prompt:
Chapter: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and
Balances Between the Different Departments.

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, February 6, 1788.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in
practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments,
as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is,
that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the
defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.
Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important
idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place
it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment
of the principles and structure of the government planned by the
convention.

In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise
of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is
admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty,
it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and
consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should
have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of
the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require
that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative,
and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of
authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever
with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several
departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in
contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional
expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore,
from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the
judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist
rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications
being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be
to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications;
secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are
held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on
the authority conferring them.

It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as
little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments
annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the
judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their
independence in every other would be merely nominal.

But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision
for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to
the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The
interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights
of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices
should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions.

This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect
of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human
affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in
all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to
divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may
be a check on the other--that the private interest of every individual
may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence
cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of
the State.

But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of
self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority
necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to
divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them,
by different modes of election and different principles of action, as
little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions
and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be
necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further
precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that
it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on
the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the
legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with
which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be
neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it
might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary
occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an
absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this
weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by
which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of
the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own
department?

If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as
I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the
several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be
found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the
former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.

There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the
federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting
point of view.

First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people
is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the
usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into
distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America,
the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two
distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided
among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises
to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.

Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of
the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests
necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority
be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be
insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil:
the one by creating a will in the community independent of the
majority--that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in
the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an
unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not
impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing
an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a
precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as
well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests
of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The
second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United
States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent
on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts,
interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or
of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations
of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must
be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in
the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of
sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of
interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent
of country and number of people comprehended under the same government.
This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal
system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican
government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of
the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States
oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best
security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class
of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and
independence of some member of the government, the only other security,
must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It
is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued
until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a
society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite
and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a
state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the
violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger
individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to
submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves;
so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be
gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will
protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be
little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from
the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the
popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed
by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power
altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the
voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of
it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great
variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition
of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other
principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there
being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there
must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former,
by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter,
or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no
less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions
which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided
it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of
self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable
sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious
modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: James Madison begins his famous federalist paper by explaining that the purpose of this essay is to help the readers understand how the structure of the proposed government makes liberty possible. Each branch should be, in Madison's opinion, mostly independent. To assure such independence, no one branch should have too much power in selecting members of the other two branches. If this principle were strictly followed, it would mean that the citizens should select the president, the legislators, and the judges. But the framers recognized certain practical difficulties in making every office elective. In particular, the judicial branch would suffer because the average person is not aware of the qualifications judges should possess. Judges should have great ability, but also be free of political pressures. Since federal judges are appointed for life, their thinking will not be influenced by the president who appoints them, nor the senators whose consent the president will seek. The members of each branch should not be too dependent on the members of the other two branches in the determination of their salaries. The best security against a gradual concentration of power in any one branch is to provide constitutional safeguards that would make such concentration difficult. The constitutional rights of all must check one man's personal interests and ambitions. We may not like to admit that men abuse power, but the very need for government itself proves they do: "if men were angels, no government would be necessary." Unfortunately, all men are imperfect, the rulers and the ruled. Consequently, the great problem in framing a government is that the government must be able to control the people, but equally important, must be forced to control itself. The dependence of the government on the will of the people is undoubtedly the best control, but experience teaches that other controls are necessary. Dividing power helps to check its growth in any one direction, but power cannot be divided absolutely equally. In the republican form of government, the legislative branch tends to be the most powerful. That is why the framers divided the Congress into two branches, the House of Representatives and the Senate, and provided for a different method of election in each branch. Further safeguards against legislative tyranny may be necessary. In a representative democracy it is not only important to guard against the oppression of rulers, it is equally important to guard against the injustice which may be inflicted by certain citizens or groups. Majorities often threaten the rights of minorities. There are only two methods of avoiding evil. The first is to construct a powerful government, a "community will." Such a "will' is larger than, and independent of, the simple majority. This "solution" is dangerous because such a government might throw its power behind a group in society working against the public good. In our country, the authority to govern comes from the entire society. In addition, under the Constitution society is divided into many groups of people who hold different views and have different interests. This makes it very difficult for one group to dominate or threaten the minority groups. Justice is the purpose of government and civil society. If government allows or encourages strong groups to combine together against the weak, liberty will be lost and anarchy will result. And the condition of anarchy tempts even strong individuals and groups to submit to any form of government, no matter how bad, which they hope will protect them as well as the weak. Madison concludes that self-government flourishes in a large country containing many different groups. Some countries are too large for self-government, but the proposed plan modifies the federal principle enough to make self-government both possible and practical in the United States.


prompt:
Chapter: The House of Representatives

From the New York Packet. Friday, February 8, 1788.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I
pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the
government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives.

The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to the
qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are
to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of
the State legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very
justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It
was incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish
this right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional
regulation of the Congress, would have been improper for the reason just
mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the
States, would have been improper for the same reason; and for the
additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State
governments that branch of the federal government which ought to
be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different
qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule, would
probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it
would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the
convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within
their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it
is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be
established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States,
because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not alterable by
the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the
States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as
to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution.

The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly
defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more
susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and
regulated by the convention. A representative of the United States must
be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a
citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an
inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of
his service, must be in no office under the United States. Under these
reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government
is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive,
whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any
particular profession of religious faith.

The term for which the representatives are to be elected falls under a
second view which may be taken of this branch. In order to decide on
the propriety of this article, two questions must be considered: first,
whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe; secondly,
whether they be necessary or useful.

First. As it is essential to liberty that the government in general
should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly
essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an
immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.
Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this
dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular
degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does
not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend
on a variety of circumstances with which it may be connected. Let us
consult experience, the guide that ought always to be followed whenever
it can be found.

The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the
citizens in person, being at most but very imperfectly known to
ancient polity, it is in more modern times only that we are to expect
instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research too
vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves to the few
examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest analogy
to our particular case. The first to which this character ought to be
applied, is the House of Commons in Great Britain. The history of
this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to the date of Magna
Charta, is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of
it has been made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest
records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to SIT only every
year; not that they were to be ELECTED every year. And even these annual
sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch, that,
under various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often
contrived by royal ambition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided
by a statute in the reign of Charles II, that the intermissions should
not be protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of
William III, when a revolution took place in the government, the subject
was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the
fundamental rights of the people that parliaments ought to be held
FREQUENTLY. By another statute, which passed a few years later in the
same reign, the term "frequently," which had alluded to the triennial
period settled in the time of Charles II, is reduced to a precise
meaning, it being expressly enacted that a new parliament shall be
called within three years after the termination of the former. The last
change, from three to seven years, is well known to have been introduced
pretty early in the present century, under an alarm for the Hanoverian
succession. From these facts it appears that the greatest frequency of
elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom, for binding
the representatives to their constituents, does not exceed a triennial
return of them. And if we may argue from the degree of liberty retained
even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious ingredients
in the parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that a reduction of
the period from seven to three years, with the other necessary
reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people over their
representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections, under the
federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence
of the House of Representatives on their constituents.

Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by the
discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the
accession of a new prince, or some other contingent event. The
parliament which commenced with George II. was continued throughout his
whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The only dependence of
the representatives on the people consisted in the right of the latter
to supply occasional vacancies by the election of new members, and in
the chance of some event which might produce a general new election.
The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights of
their constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was extremely
shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their
deliberation. Of late these shackles, if I mistake not, have been
broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been established. What
effect may be produced by this partial reform, must be left to further
experience. The example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but
little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from
it, it must be that if the people of that country have been able under
all these disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of
biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty, which
might depend on a due connection between their representatives and
themselves.

Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States,
when British colonies, claims particular attention, at the same time
that it is so well known as to require little to be said on it. The
principle of representation, in one branch of the legislature at
least, was established in all of them. But the periods of election were
different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any reason to
infer, from the spirit and conduct of the representatives of the
people, prior to the Revolution, that biennial elections would have been
dangerous to the public liberties? The spirit which everywhere displayed
itself at the commencement of the struggle, and which vanquished the
obstacles to independence, is the best of proofs that a sufficient
portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense
of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement This remark holds
good, as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections were
least frequent, as to those whose elections were most frequent Virginia
was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary
usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by
public act, the resolution of independence. In Virginia, nevertheless,
if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former government
were septennial. This particular example is brought into view, not as
a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances
was probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in SEPTENNIAL
elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are
inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a very
substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no danger
from BIENNIAL elections.

The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little
strengthened by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the
federal legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative
authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament; and
which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial assemblies
and the Irish legislature. It is a received and well-founded maxim, that
where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is,
the shorter ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the
power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In the second
place, it has, on another occasion, been shown that the federal
legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on its people,
as other legislative bodies are, but that it will be, moreover, watched
and controlled by the several collateral legislatures, which other
legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can
be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent
branches of the federal government for seducing, if they should be
disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the
people, and the means of influence over the popular branch possessed
by the other branches of the government above cited. With less power,
therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on
one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Madison explains the Constitution's provisions for electing members of the House of Representatives. He discusses the importance of a constitutionally-guaranteed right to vote and details the qualifications candidates must have to be elected. Madison devotes the majority of the paper to a discussion of the "safety" of biennial elections. By safety, Madison means the protection of liberty from a tyrannical government. Madison uses examples from British, Irish, and American history to defend the prudence of electing representatives every two years. He asserts that such a system will guarantee that the representatives remain beholden to the American people, first and foremost.


prompt:
Chapter: The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, February 9, 1788.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, "that where
annual elections end, tyranny begins." If it be true, as has often been
remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in
reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often
applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not
look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which
this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to
the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between
the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can
bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not,
in this respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within
extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which
may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil
society. The election of magistrates might be, if it were found
expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or
monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation
from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our
attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the election
of the most numerous branches of the State legislatures, we find them by
no means coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elections of
other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods
are half-yearly. In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they
are annual. In South Carolina they are biennial--as is proposed in the
federal government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the
longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show,
that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater
share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either the one
or the other of these States is distinguished in these respects, and by
these causes, from the States whose elections are different from both.

In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one,
and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction
so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the
people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the
government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little
understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme
power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a
full power to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain,
where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most
discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it
is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and
uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary
objects of legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several
instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most
fundamental articles of the government. They have in particular, on
several occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the
last occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial
elections, but by the same act, continued themselves in place four years
beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. An attention
to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the
votaries of free government, of which frequency of elections is the
corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty,
against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no Constitution,
paramount to the government, either existed or could be obtained, no
constitutional security, similar to that established in the United
States, was to be attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be
sought for; and what better security would the case admit, than that of
selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time,
as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the
national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions? The most
simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the subject was that
of a year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable
zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an
unlimited government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be
calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual
elections. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient
to a government limited, as the federal government will be, by the
authority of a paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend that the
liberties of the people of America will not be more secure under
biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those
of any other nation would be, where elections were annual, or even
more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the
government?

The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary
or useful. The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative
will appear from several very obvious considerations.

No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright
intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the
subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be
acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in
private as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained,
or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station
which requires the use of it. The period of service, ought, therefore,
in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical
knowledge requisite to the due performance of the service. The period
of legislative service established in most of the States for the more
numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be
put into this simple form: does the period of two years bear no greater
proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal legislation than one
year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very
statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought
to be given to it.

In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws
which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the citizens
are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of the State,
which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, and occupy
much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. The
great theatre of the United States presents a very different scene.
The laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in every State;
whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very
extensive region, and are extremely diversified by the local affairs
connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any
other place than in the central councils to which a knowledge of them
will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire. Yet
some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the States,
ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States. How
can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws, without
some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the
regulations of the different States? How can the trade between the
different States be duly regulated, without some knowledge of their
relative situations in these and other respects? How can taxes
be judiciously imposed and effectually collected, if they be not
accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to
these objects in the different States? How can uniform regulations
for the militia be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of many
internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each
other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation,
and suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the
representatives ought to acquire. The other interior objects will
require a proportional degree of information with regard to them.

It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much
diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration
of the government and the primeval formation of a federal code.
Improvements on the first draughts will every year become both easier
and fewer. Past transactions of the government will be a ready and
accurate source of information to new members. The affairs of the Union
will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among
the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse among those of
different States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual
knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general
assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these abatements,
the business of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both
in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State,
as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to
transact it.

A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal
representative, and which has not been mentioned is that of foreign
affairs. In regulating our own commerce he ought to be not only
acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other
nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations.
He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that,
as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted
to the federal government. And although the House of Representatives is
not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements,
yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public
affairs, those particular branches will frequently deserve attention in
the ordinary course of legislation, and will sometimes demand particular
legislative sanction and co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge
may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can
only be derived from the public sources of information; and all of it
will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the subject
during the period of actual service in the legislature.

There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but
which are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the
representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered
necessary by that circumstance, might be much more serious objections
with fit men to this service, if limited to a single year, than if
extended to two years. No argument can be drawn on this subject, from
the case of the delegates to the existing Congress. They are elected
annually, it is true; but their re-election is considered by the
legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. The election of
the representatives by the people would not be governed by the same
principle.

A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess
superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become members of long
standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps
not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the
proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of
the members the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may
be laid for them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation
which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate.

It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent
elections even in single States, where they are large, and hold but
one legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be
investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due
effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means,
the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding
it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious
encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining
irregular returns. Were elections for the federal legislature to be
annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in
the more distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must be, the
judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members; and
whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for simplifying
and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of
a year would unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be
dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be
little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.

All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming, that
biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we
have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the people.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Madison continues his defense of biennial elections for members of the House. He rejects the notion that liberty is confined to a "single point of time" and that elections must take place annually in order to minimize the risk of tyranny. He points to the fact that elections occur with varying frequency in the different states without any discernible difference in the degree of liberty enjoyed by each state. Madison suggests further that since the Congress cannot change the fundamental form of government on its own, there is less risk in having elections on a biennial instead of annual basis. Madison furthermore suggests that it takes time for congressmen to understand the complex issues facing them at the federal. One year would be insufficient for acquiring sufficient knowledge to make informed decisions. Finally, Madison points to certain practical issues, such as the inconvenience of traveling long distances to Congress to serve only a one year term. He also warns that one year would not afford enough time to remove from office congressmen who took office through fraudulent or illegitimate means in order to accomplish some corrupt agenda.


prompt:
Chapter: The Apportionment of Members Among the States

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 12, 1788.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates
to the appointment of its members to the several States which is to be
determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes.

It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not
to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to
represent the people of each State. The establishment of the same rule
for the appointment of taxes, will probably be as little contested;
though the rule itself in this case, is by no means founded on the same
principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the
personal rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal
connection. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth,
of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a
very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as
applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is
evidently the least objectionable among the practicable rules, and had
too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found
a ready preference with the convention.

All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it follow, from
an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves
combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought
to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are
considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be
comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property,
and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of
persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full
force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be
offered on the opposite side.

"We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our Southern brethren
observe, "that representation relates more immediately to persons, and
taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of
this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the
fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect
whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of
both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as
persons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor,
not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to
another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained
in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of
another--the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank,
and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal
denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in
his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the
master of his labor and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for
all violence committed against others--the slave is no less evidently
regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of
the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article
of property. The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great
propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed
character of persons and of property. This is in fact their true
character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under
which they live; and it will not be denied, that these are the proper
criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have
transformed the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is
disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that
if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the
negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with
the other inhabitants.

"This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all
sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as they
are the only proper scale of representation. Would the convention have
been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected the slaves from
the list of inhabitants, when the shares of representation were to
be calculated, and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of
contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected, that
the Southern States would concur in a system, which considered their
slaves in some degree as men, when burdens were to be imposed, but
refused to consider them in the same light, when advantages were to be
conferred? Might not some surprise also be expressed, that those who
reproach the Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as
property a part of their human brethren, should themselves contend,
that the government to which all the States are to be parties, ought to
consider this unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light of
property, than the very laws of which they complain?

"It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not included in the
estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing them. They
neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon
what principle, then, ought they to be taken into the federal estimate
of representation? In rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would,
in this respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to
as the proper guide.

"This objection is repelled by a single observation. It is a fundamental
principle of the proposed Constitution, that as the aggregate number of
representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by
a federal rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the
right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised
by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may designate. The
qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps,
the same in any two States. In some of the States the difference is
very material. In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are
deprived of this right by the constitution of the State, who will be
included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the
representatives. In this point of view the Southern States might
retort the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down by
the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of
particular States towards their own inhabitants; and consequently, that
the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census
according to their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants,
who, by the policy of other States, are not admitted to all the rights
of citizens. A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived
by those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that equal
moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the slaves be
considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising
expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as
inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free
inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the
MAN.

"After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the
Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? We have hitherto
proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only, and
not at all to property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted
no less for protection of the property, than of the persons, of
individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered
as represented by those who are charged with the government. Upon this
principle it is, that in several of the States, and particularly in
the State of New York, one branch of the government is intended more
especially to be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected
by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of
government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not prevail.
The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the
personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property
in the choice of those hands.

"For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the
people of each State, ought to bear some proportion to the comparative
wealth of the States. States have not, like individuals, an influence
over each other, arising from superior advantages of fortune. If the
law allows an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his
representative, the respect and consequence which he derives from his
fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the
objects of his choice; and through this imperceptible channel the
rights of property are conveyed into the public representation. A State
possesses no such influence over other States. It is not probable that
the richest State in the Confederacy will ever influence the choice of
a single representative in any other State. Nor will the representatives
of the larger and richer States possess any other advantage in the
federal legislature, over the representatives of other States, than what
may result from their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their
superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it
ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. The
new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the
existing Confederation, as well as from that of the United Netherlands,
and other similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy
of the federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary
resolutions of the states composing the union. Hence the states,
though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal
influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent
and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed Constitution, the
federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the
individual States. They will depend merely on the majority of votes in
the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, whether proceeding
from a larger or smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or
powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner
as the votes individually given in a State legislature, by the
representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a
precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any difference in
the case, it proceeds from the difference in the personal character of
the individual representative, rather than from any regard to the extent
of the district from which he comes."

Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests
might employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little
strained in some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess that it fully
reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have
established.

In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation
and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the
census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a
considerable degree on the disposition, if not on the co-operation, of
the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as
little bias as possible, to swell or to reduce the amount of their
numbers. Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this
rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants.
Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary
temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the
States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each
other, and produce the requisite impartiality.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Madison defends the constitution's system for apportioning representatives among the States according to population. He also discusses the decision to count slaves as three-fifths of a person. He gives several reasons for the compromise: that the laws regard slaves as both property and persons; that southern states would consider it unfair to include slaves in calculating tax burdens but not for the number of representatives apportioned to the states; and that it would take into account the different levels of wealth of the states. Madison admits that this reasoning is somewhat of a stretch; however, it asserts that it was a "compromising expedient" necessary to pass a constitution acceptable to all states. Finally, Madison suggests that by basing both taxes and number of representatives on population, the Constitution ensures states do not have an incentive to manipulate the numbers. If states claim too small a population, they will benefit in terms of taxes, but suffer in terms of the number of representatives they are allotted.


prompt:
Chapter: The Total Number of the House of Representatives

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, February 13, 1788.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms
another and a very interesting point of view, under which this branch of
the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any article, indeed,
in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention,
by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which
it has been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that
so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of
the public interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper
knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents;
thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citizens which will
sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the people, and be
most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression
of the many; fourthly, that defective as the number will be in the first
instance, it will be more and more disproportionate, by the increase
of the people, and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent
increase of the representatives.

In general it may be remarked on this subject, that no political problem
is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the
number most convenient for a representative legislature; nor is there
any point on which the policy of the several States is more at variance,
whether we compare their legislative assemblies directly with each
other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the
number of their constituents. Passing over the difference between the
smallest and largest States, as Delaware, whose most numerous branch
consists of twenty-one representatives, and Massachusetts, where
it amounts to between three and four hundred, a very considerable
difference is observable among States nearly equal in population. The
number of representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of
that in the State last mentioned. New York, whose population is to that
of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than one third of the
number of representatives. As great a disparity prevails between the
States of Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, the
representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents
than of one for every four or five thousand. In Rhode Island, they bear
a proportion of at least one for every thousand. And according to the
constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to every
ten electors; and must unavoidably far exceed the proportion in any of
the other States.

Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio between the
representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter
are very numerous as where they are very few. Were the representatives
in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island, they would,
at this time, amount to between four and five hundred; and twenty or
thirty years hence, to a thousand. On the other hand, the ratio of
Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce the
representative assembly of the latter to seven or eight members. Nothing
can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on
arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly
trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does
not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better
depositary. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand,
the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all
cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the
benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too
easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the
number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order
to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very
numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails
to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a
Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.

It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were
applied to the case of biennial elections. For the same reason that
the limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State
legislatures, justify less frequent elections than the public safely
might otherwise require, the members of the Congress need be less
numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and were
under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies.

With these general ideas in our mind, let us weigh the objections which
have been stated against the number of members proposed for the House of
Representatives. It is said, in the first place, that so small a number
cannot be safely trusted with so much power.

The number of which this branch of the legislature is to consist, at the
outset of the government, will be sixty-five. Within three years a census
is to be taken, when the number may be augmented to one for every thirty
thousand inhabitants; and within every successive period of ten years
the census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to be
made under the above limitation. It will not be thought an extravagant
conjecture that the first census will, at the rate of one for every
thirty thousand, raise the number of representatives to at least one
hundred. Estimating the negroes in the proportion of three fifths, it
can scarcely be doubted that the population of the United States will
by that time, if it does not already, amount to three millions. At
the expiration of twenty-five years, according to the computed rate of
increase, the number of representatives will amount to two hundred, and
of fifty years, to four hundred. This is a number which, I presume, will
put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the body. I
take for granted here what I shall, in answering the fourth objection,
hereafter show, that the number of representatives will be augmented
from time to time in the manner provided by the Constitution. On a
contrary supposition, I should admit the objection to have very great
weight indeed.

The true question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of the
number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty?
Whether sixty-five members for a few years, and a hundred or two hundred
for a few more, be a safe depositary for a limited and well-guarded
power of legislating for the United States? I must own that I could
not give a negative answer to this question, without first obliterating
every impression which I have received with regard to the present
genius of the people of America, the spirit which actuates the State
legislatures, and the principles which are incorporated with the
political character of every class of citizens I am unable to conceive
that the people of America, in their present temper, or under any
circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every second
year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a hundred men who would be
disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am
unable to conceive that the State legislatures, which must feel so many
motives to watch, and which possess so many means of counteracting,
the federal legislature, would fail either to detect or to defeat
a conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common
constituents. I am equally unable to conceive that there are at this
time, or can be in any short time, in the United States, any sixty-five
or a hundred men capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the
people at large, who would either desire or dare, within the short space
of two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to them. What change
of circumstances, time, and a fuller population of our country may
produce, requires a prophetic spirit to declare, which makes no part of
my pretensions. But judging from the circumstances now before us, and
from the probable state of them within a moderate period of time, I must
pronounce that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number
of hands proposed by the federal Constitution.

From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold?
If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable
them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that
we are at this time a free and independent nation? The Congress which
conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous body than their
successors will be; they were not chosen by, nor responsible to,
their fellowcitizens at large; though appointed from year to year, and
recallable at pleasure, they were generally continued for three years,
and prior to the ratification of the federal articles, for a still
longer term. They held their consultations always under the veil of
secrecy; they had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign
nations; through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their
country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case
with our future representatives; and from the greatness of the prize
at stake, and the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may well
be supposed that the use of other means than force would not have been
scrupled. Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not
betrayed; nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular
ever suffered, even from the whispers of calumny.

Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal
government? But where are the means to be found by the President, or the
Senate, or both? Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed, will
not, and without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives
cannot, more than suffice for very different purposes; their private
fortunes, as they must all be American citizens, cannot possibly be
sources of danger. The only means, then, which they can possess, will be
in the dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests
her charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be
exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now,
the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The improbability
of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members
of government, standing on as different foundations as republican
principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to
the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this
apprehension. But, fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still
further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible
to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may
be increased, during the term of their election. No offices therefore
can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant
by ordinary casualties: and to suppose that these would be sufficient to
purchase the guardians of the people, selected by the people themselves,
is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and
to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which
all reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty, who give
themselves up to the extravagancies of this passion, are not aware of
the injury they do their own cause. As there is a degree of depravity in
mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust,
so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain
portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the
existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.
Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of
some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the
inference would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for
self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can
restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Madison defends the size of the House of Representatives. Critics had alleged that there were too few members of the House to guard against the cabals, i.e. small groups of legislators violating the rights of the people. Madison argues that the House is big enough to guard against such cabals and small enough to avoid the inefficiencies and confusion of a multitude. Madison points to the fact that the size of state legislatures vary greatly to suggest that the exact size of the House need not be restricted to a precise number. Madison also introduces the notion that republican government ultimately depends on the virtue of the people. Without virtue, "nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another."


prompt:
Chapter: The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of
Representatives)

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, February 16, 1788.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE SECOND charge against the House of Representatives is, that it
will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its
constituents.

As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed
number of representatives with the great extent of the United States,
the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests,
without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will
distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best
answer that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of these
peculiarities.

It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to
be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents.
But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and
interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate.
An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do
not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every
attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust. In
determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a
particular authority, recourse then must be had to the objects within
the purview of that authority.

What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which are of
most importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are
commerce, taxation, and the militia.

A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has been
elsewhere remarked; but as far as this information relates to the laws
and local situation of each individual State, a very few representatives
would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils.

Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be
involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark
is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist of internal
collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of
the State may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed in
sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, diffusively elected
within the State? Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts,
and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests in
either, which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of
the district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the State,
framed by representatives from every part of it, will be almost of
themselves a sufficient guide. In every State there have been made, and
must continue to be made, regulations on this subject which will, in
many cases, leave little more to be done by the federal legislature,
than to review the different laws, and reduce them in one general act.
A skillful individual in his closet with all the local codes before him,
might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole union,
without any aid from oral information, and it may be expected that
whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases
requiring uniformity throughout the States, the more simple objects will
be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given
to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the State
codes, we need only suppose for a moment that this or any other State
were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within
itself a power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of
local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several
volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labors
of the general legislature, and render a much smaller number of members
sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great advantage from
another circumstance. The representatives of each State will not only
bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local
knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in all cases
have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the
State legislature, where all the local information and interests of the
State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a
very few hands into the legislature of the United States.

(The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater
force to the case of the militia. For however different the rules of
discipline may be in different States, they are the same throughout
each particular State; and depend on circumstances which can differ but
little in different parts of the same State.)(E1)

(With regard to the regulation of the militia, there are scarcely any
circumstances in reference to which local knowledge can be said to
be necessary. The general face of the country, whether mountainous or
level, most fit for the operations of infantry or cavalry, is almost the
only consideration of this nature that can occur. The art of war teaches
general principles of organization, movement, and discipline, which
apply universally.)(E1)

The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used, to prove
the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives, does not in any
respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the
extensive information which the representatives ought to possess, and
the time that might be necessary for acquiring it. This information,
so far as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and
difficult, not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a
single State, but of those among different States. Taking each State by
itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but little diversified.
A few men, therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a
proper representation of them. Were the interests and affairs of each
individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in
one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole
State might be competently represented by a single member taken from any
part of it. On a comparison of the different States together, we find
a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances
connected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of which the
federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst a few
representatives, therefore, from each State, may bring with them a
due knowledge of their own State, every representative will have much
information to acquire concerning all the other States. The changes
of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation of the
different States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect of time
on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly, will be just the
contrary. At present some of the States are little more than a society
of husbandmen. Few of them have made much progress in those branches of
industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation.
These, however, will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced
population, and will require, on the part of each State, a fuller
representation. The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken
care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper
increase of the representative branch of the government.

The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind so many
political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and
which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries,
corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The
number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot
be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of these
eight millions in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and
fifty-eight. Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and
sixty-four persons, and one half, by five thousand seven hundred and
twenty-three persons.(1) It cannot be supposed that the half thus
elected, and who do not even reside among the people at large, can add
any thing either to the security of the people against the government,
or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the
legislative councils. On the contrary, it is notorious, that they are
more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive
magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They
might therefore, with great propriety, be considered as something more
than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation. We
will, however, consider them in this light alone, and will not extend
the deduction to a considerable number of others, who do not reside
among their constitutents, are very faintly connected with them, and
have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these
concessions, two hundred and seventy-nine persons only will be the
depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight millions that
is to say, there will be one representative only to maintain the rights
and explain the situation of TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND
SEVENTY constitutents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of
executive influence, and extending its authority to every object of
legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree
diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that
a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these
circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable,
in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature
concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the
weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House
of Representatives as above explained it seems to give the fullest
assurance, that a representative for every THIRTY THOUSAND INHABITANTS
will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the
interests which will be confided to it.

PUBLIUS

1. Burgh's "Political Disquisitions."

E1. Two versions of this paragraph appear in different editions.

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: This paper answers a second criticism levied against the House: that it is too small to possess adequate knowledge of the interests of the people. Madison responds that the representatives only need to have adequate local knowledge as it pertains to commerce, taxation, and the militia. Other, more minute details, "do not lie within the compass of legislation." Madison argues that in all three of these areas, Congress will have enough members to make informed decisions on these issues. Madison argues that congressmen need to be more concerned with adequately understanding issues in other states and making proper legislation as it relates to them. That will be their major task. However, as the country continues to develop, Madison suggests the interests in the states will become relatively similar even as the complexities within the States themselves increase.


prompt:
Chapter: The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense
of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation.

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE THIRD charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will
be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy
with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious
sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few.

Of all the objections which have been framed against the federal
Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whilst the
objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the
principle of it strikes at the very root of republican government.

The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to
obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most
virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place,
to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst
they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining
rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government. The means
relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are
numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation of
the term of appointments as will maintain a proper responsibility to the
people.

Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the constitution of the
House of Representatives that violates the principles of republican
government, or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the many?
Let me ask whether every circumstance is not, on the contrary, strictly
conformable to these principles, and scrupulously impartial to the
rights and pretensions of every class and description of citizens?

Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich,
more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the
haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of
obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great
body of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who
exercise the right in every State of electing the corresponding branch
of the legislature of the State.

Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit
may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No
qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil
profession is permitted to fetter the judgement or disappoint the
inclination of the people.

If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of
their fellow-citizens may confer the representative trust, we shall find
it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their
fidelity to their constituents.

In the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the
preference of their fellow-citizens, we are to presume that in general
they will be somewhat distinguished also by those qualities which
entitle them to it, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to
the nature of their engagements.

In the second place, they will enter into the public service under
circumstances which cannot fail to produce a temporary affection at
least to their constituents. There is in every breast a sensibility to
marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart
from all considerations of interest, is some pledge for grateful and
benevolent returns. Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation against
human nature; and it must be confessed that instances of it are but
too frequent and flagrant, both in public and in private life. But the
universal and extreme indignation which it inspires is itself a proof of
the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment.

In the third place, those ties which bind the representative to his
constituents are strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature. His
pride and vanity attach him to a form of government which favors his
pretensions and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions.
Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a few aspiring
characters, it must generally happen that a great proportion of the men
deriving their advancement from their influence with the people,
would have more to hope from a preservation of the favor, than from
innovations in the government subversive of the authority of the people.

All these securities, however, would be found very insufficient without
the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth place, the
House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members
an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the
sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation
can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to
anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise
of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from
which they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful
discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal
of it.

I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of
Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures, that they
can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves
and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This has
always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can
connect the rulers and the people together. It creates between them
that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments, of which few
governments have furnished examples; but without which every government
degenerates into tyranny. If it be asked, what is to restrain the
House of Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of
themselves and a particular class of the society? I answer: the genius
of the whole system; the nature of just and constitutional laws; and
above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of
America--a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by
it.

If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not
obligatory on the legislature, as well as on the people, the people will
be prepared to tolerate any thing but liberty.

Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their
constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords
by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great
mass of the people. It is possible that these may all be insufficient
to control the caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all that
government will admit, and that human prudence can devise? Are they not
the genuine and the characteristic means by which republican government
provides for the liberty and happiness of the people? Are they not the
identical means on which every State government in the Union relies for
the attainment of these important ends? What then are we to understand
by the objection which this paper has combated? What are we to say to
the men who profess the most flaming zeal for republican government,
yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of it; who pretend to be
champions for the right and the capacity of the people to choose their
own rulers, yet maintain that they will prefer those only who will
immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed to them?

Were the objection to be read by one who had not seen the mode
prescribed by the Constitution for the choice of representatives, he
could suppose nothing less than that some unreasonable qualification
of property was annexed to the right of suffrage; or that the right of
eligibility was limited to persons of particular families or fortunes;
or at least that the mode prescribed by the State constitutions was in
some respect or other, very grossly departed from. We have seen how far
such a supposition would err, as to the two first points. Nor would
it, in fact, be less erroneous as to the last. The only difference
discoverable between the two cases is, that each representative of the
United States will be elected by five or six thousand citizens; whilst
in the individual States, the election of a representative is left to
about as many hundreds. Will it be pretended that this difference is
sufficient to justify an attachment to the State governments, and an
abhorrence to the federal government? If this be the point on which the
objection turns, it deserves to be examined.

Is it supported by REASON? This cannot be said, without maintaining
that five or six thousand citizens are less capable of choosing a fit
representative, or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one, than
five or six hundred. Reason, on the contrary, assures us, that as in so
great a number a fit representative would be most likely to be found, so
the choice would be less likely to be diverted from him by the intrigues
of the ambitious or the ambitious or the bribes of the rich.

Is the CONSEQUENCE from this doctrine admissible? If we say that five or
six hundred citizens are as many as can jointly exercise their right
of suffrage, must we not deprive the people of the immediate choice of
their public servants, in every instance where the administration of the
government does not require as many of them as will amount to one for
that number of citizens?

Is the doctrine warranted by FACTS? It was shown in the last paper,
that the real representation in the British House of Commons very little
exceeds the proportion of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants.
Besides a variety of powerful causes not existing here, and which
favor in that country the pretensions of rank and wealth, no person is
eligible as a representative of a county, unless he possess real estate
of the clear value of six hundred pounds sterling per year; nor of a
city or borough, unless he possess a like estate of half that annual
value. To this qualification on the part of the county representatives
is added another on the part of the county electors, which restrains
the right of suffrage to persons having a freehold estate of the annual
value of more than twenty pounds sterling, according to the present
rate of money. Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances, and
notwithstanding some very unequal laws in the British code, it cannot be
said that the representatives of the nation have elevated the few on the
ruins of the many.

But we need not resort to foreign experience on this subject. Our own
is explicit and decisive. The districts in New Hampshire in which the
senators are chosen immediately by the people, are nearly as large as
will be necessary for her representatives in the Congress. Those of
Massachusetts are larger than will be necessary for that purpose;
and those of New York still more so. In the last State the members of
Assembly for the cities and counties of New York and Albany are elected
by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled to a representative
in the Congress, calculating on the number of sixty-five representatives
only. It makes no difference that in these senatorial districts and
counties a number of representatives are voted for by each elector at
the same time. If the same electors at the same time are capable of
choosing four or five representatives, they cannot be incapable of
choosing one. Pennsylvania is an additional example. Some of her
counties, which elect her State representatives, are almost as large
as her districts will be by which her federal representatives will be
elected. The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between fifty
and sixty thousand souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts
for the choice of federal representatives. It forms, however, but one
county, in which every elector votes for each of its representatives in
the State legislature. And what may appear to be still more directly
to our purpose, the whole city actually elects a SINGLE MEMBER for the
executive council. This is the case in all the other counties of the
State.

Are not these facts the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy which
has been employed against the branch of the federal government under
consideration? Has it appeared on trial that the senators of New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, or the executive council of
Pennsylvania, or the members of the Assembly in the two last States,
have betrayed any peculiar disposition to sacrifice the many to the
few, or are in any respect less worthy of their places than the
representatives and magistrates appointed in other States by very small
divisions of the people?

But there are cases of a stronger complexion than any which I have yet
quoted. One branch of the legislature of Connecticut is so constituted
that each member of it is elected by the whole State. So is the governor
of that State, of Massachusetts, and of this State, and the president of
New Hampshire. I leave every man to decide whether the result of any
one of these experiments can be said to countenance a suspicion, that
a diffusive mode of choosing representatives of the people tends to
elevate traitors and to undermine the public liberty.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Madison answers the charge that the House of Representatives will consist of people who "will have least sympathy with the mass of the people; and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many, to the aggrandizement of the few." Madison points out that the electors of the representatives will not be confined to certain segments of the population, but will consist of "the great body of the people of the United States." Madison then outlines several reasons for why the representatives will remain faithful to the interests of the American people. He argues that a sense of duty, gratitude, interest, and ambition will ensure that the representatives serve the people well. In particular, he notes that the representatives owe their distinguished position to the people and, especially due to the frequency of elections, will be motivated to retain their support. If they want to stay in power, the representatives must behave properly in the eyes of the people.