Chicago Railway Company v. United States (246 U.S. 512)/Opinion of the Court
Charging violation of the Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 607), to prevent cruelty to animals while in transit, the United States sued petitione  for the prescribed penalty and recovered a judgment in the District Court, Northern District of Illinois, which the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 234 Fed. 268, 148 C. C. A. 170.

The statute forbids an interstate railroad carrier from confining animals in cars longer than thirty-six hours, upon written request, without unloading them for rest, water and feeding 'unless prevented by storm or by other accidental or unavoidable causes which cannot be anticipated or avoided by the exercise of due diligence and foresight,' and subjects every such carrier 'who knowingly and willlfully fails to comply' therewith to a penalty. Admitting continuous confinement for more than thirty-six hours petitioner defended upon the ground that it was prevented from unloading within the required period by exculpatory accidental and unavoidable causes.

It appeared: The animals were loaded at Ringsted, Iowa, 438 miles from destination-Union Stock Yards, Chicago-at 6 p. m. October 4th, and as part of a train the car containing them left Clinton, Iowa, 138 miles from Chicago, at 6 p. m. October 5th. The ordinary schedule time between the latter points is nine hours, but without increase of actual moving speed the run had been made in about six. While the train was passing through Proviso, 16 miles from destination, at 2:48 a. m. October 6th a drawbar came out and derailed a car. A delay of two hours and fifty-two minutes followed-not undue the carrier contends, but unreasonably long the government maintains. Later, at Brighton Park an air hose burst causing further delay of twenty-eight minutes. The car reached the stock yards at 9:05 a. m. October 6th-thirty-nine hours and five minutes after being loaded.

In its charge to the jury the trial court said:

'Your inquiry has to do with the transportation of this car      of stock from the point of origin out in Iowa to destination,      Union Stock Yards, and if, on the evidence in this case, you      conclude that the railway company, by the exercise of due      diligence, would have gotten that car of stock from the point      of origin to Union Stock Yards inside of thirty-six hours,      your verdict should be in favor of the United States and      against the defendant, even though you should be of the      opinion that these two particular things which have been made      the subject of most of the contention here were properly      handled by the railway company.

'Now, in determining this question you take into   consideration the distance, among other things, the   distance shown by the evidence from the point of origin   to destination, what the evidence shows as to the period   of time, thirty-nine hours and five minutes consumed   from point of origin to destination, not merely from   Clinton to Chicago, the whole movement is here for your   consideration and to be considered by you in determining   whether or not due diligence has been shown by the   carrier.

'Now, what is due diligence? Due diligence, as that term is      used in this statute means the exercise of foresight bringing      to bear on the situation in hand, the transaction in hand,      the human intelligence of an average man employed in such      business and exercised by a man who has been experienced in      railroad business, trained in railroad business so that he      knows what should be done in the matter of handling      railroads, operating railroads, moving cars-not merely the      movement of an engine, the handling of the throttle by an      engineer, not merely the handling of the conductor's work,      the brakeman's work or the division superintendent's work,      but the whole thing involved in the transaction of operation      of the railroad in so far as the movement of this train is      concerned, and whatever ingenuity, that is to say whatever      human intelligence could devise and put in operation, having      in mind the practical operation of a railroad, and having in      mind the purpose which the law has, to get stock to market      within the time mentioned, having in mind the movement of      trains, the keeping of a railroad open, what human ingenuity      could devise, in so far as human intelligence goes, having      the benefit of experience, in the way of safeguards and in      the way of provision to get stock from origin to destination      within the period of this statutory limit, the railroad      company has to do. Of course it is not the law that a railway      company may lay out a slow schedule over a long distance and      then if just before they get in to destination something happens for which they were not prepared or      equipped, merely because if that thing had not happened they      might have skinned in within the thirty-six limit they are      excused; that is not the law.'

The statute must be construed with a view to carrying its humanitarian purpose into effect and the exception in favor of the carrier given proper latitude and enforced in the light of practical railroad conditions. Nothing indicates the running schedule was unduly slow; and the jury were improperly given to understand that, conceding matters were properly handled when accidents occurred at Proviso and Brighton Park, they might nevertheless decide the railroad could have got the car to destination within thirty-six hours if due diligence had been exercised in laying out such schedule. The definition of 'due diligence' in the charge was too exacting and misleading. As applied to the facts due diligence did not require, as the court declared, that 'whatever ingenuity, that is to say whatever human intelligence could devise and put in operation, having in mind the practical operation of a railroad, and having in mind the purpose which the law has, to get stock to market within the time mentioned, having in mind the movement of trains, the keeping of a railroad open, what human ingenuity could devise, in so far as human intelligence goes, having the benefit of experience, in the way of safeguards and in the way of provision to get stock from origin to destination within the period of this statutory limit, the railroad company has to do.'

We find nothing in the act indicating a purpose to interfere directly with the carrier's discretion in establishing schedules for trains; the design was to fix a limit beyond which animals must not be confined, whatever the schedule, except under the extraordinary circumstances stated. In general, unloading can only take place at specially prepared places or final destination. If in the exercise of ordinary care prudence and foresight the carrier reasonably expects that following the determined schedule the containing car will reach destination or some unloading place within the prescribed time it properly may be put in transit. Thereafter the duty is on the carrier to exercise the diligence and foresight which prudent men, experienced in such matters, would adopt to prevent accidents and delays and to overcome the effect of any which may happen-with an honest purpose always to secure unloading within the lawful period. If, notwithstanding all this, unloading is actually prevented by storm or accident the reasonable delay must be excused.

In the Hours of Service Act, 34 Stat. 1415, 1416 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8679), there is a previso:

'That the provisions of this act shall not apply in any case      of casualty or unavoidable accident or the act of God; nor      where the delay was the result of a cause not known to the      carrier or its officer or agent in charge of such employe at      the time said employe left a terminal, and which could not      have been foreseen. * * *'

Construing this, in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 244 U.S. 336, 343, 37 Sup. Ct. 635, 637 (61 L. Ed. 1175), we said:

'It was not the intention of the proviso, as we read it, to      relieve the carrier from the exercise of diligence to comply      with the general provisions of the act, but only to relieve      it from accidents arising from unknown causes which      necessarily entailed overtime employment and service. United      States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141 [10 L. Ed. 689]. It is still      the duty of the carrier to do all reasonably within its power      to limit the hours of service in accordance with the      requirements of the law.'

This general principle should also be followed in construing and applying the provision of the statute here under consideration.

The judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded. 

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