a memorandum had been submitted to the australian war cabinet in february 1942 (after menzies, fadden, and the united australia party-country party coalition had moved to opposition), where the general officer commanding-in-chief of the home forces, lieutenant-general iven mackay, had advocated that in the event of an invasion, the majority of available australian forces be concentrated in the area between brisbane and melbourne, where most of the nation's industrial capability was located. mackay had previously been instructed to prioritise the regions around sydney and newcastle, with darwin as a secondary priority, and had to consider the fact that a large portion of australia's military and naval forces were deployed overseas. ward's theory was based on an incomplete understanding of this plan (which had been submitted to and rejected by ward's own government, catered for the defence of strategic northern locations, including darwin and townsville, and instead of simply abandoning the rest of the country to the japanese, advocated a scorched earth policy and guerrilla warfare to slow invaders until other forces could be deployed), along with public knowledge of evacuation plans for regions of queensland (which, instead of a total evacuation south, was to clear potential battle sites of civilians).