in shusterman's and, also, dewey's opinion, the eastern meditation practices repair perception for understanding our dependence on the society's moral order. shusterman underlines that even if, as rorty claims, wilfrid sellars's critique of the myth of the given proves that immediate, non-discursive somatic experience cannot be integrated into epistemology, it does not preclude that this experience may be usefully deployed in philosophy as such, because to think otherwise would be to wrongly conflate all philosophy with one of its sub-disciplines, i.e. theory of cognition. and the fact that we can hardly imagine any form of application of the immediate somatic experience in the realm of philosophy is not a proof that this is impossible, but rather indicates that our conception of philosophy is dominated by an idealistic paradigm, naturally hostile to the body as such. the will to change this situation has been one of the reasons why shusterman developed a philosophical sub-discipline devoted to the body and its experience: somaesthetics.