This thesis is a case study of Federal Nigeria's foreign policy for the period 1960-66. Concerned with the major factors which determined that policy, it explores the following questions: Which of the two sets of omnibus factors - the economic and the non-economic - had greater relative significance in fashioning Nigeria's relationship with the outside world? What was the nature and strength of the main non-economic forces? How, why and where did they propel Lagos' external policy? Was the foreign policy of Nigeria's First Republic actually a true "reflection...[of]...that pattern of peaceful change, accomodation and compromise that has charactarised Nigerian political evolution since the end of the second world war as many Western observers were inclined to believe prior to the military overthrow of the civilian government in January 1966? The thesis involves firstly a delineation of the Nigerian government's transactions with other states, followed by an analysis of the main operative economic and non-economic factors which moulded the government's policy. Chapter 1 sets the stage by highlighting the degree to which Nigerian economic performance relied on Foreign Trade. Chapters 2-8 constitute the main body of the study, and Chapter 9 concludes the exercise. It is argued that although economic considerations were significant, non-economic factors had greater relativs deteraining influence. Nigeria's colonial history, the ideological preferences of the elites, and the dominant position of the Muslim North in the Federal Government pro-pelled the country towards a conservation foreign policy posture in the immediate post-independence period. However, the basically unstable domestic political situation was a paramount concern throughout and this counselled a caution policy in marked contrast to the government's ambitions for leadership in Africa. Eventually these contradictory impulses progressively inducted policy modifications