text: [EM] Legal Analysis of HR811 & Brennan Center Think-Tank Analysis of HR811
  Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
  abd at lomaxdesign.com
  Wed Jun 13 21:14:16 PDT 2007
  I reviewed, on the Range Voting list, a blog that criticized HR 811.
  On that blog, it was claimed that the requirement of HR 811 that
  voters must be, on request, provided with a paper ballot to fill out,
  would not take effect until 2010. I could find nothing about this in
  the text of the bill, the latest I could find, as reported out of
  committee, which would otherwise be effective for November 2008 elections.
  Does anyone have more information on that point?
  HR 811 appears to be very good legislation. It does not resolve all
  potential problems with DREs, for sure, but for the first time makes
  it possible to independently verify the vote with paper records.
  Once there are paper records, public ballot imaging becomes possible.
  I have so far only seen state law in one state on the subject of
  ballots being photographable public records, in Florida, where law
  specifically permits it. So in Florida, at least, it becomes
  possible, in 2008 if not before, for the public to fully count the
  election, thus bypassing all dependence upon DREs for vote counting;
  the DREs then become only a convenience for election officials, not a
  crucial function because counting errors *would* be discovered. All
  of them, not just those from the statistical checks.
  However, there does remain the problem of DREs printing ballots which
  are altered from voter intent and expression on the machine. It is
  argued that votes will not carefully examine the ballots, and that
  therefore the precedence should be reversed: ballots should be
  hand-marked by the voter and then the data entered from them.
  Certainly some opportunity for influencing the vote corruptly
  remains, then, with the use of DREs to routinely prepare the ballots
  for the voter. Voters, however, can interdict this, and voter
  volunteers could actually extensively check the machines.
  For example, a voter could go in and vote many times, viewing the
  receipt, and then cancelling the vote as incorrect in some way, thus
  presenting herself with many opportunities to view transcription
  errors in a context where she was being careful about how to vote.
  Likewise, it is not necessary that every voter verify the printed
  ballot in order to be able to detect systematic failure to properly
  What has come to me as the ultimate measure to be taken with this is
  to emphasize to voters that the paper ballot *is* the vote, that the
  machine is only a device for preparing it. While it is true that the
  machine's copy of the vote may be used for counting, it is also true
  that it might not. In the end, it is the paper ballot that is the
  legal vote and which will prevail if, for example, the machine vote
  is lost or destroyed, or differs from the paper ballot. I think that
  studies that showed that voters weren't carefully examining the paper
  receipts was that the conception was that they were merely receipts,
  something extra and not important. HR 811 makes it clear that this is
  not the case.
  The paper ballot is the vote, whether it is prepared by a DRE, or is
  a paper ballot filled out by the voter. And I'd suggest that voters
  who don't have disabilities making it difficult be encouraged to
  request and use paper ballots. If enough do this, the alleged
  economic advantage of counting with the DREs would evaporate, and
  what are really more efficient and cheaper and more difficult to
  corrupt systems which scan paper ballots would replace them.
  Indeed, I've suggested that equipment for automatically counting
  ballots is lying about unused, or readily available for use, in
  abundance, it need not be purchased. All it takes is a fax machine
  and a computer, any standard computer of modest capability, the kind
  that you presently have to pay someone to take away for recycling. If
  ballots are imaged by multiple independent observers, whether by fax
  or by using digital cameras, the counting process becomes much less
  critical, since different processes can be used by different
  analysts, and corrupting the images is likewise impossible, since
  they reside in totally independent locations and under the
  independent control of the observers.
  This would free election officials to use whatever process is most
  efficient, since the stringent security requirements of, for example,
  manually counting physical ballots are eliminated. Ballot images can
  be copied and counted by independent teams, with each count
  proceeding far more rapidly due to the free handling that becomes
  possible. However, I'd expect software to be developed that would
  take images, recognize the votes on them, and automatically count
  them, presenting ambiguous ballots to an operator for resolution.
  Observers could observe this, but it is far more efficient to allow,
  indeed, each observer to do their own counting! You can do that with
  ballot images, not with the physical ballots.
  Ballot imaging should make it possible to immediately sequester the
  physical ballots. The mandatory audits under HR 811 would, of course,
  be done with the physical ballots, by hand, thus providing another
  independent validation of the vote, albeit only statistically because
  of the reduced sample size.
  More information about the Election-Methods