The preceding analysis investigated private interest groups’ behaviour towards 
monetary policy makers and central banks, exploring the extent to which they seek to 
influence monetary policy and their motivations for doing so or not. Where evidence 
of interest group activity with respect to monetary decisions was found, the study 
identified the ways in which groups communicate with policy makers. 

Considering the importance of monetary policies for an economy as a whole and 
individual firms and households in particular, the low level of interest group activity 
observed in practice appears puzzling at first sight. However, the theoretical analysis 
above suggests that there may, in fact, be good reasons for interest group activity to 
keep a low profile with regard to monetary policymaking. 

In order to explain the conundrum, a micro-behavioural approach has been suggested 
with the aim of investigating the basic incentives for individuals and interest groups in 
the private sector to take political action on monetary questions or to refrain from 
doing so. The decision whether to take political action or not has been presented as a 
cost-benefit analysis, weighing the expected benefits of identifying, aggregating and 
mediating individual and group interests against the potential costs. The determinants 
of costs and benefits have been analysed with respect to the issue, institutional, and 
group contexts from which they originate