although at times deadlocked, negotiations communicated via memorandums continued on a quid pro quo basis in which the british had the advantage; if the ottomans were to accept kuwait’s autonomous status and proposed boundaries, the british would have to accept ottoman suzerainty, and in return, the northern islands of warba and bubiyan must be allocated to kuwait, and so forth. the waning influence of istanbul in the gulf forced it to make concessions without much to gain in return. the ottoman empire had faced a number of setbacks in the last few decades—a few of its provinces achieved independence, some were annexed by other countries, or many lost in conflict—and for internal political reasons it may have seemed important to maintain kuwait as part of the empire, even if only symbolically. the ottomans also felt that making this agreement would ensure british support on other more pressing issues, such as dealing with invasion by other european powers and conflicts in other parts of the ottoman empire. furthermore, british pressures led the ottomans to abandon the proposed extension of the railway line to kuwait and instead opt for a basra terminus. plans for a basra terminus created a new series of demands on behalf of the british, including the ottoman renunciation of qatar, and delineating its role in the wider persian gulf waters. britain had wanted to conclude agreements with sheikh of qatar jasim al-thani about illicit arms traffic and maritime peace, and also sought to formally establish its dominance in the gulf. by 6 may 1913 britain and the ottoman empire initialed the compromise and the anglo-ottoman convention was signed on 29 july 1913, exactly two years after the first memorandum.