theindependent--2019-02-03--Nissanaposs Sunderland snub over Brexit is further proof of the Toriesapos failure to lead the c

Nissan's Sunderland snub over Brexit is further proof of the Tories' failure to lead the country

Almost two thirds of Sunderland’s electorate voted to leave the EU, despite a warning by Nissan of the advantages of remaining within the EU.  Now Nissan is pulling investment on the future X-Trail SUV. The pro-Brexit lobby will claim that this has nothing to do with Brexit, but a survey of more than 1,200 companies, published on 1 February from the Institute of Directors, shows that nearly a third of companies are either moving or actively considering doing so in connection with Brexit.  This is why Brexiteers are terrified of allowing the people to now have an informed say on whether they wish to accept the consequences of the lies, fantasies and wishful thinking spewed out at the referendum.  Governments are supposed to lead, and to lead in the interests of the nation. Focusing on placating dogmatists and fanatics is not leadership.  Cowering behind “the will of the people” – a narrow decision based on fantasies and falsehoods, underpinned by obscure funding which has attracted serious questions – is not leadership.  For this government to then manoeuvre to drive the nation down what is now evidently a disastrous course is simply irresponsible. The Conservative party does not lead. It has shown itself entirely derelict in its duty to the nation.  Sean O’Grady’s article, “Nissan’s U-turn is the beginning of the end for Britain’s revived car industry” (3 February) paints a bleak but realistic picture.  But he proudly voted for Brexit.  Is this the primary problem with our Brexit dichotomy?  One seriously wonders how crazy and serious things have to get before the political classes wake up to this crisis.  The latest blow is from Nissan and the almost certain decision not to build the X-trail model in Sunderland.  We are already only too aware of other car manufacturers cutting back; only a fool would ignore such corporate manoeuvrings.  But what have we heard from the Labour party in the last few days? The old chestnut of fighting for a general election. They must get a grip, the next general election will be 2022 and by that time tens of thousands of Labour voters’ jobs will have evaporated.  And if they do manage to gain power at that point, I predict some crazy scheme of nationalising the remnants of the car industry.  Anyone over 50 should be able to remember British Leyland. For goodness’ sake, are we to have a rerun of the shambles of that era?  A moribund economy, crippled NHS, high unemployment, anger, crazy populist parties, and an endless campaign to rejoin the EU.  This is what we have to look forward to.  It's not so much riots as a result of no deal that authorities need to be concerned with, but civil unrest if there's no Brexit, a seriously delayed Brexit or a losers' vote.  Over the last few weeks, I've heard less sense from MPs on important issues that affect us all than from David Attenborough, Jamie Oliver, Martin Lewis, Chris Packham and Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall combined.  The letter from Amanda Spielman, head of Ofsted, to Damian Hinds (reported 1 February) about Steiner schools raises serious and concerning questions.  It discloses that Spielman lumps all Steiner schools together and questions Steiner pedagogy itself.  Steiner schools may share a common approach to education, but they are not an homogenous group.  Our school (Steiner Academy Bristol)  is entirely free-standing as are all the other state-funded Steiner academies and we should be assessed on our own merits.  We contend that this did not happen with our own inspection in November which we assert was flawed from beginning to end. It is for this reason we are applying for the inspection to be judicially reviewed.  The key feature of Steiner pedagogy is that it is age-appropriate and takes a holistic approach to child development.  Around the world, and in countries that top the world league tables, state-funded Steiner schools are held up as beacons of effective education.  Much academic research now endorses the Steiner approach. Does Ofsted understand this at all? Or do they have a standardised, one-size-fits-all view of education?  Are we seeing a campaign against a different way of educating our children? If so, that is deeply worrying and arguably discriminatory.  Najah al-Otaibi has misrepresented history by claiming that Pope Francis's visit to the UAE will be the first of its kind to the Islamic world. Pope Francis has visited Turkey, Jordan and the Palestinian territories.  In Turkey, his holiness prayed at the blue mosque, and in the holy land, he visited the Jordan river where Jesus Christ was baptised by John.  In Palestine, he visited the church of the nativity, the birthplace of Jesus and prayed for peaceful coexistence, universal harmony and healing in our time.  We face formidable challenges from sectarian strife, ignorance, distrust, inter-religious conflicts to poverty and unemployment.  Let us hope that his holiness's visit will bridge relations between the Christian and Muslim world, and create an invincible defence against those who sow division and discord.     The Independent has launched its #FinalSay campaign to demand that voters are given a voice on the final Brexit deal.      Sign our petition here


unian--2019-10-18--Rada to probe Russian influence on TV, info warfare operations

The investigation will work on repelling Russia's information aggression and target the deals on the acquisition of TV channels.  The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has set up an interim investigation commission to probe "compliance with the requirements of the law in the process of information television channels changing their owners and ensuring counteraction to the information influence of the Russian Federation."  The corresponding resolution notes that the Commission's goal is to prevent monopolization in the information and TV broadcasting market, to limit the influence of the Russian Federation on the information space, and to counter threats to national security in the information space.  Among the main tasks is conducting a comprehensive check of the circumstances of the acquisition, sources of payment and receipt of funds during the change of ownership at NewsOne, 112 Ukraine, and ZIK TV channels; a study to identify persons who directly or indirectly participated in the process of changing the owners of these channels, who are their ultimate beneficiaries, and who affect their editorial policy; verification of information on the systematic dissemination by certain Ukrainian television channels of narratives and messages that could threaten national security, defense and the territorial integrity of Ukraine.  It is also planned to conduct an investigation into special info warfare operations carried out by TV channels aimed at undermining defense, demoralizing Ukrainian military, provoking extremism, feeding panic, aggravating and destabilizing the socio-political and socio-economic situation, inciting ethnic and religious conflicts in Ukraine and other manifestations of threats to information security of Ukraine.  The decision notes that if sufficient grounds are established, the issue of bringing the perpetrators to justice shall be initiated.  The Commission will operate for six months.  As UNIAN reported earlier, ZIK TV was acquired by Taras Kozak, who is considered an ally of Viktor Medvedchuk, Vladimir Putin's major political operative in Ukraine. Thus, Kozak's media assets now include three TV channels: 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and ZIK TV.


vox--2019-07-20--Trump met a lot of refugees and seemed to learn about their crises for the very first time

In a meeting with victims of religious persecution on Wednesday, President Donald Trump repeatedly appeared to be unaware of many of the world’s most pressing humanitarian crises.  Trump met with more than two dozen survivors of religious conflict, a few of whom told their stories — and made impassioned entreaties for aid — directly to the president. As he asked questions of his guests, the president seemed to reveal a stark lack of familiarity with the fundamental details of problems faced by Rohingya in Myanmar, Uighurs in China, and Yazidis in Iraq — groups in crisis that his own administration has established positions and policies on.  On multiple occasions, Trump asked refugees among the group where the conflicts they were fleeing were taking place.  Mohib Ullah, a Rohingya man who had escaped violence in Myanmar, explained that he was staying in a refugee camp in neighboring Bangladesh and asked the president what his plans are to help his beleaguered people. Trump replied by asking, “And where is that, exactly? Where?”  It was unclear if Trump was referring to the country that Ullah had fled or was staying in, but Ullah repeated that he was staying in Bangladesh, and Sam Brownback, the US ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, attempted to intervene by explaining that Bangladesh is “next to Burma [an older term for Myanmar]” and that “the Rohingya have been run out.”  The president replied, “Thank you, appreciate it,” and moved on without ever answering Ullah’s question.  The Trump administration’s official position is that Myanmar has engaged in “ethnic cleansing” of the Rohingya, a long-persecuted Muslim minority group, and it has imposed multiple rounds of sanctions on its military leaders for their human rights abuses.  In fact, just one day before Trump’s meeting, the administration announced new sanctions barring military leaders from Myanmar from entering the US because of their extrajudicial killings of Rohingya. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the new sanctions were being levied because he and the rest of the administration “remain concerned that the Burmese government has taken no actions to hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations and abuses, and there are continued reports of the Burmese military committing human rights violations and abuses throughout the country.”  Trump, however, did not mention these sanctions to Ullah, and based on his questions, did not appear to be overly familiar with the conflict between the Rohingya and the government and military of Myanmar in the first place.  Trump also seemed almost entirely unacquainted with the oppression of Uighurs, China’s predominantly Muslim minority.  When Jewher Ilham, a Uighur woman, said that millions of her people have been locked up in “concentration camps” and that she hadn’t seen her detained father since 2013, Trump again replied as if he was hearing about the crisis for the first time.  “Where is that? Where is that in China?” he asked.  After Ilham explained that Uighurs live in western China in the Xinjiang province, Trump proceeded to ask her how long her father had been gone, even though Ilham had told him in her introduction.  After a brief back-and-forth about how often Ilham communicated with her father, Trump declared, “That’s tough stuff,” and moved on.  China treats its entire Uighur population as a national security threat and has established one of the most high-tech and invasive surveillance regimes in the world to regulate it. The Pentagon has described the mass detainment of Uighurs as “concentration camps,” and they have been a major point of tension between the US and China as they navigate trade talks; Chinese President Xi Jinping has reportedly asked the US to remain silent on the camps should the Trump administration like its trade talks with China to be successful.  The president also had an awkward exchange with Nadia Murad, a Yazidi refugee from Iraq who escaped captivity by ISIS. Trump again did not appear to pay close attention to her testimony, asking Murad where her family members were right after she’d told the president they had been killed.  Trump tried to steer the conversation toward the topic of ISIS no longer being in Sinjar, a town that has long been the home to the Yazidi ethnic and religious minority, but Murad explained that ISIS wasn’t the issue. Instead, she explained Yazidi refugees are afraid to return because of security and political concerns.  “Now there is no ISIS, but we cannot go back because Kurdish government and the Iraqi government, they are fighting each other who will control my area,” she said. “And we cannot go back, if we cannot protect our dignity, our family.”  “But now ISIS is gone. Now it’s Kurdish and who?” Trump asked.  Murad again explained that security forces are of concern to her people. There have been reports of skirmishes in the Yazidi homeland as the Iraqi government works to retake control from militias and the remnants of US-backed Kurdish forces.  After Murad elaborated on safety concerns, Trump pivoted, asking her about the Nobel Peace Prize she was awarded in 2018 — Murad was given the prize for her advocacy for the Yazidis. The group was attacked by ISIS in 2014; several thousand were killed, and more than 3,000 others were taken as slaves, including sex slaves.  The activist told the president she was given the prize for speaking out about her time as a slave and her escape from bondage, as well as her work on behalf of the thousands of Yazidi women raped by ISIS troops.  “Let me look; we’re going to look,” Trump responded.  Ultimately, the timing of the meeting, intended to project an image of the Trump administration’s dedication to protecting refugees persecuted for their religions, was rather ironic. Immediately afterward, the president attended a rally and whipped up xenophobic anger at perhaps the most prominent refugee in American politics, herself a US religious minority. And the next day, Politico reported that security officials in the Trump administration are considering cutting refugee admissions “to nearly zero” next year.


windowoneurasiablog--2019-01-07--Moscow Patriarchate Churches in Western Ukraine Shifting to OCU But Those in East Arent

Moscow Patriarchate Churches in Western Ukraine Shifting to OCU But Those in East Aren’t

Staunton, January 6 – More than 40 parishes which had been subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate’s church in Ukraine have chosen to change their affiliation to the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine, but so far all of those have been in the west or central regions of the country rather than in the historically ethnically Russian regions in the east, Radio Liberty reports.  Four Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate congregations have made the change in affiliation in Lviv, four in Khelmnitsky, three in Chernovitsy, two in Ternopol, and two in Volhynia, all in the west. Twenty in Vinnnitsa oblast have done so as well (  In addition, four communities in central Ukraine have made the shift: two in Cherkassk, one in Kyiv, and one in Dneprpetrovsk. But in the eastern portion of Ukraine, RFE/RL reports, “not a single community of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has declared its desire to shift to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.  This pattern is not unexpected: parishioners in the western and central portions of Ukraine are more likely to be nationalistically inclined and thus respond to the autocephaly declaration by making a change, while those in the east are less nationalist historically and thus less likely to take the lead in this regard.  In the short term, that may exacerbate ethnic tensions and make the two churches more “nationalist” than would otherwise be the case, something that both the religious and secular authorities will have to watch out for lest the Russian side exploit this division to trigger ethno-religious conflicts as many in Moscow have threatened to do.


windowoneurasiablog--2019-09-10--Where Everyone is a Newcomer Islamic Identities in the Russian North

‘Where Everyone is a Newcomer’ – Islamic Identities in the Russian North

Staunt on, September 6 – Many of the most serious ethnic and religious conflicts in the Russian Federation occur when a new group enters a territory whose longtime residents consider the region their own and view any new arrivals as an alien threat. But where this division is absent because everyone is a relative newcomer, such tensions are reduced if not eliminated.  In a new study, Marlene Laruelle and Sophie Hohmann suggest that relations between Russians and Muslims are different in Russia’s Arctic cities because the Muslims there believe that “everyone is an immigrant” (  f Arctic cities have described themselves as living n an island separated fr ntinent’ (materik) – and this tradition continues … Am ng Muslim communities” in these cities, “there prevails an even str  That has c ns between ethnic Russians and Muslims as communities and f r the way in which the Muslim community there has taken shape. The Muslims as migrants “largely h r the pioneering atmosphere f Russia’s Arctic cities, insisting n the fact that ‘everyb  They behave differently and s d the Russians am m they live; and as a result, Laruelle and H wer than in the c lises,” although such c t entirely absent. But the sense that everyone is part  At the same time, the Muslim community, which consists , f cuses less n the l gical divisi ns than d Muslims elsewhere. At the “ fficial” level,” f r example the 59 registered m sques in the N rth welc me b th Sunnis and Shiia and all f ur legal sch ls f Sunni Islam.  Laruelle and H hmann d n t say, but this lack f divisi n is als f und in many ther places in the Russian Federati n largely because S viet anti-religi us eff rts left the Muslim p pulati n with ut a sophisticated understanding f these differences and thus paved the way f r a m re “ecumenical” approach than in places where religious knowledge is greater.  rth are “supra-ethnic.” That is, they accept “every Muslim n n. In the majority of cases, imams and funders may be Tatar, Bashkir, or Azerbaijani, but everyday followers are mostly North Caucasians, Uzbeks, or Tajiks.”  And they p int ut that “preaching takes place in Russian, the only language shared by all these communities.”  What their findings suggest is that except f th sides, the Russian and Muslim communities in the Russian N ther than is the case in m uth and that the Muslim community itself is bec  trends are mutually reinforcing, but there is a risk that the further integrati ne especially as the Muslim communities there continue t  At the very least, this development c


21stcenturywire--2019-04-25--Sri Lanka Supposed ISIS Attack Targets Another Ally of China

Sri Lanka: Supposed ‘ISIS’ Attack Targets Another Ally of China

Heavy security as military deployed to churches in Sri lanka following a string of attacks on Easter Sunday (Image Source: Tamil Guardian)  The recent, tragic Easter attack in the South Asian state of Sri Lanka – killing and injuring hundreds – follows a now unfortunately all too familiar formula.  The New York Times has reported in its article, “What We Know and Don’t Know About the Sri Lanka Attacks,” that:  It is also reported that these extremists received assistance for the large-scale attack from foreign sponsors. The attack has put Sri Lanka on the map for many in the general public for the first time – but for all the wrong reasons.  Sri Lanka has recently and decisively pivoted toward Beijing as a major partner of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. This is despite Washington’s best efforts to prevent it from doing so.  Consequently, extremists fuelled by Washington’s “clash of civilizations” have helped set the stage for growing violence between Sir Lanka’s majority Buddhists and its minority Muslim communities. The resulting violence serves as a medium for US coercion, destabilization, and intervention aimed at undermining Sri Lanka’s unity as a nation, and thus its viability as a partner for China.  A nearly identical ploy has been used in nearby Myanmar where US-backed Buddhist extremists battle against US-Saudi-Qatari backed extremism rising from the ranks of the nation’s Muslim Rohingya minority.  The resulting violence and growing humanitarian crisis – without coincidence – is unfolding in Myanmar’s Rakhine state – precisely where China is attempting to build another leg of its region-spanning OBOR initiative.  Sri Lanka has signed on to OBOR in a big way, with major rail, port, airport, and highway projects all moving forward with Beijing’s support. Sri Lanka is also considered by Western policymakers as one of several among China’s strategic “String of Pearls,” strong points where China can secure maritime routes through waters traditionally dominated by the United States.  These projects are derided across the Western media with headlines like the New York Times’ article, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port” and France24’s article, “In Sri Lanka, the new Chinese Silk Road is a disappointment” – characterizing Washington’s growing opposition to China’s expanding influence across Asia – a region Washington has long presumed primacy over.   Washington’s ability to compete with China regarding regional development is nonexistent. Instead, the US has tried to tempt nations like Sri Lanka with military aid.   AFP in an article titled, “US gives Sri Lankan military US$39 million, countering China’s investments in strategic island,” would claim:  This “free, open, and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region,” is how the US regularly refers to US primacy in Asia throughout policy papers, diplomatic statements, and even political speeches.  It is obvious that “military aid” can in no way compete with massive investments by China aimed at spurring national development through tangible infrastructure projects.  America’s inability to compete openly and on equal economic footing has given way to political interference and even the use of violence.  In Myanmar, the US is documented to have supported ethnic violence for years. The US all but installed current “State Counsellor” Aung San Suu Kyi into power along with her political party – the National League for Democracy (NLD) lined top to bottom with US State Department-funded “activists.“  Despite the liberal facade constructed by the Western media around Suu Kyi, her political party, and factions supporting both – rampant bigotry and racism pervades all three.  Simultaneously, US-funded fronts posing as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have worked to co-opt and wield Rohingya communities as an equal but opposing political weapon while US-allies Saudi Arabia and Qatar have begun radicalizing and arming factions within Rohingya communities to carry out armed violence across Rakhine state.  The resulting conflagration affords the US and its partners a pretext to intervene on an ever-expanding scale – giving Washington access to and leverage over Myanmar to counter Beijing’s growing influence.  And in precisely the same way the US has inserted itself into the heart of Myanmar’s political affairs – it is attempting to do so again in other Asian nations – including now Sri Lanka.  Articles from across the Western media including the UK Independent’s 2018 article titled, “Violent Buddhist extremists are targeting Muslims in Sri Lanka,” even establish direct links between Myanmar’s and Sri Lanka’s growing conflicts.   The article would admit (emphasis added):  Currently, Sri Lanka’s most active Buddhist extremist group is Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist power force, or BBS). BBS entered politics in 2012 with a Buddhist-nationalist ideology and agenda, its leaders claiming that Sri Lankans had become immoral and turned away from Buddhism. And whom does it blame? Sri Lankan Muslims.      BBS’s rhetoric takes its cue from other populist anti-Muslim movements around the globe, claiming that Muslims are “taking over” the country thanks to a high birth rate. It also accuses Muslim organisations of funding international terrorism with money from Halal-certified food industries. These aren’t just empty words; in 2014, one of their anti-Muslim protest rallies in the southern town of Aluthgama ended with the death of four Muslims.      BBS also has links to Myanmar’s extremist 969 movement. Led by nationalist monk Ashin Wirathu, who calls himself the “Burmese Bin Laden”, it is notorious for its hardline rhetoric against the Rohingya Muslim community.  The West’s use of “Islamophobia” to sell its serial wars of aggression and to divide nations around the globe is a classic example of “divide and conquer.  While the West no longer possesses any real means to “conquer” the nations it is now targeting – it does possess the capacity to use resulting divisions to destroy them. If the US cannot hold primacy over Asia – no one will. It is a “War on Peace” waged under the guise of a “War on Terrorism.”  Sri Lanka appears to be but the latest victim of Washington’s now trademark “slash and burn” foreign policy – where it is fueling conflict to consume political orders that oppose its interests, and building upon the ashes ones that do serve them instead.  In the coming days, weeks, and months – not only will more information emerge linking the recent attacks in Sri Lanka to Washington, Riyadh, and Doha’s global network of terrorism – but additional pressure will also be mounted upon Sri Lanka to divest from Beijing and pivot back toward the West.  In reality – Sri Lanka’s violence is an artificial construct carried out by a tiny minority of extremists on either side of an equally artificial ethno-religious divide. The nation and the region must unite in purpose – as peace and stability benefit them all – while chaos benefits only a handful of waning interests from afar.  ***   Author Tony Cartalucci, Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer and special contributor to 21st Century Wire, and whose work can be found at a number of popular news and analysis outlets the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.


21stcenturywire--2019-06-29--Istanbul Election Re-Run The Culmination of an AKP Policy of Sunnification

İstanbul Election Re-Run: The Culmination of an AKP Policy of ‘Sunnification’

The Justice and Development Party (or AKP, represented by the colour yellow) has been ruling Turkey throughout most of  the 21st century, a fact that might have led some to forget that other political parties do exist as well in today’s Turkey: even Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party (or CHP, represented by the colour red), the main opposition, but also the National Movement Party (or MHP, represented by the colour blue), the AKP’s recent Islamofascist friend and ally. These three parties, in conjunction with the Kurds, represented by the proscribed terror group PKK (or Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê meaning Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and the political party HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party, represented by the colour purple), dominate the country’s political discourse.  On 31 March 2019, Turkey held nationwide local elections . . . elections that once again saw the ruling AKP carry the day – with two notable exceptions, however: the metropolitan municipalities of Ankara and İstanbul were won by candidates running for the opposition CHP. And particularly, the loss of the latter was a severe blow for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the AKP’s party leader and the nation’s first popularly elected Absolute President (or Prez). As a result, though quite momentous, it did not come as a surprise that the İstanbul outcome was eventually challenged and a re-run ordered. In spite of this tried and tested AKP strategy, on 23 June, the CHP candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu once again emerged victorious, even gathering a grand total of 54.21% of the vote, leaving his AKP rival Binali Yıldırm trailing with a mere 44.99%.  During the original election run on 31 March, nationwide, more than 57 million Turks (or Turkish citizens) were registered to vote, and, on the day itself, voter turnout stood at just under 85%. And subsequently, Turkey’s electoral map looks overwhelmingly yellow (with a few blue allied dots) and a number of red and purple spots in the fringes. The Prez and his henchmen tried hard to portray these local elections as a kind of referendum on whether or not the Turkish public-at-large was still in favour of rigid AKP rule and its surreptitious slide into a what I have termed a “post-Kemalist reality” in 2016. And, by and large, the outcome seemed to all but vindicate Tayyip Erdoğan’s drive towards re-imagining the Republic of Turkey as a pseudo-Ottoman Sunni superpower in the region and beyond. Were it not that two major exceptions bucked the trend – Ankara and İstanbul. And particularly the latter defeat was hard to swallow for the Prez – after all, that’s where he made his own debut on Turkey’s political stage in 1994, and the city’s patronage network is an important source of monetary income for his many hangers-on, whether individual or institutional (in the shape of pious and less pious foundations or vakıfs and the like). This loss of İstanbul (and to a minor extent, Ankara) led the political scientist Dr Burcu Değirmen-Dysart to argue somewhat hyperbolically that “Turkey’s March 31 local elections revealed that more and more people grew discontent with Erdogan’s and his party’s tightening authoritarian grip,” commenting about a month later (30 April 2019). And two weeks following the AKP’s lackluster performance in İstanbul, the news agency Reuters matter-of-factly reported that the outcome “was annulled last week [6 May 2019] in Istanbul and will be re-run on June 23.” Pundits and other know-it-alls (myself included) immediately began pontificating that this re-run could only mean that the Prez had a plan and that the AKP contender Binali Yıldırım (whom I have christened Hapless during his tenure as Turkey’s final PM, 24 May 2016-16 April 2017) was sure to assume residency in Saraçhane (where the offices of the İBB or İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality are housed) at the end of this month.  The Persistence of Memory: İstanbul as a City of Faith  Though in the immediate aftermath of the İstanbul elections, nobody really knew much about the CHP candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu, other than the fact that he had led the İstanbul municipality of Beylikdüzü (2014-19) or even beyond that he originally hailed from the Black Sea region’s city of Trabzon. In the intervening period (6 May-23 June), he made sure that there’d be no one left in Turkey (or abroad, for that matter) who didn’t know the name İmamoğlu. His re-election campaign adopted the slogan #HerŞeyÇokGüzelOlacak (or ‘Everything will be very beautiful’ (or good), and in the days before the re-run, his innumerable trips all over the place, his speeches and television appearances turned the softly-spoken man into a veritable anti-AKP icon, appealing not just to Erdoğan’s traditional enemy base but also to Turks whom one might normally assume to be AKP supporters, if not Erdoğan voters. İmamoğlu and his team used 47 days to craft a skillful operation that knew a couple of highlights sure to make a wider audience enamoured with the CHP candidate, and not just in İstanbul. The campaign period coincided with the month of Ramazan (the month-long period of fast observed by pious Muslims throughout the world, 5 May-3 June 2019) – which is normally a time in Turkey when hungry taxi drivers become irate and nothing much happens otherwise, but AKP supporters (or obviously ‘pious’ fasting Turks) become highly visible at night, strolling through specially erected Ramazan markets, as the one on the Hippodrome in Sultanahmet, as well as on Turkey’s national television channels hosting requisite pious fasting programmes for the duration. But not this year, this year a lively and colourful election campaign was fought, with İmamoğlu as a pious man from a solidly conservative background (in the period 1984-87, his father was a member of Turgut Özal [1927-93]’s ANAP [or Motherland Part], a right-wing political party that enacted many pro-Islamic policies and was nebulously linked to the Naqshbandi brotherhood), able to charm people all around while abstaining from food or drink from sunrise to sunset.  In my opinion, a well-played stratagem of İmamoğlu’s was his appearance on CNN Türk, effectively just another AKP propaganda channel (20 May 2019). The well-known journalist Ahmet Hakan conducted the interview, which he conspicuously cut short right before the CHP candidate was about to talk about his plans for İstanbul and his determination to root out waste and corruption in the city’s municipal offices. İmamoğlu’s team had clearly given a number of advertising clips to the channel beforehand, clips which were aired during the intervals. One of these clips told the backstory of İmamoğlu’s by-now famous slogan #HerŞeyÇokGüzelOlacak. The footage shown appeared to consist of recordings made by  İmamoğlu’s team during the ongoing campaign. One clip focused on a boy who kept chasing İmamoğlu’s convoy and at one stage, the candidate talks directly to the boy who addresses the candidate with the colloquial phrase Abi, reserved for men advanced of one’s own age. The boy literally said, ‘Ekrem Abi, everything will be very beautiful’ (or, “her şey çok güzel olacak”). CNN Türk aired this clip (and many others) during the intermissions in the broadcast, and its effect on the viewers must have been far from insignificant. But, in spite of the generally positive mood engendered, at one stage during the interview, İmamoğlu countered claims that, were he to become Mayor of İstanbul, alcoholic beverages would be served in social facilities pertaining to the Metropolitan Municipality (Belediye Sosyal Tesisleri). In response, he related how he had established six social facilities in Beylikdüzü, and that alcohol is definitely not being served there. Though this was but a passing segment in the interview, this affirmation that as Mayor of İstanbul, İmamoğlu would all but continue Erdoğan’s strict restriction policy on the free  distribution of alcoholic beverages surely shocked some viewers, albeit many shrugged it off. Still, as I explained as long as ago as 2011, a “strict interpretation of Islam explicitly prohibits the drinking of intoxicants in this world.” But not in Kemalist Turkey, which was very different from its Muslim neighbours in this respect, as “Turkey’s Muslim citizens have had legal access to alcohol since 1926.” This free availability of alcoholic beverages has become problematic in AKP-led Turkey. In 2016, the Prez famously praised the Turkish yoghurt beverage of Ayran as the country’s “national drink” in favour of the aniseed liquor Rakı, normally cited in this context. But apart from this brief episode, Hakan and İmamoğlu successfully skirted dealing with the issue of Islam during the interview, arguably taking it as a given that, in AKP-led Turkey, adherence to the Prophet’s tenets is universal and not to be questioned. Still many secularist opponents of the AKP regime must have felt somewhat disappointed by the CHP candidate’s assurances.  Another well-played strategem came at the end of the fast, in Turkey marked by a three-day public holiday (traditionally known as Şeker Bayramı, but now as Ramazan Bayramı, under AKP directives) when joyful celebrations occasion family and other visits (known in Turkish as Bayramlaşma). İmamoğlu flew home to the Black Sea region (his home turf which is known in Turkish as his memleket, 5 June 2019). İmamoğlu planned to alight in the cities of Trabzon, Giresun and Ordu, using social media accounts to promulgate the news. His get-together with the people of Trabzon morphed into a giant meeting, exceeding all expectations and surprising everyone. The rally counted many hundreds, many thousands of participants and İmamoğlu addressed the crowd in a most persuasive way: “I would like to remind you, as your brother who knows he will be chosen anew during the [upcoming] elections for the Metropolitan Municipality of İstanbul, that I will also engage in [this] fight for democracy. For that reason I am in need of the support of all of my fellow-occupants [of my memleket] who are here. Pray for me and it is therefore absolutely necessary that you talk to your relatives in İstanbul.” In this cunning way, the CHP candidate employed his visit to his memleket to boost his national visibility, while simultaneously placating İstanbul voters with a Black Sea background to cast their ballots in his favuor rather than for his AKP rival, which would have been their natural course given that the Prez’s own memleket is adjacent home city of Rize. Moreover, the Black Sea area’s inhabitants are notoriously pious as well as “ingenious, witty, and kind,” if we are to believe the İstanbul-based journalist Jennifer Hattam. And the CHP candidate’s words really seem to contain hints of possible long-term strategies to be pursued in years to come, as İmamoğlu rather emphatically stressed  that he will “fight for democracy.”  Whereas the opposition capitalised on the themes of hope and faith, the AKP camp opted to rehash its well-worn themes of fear and unrest, falling short of doing a complete re-run of the 2015 narrative. At the very outset of June, with 22 days to go, for instance, the Prez himself addressed a crowd of believers, admonishing them with the words, “[t]his is İstanbul, otherwise known as İslambol [meaning replete or adorned with Islam]. This is not Constantinople, but there are those who would like to see [the city] as such.” Harking back to an Ottoman tradition, clearly attested in the reigns of Ahmed III (1703-30) and his son Abdülhamid I (1774-89) (but according to some, even present in Mehmed II (1451-81)’s day, though the latter seems dubious at best), Tayyip Erdoğan attempted to frighten his Muslim audience that a CHP victory would usher in a return of repressive anti-Islamic policies commonly associated with the figure of Atatürk and his party in the minds of Turkey’s pious Islamists. Arguably, Erdoğan based his allegations on a spurious article that appeared in the Greek press following İmamoğlu’s 31 March victory, an article that received a lot of coverage in Turkey’s AKP-dominated media landscape. The piece carries the provocative headline “Ekrem Imamoglu: The ‘Greek’ who ‘conquered’ Istanbul’.” This slanderous sample of printed libel declares summarily that “Ekrem Imamoglu is according to some reports of Pontian origin and a Greek-speaker.” Going back to Ottoman days, the north-eastern corner of the Black Sea littoral was home to a sizeable Greek-speaking population group, usually referred to as ‘Pontian Greeks.’ This Orthodox population group was ethnically cleansed in the period running up to the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1923).  But with four days to go before election day, the Prez played the Kurdish card. In 2015, he had used that card to awaken fears of renewed war and conflict with the Kurdish terror group PKK, to coax citizens into voting for the AKP in the then-electoral re-run (1 November 2015). But now the AKP decided to use another hand. The propaganda rag Daily Sabah put it like this: “Abdullah Öcalan [popularly known as Apo], the jailed leader of the PKK terrorist group, called on pro-PKK People’s Democratic Party (HDP) not to side with any other party in the Istanbul mayoral election rerun on Sunday. Öcalan made the statement in a letter that was shared with members of the press Thursday [, 20 June 2019] by academic Ali Kemal Özcan.” In other words, Apo all but tacitly supported the Prez asking Kurds not to vote rather than vote for the CHP candidate. An intervention that, in the aftermath of İmamoğlu’s unexpectedly large 23 June victory, led Ahmet Hakan to proclaim that “[t]his election’s biggest loser is  Abdullah Öcalan,” a statement that must have left many baffled and flabbergasted. If anything though, this weird episode, which even saw Apo’s brother Osman Öcalan appear on the state-run television channel TRT Kurdî, all but discloses the apparently close and even organic links between Öcalan and Erdoğan, between the PKK and the AKP. With regard to the actual İstanbul re-run, though, appearing before a crowd of businessmen a week prior to the vote, the Prez appeared sanguine (even somewhat resigned or even reconciled), saying that this “election only aims to appoint a mayor,” even calling the whole thing but a “simple change in the shopfront.” Explaining himself somewhat, Erdoğan added that the AKP holds 25 out of a total 39 municipalities in the metropolitan area of İstanbul (16 June 2019). And, following his massive victory, İmamoğlu again descends upon his offices in Saraçhane, only to find that “his powers and those of fellow mayors across the country are being whittled down, [as] part of a broader strategy to hobble opposition-run municipalities’ ability to govern effectively,” as expressed by the always well-informed journalist Amberin Zaman.  Mustafa Kemal’s Party Embraces Islam: The Culmination of the AKP Policy of Sunnification  In spite of this seeming entente between an erstwhile Marxist-Leninist outfit-now-espousing Libertarian Municipalism (PKK) and a political party grounded in political Islam and arguably embracing Pan-Islamism (AKP), the reality on the ground appears very different. The reality on the ground in the New Turkey (as coined by the AKP) is such that its policy of Sunnification (my coinage) has led to a near-universal acceptance that Turkey’s future lies within bounds established in the 7th century CE, albeit employing the full technological and scientific benefits of the 21st century (in a Turkish version of what the left-liberal Pakistani journalist Nadeem Paracha has termed ‘Maududi-ism’). And the vast majority of Turks have now voluntarily adopted a lifestyle supposedly more in line with the Prophet’s example. Still, the press seems happy to report every now and then that younger generations are turning away from religion and that even İman-Hatip (secondary education institution intended to train government employed imams or prayer leaders) graduates are turning towards deism in favour theism (meaning that they seem to be all but abandoning Allah). These arguably diversionary if not downright ‘fake’ reports notwithstanding, the concept of Islam has well and truly taken its place at the heart of Turkish society again, in rural as well as urban settings. The world of politics has also been deeply affected by this trend. The CHP, as the party founded by Mustafa Kemal-who-became-Atatürk, has quite naturally also been subject to this encroachment. In the course of the year 2008, the then-party leader Deniz Baykal initiated accepting headscarfed women into the ranks of the Republican People’s Party. In February 2009, Baykal was quoted as saying that he can see “signs [that] a new political wind has started blowing swiftly” throughout Turkey. In a similar ceremony held in the same year’s November, he made the following programmatic announcement: “[w]e are all on our way, together with [women wearing] headscarfs, [women wearing] turbans [which in today’s Turkey refers to more elaborate forms of head-covering], bare-headed [women], young, old, women, men.” In Kemalist Turkey, the “thorny headscarf issue” signified opposition to a greater visibility of Islam in Turkey’s public and political life. The Quran seems quite adamant that women should dress modestly, particularly avoiding gratuitous displays of cleavage, which should be covered or veiled (‘hijab’, Quran 24:31). But the usage of the term “hijab” has led to the universal assumption that women should cover their hair as well as their cleavage. For that reason, in Kemalist Turkey, headscarfed women were a focal point in the debate surrounding Islam and fundamentalism (irtica). Baykal’s move to accept headscarfed women into the CHP ranks thus denoted a sharp reversal in attitude and appreciation on the part of the party leadership. As leader of the CHP, Baykal (1992-2010) was at the time fighting the PM Tayyip Erdoğan, and in that capacity he oftentimes attacked his opponent using the most vitriolic of words. In his long political career though he never really tasted any tangible success or victory. And the same is true for his successor Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu who took up his job on 22 May 2010. Prior to taking over Baykal’s job, when he was the Vice Chairman of the CHP faction, Kılıçdaroğlu declared publicy that “[w]e need to open our arms to” headscarfed ladies, indicating that this “overture” would not lead to losses but instead to “profitable” outcomes in the long run. A strategy that led the rather prominent CHP member Canan Kaftancıoğlu to admit during a live television broadcast on 11 May 2017 that her party is committing “taqiyya in order to gain votes from the right,” adding that she was “concerned” about that. The concept of ‘Taqiyya’ is an Islamic concept usually associated with the Shi’a faction but really an “integral part of Islam,” as can be read on a dedicated webpage provided by the Non Profit Organisation, the Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project (DILP). The same source defines the concept as a “precautionary dissimulation or denial of religious [or ideological] belief and practice in the face of persecution.” As a result, Kaftancıoğlu all but admitted that her party had been sliding towards accepting the new Islamic status quo in Turkey, albeit that she personally interprets this development as a conscious tactic or ruse rather than a straightforward political development – a political development that sees the nominally social-democratic Republican People’s Party adopting right-wing and/or outright Islamic or Islamist attitudes and policies.  But whether merely taqiyya or not, it is only now that the openly pious and devout Ekrem İmamoğlu has twice won the mayor’s seat of metropolitan İstanbul, that Kılıçdaroğlu’s party been successful, even allowing the latter to climb on top of an election bus to give a ‘balcony speech’ – something that has been turned into a political tradition by Tayyip Erdoğan in this century. Despite the fact that the actual winner of the contest was İmamoğlu, Kılıçdaroğlu gave his speech as the “architect of the 31 March victory.” For the party leader had appointed the candidate who was to win the city of İstanbul in a landslide – a choice reminiscent of his pick of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu to compete for the presidency in 2014. Back then, Tayyip Erdoğan easily defeated his rivals in the first round with a handsome landslide. Kılıçdaroğlu’s pick was greeted with shock and amazement at the time, as the CHP candidate was the “former head of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC),” and ideologically very much in line with Erdoğan and his AKP as a self-professed academic with Islamist leanings. In the same way, this year’s victorious pick also seems at odds with the self-described ‘secularist’ CHP. In the aftermath of the 31 March elections, the academic theologian and writer Prof. Dr Hilmi Demir tweeted the insightful query: “[t]he elections were not won by the CHP but by İmamoğlu and Mansur [the now-mayor of Ankara]. Why did they win, because they are not [really] part of the CHP.” In a crafty manner, Dr Demir utilised the 140 characters at his disposal to pierce any kind of delusional bubble that might have engulfed CHP voters in İstanbul, Ankara and beyond. The successful Ankara contender Mansur Yavaş is a politician hailing from the  Islamofascist tradition of the MHP who had in 2009 tried to become mayor of Turkey’s capital running on an MHP ticket. When he was not put forward as an MHP candidate in 2013, Yavaş joined the CHP instead, finally reaching his goal this year.  As for Kılıçdaroğlu’s İstanbul pick, beyond the right-wing atmosphere in his family and personal life, his character as a pious Muslim led many to assume that İmamoğlu would join the AKP to become another henchman. A little book that appeared in April 2016, carrying the unlikely title Ekrem İmamoğlu Benim Sevgili Başkanım (or, ‘Ekrem İmamoğlu My Beloved Leader’), written by the journalist Şirin Mine Kılıç, paints a sympathetic portrait of the man and his vision. Kılıç describes the politician as an individual endowed with a strong sense of “responsibility” from a young age, starting in his primary school days, also inserting the adjectives “honest” and “sincere” into the descriptive assessment of her ‘Beloved Leader’. Kılıç writes that “his political preference became clear from 2000 onward. He became a convinced CHP voter.” The reason was his personal discovery of the figure of Atatürk and his role in the foundation of the country, Mine Kılıç argues.  İmamoğlu joined the CHP in 2008, and was elected as the head of the party’s youth wing the following year. The local CHP chapter in the Istanbul district of Beylikdüzü selected him as its president on 16 September 2009 – being re-elected on 8 March 2012, only to resign on 15 July 2013 to run for mayor of Beylikdüzü. On 30 March 2014 he was elected as mayor, easily defeating the AKP incumbent Yusuf Uzun. Proving his pious credentials as mayor, İmamoğlu marked the 77th anniversary of Atatürk’s death by organising a reading of the Mevlid in the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Mosque in Beylikdüzü on 10 November 2015. The construction of this huge mosque, able to accommodate up to 4,000 worshippers, begun in the 1990s, and was but completed in the first decade of this century. And İmamoğlu also had the building and its adjacent area refurbished in the same year (2015), even incorporating a dedicated compound for the celebration of weddings (known as Nikah Salonu, in Turkish). Combining his dedication ot the Prophet and his love for Atatürk, İmamoğlu employed the mosque for a public recital of a poem (Mathnawi, or Mesnevi in Tiurkish) celebrating the birth of Muhammad on 12 Rabi’ul-Awwal. In the Ottoman tradition, the Mathnawi Vesîletü’n-necât, written by Süleyman Çelebi in the year 1409/812, stands out as the prime example in this context. The first documented public recitation of the Mevlid occurred in the reign of Sultan Murad III (1574-95), in the year 1588/996. In fact, it is all but customary in pious (or Islamist) circles in Turkey to have the Mevlid recited on important occasions, such as university graduations and funerals, or the anniversary of Atatürk’s death in this case.  What I have termed the AKP policy of Sunnification has now come full circle in Turkey, I would argue. The reins of government are still firmly held by the Prez and his AKP henchmen. Beyond purely party political contests and rivalries, however, it seems beyond doubt that the state founded by Mustafa Kemal in 1923 no longer exists. Instead, the New Turkey is a place rejoicing in manifold manfestations of pseudo-Ottoman kitsch and an increasing encroachment of Muslim mores into public and private life. Even the CHP, a one-time bastion of so-called ‘Turkish Secularism,’ has now completely succumbed to the seductive lure of Quranic and other pious recitations, as evidenced in the recent reversals in Ankara and İstanbul. Already in early March, the academic and political commentator Erol Mütercimler, whom the journalist and HaberTürk columnist Oray Eğin has somewhat flippantly called “[t]he man who knows everything,” predicted that the CHP candidate would be victorious in İstanbul, if able to capture “at least 9% of those who [normally] vote AKP,” as well as 4% of MHP voters. In the same breath, he also remarked that İmamoğlu hails from “rightwing, conservative roots.” And now, the previously little know mayor of Beylikdüzü district of Istanbul has stepped on the national (as well as international) stage with a bang, with a big bang even. In Trabzon, he told a quasi-hysterical crowd that his intention is to “fight for democracy,” and, if anything, I would argue that İmamoğlu is positioning himself for a future confrontation with none other than  Tayyip Erdoğan himself.  The local press and population seem to support such a development, and on an international level, it looks as if the now-newly installed Mayor of Metropolitan of İstanbul is being appropriated wholesale in order to be groomed for a future role. In the wake of election day, the New York Times carried the headline “A New Dawn in Turkey After Erdogan Loses Istanbul” (24 June 2019). İmamoğlu appeared on CNN International via video-link from Taksim to chat with Christiane Amapour (26 June 2019). Speaking in Turkish, Ekrem İmamoğlu told Amanpour and the rest of the world that his victory on “June 23rd showed us that no one, no individual or power, can stand in the way of the will of the people, no politician has the luxury to ignore that fact.” Arguably, he was talking about the Prez or, at the very least, that is how Amapour took his words, presumably in conjunction with the majority of her global audience. In today’s polarised world, the figure of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has become somewhat of a universal bogeyman – oftentimes appearing in a phrase also including Trump and Putin, as if constituting a veritable ‘unholy trinity of evil-doers.’ As a result, there are those who are now thinking that, come 2023, a CHP President could very well be taking up residency in the Beştepe Palace, Erdoğan’s White (or Ak, as in his preferred moniker for his party, the Ak Parti rather than AKP) Palace.  In fact, there appear to be some striking parallels between İmamoğlu and Erdoğan. Hinting at the distinct possibility that the first is being groomed to be Turkey’s new saviour, there is the fact that the latter’s rise to power was at the very least approved (if not, encouraged or even engineered) by Washington. Following the AKP’s victory in 2002, Tayyip Erdoğan became the country’s Prime Minister on 14 March 2003. But his ties to America stretch back to his days as Mayor of Istanbul (1994-98): “Erdogan had been in the U.S. on 17-25 April 1995; on 17-22 November 1996; on 20-23 December 1996; on 26 March 1998; on 26 July 2000; and on 4 July 2001 . . . and one last time, in February 2002,” as I wrote in 2014. In the same piece, I next posed the following query:  “Did the Clinton White House try to influence the course of Turkish politics by means of entertaining the self-professed proponent of the Sharia and was the Bush White House merely following the precedent set by its predecessor in grooming its champion of moderate Islam?”  Given the fact that Turkey’s current Absolute President no longer enjoys the West’s support as a member of the ‘unholy trinity of evil-doers,’ one could argue that İmamoğlu’s sudden arrival on the scene is all but fortuitous. Though the latter makes a big show of his love for Atatürk, his personal life and habits more than indicate that he could very easily function as a new champion of moderate Islam to replace the old but no longer ‘useful’ or even desired champion. And for that reason, the Prez’s words that “whoever wins Istanbul, wins Turkey” might prove very true in the long run. His initial stint as mayor of the city ushered in a 25-year period of AKP rule in Turkey’s biggest and most important city. The news agency Reuters‘ Orhan Çoşkun now even reports that some of Erdoğan’s stalwart allies have started abandoning ship: “Former allies of Turkey’s Erdogan plan rival party after Istanbul defeat.”  But for now, people are happy and opponents of the AKP regime rejoice, and nobody really knows what will happen next. Is this now really the beginning of the end or will the Prez bounce back and once again resume his place in the hearts and minds of the Turkish population?!??  Or, will İmamoğlu ever so gently replace him as the new face of an Islamic Turkey where the figure of Atatürk is once again revered, albeit re-reinterpreted?!??  As the first popularly elected President of the Republic, Tayyip Erdoğan set out to complete Mustafa Kemal’s accomplishments “by means of reviving the Turks’ ties to their Muslim creed and uniting all the ethnic groups and sub-groups living on Anatolian soil under the banner of Islam.” As illustrated at the outset, already as mayor of Beylikdüzü, İmamoğlu has undertaken steps to integrate the figure of Atatürk into the Turkish version of Islam. Perhaps this new approach to Republican history will lead the way to the future, as a time when a smiling and sympathetic yet pious and devout political leader that is no one else but Ekrem İmamoğlu will reintegrate Turkey into the world, as an indispensable part and parcel of the West and gateway to the East.  ***   21WIRE special contributor Dr. Can Erimtan is an independent historian and geo-political analyst who used to live in Istanbul. At present, he is in self-imposed exile from Turkey. He has  a wide interest in the politics, history and culture of the Balkans, the greater Middle East, and the world beyond. He attended the VUB in Brussels and did his graduate work at the universities of Essex and Oxford. In Oxford, Erimtan was a member of Lady Margaret Hall and he obtained his doctorate in Modern History in 2002. His publications include the revisionist monograph “Ottomans Looking West?” as well as numerous scholarly articles. In Istanbul, Erimtan started publishing in Today’s Zaman and in Hürriyet Daily News. In the next instance, he became the Turkey Editor of the İstanbul Gazette. Subsequently, he commenced writing for RT Op-Edge, NEO, and finally, the 21st Century Wire. You can find him on Twitter at @theerimtanangle


21stcenturywire--2019-11-20--Turks, Kurds, Armenians & Americans: Genocide Denial as the Turkish Republic’s Raison d’être

The present Republic of Turkey was built by the followers of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), known as Kemalists, who for the most part had been members of the Committee for Union and Progress (hence Unionists), the political movement that led the Ottoman state to its demise in the Great War. In this 21st century then, an Islamist political movement, with its roots in the Naqshibandiyyah brotherhood, has brought about the end of Atatürk’s example and an officially-approved Ottoman revival (as a shorthand for an Islamic réveil). In spite of their differences, these two permutations of the Turkish state – Kemalist and Islamist – possess an eerily similar relationship with a specific aspect of the Turkish past, a particular episode that took place in the early years of the previous century: the Armenian Genocide.  U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham from South Carolina is one of the most mercurial of political operators in American politics. Starting out as a vocal supporter of Turkey, then recently becoming one of the the main Kurdophilia proponents in the U.S. Congress, he’s now once again become Turkey’s saviour, blocking a “Senate resolution recognising the Armenian genocide.” This issue of the ‘Armenian genocide,’ which now seems to have come to greater public and popular attention as a result of Kim Kardashian’s ‘passionate’ and ‘eloquent’ advocacy, constitutes a major controversy in the Republic of Turkey as the successor state to the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia (and western Thrace). In fact, some would argue that the ‘New Turkey‘ constructed and ruled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (or the Prez) and his Justice and Development Party (or AKP) has now placed itself in the direct line of succession with its Islamic forebears in the area – not just the Ottomans (1299-1922), but also the Seljuks (1075-1308). And every year, this legacy comes under a great deal of global scrutiny on the 24th of April. Known as ‘Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day,’ it is the day that Ankara watches Washington closely. This year, President Trump did not disappoint, as his public statement included the Armenian expression “Meds Yeghern“ (literally ‘Great Crime’), and deftly managed to avoid the dreaded G-word. The Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin (1900-59) coined the term ‘genocide’ in 1944, which was subsequently adopted by the United Nations on 9 December 1948, coming into force on 12 January 1951, “in accordance with article XIII.” And Turkey is all but paranoid about being tarred with the term.  Quite recently, the U.S. House of Representatives did the unthinkable and went ahead and recognised the Armenian Genocide: the “US House of Representatives has voted overwhelmingly in favour of recognising the mass killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks during World War One as a genocide,” reported the BBC on 30 October. In years past, American lawmakers have always managed to pragmatically dodge this Armenian bullet, but now the much-publicised but as yet unrealised genocidal extermination of the “Kurds” of northern Syria (popularly known as Rojava) in the framewok of #OperationPeaceSpring has made these lawmakers brave, braver than usual and quite willing to antagonise the Turks, even if only to spite President Trump. And many will say, at long last. Adding insult to injury, the U.S. Congress took the momentous vote on 29 October, Republic Day of Turkey (Cumhuriyet Bayramı, in Turkish) commemorating the foundation of the Turkish state in 1923. On that same day this year, House Resolution 296 was introduced by Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) and reads as follows in summary: “This resolution states that it is U.S. policy to (1) commemorate the Armenian Genocide, the killing of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923; (2) reject efforts to associate the U.S. government with efforts to deny the existence of the Armenian Genocide or any genocide; and (3) encourage education and public understanding about the Armenian Genocide.” And the full text of the bill goes a lot further, stipulating that “the United States has a proud history of recognizing and condemning the Armenian Genocide, the killing of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923, and providing relief to the survivors of the campaign of genocide against Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syriacs, Arameans, Maronites, and other Christians.”  Furthermore, the bill even adds that “Raphael Lemkin [himself] . . . invoked the Armenian case as a definitive example of genocide in the 20th century.” In this way, the U.S. Congress has seemingly managed to link the now much-maligned Tayyip Erdoğan with the despicable figure of Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) – the South-Sudanese UN official Francis Deng has after all called “Nazi Germany’s attempt to exterminate the Jews in the country and elsewhere in Europe . . . the most extreme case of genocide.” But about a fortnight later, the Senator from South Carolina saved the day, and now Turks can sleep easy again, knowing that, come 24 April 2020, the Americans will not have the temerity of connecting the new post-Kemalist Republic with the dreaded G-word. By sheer coincidence, the Prez was recently visiting his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, and then he also met with several Republican senators at the White House, including the Carolinian (13 November 2019). In the White House, Erdoğan even whipped out his smartphone and proceeded to show the gathered men a specially prepared clip showing perfidious acts carried out by the PKK/YPG (Kurdish Workers’ Party/People’s Protection Units) and particularly pointing out that the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) General Commander Mazloum Abdi Kobani, whom Trump has actually been tweeting with, is none other than the PKK operative Ferhat Abdi Şahin. Graham then apparently grew a bit of a spine, reportedly asking the Turkish President, “[d]o you want me to get the Kurds to play a video about what your forces have done?” Still, soon after meeting with his boss and the Prez, the South Carolinian Senator blocked a similar resolution in the Senate to HR 296, afterwards telling the world that his object was not “to sugarcoat history or try to rewrite it, but to deal with the present.”  The Politics of Denial and Reconciliation  Still, about a fortnight previously, the Prez did not waste any time coming up with a suitable response, speaking to the nation on television he talked about the congressional vote as “worthless and [added that] we do not recognise it.” The AKP FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, for his part, called the vote “null and void,” and even made the link with Operation Peace Spring, tweeting that “[t]hose whose projects were frustrated turn to antiquated resolutions. Circles believing that they will take revenge this way are mistaken. This shameful decision of those exploiting history in politics is null and void for our government and people” (10:24 pm, 29 Oct 2019). On the other side of Turkey’s political spectrum, the opposition MP Garo Paylan, a Turkish citizen of Armenian extraction, tweeted that the “US Congress has recognized the Armenian Genocide. Because my own country [i.e. Turkey] has been denying this for 105 years, our tragedy is discussed in other world parliaments. The real healing for Armenians will come when we can talk about the Armenian Genocide in Turkey’s own parliament” (3:31 pm, 30 Oct 2019).     Horrific scenes in the ruined Armenian village of Sheyxalan in 1915 (Image Source: Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute/AFP)  The Armenian MP Paylan is a vocal and visible member of the HDP or the Peoples’ Democratic Party, which the West likes to call a ‘pro-Kurdish’ party, but should nevertheless really be seen as a political vehicle employed by the nation’s Kurds and its supporters, largely beholden to the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan (popularly known as Apo). The opposition party purports to represent all the different ethnic and religious groups and sub-groups living in Anatolia, hence the inclusion of the Armenian Paylan as its MP. With regard to the issue of the Armenian Genocide, the HDP has conveniently already come clean: on 2 October 2015 the party released its elections platform which included a section that stipulated that “the [Turkish] state should issue state-level apologies for genocides and massacres committed against different groups over the years.”  The mere existence of this political grouping is testament to the fact that the nation state that is Turkey is far from being solely inhabited by ethnic Turks. This fact, which might puzzle most people, is rooted in late-Ottoman Unionist precedent and early-Republican Kemalist history: “Anatolia has always been home to a wide variety of ethnic and religious groups and sub-groups, and today, the makeup [of] Turkey’s population is the result of Ottoman government policies carried out in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These policies were aimed at transforming Anatolia (the heartland of the Ottoman Empire) into a Muslim homeland where refugees from the Russian Empire and the Balkans were settled. In the early 20th century, Anatolia was thus home to ethnically heterogeneous Muslim groups: in addition to a large majority of Turkish Muslims, there were Kurds, Arabs, Lazes, Muslim Georgians, Greek-speaking Muslims, Albanians, Macedonian Muslims, Pomaks, Serbian Muslims, Bosnian Muslims, Tatars, Circassians, Abkhazians and Dagestanis among others. Prior to the formulation of Turkish nationalism as an ideological binding-force, the diverse ethnic groups in Anatolia were united by their common identity as Muslims and their allegiance to the Ottoman Caliphate, abolished in 1924,” as I have explained elsewhere. These population policies came to an official culmination in the 1923 with the League of Nations-sanctioned population exchange between Greece and Turkey, when Greek- as well as Turkish-speaking Orthodox believers in Anatolia were replaced by Turkish-speaking Muslims hailing from areas previously held by the Kingdom of Greece (1832-1924).  A state-sponsored “policy of Turkification carried out in the first decades of the republican existence has meant that these various [Muslim] ethnic subgroups have in time merged with the Turkish mainstream,” after having largely replaced various native Christian population groups previously inhabiting Anatolia’s fertile plains and lands, a historical process I explained in a now more than ten-year old in-depth academic piece. And the issue of the Armenian Genocide has to be seen within the context of this grand scheme of ethno-religious demographic engineering on the part of the late-Ottoman Unionist government partly continued by the pre-Republican state in the early 1920s – after all, “the Kemalists continued with the ethnic [and religious] puriﬁcation policies of the Unionists,” as expressed by the historian Dr Doğan Gürpınar. The Unionists tried to solve the Armenian issue, which had been a thorn in the Ottoman side ever since the days of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1908) and the Treaty of Berlin (13 July 1878), and particularly the latter’s Article 61, which made the “Armenian Problem . . . an international problem.” The political scientist and historian Dr Fuat Dündar matter-of-factly posits that the Unionists “implemented population policies according to the [principle] of Islamization . . . All non-Muslims, especially the Armenians along with Rums (Ottoman Greeks) and Eastern Christians . . . were subjected to expulsion and resettlement in order to create a new Anatolia with more homogenous and loyal communities.” The aim was the creation of a Muslim homeland in the Ottoman heartland, where Muslim Ottomans could live and thrive, united in their Ottoman citizenship and allegiance to the Sultan-Caliph residing in Istanbul. The Balkans War (1912-13) had earlier decisively proven that Christian Ottomans were not to be trusted, as they obviously preferred political independence over loyalty to the Ottoman state.  In this context, my usage of the noun Muslim does not necessarily denote personal piety or particular devotion (though on an individual level these traits should not be discounted), rather, I would suggest, the Unionist leadership wielded the religion of Islam as providing a common identity and goal, superseding ethnic and/or linguistic solidarity and togetherness. Though many historians and commentators regard the Unionist position as Turkist and hence nationalist avant-la-lettre, I would like to contend that the Committee for Union and Progress was primarily Ottomanist in its outlook, meaning that they strove to uphold Ottoman citizenship as defined in the first Ottoman Constitution (1876), and as a result, following the Balkan Wars, the Unionists attempted to forge a novel form of Ottomanism, a common citizenship beholden to Islam and the Sutlan-Caliph.  Returning to the Armenian issue, the Paris-based political scientist Prof. Dr. Hamit Bozarslan unequivocally states that, not quite 37 years after the Berlin Treaty, the “extermination of the Armenians started in the wake of the Deportation Act (Tehcir Kanunu) adopted on April 24, 1915, and was LARGELY finished before the end of the same year.” At the time, the New York Times carried numerous pieces dealing with the Armenian atrocities (according to the foreign correspondent John Kifner, ‘145 articles in 1915 alone’). On 7 October 1915, for instance, the paper reported that James Bryce (1838-1922), erstwhile Regius Professor of Civil Law (1870-93) and British Ambassador to the United States of America (1907-13), had testified before the House of Lords that “the figure of 800,000 Armenians destroyed was quite a possible number.” In the run up to the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, the Kemalist Ankara government pursued its own policy of ethnic cleansing with regard to the so-called Pontus Greeks living on the Black Sea littoral, a topic I have dealt with in 2008. These Unionist population policies created the breeding ground for the nation state Turkey, largely based on Anatolia with a small foothold on Europe’s eastern flank. Originally these territories functioned as a Muslim Ottoman homeland, which was subsequently re-defined as a Turkish homeland. The above-mentioned Kemalist authorities’ “policy of Turkification” effectively provided the various ethnic groups and sub-groups living within the nation state’s borders with a new identity, from being Ottoman Muslims beholden to the Sultan-Caliph residing in İstanbul, they became Turks (or Turkish citizens, as stipulated in the 88th article of the Republic’s Consitution, accepted on 20 April 1340/1924) tied to the figure of Mustafa Kemal (to be surnamed Atatürk in 1934, 1881-1938), the first and ‘eternal’ President of the Republic of Turkey and to the nation state he founded (Following his untimely death, Atatürk was proclaimed the nation’s ‘Eternal Chief’ or Ebedi Şef on 26 December 1938).  Back to the Future: The Past is in the Present  As an homegrown Turkish Islamist political movement, the AKP originally took part in pious Turkish Muslims’ hatred and dislike of the figure of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. But in time, the Prez and his henchmen have co-opted this figure, as a foil for their personal goals and ambitions. Such a development has led towards to the figure of Recep Tayyip replacing that of Mustafa Kemal: “Erdoğan [has now] become another Atatürk for the Turkish nation. Whereas the first President (1923-38) ushered his fellow-Turks into the modern world, arguably shedding any excessive traits of their Islamic persuasion in the process . . . starting [in] 2014 [, Erdoğan has by now largely] complete[d] this task [of creating a new homeland] by means of reviving the Turks’ ties to their Muslim creed and uniting all the ethnic groups and sub-groups living on Anatolian soil under the banner of Islam,” as I have argued in the summer of 2014. And in that context, the issue of Armenian massacres perpetrated in the course of the Great War (1914-18), that have become known as the Armenian Genocide in the aftermath of World War II, originally fulfilled an important role in Tayyip Erdoğan’s plan to connect the New Turkey with the “first assembly of what was to become Turkey’s parliament on 23 April, 1920.” This pre-republican Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi or BMM), which effectively constituted the Ankara government that led the War-of-Independence (1919-22), “consisted [solely] of representatives of Anatolia’s Muslim population.”  In 2014, then still-PM Tayyip Erdoğan took the unprecedented step of offering his condolences to the Armenian people in nine different languages, including Armenian, on the prime-ministerial website: “Millions of people of all religions and ethnicities lost their lives in the first world war . . . Having experienced events which had inhumane consequences – such as relocation – during the first world war should not prevent Turks and Armenians from establishing compassion and mutually humane attitudes towards one another. It is our hope and belief that the peoples of an ancient and unique geography, who share similar customs and manners, will be able to talk to each other about the past with maturity and to remember together their losses in a decent manner. And it is with this hope and belief that we wish that the Armenians who lost their lives in the context of the early 20th century rest in peace, and we convey our condolences to their grandchildren,” as can now be read the Guardian website as the original prime-ministerial webpage no longer seems to exist. At the time, I conjectured that this gesture on the 99th anniversary of the 1915 events could usher in an AKP-led drive to downplay the ideological glue that is nationalism and instead stress a common spiritual heritage of the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia (“an ancient and unique geography”) – a common spiritual heritage expressed in either Islam or Christianity.  The 2014 prime-ministerial message fell short of acknowledging the Armenian Genocide, but could be seen as a first move towards a more realistic form of coming to terms with the past or Vergangenheitsbewältigung, to use the arguably somewhat unwieldy German term. Alas, this proved but a futile hope, as the following year (2015), the Turkish government once again pushed its denialist narrative in response to global centenary commemorations of the implementation of the Deportation Act (Tehcir Kanunu), leading to wholesale genocidal consequences in weeks and months to come. In fact, as the issue of symbolic dates and their meaning is a hot topic in Turkey, that year, Ankara moved the culmination of the Gallipoli commemorations to the 24th instead of the 25th of April (known as Anzac Day by Australians and New Zealanders). Ohannes Kılıçdağı, a writer for Agos, an Armenian weekly published in Turkey, at the time declared that “[e]verybody knows that the two memorials around Gallipoli have been held on 18 March and 25 April every year.” Traditionally, the 1915 Ottoman victory at Gallipoli was celebrated as a major milestone in Mustafa Kemal’s career path which was to reach its climax in the 1923 foundation of the Republic. But today, in AKP-led post-Kemalist Turkey, the military success at Gallipoli is taken as proving that Ottoman Muslim conscripts saved the day by defeating Christian invaders intent on partitioning the Ottoman lands. In fact, both commemorations seem to stress the primacy of Islam in Anatolia: the military victory momentarily saved the Muslim Ottoman state which was to become the Turkish nation state, and the Deportation Act (Tehcir Kanunu) initiated the final expulsion of non-Muslims from the Anatolian mainland by means of a ruthless and effective form of ethnic cleansing.  The Turkish Republic’s Raison d’être: The invented tradition of Turkish denialism  In time, the AKP adoption of the traditional Turkish denialist discourse has gotten stronger and more determined, particularly in the aftermath of the 2016 Coup-that-was-no-Coup, which ultimately led to an informal alliance between the Islamist AKP and the Islamo-fascistoid MHP (or Party of the Nationalist Movement). Since February 2018, this informal pact became an electoral alliance carrying the name ‘People’s Alliance’ or Cumhur İttifakı, in Turkish. But five years ago, Tayyip Erdoğan was all but on the verge of reconciling with the infamous G-word, yet now he has performed a total U-turn allowing him to seek a connection with the infamous ‘invented tradition’ of Turkish denialism (to use the 1983 Hobsbawmian coinage). For, as Dr Doğan Gürpınar reminds us, in Turkey “the year 1915 was a non-issue before the assassinations of Turkish diplomats as revenge by the ‘Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia’ (ASALA) in the 1970s.” Gürpınar explains that “institutionalized Turkish denialist discourse was formulated and developed only in the 1970s and even the 1980s as a response to the rise of the Armenian genocide agenda as an organized cause by the late 1960s and became an issue of public attention in Turkey after decades of oblivion.” After all, in 1919, the British Empire pressurised the defeated Ottoman government of Istanbul to set up a Courts-Martial to try individual Unionists, government officials, and military leaders, as well as other functionaries, with charges of committing crimes against the Armenians and subverting the Ottoman constitution (1876/1908) by leading the Empire into the Great War (1919-22). This was done in response to a joint declaration by Britain, France and Russia issued on 24 May 1915 to “hold personally responsible . . . all members of the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.” In 1922, the “Court Martial pronounced, in accordance with said stipulations of the Law the death penalty against Talaat, Enver, Cemal [Pashas], and Dr. Nazim,” having found them guilty of “massacre, plunder of goods, appropriation and hoarding of riches.” Two of the three guilty Pashas had fled the Ottoman lands and were later assassinated by Armenian terrorists in the course of the so-called Operation Nemesis. In this way, the Armenian massacres which were to be named erroneously the ‘First Genocide of 20th Century,’ received their legal and judicial resolution right before the Kemalist victory and the subsequent foundation of the Republic of Turkey. As I explained in 2014, “many commentators and even historians refer to the Armenian issue as the 20th century’s first genocide, [though] in reality the German Empire under Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-1918) had already constituted a precedent previously.” As expressed by the Dutch Professor of African History “Jan-Bart Gewald ‘[b]etween 1904 and 1908 Imperial German troops committed genocide in German South West Africa (GSWA), present-day Namibia.’ Germany’s late and short (‘about thirty-five years,’ as expressed by the sociologist Gurminder K. Bhambra) entry into Europe’s colonial game overseas led to extreme measures. In South West Africa, German settlers employed the Herero-German war to ‘rightfully’ occupy territory belonging to the Herero tribes. This land-grab was preceded by ‘the planned and officially sanctioned attempted extermination of the Herero people.’ As the Ottomans had enjoyed good relations with the German Empire ever since the early years of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), it would stand to reason to assume that the Unionists were eager to apply the German experiences in South West Africa to their own territorial designs for Anatolia.” In this way, the Unionist government implemented a strict policy of ethnic cleansing to clear occupied territories in order to populate them with new arrivals – Muslim refugees fleeing war and persecution in the Balkans and the Russian Empire. These population policies created the ground for the territorial expression of Turkish nationalism as understood by the Kemalist leadership, first developed in 1922 (as I have conclusively illustrated in 2008). And today, the post-Kemalist New Turkey as the temporal successor of the nation state founded by Atatürk and self-proclaimed heir to to the Ottoman Empire finds itself forced to continue the habits and rituals of the infamous ‘invented tradition’ of Turkish denialism  At the White House (13 November 2019), the New Turkey’s Prez reaffirmed his commitment to the tenets of denialism: “Historians not politicians should make a decision concerning an issue that was experienced 104 years ago during [the prosecution of] a war. Turkey is on the side of dialogue and free discussion. Our proposal to the Armenian side of setting up a joint historical commission is still valid. In the archives of our armed forces more than one million documents are available.” In the same breath, he went on to suggest that H. Res. 296 was introduced by U.S. lawmakers sympathetic to the PKK/YPG/PYD (the latter being the Democratic Union Party) nexus, an entity more commonly known as the “Kurds,” and, in response, the U.S. President actually came out with the statement that Tayyip Erdoğan has “a great relationship with the Kurds. Many Kurds are living currently in Turkey and they’re happy, and taken care of, including healthcare and education,” and adding “[t]his has been thousands of years in the process between borders, between these countries and other countries that we’re involved with 7,000 miles away.” This statement is a prime example that really shows that Donald Trump has no idea what he is talking about most of the time. In fact, the Democratic Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi’s remark that the President is “an imposter . . . [that] knows full well that he’s in that office way over his head,” does spring to mind. Admittedly, Pelosi’s words were spoken in the context of the ongoing impeachment hearings, but appear strangely apposite here.  The situation of the Kurds in the Middle East is a complex matter that cannot be contained in soundbites and catchy phrases. As I wrote last January, “Turkish and Kurdish populations have been sharing space in the same locality for centuries – for ‘four hundred years of more,’ as verbalised by Dr Christopher Houston.” Dr. Janet Klein, an expert in late-Ottoman Kurdistan, for her part, simply said that “[t]he idea that Turks and Kurds have been engaged in conflict for centuries is very ahistorical.”  Still, in the West, the perception is that Turks and Kurds are continuously at each others’ throats. In reality though, the current enmity between the Turkish state and the Kurds, or rather the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party or Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê), goes back to the 1980’s: “The PKK has been waging a bloody war against the Turkish state for more than 30 years now. At first, this struggle aimed at the creation of an independent Kurdistan in the south-eastern Anatolia, but in time, these separatist demands have become calls for local autonomy and cultural recognition. The AKP was the first political organization in Turkey to officially acknowledge the existence of a Kurdish issue, and the first one to attempt to tackle the deadlock by means of a negotiation process, known as the ‘Kurdish overture’ launched in 2009. But following the inconclusive June 2015 elections and Turkey’s subsequent November Surprise [as I have termed the surprisingly unsurprising AKP electoral victory on 1 November 2015] that saw the AKP receive a veritable mandate for the construction of a post-Kemalist century, Ankara has once again started beating the war drums,” as I have written in 2016. And these war drums have now led the Turkish Army and its Jihadi FSA allies into northwestern Syria. The Prez announced his designs on 24 September at the United Nations General Assembly in New York: “Our intention is to establish the possibility for 2 million Syrians to settle down in a safe zone we plan to set up.”  The Canadian journalist and writer Nick Ashdown recently put it like this: “Erdogan has long seemed comfortable using demographic engineering as a political tool. Indeed, he has threatened to use Middle Eastern refugees as a weapon against Europe, repeatedly warning he could ‘open the gates’ and flood Europe with the Syrians currently living in Turkey. He also seems quite comfortable opining on which groups belong where in Syria. ‘Arabs are most suitable for this area,’ he told journalists during an interview on Oct. 24.” The Prez namely spelled out his intentions there and then: “Those areas aren’t appropriate for Kurds’ lifestyles, because they’re desert.” For, as should be quite common knowledge by now, the Kurds have ‘no friends but the mountains.’ Ashdown rightly points out the “worrisome historical resonances of Erdogan’s proposed policy” namely “[s]tate-facilitated or state-enforced population transfers have a long history in the former Ottoman Empire and have left an indelible imprint on northern Syria in particular. Known as sürgün (‘deportation’ or ‘exile’) during Ottoman times, they were often used as a form of politically motivated demographic engineering.” After all, the Prez and his AKP henchmen just love to operate in accordance with good Otttoman precedent. The notorious 1915 Tehcir Kanunu, for instance, aimed at deporting Ottoman Armenians to Deir Ezzor in the Syrian desert: “Armenians were killed, the majority of them through death marches periodically interrupted by mass killings. Concentration camps in Syria’s Deir Ezzor were some of the final destinations for those who survived the marches,” as explained by Ashdown.  Though the Prez is keen on good Ottoman precedents, his view of historical reality does not necessarily square with the facts on the ground. Following his White House visit, he went to the Washington Diyanet Center, a purpose-built architectural propaganda vehicle for the AKP-led New Turkey in the new world, where he said the following absurdity, which is really beyond any need to receive a form of correction: “They [Armenians] used to travel in different places as nomads. The forced deportation took place while they were living the same way as nomads in Turkey.” It seems that over the past years, Tayyip Erdoğan has made a most amazing intellectual journey, a journey which has taken him from a point of near-reconciliation – to his current location where he seems to follow his U.S. counterpart’s example closely and does not shy away from making-up alternative facts to suit his agenda. And this means that the issue of the Armenian Genocide will continue to fester and simultaneously, the invented tradition of Turkish denialism will, in turn, continue to thrive in the post-Kemalist and pseudo-Ottoman era ushered in by the Islamist political movement set up none other than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.  Whether nationalist or Islamist, the invented tradition of Turkish denialism seems set to persist, and persist for as long as there is a Turkish Republic.  ***   21WIRE special contributor Dr. Can Erimtan is an independent historian and geo-political analyst who used to live in Istanbul. At present, he is in self-imposed exile from Turkey. He has a wide interest in the politics, history and culture of the Balkans, the greater Middle East, and the world beyond. He attended the VUB in Brussels and did his graduate work at the universities of Essex and Oxford. In Oxford, Erimtan was a member of Lady Margaret Hall and he obtained his doctorate in Modern History in 2002. His publications include the revisionist monograph “Ottomans Looking West?” as well as numerous scholarly articles. In Istanbul, Erimtan started publishing in Today’s Zaman and in Hürriyet Daily News. In the next instance, he became the Turkey Editor of the İstanbul Gazette. Subsequently, he commenced writing for RT Op-Edge, NEO, and finally, the 21st Century Wire. You can find him on Twitter at @theerimtanangle


abcnews--2019-11-15--UN extends peacekeepers in Central African Republic

The U.N. Security Council voted unanimously Friday to extend the U.N. peacekeeping force in Central African Republic for a year, with a mandate to protect civilians, support peace efforts, and assist in preparing for elections starting in 2020.  The French-drafted resolution welcomed the Feb. 6 peace agreement signed by the government and 14 armed groups and reiterated the council’s support for President Faustin-Archange Touadera and his government in their efforts to promote lasting peace.  It urged all signatories to implement the agreement without delay and condemned “in the strongest terms” violations and violence perpetrated by some armed groups and militias throughout the country. It demanded that armed groups cease all violence.  The resolution also condemned “incitement to ethnic and religious hatred and violence, violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses, including those committed against children and those involving sexual and gender-based violence in conflict.”  Central African Republic has seen deadly interreligious and intercommunal fighting since 2013, when predominantly Muslim Seleka rebels seized power in the capital and mainly Christian anti-Balaka militias fought back, resulting in thousands of people killed and hundreds of thousands displaced.  A period of relative peace followed in late 2015 and 2016, but violence spread and intensified after that. The peace agreement signed on Feb. 6 is the eighth since fighting began in 2013 and the first where armed groups, who control most of the impoverished country, held direct talks with the government.  France’s U.N. Ambassador Nicolas De Riviere told the council after the vote: “This agreement represents indeed the only path toward lasting peace in Central African Republic, and while progress has already been made, significant challenges remain.”  The Security Council warned in the resolution that individuals or entities that undermine peace and stability in Central African Republic, also known by its initials CAR, can face sanctions.  It called on neighboring countries, regional organizations and international partners to support the peace process.  The council urged government authorities “to urgently implement a genuine and inclusive process to support reconciliation.” This should be done by addressing the root causes of the conflict, including the marginalization of civilians from specific communities, issues of national identity, economic development and local grievances, it said.  The resolution urged CAR authorities and all “national stakeholders” to prepare inclusive, free, fair and transparent presidential, legislative and local elections in 2020 and 2021.  The Security Council extended the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping mission known as MINUSA until Nov. 15, keeping its personnel at 11,650 military — including 480 military observers and staff officers — and 2,080 police personnel.  It said MINUSCA’s “strategic objective is to support the creation of the political, security and institutional conditions” to reduce the presence and threat of armed groups.  The council set out a number of priority tasks for MINUSCA — protecting civilians, supporting the peace process including by helping implement the peace agreement and assisting with elections, national reconciliation, “social cohesion and transitional justice,” and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid.  It also authorized other tasks for MINUSCA including supporting CAR authorities to extend their authority throughout the country, in reforming the security sector, promoting human rights, and in disarming and demobilizing armed groups and repatriating foreign fighters.