starting production in 1988, the factory soon experienced numerous cost overruns, inflating the price of each tank to a level beyond the cost of buying complete tanks—the initial production run was estimated to cost us$2.7 billion versus us$1.9 billion for purchasing tanks directly from the united states via general dynamics. egyptian defense officials believed these additional costs were of no concern, stating that the factory "...serves other egyptian goals such as economic development, modernization of the tank fleet, self-sufficiency in tank production..." however, in a review of the program, the general accounting office (now the government accountability office) noted that egypt's purported gains in self-sufficiency were limited because the united states, citing security issues, would not part with key pieces of technology needed to manufacture the bulk of the tank's components, including the armor, fire-control system, and engine. egyptian input in the production process was originally planned increase over the course of six phases, with later phases including the transfer of technologies needed to manufacture more advanced portions of the vehicle; however, the cost increases and the lack of technology transfers eventually halted the advancement of these phases, leaving the factory in a position where it only had the capability to produce the simplest parts of the tank and had to acquire all other parts from us-based companies. as a consequence, american officials estimated that egypt would only be able to indigenously produce 19% of the tank's parts.