The problem of moral luck Given the notion of equating moral responsibility with voluntary action, however, moral luck becomes a problem. This problem is illustrated by an example that many moral luck philosophers employ – that of a traffic accident. There are two people driving cars, Driver A, and Driver B. They are alike in every way. Driver A is driving down a road, and, in a moment of inattention, runs a red light as a child is crossing the street. Driver A slams the brakes, swerves, in short does everything to try to avoid hitting the child – alas, the car hits and kills the child . Driver B , in the meantime, also runs a red light but, since no one is crossing , gets a traffic ticket but nothing more . If a bystander were asked to morally evaluate Drivers A and B, there is very good reason to expect them to say that Driver A is due more moral blame than Driver B . After all, Driver A's course of action resulted in a death , whereas the course of action taken by Driver B was quite uneventful . However, there are absolutely no differences in the controllable actions performed by Drivers A and B. The only disparity is that in the case of Driver A, an external uncontrollable event occurred, whereas it did not in the case of Driver B. The external uncontrollable event, of course, is the child crossing the street. There is no difference at all in what the two of them could have done – however, one seems clearly more to blame than the other. How does this occur? This is the problem of moral luck. If it is given that moral responsibility should only be relevant when the agent voluntarily performed or failed to perform some action, Drivers A and B should be blamed equally , or praised equally, as may be the case. At the same time, this is at least intuitively problematic, as – whatever the external circumstances are – one situation resulted in a death , and the other did not .
The problem of moral luck Given the notion of equating moral responsibility with voluntary action, however, moral luck leads to counterintuitive solutions. This is illustrated by an example of a traffic accident. Driver A, in a moment of inattention, runs a red light as a child is crossing the street. Driver A tries to avoid hitting the child but fails and the child dies . Driver B also runs a red light , but no one is crossing and only gets a traffic ticket . If a bystander is asked to morally evaluate Drivers A and B, they may assign Driver A more moral blame than Driver B because Driver A's course of action resulted in a death . However, there are no differences in the controllable actions performed by Drivers A and B. The only disparity is an external uncontrollable event . If it is given that moral responsibility should only be relevant when the agent voluntarily performed or failed to perform some action, Drivers A and B should be blamed equally . This may be intuitively problematic, as one situation resulted in a death .
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