to us the most manifest order, which 
it is allotted in intellectuals. On this account also, prior to all other 
things, the demiurgus constitutes participated intellect, as Timæus says. 
For placing intellect in soul, and soul in body, he fashioned the universe. 
Energizing therefore, according to his own essence, and producing by his 
very being, he constituted the intellect of the universe prior to all other 
things. For every participated proceeds from imparticipable intellect. 
Hence, as if Plato had said, that the generative cause which gives subsistence 
to participated intelligible, is that which is primarily being, so 
since the demiurgus first produces intellect from himself, he will be 
imparticipable and intellectual intellect. From these things therefore, it is 
evident what the hyparxis of the demiurgus and father is, and what order 
it is allotted in intellectuals according to Timæus. 

 us however after another manner syllogistically collect the peculiarity 
of the demiurgus, receiving from the Timæus the principles of the 
arguments on this subject. This therefore is known to every one, that 
Timæus calls the whole demiurgus fabricator and father, in the beginning 
of what he says concerning him. For he says, “It is difficult to discover 
the fabricator and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible 
to speak of him to all men.” Hence, he does not think fit to call him 
either father alone, or fabricator alone, nor again connecting the two, 
father and fabricator, but on the contrary, he places the fabricative prior 
to the paternal. Now therefore, we must show in the first place, in what 
respect fabricator and father differ from each other; and in the next place,
in addition to this, who the fabricator alone is, and who father and fabricator 
is, and how the fabricative and at the same time paternal peculiarity, 
is considered by Plato as adapted to the demiurgus. 

If therefore, we divide all things into the Gods, and the progeny of the 
Gods, and this is the same thing as to divide them into superessential 
monads, and the progressions of beings, father indeed will be generative 
of the Gods and superessential unities; but fabricator will give subsistence 
to essences and beings. For again, according to this reason Timæus 
says, that the natures which are generated by the demiurgus are equal to 
the Gods; for the demiurgus is not only fabricator, but also father; but 
that those which are produced by the junior Gods, are allotted a mortal 
nature. For these Gods are alone producers and fabricators of things 
which participate of existence alone, and not of the superessential peculiarity. 
Hence through that by which they suffer a diminution with respect 
to the demiurgic monad, through this they are not allotted a power 
generative of things equal to the Gods. And through that by which the 
intellectual demiurgus is expanded above the junior Gods, through this 
he binds to himself the generations of all mundane natures. 

But if again, we divide beings into the total and partial, father indeed, 
will appear to us to be the hypostatic cause of wholes, but fabricator of 
partial natures. For the former is the cause exemptly of things that are 
generated; but the latter proximately. And the former, produces 
indeed by his very being, energy giving perfection to his hyparxis; but 
the latter produces by energizing, his hypostasis being fixed according 
to energy. If also we again separately divide the generations of perpetual 
and* mortal natures, we must refer the generation of perpetual natures 
to the paternal cause, but the generation of mortal natures to the 
fabricative cause. For the fabricator indeed produces that which is generated 
from non-being to being. For the Elean guest defines the 
effective art to be this. But the father constitutes things posterior to 
himself consubsistent with himself. For he is father by his very being, 
and has the power of generating united with himself. Each therefore, I 
mean the paternal and the effective or fabricative, is assimilated to the 
principle of bound. And the former indeed is the cause of union, but 
the latter of the production of forms. And the former is the cause of 
wholes, but the latter of an extension as far as to parts. And the one 
indeed, is the primary leader of simple, but the other of composite natures; 
Again however, in these the generative cause, and the cause 
which is productive of life, are opposed to each other; because the 
paternal cause indeed is connascent with generative powers, but the 
effective with vivific powers. And as the paternal and the effective 
causes pertain to the coordination of bound, so every thing prolific and 
vivific, pertains to vivification, and the first infinity. 

These things, however, being thus divided by us, it is evident that the 
paternal indeed, is itself by itself primarily in the intelligible Gods. For 
they are the fathers of wholes, being fixed according to supreme intelligible 
union. And on this account, Plato also calls the first God father, 
from the natures which are proximately established after him, transferring 
to him the appellation of father. For every where indeed, it is usual 
with Plato to introduce names to the ineffable from secondary causes, 
and the causes which are posterior to it. But at one tune indeed, he 
introduces the names from all beings, and at another from the first beings. 
For it neither was nor is lawful to refer names to him who is exempt from 
all beings, from subordinate natures, and which are placed in an order 
very remote from him. If therefore, all beings participate of the paternal 
peculiarity, we must say that Plato gives this name to the one from all 
beings; for there is. not among all beings such a cause as this. 
Hence it is evident that Plato introduces to the one an appellation of this kind, 
from that which is the first and highest in the Gods. The intelligible 
Gods, however, are more ancient than all (he divine orders, and subsist 
immediately after the one. The paternal cause therefore of beings is in 
the intelligible Gods, and the intelligible Gods are the fathers of all the 
divine genera; being established in the highest essences, and occultly producing 
wholes. And the first God indeed, is beyond the appellation of 
father, as he is likewise beyond all other names; and he is neither properly 
called the good, or the one, through his ineffable and unknown transcendency. 
But the intelligible Gods are primarily superessential unities 
and goodnesses, and are the exempt fathers of beings. 

The paternal peculiarity, therefore, originates supernally from the first 
intelligible triad; but the fabricative first presents itself to the view in 
the third triad. For that which generates all forms, and adorns all things 
with forms is the third triad of intelligibles. For there, as we have said, 
all-perfect animal subsists, which is comprehensive of the first and intelligible 
paradigms. Here therefore, the effective also or fabricative at the 
same time subsists. For animal itself constitutes the Gods, and produces 
the forms of all beings. Hence it is allotted the paternal peculiarity, 
according to the divine cause, but according to the formal cause, it unfolds 
into light the effective principle of wholes. But again, on the contrary, 
the effective and at the same time paternal peculiarity, is allotted 
its hypostasis in the demiurgic monad. Hence also the demiurgus of 
wholes is the hypostatic cause of Gods. In a particular manner however, 
he fabricates the world, energizing with forms and demiurgic reasons. 
For he constitutes intellect, souls and bodies, adorning all things with 
forms, some indeed with first, others with middle, and others with last forms. 

Do you not see, therefore, how the end of intelligibles indeed, was 
paternal and at the same time effective; but the end of intellectuals is 
effective and at the same time paternaL There however, the paternal 
peculiarity is more predominant; but here the effective. For in both 
indeed, both causes preexist; nevertheless in the paradigm [i. e. in animal 
itself] the paternal is more prevalent, but in the demiurgus the 
effective. For the former produces by his very being; but the latter by 
energizing. And in the former indeed, fabrication [or effective energy] 
is essential; but in the latter essence is effective. Forms also are with 
both; but in the former intelligibly, and in the latter intellectually. From 
these things therefore, it is evident, that the demiurgic cause subsists 
analogous to the paradigmatic cause; and that it has the same order with 
respect to intellectuals, as that has with respect to intelligibles. And on 
this account Timæus also says that the demiurgus of wholes was extended 
to that paradigm. For he says, “Whatever ideas intellect perceived by 
the dianoëtic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it 
necessary for the universe to contain.” And together with this analogy, 
there is a diminution of the intellectual with reference to the intelligible. 
For the latter is more united; but the former is more separated. And 
the one indeed is preestablished in the order of the desirable; but the 
other is moved about the desirable. And the one fills with paternal 
power; but the other absorbs as it were and embosoms the whole prolific 
abundance of the desirable. And after this manner, the demiurgus of the 
universe is all-perfect, receiving whole intelligible powers, from all-perfect 
animal. For the universe is threefold; one indeed being intelligibly [all]; 
another intellectually; and another sensibly. For the world is perfect, 
from perfect natures, as Timæus says. And animal itself is perfect according 
to all things, as the same Timæus asserts. The demiurgus likewise, 
being the best of causes, is all-perfect. 

Again therefore, resuming what we have said, we repeat, that the 
paternal cause commences from the supreme union of intelligibles; but 
the paternal and at the same time effective cause is consubsistent in the 
intelligible paradigm; and the effective and at the same time paternal 
cause is defined according to the whole demiurgus. But the cause which 
is alone effective and fabricative, pertains to the junior Gods who give 
subsistence to partial and mortal things. The peculiarity therefore of 
the demiurgic cause is effective and paternal. And this Timæus asserts, 
not only in the beginning of the discourse about it, in which he says, “[To 
discover] therefore, the artificer and father of this universe, &c.;” but 
also in the speech to the junior Gods, he does the same thing; for the 
demiurgus in a similar manner says to them: “Gods of Gods of whom I 
am the demiurgus and father, [Whatever is generated by me is indissoluble, 
I being willing that it should be so.]” For he does not call himself 
father and demiurgus, but demiurgus and father, just as there [Timæus 
calls him] fabricator and father. And not in the Timæus only is this 
mode of the arrangement of the names defined, but in the Politicus also, 
the Elean guest speaking about the world says that it imitates the instruction 
of its demiurgus and father; and in the beginning indeed, he uses 
these names more accurately, but in the end more negligently. Since 
Plato therefore, every where preserves this order of names unchanged, it 
is evident to those who are not entirely unskilled in things of this kind, 
that he defines the demiurgic monad according to this peculiarity, and 
that he considers it to be effective and at the same time paternal. 
For because indeed, it is the end of the intellectual triad, it is allotted a paternal 
transcendency with respect to all the second genera of Gods; but 
because it produces from itself all the partial genera and species of beings, 
it possesses an effective cause of the natures to which it gives subsistence. 
And because indeed, it is father, power is in it, and at the same time intellect. 
For the demiurgus himself says, “Imitating the power which I 
employed in your generation.” And again, Timæus says concerning the 
demiurgus; “Whatever ideas intellect perceived in animal itself, such 
and so many he conceived by the dianoetic energy it necessary for this 
universe to contain.” Hence he is father, and the power of the father is 
in him, and intellect. All these however, are in him intellectually, and 
not intelligibly. Hence, I think he is called father indeed, not simply, 
but together with effector and demiurgus; and power, not by itself, but 
the power of the demiurgus and father. For he who calls himself demiurgus 
and father, says that it is the power of himself. But he is immediately called intellect, without the addition of power, and the other 
appellations. Whatever ideas therefore intellect perceived,” &c. 
For  all things are in him intellectually, and both power and father, by which 
he imitates the intelligible paradigm. For in him all things were intelligibly, 
viz. bound, infinity, and that which is mixed from both these. 
These, however, are father, power, and intellect. But the intellectual of 
the paradigm indeed was intelligible in the intelligible Gods, subsisting 
prior to an intellectual cause. The intellectual however of the 
demiurgus, is of itself intellectual, being intellectual in intellectuals, as 
was before observed. Because indeed, as we have said, he is father, 
power is in him, and also intellect. But because these are defined according 
to the effective and demiurgic, he is coarranged with the vivific 
order, and together with it constitutes the genera of life, and vivifies the 
whole world. What this order is however, and where it is arranged, we 
shall shortly survey. But thus much is evident from what has been said, 
that so far as he is the demiurgus, he requires contact with the vivific 
order, together with it generates total lives, and conjoins it to himself. 
Disseminating, however, all the measures of life in it, and together with 
it adorning and producing them, he again converts them to himself. For 
it belongs to him to generate all things, and to recall all things to himself, 
no less than to generate them, because he is established at the end 
of the intellectual order, and is the demiurgic intellect. As he is therefore 
demiurgic, he gives subsistence to all things; but as intellect, he 
convolves multitude to union, and converts it to himself. He also 
accomplishes both these, by the words which he delivers to the junior 
Gods. For he fills them with demiurgic and prolific power, collects them 
to himself, constitutes himself the object of desire as it “were to the multitude 
of Gods, and extends about himself all the demiurgi in the world. 

 the third place therefore, let us purify our conceptions about the demiurgic 
cause according to other projecting energies of intellect, following 
for this purpose Timæus. In the first place then, Timæus in the beginning 
of the theory concerning the demiurgus, sufficiently exhibits his goodness, 
and his unenvying and abundant communication of demiurgic 
reasons, being impelled to this from the seat of goodness which is inherent 
in him, and from his exuberant deity. For his goodness and his 
unenvying abundance, are not as it were a certain habit of good, and a 
power, or a form itself by itself existing prior to many goods, but it is one 
ineffable participation of good, and the one of the demiurgic order; according 
to which the demiurgus also is a God, and fills all things with 
their proper good. 
For because there is deity in him which desires to adorn and arrange all things, 
and an hyparxis which is extended to the providence of the whole of things, 
on this account he establishes the principle of fabrication. 
His goodness therefore is nothing else than demiurgic 
deity. But his will is the progeny of the energy of his goodness, 
bounding the end of his power. For since in the demiurgus of wholes 
there are, as we have said, father, power, and intellect, and these subsist 
in him intellectually, according to each of these he is filled with the participation 
of the one. And through goodness indeed, that which is 
paternal in him, and which is as it were the intelligible of intellect, is 
illuminated. But through will, his power is governed, and is extended 
to one intelligible good. And through providence, his intellect is perfect, 
and gives subsistence to all things. All these likewise are the progeny 
of the one deity in the demiurgus. 

In the first place, therefore, as I have said, Timæus unfolds through 
these things the divine peculiarity of the demiurgus. But in the second 
place, he presents to our view the intelligible cause which is in him, and 
also the united paradigmatic cause of wholes which he contains. For 
to make all things similar to himself, evinces that he is the intelligible 
paradigm of every thing beautiful and good in the world. For because 
he gives subsistence to all things by his very being, that to which he 
gives subsistence is the image of himself. And according to this 
reasoning the demiurgus is not only a God, but he contains in himself 
the intelligible, and true being, and antecedently comprehends not only 
the final cause of mundane natures, but also the paradigmatic cause. 
But again, in the third place, Timæus celebrates the demiurgic power, 
and the principle which abolishes every thing disorderly and indefinite, 
and prepares the beautiful alone and the good to have dominion in 
wholes. For the assertion that the demiurgus to the utmost of his power 
suffered nothing evil and vile to exist, indicates his unconquerable 
power, which adorns things material in an unpolluted manner, and 
imparts by illumination bound to indefinite, and order to disorderly 
natures. 

In which part of the Timæus, likewise, this dogma of Plato will appear 
to you to be admirable, that matter is generated from some one of the 
Gods situated above the demiurgus. For the demiurgus receiving 
matter occupied by the vestiges of forms, thus himself introduces into it 
all the perfection of ornament and arrangement. Matter, therefore, and 
the whole of that which is the subject of bodies, proceed supernally from 
the first principles, which on account of their exuberance of power, are 
able to generate even the last of beings. But the demiurgus of the 
universe, imparts by illumination, order, bound, and ornament, and the 
whole world is fabricated an image of intelligibles, through the communication 
of forms. 

In the fourth place, therefore, let us survey how Timæus unfolds to 
us the demiurgic intellect. “By a reasoning process,” says he, the 
demiurgus discovered from the things which are visible according to 
nature, that no work which is destitute of intelligence can ever become 
more beautiful than that which possesses intellect.” What therefore is 
this reasoning? What is the discovery, and whence does it originate? 
Reasoning, therefore, is indeed distributed intellection, looking to itself, 
and in itself investigating good. For every one who reasons, passes from 
one thing to another, and being converted to himself, searches after 
good. The demiurgic intellect, therefore, in adorning and arranging the 
universe subsists analogously to him who reasons; for he emits the 
divided causes of mundane natures, which preexist unitedly in intelligibles. 
For those things which intelligible intellect constitutes 
uniformly and exemptly, these intellectual intellect separating, distributing 
into parts, and as it were fabricating by itself, generates. 
Reasoning therefore is the being filled with the intelligible, and an all-perfect union with it. By which also it is evident that it is not fit to 
think this reasoning [of the demiurgus] is either investigation or doubt, 
or a wandering of divine intellect, but that it is stable intelligence 
intellectually perceiving the multiform causes of beings. For intellect is 
always united to the intelligible, and is filled with its own intelligibles. 
And in a similar manner it is intellect in energy, and intelligible. For 
at one and the same time, it intellectually perceives and is perceived, 
discovers itself, entering into itself, and the reasoning also finds what 
this intelligence is, but not according to transition. For the intelligence 
of the Gods is eternal. And invention with them is not the discovery of 
that which i3 absent; for all things are always present to the intellect 
of the Gods. The intelligible likewise there is not separated from 
intellect. The conversion, therefore, of intellect to itself may be called 
reasoning; but the being filled from intelligibles invention. And 
intelligibles themselves may be denominated things visible according to 
nature. For because Timæus had denominated the unadorned subject 
of bodies when it was vanquished by the obscure vestiges of forms, 
visible, hence, I think, he calls intelligibles visible according to nature. 
For it is according to nature, to intellect to look to these, and not to 
things subordinate to these. As, therefore, he says, that intellect itself 
sees intelligibles, after the same manner also he calls intelligibles things 
naturally visible, and converts intellect to the intelligible, as that which 
sees to that which is seen. If, therefore, intellect sees animal itself, and 
assimilates to it the whole world, it may be said that animal itself is 
visible to the demiurgus of the universe. For there the most splendid of 
intelligibles subsists; and this is that which we before demonstrated, 
when we said that there the fountain of beauty shines forth, which 
Socrates, in the Phædrus, denominates splendid and fulgid. 

 therefore are the conceptions which are to be assumed of the 
demiurgic cause, and from these things they are to be derived. We 
shall however obtain one perfection of the summit of the dogmas 
concerning it, if we are able to survey the words which this cause 
extends to the junior demiurgi, and to unfold the concealed meaning of 
them. This, therefore, we shall also do, establishing the following principle 
of the explanation of them: The energies and powers of the Gods are 
twofold. And some indeed abide in, and energize about them, and 
have for their end one hypostasis, and which is united to essence. But 
others proceed from them, exhibit an efficacious power about secondary 
natures, and coexist with the multitude of their recipients, and with the 
peculiarity of essence. These, however, being twofold, the secondary 
are suspended from those that are prior to them, are defined about them, 
and receive their proper hyparxis according to them. For it is every 
where necessary that externally proceeding should be the images of 
internal energies, evolving the at-once-collected nature of their indivisibility; 
multiplying that in them which is united, and dividing their impartibility. 

According to this reasoning, therefore, the energy of nature is also 
twofold, one being that which abides in it, according to which it connects 
itself, and the reasons it contains, but the other proceeding from it, 
through which also bodies are filled with these physical powers, which 
being moved by nature, act on each other, and physically suffer by each 
other. Again, the motion of the soul likewise is twofold. And the one 
indeed is self-motive, is converted to itself, is of itself, concurs with the 
life of the soul, and is without any difference with respect to it. But 
the other is incumbent on alter-motive natures, moves these, and about 
these extends the power of itself. The energy of intellect, therefore, is 
likewise twofold. 
And one indeed is intellectual, is united to true beings, and is impartible, 
being coexistent with the intelligible itself of intellect, or rather being 
the intelligible itself, and intellect. For intellect is not of itself in capacity, 
and afterwards receiving energy, intellectually perceives the intelligible; 
but it is one simple energy. 
For the multitude of it is unical, and its energy is directed to itself. But the 
other,energy of intellect is directed to externals, and to things which are 
able to participate of intellect. For these intellect causes to be intellectual 
through itself, splendidly as it were emitting the light of its own 
intelligence, and imparting it to others.  It is necessary, therefore, that 
the divine and demiurgic intellect itself, should always indeed be united 
to the intelligible, and that it should have the plenitude and self-sufficiency of demiurgic intelligence eternally established according to a 
union exempt from wholes; 
to which, as it appears to me, Timæus also looking says, that the father 
of the universe abides in his accustomed manner, and withdraws himself 
to his own place of survey, delivering the fabrication of mortal natures 
to the mundane Gods. For so far as he is exempt from the beings posterior
to himself and is uncoordinated with the more partial multitude of Gods,
so far he is converted to himself, and surveys and intellectually perceives 
the natures prior to himself, according to one uniform union.
But in consequence of the more ruling and leading Gods being extended towards him,
he emits from himself secondary energies, to all the partial orders. 

Timæus, therefore, fashions through words, these powers and efficacious 
energies which proceed from the whole and one fabrication to the 
demiurgic multitude of Gods. For words are the images of intellections; 
because indeed they evolve that which is contracted in intelligibles, but 
lead forth that which is impartible into a partible hypostasis. They 
likewise transfer that which abides in itself into habitude to another 
thing. 
And it is evident that the reasons which are impelled from 
nature, are certain natural [powers], and render that which receives them 
physical. But the reasons which are generated from soul, are indeed 
vivific, but render the inanimate nature which participates of them 
[animated] and moved from itself, through the power of soul, as Socrates 
says in the Phædrus, and communicate to it the resemblance of self-motion. 
And the reasons which are generated from intellect, illuminating 
the natures posterior to it, distribute all intellectual goods to their 
recipients, being the suppliers of true knowledge, of purity and a more 
simple life. After the same manner also the demiurgic words produce 
in the junior Gods, whole, impartible, and united measures of exempt 
fabrication, and fill their essences with demiurgic providence. 
They likewise render them second demiurgi, and emulous of their father. 
For he indeed gives subsistence to the whole plenitudes of the world. 
But they, imitating him, fabricate all partial natures in conjunction with 
wholes. 
And he produces the essence of perpetual natures. But they 
fashioning mortal natures according to one generation-producing circle, 
likewise transmute these. And as the one demiurgus governs the whole 
periods of the universe, thus also the many demiurgi convolve the 
divisible circles of the natures that are borne along in generation. If, 
therefore, we assert these things rightly concerning the words proceeding 
from the demiurgus to the multitude of mundane Gods, and they are 
efficacious, fabricative, and convertive of their recipients to a union with 
him, and are also perfective of the beneficent reasons which they 
contain, we shall no longer seem to speak paradoxically, if we say that 
these words extend to the Gods in the world the participation of all the 
powers that are firmly established in the father, and of the causes prior 
to, and subsisting after him. And as he convolving the end of the 
intellectual Gods, is the plenitude of all things, so likewise the demiurgic 
words proceeding from him, produce in the junior Gods the peculiarities, 
as I may say, of all the divine genera that are above the world, through 
which they are suspended from all the orders prior to them; just I think 
as the whole of this world [is suspended from the mundane Gods who] 
fabricate all mortal natures, and impart to different things a different 
power, and an efflux of divine powers. 

What, therefore, in short, is it which Plato indicates the Gods derive 
through these words from the first demiurgus, and the all-perfect fabrication? 
In the first place, indeed, they derive this, that they are Gods of 
Gods. For the vocal address proceeding to them from the father, is the 
supplier of divine power, and is allotted an efficacious presence in its 
participant, as we before observed. But in the next place, these words 
impart to them an indissoluble power. The demiurgus of wholes, 
however, comprehends in himself the cause of dissolution, in order that 
they may indeed be essentially indissoluble, but according to the cause 
of binding, not indissoluble. In the third place, therefore, the demiurgus 
produces in them from on high, through these words, a renovated 
immortality. For the assertion that they are neither immortal, nor shall 
be subject to the fatality of death, establishes them in this form of 
immortality, which the fable in the Politicus denominates renovated. 
In addition to this also, the words testify that they derive from the father 
a power perfective of wholes. For if the world is imperfect without the 
subsistence of mortal animals, it is doubtless necessary that those who 
preside over the generation of them should be the causes of perfection 
to the universe. And in the last place, these words impart to the junior 
Gods a paternal and generative empire derived from the exempt and 
intellectual cause of wholes; and insert in them the proximate powers 
of regeneration. For through these words, the junior Gods again receive 
in themselves the natures that are corrupted, fabricate parts from wholes, 
and again effect the dissolution of parts into their wholes. 
And universally the words of the demiurgus subject the perpetually-generated 
course of nature, to the fabrication of the junior Gods. In short, 
therefore, the demiurgus fills the junior Gods with divine union, fills 
them with a firm establishment, and fills them with a perpetuity adapted 
to their nature. But he pours into them the all-various causes of 
perfective powers, of vivific rivers, and demiurgic measures. Hence 
also, the many demiurgi refer the fabrication of particulars to the one 
and whole providence of the father, and the principles of demiurgic 
works which they received from him, to his efficacious production. And 
all of them indeed are filled with all powers, because all of them 
participate of the demiurgic words which proceed into them from the 
father. But some of them are more characterized by one peculiarity 
than another. 

And some of them indeed are the suppliers of union to their progeny; 
others, of indissoluble permanency; others, of perfection; and others, of life. 
But others preside over regeneration, and being allotted in a distributed 
manner in the universe, the powers which subsist unitedly in the one demiurgus, 
they are subservient to the providence of the father. And every thing 
which is generated by the many demiurgi, is in a much greater degree 
produced by the one fabrication; which governs mortal natures indeed, 
eternally, things that are moved, immoveably, and partible natures 
impartibly. It is not however necessary that the progeny of that one 
demiurgus should be suspended from the motion of the junior Gods. 
For every where the one fabrication is more comprehensive than that 
which is multiplied. And the more causal of divine natures energize 
prior to their own offspring, and together with them constitute the 
progeny that proceed from them. The first [demiurgic] God, therefore, 
produces from and through himself the divine genera1 of the universe, 
according to his beneficent will. But he governs mortal natures through 
the junior Gods, generating indeed these also from himself, but other 
Gods producing them as it were with their own hands. For he says, 
“these being generated through me will become equal to the Gods.” 
The cause, therefore, through which, is to be attributed to the junior 
Gods; but the cause from which, even in the production of mortal 
natures is to be referred to the whole demiurgus. For always the first 
of those things that are constituted, produce in conjunction with their 
monad the generation of secondary natures. And all things indeed 
proceed from that monad, but some things immediately; and through 
it, but some things through other media receive the providence that 
emanates from it. For these middle genera of causes are allotted the 
providential inspection of secondary natures from the first effective 
monad. 

 the words, therefore, in the Timæus, which the demiurgus 
delivers to the Gods in the world, thus much may suffice at 
present. But after these, it is fit to survey the second measures of total 
demiurgic providence, which the demiurgus extends from himself to the 
many and divisible souls. For having constituted these, divided them 
equal in number to divine animals, and disseminated them about the 
world, he inserts in them fabricative boundaries, defines the whole 
periods of them, inscribes in them the laws of Fate, proposes the 
apparent measures of their generation-producing life, legally institutes, 
and adorns in a becoming manner all the rewards of virtue, and the 
works of vice, intellectually comprehends in one the end of every period, 
and coarranges with a view to this the whole polity of partial souls. 
All souls, therefore, of an immortal condition, being allotted a progression 
from the demiurgus, are filled from him with an united and 
intellectual providence. Because, however, progeny which are suspended 
from their causes participate of the perfective efficacy which proceeds 
from them, divine souls, indeed, primarily subsisting from thence, 
become auditors of the words of their father immediately; but partial 
souls participate of the uniform providence of the demiurgus secondarily, 
and with greater partibility. Hence also the demiurgus, as a legislator, 
defining to these all the measures of their life, he thus extends demiurgic 
words, unitedly comprehending the divided nature of the whole of their 
life, convolving in sameness without time their temporal mutability, and 
collecting uniformly, according to one simplicity, the multiform and 
diversified nature of the energy which exists about them. But to divine 
souls he immediately unfolds the providence of himself, and exhorts 
them to join with him in a providential inspection of the whole world, to 
fabricate, adorn and dispose in conjunction with him, mortal natures, to 
govern generated beings according to the measures of justice, and to 
lead and convolve all things, following demiurgic providence. Very far 
therefore, are those interpreters of Plato from according with the fabrication 
of the universe, who admit that partial are the same with whole 
souls, and who attribute the same essence to all souls; because all of 
them are allotted their generation from one demiurgus. 

For in the first place, the father in the course of his fabrication 
adorning, and disposing in an orderly manner partial souls, poured 
mingling, the remainder of the former mixture, says Timæus, and 
produced the second and third genera. But in a progression of this 
kind, the words effective of conversion which he extends to divine souls, 
are intellectual, and demiurgic, and impart to them generative powers, 
and perfective goods; but those which he extends to partial souls, are 
the definite sources of generation, of the laws of Fate, of justice, and 
all-various periods. If, therefore, every thing which proceeds from the 
demiurgus is essentially imparted to souls, it is indeed necessary that 
different measures of words should be the causes of different powers; 
and that to some among the number of divisible souls, the demiurgus 
should distribute a polity exempt from mundane affairs, but to others 
a polity arranged under these souls, and supernally governed by them. 
These things, however, may elsewhere be more copiously demonstrated. 

 the demiurgic words therefore, again returning to the demiurgic 
intellect, let us survey following Plato, who the demiurgus is, who 
convolves the end itself of the intellectual triad to the beginning, and 
after what manner it is fit to denominate him according to the Grecian 
theology. Or rather, prior to this let us summarily show what we may 
assume concerning him according to the narration of Timæus. For we 
shall more easily learn those particulars, if we assent to these. For directly, 
in the beginning of the theology concerning him, he is celebrated 
as the fabricator and father of the world. And he is neither called fabricator 
alone, nor father and fabricator, but at one and the same time 
manifestly possessing both peculiarities, he is rather characterized by the 
fabricative, than by the paternal cause. But he is denominated the 
demiurgus of wholes, according to his goodness, unenvying and exuberant 
will, and his power which is able to adorn and arrange all things, and 
even such as are of a disorderly nature. He is however particularly 
unfolded to us as the supplier of beauty, symmetry and order, and as the 
best of causes; and this because he is allotted the uniform, and first 
effective power of the whole demiurgic series. But he gives subsistence 
to intellect and soul, and at the same time to all the life in the world; 
since he fabricated the whole world an animal animated, and endued with 
intellect. Being likewise full of every intelligible, and extending himself 
to intelligible and all-perfect animal and conjoining this to himself through 
similitude, he fabricates the sensible universe only-begotten, in the same 
manner as the separate paradigm [animal itself] transcending wholes, 
unitedly constitutes the intelligible universe. 

Moreover, he is likewise the fabricator of bodies, and the perfector of 
works, binding all things by the most excellent analogies, and co-adapting 
their powers, bulks, and numbers by the most beautiful bonds. 
Farther still, he constituted the universe a whole from wholes, and perfect 
from perfect parts, that it might be free from old age and disease, and 
might contain in itself all the genera of the elements. 
He likewise adorned it with the first figure, and with the most simple and most comprehensive of all figures. Besides these things, he is also the cause of 
self-sufficiency to the universe, and of a circulation into itself, in order 
that suffering all things from, and effecting all things in itself, it might 
not be in want of any thing externally situated. And he is indeed the 
supplier of intellectual motion, and of a life which is evolved according 
to time, and which effects a mutation always according to the same, and 
similarly, and about the same things. Farther still, he is the father of 
soul, and of all the genera in soul, of the division in it, and all the 
harmonic reasons it contains, constituting it in the world, as a self-moved 
and immortal lyre; and he is also the divider of the one, and the seven 
circles in it, and in short, is the maker and fabricator of figure and 
morphe.

In addition to these things likewise, he generates from himself the 
whole of time, according to the imitation of eternity, together with all the 
measures of time, and the Gods that unfold these measures into light. 
But he especially constitutes the whole sun, enkindling its light from his 
own intellectual essence, in order that possessing a transcendency exempt 
from the other Gods it might be the king of the universe. Moreover, he 
fabricates all the multitudes of mundane Gods and dæmons, and all 
celestial and sublunary natures, in order that he may evince this only-begotten and self-sufficient God [the world] to be the image of the intelligible 
and all-perfect God; fixing the earth indeed, as a firm seat 
or Vesta, in it, but distributing by lot the other elements to divine souls 
and dæmons. Besides all this likewise, he converts to himself the genera 
of Gods that have proceeded from him, and fills all things with undefiled 
generation, with perpetual life, demiurgic perfection, and generative 
abundance. He also constitutes divisible souls together with their vehicles, 
divides them about their leading Gods, arranges different souls under 
different Gods, unfolds to them the laws of Fate, measures their descents 
into generation, establishes rewards to their contests in their periodic 
revolutions, and institutes, as I may say, the whole of their polity in the 
world. 

But after all these things, he introduces a boundary to the providence 
of wholes, and returning to his own place of survey, delivering to the 
junior Gods the superintendence of mortal natures, and abiding in his own 
accustomed manner, is the paradigm to the demiurgi in the world of 
providential attention to beings of a second order. And as in the fabrication 
of wholes the paradigm is intelligible animal, so in the arrangement 
of partial natures, the paradigm is intellectual animal, in which all 
forms shine forth in a divided manner, according to their own nature. 
For Timæus says, “the children understanding the order of their father, 
were obedient to it,” and he abiding, and paternally, and eternally producing 
all things, they adorn and arrange the mortal genera demiurgically, 
and according to time. Hence the providence of the demiurgus 
presents itself to the view, extending from on high as far as to the production 
of these, and what is here said by Plato, is as it were a hymn to the 
demiurgus and father of this universe, celebrating his productions, and 
the benefits which he confers on the world. 

And it is requisite that being persuaded by what is here clearly written, 
we should investigate all the other enquiries about the demiurgus. My 
meaning is, that we should investigate what we mentioned a little before, 
who the demiurgus is, and how we ought to denominate him according 
to the sentiments of the Greeks; and on what account, Timæus neither 
delivers the name of him, nor unfolds to us who he is, but says, “that it 
is difficult to discover him, and that when discovered, it is impossible to 
speak of him to all men.” Now therefore, I think, from what has been 
already said, it is evident even to those who are but in a small degree 
intelligent, that according to the decision of Plato, it is the great Jupiter, 
who is now celebrated by us as the demiurgus. For if, as we have observed, 
the kingdom of Saturn is the summit of the whole intellectual 
triad, and the intelligible transcendency of intellectuals, but the maternal 
and vivific fountain of Rhea, is the middle centre, and the receiving bosom. 
of the generative power in Saturn, it is manifest to every one, that the 
mighty Jupiter is allotted the end of this triad. For from the before-mentioned causes, one of which indeed is paternal, but the other generative, 
he is the God having a paternal subsistence, who is said to reign, 
receiving the intellectual dominion of his father. If, therefore, it is necessary 
that the demiurgus should convolve the end of this intellectual 
triad, as was before demonstrated, and to effect this, is the province of 
the royal power of Jupiter, we must evidently acknowledge that the 
Jovian empire is the same as that of the demiurgus, and that Jupiter is 
the demiurgus celebrated in the Timæus. 

, however, it be necessary to consider this as worthy of further discussion, 
and to demonstrate that the theology in the Timæus about the 
demiurgus, accords with what is elsewhere written by Plato concerning 
this God, let us in the first place assume what is delivered in the Critias, 
because this dialogue proximately follows the Timæus, and is composed 
according to an analogy to it, delivering the hypostasis of the same things 
in image, the primary paradigms of which Timæus celebrates through 
the fabrication Gf the world. Here, therefore, Plato, (that I may derive 
what I say from the beginning) relating the warlike preparations of the 
Athenians, in former times, and the insolence and usurpation of the 
Atlantics, who were the progeny of Neptune, but destroyed the divine 
seed, through the mixture of human and mortal pursuits, and conducted 
themselves insolently to all men, collects indeed the Gods to a consultation 
concerning them, in the same manner as poets inspired by Phoebus, and 
forms a common assembly of the Gods. But Jupiter is the author of the 
whole polity of them, and converts the multitude of them to himself. And 
as in the Timæus the demiurgus convolves all the mundane Gods to himself, 
so Jupiter in the Critias providentially attending to the whole of 
things, collects the Gods to himself. 

In the next place, therefore, let us consider what Plato says concerning 
this God, and how it accords with what was before said by Timæus. 
“But Jupiter the God of Gods who reigns legitimately, and who is able 
to perceive every thing of this kind, when he saw that an equitable race 
was in a miserable condition, and was desirous of punishing them, in order 
that by being chastized they might possess more elegant manners, collected 
all the Gods into their most honourable habitation, whence being 
seated as in the middle of the whole world, he beholds all such things as 
participate of generation.” Here, directly in the beginning, king Jupiter 
being celebrated as the God of Gods, does it not accord with what is 
written in the Timæus, where he is said to be the father and cause of all 
the mundane Gods? For what other God is it who reigns over all the 
Gods, except the cause of their subsistence and essence? Who is it also 
that calls the mundane deities, Gods of Gods? Is it not him who binds 
to himself the principle of all fabrication? If, therefore, he imparts to 
his progeny to be Gods of Gods, in a much greater degree it pertains to 
him to be celebrated as the God of all [the mundane] Gods. To which, 
therefore, of the Gods prior to the world, does it particularly belong to 
punish offenders except to him who defines to souls all their measures, 
unfolds to them the laws of the universe, and legally institutes such things 
as are fit concerning justice and injustice, in order that afterwards he may 
not be accused of the vices of each of them? Moreover, to congregate 
all the Gods into their most honourable habitation, from which the whole 
of generation may be seen, and which possesses the middle of the universe, 
is to attribute to him a providence exempt from multitude, but extending 
equally to the whole world; which things indeed are the illustrious goods 
of the demiurgic monad. For to convert all the Gods to himself, and to 
survey the whole world pertains exemptly to the demiurgus of the 
universe. For what else is multitude able to participate proximately, 
except the monad from which it derives its subsistence? And who can 
convert all the Gods in the world to himself, but the fabricator of their 
essence, and of their allotment in the universe? 

 must establish this, therefore, as one and the first argument in 
proof of the thing investigated. But if you are willing, we will derive a 
second argument from what is said by Socrates in the Cratylus, in which 
he discusses the meaning of the names, from which he may represent to 
us the essence of Jupiter. For he is not led to the nature of this God 
from one name, as he is in the names of other Gods, such as Saturn, 
Rhea, Neptune, and Pluto, but from two names which tend to one thing, 
and which divisibly indicate the one and united essence of Jupiter, he 
unfolds the power of this God, and the peculiarity of his hyparxis. 
For the common rumour concerning him, denominates him in a two-fold 
respect. And at one time calling him dia, we worship him in our 
prayers and hymns; but at another time we celebrate him as zena, 
a word derived from life. Being therefore at the same time called 
zeus and delighting in the appellation of dia, he is similarly denominated 
from both names by the Greeks. And these names manifest the essence 
and order which he is allotted among divine natures. And neither of 
these names indeed, is by itself sufficiently able to make known the peculiarity 
of the God; but when conjoined with each other and forming a 
sentence, they have the power of unfolding the truth concerning him. 
How, therefore, from both the names the power of this king is signified, 
and the precedaneous order of his hypostasis in the Gods, we may hear 
Socrates himself saying, “That the name of his father who is called 
Jupiter is beautifully posited; but that it is not easy to apprehend the 
meaning of it, because in reality the name of Jupiter is as it were a 
sentence. 
Dividing it however into two parts, some of us use one part, 
and some another. For some indeed call him zena, but others dia. 
And these parts collected into one evince the nature of the God, which 
we say a name ought to effect. For there is not any other who is more 
the author of life to us, and to all other things than he who is the ruler 
and king of all things. It happens, therefore, that this God is rightly 
denominated, on account of whom life is present to all living beings. 
But it is divided into two parts, as if I should say that there is one 
name from dia and zena.” The mode, therefore, of collecting the names 
into one, and of rendering the hyparxis of this God apparent through 
both, is manifest to every one. 

If, however, he is the supplier of life to all things, as he is said to be, 
and is the ruler and king of all such things as are said to live, to whom can 
we assert this peculiarity pertains, if we omit the demiurgus? And is it 
not necessary, that according with what is said in the Timæus, we should 
refer to him the principle of vivification. For the demiurgus renders the 
whole world animated, endued with intellect, and an animal, and constitutes 
the triple life which is in it, one indeed being impartible and 
intellectual, another partible and corporeal, and another between these, 
impartible and at the same time partible. 
It is he likewise who conjoins each of the celestial spheres to the circulations 
of the soul, inserts in each of the stars a psychical and intellectual life, 
and produces in the sublunary elements leading Gods and souls, 
and in addition to all these things, constitutes the divisible genera of life, 
and imparts to the junior Gods the principle of mortal animals. 
All things therefore in the world are full of life, through the power of the demiurgus 
and father. 
And this world is one animal, deriving its completion from containing all animals, 
through the never-failing cause of the power by which it was generated. 
And there is no other who is the supplier of life to all things, and through 
whom all things live, some indeed more clearly, but others more 
obscurely, than the demiurgus of wholes. For he also is intellectual 
animal, in the same manner as the all-perfect paradigm is intelligible 
animal. Hence likewise, these are conjoined to each other. And the 
one indeed is paternally the cause of wholes; but the other demiurgically. 
And as animal itself constitutes intelligibly, all intelligible and 
sensible animals, according to one cause, thus also the demiurgus 
fabricates intellectually according to a second order, the animals in the 
world. 

As animal itself likewise proximately subsists from intelligible life, so 
the demiurgus is generated from intellectual life, and is the first that is 
filled with the rivers of vivification. Hence he illuminates all things 
with life, unfolding the depths of the animal-producing deity, and calling 
forth the prolific power of the intellectual Gods. If therefore, all things 
live through the demiurgic cause, they also participate of soul and intellect, 
and, as I may say, of all vivification, through the providence of this 
God. But he who pours the rivers of life on all things in the world from 
himself, and is the ruler and king of wholes, is the mighty Jupiter, as 
Socrates says in the Cratylus, and evidently appears to be the same with 
the demiurgus. And the divinely-inspired intellectual conception of 
Timæus concerning the demiurgus, accords with the theology of Socrates 
about Jupiter. If likewise each of them denominates the knowledge of 
this God difficult to be apprehended, and one of them says that it is 
difficult to discover, him, and when discovered, that it is impossible to 
speak of him to all men, but the other asserts that it is not easy to 
understand the name of Jupiter, do they not in this respect accord with 
each other in what they say concerning this God? Besides this also, the 
composition of the names, and the coalition of the two names into one 
hyparxis, appear in a remarkable degree to be adapted to the demiurgus. 
For a biformed essence, and generative power, are attributed to him 
according to other theologists. For the duad sits with him, according to 
which he generates all things; concerning which Timæus also introduces 
him speaking to the demiurgi in the world, and saying, “Imitating my 
power.” And through this he produces and vivifies all things. Hence 
it is necessary through names also to consecrate the duad to him 
according to ancient rumour. For he glitters with intellectual sections, 
divides and collects wholes, and constitutes one indissoluble order from 
many things. And this the power of the names indicates, extending us 
from divided intellection, to one self-perfect and uniform theory. 

All these particulars therefore, clearly demonstrate to us that Plato considers 
the demiurgus of wholes to be the same with Jupiter. For he who 
alone is the cause of life to all things, and who is the king of all things, is the 
demiurgus of the universe. And he who in a remarkable manner rejoices in 
a duad of names, is he who arranges and adorns the whole world. And it 
appears to me, as I have frequently said, that in consequence of being 
allotted the end of the intellectual triad, converting this to the beginning, 
and being full of the middle fountains of life, but uniting himself to the 
watch-tower of his father, and producing into himself the simplicity of 
an intelligible subsistence, according to the peculiarity of first-effective 
causes, he is also allotted a duad of names. And as he received his 
essence from both [i. e. from Saturn and Rhea] and possesses indeed 
bound from his father, but infinite power from the generative deity of his 
mother, thus also he possesses one of the names from his father, and from 
the uniform perfection which is in him; but the other from total vivification. 
And through both, as he is allotted an essence, so likewise an 
appellation. For it is obvious to every one, that the term dia 
on account of which, is a sign of a total essence. “Let us declare, says 
Timæus, on account of what cause [the composing artificer constituted 
generation and the universe]. He was good.” But the name of life 
pertains of itself to the middle order of beings. The demiurgus therefore 
obtains one of these names, viz. dia, from the intellectual summit, 
and the paternal union. For according to the participation of it, he is 
one, bound, and intelligible. But he obtains the other name from the 
middle order of intellectuals. For there life, and the vivific bosoms are 
allotted their hypostasis. The demiurgic intellect however, shining forth 
from both, participates also of the names through composition. For we 
call him dia and zena, because life proceeds to all things on account of 
him, and to live is inherent in all [vital natures] on account of him. 
And thus after a manner the position of the names indicates the progression 
of the demiurgus from both the precedaneous causes. 

 therefore, let us direct our attention to what is written in the 
Philebus, and survey how, in what is there said, Socrates refers the fabrication 
of the universe to Jupiter. For admitting that intellect adorns and 
arranges all things, in the same manner as the wise men prior to him, 
and that it governs the sun and moon, and all the circulation [of the 
heavens] he demonstrates that the whole world participates of soul, and 
intellectual inspection, and that we also derive the participation of these 
from wholes; but that the universe is not and was not from chance, and 
likewise the most divine of visible natures, as many physiologists assert, 
while the natures which the universe contains participate of soul and 
intellect.
Having therefore, as we have said, demonstrated these things, 
and shown that what the whole world contains is greater and more perfect 
than what we contain, and that wholes have a greater authority, and a 
more ruling essence than partial natures, and having placed intellect over 
wholes, as that which adorns and arranges the universe, and likewise 
assigned this province to soul, through the inspection of intellect, (for 
intellect is not present to the world without soul) he afterwards recurs to 
imparticipable intellect, to the author of participated intellect and soul, 
and the fabricator of the whole world, and he denominates and celebrates 
this fabricator, who contains the causes of the plenitudes in the world, as 
no other than Jupiter the great king and ruler of wholes, conformably to 
the rumour of the Greeks. He likewise extends about him all the 
providence of the world, and places in him the whole cause of the 
arrangement and ornament of the universe. 

It is better however, in the next place, to hear the words themselves of 
Plato. He gives therefore to the world an intellectual superintendance, 
and adds this to the before mentioned demonstrations, that there is, as we 
have frequently observed, an abundance of infinity in the world, and a 
sufficiency of bound, and that there is a certain cause in them by no 
means vile and contemptible, which adorns and co-arranges the years, 
the seasons, and the months, and which may most justly be called 
wisdom and intellect. But again, because it is necessary that participated 
intellect should govern the world through soul as a medium, (for it 
is impossible that intellect should be present to any thing without soul, 
as Timæus also asserts) hence it is requisite that soul also should preside 
over the universe, and that proximately having dominion over the natures 
it contains, it should govern the world according to intellect. 
This therefore Socrates having in the next place added, he subjoins as follows: 
“Moreover, wisdom and intellect could never be without soul.” For 
how could the impartible and eternal essence of intellect be immediately 
conjoined with a corporeal nature? It is necessary therefore that intellect 
should preside over wholes, that it may connect the order in the world, 
well-being, and all things. For order and well-being are the progeny of 
an intellectual essence. But it is necessary that soul primarily participating 
of intellect, should illuminate body with the light proceeding from 
thence, and fill all things with intellectual arrangement. It must be 
admitted therefore, that the world is animated and endued with intellect. 
Hence from this Socrates ascends to the cause itself of the whole world, 
which produced intellect and soul, and generated the total order [of the 
universe.]

“Hence, (Socrates adds) you may say that in the nature of Jupiter 
there are a royal soul and a royal intellect through the power of cause; 
and that in the other Gods there are other beautiful things, whatever 
they are, by which their deities love to be distinguished, and from which 
they delight in taking their respective denominations.” One of these 
two things therefore is necessary, either that what is here said is said 
concerning the world, or concerning the demiurgus of wholes. For if 
the world is Jupiter, the participated intellect in the world is royal, 
and the soul also is royal which governs the universe, and arranges and 
adorns it according to intellect. And these things are evidently present 
to the world through the power of the cause by which it was constituted, 
and which rendered it a partaker of intellect and animated. And thus 
Jupiter will be that which is adorned and fabricated, and not the 
adorner and fabricator of all things. If, however, it is necessary that the 
power of cause should be comprehensive in an exempt manner of a royal 
intellect and a royal soul, we must admit that the nature of Jupiter is in 
the demiurgic order and power; and intellect and soul will be in him 
according to cause, since he imparts both these to his progeny. Of these 
two opinions therefore, every one may adopt that which he pleases, but 
to me, when I consider what is here said, and every other assertion of 
Plato concerning this God, it by no means appears to be necessary to 
refer the nature of Jupiter to the whole world. For neither does the 
only-begotten subsistence of the world accord with the kingdom of 
Jupiter, since the Saturnian triad, and which distributes the dominion of 
the father, is manifestly celebrated by Plato himself; nor can that which 
is cause to all things, as it is said in the Cratylus, refer to the world. 
For the world is among the number of things which participate of life 
from another. As I have said therefore, we must leave this opinion, as 
by no means adapted to Plato, though it is adopted by some of his 
interpreters. But considering cause to be the same as Jupiter, we must 
say that soul and intellect are established in him exemptly; and that 
Jupiter participates of both these, from the Gods that are prior to him; 
of intellect indeed, from his father, but of soul from the queen [Rhea] 
who is the deity of vivification. For there the fountain of soul subsists, 
just as in Saturn, there is intellect according to essence. For every 
where the intelligible unically comprehends the intellect which is coordinate 
with it. And thus much concerning these particulars. 

 the next place, we may conjoin with this the mythological conceptions 
in the Protagoras, and arrive at the same conclusion, considering in 
common with the Timæus, bow the opinions delivered to us concerning 
the mighty Jupiter, through the Protagorean fable, accord with the assertions 
about the demiurgus. The fable says, therefore, that Prometheus 
adorning the human race, and providentially attending to our rational 
life, that it may not perish by being merged in the furies of earth, and 
the necessities of nature, as some one of the Gods says, bound nature to 
the arts, extended these which are imitations of intellect, as it were to 
sportive souls, and through these excited our gnostic and dianoëtic power 
to the contemplation of forms. For every artificial production is effective 
of form, and adorns the matter which is the subject of it. The fable 
also adds, that Prometheus providentially attending to the arts gave them 
to souls, and that he received them from Vulcan and Minerva. For in 
these Gods the cause of all arts is primarily comprehended; Vulcan 
primarily imparting the fabricative power of them; but Minerva supernally 
illuminating their gnostic and intellectual power. Not only 
however, is the invention of arts necessary to souls in generation, but 
also a certain other science, the political, which is more perfect than the 
arts, and which is able to arrange and adorn them, and to lead souls 
through virtue to a life according to intellect. But as Prometheus was 
unable to impart this life to us, because the political science is primarily 
with the mighty Jupiter, but it was not possible (says the fable) for 
Prometheus to enter latently into the tower of Jupiter, (for the guards of 
Jupiter are terrible, defending him exempt from all partial causes,)—
hence Jupiter sent the messenger Hermes to men, who brought with him 
prudence and shame, and in short the political science. Jupiter also 
ordered Hermes to impart similarly to all men these virtues, and to distribute 
to all souls the knowledge of things just, beautiful, and good, but 
not in a divided manner, as different arts are distributed to different 
persons. And some men indeed are judges of these things; but others 
are ignorant either of all, or of some of the arts. 

In what is here said, therefore, Plato primarily refers to Jupiter the 
paradigm of the political science, as is evident from the words themselves. 
But he produces the progression of this science, and the communication 
and participation of the Hermaical series, and extends its essential, 
presence, which we participate in common, to all souls. For to distribute 
to all of them, is to insert in souls essentially a science of this kind. 
These things, therefore, being laid down, let us consider to whom we 
must say the political science especially pertains, and who it is that 
primarily established a polity in the universe, that formed divine to 
govern mortal natures, divided wholes from parts, and produced self-motive and intellectual natures more ancient than those that are deprived 
of the presence of intellect. Is it not the demiurgus, who is the cause to 
us of all these goods, who governs the whole world according to rectitude, 
binds it by the best analogies, establishes every polity in it, possesses 
and comprehends the laws of Fate, and extends the sacred laws of 
Adrastia, as far as to the last of things, and arranges and adorns by justice 
all celestial and sublunary natures? For he who introduces partial souls 
into the universe as into their habitation, and imparts to them a total 
polity which is the best of all polities, and is governed by the most excellent 
laws, is he who denominates these laws the laws of Fate, who defines 
the measures of Justice, and legally institutes all things, as Timæus says. 
Is it not therefore superfluous to endeavour to prove that he who possesses  
the first paradigm of the political science, is according to Plato the demiurgus? 

If, however, these things are true, and according to the fable in the 
Protagoras it must be admitted that the political science first subsists in 
Jupiter, it is evident from what has been said, that the demiurgus of the 
universe is Jupiter. For to what other cause can we grant the primary 
form of the political science to belong, than to that which arranges and 
adorns the universe? If the polity in the heavens is the first and most 
perfect of all polities, as Socrates in the Republic says it is. Who likewise is he that produces all things, and co-arranges them when produced 
to each other, in order to the elegant disposition of the universe? If, 
therefore, the first and most perfect demiurgus of the universe is political, 
but the political science first subsists with Jupiter, being established with 
him on a sacred foundation, proceeds from thence to all secondary 
natures, and adorns and arranges both wholes and parts according to 
intellect, it is evidently necessary that the demiurgus of wholes should be 
the same with Jupiter, and that there should be one hyparxis of both, 
which administers every thing in the world according to rectitude, and 
circularly leads every thing confused and disorderly into order.
For, says Timæus, it is not lawful for that which is best to effect any thing 
else than that which is most beautiful. How therefore is it possible that he 
who adorns and arranges wholes through Themis, and together with her 
produces all things, should not essentially possess in himself the whole of 
the political science? 

How is it possible likewise that he should not be the first Jupiter, who 
definitely imparts to all things that which is divine, and weaves one polity 
from all things, but is exempt from all partial causes and the Titannic 
genera, and is guarded by his own undefiled powers, beyond the whole 
world? For the guards which surround him, obscurely signify his immutable 
order, and the undeviating defence of fabrication, through which 
being firmly established in himself, he pervades through all things without 
impediment, and being present to all his progeny, is according to supreme 
transcendency expanded above wholes. Moreover, the citadel of Jupiter, 
according to the rumours of theologists, is a symbol of intellectual circulation, 
and of the highest summit of Olympus, which all the wise suspend 
from the intellectual watch tower of Jupiter, to which he extends all the 
mundane Gods, imparting to them from thence intellectual powers, 
divine light, and vivific illuminations, and compressing all the profundities 
of the worlds by one most simple circulation, through which the 
summit also of the apparent worlds is denominated the period of sameness, 
and the most prudent and uniform circulation, as Timæus says, 
expressing the unical intellectual power of demiurgic conversion, and 
being allotted the same transcendency with respect to all the sensible 
world that the supreme summit of Jupiter possesses with respect to all 
the arrangement of the firmaments. These things may also be assumed 
by us as subservient to the proposed investigation, from the fabulous 
fictions in the Protagoras. 

 may, however, approach still nearer to the truth, and assume in 
the present discussion, the fable in the Politicus. For in this it will appear 
that Plato in a remarkable manner considers, the demiurgus of the 
universe to be the same with Jupiter, and even as far as to the very 
names asserts the same things as Timæus. The Elean guest, therefore, 
as we have before observed, assigns [in this dialogue] twofold circulations 
to the whole of this world, the one intellectual, and which elevates souls but 
the other proceeding into nature and imparting things contrary to 
the former. And the one indeed, being unapparent, and governed by 
diving providence, but the other apparent, and convolved according to 
the order of Fate. He also places twofold motive causes over these 
circulations. For every mutation and period require a certain moving 
cause. And prior to the causes that move the circulations, he asserts 
that there are as it were twofold ends of the periods, and assigns first 
effective causes of the motions, coordinate to the moving causes, and to 
the circulations themselves which differ from each other. Jupiter therefore moves, and circularly leads one of the periods, whether you are willing to call it intellectual, or providential, or in whatever other way you 
may denominate it, and he also supplies the world with life, and imparts 
to it a renovated immortality. But he preestablishes his father Saturn 
as the object of desire to, and the end of the whole of this circulation. For 
he leads back wholes, and converts them to himself. 

Moreover, he extends happy souls to the watch-tower of his father, viz. 
those souls whose corporeal nature is obliterated, and whose circulation 
is to the incorporeal and the impartible. All the generation producing  
symbols likewise of these souls are amputated, and the form of their life 
is transferred to the intellectual summit. For these souls are also said to 
be the nurselings of Saturn, but to commit the government of themselves 
to Jupiter, and through him to be extended to the intelligible, and the 
Saturnian dominion. For the intelligible is nutriment, as it is said by the 
Gods themselves. And as Socrates in the Phædrus elevates souls 
through the circulation of the heaven to the supercelestial place, where 
souls are nourished, survey true beings, and the unknown order of the 
Gods, with the highest powers of themselves, and as he there says, intellectually 
perceive with the heads of the charioteers,—thus also the Elean 
guest circularly leads souls under Jupiter, to the Saturnian watch-tower, 
and asserts that such as have ascended are nourished by Saturn, and calls 
them the nurselings of the God. For every where indeed, the intelligible 
is perfective of, and has the power of filling an intellectual life, and the 
summit of intellectuals extends perfection. These souls likewise participate 
of the natures that are beyond, establish themselves in more elevated 
intellectuals, and ascend as far as to the unknown order, but remote from 
the good, and the one principle of all things. But the souls [that ascend 
through the circulation of the heaven] are extended to the first intellect, 
which is imparticipable, and the intelligible itself, and when they are 
there, and have established their life in the occult order as in a port, they 
ineffably participate of the union proceeding from the good, and of the 
light of truth. 

With respect however to what remains respecting the twofold periods, 
as we have said, the world itself indeed moves itself, being moved 
according to its own nature, and giving completion to the order of Fate. 
But the first-effective cause of this motion of the world, and of its life, is 
the God who illuminates it with the power of being moved and of living, 
and is the mighty Jupiter. Hence also this period is said to be Jovian, 
so far as Jupiter is the cause of this apparent arrangement, just as Saturn 
is the cause of the intellectual and unapparent arrangement. It is better, 
however, to hear Plato himself discussing these things. That there are, 
therefore, twofold circulations of the universe, and that the God who 
moves it is the leader of the one, but of the other the world itself convolving 
itself, Plato here teaches us. But as was just now said, and which is 
the only thing that remains, the universe is at one time co-governed by 
another divine cause, again acquiring life, and receiving a renovated 
immortality from the demiurgus; but at another time, when he lays aside 
as it were the handle of his rudder, the world being left by itself, moves 
for a time by itself, so as frequently to proceed in an inverted order. 

Again, however, that one of the periods, viz. the apparent, is Jovian, 
but that the other is referred to the kingdom of Saturn, Plato himself 
determines in what follows, subjoining these words, after the celebration 
of that life, and of the undefiled polity of the souls that are there, which 
is liberated from all corporeal pains, and the servitude about matter: 
“You have heard, Socrates, what was the life of men under Saturn; but 
you yourself have seen what the condition of the present life is, which is said 
to be under Jupiter.” And moreover, that of these two circulations, 
(since the apparent is under Jupiter) Jupiter is the cause and maker of 
it, is obvious to every one, and that again Jupiter is the power that moves 
the unapparent circulation, which is Saturnian, may be demonstrated 
from what is written. For it is necessary that these two Gods should 
either rule over each of these circulations, or that one of them should rule 
over the unapparent, but the other over the present circulation. If, 
however, Jupiter moves the universe according to this period, the world 
can no longer be said to convolve itself, and to govern every thing it 
contains. 
Nor will it be true neither that the whole is convolved by 
divinity with twofold and contrary circulations, nor again, that two 
certain Gods convolve it whose decisions are contrary to each other. 
For if Saturn indeed moves it according to one circulation, but Jupiter 
moves it according to a period contrary to that of Saturn, two Gods 
will move it according to contrary circumvolutions. If, however, these 
things are impossible, it is indeed manifest to every one that both the 
divine causes preside over the circulation according to the Saturnian 
convolution; Saturn indeed as the supplier of an intellectual life; but 
Jupiter, as elevating all things to the Saturnian empire, and establishing 
them in his own intelligible. And thus that period may be called Saturnian, 
in consequence of Saturn imparting the first effective cause of 
the whole [of an intellectual] life. But according to this more physical 
circulation, and which is known to every one, Fate and connate desire 
move the universe. 

Jupiter, however, is the cause of this motion exemptly, who gives 
Fate and an adscititious life to the world. These things, therefore, being 
demonstrated by us, let us consider what the particulars are which are 
asserted of the God who moves the world according to the other period. 
And they are these; “that the world indeed at another time is 
conjointly governed by another divine cause, again acquiring life, and 
receiving a renovated immortality from the demiurgus.” It is obvious, 
therefore, to every one; that the Elean guest says, that the God who 
moves the universe according to the Saturnian period, supplies it with 
life, and imparts to it a renovated immortality, and that he clearly calls 
him the demiurgus. Hence, if it is Jupiter who conjointly governs that 
period, as has been demonstrated, he will be the demiurgus of the world, 
and the supplier of immortality. And what occasion is there to say 
much on the subject? For if the same God is the cause of life, and is 
denominated the demiurgus, again the Cratylus will present itself to 
us, and Jupiter according to this will be the same with the demiurgus. 
For life accedes to all things from Jupiter, as it is asserted in that 
dialogue. Moreover, in what follows, as Timæus calls the cause of the 
circulation of Fate, demiurgus and father, after the same manner the 
Elean guest denominates this cause, and also calls it the maker. “For 
the world,” says he, “revolves, remembering the doctrine of the demiurgus 
and father.” Properly, therefore, do we denominate the whole 
of this period Jovian, because the world moves and convolves itself; 
according to the doctrine of Jupiter, and the order imparted to it from 
him. Again, therefore, Jupiter is demiurgus and father. And here also 
the Elean guest preserves the same order of the divine names as Timæus. 
For he does not call him father and demiurgus, but on the contrary, in 
the same manner as Timæus, demiurgus and father; because the demiurgic 
peculiarity in him is more manifest than the paternal deity. These 
things, however, have been copiously investigated before; and it has 
been shown in what respect the demiurgic is different from the paternal 
genus, how they are complicated with each other, where the paternal 
subsists essentially, but the demiurgic according to cause, and where 
again, the demiurgic subsists essentially, but the paternal, according to 
participation. 

 will remain, therefore, that we should make mention of what is 
written in the Laws concerning Jupiter. For perhaps in them also it 
will appear that Plato assigns the same order to the demiurgus and to 
Jupiter. As the equalities, therefore, according to which polities are 
adorned, are twofold, and the one polity indeed proposes the equal 
according to number, and proceeds through things which differ from 
each other according to an equal law; but the other embraces in all 
things, the equality which is according to desert; and also, since 
equality subsists according to ratio,—this being the case, each of these 
equalities exists in the providence of the world. For the essence of the 
soul, indeed, is primarily divided by its fabricator by the equality 
according to ratio; but it is also consummately filled with the remaining 
middles, and bound with them through the whole of itself. The several 
bodies [of the world] likewise, participate of a certain common essence, 
in the fabrication of things; and on this account they are allotted the 
equality which is according to number. But all things are arranged and 
adorned through the best of analogies, and the demiurgus according to 
this inserts both in wholes and parts, an indissoluble order in the 
universe, and an adaptation of them to each other. 

This equality, therefore, the Athenian guest exhorts his citizens 
particularly to honour, in consequence of assimilating his city to the 
universe. He also says that it is a thing of this kind, but that it is not 
likewise easy for every one to perceive the most true and excellent 
equality; for it is the judgment of Jupiter. What therefore is the cause 
on account of which the Athenian guest asserts this analogy to be the 
judgment of Jupiter? What other cause can we assign than its contributing 
to the perfection of the world, and its power and dominion in 
the fabrication of wholes? For that which gives an orderly distinction to 
the genera of causes, contrives the most beautiful bond of them, and 
weaves together one order from wholes, is according to Timæus the 
power of this analogy. For it established soul in the middle (of the 
universe) analogous to intellect and a corporeal nature. For soul is the 
middle of an impartible and partible essence. And by how much it 
surpasses a partible, by so much it falls short of an impartible hypostasis. 
The power of this analogy, however, binds the soul from double and 
triple ratios, and connects the whole of it proceeding from and at the 
same time returning to (its principles,) by the primary and self-motive 
boundaries of equality. It likewise constitutes the corporeal series from 
the four first genera. And it adapts indeed the extremes to each other 
through the middles, but mingles the middles according to the peculiarity of the extremes. It reduces, however, all things to one world, 
and one indissoluble order connectedly comprehended in the universe. 
If, therefore, we acknowledge that this equality has dominion in the 
whole fabrication of things, the best of analogies is the judgment of the 
demiurgus, and according to the decision of him who generated wholes 
it is allotted that great dominion in the fabrication of the universe, 
which we have before shown it to possess. Hence if the same analogy 
is the judgment of Jupiter, as the Athenian guest says it is, it is obvious 
to every one that the nature of Jupiter is demiurgic. For it is not any 
thing else which judges of the dignity of this analogy than that which 
employs it in the arrangement of wholes. And to this the legislator 
establishing himself analogous, binds and in a particular manner adorns 
the city which is assimilated to the universe, by this analogy. 

 these things, therefore, and from all that has been previously said, 
we confidently assert, following Plato and paternal rumours, that Jupiter 
is the demiurgus of the universe; and we may collect into one, the 
scattered opinions of the ancients on this subject; of whom, some, indeed, 
refer the paradigm of the world, and the demiurgic cause to the same 
order; but others divide these from each other. And some place all-perfect animal prior to the demiurgus; but others afford an hypostasis 
to it after the demiurgus. For if the demiurgus is, as has been said, the 
great Jupiter, and the paradigm proposed to the demiurgus in order to 
the generation of the world, is all-perfect animal, these are at the same 
time united to each other, and are allotted an essential separation. 
And animal itself, indeed, intelligibly comprehends in itself the whole 
Jovian series; but Jupiter the demiurgus of the universe intellectually 
pre-establishes in himself the nature of animal itself. For animal itself 
is the supplier of life to all things, and all things primarily live on 
account of it, and Jupiter being the cause of life, possesses, the paradigm 
and the generative principle of the essence of all animals. Justly, 
therefore, does Timæus, in Plato, having called the intelligible paradigm 
animal, conjoin the demiurgic intellect to the first intelligible animal; 
and through the all-perfect union of the demiurgus and father with it, he 
also arranges and adorns this universe. For Jupiter binding to himself 
the fabrication of the universe, and being an intellectual animal, is 
united to intelligible animal, and being allotted a progression analogous 
to it, constitutes all things intellectually, which proceed from animal 
itself intelligibly. 

For, as we have said, the intelligible hypostases being triple, and one 
indeed, being allotted its hyparxis according to existence and the one 
being; but another according to intelligible life, and the middle centre 
of the intelligible breadth, where eternity, all life, and intelligible life 
subsist, as Plotinus somewhere says; and another according to intelligible 
multitude, the first plenitude of life, and the all-perfect paradigm 
of wholes,—this being the case, the three kingdoms of the intellectual 
Gods are divided analogous to the three intelligible hypostases. And 
one indeed, the mighty Saturn, being allotted an hyparxis according to 
the summit of intellectuals, and having a paternal transcendency, 
possesses a dominion analogous to the summit of the intelligible Gods, 
and the occult order. 
And as in that order, all things are uniformly, and are ineffably, 
and without separation united, thus also this God 
again converts to himself, and conceals in himself the natures that have 
proceeded from him, imitating the occult of the first summit. But again, 
the order which comprehends the middle genera of wholes, and is filled 
indeed, from the generative power of Saturn, but fills from itself the 
whole fabrication with vivific rivers, has the same order in intellectuals 
which eternity has in intelligibles, and the uniform cause of the life 
which is there. And as eternity proximately generates intelligible 
animal, which is also denominated eternal, through the participation of 
eternity, thus also the middle bosom of the intellectual Gods, unfolds 
the demiurgus of the universe, and the vivific fountain of wholes. 
But the third king, viz. the fabricator and at the same time father, is indeed 
co-ordinate to the remainder of the intelligible triad, viz. to all-perfect 
animal. And as that is an animal, so likewise is Jupiter. And Jupiter 
indeed is intelligibly in all-perfect animal; but all-perfect animal is 
intellectually in Jupiter. The extremities likewise of the intelligible 
and intellectual Gods are united to each other; and in them, separation 
is co-existent with union. And one of them, indeed, is exempt from 
fabrication; but the other is converted to the intelligible, is filled from 
thence with total goods, and is allotted a paternal transcendency through 
the participation of it. The maker, therefore, and father of the universe, 
who has firmly established in himself the uniform strength and power of 
all fabrication, who possesses and comprehends the primary cause of 
the generation of wholes, and who stably fixes in himself all things, and 
again produces them from himself in an undefiled manner, being allotted 
such an order as this among the intellectual fathers, is celebrated, as I 
may say, through the whole of the Timæus, in which dialogue, his 
prolific and paternal power is unfolded, and his providence which 
pervades from on high as far as to the extremities of the universe. He 
is also frequently celebrated by Plato in other dialogues, so far as it is 
possible to celebrate his uniform and united power, and which through 
transcendency is exempt from wholes. 

 however some one recollecting what is said in the beginning of the 
Timæus about him, viz. that it is difficult to discover him, and when 
found, impossible to speak of him to all men, should enquire in the first 
place, why since the Grecian theology ascribes such a name to the 
demiurgus, as we have before mentioned, Timæus says that he is ineffable, 
and established above all the indication which subsists in words. In 
the next place, if he should inquire why intelligible animal which is 
arranged above the demiurgus is both denominated, and is made known 
by many signs, but the demiurgus who has established his kingdom in 
an order secondary to that of all-perfect animal, and is an intellectual 
God, (all-perfect animal receiving an intelligible transcendency) is left by 
Timæus ineffable, as we have said, and unknown, perhaps we also, 
following Plato, may be able to dissolve all such doubts. For every 
order of the Gods originates from a monad, and presides over its 
proper series according to the first-effective cause. And such things 
indeed as are nearer to this principle are more total than those 
that are more remote from it. But more total natures are manifestly 
seen to be less distant from the monad, and conjoin things which 
are diminished according to essence to the natures that are prior 
to them. Every order of the Gods likewise is a whole united to 
itself through the whole, is allotted one indissoluble connexion, both 
in wholes and parts, and through the monad which collects every order 
into one, it is converted about itself, is suspended from this, and is 
wholly convolved according to it. 

If, therefore, we assert these things truly, in each order a monad is 
allotted a transcendency with respect to multitude, analogous to the 
good. And as the unical cause of whole goods, and which is incomprehensible 
by all things, is exempt from all things, constitutes all things 
about itself, generates them from itself, and hastily withdraws the unions 
of all things to its own ineffable superunion, thus also the uniform and 
generative principle of every co-ordinate multitude, connects, guards and 
perfects the whole series of itself, imparts good to it from itself, and 
fills it with order and harmony. It is likewise that to its own progeny, 
which the good is to all beings, and is the object of desire to all the 
natures that originate from itself. Thus, therefore, the union of the 
intelligible father subsists prior to the whole paternal order; the one 
wholeness of the Synoches is prior to the connective order; and the first 
effective cause of life, to the vivific order. 

Hence also, of every demiurgic series, which is suspended from the 
triad of the sons of Saturn, the monad which proximately fabricates 
wholes, and is established above this triad, comprehends in itself all the 
demiurgic Gods, converts them to itself, and is of a boniform nature. 
The one fountain likewise of all the demiurgic numbers, subsists, as I 
may say, with respect to all this order analogous to the one, and to the 
one principle of all things. Timæus therefore, indicating these things 
to us, asserts directly in the beginning of the generation of the world, 
that this monad which proximately fabricates wholes, is difficult to be 
known, and is indescribable, as having the same ratio as the ineffable 
and unknown cause of all beings. Whence likewise, I think, he calls 
the demiurgus the best of causes, and the father of this universe, as being 
allotted the highest order among the demiurgi, and convolving to himself, 
and producing from himself all the effective principles. That one however, 
Parmenides demonstrates to be perfectly unknown and ineffable; 
but Timæus says that it is difficult to discover the maker and father of 
the world, and impossible to speak of him to all men; which assertion 
falls short of the cause that flies from all knowledge, and all language, 
and appears to verge to the nature of things known and effable. For 
when he says that it is impossible to speak of him to, all men, he does 
not leave him entirely ineffable and unknown. And the assertion that it 
is difficult to discover him, is not the sign of a peculiarity perfectly 
unknown. For because the demiurgus has established a kingdom 
analogous to the good, but in secondary and manifold orders of it, he 
participates indeed of the signs of the good, but is allotted the participation 
in conjunction with an appropriate peculiarity, and a communion with 
beings adapted to him. And as he is good, but not the good itself, 
so likewise he is difficult to be known by the natures posterior to him, 
but is not unknown. He is also celebrated in mystic language, but is 
not perfectly ineffable. You may see however, the order of things, and 
the remission in them proceeding in a downward progression. For the 
good indeed, is exempt from all silence, and all language. But the genus 
of the intelligible Gods rejoices in silence, and is delighted with ineffable 
symbols. Hence also, Socrates in the Phædrus, calls the vision of the 
intelligible monads the most holy of initiations, as being involved in 
silence, and perceived intellectually in an arcane manner. But the 
vision of intellectuals is indeed effable, yet is not effable and known to all 
men, but is known with difficulty. For through diminution with respect 
to the intelligible, it proceeds from silence and a transcendency which is 
to be apprehended by intelligence alone into the order of things which 
are now effable. 

If however, this be the case, all-perfect animal is much more ineffable 
and unknown than the demiurgic monad. For it is at once the monad 
of every paradigmatic order, and is intelligible, but not intellectual. 
How therefore, do we endeavour to denominate, and as it were unfold it, 
but thus magnificently celebrate the demiurgic cause? And how do we 
class this cause in the same rank with things ineffable? For this will not 
be acting conformably to Plato, who arranges animal itself beyond the 
demiurgus; but this will be giving an hypostasis to it in a secondary 
order of Gods, where it will be ranked, and will be effable and known 
more than the demiurgic monad. To which may be added, that to 
denominate that all-perfect animal most beautiful, but the demiurgus the 
best of causes, gives indeed the same analogy to these causes with 
respect to each other, as there is of the good with respect to the beautiful. 
And as the good is prior to the beautiful, (for the first beauty, as Socrates 
says in the Philebus, is in the vestibules of the good) so likewise the best 
is prior to the most beautiful, and the demiurgus is prior to all-perfect 
animal. For the best indeed, remarkably participates of the good, but 
the most beautiful, of beauty. 

 addition to these things therefore, it must also be asserted by us, 
that the most beautiful and the best, are simply indeed related to each 
other according to order, as the good is to the beautiful. For the series 
of the whole of goodness is expanded above all the progression and 
arrangement of the beautiful. Every where, therefore, the best is prior 
to the most beautiful. And the one, indeed, with reference to an inferior 
order, will be the best, but the other with reference to a more excellent 
order, will be the most beautiful. I say for instance, that the most 
beautiful, as in intelligibles, will have this peculiarity; but the best as in 
intellectuals. And if the most beautiful, in supermundane natures, is a 
thing of this kind, the best will be said to be best as with reference to the 
Gods in the world. Hence, if the best of causes is the leader of the 
demiurgic series, and according to it is allotted a transcendency of this kind, 
but the most beautiful of intelligible animals preestablishes the illustrious 
power of beauty in a higher order, by what contrivance can it on this 
account be shown that intelligible and all-perfect animal is subordinate 
to the intellectual cause? And that the demiurgus is converted to that 
which is posterior to himself? Or how can it be said that animal itself is 
visible to him, and all-perfect animal, and that which is comprehensive 
of all intelligibles, if it is made to be comprehended by another? For 
thus the demiurgus will be more comprehensive than animal itself, if the 
former indeed being characterized according to the best, is expanded 
above the paradigm, but the latter being denominated as most beautiful 
is secondary to the demiurgic cause. 

Moreover, as that all-perfect and intelligible animal is particularly 
considered by Timæus according to a formal nature, and not according 
to the union which is in it, and an hypostasis which is above all forms, he 
very properly grants that animal itself may be known and manifested by 
words, but considers the demiurgus as in a certain respect ineffable, and 
superior to knowledge. For both indeed, I mean the demiurgus and 
animal itself, participate of union, and prior to a formal essence, are contained 
in the one. And if you assume the unities which are in them, you 
must admit the unity of the paradigm to be intelligible, but the demiurgic 
unity to be intellectual, and that an intelligible hyparxis is nearer to the 
first one, which is unknown and incomprehensible by all things, than an 
intellectual hyparxis. But if you are willing to survey the forms of the 
paradigm by themselves, according to which it is said to be the paradigm 
of every thing in the world, and the goodness and union of the demiurgus, 
the former will appear to you to be known and effable; but the demiurgic 
cause will be seen to participate of the unknown and ineffable peculiarity 
of the Gods. 
For again, Timæus was in a remarkable degree in want of the demiurgus 
and father, as the producing cause of wholes, and the generator of the world. 
But to generate, to produce and provide are the peculiarities of Gods, 
so far as they are Gods. Hence also Timæus denominates the peculiarity 
of the demiurgus according to which he is a God, the cause of the generation 
of the universe, and the most proper principle of the arrangement of wholes. 
But he denominates the peculiarity of the paradigm to be that which 
comprehends the first forms, 
according to which the world also is invested with forms. For it is the 
image of the paradigm, but the effect of the demiurgus. It belongs, 
therefore, to the paradigm to be the first of forms, but to the demiurgus 
to be the best of causes, according to his goodness, and the hyparxis of 
essence. For, as we have said, to generate, to give subsistence to, and to 
provide for other things, especially pertain to the Gods, and not to the 
natures which are primarily suspended from them; but the latter are 
allotted through the former an abundance prolific of secondary natures. 
It appears tome that Socrates in the Republic indicating these things, 
does not say that the sun is the cause of generation, till he had declared 
him to be the progeny of the superessential principle of all things; just as 
Timæus does not begin the fabrication of the universe, till he had celebrated 
the goodness of the demiurgus of wholes. For each [i. e. the 
demiurgus and the sun] is a producing cause according to the good, the 
former indeed of the universe, but the latter of a generated nature; but 
not according to the intellect which is in than, or life, or any other form 
of essence; For these through the participation of the good constitute 
the natures posterior to themselves. And thus through these things we 
have answered the before-mentioned doubts. 

 the problems pertaining to total fabrication, it now remains for me 
to relate what my opinion is respecting the Crater, and the genera that 
are mingled in it. For these also Timæus co-arranges with the demiurgic 
monad, in the generation of the soul. The demiurgus, therefore, mingles 
the elements of the hypostasis of souls; but the middle genera of being 
are mingled. The much-celebrated Crater, however, receives this mixture, 
and generates souls in conjunction with the demiurgus. Hence, in 
the first place, the genera of being must be admitted to be twofold. And 
it must be granted indeed, that some of them give completion to total 
hypostases, but others, to such as are partial; and that the hyparxes of 
first effective and united causes, are established in the intelligible Gods. 
For there essence subsists primarily in the summit of intelligibles, and 
motion and permanency are in the middle centre. For intelligible eternity 
abides in one, and at once both abides and is the occult cause of all 
life. 
Hence, Plotinus also calls eternity life which is one and total: and 
again, in another part of his works he calls it intelligible life. But the 
third from him, Theodorus, denominates it permanency. And both 
these opinions harmonize with each other; because permanency also is in. 
eternity, (for according to Timæus, eternity abides in one) and motion. 
For eternity is intelligible life, and that which participates of it is intelligible 
animal. Moreover, sameness and difference, are in the extremity 
of intelligibles. For whence does multitude originate, but from difference? 
And whence is the communion of parts with wholes, and the 
hyparxis of things which are divided in each other derived but from sameness? 
For that one participates of being, and being of the one. All the 
parts likewise of the one being pervade through each other in an unconfused 
manner; for at one and the same time sameness and difference are 
there occultly. And the whole intelligible breadth is allotted its hypostasis according to the first and most uniform genera. As essence likewise 
presents itself to the view in conjunction with the one, according to the 
first triad, so motion and permanency shine forth in the second, and 
sameness and difference in the third triad. And all things are essentially 
in the intelligible; just as life and intellect are there intelligibly. For 
since all beings proceed from intelligibles, all things preexist there 
according to cause. And motion and permanency are there essentially, 
and sameness and difference uniformly. 

Again, in the middle genera of the intelligible and intellectual hypostases, 
the same things subsist secondarily and vitally. In the summit of 
them indeed, essence subsists. For Socrates in the Phædrus speaking 
about this order, characterizes the whole of it from essence. For the 
truly-existing essence which is without colour, without figure, and without 
contact, subsists after this manner. But in the middle centre there are 
motion and permanency. For there the circulation of the heaven subsists, 
as the same Socrates says; being established indeed undeviatingly, 
in one form of intelligence; but being moved in, and about itself; or 
father being motion and eternal life. But in the extremity of this order, 
sameness and difference are vitally established. Hence it is converted to 
the beginning according to the nature of sameness, is divided uniformly, 
proceeds into more numbers, and generates from itself more partial 
monads. 

Again, in the third orders, the highest of the intellectual Gods possesses 
all things according to essence, and is the intelligible itself and true being 
in intellectuals, again recalling the separation which is in himself into 
undivided union. But the middle order subsists according to motion and 
at the same time permanency. For it is a vivific deity, abiding and at 
the same time proceeding, being established with purity, and vivifying 
all things by prolific powers. And the third progression subsists according 
to sameness, together with difference. For this separates itself from 
the fathers, and is conjoined to them through intellectual conversion. And 
it binds, indeed, at once the natures posterior to itself, to each other, 
according to the common powers of forms, and at the same time separates 
them by intellectual sections. But in this order, all genera and species 
first shine forth to the view; because it is especially characterized 
according to difference, being allotted the end of all the total hypostases. 
From this likewise it proceeds to all things, viz. to participated intellect, 
the multiform orders of souls, and the whole of a corporeal nature. 
For in short, it constitutes triple genera of the natures posterior to itself; 
some indeed, being impartible and the first; others being media 
between partible and impartible natures; and others being divided about 
bodies. And through these things it generates all the more partial genera 
of beings. That we may therefore again return to what has been before 
said, the genera must be admitted to subsist every where, yet not every 
where after the same manner; but in the highest orders of divine natures 
indeed, they subsist uniformly, without separation, and unitedly, where 
also permanency participates of motion, and motion of permanency, and 
there is one united progression of both. In the more partial orders, however, 
it must be admitted that the same things subsist in a divided manner, and 
together with an appropriate remission. For since the first and most 
total of forms are in the extremity of intelligibles, it is indeed necessary 
that genera should have the beginning of their hypostasis in intelligibles. 
And if the demiurgic cause is generative of all the partial orders, it comprehends 
the first genera of the hypostasis of them. As likewise the 
fountain of all forms subsists in this cause, though there are intelligible 
forms, so the genera of being preexist in it, though there are other whole 
genera prior to it. And the divine Jamblichus somewhere rightly 
observes that the genera of being present themselves to the view in the extremity 
of the intelligible Gods. The present theology likewise, following 
things themselves, gives a progression to these as well as forms supernally, 
from the intelligible Gods. For such things as subsist according to cause, 
occultly, and without separation in the first essences [i. e. in intelligibles] 
these subsist in a divided and partible manner, and according to the nature 
of each,in intellectuals. For from hence, all the divisible orders of beings are 
filled both with these genera, and with formal hyparxes. And on this account, 
the demiurgus also is said to comprehend all genera, and to have the 
fountain of forms, because he generates, all the partial rivers [of life] and 
imparts to them from himself by illumination all the measures of subsistence. 
Hence triple genera of all beings proceed from the demiurgus, some 
indeed being impartible, others partible, and others subsisting between 
these, being more united indeed than the partible, but more separated 
than the impartible genera; but subsisting according to the middle of 
both, and connectedly containing the one bond of beings. And the 
demiurgus indeed produces the intellectual essence, through the first and 
impartible genera; but the corporeal essence through the third and 
partible genera; and the psychical hypostasis which is in the middle of 
these, through the middle genera in beings. Moreover, he generates 
every intellectual and impartible nature from himself, and fills them with 
total generative power. But he constitutes the psychical essence, in 
conjunction with the Crater; and the corporeal essence, in conjunction, 
with total Nature.

 in this arrangement likewise we follow Timæus, any one may 
learn from the following considerations: The demiurgus producing the 
intellect of the universe, himself produces it from his own essence alone, 
unfolding it at once according to one union, in consequence, of constituting 
it eternally, and no mention whatever is here made of the Crater. 
But the demiurgus in arranging and adorning soul prior to body, mingles 
the genera, and energizes in conjunction with the Crater. And in fashioning 
the body of the universe, and describing the heaven, he fabricates 
it in conjunction with Necessity. For the nature of the universe, 
says Timæus, was generated mingled from intellect and necessity. And neither 
does he here assume the Crater in order to the arrangement of bodies. 

But it has been abundantly shown by us elsewhere, that Plato calls 
physical production, a production through necessity, and does not, as 
some suppose, consider necessity to be the same with matter. It is 
evident, therefore, that the demiurgus produces the generation of bodies 
together with total Nature, mingles the partible genera in the first Nature, 
and thus produces bodies from intellect and necessity. For bodies 
receive from intellect indeed, good and union; but from necessity a 
progression which terminates in interval and division. He arranges and 
adorns, however, the self-motive essence of souls, in conjunction with the 
Crater. And neither intellect, nor bodies, require a cause of this kind. 
The demiurgus indeed is the common source of the triple genera. But 
the Crater is the peculiar cause of souls, and is co-arranged with the demiurgus 
and filled from him, but fills souls. And receiving from thence 
indeed the powers of prolific abundance, it pours them on souls according 
to the measures of their respective essences. To some of them likewise it 
orderly distributes the summits of the genera [of being], to others the 
middle progressions of the genera, and to others, the terminations of 
them. Hence the Crater is indeed essentially vivific, since souls also are 
certain lives, but it is the first-effective cause of souls, according to the 
peculiarity of hyparxis, and is the uniform and all-perfect monad, not 
of every life, but of that which is psychical. For from this Crater the 
soul of the universe subsists, and likewise the second and third genera of 
partible souls, and of those souls that are allotted a progression between 
these. 

The whole number, therefore, of the psychical order proceeds from the 
Crater, and is divided according to the prolific powers which it contains. 
Hence the Crater is said to be the cause of souls, the receptacle of their 
fabrication, and the generative monad of them, and the like. For it is 
said to be so rightly, and conformably to the mind of Plato. If, however, 
the Crater is co-arranged with the demiurgus, and equally constitutes 
with him the genera of souls, it is indeed necessary that this Crater 
should be fontal, in the same manner as the whole demiurgus. Hence 
the Crater is the fountain of souls, but it united to the demiurgic monad. 
And on this account, Socrates also in the Philebus says, that in Jupiter 
there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect. For that which we at present 
denominate fontal, he calls royal; though the name of fountain when 
applied to souls is well known to Plato. For Socrates, in the Phædrus, 
says, that the self-motive nature is the fountain and principle of motion 
to such other things as are moved. 

And you see that as a twofold divine monad prior to souls is delivered 
by theologists, the one being indeed fontal, but the other of a primary 
ruling nature, Plato likewise gives to the progeny of these twofold; 
appellations, assuming one name from the more total, but the other front 
the more partial monad. For the self-motive nature, is a fountain indeed, 
as being the offspring of the fontal soul, but it is a principle, as participating of the primary ruling soul. If therefore, the name of fountain, and; 
also of principle is assigned by Plato to souls, what occasion is there to 
wonder if we denominate the exempt monads of them, fountains and 
principles? Or rather from these things that is demonstrated. For 
whence is a ruling power imparted to all souls except from the ruling 
monad? For that which similarly extends to all souls, is necessarily 
imparted to them from one and the same cause. If therefore, some one 
should say it is imparted by the demiurgus, so far as he is the demiurgus, 
it is necessary that in a similar manner it should be inherent in all other 
things which proceed from the demiurgic monad. But if it proceeds 
from the definite and separate cause of souls, that cause must be 
denominated the first fountain and principle of them. 

Moreover, that of these two names, the ruling is more allied to souls 
than the fontal, as being nearer to them according to order, Plato 
manifests in the same dialogue. For calling the self-motive nature the 
fountain and at the same time principle of the motion of the whole of 
things, he nevertheless frames his demonstration of its unbegotten 
subsistence from principle alone. For, says he, principle is unbegotten. 
For it is necessary that every thing which is generated should be 
generated from a principle. If therefore, demonstrations are from things 
proximate to the things demonstrated, it is necessary that principle 
should be more proximate to souls than fountain. Farther still, if every 
thing which is generated is generated from a principle, as Plato says, but 
souls are in a certain respect generated, as Timæus says, there is also a 
precedaneous principle of souls. And as they are the principles of 
things which are generated according to time, so after another manner 
principle subsists prior to souls, which are generated. And as they are 
unbegotten according to the generation of bodies, thus also the principle 
of souls is exempt from all generation. Through these things therefore, it 
is demonstrated by us, that the Crater is the fountain of souls, that after the 
fountain there is a primary ruling monad of them, and that this monad 
is more proximate to souls than the fountain, but is established above 
them, as being their prolific cause. And all these particulars we have 
demonstrated from the words of Plato. 

 therefore, let us return to the things proposed, and teach in a 
greater degree the lovers of the contemplation of truth, concerning this 
Crater. For the whole vivific deity having established in the middle of 
the intellectual kings the prolific cause of divine natures, and according 
to her highest, most intellectual and all-perfect powers, being occultly 
united to the first father, but according to more partial and secondary 
causes from them, being conjoined to the demiurgus, and establishing 
one conspiration together with him of the generation of the partial orders, 
Timæus mystically mentions those more ancient powers of the Goddess, 
and which abide in the first father. But with respect to those powers 
that are co-arranged with the demiurgus, and adorn together with him 
the natures in the universe, some of these he delivers more clearly but 
the whole of others through indication. For the secondary monads 
themselves of the Goddess are triple, as the wise assert, one of them 
being the fountain of souls, the second, being the fountain of the virtues, 
but the third being the fountain of Nature which is suspended from the 
back of the Goddess. The demiurgus therefore, also assumes these three 
hypostases to his own prolific production. And the Crater indeed, as 
we have said, is the fountain of souls, unically containing the whole and 
perfect number of them. And as the demiurgus is allotted a paternal 
cause with respect to the psychical generation, so the Crater is prolific, 
and is allotted the ratio and order of a mother. For such things as 
Jupiter produces paternally in souls, the fountain of souls produces 
maternally and generatively. 

Virtue however, energizes by itself, and adorns and perfects wholes. 
And on this account, the universe having participated of soul, immediately 
also participates of virtue. “For the demiurgus, says Timæus, 
having placed soul in the middle, extended it through the universe, and 
besides this surrounded the body of it externally with soul as with a veil, 
and causing circle to revolve in circle, constituted heaven one, alone and 
solitary, but through virtue able to converse with itself, and being in want 
of no other thing, but sufficiently known and friendly itself to itself.” At 
one and the same time therefore the world is animated, lives through the 
whole of its life according to virtue, and possesses from the virtues as its 
highest end, friendship with itself, and an all-perfect knowledge of itself. 
For it is itself sufficiently known and friendly to itself through virtue. 

Moreover, nature also is consubsistent with the generation of body. 
For the demiurgus generates body through necessity, and fashions it 
together with its proper life. And on this account, shortly after, having 
constituted partial souls, he shows to them the nature of the universe, 
and the laws of Fate. For in consequence of possessing the cause of 
total Nature and Fate, he also exhibits these to souls. For the 
demiurgus is not converted to things posterior to himself, but primarily 
contains in himself the things which are exhibited, and unfolds to souls 
the powers of himself. Hence, the paradigm of all Nature, and the one 
cause of the laws of Fate pre-subsist in him. For the fountain of 
Nature, is called the first Fate by the Gods themselves. “You should 
not look upon Nature, for the name of it is fatal.” Hence also, Timæus 
says, that souls at one and the same time see the laws of Fate, and the 
nature of the universe, viz. they see as it were mundane Fate, and the 
powers of it. And the Elean guest in the Politicus, denominates the 
motive cause of the more physical circulation of the universe, Fate. 
For he says that “Fate and connate desire convolve the world.” And 
the same person likewise clearly acknowledges that the world possesses 
this power from the demiurgus and father. For he says that all the 
apparent arrangement and circulation are derived from Jupiter. It is 
demonstrated therefore, that according to these three causes of the vivific 
Goddess which are co-arranged with the demiurgus, the world is perfected 
by him, viz. according to the fontal Crater, the fountain of the 
virtues, and the first-effective cause of nature. 

It is likewise manifest that again in these things Plato does not refuse 
to employ the name of fountain. For in the Laws he calls the power 
of prudence which is essentially inherent in souls, and which is productive 
of the virtues in us, the fountain of intelligence. And he also says, that 
two other fountains are imparted to us by nature, viz. pleasure and pain. 
As, therefore, we before demonstrated that souls are called the fountains 
of motions, on account of the one fountain of them, of which they 
participate, thus also when Plato calls the first progeny of Nature 
fountains, it is obvious to every one, that he will permit the exempt 
cause itself of them to be denominated a fountain. After the same 
manner, likewise, since he magnificently celebrates the essential power 
of virtue in us, as the fountain of intelligence, he will not be compelled 
to hear a name which does not at all pertain to his philosophy, if some 
one should be willing to denominate, the first monad of the virtues, a 
fountain. 
But where shall we have the name of fountain posited by him 
in the intellectual Gods? In the Cratylus, therefore, he says that Tethys 
is the occult name of a fountain, and he calls Saturn himself and the 
queen Rhea fluxions. For these divinities are rivers of the intelligible 
fountains, and proceeding from fountains placed above them, they fill 
all the natures, posterior to themselves with the prolific rivers of life. 
And the Crater itself likewise is fontal. The Gods, therefore, also 
denominate the first-effective causes of partial natures, fontal Craters. 
These things, however, we shall more fully investigate elsewhere. Let 
it be considered also, that we have here sufficiently examined the 
particulars concerning the demiurgic monad, according to the narration 
of Plato. 

 the next place, let us survey those causes and leaders of uncontaminated 
purity, and see if Plato any where appears to remind us of 
this order of Gods, and of the inflexible power proceeding from them to 
all the divine genera. For the. first-effective triad of the immutable 
order, is united to the triad of the intellectual kings and the progressions 
of the former are co-divided with the monads of the latter. And the 
summit of the triad, and as it were, the flower of the inflexible guard of 
wholes is united to the first intellectual king. But the middle centre of 
the triad, is in a kindred manner conjoined to the second intellectual 
king, proceeds together with him, and subsists about him. And the 
extremity of the whole triad is connected with the third intellectual 
king, is converted with him to the principle [of the intellectual order,] 
and together with him is convolved to the one union of the father of all 
the intellectual Gods. And after this manner, indeed, the three 
unpolluted guardians of the intellectual fathers, are monadically divided. 
But together with this division they have also an hypostasis united to 
each other. All of them, likewise, are in a certain respect in each of 
the fathers, and all of them energize about all. And after a certain 
manner indeed according to their proper hypostasis, they are divided 
from the fathers; but after another manner they are impartibly assumed 
with them, and at one and the same time they are allotted an equally
dignified order with the father, and appear to possess an essence 
subordinate to them. 

Such, therefore, being their nature, they preserve, indeed, the whole 
progressions of the fathers undefiled, but supply them with inflexibility 
in their powers, and immutability in their energies. They are suspended, 
however, from total purity. And if some of the ancients have in any 
of their writings surveyed in intellect that which always subsists with 
invariable sameness, which receives nothing into itself from subordinate 
natures, and is not mingled with things. inferior, they celebrate all such 
goods as these, as pervading to intellect, and other natures, from these 
Gods. 
For the oration in the Banquet of Plato, celebrates in a remarkable 
manner the immiscibility of the divine essence with secondary 
natures; and that which transcends the whole of things in purity and 
immutable power, arrives to the Gods through the guardian cause. And 
as the intellectual fathers, are the suppliers of prolific production, both 
to all other things, and to the inflexible Gods, thus also, the undefiled 
Gods, impart the power of purity, both to the fathers, and to the other 
divine orders. At one and the same time, therefore, the three unpolluted 
Gods subsist with the three intellectual kings, are the guardians of the 
fathers themselves, establish about them an immutable guard, and 
firmly fix themselves in them. Hence also, the Athenian guest, as he 
arranges and adorns his polity through the best analogy, through which, 
the demiurgus binds and constitutes the whole number [of the elements,] 
so likewise he appoints a guard to all the inhabitants of the region, that 
nothing, as much as possible, may be without defence; imitating in this 
the intellectual Gods themselves who guard all things by the undefiled 
leaders. And it appears to me that on this account he calls the rulers 
[of his polity] guardians of the laws, or [simply] guardians, because the 
inflexible guardians are consubsistent with the intellectual leaders of the 
whole Worlds. 

 arguments, however, will be more remote from that divine 
triad, and are referred to it from ultimate images. But perhaps 
omitting these, we may abound with greater conceptions, and more 
conducive to the investigation of the thing proposed, and speculating 
together with Plato the divine genera, we may discover how he also 
celebrates this order of Gods, and constitutes them together with the 
three kings that are now discussed, just as by other theologists also, we 
are mystically instructed in the truth concerning them. In the fable 
therefore of Protagoras, Plato indicating to us the exempt watch-tower 
of Jupiter, and the transcendency of his essence which is unmingled with 
all secondary natures, through which be is inaccessible and unrepealed 
to the partible genera of Gods, refers the cause of this to his immutable 
guard, and the defensive order by which he is surrounded. 
For on account of this, all the demiurgic powers indeed are firmly established in 
themselves. But all the forms [that are in him] are according to supreme 
transcendency exempt from secondary natures. And in short, the 
demiurgic intellect [through this order] abides after its accustomed 
manner. For the fable says that the guards of Jupiter are terrible to 
all things And on this account such [partible] genera of Gods (one of 
which also Prometheus is) cannot be immediately conjoined with the 
undefiled and Olympian powers of the demiurgus. If, therefore, Socrates 
himself in the form of a fable clearly delivers to us the guard about the 
demiurgus, is it not through these things evident that the guardian 
genus is consubsistent with the intellectual Gods? For as the Oracles 
say, that the demiurgic order is surrounded with a burning guard, thus 
also Plato says that guards stand round it, and defend inflexibly the 
summit of it exempt from all secondary natures. 

But in the Cratylus, Socrates unfolding through the truth which is 
expressed in names, who Saturn is, demonstrates indeed his peculiar 
hyparxis, according to which he subsists as the leader of the total intellectual 
orders. He likewise unfolds to us the monad of the unpolluted 
order, which is united with Saturn. For Saturn, as he says in that 
dialogue, is a pure intellect. For, he adds, the koron of him, 
does not signify his being a boy, but the purity, and incorruptible nature 
of intellect. After an admirable manner therefore, the fabricator of these 
divine names, has at one and the same time conjoined the Saturnian 
peculiarity, and the first monad of the unpolluted triad. For the union 
of the first father with the first of the unpolluted Gods, is transcendent, 
and hence this inflexible God is called silent by the Gods, is said to accord 
with intellect, and to be known by souls according to intellect alone; 
because he subsists in the first intellect according to one union with it 
Saturn therefore, as being the first intellect, is defined according to its 
proper order, but as a pure and incorruptible intellect, he has the undefiled 
conjoined in himself. And on this account, he is the king of all the 
intellectual Gods. For as intellect he gives subsistence to all the 
intellectual Gods, and as a pure intellect, he guards the total orders of 
them. The two fathers therefore, [Saturn and Jupiter] are shown by the 
words of Plato to be co-arranged with the immutable Gods, according to 
union indeed, the first, but according to separation the third. 

If you are willing however, to survey the one inflexible guard of them 
with respect to each other, according to which the third father is stably 
in the first, as being the intellect of him, and energizing about him, again 
direct your attention to the bonds in the Cratylus, of which indeed, 
partible lives, and the lives deprived of intellect, and which are stupidly 
astonished about matter, are unable to participate. But a divine intellect 
itself, and the souls which are conjoined to it, participate of these 
bonds according to an order adapted to them. For the Saturnian bonds, 
appear indeed to bind the mighty Saturn himself, but in reality, they 
connect about him in an undefiled manner the natures that throw the 
bonds around him. For a bond is the symbol of the connective order of 
the Gods, since every thing which is bound is connected by a bond. 
Again therefore from these things, the guardian good which extends from 
the connective Gods to the intellectual kings is apparent, since it unites, 
and collects them into one. For a bond guards that which is connected 
by it. But the immutable Gods inflexibly preserve their own appropriate 
orders. For the guardship of these Gods is twofold; the one indeed, 
being primary and uniform, and suspended from the triad of the 
connective Gods; but the other being co-existent with the intellectual 
kings, and defending them from a tendency to all secondary natures. 
For all the intellectual fathers ride on the unpolluted Gods, and are 
established above wholes, through their inflexible, undeviating, and 
immutable power. 

If however, it be not only necessary that these two fathers should 
participate of this guardian order, but that the middle vivific deity of 
them should be allotted a monad of the immutable Gods coordinate to 
herself, it is indeed necessary that the first [guardianship] of the unpolluted 
leaders in the intellectual fathers, should be triadic, and should have 
the same perfect number with the three intellectual Gods. It is likewise 
necessary that the first of these leaders should be stably united to the 
first [of the intellectual kings]; but that the second should in a certain 
respect be separated from the second of these kings, together with a 
union with him. And that the third should now be entirely separated 
from the third king. And thus the unpolluted proceeds conformably to 
the paternal order, and is after the same manner with it triadically 
divided. The first of the unpolluted Gods likewise guards the occult 
nature of Saturn, and the first-effective monad which transcends wholes, 
and establishes perfectly in him the causes that proceed from, and again 
return to him. But the second, preserves the generative power of the 
queen Rhea, pure from matter, and undefiled, and sustains from the 
incursions of secondary natures her progression to all things, on which 
she pours the rivers of life. And the third preserves the whole fabrication 
of things established above the fabrications, and firmly abiding in 
itself. It likewise guards it so as to be inflexible, one, and all-perfect 
with respect to the subjects of its providential case, and expanded above 
all partial production. 

 us now then from this indefinite and common doctrine about 
these Gods, adduce the Grecian rumour concerning it, as delivered to us 
by Plato, and demonstrate that he as far as to the very names follows 
the theologists of the Greeks, just as in the mystic theory of the three 
kings, and the narration of the unpolluted Gods, he does not depart from 
their interpretation. For who that is in the smallest degree acquainted 
with the divine wisdom of the Greeks, does not know that in their arcane 
mysteries, and other concerns respecting the Gods, the order of the 
Curetes, is in a remarkable manner celebrated by them, as presiding 
over the undefiled peculiarity, as the leader of the goddess [[Rhea,] and 
as binding in itself the guardianship of wholes? These Gods therefore, 
are said to guard the queen Rhea, and the demiurgus of wholes, and 
proceeding as far as to the causes of partible vivification and fabrication, 
to preserve the Proserpine and Bacchus which are among these causes, 
exempt from secondary natures, just as here [i.e. in the intellectual order], 
they defend the vivifications of total life, and the first-effective monads of 
all-perfect fabrication. Not only Orpheus therefore, and the theologists 
prior to Plato knew this Curetic order, and knowing, venerated it, but 
the Athenian guest also in the Laws celebrates it. For he says, that the 
armed sports of the Curetes in Crete, are the principal paradigms of all 
elegant motion. And now, neither is he satisfied with having mentioned 
this Curetic order, but he also adds the one unity of the Curetes, viz. our 
mistress Minerva, from which the mystic doctrine also of theologists 
prior to him, suspends the whole progression of the Curetes. He likewise, 
surrounds them above with the symbols of Minerva, as presiding 
over an ever-flourishing life, and vigorous intellection; but beneath, he 
manifestly arranges them under the providence of Minerva. For the 
first Curetes indeed, as being the attendants of the intelligible and occult 
Goddess, are satisfied with the signs that proceed from thence; but those 
in the second and third orders, are suspended from the intellectual 
Minerval monad. 

What then is it, that the Athenian guest says concerning this monad, 
which converts to itself in an undefiled manner the Curetic progressions? 
“The core (κορη) i.e. virgin, and mistress that is with us, being delighted 
with the discipline of dancing, did not think it proper to play with empty 
hands; but being adorned with an all-perfect panoply, she thus gave 
perfection to dancing.” Through these things therefore, the Athenian 
guest clearly shows the alliance of the Curetic triad to the Minerval 
monad. For as that triad is said to sport in armour, so he says that the 
Goddess who is the leader of them [i.e. of their progression] being 
adorned with an all-perfect panoply, is the source to them of elegant 
motion. And as he denominates that triad Curetic, from purity, so likewise 
he calls this goddess Core, as being the cause of undefiled power 
itself. For koron (το κορον) as Socrates says in the Cratylus, signifies the 
pure and incorruptible. Whence also the Curetes are allotted their 
appellation, as presiding over the undefiled purity of the Gods. And 
the monad of them is particularly celebrated as a mistress and as Core 
[a virgin] she being the supplier of an inflexible and flourishing dominion 
to the Gods. The word koron therefore, as we have said, is a symbol of 
purity, of which these Gods are the primary leaders, and according to 
which they are participated by others. But their being armed, is a 
symbol of the guardian power according to which they connect wholes, 
guard them exempt from secondary natures, and preserve them established 
in themselves. For what other benefit do men derive from arms 
except that of defence? For these are in a particular manner the safeguard 
of cities. Hence fables also ascribing to the unpolluted Gods an 
unconquerable strength, give to them an armed apparatus. Hence 
adorning the one unity of them with an all-perfect panoply, they establish 
it at the summit of the progression of these Gods. For the all-perfect 
precedes things which are divided according to parts, and the panoply 
exists prior to the partible distribution of guardian powers. And it 
appears to me that through these particulars Plato again asserts the same 
things as were afterwards revealed by the Gods. For what they denominate 
every kind of armour, this Plato celebrates as adorned with an 
all-perfect panoply. [For the Gods say,] “Armed with every kind of 
armour, he resembles the Goddess.” For the all-perfect in the habit of 
Pyrrhich arms, and the undefiled in power, pertain, according to Plato, 
to the Minerval monad; but according to the narration of the Oracles 
they pertain to that which is furnished with every kind of arms. 

Farther still, rhythm and dancing are a mystic sign of this deity, because 
the Curetes contain the undefiled power of a divine life; because they 
preserve the whole progressions of it always arranged according to one 
divine boundary; and because they sustain these progressions from the 
incursions of matter. For the formless, the indefinite, and the privation 
of rhythm, are the peculiarities of matter. Hence, the immaterial, the 
definite, and the undefiled, are endued with rhythm, are orderly, and 
intellectual. For on this account, the heavens also are said to form a 
perpetual dance, and all the celestial orbs participate of rhythmical and 
harmonious motion, being filled with this power supernally from the 
unpolluted Gods. For because they are moved in a circle they express 
intellect, and the intellectual circulation. But because they are moved 
harmonically, and according to the first and best rhythms, they participate 
of the peculiarity of the guardian Gods. Moreover, the triad of the 
unpolluted leaders is suspended from the summit of the intellectual 
Gods. And that it proceeds from this summit, Plato himself teaches us, 
by placing the first cause of purity in Saturn the king of all the intellectual 
hebdomad. For purity (το κορον) is there primarily, as he informs us 
in the Cratylus, and the first-effective cause of purity, preexists unically 
in Saturn. For on this account also, the Minerval monad, is called Core 
(a virgin) and the Curetic triad is after this manner celebrated, being 
suspended from the purity in the intellectual father. 

 the undefiled leaders, thus much we have had to say, 
according to the narration of Plato. The monad therefore, now remains, 
which closes the number of all the intellectual hebdomad, and is the first 
arid uniform cause of all division, which must in the next place be 
discussed by us. The sections therefore, of the intellectual Gods which 
are celebrated by all the wise in divine concerns among the Greeks, and 
which obscurely signify the separations in those Gods, are effected in 
them through the seventh monad, which is the cause of division, and 
according to which they separate themselves from the Gods that are 
placed above them, proceeding into another order, are allotted a union 
exempt from subordinate natures, and by themselves have definite 
order and a progression bounded according to number. Plato however,
allows indeed poets that are inspired by Phoebus, to signify things 
of this kind obscurely and mystically; but he excludes the multitude from 
hearing these things, because they believe without examination in the 
fabulous veils of truth. And this is, what Socrates reprobates in Euthyphron, 
who was thus affected in consequence of being ignorant of divine 
concerns. According to the divinely-inspired intellect of Plato therefore, 
transferring all such particulars to the truth concerning wholes, and 
unfolding the concealed theory which they contain, we shall procure 
for ourselves the genuine worship of a divine nature. For Socrates 
himself in the Cratylus, unfolds to us the Saturnian bonds, and their 
mystic meaning, and in a remarkable manner demonstrates that the 
visions of those ancient and illustrious men do not fall off from the 
truth. 

After the same manner therefore, he will permit his friends to assume 
intellectual sections, and the power which is productive of these, according 
to divinely-inspired conceptions, and will suffer them to survey these 
together with bonds in the intellectual Gods. Farther still, the fable in 
the Gorgias, in a clearer manner separates the empire of Jupiter from 
the Saturnian kingdom, and calls the former the second from, and more 
recent than the latter. What is the cause, therefore, which separates 
these paternal monads? What intellectual power produced the intellectual 
empire from that which is exempt from it? For it is necessary 
that there should be with the Gods themselves the first-effective fountain 
of division, through which Jupiter also separates himself from the monad 
his father, Saturn from the kingdom of the Heaven, and the natures 
posterior to Jupiter, proceeding into an inferior order, are separated 
from his all-perfect monad. 

Moreover, the demiurgus himself in the production of the genera 
posterior to himself, at one and the same time is the cause to them of 
union, and the source of their all-various divisions. For fabricating the 
soul one whole, he separates it into parts, and all-various powers. And 
in the Timæus where the demiurgus is said to do this, Plato himself 
does not refuse to call these separations, and essential divisions, sections. 
He likewise cuts off parts from thence, places them in that which is 
between these, and again separates parts from the whole, and thus the 
mixture from which he had cut off these parts, was now wholly consumed. 
Is it therefore any longer wonderful that the framers of fables 
should denominate the divisions of the intellectual leaders, sections, since 
even Timæus himself who does not devise fables, but indicates the 
essential progression of souls into multitude, uses as a sign the word 
section? And does not also Plato in the greatest degree accord with the 
highest of theologists, when he delivers to us the demiurgus glittering 
with intellectual sections? As therefore the demiurgus, when producing 
the essence of souls, constitutes it according to true being, when generating 
life, he generates it according to the life which is in real beings, 
and produces the intellect which is in souls according to the intellect 
which is in himself,—thus also when cutting the essence of the soul from 
itself, and separating it, he energises according to the sections and 
separations which are in the intellectual order, and according to the one 
and intellectual cause of them. According to Plato, therefore, there is 
a first monad of the total divisions in intellectuals, and together with 
the twofold triads, I mean the paternal and the undefiled, it gives 
completion to the whole intellectual hebdomad. And we, following 
Plato, and other theologists, concede the same things. 

 us now, however, return to the beginning, and demonstrate that 
Parmenides delivers the same things concerning this intellectual hebdomad, 
and that he produces this hebdomadic aiōn (eternity) and the 
peculiarity of the Gods which is intellectual alone, in continuity with. 
the triple orders of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual 
Gods. And, in the first place, let us survey what he says concerning 
the father of the intellectual Gods, and the undefiled power which is 
co-arranged with him. For after the threefold figure, and the order of 
the Gods which perfects all things, that which is in itself and in another, 
becomes apparent. These things, however, are demonstrated to be 
signs of the intellectual summit of the intellectual monads. For the 
first father of the Gods in this order, at one and the same time is allotted 
a paternal transcendency with respect to those posterior to him, and is the 
intellect of the first intelligibles. For every imparticipable intellect is 
said to be the intellect of the natures prior to itself, and towards them, 
from whom it is produced, it has an intellectual conversion, and in them 
as first-effective causes it establishes itself. Whence also the demiurgic 
intellect is the intellect of the natures above itself, and proximately indeed 
of its own father, from which likewise it proceeds, but eminently of the 
intelligible unities beyond [Saturn]. 

The first king, therefore, in intellectuals, is both an intellectual father, 
and a paternal intellect. He is, however, the intellectual father indeed 
of the Gods that proceed from himself; but he is the paternal intellect 
of the intelligibles prior to himself. For he is indeed intellectual 
essentially; but he has an intelligible transcendency in intellectuals; 
because he is also established analogous to the unknown order of the 
intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, and to the occult 
order of the intelligible triads. And as they are expanded above the 
triadic hypostases of the Gods posterior to themselves, thus also the 
father of intellectuals, is a father expanded above the whole intellectual 
hebdomad, in consequence of being a paternal intellect. And analogously 
to the above-mentioned orders of Gods, he establishes himself in 
them, and is filled from them with paternal and intelligible union. On 
this account also, he is occult, shuts in himself the prolific powers of 
himself, and producing from himself total causes, he again establishes 
them in, and converts them to himself. 

These things, therefore, Parmenides also indicating, magnificently 
celebrates this order by these twofold signs, and characterizes the first 
king and father of the intellectual Gods through these peculiarities. 
For he is in himself, and in another. For so far indeed as he is a total 
intellect, his energy is directed to himself, but so far as he is in the intelligibles 
prior to himself, he establishes in another the all-perfect intelligence 
of himself. For, indeed, this subsistence in another, is more 
excellent than the subsistence of a thing in itself; since, as Parmenides 
himself concludes, the subsistence of Saturn in another, pertains to him 
according to whole, but the subsistence of him in himself, according to 
parts. Where, therefore, does the another pre-exist? And to what order 
of the Gods prior to Saturn does it belong? Or is not this also divinely 
unfolded by our preceptor? For he says that this another, remarkably 
pertains to that order, according to which the power of difference first 
shines forth, being the progeny of intelligible and paternal power. Hence 
in the first triad the another was occultly, so far as power also had there 
an occult subsistence; but it particularly shines forth in the first order 
of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods. For there 
the first difference, the feminine nature of the Gods, and the paternal 
and unvocal power subsist. 

[Saturn therefore] who is the first of the intellectual fathers being 
intelligible, so far as he is a whole, establishes himself in the intelligible 
triads prior to himself, from which also he is filled with united and occult 
goods. And on this account he is said to be in another. With respect 
to those triads indeed, the another is occultly and according to cause in 
the intelligible [i. e. in the first triad] of intelligibles; but according to 
essence in the intelligible of the intelligible, and at the same time, 
intellectual Gods. All intelligibles therefore are united; the intelligible 
indeed of the intelligible and intellectual Gods being united to the 
intelligible of the intelligibles prior to intellectuals; but the intelligible 
of intellectuals, to both. And the subsistence indeed in another, adheres 
to the difference which is according to unical number. But unical 
number is suspended from the occult union of the one being; on which 
account also it is unical. 

Farther still, we also say, that there is a twofold conversion in those 
orders, the one indeed being towards themselves, but the other towards 
the causes of them, (for it neither was nor will be lawful for divine natures, 
to convert themselves in any respect to natures posterior to themselves). 
And the intelligible Gods generate all things stably; but the intelligible 
and intellectual Gods who illuminate imparticipable life, impart the 
original cause of progression to all things; and the intellectual Gods 
arrange and adorn wholes according to conversion. Hence, it is indeed 
necessary that the summit of intellectuals which pours forth from itself 
the whole and all-perfect form of conversion, should be characterized by 
both the convertive symbols, and should be at one and the same time 
converted to itself, and to the natures prior to itself. Hence, because 
indeed, it is converted to itself, it is in itself; but because it is converted 
to the intelligible orders beyond itself, it is in another. For the another 
is more excellent than the whole intellectual order. As, therefore, the 
summit of intelligibles primarily subsists according to the intelligible 
peculiarity itself, and is firmly established above wholes; and as the 
summit of intelligibles and intellectuals primarily unfolds the peculiarity 
of this order, subsisting according to divine diversity, and being to all 
things the cause of all-various progressions;—thus also the intelligible 
deity of intellectuals, exhibits from himself according to union the twofold 
forms of conversion, being indeed in another according to the more 
excellent form of conversion, but in himself according to the less excellent 
form. For to be converted to himself is inferior to the conversion to 
more excellent natures. 

Again, therefore, the subsistence in another, is the illustrious prerogative of the intelligible and paternal peculiarity. For the another is 
intelligible, and difference was the power proceeding from the intelligible 
fathers, and from the natures firmly established in them. Hence, that 
which is comprehended in this power, and is filled from it, is paternal 
and intelligible. But the subsistence of a thing in itself is the proper 
sign of the unpolluted monad. For as we have before observed, the 
summits of the two intellectual triads are conjoined. And the monad 
of the guardian triad has eternally established itself in the paternal 
monad, and again establishes in, and converts to itself the natures which 
have proceeded from itself. And the first intellectual father is indeed 
father on account of himself, but on account of the unpolluted [monad,] 
he comprehends in himself the genera of himself, stably recalls them 
[when they have proceeded from him] to himself, and in his own 
allness contains the intelligible multitudes of intellectuals in unproceeding 
union with their monad. 

The first leader, therefore, of the guardian order subsists in conjunction 
with the father. And the father indeed comprehends the unpolluted 
cause, but is comprehended by the first intelligibles. And as he is 
intelligibly established in them, so likewise he has established in himself, 
and constituted about himself, the one summit of the inflexible Gods. 
In the Parmenides, therefore, also the same God appears to us to be a 
pure intellect. Because, indeed, he is intellect, being extended to the 
intelligible place of survey, and on this account being in another, so far 
as he is wholly established in it. But again, because he is pure and 
immaterial, being converted to himself, and shutting in himself all his 
own powers. For the parts of this wholeness, are more partial powers, 
which hasten indeed to a progression from the father, but are on all 
sides established and comprehended by the wholeness. And the wholeness 
itself is a deity, connectedly containing in itself intelligible parts, 
being parturient indeed with intellectual multitude, generating all things 
stably, and again embosoming and collecting to itself its progeny, and 
as the more tragical fables say, absorbing and depositing them in itself 
For the progeny of it are twofold; some indeed, being, as it were, analyzed 
into it; but others being divided from it. And some abiding in it 
through the first unpolluted monad; but others proceeding according to 
the prolific cause of the intellectual Gods, surmounting the union of the 
father, and being the primary leaders of another order, and of the 
arrangement and ornament of secondary natures. The first order therefore of the intellectual Gods, is thus delivered to us by Parmenides. 

 second order however, after this, is that which comprehends the
middle genera of wholes, is the cause to all things of progression and 
prolific power, and is in continuity with the first order of the intellectual 
Gods. What else therefore than life is every where in continuity with 
the intelligible and true being? For it is the medium between intellect 
and the intelligible, conjoining intellect to the intelligible, and expressing 
the intelligible power which collects together the one and being. As the 
intelligible therefore is to the one and hyparxis, so is life to power, and 
intellect to being. And as in intelligibles, the one is the object of desire, 
but being aspires after the participation of the one, and power collects 
being to the participation of the one, and the one to a communion with 
being, (for the one here is not imparticipable, and exempt from all power) 
so likewise the intelligible is the object of desire to intellect, but intellect 
is filled with it. 
And life binds indeed intellect to the intelligible, but unfolds the intelligible 
to intellect. Whence also, I think, those who are wise in all divine concerns, 
call the one and hyparxis intelligible. 
But that which is primarily being, they call the first intellect, conformably to this 
analogy. Life therefore, is the medium between being and intellect, in 
the same manner as power subsists between the one and being. And all 
these, viz. the intelligible, life, and intellect are primarily in intelligibles; 
but secondarily in intelligibles and intellectuals; and according to a 
third diminution, in intellectuals. In intelligibles however, being is 
according to essence; for there intellect is primarily according to cause. 
But in intellectuals, intellect indeed, is according to essence; but the 
natures prior to intellect, are according to participation. Since therefore, 
life is surveyed in a threefold respect, in intelligibles indeed according to 
cause; but in intelligibles and intellectuals, according to hyparxis; and 
in intellectuals, according to participation, it is indeed necessary that 
the life which is in the intellectual order, should both be life, and 
participate of the causes generative of life prior of itself. The one 
therefore of the intellectual Gods which is arranged in the middle, is 
not motion, but that which is moved. For prior to this, it has been 
demonstrated by Plato, that all life is motion. For soul is self-motive 
because it is self-vital. And intellect is on this account moved, because 
it has the most excellent life. The first vivific cause, therefore, of the 
intellectual Gods, is primarily allotted motion. If, however, it was the 
first-effective and highest life, it would be requisite to denominate it 
motion, and not that which is moved. But since it is life as in intellectuals, 
but is filled from exempt life, it is at the same time motion, and 
that which is moved. 
Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides demonstrate that the one in this order 
is moved, because it proceeds from the causes of all life that are placed above it, 
and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad 
of intelligibles and intellectuals. 
Hence also, Socrates in the Phædrus calls this middle 
triad Heaven; for the whole of it is life and motion. But that which 
is moved, is the middle in intellectuals, as being filled from it, [i. e. from 
the life in the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals;] since 
eternity also, which is arranged according to the intelligible wholeness, 
is all-perfect life, and all life, according to Plotinus. There, however, 
the middle is life according to cause; but in intellectuals, it is life 
according to participation; and in the order between these, it is life 
according to essence, proceeding indeed from intelligible life, (as Parmenides 
also manifests, characterizing both according to wholeness, though the 
wholeness in intelligibles is different from that which is in intelligibles and 
intellectuals, as we have before observed,) but producing after this, 
intellectual life. For that which is moved, is indeed entirely allied to 
the circulation of the Heaven, and to intellectual and intelligible life. 

Moreover, the permanency which is coordinate with this motion, is not 
one certain genus of being, as neither is motion. For beings indeed are 
naturally adapted to participate of the genera of being; but the superessential goods of the Gods, are expanded above the order of beings. If, 
therefore, Parmenides here, assuming the one itself by itself, surveys in 
this motion and permanency, he evidently does not attribute the elements 
of being to the Gods, but assigns to them peculiarities appropriate, 
all-perfect, and transcending wholes. And thus asserting that the one is 
moved and stands still, according to motion, indeed, he delivers the vivific 
hyparxis of the Gods, the generative fountain of wholes, and the leading 
cause of all things. But according to permanency, he delivers the unpolluted 
monad coordinated with motion, and which connectedly-contains 
the middle centres of the guardian triad. For as the summit of the 
guardian triad, is united to the first father, according to the first hypostasis, 
thus also the deity who contains the middle bond of the unpolluted 
leaders, is by a congeniality of nature consubsistent with the motive 
cause of all the Gods, which moves wholes, and is primarily moved from 
itself. And through this deity, the prolific power of this Goddess [Rhea] 
is firmly established in herself. Producing likewise, and multiplying all 
things, she is [through this deity] exempt from wholes, and inflexibly 
exists prior to her progeny. With respect, therefore, to motion here and 
permanency, the former indeed is the fountain of the life and generative 
power that proceeds to all things; but the latter, establishes the whole 
vivific fountain in itself, but is from thence filled with the prolific rivers of 
life. 
Parmenides, therefore, delivering to us these things, and the progression 
of them, demonstrates that that which is moved is generated 
from that which is in another, but that which stands still, from that which 
is in itself. For the first monad of the paternal triad constitutes the 
natures posterior to it. And after the Same manner, the highest of the 
unpolluted triad, and which is intelligible as in this triad, imparts at one 
and the same time the middle and last monad of the triad. Oh this 
account, also, motion here is better than permanency. For as a subsistence 
in another is according to cause more ancient than the subsistence 
of a thing in itself, so likewise that which is moved, is causally more 
ancient than that which is permanent. For the unpolluted Gods, are in 
power subordinate to the fathers, and are comprehended in them. 

 third, therefore, to the Saviour, as they say, and let us direct our 
attention to the demiurgic monad, unfolding itself into light together with 
the coordinate Gods it contains. In the first place, then, here also the 
communion of the one with other things is apparent, and we must no 
longer consider the one alone by itself, but according to its habitude 
towards other things. Because, therefore, the demiurgic order produces 
wholes from itself, and arranges and adorns a corporeal nature, it also 
generates all the second and ministrant causes of the Gods. For what 
occasion is there to say that the term other things, is a sign of a corporeal 
condition of being, since formerly the Pythagoreans thought fit to characterize 
an incorporeal nature by the one, but indicated to us the nature 
which is divisible about body, through the term others? In the second 
place, the number of the conclusions [in this part of the Parmenides] is 
doubled. For the one is no longer demonstrated to be alone same, or 
different, as it is to be in itself, and in another, or to be moved, and stand 
still, but it is demonstrated to be the same with itself, and different from 
itself, and to be different from other things, and the same with other 
things. But this twice appeared to us before to be entirely adapted to 
the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologists, and to Socrates 
in the Cratylus, who says that the demiurgic name is composed from 
two words. 
In the third place, therefore, the multitude of causes is here 
separated, and all the monads of the Gods present themselves to the 
view, according to the demiurgic progression. For the demiurgic order 
is apparent, the prolific power co-ordinate with it, the undefiled monad 
the cause of exempt providence, and the distributive fountain of wholes; 
and together with these, as I may say, all the orders about the demiurgus 
are apparent, according to which he produces and preserves all things, 
and being exempt from the things produced, is firmly established 
in himself, and separates his own kingdom, from the united empire of 
his father. 

How, therefore, and through what particulars do these things become 
apparent? We reply, that the same with itself (for this Parmenides first 
demonstrates) represents to us about the nature of the one, the monadic 
and paternal peculiarity, according to which the demiurgus also subsists. 
Hence, likewise, the one is said to be the same with itself. For the 
another is in the demiurgus according to the transcendency of different 
causes; but the same, appears to be a sign of his proper, viz. of his 
paternal, hyparxis. For being one, and the exempt father and demiurgus 
of wholes, he establishes his proper union in himself. And in this 
one, Parmenides in a remarkable manner shows the uniform, and that 
which is allied to bound. But the same with other things, is the singular 
good of prolific power, and of a cause proceeding to, and pervading 
through all things without impediment. For the demiurgus is present 
to all things which he produces, and is in all things the same, which he 
arranges and adorns, pre-establishing in himself the generative essence 
of wholes. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, bound and 
infinity subsist in him demiurgically. And the one indeed is in the 
sameness which is separate from other things, but the other is in the 
power which generates other things. For every where power is prolific 
of secondary natures. But the principle which subsists according to 
bound, is the supplier of an united and stable hypostasis. 

Moreover, the different from other things, manifests his undefiled purity 
and his transcendency which is exempt from all secondary natures. For 
the first intellect was on this account pure and incorruptible, as Socrates 
says in the Cratylus, because it is established above coordination or 
communion with all sensible natures. For as some one of the Gods
says, he does not incline his power to matter, but is at once exempt from 
all fabrication. But the demiurgic intellect receiving from thence total 
power, and a royal dominion, adorns indeed sensibles, and constitutes 
the whole of a corporeal nature. Together however, with prolific 
abundance, and the providential attention to secondary natures, he 
transcends his progeny, and abides in his own accustomed manner, as 
Timæus says, through the inflexible guard which subsists with him, and 
the power imparted to him from it, which is uncontaminated with other 
participants. 
Hence, through the never-failing supply of good, and 
providential energies, and the generation of subordinate natures, he
is the same with them. For he is participated by them, and fills his
progeny with his own providential care. But through his purity, 
undefiled power, and inflexible energies, he is separate from wholes, is 
disjoined from them and is imparticipable by other things. And as the 
first king of intellectuals is allotted his non-inclination to matter, through 
the guard which is united to him, and through the undefiled monad; 
and as the vivific goddess possesses her stable and inflexible power 
from the second cause of the guardian Gods; thus also the demiurgic intellect 
preserves a transcendency exempt from other things, and a union separated 
from multitude, through the third monad of the leaders 
of purity. 
For the cause of separate providence is a guard coordinate 
with the demiurgus, who hastens to produce all things, and to pervade 
through all things. But the guard which is the supplier of stable power
is coordinate with the vivific deity, who is moved to the generation of 
wholes. And with the intellect that is multiplied according to intellectual 
conceptions [i. e. with Saturn,] the guard is coordinate, that imparts 
an undefiled union of the conversion of all his energies to himself. The 
monad, therefore, remains, which is arranged as the seventh of these 
intellectual monads, which is present with, and energizes with all of 
them, but particularly unfolds itself into light in the demiurgic order, 
and which Parmenides also producing for us together with the whole 
demiurgus, defines it in difference, in the same manner as he does the 
undefiled cause in the demiurgus. He says however, that this difference 
separates the demiurgic monad itself from itself. For we have before 
observed that this order is the supplier of separation to all the Gods. 
As therefore, the demiurgus is the same with himself, through the paternal 
union, after the same manner he is separated from himself and his 
father through this difference. Whence therefore, does he derive this 
power? From being in himself, says Parmenides, and in another. For 
these were indeed unitedly in the first father, but separately in the third. 
Separation therefore, preexisted there according to cause; but in the 
demiurgus it shines forth, and unfolds the power of itself. 

That the cause however of division, is in a certain respect in the first 
father, Parmenides manifests in the first hypothesis, when he says, “that 
every thing which is in itself is in a certain respect a duad, and is 
separated from itself.” There however, the duad is occultly; but here it 
subsists more clearly, where also all intellectual multitude shines forth to 
the view. For difference is the progeny of the firmly-abiding duad 
which is there. This therefore separates the demiurgic intellect from the 
Gods prior to it, and divides the monads in it from each other. For if 
so far as it is in another, it is united to the intelligible of itself, but so far 
as it is in itself it is separated from it, because it proceeds according to 
each order of its own intelligible,—if this be the case, it is necessary that 
this difference should be the cause to it of separation from its father. 
All the intellectual monads therefore; have appeared to us to subsist 
coordinately with each other. And the subsistence indeed, in another is 
the sign of the father. But the subsistence in itself, is the sign of the 
first unpolluted monad. Again, motion is the sign of vivific goodness; 
but permanency of the inflexible power conjoined with motion. And sameness 
with itself, and with another, is the sign of the demiurgic peculiarity; 
but the being different from other things, is the sign of the guard about 
the demiurgus. 
And in the last place, the being different from itself, is 
the sign of the seventh intellectual monad, which is according to cause 
indeed, and occultly in the first father, but is allotted its hypostasis more 
clearly in the demiurgus. Parmenides likewise appears to me, when 
dividing the signs of fabrication, to have unfolded in the middles 
themselves, the peculiarities of the undefiled monad, and of the dividing 
monad, so far as they also are in a certain respect comprehended in the 
fabrication. For he shows in the first of the conclusions that the one is 
the same with itself; in the second, that it is different from itself; in the 
third, that it is different from other things; and in the fourth that it is 
the same with other things. 
For he co-arranges indeed, the dividing power with the paternal union; 
but connects with a transcendency separate from secondary natures,
the providential cause of them. 
For in the Gods, it is necessary that union should exist prior to separation, and 
and a purity unmingled with secondary natures, prior to a providential 
inspection of them; through which likewise, being every where, they are 
no where, being present with all things, they are exempt from all things, 
and being all things, they are not any of their progeny.