prompt:
Chapter: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and
Influence)

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 3, 1787

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like
the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily
persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their
interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect
for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and
uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly
united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for
all general and national purposes.

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear
to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that
they are cogent and conclusive.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary
to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY seems to
be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a great
variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently
affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and
comprehensively.

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the
preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from
FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising
from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it
is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to
examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial
Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best
security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.

The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will
always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the
causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this
remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes
of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America;
for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the
fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to
preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.

The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation
of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties
with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia,
are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also
extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect
to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to
attend to.

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the
laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident
that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national
government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by
three or four distinct confederacies.

Because when once an efficient national government is established, the
best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will
generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country,
or other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies,
or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more
general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications
will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national
government,--especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and
never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in
some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration,
the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national
government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of
individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to
other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.

Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of
treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in
one sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas, adjudications on
the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four
confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as
well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by
different and independent governments, as from the different local laws
and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of
the convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and
judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national
government, cannot be too much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the
governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and
justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and
consequently having little or no influence on the national government,
the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be
preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great
weight to this reasoning.

Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to
resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do,
result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great
number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be
able, if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the
aggressors. But the national government, not being affected by those
local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong
themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its
commission by others.

So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of
treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are
less to be apprehended under one general government than under several
lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of
the people.

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful
violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national
government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort
than can be derived from any other quarter.

Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and
interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the
Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of
the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several
instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper
conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to
restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of
many innocent inhabitants.

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some
States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more
immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be
those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of
apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence,
to excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate
that danger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will
not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately
interested.

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and
settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that
respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly
than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men,
naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their
acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The
national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride,
but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on
the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which
threaten them.

Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and
compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united
nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State
or confederacy of little consideration or power.

In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge,
or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE,
to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to
it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded
or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any
other POWERFUL nation?

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: John Jay begins by stating that for a number of years, the general consensus among the people has been that the best government for the nation would be a national government, invested with sufficient power "for all general purposes." He then says that as he's further examined this matter, he's only grown more convinced that the people are right. For him, the greatest issue concerning government is the safety of the people. In this essay, he will argue that a "cordial Union under an efficient national Government, affords the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad." Jay argues that wars are proportional to the just causes to go to war; so, by examining whether a united nation of states would have fewer causes than the separated assembly of sovereign states, you can discern which form of government would most likely preserve the peace of the land. Jay then tells his readers that America has already formed treaties with six nations, all of which, except for Prussia, are maritime nations and could readily injure the United States. It is of paramount importance, therefore, to maintain these relationships with these countries, especially considering the importance they hold to commerce in the young nation. To him, it seems that "one national government" could observe the laws of the nation "more perfectly and punctually" than thirteen separate state governments. First, for Jay, one government has available the "best men of the country" because it is effectively able to pool the best men in each state, city, county, etc., and utilize them for one common cause. Thus, the administration, the council, and the judicial decisions will be "more wise" in a united government, thereby creating a "safer" situation for foreign affairs. Next, Jay argues that treaties in the national government will be argued and executed in a singular manner, not in thirteen different ways. In addition, because each state has different desires and wants, persuasion that is not truly for their common good might influence them more than the nation as a whole; a national government, in contrast, is never subject to making treaties based on local circumstances. Jay also believes that empirical evidence proves his point: by his count, not one "Indian" war has been provoked by the national government, but several states have provoked such wars, leading to the "slaughter of many innocent inhabitants." In sum, "not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national Government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably." Jay concludes by citing an example from history. In 1685, Genoa, a small state, offended Louis XIV and was forced to send their chief magistrate and four of their senators to personally apologize and receive his terms. Jay asks: would Spain, Britain, or "any other powerful nation" have had to undergo the same humiliation?


prompt:
Chapter: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and
Influence)

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 7, 1787

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people
would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to
by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show
that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be
more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the
State governments or the proposed little confederacies.

But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN
force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war
to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in
such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not
be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes of war.

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that
nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of
getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when
their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects
merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal
affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their
particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives,
which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in
wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people.
But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent
in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are
others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will
on examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and
circumstances.

With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can
supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding
any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign
fish.

With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we
suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as
our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing
theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to
restrain than to promote it.

In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation,
inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a
manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities
which we used to purchase from them.

The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this
continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,
added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address
of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the
advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes
or policy of their respective sovereigns.

Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one
side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor
will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and
us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.

From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent
with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that
jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and
cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they
should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land
and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure.

The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of
these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present,
and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity
for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting.
Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national government
as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of
INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation
consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends
on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country.

As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot
be provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us
inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in
question, more competent than any other given number whatever.

One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and
experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be
found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize,
assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the
benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of
treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular
interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply
the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular
part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or
separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of
system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by
putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief
Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and
thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into
three or four distinct independent companies.

What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the
government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government
of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales?
Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at
all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the
enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would?

We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if
we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one
national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain
as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one national government had not
called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets,
their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let
England have its navigation and fleet--let Scotland have its navigation
and fleet--let Wales have its navigation and fleet--let Ireland have
its navigation and fleet--let those four of the constituent parts of the
British empire be be under four independent governments, and it is
easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative
insignificance.

Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen
or, if you please, into three or four independent governments--what
armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could they ever hope to
have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend
their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their
being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by
a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity
and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have
been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished?
Although such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be
natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of other countries,
abounds with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so
often happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again.

But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or
confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and
money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which
of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of
peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and
compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be
inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over
the general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers
and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments,
and conduce far more to the safety of the people.

But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one
national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain
it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is;
and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national
government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently
regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources
and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our
people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to
cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the other
hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government (each
State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or
split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics
or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a
third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three,
what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable
would she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and
how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or
family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: In this paper, John Jay continues his argument in favor of a strong union under a single national government. He contends that such a united government will be better able to deter foreign aggression, particularly from Great Britain, France and Spain. Jay argues that America's growing economic influence as a trading nation creates tension between American and foreign commercial interests. This tension may lead to foreign powers going to war with the United States, even if the United States gave no just cause for war. Jay argues that a single government can better organize a strong and coordinated defense against foreign aggression than an America divided into multiple independent bodies.


prompt:
Chapter: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and
Influence)

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 10, 1787

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then
forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall
present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and
perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will
secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities
amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two
kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by
this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all
apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS
ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in
this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy
conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and
future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies,
who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO
PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION."

It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at
home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more
to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within
ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.

The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the
best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by
their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although
it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island
should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided
into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in
quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest
with respect to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the
arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies
were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they
were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and
assisting to each other.

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies
arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined
in affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests,"
envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection,
and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general
interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and
pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always
be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant
apprehension of them.

The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot
reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal
footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at
first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance
can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local
circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to
impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that
superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the
government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality
in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be
presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight
would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long
succession of years.

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it
would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the
scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors,
that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear.
Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote,
whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also
restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her
prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern
these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose
confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally
unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing
is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious
jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.

The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed
confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably
more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become
evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and
sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly
did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash
conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey
in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more
delicate neighbors.

They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in
contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would
be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on
the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries;
in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which
some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH
OTHER.

From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly
mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be
formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination
and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary
to put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign
enemies.

When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were
formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces
against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT
NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to
regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities
are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties
be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create
different interests, and of course different degrees of political
attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it
might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the
SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the
NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and
friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would
not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and
fulfilled with perfect good faith.

Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring
nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly
passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering
our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these
confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant
nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to
guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard
against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us
not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our
ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or
compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make
in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under
the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they
pretended to protect.

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any
given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us
against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.

PUBLIUS

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: John Jay continues his argument against dividing the U.S. into multiple independent sovereign states in this paper. Drawing on examples from British history, Jay argues that if America were divided into three or four nations, then it would be constantly beset by jealousies, tensions, disputes, and war. He argues that these different American nations would inevitably reach different levels of power and progress. This would lead to envy, fear, and destructive competition. The different nations would furthermore have different commercial concerns, which would, in turn, lead to different interests. These differences would likely result in the American nations forming different alliances with foreign powers, culminating perhaps in a situation in which one American nation would go to war with one of another American nation's allies.


prompt:
Chapter: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 14, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an
enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of
disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed
to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming
kind--those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between
the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions.
These have been already in some instances slightly anticipated; but they
deserve a more particular and more full investigation.

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt
that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united
in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be
thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To
presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their
existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and
rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of
independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would
be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at
defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some
which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective
bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power or the
desire of pre-eminence and dominion--the jealousy of power, or the
desire of equality and safety. There are others which have a more
circumscribed though an equally operative influence within their
spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between
commercial nations. And there are others, not less numerous than either
of the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions;
in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading
individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this
class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many
instances abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext
of some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national
tranquillity to personal advantage or personal gratification.

The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a
prostitute,(1) at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of
his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of
the SAMMIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
MEGARENSIANS,(2) another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution
with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of
the statuary Phidias,(3) or to get rid of the accusations prepared to
be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the
purchase of popularity,(4) or from a combination of all these causes,
was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in
the Grecian annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after
various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the
ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.

The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,
permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,(5) entertained
hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the
influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and interest of
this enterprising and powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a
war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the
hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the kingdom over which
he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there
ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal
monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was
at once the instrument and the dupe.

The influence which the bigotry of one female,(6) the petulance of
another,(7) and the cabals of a third,(8) had in the contemporary
policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe,
are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally
known.

To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in
the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic,
according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.
Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from
which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of
instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature will
not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either of the
reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a reference, tending
to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be made to a
case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a
DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would
have been plunged into a civil war.

But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this
particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men,
who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the
States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of
republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency
to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors
which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours,
will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with
each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate
a spirit of mutual amity and concord.

Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of
all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If
this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not,
on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and
immediate interest, have a more active and imperious control over human
conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility or
justice? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than
monarchies? Are not the former administered by MEN as well as the
latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires
of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are
not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage,
resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent
propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often
governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are,
of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those
individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change
the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and
enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been
as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the
prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity
of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many
instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the
one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of human
opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.

Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them,
Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often
engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies
of the same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp;
and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.

Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very
war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into
the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn,
gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a
conquest of the commonwealth.

Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition,
till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II.
found means to accomplish that formidable league,(9) which gave a deadly
blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic.

The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes,
took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had
furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were
among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV.

In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose
one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the
predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have
been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom
has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people.

There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as
royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their
representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs
into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and
sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. In that memorable
struggle for superiority between the rival houses of AUSTRIA and
BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the
antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the ambition,
or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader,(10) protracted the war
beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable
time in opposition to the views of the court.

The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure
grown out of commercial considerations,--the desire of supplanting and
the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic
or in the general advantages of trade and navigation, and sometimes even
the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other nations
without their consent.

The last war but between Britain and Spain sprang from the attempts of
the British merchants to prosecute an illicit trade with the Spanish
main. These unjustifiable practices on their part produced severity on
the part of the Spaniards toward the subjects of Great Britain which
were not more justifiable, because they exceeded the bounds of a just
retaliation and were chargeable with inhumanity and cruelty. Many of
the English who were taken on the Spanish coast were sent to dig in the
mines of Potosi; and by the usual progress of a spirit of resentment,
the innocent were, after a while, confounded with the guilty in
indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of the merchants kindled a
violent flame throughout the nation, which soon after broke out in the
House of Commons, and was communicated from that body to the ministry.
Letters of reprisal were granted, and a war ensued, which in its
consequences overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years before
had been formed with sanguine expectations of the most beneficial
fruits.

From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose
situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason
can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an
expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present
confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough
of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused
us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and
evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from
the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim
for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the
other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of
perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?

Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and
credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and
ill administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State
of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and
the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare--!

So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the
tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord
and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has
from long observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom
in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations
natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject
to this effect: "NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies
of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a
CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences
that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which
disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their
neighbors."(11) This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and
suggests the REMEDY.

PUBLIUS

1. Aspasia, vide "Plutarch's Life of Pericles."

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the
connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.

5. Worn by the popes.

6. Madame de Maintenon.

7. Duchess of Marlborough.

8. Madame de Pompadour.

9. The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of France,
the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and states.

10. The Duke of Marlborough.

11. Vide "Principes des Negociations" par l'Abbe de Mably.

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: To answer critics who claim that states will prevent conflict between themselves because of the power of commerce, Hamilton argues that it is not in the interest of any nation to be philanthropic with their neighbors. Republics, just like monarchies, are addicted to war. Both types of government are administered by men, and they can just as easily fall whim to the wants of a few men, just as the republics of Athens, Venice, Holland, and Carthage--commercial republics all--likewise fell. Most importantly, Britain, which is extremely active in commerce, has been one of the most frequently warring nations in history. Hamilton also warns against popular wars, such as in the case of Austria, which fought many popular wars based on the idea of commerce. Hamilton concludes by advising the people to cease to be foolish. The recent events and the depth to which the country has sunk should serve as warning. He then quotes another source, claiming that "Neighboring States are naturally enemies of each other."


prompt:
Chapter: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between
the States)

For the Independent Journal. Thursday, November 15, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements
could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It
would be a full answer to this question to say--precisely the same
inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the
nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits
of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within
our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the
restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience
to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those
restraints were removed.

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most
fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest
proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this
origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have a vast
tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States.
There still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them,
and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar
claims between them all. It is well known that they have heretofore had
serious and animated discussion concerning the rights to the lands which
were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went
under the name of crown lands. The States within the limits of whose
colonial governments they were comprised have claimed them as their
property, the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this
article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of the
Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through the
submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction
of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the treaty of
peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an acquisition to the
Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent
policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the
States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the
whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a continuation of the
Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination of the
dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this
dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a
large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if
not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that
were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle
of federal compromise, would be apt when the motive of the grant had
ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States would no
doubt insist on a proportion, by right of representation. Their argument
would be, that a grant, once made, could not be revoked; and that the
justice of participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint
efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to
probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a
right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty
to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different
principles would be set up by different States for this purpose; and as
they would affect the opposite interests of the parties, they might not
easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.

In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample
theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to
interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to
the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword
would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences.
The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania,
respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in
expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of
confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision
of a federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided
in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications
of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be
entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, something
like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have
sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure
on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself
to have been injured by the decision; and States, like individuals,
acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage.

Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions
which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and
the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as
well from States not interested as from those which were interested
in the claim; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the
Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert
its rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one,
a jealousy entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest
of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had
obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that district.
Even the States which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours,
seemed more solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish
their own pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and
Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions, discovered
a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed
by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that State, entered
deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an
unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review of
these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be
likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their
unpropitious destiny to become disunited.

The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of
contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous
of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing
in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State,
or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy
peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and
exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on
the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since
the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to
those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent
of this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE
THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT
SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of enterprise,
which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion
of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this
unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by
which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to
their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one side,
the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally
lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.

The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others
tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently
submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New
York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this
kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on
her importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the
inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what
we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this
advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them
should be remitted in favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would
it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the way, to
distinguish the customers in our own markets. Would Connecticut and New
Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit?
Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed
enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived
an advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so
oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent
weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of
New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity alone will
answer in the affirmative.

The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision
between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the
first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would be
alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible
to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is
scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real
objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse
interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the
States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some
of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit,
or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the
question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of
the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the
difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of whose
citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State
in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some
equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of the former
would excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule
would, in the meantime, be postponed by real differences of opinion and
affected delays. The citizens of the States interested would clamour;
foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands,
and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency
of external invasion and internal contention.

Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the
apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule
agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon
some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would
naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as
naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an
increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible
a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their contributions, not
to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these States
with their engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and
altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the
equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments on the part
of some of the States would result from a diversity of other causes--the
real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of their finances;
accidental disorders in the management of the government; and, in
addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with
money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced
them, and interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies,
from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations,
and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the
tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions
for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident
benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is
nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.

Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions
on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may
be considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not
authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would
preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if
unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in
too many instances disgracing their several codes. We have observed the
disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of
the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we
reasonably infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a
war, not of PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious
breaches of moral obligation and social justice.

The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States
or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this
situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded
in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part
of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if
not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league,
offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring
alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of
European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the
parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to
the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them
all. Divide et impera(1) must be the motto of every nation that either
hates or fears us.(2)

PUBLIUS

1. Divide and command.

2. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as
possible be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them four
times a week--on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the
Daily Advertiser.

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: In this paper, Alexander Hamilton continues his argument for a union over a system of multiple, independent American sovereignties. Hamilton argues that if the American states are not united under a single national government they will have the same inducements to go to war with each other as all other neighboring nations in the world. In particular, he details how territorial disputes, commercial competition, and management of the public debt could all lead to conflicts between the states. He concludes by arguing that all these sources of conflict would ultimately cause America to be weak, disunited, and at great risk of falling prey to the "artifices and machinations" of foreign powers.


prompt:
Chapter: The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 20, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States,
in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be
formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to
those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with
each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not
united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some
of the consequences that would attend such a situation.

War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence,
would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is
in those countries where regular military establishments have long
obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent
of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy,
have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of
rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that
rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their
introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends.
The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places,
which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two
or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country.
Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and
delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would
penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as
intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively
small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid
of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises
of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter
of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires
overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide
nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and
little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy
of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible.
The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open
to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with
little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests
would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore,
would be desultory and predatory. PLUNDER and devastation ever march in
the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the
principal figure in the events which would characterize our military
exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not
long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful
director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will,
after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life
and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant
on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to
liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a
tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe,
they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the
correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies,
it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it
is therefore inferred that they may exist under it.(1) Their existence,
however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most,
problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied,
must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent
war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant
preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or
confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon
an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to
supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular
and effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by
fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to
strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their
constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It
is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the
legislative authority.

The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or
confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors.
Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous
governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often
triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural strength,
which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the
safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them
long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They
would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had been
effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus, we
should, in a little time, see established in every part of this country
the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old
World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our
reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are
accommodated to this standard.

These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative
defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the
hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they
are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of
human affairs.

It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did
not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often
distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally
satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of
the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain,
and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are
incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the
true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue,
which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver
and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the
offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have
produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered
disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the
inseparable companions of frequent hostility.

There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a
country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in
one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them.
The rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if they are even so
inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be
maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely,
if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the people are in
no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not
accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil
state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the
principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army
renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it;
and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for
protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the
soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a
necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may
be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.

The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to
suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it
will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of
the great body of the people.

In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this
happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to
be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for
instant defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the
importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of
the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The
inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably
subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to
weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are
brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but
as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of
considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is
very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make
a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military
power.

The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An
insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure
against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity
of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head
against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time to rally and
embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No motive of national
policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger
number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has been, for a
long time past, little room for the operation of the other causes, which
have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war. This peculiar
felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve
the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the
prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had been
situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have
been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at home
coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like
them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute
power of a single man. It is possible, though not easy, that the people
of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by
the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually
kept up within the kingdom.

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a
great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to
continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any
dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this
position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited,
and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most
probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies,
we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the
continental powers of Europe--our liberties would be a prey to the means
of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It
deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and
honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and
solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this
interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and
trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with
trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in
all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that
flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries
would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real,
certain, and formidable.

PUBLIUS

1. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it
will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been
taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to
be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America,
most of which contain no guard at all on this subject.

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Hamilton begins this Federalist paper by assuming that he has proven to his readers that the union provides safety from foreign attack, and wants to proceed and address some of the other consequences of the dissolution of the states. Of paramount interest to Hamilton is "war between the states," something this author believes would be "accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries, where regular military establishments have long obtained." While Europe has many fortifications against military advance, the United States has none. Instead, the United States has a wide-open frontier, and geography that would create a situation where the "populous states would with little difficulty overrun their less populous neighbors." War would consequently be more deadly than in Europe. Because of this fact, standing armies would soon become a necessity and standing armies, regardless of the form of government, "compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort for repose and security, to institutions, which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights." The weaker states would have the first need of standing armies, an institution Hamilton despises, and would thus, in Hamilton's opinion, make the state governments evolve towards monarchy, because a strong executive is necessary during war. The small states, in Hamilton's suppositions, would have more power over the larger states, and the larger states would result to the same methods of defense that the smaller states first resorted to. Next, Hamilton distinguishes between countries with military establishments who are frequently subject to invasion, and states that do not deal with this dilemma. A country that is not subject to invasion has no excuse for a standing army, while a country constantly under the threat of an invasion has an excuse for an army. In a country where there is a standing army because of the constant threat of invasion, people's liberties are infringed upon. Great Britain is a country in the first situation. Because of the sea insulating it from attack, the people would never stand for a standing army, and thus, liberty is defended. Hamilton concludes, "if we are wise enough to preserve the union, we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation," thus holding off Europe and her colonies and putting all of the states at the greatest advantage possible.


prompt:
Chapter: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 21, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of
the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It
is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece
and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the
distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the
rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of
perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they
exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to
the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of
felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising
from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be
overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If
momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us
with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish
us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction
and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments
for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly
celebrated.

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the
advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms
of republican government, but against the very principles of civil
liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the
order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation
over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics
reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in
a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust,
America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not
less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their
errors.

But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of
republican government were too just copies of the originals from which
they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised
models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty
would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of
government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most
other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various
principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all,
or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power
into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances
and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their
offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the
legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new
discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection
in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which
the excellences of republican government may be retained and its
imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances
that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I
shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on
a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the
new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such
systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single
State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great
Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object
under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the
principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended
to in another place.

The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard
the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force
and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon
in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the
most approved writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of
the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the
observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory
for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of
the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work,
nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they
subscribe with such ready acquiescence.

When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards
he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of
almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be
compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms
of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point
as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either
of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting
ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous
commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the
miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who
have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been
aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the
division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated
policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of
petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to
extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue,
but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of
America.

Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as
has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that,
in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon
the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more
considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would not militate against their
being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the
true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition
to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a
confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of
popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with
those of republicanism.

"It is very probable," (says he(1)) "that mankind would have been
obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single
person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the
internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of
a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC."

"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller STATES
agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to form. It
is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable
of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a
degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united
body."

"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may
support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this
society prevents all manner of inconveniences."

"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he
could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the
confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this
would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still
remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which
he had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his
usurpation."

"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states
the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they
are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on
one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and
the confederates preserve their sovereignty."

"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the
internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation,
it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of
large monarchies."

I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages,
because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments
in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions
which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to
make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more
immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of
the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between
a CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential
characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its
authority to the members in their collective capacities, without
reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended
that the national council ought to have no concern with any object
of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between
the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a
confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary;
they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed
happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the
manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in
their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions
to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that
there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly
shown in the course of this investigation that as far as the principle
contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder
and imbecility in the government.

The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an
assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states
into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal
authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate
organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by
a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in
perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it
would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or
a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an
abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the
national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in
the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very
important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every
rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES
or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON
COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE. The
COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of
the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate species of
interference in their internal administration; for if there be any thing
that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is
the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this
association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate
Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the
distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this
enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the
novel refinements of an erroneous theory.

PUBLIUS

1. "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.

Q: Can you write an appropriate summary of the above paragraphs?
A:

completion: Alexander Hamilton explains that "a firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection." While other republics have provided good examples, they are merely examples and should be used as a starting place, not an ending place. Improvements have been made in political science, as well as the other sciences, since its inception. Hamilton trusts that at some point in history, America's Constitution will also be a starting place for governance. These improvements include "balances and checks," such as elected judges and two separate legislative bodies to represent different aspects of the people. After making these assertions, Hamilton makes an astute analogy, comparing the nation and the states to an orbit of planets around the sun, each still being their own entity but all forced to orbit around something more powerful in order to survive. Hamilton concludes that the utility of a confederacy is to suppress factions, to guard the internal tranquility of states, and to increase their external force and security. In Hamilton's view, a strong government would be able to suppress rebellions in other parts of the country because they would not have the same ties to the region; this is an advantage of a larger republic. He believes that people who use Montesquieu's arguments to claim that the size of the nation is not suitable for a republic are misguided and using the philosopher's words out of context. To try to persuade people that they are wrong, Hamilton quotes the philosopher at length. The majority of Montesquieu's comments used by Hamilton are concerned with the value of the size of a republic in avoiding internal corruption, domestic factions, and insurrections, not the impossibility of liberty existing in a large republic. The author then proceeds to discuss the difference between a confederacy and a consolidation of states. While people believe a confederation to be an alliance with no "object of internal administration," Hamilton believes that this position is arbitrary, with no basis in precedent or principle. For him, the definition of a confederate republic is an "assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states into one state. The rest is left to the discretion of those involved in forming the government. As long as there is no abolition of state governments, something that is not proposed by the Constitution, the government is indeed a confederation. Hamilton concludes his essay with an example of the Lycian confederacy, a government that existed with representation based on the size of the population. Montesquieu, speaking of this association, said: "were I to give a model of an excellent confederate republic, it would be that of Lycia." Hamilton, then, emphasizes that the novelties in the Constitution are not completely new and have even approved by the philosopher most frequently quoted by the Constitution's critics.