in a critique of clark's "supersizing the mind", lawrence shapiro and shannon spaulding, of the university of wisconsin-madison, touch upon this criticism from scholars who challenge extended cognition. they describe the argument against clark being that "...cognitive routines involving biological memory and those involving external stores of information are importantly different." essentially they are claiming that the way someone stores memory externally is separate from their biological cognition. for example, if inga were to use a notepad, it would function as an extension of her compression as her thought process would follow clark's description of dynamic loops that return to the mind in a cycle. however, when otto uses the notepad has a way to retain his memory, whatever thoughts he records will not follow back and will become disconnected from his biological mind. in this respect, parts of otto's mind would essentially "exist outside his brain," meaning that the comparison between inga and otto may not be reliant as they appear to function differently in clark's own theory.