both the qing government in beijing and the beleaguered kulja officials asked the russians for assistance against the rebels via the russian envoy in beijing, and the russian commander in semirechye, respectively. the russians, however, were diplomatically non-committal. on the one hand, as vlangali wrote to saint petersburg, a "complete refusal" would be bad for russia's relations with beijing; on the other, russian generals in central asia generally felt that providing china with serious assistance against xinjiang's muslims would do nothing to improve russia's problems with its own new muslim subjects. were the revolt to succeed and lead to the creation of a permanent hui state, having been on the qing side of the former conflict would offer russia no benefit in its relations with that new neighbor. the decision was thus made in saint petersburg in 1865 to avoid offering any serious help to the qing, beyond agreeing to train chinese soldiers in siberiashould they send anyand to sell some grain to the defenders of kuldja on credit. the main priority of the russian government remained guarding its border with china and preventing any possibility of the spread of the revolt into russia's own domain.