he says that dewey was wrong to treat his definition of art as experience as a traditionalist wrapper definition, thus making it vulnerable to the valid charges, that it is both too narrow and too wide (there are some artworks which do not engender aesthetic experiences and, conversely, in some cases aesthetic experience accompanies phenomena which simply cannot be redefined as art, like natural beauty, e.g.). he further says that what dewey should have done instead was to assign to it the directional and transformational role mentioned above. conceived this way, shusterman argues, the definition of art as experience has an undeniable value because even though it cannot embrace the whole extension of the concept of art it "underlines a crucial background condition, direction, and valued goal of art" (i.e. aesthetic experience) and also helps to widen "the realm of art by challenging the rigid division between art and action that is supported by definitions that define art as mimesis, poiesis, or the narrow practice defined by the institutional art world".