prompt:
Chapter: Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the
Progress of Population Demands.

Considered For the Independent Journal Wednesday, February 20, 1788.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am
to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will
not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may
demand.

It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would have
great weight. The following observations will show that, like most other
objections against the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial
view of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures
every object which is beheld.

1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the
federal Constitution will not suffer by a comparison with the State
constitutions, in the security provided for a gradual augmentation of
the number of representatives. The number which is to prevail in the
first instance is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to
the short term of three years.

Within every successive term of ten years a census of inhabitants is to
be repeated. The unequivocal objects of these regulations are, first, to
readjust, from time to time, the apportionment of representatives to the
number of inhabitants, under the single exception that each State shall
have one representative at least; secondly, to augment the number of
representatives at the same periods, under the sole limitation that the
whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants.
If we review the constitutions of the several States, we shall find that
some of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject,
that others correspond pretty much on this point with the federal
Constitution, and that the most effectual security in any of them is
resolvable into a mere directory provision.

2. As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual
increase of representatives under the State constitutions has at least
kept pace with that of the constituents, and it appears that the former
have been as ready to concur in such measures as the latter have been to
call for them.

3. There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which insures
a watchful attention in a majority both of the people and of their
representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the latter. The
peculiarity lies in this, that one branch of the legislature is a
representation of citizens, the other of the States: in the former,
consequently, the larger States will have most weight; in the latter,
the advantage will be in favor of the smaller States. From this
circumstance it may with certainty be inferred that the larger States
will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of that
part of the legislature in which their influence predominates. And it so
happens that four only of the largest will have a majority of the whole
votes in the House of Representatives. Should the representatives or
people, therefore, of the smaller States oppose at any time a reasonable
addition of members, a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient
to overrule the opposition; a coalition which, notwithstanding the
rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary
occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted by
common interest, but justified by equity and the principles of the
Constitution.

It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be prompted by like
motives to an adverse coalition; and as their concurrence would be
indispensable, the just and constitutional views of the other branch
might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has probably created
the most serious apprehensions in the jealous friends of a numerous
representation. Fortunately it is among the difficulties which, existing
only in appearance, vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The
following reflections will, if I mistake not, be admitted to be
conclusive and satisfactory on this point.

Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two
houses on all legislative subjects, except the originating of money
bills, it cannot be doubted that the House, composed of the greater
number of members, when supported by the more powerful States, and
speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of the people,
will have no small advantage in a question depending on the comparative
firmness of the two houses.

This advantage must be increased by the consciousness, felt by the same
side of being supported in its demands by right, by reason, and by the
Constitution; and the consciousness, on the opposite side, of contending
against the force of all these solemn considerations.

It is farther to be considered, that in the gradation between the
smallest and largest States, there are several, which, though most
likely in general to arrange themselves among the former are too
little removed in extent and population from the latter, to second an
opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence it is by no
means certain that a majority of votes, even in the Senate, would be
unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of representatives.

It will not be looking too far to add, that the senators from all
the new States may be gained over to the just views of the House of
Representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked. As these
States will, for a great length of time, advance in population with
peculiar rapidity, they will be interested in frequent reapportionments
of the representatives to the number of inhabitants. The large States,
therefore, who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have
nothing to do but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually
conditions of each other; and the senators from all the most growing
States will be bound to contend for the latter, by the interest which
their States will feel in the former.

These considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject, and
ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been
indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should all be
insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States, or their
predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, a constitutional
and infallible resource still remains with the larger States, by which
they will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The
House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose,
the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word,
hold the purse--that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the
history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation
of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and
importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all
the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This
power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete
and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate
representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every
grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.

But will not the House of Representatives be as much interested as the
Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions, and will
they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation
on the pliancy of the Senate? Or, if such a trial of firmness between
the two branches were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to
yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with
those who reflect that in all cases the smaller the number, and the more
permanent and conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger
must be the interest which they will individually feel in whatever
concerns the government. Those who represent the dignity of their
country in the eyes of other nations, will be particularly sensible to
every prospect of public danger, or of dishonorable stagnation in public
affairs. To those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of
the British House of Commons over the other branches of the government,
whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute
inflexibility on the side of the latter, although it could not
have failed to involve every department of the state in the general
confusion, has neither been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost
degree of firmness that can be displayed by the federal Senate or
President, will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they
will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.

In this review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives, I
have passed over the circumstances of economy, which, in the present
state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening the temporary
number of representatives, and a disregard of which would probably have
been as rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been
shown by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks
on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in
engaging in the federal service a large number of such characters as
the people will probably elect. One observation, however, I must be
permitted to add on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very
serious attention. It is, that in all legislative assemblies the greater
the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in
fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more numerous an
assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater is known
to be the ascendency of passion over reason. In the next place, the
larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of
limited information and of weak capacities. Now, it is precisely on
characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few
are known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics, where
the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single orator, or an
artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as
if a sceptre had been placed in his single hand. On the same principle,
the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the
more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings
of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the
slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than
in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain
limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few.
Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, AFTER
SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY, OF LOCAL
INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY, they will
counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives.
The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the
soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be
enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs
by which its motions are directed.

As connected with the objection against the number of representatives,
may properly be here noticed, that which has been suggested against the
number made competent for legislative business. It has been said that
more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in
particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for
a decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a
precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to
some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty
and partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the
inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the
general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures
to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be
reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power
would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege
limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage
of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general
weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences.
Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of
secessions; a practice which has shown itself even in States where a
majority only is required; a practice subversive of all the principles
of order and regular government; a practice which leads more directly to
public convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other
which has yet been displayed among us.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Madison responds to concerns that the number of members of the House will not be increased as population growth demands. Many opponents of the Constitution in larger states were concerned that the smaller states would seek to limit the increase in the number of members allotted to each state based on population. In particular, they feared that the Senate, which gives a disproportionate amount of power to smaller states, would become an instrument for limiting increases in the number of representatives in the House so as to restrict the power of larger States. Madison presents several arguments for why this will not be in the case. Perhaps most importantly, the House, where larger states have the greatest influence, holds the power of the purse. Only the House can propose bills for funding the government. Thus, if the Senate or President tried to restrict the expansion of the House's membership, it could use its power of the purse to persuade these other branches of government to relent. Madison also returns to his previous argument, that the safety of the republic does not necessarily increase in direct proportion to the number of elected representatives. He argues that in a large assembly, it is easy for a few powerful orators or demagogues to persuade the multitude of representatives to support a particular policy that may not be beneficial to the public good.


prompt:
Chapter: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

From the New York Packet. Friday, February 22, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this place,
that provision of the Constitution which authorizes the national
legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own
members. It is in these words: "The TIMES, PLACES, and MANNER of holding
elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each
State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by
law, make or alter SUCH REGULATIONS, except as to the PLACES of choosing
senators."(1) This provision has not only been declaimed against
by those who condemn the Constitution in the gross, but it has been
censured by those who have objected with less latitude and greater
moderation; and, in one instance it has been thought exceptionable by a
gentleman who has declared himself the advocate of every other part of
the system.

I am greatly mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be any article in the
whole plan more completely defensible than this. Its propriety rests
upon the evidence of this plain proposition, that EVERY GOVERNMENT
OUGHT TO CONTAIN IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN PRESERVATION. Every just
reasoner will, at first sight, approve an adherence to this rule, in
the work of the convention; and will disapprove every deviation from
it which may not appear to have been dictated by the necessity of
incorporating into the work some particular ingredient, with which a
rigid conformity to the rule was incompatible. Even in this case, though
he may acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will not cease to regard and
to regret a departure from so fundamental a principle, as a portion of
imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future weakness,
and perhaps anarchy.

It will not be alleged, that an election law could have been framed and
inserted in the Constitution, which would have been always applicable
to every probable change in the situation of the country; and it will
therefore not be denied, that a discretionary power over elections ought
to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as readily conceded,
that there were only three ways in which this power could have been
reasonably modified and disposed: that it must either have been lodged
wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures,
or primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former. The last mode
has, with reason, been preferred by the convention. They have submitted
the regulation of elections for the federal government, in the first
instance, to the local administrations; which, in ordinary cases, and
when no improper views prevail, may be both more convenient and more
satisfactory; but they have reserved to the national authority a right
to interpose, whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that
interposition necessary to its safety.

Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive power of regulating
elections for the national government, in the hands of the State
legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their
mercy. They could at any moment annihilate it, by neglecting to provide
for the choice of persons to administer its affairs. It is to little
purpose to say, that a neglect or omission of this kind would not be
likely to take place. The constitutional possibility of the thing,
without an equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objection. Nor
has any satisfactory reason been yet assigned for incurring that
risk. The extravagant surmises of a distempered jealousy can never be
dignified with that character. If we are in a humor to presume abuses
of power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the State
governments as on the part of the general government. And as it is more
consonant to the rules of a just theory, to trust the Union with the
care of its own existence, than to transfer that care to any other
hands, if abuses of power are to be hazarded on the one side or on
the other, it is more rational to hazard them where the power would
naturally be placed, than where it would unnaturally be placed.

Suppose an article had been introduced into the Constitution, empowering
the United States to regulate the elections for the particular States,
would any man have hesitated to condemn it, both as an unwarrantable
transposition of power, and as a premeditated engine for the destruction
of the State governments? The violation of principle, in this case,
would have required no comment; and, to an unbiased observer, it will
not be less apparent in the project of subjecting the existence of the
national government, in a similar respect, to the pleasure of the State
governments. An impartial view of the matter cannot fail to result in a
conviction, that each, as far as possible, ought to depend on itself for
its own preservation.

As an objection to this position, it may be remarked that the
constitution of the national Senate would involve, in its full extent,
the danger which it is suggested might flow from an exclusive power
in the State legislatures to regulate the federal elections. It may be
alleged, that by declining the appointment of Senators, they might
at any time give a fatal blow to the Union; and from this it may be
inferred, that as its existence would be thus rendered dependent upon
them in so essential a point, there can be no objection to intrusting
them with it in the particular case under consideration. The interest
of each State, it may be added, to maintain its representation in the
national councils, would be a complete security against an abuse of the
trust.

This argument, though specious, will not, upon examination, be found
solid. It is certainly true that the State legislatures, by forbearing
the appointment of senators, may destroy the national government. But
it will not follow that, because they have a power to do this in one
instance, they ought to have it in every other. There are cases in
which the pernicious tendency of such a power may be far more decisive,
without any motive equally cogent with that which must have regulated
the conduct of the convention in respect to the formation of the
Senate, to recommend their admission into the system. So far as that
construction may expose the Union to the possibility of injury from the
State legislatures, it is an evil; but it is an evil which could not
have been avoided without excluding the States, in their political
capacities, wholly from a place in the organization of the national
government. If this had been done, it would doubtless have been
interpreted into an entire dereliction of the federal principle; and
would certainly have deprived the State governments of that absolute
safeguard which they will enjoy under this provision. But however wise
it may have been to have submitted in this instance to an inconvenience,
for the attainment of a necessary advantage or a greater good, no
inference can be drawn from thence to favor an accumulation of the evil,
where no necessity urges, nor any greater good invites.

It may be easily discerned also that the national government would run
a much greater risk from a power in the State legislatures over the
elections of its House of Representatives, than from their power of
appointing the members of its Senate. The senators are to be chosen for
the period of six years; there is to be a rotation, by which the seats
of a third part of them are to be vacated and replenished every two
years; and no State is to be entitled to more than two senators; a
quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen members. The joint result
of these circumstances would be, that a temporary combination of a few
States to intermit the appointment of senators, could neither annul
the existence nor impair the activity of the body; and it is not from
a general and permanent combination of the States that we can have any
thing to fear. The first might proceed from sinister designs in the
leading members of a few of the State legislatures; the last would
suppose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the people,
which will either never exist at all, or will, in all probability,
proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the general government
to the advancement of their happiness in which event no good citizen
could desire its continuance.

But with regard to the federal House of Representatives, there is
intended to be a general election of members once in two years. If
the State legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive power
of regulating these elections, every period of making them would be
a delicate crisis in the national situation, which might issue in a
dissolution of the Union, if the leaders of a few of the most important
States should have entered into a previous conspiracy to prevent an
election.

I shall not deny, that there is a degree of weight in the observation,
that the interests of each State, to be represented in the federal
councils, will be a security against the abuse of a power over its
elections in the hands of the State legislatures. But the security will
not be considered as complete, by those who attend to the force of an
obvious distinction between the interest of the people in the public
felicity, and the interest of their local rulers in the power and
consequence of their offices. The people of America may be warmly
attached to the government of the Union, at times when the particular
rulers of particular States, stimulated by the natural rivalship of
power, and by the hopes of personal aggrandizement, and supported by
a strong faction in each of those States, may be in a very opposite
temper. This diversity of sentiment between a majority of the people,
and the individuals who have the greatest credit in their councils, is
exemplified in some of the States at the present moment, on the present
question. The scheme of separate confederacies, which will always
multiply the chances of ambition, will be a never failing bait to all
such influential characters in the State administrations as are capable
of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the public weal.
With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive power of
regulating elections for the national government, a combination of a few
such men, in a few of the most considerable States, where the temptation
will always be the strongest, might accomplish the destruction of the
Union, by seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among
the people (and which perhaps they may themselves have excited),
to discontinue the choice of members for the federal House of
Representatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm union
of this country, under an efficient government, will probably be an
increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe; and
that enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues
of foreign powers, and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by
some of them. Its preservation, therefore ought in no case that can
be avoided, to be committed to the guardianship of any but those whose
situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and
vigilant performance of the trust.

PUBLIUS

1. 1st clause, 4th section, of the 1st article.

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Hamilton defends the provision in the Constitution for national control over the scheduling and regulation of elections to the House. He argues that if state governments were given control over national elections, then the national government would find itself at the mercy of states. Hamilton does recognize that state governments do have the right to control the elections of senators and that this creates the opportunity for states to delay or prevent the election of senators. However, he argues that this was a necessary compromise so as to maintain the federal principle of shared power between the states and the national government. Hamilton sees no reason for extending this risk to include the House, especially since the House is elected every two years. If House elections were delayed, it would be truly detrimental. In contrast, senators are elected every six years and only one third of all Senate seats are up for election every two years. Thus, even if certain states tried to prevent an election from taking place, it would difficult for them to completely shut down the Senate.


prompt:
Chapter: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate
the Election of Members)

From The Independent Journal. Saturday, February 23, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the
federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State
legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other
side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own
elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended, that this right
would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the
representation. The interest of all would, in this respect at least,
be the security of all. But it is alleged, that it might be employed in
such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of
men in exclusion of others, by confining the places of election to
particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens
at large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions,
this seems to be the most chimerical. On the one hand, no rational
calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the
disposition which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply,
could ever find its way into the national councils; and on the other,
it may be concluded with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should
ever gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form
altogether different and far more decisive.

The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from
this single reflection, that it could never be made without causing an
immediate revolt of the great body of the people, headed and directed
by the State governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this
characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbulent and factious
seasons, be violated, in respect to a particular class of citizens, by
a victorious and overbearing majority; but that so fundamental a
privilege, in a country so situated and enlightened, should be invaded
to the prejudice of the great mass of the people, by the deliberate
policy of the government, without occasioning a popular revolution, is
altogether inconceivable and incredible.

In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations of a
more precise nature, which forbid all apprehension on the subject.
The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the national
government, and still more in the manner in which they will be brought
into action in its various branches, must form a powerful obstacle to a
concert of views in any partial scheme of elections. There is sufficient
diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits
of the people of the different parts of the Union, to occasion a
material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards
the different ranks and conditions in society. And though an
intimate intercourse under the same government will promote a gradual
assimilation in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as well
physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less degree, permanently
nourish different propensities and inclinations in this respect. But the
circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in
the matter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several
component parts of the government. The House of Representatives being
to be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State
legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the
people, there would be little probability of a common interest to cement
these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of
electors.

As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of "time and
manner," which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the national
government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will
direct the choice of its members. The collective sense of the State
legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of
that sort; a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the
discrimination apprehended would never be attempted. For what inducement
could the Senate have to concur in a preference in which itself
would not be included? Or to what purpose would it be established, in
reference to one branch of the legislature, if it could not be extended
to the other? The composition of the one would in this case counteract
that of the other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the
appointments to the Senate, unless we can at the same time suppose the
voluntary co-operation of the State legislatures. If we make the latter
supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is
placed--whether in their hands or in those of the Union.

But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the
national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between
the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of
property, or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in
favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile
interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable
language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the
elevation of "the wealthy and the well-born," to the exclusion and
debasement of all the rest of the society?

If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned
in any particular description of industry or property, I presume it will
readily be admitted, that the competition for it will lie between landed
men and merchants. And I scruple not to affirm, that it is infinitely
less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the national
councils, than that the one or the other of them should predominate in
all the local councils. The inference will be, that a conduct tending to
give an undue preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the
former than from the latter.

The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and
commerce. In most, if not all of them, agriculture is predominant. In a
few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire, and in most
of them has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as either
prevails, it will be conveyed into the national representation; and for
the very reason, that this will be an emanation from a greater variety
of interests, and in much more various proportions, than are to be found
in any single State, it will be much less apt to espouse either of them
with a decided partiality, than the representation of any single State.

In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the
rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon
the whole, preponderate in the government. As long as this interest
prevails in most of the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a
correspondent superiority in the national Senate, which will generally
be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies. It cannot
therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile
class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the federal
legislature. In applying thus particularly to the Senate a general
observation suggested by the situation of the country, I am governed by
the consideration, that the credulous votaries of State power cannot,
upon their own principles, suspect, that the State legislatures would
be warped from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the
same situation must have the same effect, in the primitive composition
at least of the federal House of Representatives: an improper bias
towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this
quarter as from the other.

In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it
may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the national
government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of
the federal administration to the landed class? As there is little
likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for
those who would be immediately injured by it, a labored answer to this
question will be dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first,
that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely that any
decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the Union than in
those of any of its members. Secondly, that there would be no temptation
to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because
that class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a
preponderancy as itself could desire. And thirdly, that men accustomed
to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale,
must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce, to be inclined
to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the entire
exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share
in the management of them. The importance of commerce, in the view of
revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body
which would be continually importuned in its favor, by the urgent calls
of public necessity.

I the rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a
preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of
industry and property, because, as far as I understand the meaning of
the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. They
appear to have in view, as the objects of the preference with which they
endeavor to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description of
"the wealthy and the well-born." These, it seems, are to be exalted to
an odious pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens. At one
time, however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of
the smallness of the representative body; at another time it is to
be effected by depriving the people at large of the opportunity of
exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body.

But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election
to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference?
Are "the wealthy and the well-born," as they are called, confined to
particular spots in the several States? Have they, by some miraculous
instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them a common place of
residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are
they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country as avarice
or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their
predecessors? If the latter is the case, (as every intelligent man knows
it to be,(1)) is it not evident that the policy of confining the places
of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own
aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth
is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference
apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for
those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power
to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be
expressly restricted to the regulation of the TIMES, the PLACES, the
MANNER of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose
or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and
fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.

Let it, however, be admitted, for argument sake, that the expedient
suggested might be successful; and let it at the same time be equally
taken for granted that all the scruples which a sense of duty or
an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire, were
overcome in the breasts of the national rulers, still I imagine it
will hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an
enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force
sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the people. The
improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has been
discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers; but that
the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the
strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment that such a force
might exist, and the national government shall be supposed to be in the
actual possession of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition
to invade the essential rights of the community, and with the means of
gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who
were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of
fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class
of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to
their own immediate aggrandizement? Would they not rather boldly resolve
to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation,
than to trust to precarious expedients which, in spite of all
the precautions that might accompany them, might terminate in the
dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would they not fear
that citizens, not less tenacious than conscious of their rights, would
flock from the remote extremes of their respective States to the places
of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to substitute men who would
be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the people?

PUBLIUS

1. Particularly in the Southern States and in this State.

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Hamilton responds to concerns that the power of the national government to determine the time, places, and manner of elections of representatives to the House might result in the elevation of the wealthy over the mass of the citizens. The fear seems to have been that the national government may conspire to hold elections in only parts of the states populated by the wealthy. This would presumably prevent lower income citizens from voting. Hamilton rejects this fear on several grounds, including the fact that such places do not exist--that is, the rich are scattered throughout the states. Hamilton also argues that the American people would never tolerate such behavior by the national government. He furthermore asserts that the separation of powers between the House, the Senate and the president would make it much more difficult for the national government to conspire against the states. Each branch of the national government is elected by different populations--the House by the people, the senate by the state legislatures and the president by electors chosen by the people. Given the fact that each branch has such different sources of power, it would be highly unlikely for them to all represent a particular class of people or a particular set of interests.


prompt:
Chapter: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate
the Election of Members)

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 26, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections,
contained in the plan of the convention, when pressed in argument,
will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this
qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a
declaration, that all elections should be had in the counties where the
electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an
abuse of the power. A declaration of this nature would certainly have
been harmless; so far as it would have had the effect of quieting
apprehensions, it might not have been undesirable. But it would, in
fact, have afforded little or no additional security against the
danger apprehended; and the want of it will never be considered, by
an impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still less as an
insuperable, objection to the plan. The different views taken of the
subject in the two preceding papers must be sufficient to satisfy all
dispassionate and discerning men, that if the public liberty should ever
be the victim of the ambition of the national rulers, the power under
examination, at least, will be guiltless of the sacrifice.

If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only, would exercise
it in a careful inspection of the several State constitutions, they
would find little less room for disquietude and alarm, from the latitude
which most of them allow in respect to elections, than from the latitude
which is proposed to be allowed to the national government in the same
respect. A review of their situation, in this particular, would tend
greatly to remove any ill impressions which may remain in regard to this
matter. But as that view would lead into long and tedious details, I
shall content myself with the single example of the State in which
I write. The constitution of New York makes no other provision for
LOCALITY of elections, than that the members of the Assembly shall be
elected in the COUNTIES; those of the Senate, in the great districts
into which the State is or may be divided: these at present are four in
number, and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may readily be
perceived that it would not be more difficult to the legislature of New
York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York, by confining
elections to particular places, than for the legislature of the United
States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union, by the like
expedient. Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was to be appointed
the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is
a part, would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only
electors of the members both of the Senate and Assembly for that county
and district? Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote
subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, etc., or in
any part of the county of Montgomery, would take the trouble to come to
the city of Albany, to give their votes for members of the Assembly
or Senate, sooner than they would repair to the city of New York,
to participate in the choice of the members of the federal House of
Representatives? The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise
of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws, which afford
every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to this question. And,
abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can be at no loss
to determine, that when the place of election is at an INCONVENIENT
DISTANCE from the elector, the effect upon his conduct will be the same
whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles. Hence
it must appear, that objections to the particular modification of the
federal power of regulating elections will, in substance, apply with
equal force to the modification of the like power in the constitution of
this State; and for this reason it will be impossible to acquit the one,
and to condemn the other. A similar comparison would lead to the same
conclusion in respect to the constitutions of most of the other States.

If it should be said that defects in the State constitutions furnish no
apology for those which are to be found in the plan proposed, I answer,
that as the former have never been thought chargeable with inattention
to the security of liberty, where the imputations thrown on the latter
can be shown to be applicable to them also, the presumption is that they
are rather the cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition, than
the well-founded inferences of a candid research after truth. To
those who are disposed to consider, as innocent omissions in the State
constitutions, what they regard as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of
the convention, nothing can be said; or at most, they can only be asked
to assign some substantial reason why the representatives of the people
in a single State should be more impregnable to the lust of power, or
other sinister motives, than the representatives of the people of the
United States? If they cannot do this, they ought at least to prove
to us that it is easier to subvert the liberties of three millions
of people, with the advantage of local governments to head their
opposition, than of two hundred thousand people who are destitute
of that advantage. And in relation to the point immediately under
consideration, they ought to convince us that it is less probable that
a predominant faction in a single State should, in order to maintain its
superiority, incline to a preference of a particular class of electors,
than that a similar spirit should take possession of the representatives
of thirteen States, spread over a vast region, and in several respects
distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local circumstances,
prejudices, and interests.

Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication of the
provision in question, on the ground of theoretic propriety, on that of
the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of
placing it in the manner proposed. But there remains to be mentioned a
positive advantage which will result from this disposition, and which
could not as well have been obtained from any other: I allude to the
circumstance of uniformity in the time of elections for the federal
House of Representatives. It is more than possible that this uniformity
may be found by experience to be of great importance to the public
welfare, both as a security against the perpetuation of the same spirit
in the body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction. If each State
may choose its own time of election, it is possible there may be at
least as many different periods as there are months in the year. The
times of election in the several States, as they are now established for
local purposes, vary between extremes as wide as March and November. The
consequence of this diversity would be that there could never happen a
total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an improper
spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would
be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward
in succession. The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same,
assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions. There is a
contagion in example which few men have sufficient force of mind to
resist. I am inclined to think that treble the duration in office, with
the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time, might
be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration subject to
gradual and successive alterations.

Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for
executing the idea of a regular rotation in the Senate, and for
conveniently assembling the legislature at a stated period in each year.

It may be asked, Why, then, could not a time have been fixed in the
Constitution? As the most zealous adversaries of the plan of the
convention in this State are, in general, not less zealous admirers of
the constitution of the State, the question may be retorted, and it
may be asked, Why was not a time for the like purpose fixed in the
constitution of this State? No better answer can be given than that it
was a matter which might safely be entrusted to legislative discretion;
and that if a time had been appointed, it might, upon experiment, have
been found less convenient than some other time. The same answer may be
given to the question put on the other side. And it may be added that
the supposed danger of a gradual change being merely speculative, it
would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish,
as a fundamental point, what would deprive several States of the
convenience of having the elections for their own governments and for
the national government at the same epochs.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: In this paper, Hamilton responds to the claim that the Constitution should have required elections to be held in the counties where the electors reside. This would prevent Congress from forcing States to hold elections in a location inconvenient to the voters, or a certain segment of voters. Hamilton responds that in many state constitutions, including New York's, there is no such provision for the location of elections and that no harm resulted from this omission. Furthermore, Hamilton asserts that there will be a significant advantage in allowing Congress to set a uniform time for elections to be held. He argues that placing the entire house and one third of the senate before the people for reelection at the same time will help ensure that the same detrimental "spirit" or "faction" will not continue for long in Congress. He speculates that if each state could hold elections at different times, then members of Congress would be added and removed gradually and thus make new members, few in number, susceptible to pressure from the majority of Congress to support a particular faction detrimental to the public good.


prompt:
Chapter: The Senate

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, February 27, 1788

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and
answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I
enter next on the examination of the Senate. The heads into which this
member of the government may be considered are: I. The qualification of
senators; II. The appointment of them by the State legislatures;
III. The equality of representation in the Senate; IV. The number of
senators, and the term for which they are to be elected; V. The powers
vested in the Senate.

I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those
of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer period
of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a
representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a
citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The
propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the
senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and
stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should
have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages;
and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign
nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned
from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and
education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity
between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents
may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate
and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign
influence on the national councils.

II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators
by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been
devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has
been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the
public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring
a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an
agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the
authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two
systems.

III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point,
which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite
pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much
discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly
incorporated into one nation, every district ought to have a
PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among independent and
sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties,
however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share in the common
councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a
compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character,
the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of
proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by
the standard of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on
all hands to be the result, not of theory, but "of a spirit of amity,
and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our
political situation rendered indispensable." A common government, with
powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more
loudly by the political situation, of America. A government founded on
principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not
likely to be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then,
for the former, lies between the proposed government and a government
still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of
prudence must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging
a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to
contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the
sacrifice.

In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to
each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of
sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for
preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be
no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are
not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an
improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.

Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of
the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper
acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the
concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority
of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on
legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial;
and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller
States, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and
distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to
peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by
their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of
this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess
of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most
liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be
more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.

IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come
next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both of
these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are
to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be
necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from
the want of such an institution.

First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a
less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may
forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful
to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second
branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the
power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the
government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the
concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy,
where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient.
This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well
understood in the United States, that it would be more than superfluous
to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the improbability of
sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the
genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from
each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony
in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican
government.

Second. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the
propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse
of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders
into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject
might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United
States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position
that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be
remarked is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself
to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It
ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to
hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.

Third. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due
acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not
possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits
of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led
by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a
study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of
their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of
important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may
be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present
embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our
governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than
the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the
repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our
voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many
impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding
session; so many admonitions to the people, of the value of those aids
which may be expected from a well-constituted senate?

A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of
government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge
of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments
are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient
in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American governments too
little attention has been paid to the last. The federal Constitution
avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for
the last in a mode which increases the security for the first.

Fourth. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid
succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out,
in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the
government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half
of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change
of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a
continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule
of prudence and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in
private life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in
national transactions.

To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a
volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a
source of innumerable others.

In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other
nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. An
individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to
carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all
prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly.
His more friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline
to connect their fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the
opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to
another what one individual is to another; with this melancholy
distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent
emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking
undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other. Every nation,
consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may
calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic
policy of their wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on this
subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own
situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends;
that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every
nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils
and embarrassed affairs.

The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It
poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to
the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the
laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that
they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they
are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who
knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law
is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is
little known, and less fixed?

Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it
gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over
the industrious and uninformed mass of the people. Every new regulation
concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of the
different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch
the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not
by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their
fellow-citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said with
some truth that laws are made for the FEW, not for the MANY.

In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable
government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every
useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a
continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard
his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that
his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What
farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given
to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no
assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him
a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement
or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a
steady system of national policy.

But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment
and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people, towards
a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and
disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government, any
more than an individual, will long be respected without being truly
respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain
portion of order and stability.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Madison begins this paper explaining that it will examine four points concerning the Senate; the qualification of the senators, the method by which they are selected; equal representation in the Senate; and the number of senators and the six-year term. Two differences exist between the qualifications of senators and representatives: senators must be older and must be citizens of the United States longer. Senators serve longer and need a broader knowledge of government affairs, particularly in the area of foreign relations; consequently, the framers thought they should be older. Appointment by the state legislatures, rather than election by the people, is desirable for two reasons: first, this type of appointment assures that the Senate will consist of a select group of men, and the appointment by the states will provide a link between the states and the national government. The Constitution provides for two senators from each state. This equality of representation is clearly a compromise between the different interests of the large and small states. In a federal system , it would be unfair not to recognize two opposing principles proportional versus equal representation. The principle of proportional representation is recognized in the House; the principle of equal representation is recognized in the Senate. Equal representation in the Senate protects the sovereignty of all the states, thus ensuring that the new government will not abolish the state governments. It also means that a bill, which must be passed by both houses before it becomes a law, will reflect the whishes of the people and the states . The method of appointing the senators solves another important problem. Frequently, men who hold public office forget their obligation to the people, and therefore, betray the public trust. By dividing the legislative branch into two parts and requiring agreement between them, the liberties of the people will be more secure, and the passage of bad laws will be more difficult. The history of governments all over the world demonstrates that where the legislative body is not divided their partisan leaders often sway the legislators. The senate, which consists of fewer men who will hold their office for six years, reduce this threat. Representatives, elected by the people, serve for only two years; in many cases their private occupations may be more important to them than their public office, and they cannot be expect to devote sufficient time to government or to a study of the laws. Most blunders of our governments to date have been caused by incompetence and a lack of political wisdom. The Senate will not only provide stability in government, it will reduce the tendency of the House to pass too many laws. Unnecessary legislation produces chaos and favors the wealthy. The people cannot be expected to keep up with too many new laws and regulations; farmers and merchants will be reluctant to start new business ventures if they feel that new regulations will hurt their investments. The object of good government is the happiness of the people, but good intentions are not enough. Our state and national governments have paid too little attention of statecraft and the art of government. Fortunately, the structure of the government under the Constitution will help to correct this defect. A society cannot progress unless the government is stable and respectable.


prompt:
Chapter: The Senate Continued

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, March 1, 1788

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want
of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable
member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be
forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the
causes already mentioned, but the national councils will not possess
that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not
less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and
confidence.

An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every
government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the
merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various
accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of
a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases,
particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong
passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the
impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not
America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how
many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and
propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried
by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of
mankind?

Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is
evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous
and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small that a
sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the
portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with
public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may
be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the
community. The half-yearly representatives of Rhode Island would
probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the
iniquitous measures of that State, by arguments drawn from the light in
which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the
sister States; whilst it can scarcely be doubted that if the concurrence
of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to national
character alone would have prevented the calamities under which that
misguided people is now laboring.

I add, as a SIXTH defect the want, in some important cases, of a due
responsibility in the government to the people, arising from
that frequency of elections which in other cases produces this
responsibility. This remark will, perhaps, appear not only new, but
paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to be
as undeniable as it is important.

Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects
within the power of the responsible party, and in order to be effectual,
must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper
judgment can be formed by the constituents. The objects of government
may be divided into two general classes: the one depending on measures
which have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other
depending on a succession of well-chosen and well-connected measures,
which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of
the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every
country, needs no explanation. And yet it is evident that an assembly
elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one
or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may
essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result,
any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be
justly made to answer for places or improvements which could not be
accomplished in less than half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the
people to estimate the SHARE of influence which their annual assemblies
may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions
of several years. It is sufficiently difficult to preserve a personal
responsibility in the members of a NUMEROUS body, for such acts of
the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its
constituents.

The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the
legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to provide
for such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of
measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of
those objects.

Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the
necessity of a well-constructed Senate only as they relate to the
representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by
prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shall not
scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes necessary as a
defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions.
As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all
governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately
prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in
public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion,
or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations
of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will
afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical
moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and
respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career,
and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves,
until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the
public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have
often escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard
against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then
have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens
the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.

It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive region
cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be subject
to the infection of violent passions, or to the danger of combining
in pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a
distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the contrary,
endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is one of the principal
recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time, this
advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary
precautions. It may even be remarked, that the same extended situation,
which will exempt the people of America from some of the dangers
incident to lesser republics, will expose them to the inconveniency
of remaining for a longer time under the influence of those
misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may
succeed in distributing among them.

It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect that
history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate.
Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only states to whom that
character can be applied. In each of the two first there was a senate
for life. The constitution of the senate in the last is less known.
Circumstantial evidence makes it probable that it was not different in
this particular from the two others. It is at least certain, that it
had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor against popular
fluctuations; and that a smaller council, drawn out of the senate,
was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These
examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to
the genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when compared with the
fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very
instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend
stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which
distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well
ancient as modern; and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in
reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight
to this consideration, it may still be maintained, that there are many
points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our
attention. Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be
supplied by a senatorial institution, are common to a numerous assembly
frequently elected by the people, and to the people themselves. There
are others peculiar to the former, which require the control of such an
institution. The people can never wilfully betray their own interests;
but they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people;
and the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative
trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the
concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every
public act.

The difference most relied on, between the American and other republics,
consists in the principle of representation; which is the pivot on
which the former move, and which is supposed to have been unknown to the
latter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The use which has been
made of this difference, in reasonings contained in former papers,
will have shown that I am disposed neither to deny its existence nor
to undervalue its importance. I feel the less restraint, therefore, in
observing, that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient
governments on the subject of representation, is by no means precisely
true in the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering into a
disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known
facts, in support of what I advance.

In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive functions
were performed, not by the people themselves, but by officers elected by
the people, and REPRESENTING the people in their EXECUTIVE capacity.

Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons,
annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. The degree of power delegated
to them seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period,
we find an assembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hundred
members, annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE; and PARTIALLY representing them
in their LEGISLATIVE capacity, since they were not only associated with
the people in the function of making laws, but had the exclusive right
of originating legislative propositions to the people. The senate of
Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the duration of its
appointment, appears to have been ELECTIVE by the suffrages of the
people. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the
popular governments of antiquity.

Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the
Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in numbers, but annually ELECTED BY
THE WHOLE BODY OF THE PEOPLE, and considered as the REPRESENTATIVES of
the people, almost in their PLENIPOTENTIARY capacity. The Cosmi of Crete
were also annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE, and have been considered by
some authors as an institution analogous to those of Sparta and Rome,
with this difference only, that in the election of that representative
body the right of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the
people.

From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that
the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients nor
wholly overlooked in their political constitutions. The true distinction
between these and the American governments, lies IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION
OF THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITY, from any share in the
LATTER, and not in the TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
PEOPLE from the administration of the FORMER. The distinction,
however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a most advantageous
superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to this
advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it
from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot
be believed, that any form of representative government could have
succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of
Greece.

In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by
examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of
the Constitution will probably content himself with repeating, that a
senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of
six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the
government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.

To this general answer, the general reply ought to be sufficient, that
liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the
abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the former as
well as of the latter; and that the former, rather than the latter,
are apparently most to be apprehended by the United States. But a more
particular reply may be given.

Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be
observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the
State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and
must finally corrupt the people at large. It is evident that the Senate
must be first corrupted before it can attempt an establishment of
tyranny. Without corrupting the State legislatures, it cannot prosecute
the attempt, because the periodical change of members would otherwise
regenerate the whole body. Without exerting the means of corruption with
equal success on the House of Representatives, the opposition of that
coequal branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt;
and without corrupting the people themselves, a succession of new
representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine
order. Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself that the
proposed Senate can, by any possible means within the compass of human
address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through all these
obstructions?

If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is pronounced by
experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite
example. The Senate of that State is elected, as the federal Senate will
be, indirectly by the people, and for a term less by one year only
than the federal Senate. It is distinguished, also, by the remarkable
prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the term of its
appointment, and, at the same time, is not under the control of any such
rotation as is provided for the federal Senate. There are some other
lesser distinctions, which would expose the former to colorable
objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the federal Senate,
therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly
proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time
to have been betrayed by the Senate of Maryland, but no such symptoms
have appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained
by men of the same description with those who view with terror the
correspondent part of the federal Constitution, have been gradually
extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland
constitution is daily deriving, from the salutary operation of this part
of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of
any State in the Union.

But if anything could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought
to be the British example. The Senate there instead of being elected for
a term of six years, and of being unconfined to particular families
or fortunes, is an hereditary assembly of opulent nobles. The House
of Representatives, instead of being elected for two years, and by the
whole body of the people, is elected for seven years, and, in very
great proportion, by a very small proportion of the people. Here,
unquestionably, ought to be seen in full display the aristocratic
usurpations and tyranny which are at some future period to be
exemplified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for the
anti-federal argument, the British history informs us that this
hereditary assembly has not been able to defend itself against the
continual encroachments of the House of Representatives; and that it no
sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by
the weight of the popular branch.

As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples
support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta, the Ephori, the
annual representatives of the people, were found an overmatch for the
senate for life, continually gained on its authority and finally drew
all power into their own hands. The Tribunes of Rome, who were the
representatives of the people, prevailed, it is well known, in almost
every contest with the senate for life, and in the end gained the most
complete triumph over it. The fact is the more remarkable, as unanimity
was required in every act of the Tribunes, even after their number was
augmented to ten. It proves the irresistible force possessed by that
branch of a free government, which has the people on its side. To these
examples might be added that of Carthage, whose senate, according to
the testimony of Polybius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex,
had, at the commencement of the second Punic War, lost almost the whole
of its original portion.

Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts,
that the federal Senate will never be able to transform itself, by
gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body, we are
warranted in believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen
from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against, the House
of Representatives, with the people on their side, will at all times
be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and
principles. Against the force of the immediate representatives of
the people, nothing will be able to maintain even the constitutional
authority of the Senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and
attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the
legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the people
themselves.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Madison continues this essay where he left off, claming that the fifth desire of the utility of a Senate is the "want of a due sense of national character." To any foreign country, it is necessary to have a strong, perceptive senate to ensure respect and confidence. Other nation's opinions are important for two reasons: first, that a plan will appeal to other countries as a wise policy and second, the opinion of the world, in difficult situations, can be followed. Yet, however important national character is, the Senate cannot be a numerous and changeable body. It must be small enough so that public opinion can guide each of the members, as well as pride in their actions, because of the great amount of public trust in the body. A sixth defect is the want of responsibility in the government to the people, because of the frequency of elections and other cases. The Senate, however, solves this defect because it is in power long enough to be responsible for the decisions that it makes. The Senate is not a well-conceived idea, however, merely because it represents the people. It is also a good idea because at times the people need to be protected from their own ideas and prejudices. Although people are spread over an extensive region, they can still be "subject to the infection of violent passions" In addition, "history informs us of no long lived republic which had not a senate." They, however, had senates elected for life. America, however, will not follow these examples because they are repugnant to the foundations upon which the country is built. The plan of the senate, however, blends the stability with the ideal of liberty. A senate, however, is still extremely important and necessary because they then represent the people but are immune from the people's whims. The people must be represented and in a senate that sits for life, this does not occur. Some people, however, argue that six years is to long and leads to tyrannical situations. Madison answers, however, that in order for the Senate to corrupt, it must corrupt itself, the state legislatures, the House of Representatives, and the people at large. It, therefore, is not possible in only six years. If the people do not believe Madison, they should look at the examples of the State Constitution, particularly Maryland, which has a strong senate that has not corrupted the rest of the state. The best example, however, is Britain's House of Lords, a hereditary assembly, which has not infected the rest of the country. With the balance of the House of Representative to guard and represent the people, the Senate is a necessary and important function of government that will support the "people themselves."