robert e. lee had several choices to consider for his next move. his order of the previous evening that ewell occupy culp's hill or cemetery hill "if practicable" was not realized, and the union army was now in strong defensive positions with compact interior lines. his senior subordinate, longstreet, counseled a strategic move—the army should leave its current position, swing around the union left flank, and interpose itself on meade's lines of communication, inviting an attack by meade that could be received on advantageous ground. longstreet argued that this was the entire point of the gettysburg campaign, to move strategically into enemy territory but fight only defensive battles there. lee rejected this argument because he was concerned about the morale of his soldiers having to give up the ground for which they fought so hard the day before. he wanted to retain the initiative and had a high degree of confidence in the ability of his army to succeed in any endeavor, an opinion bolstered by their spectacular victories the previous day and at chancellorsville. he was therefore determined to attack on july 2.