Frellsen Company v. Crandell/Opinion of the Court
'After the patent has once been issued, the original contest is no longer within the jurisdiction of the Land Department. The patent conveys the legal title to the patentee, and cannot be revoked or set aside, except upon judicial procedings instituted in behalf of the United States. The only remedy of Emblen is by bill in equity to charge Weed with a trust in his favor. All this is clearly settled by previous decisions of this court, including some of those on which the petitioner most relies. Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, 20 L. ed. 485; Moore v. Rob. 96 U.S. 530, 24 L. ed. 848; Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U.S. 473, 25 L. ed. 800; St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 26 L. ed. 875; Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. 106 U.S. 447, 27 L. ed. 226, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 147 U.S. 47, 37 L. ed. 72, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 217; Turner v. Sawyer, 150 U.S. 578, 586, 37 L. ed. 1189, 1191, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192.'

See also McMichael v. Murphy, 197 U.S. 304, 311, 49 L. ed. 766, 769, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460.

Obviously, in this case the supreme court of Louisiana followed the practice obtaining in respect to the public lands of the United States. But if it had not, and had declared simply the law of the state of Louisiana, its decision would doubtless be controlling on this court, for, in the matter of the sale and conveyance of lands belonging to the public, no one state is obliged to follow the legislation or decisions of another state, or even those of the United States, but may administer its public lands in any way that it sees fit, so long as it does not conflict with rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.

Counsel criticize the opinion of the supreme court of Louisiana, in that it speaks of all the lands as having gone to patent, while it is said in the petition that some of the assignees 'stood upon the certificates.' Whether the language of the petition technically justifies the construction placed upon it by the supreme court of the state is immaterial. Certainly, there is no naming of any single tract as covered by certificate alone, and not patented, and if any tract was held under a certificate of location, it was, within the scope of the ruling of the supreme court, not subject to other entry or purchase.

We see no error in the ruling of the Supreme Court, and its judgment is affirmed. 

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