arab leaders and commanders were locked in a battle with one another to prove their militancy and outdo each other in their hatred of israel: in the case of the ba'athist leadership of syria, oren argues that war was central to their ideology, while for the egyptians bellicose rhetoric over israel was an attempt to gain pan-arab leadership — even though egypt did not want a war. inside egypt the leadership was dangerously split, with different factions using anti-israeli rhetoric as a way of faction fighting inside the regime. as a result, there was no effective way for the arabs as a whole to use their numerical superiority in a multi-front war while the armed forces of the biggest arab state were caught between confusing orders and strategies. the israelis worked hard, planning meticulously for the possibility of war with an army that drilled diligently. by contrast, one syrian general predicted total defeat of israel in four days "at most." president gamal abdel nasser of egypt insisted that the israeli air force was incapable of attacking egyptian air bases — in fact the successful israeli attack on egyptian air fields was a key factor in israel's victory. one egyptian official described his country's leadership as believing that "the destruction of israel was a child's game that only required the hooking up of a few telephone lines at the commander's house and the writing of victory slogans."