The emerging autonomous vehicles (AV) can either supplement the public transportation (PT) system or be a competitor with it. This paper focuses on this competition in a hypothetical scenario--"if both AV and PT operators are profit-oriented ," and uses an ABM to quantitatively evaluate the system performance in this competition from the perspectives of four stakeholders--AV operator, PT operator, passengers, and public authority. In our model, AV operator updates its supply by changing fleet sizes while PT by adjusting headways, and both use heuristic approaches to update supply in order to increase profits. We implement the model in the first-mile scenario in Tampines . In four regulation scenarios--two by two combinations regarding whether AV and PT are allowed to change supplies--we find that since AV can release the bus operator from low-demand routes, the competition can lead to higher profits of both, and higher system efficiency , simultaneously, rather than a one-sided loss-gain result. For PT, after supply updates, spatially the services are concentrated to short feeder routes directly to the subway station , and temporally concentrated to peak hours. For passengers , the competition reduces their travel time but increases their travel costs. Nonetheless, the generalized travel cost is still reduced when counting the value of time. For system efficiencyand sustainability, bus supply adjustment can increase the bus average load and reduce total PCE , while the AV supply adjustment shows the oppositeeffect. For policy implications, the paper suggests that PT should be allowed to optimize its supply strategies under specific operation goal constraints, and AV operation should be regulated to relieve its externality on the system, including limiting the number of licenses, operation time, and service areas, which makes AV operate like a complementary mode to PT .
Emerging autonomous vehicles (AV) can either supplement the public transportation (PT) system or compete with it. This study examines the competitive perspective where both AV and PT operators are profit-oriented with dynamic adjustable supply strategies under five regulatory structures regarding whether the AV operator is allowed to change the fleet size and whether the PT operator is allowed to adjust headway. Four out of the five scenarios are constrained competition while the other one focuses on unconstrained competition to find the Nash Equilibrium. We evaluate the competition process as well as the system performance from the standpoints of four stakeholders -- the AV operator, the PT operator, passengers, and the transport authority. We also examine the impact of PT subsidies on the competition results including both demand-based and supply-based subsidies. A heuristic algorithm is proposed to update supply strategies for AV and PT based on the operators' historical actions and profits. An agent-based simulation model is implemented in the first-mile scenario in Tampines , Singapore. We find that the competition can result in higher profits and higher system efficiency for both operators compared to the status quo. After the supply updates, the PT services are spatially concentrated to shorter routes feeding directly to the subway station and temporally concentrated to peak hours. On average , the competition reduces the travel time of passengers but increases their travel costs. Nonetheless, the generalized travel cost is reduced when incorporating the value of time. With respect to the system efficiency, the bus supply adjustment increases the average vehicle load and reduces the total vehicle kilometer traveled measured by the passenger car equivalent (PCE) , while the AV supply adjustment does the opposite .
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