democracynow--2019-11-11--"This Is a Military Coup": Bolivian President Evo Morales Resigns After Army Calls for His Ouster

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.  AMY GOODMAN: Bolivia is in a state of political crisis after longtime President Evo Morales resigned Sunday following what he described as a military coup. Bolivia has been the scene of weeks of protest since a disputed election last month. Morales announced his resignation in a televised address Sunday.  AMY GOODMAN: President Morales spoke shortly after the Bolivian military took to the airwaves to call for his resignation.  AMY GOODMAN: Bolivia’s vice president also resigned Sunday, as did the head of the Bolivian Senate and the lower house. The top two officials on Bolivia’s Supreme Electoral Court have been detained. Opposition leader Jeanine Áñez, who is the second vice president of the Bolivian Senate, is claiming she will assume the presidency today.  Evo Morales was Bolivia’s first indigenous leader, was credited with lifting nearly a fifth of Bolivia’s population out of poverty since he took office in 2006. But he faced criticism from some of his former supporters for running for a third and then a fourth term. Evo Morales’s whereabouts are unknown. His home was ransacked Sunday. Mexico has offered Morales asylum. Hours before resigning, Morales had agreed to call for new elections, after the Organization of American States issued a report claiming there was, quote, “clear manipulation” in last month’s election results. According to the official results of last month’s election, Morales won 47% of the vote and just narrowly avoided a runoff election. But the OAS immediately questioned the election process, sparking mass street protests. Critics of the OAS say the global body did not provide any evidence of actual vote rigging.  We go now to Washington, D.C., where we’re joined by Mark Weisbrot, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, his latest piece for The Nation headlined “The Trump Administration Is Undercutting Democracy in Bolivia.” Talk about the latest developments, the resignation of President Evo Morales, the first indigenous president of Bolivia.  MARK WEISBROT: Well, this is a military coup. There’s no doubt about it now, after the head of the military told the president and vice president to resign and then they did. And I think it’s really terrible the way it’s been presented, because, from the beginning, you had that OAS press release, the day after the election, which hinted — or implied, actually, very strongly — that there was something wrong with the vote count, and they never presented any evidence at all. They didn’t presented it in that release. They didn’t present it in their next release. They didn’t present it in their preliminary report. And there’s really nothing in this latest so-called preliminary audit that shows that there was any fraud in this election. But it was repeated over and over again in all the media, and so it became kind of true. And, you know, if you look at the media, you don’t see anybody — you don’t see any experts, for example, saying that there was something wrong with the vote count. It’s really just that OAS observation mission, which was under a lot of pressure, of course, from Senator Rubio and the Trump administration to do this, because they wanted — they’ve wanted for some time to get rid of this government.  AMY GOODMAN: And explain how the election went — Morales stopping the election count, resuming it — and then what kind of majority he needed to avoid a runoff.  MARK WEISBROT: OK. So, this is very important, because this has been very badly described, I think, in most of the media. You have a quick count, which is not even the official count of the election, and it’s not binding. It’s not what determines the result. It’s just something that is done while the votes are being counted to let people know what’s going on at that time. And so, the quick count was interrupted, and when it resumed — and it was interrupted with Evo leading by about 7 percentage points. And when it came back, his margin increased. And if you read the press here, any of the articles, it’s reported as though something terribly suspicious happened. He didn’t have enough votes — he needed a 10-point margin in order to — a 10-point lead over the next runner-up in order to win in the first round, and he didn’t have that when the vote count, this quick count, was interrupted — or, the reporting was interrupted, I should say. And then, you know, he got it in the last 14 — last 16% of the votes counted. He reached 10%. But if you look at what was really — so, this was reported as a very suspicious thing. And this is what’s reported over and over again to make it look like something was wrong.  But if you look at it, actually — actually, the whole vote count — you see there was a steady trend of Evo’s margin increasing almost from the beginning. And it didn’t change in the last 16%; it just continued because — and you can look at the areas that were coming in — these were rural and poor areas where Evo Morales had more support. That’s all that happened. This happens in elections. You can see this if you watch election returns in the U.S. So, there was never anything there.  AMY GOODMAN: Several Latin American leaders have criticized the ouster of Evo Morales in Bolivia. This is Argentina’s President-elect Alberto Fernández.  AMY GOODMAN: And British Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn tweeted Sunday, “To see @evoespueble who, along with a powerful movement, has brought so much social progress forced from office by the military is appalling. I condemn this coup against the Bolivian people and stand with them for democracy, social justice and independence. So, if you can talk, Mark Weisbrot, about the role of the Bolivian military? And what about the Trump administration?  MARK WEISBROT: Well, I think the most — you know, the Bolivian military very clearly said — I mean, before they did that, they said they weren’t going to intervene, in terms of the protests. But they very clearly — the head of the armed forces said that Evo should resign, right before he did that. And so it was a military coup. And Evo Morales is calling it that, of course. And there isn’t any doubt about it. The media hasn’t really mentioned it as much as a military coup, but it definitely is.  In terms of the Trump administration, you can look at tweets and statements from Marco Rubio right before the votes were even counted, saying that there was going to be fraud, and, you know, making it clear that they didn’t want this government to be there. And so, yeah, I think that — I mean, it’s very obvious that they supported this coup. And it’s very obvious that they pressured the OAS, where the United States supplies 60% of the budget.  And, you know, this is the problem. The media treats this OAS as though it’s really an independent arbiter here. And they do have electoral missions, and most of the time they’re clean, but they are not always. You know, in Haiti in 2011, for example, they reversed the results of a first-round presidential election without any statistical test, recount or any reason. It was completely political. And in 2000, they reversed their position, their report on the election, when the United States, as you know and you’ve reported on this show, wanted to cut off all international aid to Haiti and spent four years preparing for the coup of 2004. So, the OAS played a major role in that by changing their report on the election in Haiti. And so, I think this is a kind of a classic military coup supported by the United States.  AMY GOODMAN: So, Mark Weisbrot, you have the CIA involvement in coups in Bolivia in 1952, in 1964, 1970, 1980. Would you add 2019 to that list?  MARK WEISBROT: I would add it to the list. I mean, we don’t have the hard evidence of what they did. You know, it’s not like 2009 in Honduras, where Hillary Clinton wrote in her memoirs that she worked in the OAS, too, to prevent the elected president, who you’ve had on this show, from coming back to the country and to the presidency. But I think we’ll probably find out more later. But it’s just — it is very obvious that they supported this coup.  AMY GOODMAN: Earlier today, Evo Morales tweeted, “The coup perpetrators who attacked my house & my sister’s, who threatened to kill ministers and their kids, who humiliated a mayor, are now lying & trying to blame us for the chaos and violence that they created. Bolivia & the world are witnesses to this coup.” Among those who condemned the coup are Lula — yes, the Brazilian former president, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, also big news. And we just have 30 seconds. But if you, Mark, can talk about the significance of his release from prison after a year and a half? He had been the front-runner in the election before he ultimately was imprisoned. Now he’s out. What does this mean?  MARK WEISBROT: Well, this is definitely a victory. But the thing that I worry about most is they could arrest him at any time for any reason. You have the so-called justice minister of the country who is the judge who put him in prison and in a trial that really almost everyone now knows was lacking in evidence and was really a political trial. And so, and you have, you know, a very — I don’t know how else to say, but a fascistic government. So, he is definitely in danger, and there’s going to be a need to really defend him.  AMY GOODMAN: Well, I want to thank you very much for being with us. Of course, we’ll continue to follow these developments. Mark Weisbrot, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, speaking to us from Washington, D.C. The president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, resigned yesterday, saying he was ousted by a military coup.  This is Democracy Now! When we come back, the first-ever Presidential Forum on Environmental Justice. It’s held in South Carolina. I co-moderated. Today we play you our segment with Elizabeth Warren.


eveningstandard--2019-01-07--Gabon aposcoup daposetatapos latest Situation aposunder controlapos as four of five rebel

Gabon 'coup d'état' latest: Situation 'under control' as four of five rebel military officers arrested, officials say

An attempted coup by military officers in Gabon has been brought under control, the government spokesman has said.  "The government is in place. The institutions are in place," Guy-Bertrand Mapangou told France 24.  He had earlier told Reuters that four officers who had taken over the national radio station were in custody. A fifth is still on the run.  Soldiers appeared on state media on Monday declaring they had launched a coup "to restore democracy" in the West African country.  They said they were unhappy with the leadership of President Ali Bongo, who is recovering from a stroke in Morocco.  Early on Monday a soldier who identified himself as Lieutenant Kelly Ondo Obiang, commander of the Republican Guard, read out a statement saying the military had seized control of the government.  He was flanked by two others holding weapons and all were dressed in camouflage uniforms and green berets.  A New Year's eve address by Ali Bongo "reinforced doubts about the president's ability to continue to carry out of the responsibilities of his office," said the leader of the self-declared Patriotic Movement of the Defence and Security Forces of Gabon.  The radio message was broadcast at around 5.30am today.  A source close to the government said there were gunshots around the national television station, but that the plotters appeared to be a small group of soldiers.  A crowd of about 300 people had gathered at the station in support of the attempted coup, but soldiers fired tear gas to disperse them, Reuters reported.  Most of Libreville remained calm but there was a strong police and military presence on the street and helicopters circled overhead.  Bongo, 59, was hospitalised in October in Saudi Arabia after suffering a stroke.  He has been in Morocco since November to continue treatment.  In his speech on New Year's, Bongo acknowledged health problems but said he was recovering.  He slurred some of his words and did not move his right arm, but otherwise appeared in decent health.  The Bongo family has ruled the oil-producing country for nearly half a century. Bongo has been president since succeeding his father, Omar, who died in 2009. His re-election in 2016 was marred by claims of fraud and violent protest.


fortruss--2019-04-30--FLORES Venezuela Black Magic The Failed Military Coup of Fourteen Tells You Everything

FLORES: Venezuela Black Magic – The Failed Military Coup of Fourteen Tells You Everything

Venezuelan President pretender Juan Guaido is about to topple the structures of power in Venezuela, mustering an impressive insurgent and popular military force of …. fourteen men. Yes, surely it is absurd. But in the details of this ridiculous looking ‘attempt’ at phase n of the coup, so very much needs to be learned about the allegorical black magic of the Color Revolution. This is a wonderful opportunity to further publicize, for people who seek to obtain it, an understanding of how the U.S understands regime change, mass and social-psychology, power-elite dynamics. We can both learn and affirm the art and science of the Color Revolution, as known as a component of paradigm of 4th Generation Warfare, this specific tactic of hybrid warfare, within the general strategem of soft-power ‘regime change’ operations.  If we are to color these Color Revolutions – Green, Orange, Velvet, Tulip, Purple, Rose – then Venezuela’s is black. Black, as the magic which has backfired on the practitioners, rendering them diseased, disfigured, and defeated. The U.S empire, in its phase of critical decline and absolute collapse, seeks to conjure phantoms, trickery, magic, spells, whisper campaigns, defamation, and sleight of hand. The failed Color Revolution on Venezuela, will so be known as the Black Revolution. Watching Guaido conjure imaginary forces in today’s video-address was like watching disgraced Christian televangelist Jim Bakker.  To be sure, the present ‘Military Coup’ in Venezuela is a fiction and because it is publicly known as such, it is therefore already a failure. It appears a particular network of U.S financed agents are working in over-drive to deliver some semblance of ‘regime change’ results in Venezuela. There are real budgets on the line here, and Guaido’s handlers are under real duress to show something, anything. Still, in the workings of these fourteen men standing strong with Guaido, the entire art and science of government subversion can be told.  And so hours ago, international headlines flashed a western-coordinated message in simulcast – ‘Guaido Pledges End of Maduro Era in Militaristic Video’ (the Guardian) , or ‘Attempted Coup Underway in Venezuela’ (CNN) – informing whatever viewers they still have that ‘big things are happening right now’ in Venezuela.  While these headlines certainly catch attention, and we are obliged to report them as breaking news for what they profess to be – the reality is that these are psychological operations that will have little effect on real power in Caracas.  The ‘presentism’ inherent in the nature of news and reporting, can often leave the audience in a perpetual state of short-term memory, and a feeling of ‘awaiting an exciting and new breaking event’. But stepping back and pausing to think, the entire charade exposes itself for what it is.  What it really was, what you really saw, is an exhausted and exhaustible Guaido stand with about fourteen individual men in uniforms purchasable anywhere. Now, there is a strong chance that these men are indeed military, and there is in fact a point here that we will elaborate further on in the below. Indeed, much of how all of these things operate on the larger scale are signified by these fourteen men.     But to summarize what we are seeing now, even in western reporting, we find a confirmation that the first phase of the psychological operation was a failure – in this phase, we were to be convinced that Maduro was no longer president, that Guaido was already in. Months ago now, we were told it was only a matter of time, hours, perhaps days, until the transition of power was complete.  And then what happened? Nothing happened, because the sleight of hand, the magician’s illusion was exposed for what it is. This, incidentally, is what the U.S’ whole war on independent media is about, and their war ‘on’ the internet, ‘through’ the internet. If people do not really believe a transition of power is happening in Venezuela, then people do not behave that way.  This is a black magic whose spell has been broken.  If people do not behave as if the government is topping, then the behaviours commensurate with, and determinative of, of a toppling of government, do not occur. Consular offices around the world, of Venezuela, retain their titular authority.  Investments and international obligations carry on with the actual-existing government in Caracas, headed by Maduro, and this is a huge part of it too.  This entire holographic reality the U.S has failed to create was constructed on this basic idea: if enough people believe it, power can actually be transferred to their designee.  There is a dictum that holds in both community organizing, mass mobilization, and insurgent and counter-insurgent psychology-in-action, of which this author has been both a practitioner and percipient witness. It is understood, as it was distilled in the writings by Gene Sharp and based in turn on the works of Saul Alinsky, that power is constantly in flux, is based upon perception and agreement, is redefined every-day, and can change hands very rapidly. Thinking people and skeptics in the west often misunderstand these as leftoid or traditionally, at least dogmatically, Marxian conceptions of power, because of the association with Alinsky, community organizing, labor unions and syndicates and the left. This is a massive error of immense proportions, and anyone professing such would be met by the ridicule it deserves. Rather, Marxian conceptions have power understood through the prism of class, in turn and in the final analysis determined by the productive forces and social relations – all together the mode of production.  But in the black magic, the artistic science of toppling governments by way of the Color Revolution, the ‘class struggle’ component is all but a demagogic illusion, and reinforced by confirmation bias and wish-fulfillment of the predisposed.  Rather, power – in the artistic black magic science of toppling governments – is understood already as an interlocking directorate of power-elites, whose interests are only mutual in a transitory and conditional sense. Therefore, to topple a government is the science and art of breaking-up inter-elite networks, and pitting an interlocking directorate against itself. It is to create a civil war among the elites. That is why in the ‘Color Revolution’ scenario it is so important if a diplomat, minister of economy, oligarch, or general declares for the rebellious side. These have very little to do with Marxian analysis of power and Marxian conceptions of revolution in the traditional, rudimentary, vulgar, or common sense of the understanding.  This basic idea of power as transitory and conditional holds a significant amount of truth, it is the reason why the information war – these psychological operations – are indeed so important. And here it is not Marx that we take from to understand power, but Baltasar Gracian, Niccolo Macchiaveli, and Xenophon of Athens.  From this bifurcation, we see clearly then why the declarations of the U.S media hologram lost its steam. The axiom that repetition of the lie becomes the truth holds in many cases, but not in the artistic science of the Color Revolution – here it only takes on dimensions of stagnation, fatigue, and the syndrome of ‘the boy who cried wolf‘. Rather than becoming more true,  it is something that becomes less true every time the story needs to be claimed and re-framed again: Maduro lost power, but is still in power? Guaido has power, but still needs to seize it? Maduro has lost authority, and it is only merely the government, the military, the international community, and the people that falsely buttresses him up?  For to be ‘narratively’ consistent, Western media might have us read that Maduro’s coup is succeeding, for he has usurped the legitimate authority of Trump’s hallucination of ‘constitutional powers’ vested by the National Assembly into Guaido. But then that would be the wrong psychological-operation method to take as well – to say he is ‘succeeding in his coup’ is to say that he is succeeding, and the ‘mass psychology of the stampede’ then works in the direction of Maduro’s power.  And for all these contradictions, we understand why the U.S attempts at staging a coup in Venezuela have failed.  Really what the U.S keeps trying to do can be summarized as two-fold.  The first is that there is always the possibility that events will spiral out of control and the regime-change story will ‘stick’. It always seems unlikely, but has a chance of happening. It would be statistically erroneous to view it in static terms – rather, the more scenarios one can create, the chances increase.  There is always a roll of the dice and the random chance that some somewhat random event will take place, or a government agency or law enforcement officer will, at a very local level, be provoked and make a huge error in judgment. This is related to training on the government’s end, but also chance – and the more ‘situations’ the U.S can manifest, the more chances these can avalanche into something else. These create mayhem and chaos situations where a U.S planted hit-man, sniper, assassin, can also be operationalized to kill a few protesters.  The idea here is to stoke a frenzied psychological ‘stampede’ situation, where events cascade. The psychological war is one of mixed messages, and policy and military personnel do not want to find themselves on the wrong-end of history – not for major ideological or moral reasons per se – but because people have jobs to keep. And so who is really the government and who is not, matters at this level. An illusion, a spectacle can be created and government and military personnel can wind up very ‘confused’. Meanwhile, specifically paid agents are in essence actors, greatly exaggerating the ‘times have changed’ narrative, breathing life into the story that Maduro has lost legitimacy.  And if life is breathed into it, then it comes alive.  The second, far more probable outcome, but one which the government should also bend-over backwards to avoid, is to create a provocation. In the video which we ran on FRN earlier, we see Leopoldo López, an opposition politician, who is meant to be under house arrest. He is clearly not at home here, and breaking the terms of his house arrest.  Lopez is not to be confused with the Venezuelan Defense Minister, Vladimir Lopez.     The U.S has wrestled concessions, and agreements have been made, that Lopez and Guaido roam free, especially Lopez, as Guaido has not been formally charged yet. Do not make an error, this is significant of something. These men are not ‘nobodies’ in Venezuela, and some element of the government’s present legitimacy is predicated on its ‘overly nice’ treatment of these characters who, in any other entirely sovereign country, would be imprisoned as traitors and saboteurs. There are Venezuelan oligarch billionaires, like magnate Ricardo Fernández Barrueco, who in fact support the Bolivarian revolution of Chavez, and now Maduro, precisely because under such a social order their assets are protected, not jeopardized. And for every Barrueco, there is a Gustavo Cisneros or a Juan Carlos Escotet.  Barrueco cannot act as a voice of reason and pragmatism among Venezuela’s oligarchy if the Venezuelan social-democracy really turns Bolshevik. And that is true, both ways. So there is a small but overly powerful milieu in Venezuela, which the government and society must continue to work to marginalize, which only goes so far and believes themselves to be better off in this ‘balanced’ scenario where Lopez and Guaido roam free. But only if the likes of Lopez roam free.  His ‘house arrest’ status, like Guaido’s ‘roaming free’ status, are huge, massive signs and signals, canaries in the mine, weather vanes, test balloons. If Lopez can ‘buck’ house arrest, Venezuela’s privileged class, and their bleach-blonde ideological progeny of ‘wealth-aspirant’ ‘opposition’ supporters, normally who are or who desire to have middle-management positions in various private firms, are given a clear sign that things really aren’t so bad.  They stomp, cry, throw bizarre and histrionic public tantrums, and protest in an alternate reality, but so long as he is not arrested, any potential vacillation among the real oligarchs is kept to a very real minimum.  This milieu which works to overturn Venezuela’s social progress decry that they have fallen to ‘communism’, that Maduro like Chavez before him, are ‘dictators like Castro’. The irony of course is that much of the world responds, chuckling ‘if only they were!’ For if only they were in such a dictatorship, this ‘Miami-Carcacas’ axis crowd, for whom Marco Rubio is a hero, wouldn’t be free to roam around, trying to stoke social mayhem. They wouldn’t be afraid that their millions or billions might be someday seized, they would already have been seized.  Nevertheless, Lopez is openly trolling the government, to seize and arrest him, to create a situation, a real scenario. Of course he is incredibly brave, or incredibly stupid for, as we have seen with the murder of the Russian opposition ‘figurine’, Boris Nemtsov, once their utility is expended, they are worth more dead as martyrs than alive as possible successors to power.  Venezuela is not  the dictatorship its ardent opponents claim it is, and their very real freedom to profess this untruth can ironically be used to convincingly create the simulacrum that it is indeed the case.  Nevertheless in all of this you do have a concrete story, and one that is indeed a telling case. Perhaps these fourteen men really are military, for indeed even in the failed military coup of 2002, in a world where the U.S was much more powerful and the information war  also was on its side, Venezuela succeeded in telling a story that was alternate to the actual reality.  In reality, Venezuela’s military intelligence worked diligently to infiltrate the coup generals – contrary to popular mythology, Chavez was not arrested by generals against him, but taken into safety by generals who supported him, posing as coup generals. The other coup generals were fooled, conned, the coup was reversed from the inside – a coup within the coup.  He was taken away to safety, not to arrest. Palacio de Miraflores after all is only a building, and real functions of government simply continued on as they always do in reality – with those who have those powers and relationships.  And so these fourteen men standing with Lopez and Guaido, they are telling of something. But here is the trick:  The U.S knows that a direct militarily, an intervention into Venezuela would be a disaster. The desire now is not to create a failed state, for it does not border Iran or Russia – rather, they border a series of now-important U.S client states, and furthermore, in the American hemisphere.  It is always therefore best to take a government out through a coup, and to stage a coup, you need coup-supporting generals in the military. And so this trick works to Venezuela’s military intelligence advantage, for as long as the U.S knows that it desires a coup, and everyone knows that a coup is desirable, then all sorts of resources are put into staging a coup. And the U.S therefore is susceptible to imagine coup supporters and allies where there are none. It becomes a massive vacuum of information, resources, and misplaced beliefs over what is possible and impossible.  So among these fourteen men standing with Guaido and Lopez, it is truly amazing that they are not arrested moments, hours, or days later. But on second thought, it is anything but amazing. If and when Guaido is arrested, it will most probably be done by those fourteen men.


globalresearch--2019-02-09--A Military Coup in Venezuela Not Without the Militarys Support

A Military Coup in Venezuela? Not Without the Military’s Support

A military coup d’état in Venezuela doesn’t seem likely so long as the Armed Forces support Maduro. Meanwhile, U.S. action will likely backfire, and serve only to strengthen those in power  Juan Guaidó, leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly, declared himself President of the Republic on January 23 before a mass demonstration of supporters. This was less than two weeks after the start of Nicolás Maduro’s second term, which the opposition—concentrated within the National Assembly—rejected, labeling Maduro a “usurper.”The 14 countries that make up the Lima Group didn’t recognize Maduro’s inauguration either. They quickly accepted Guaidó’s takeover and released statements in his favor, which the United States did as well. But considering the powers that be and overwhelming support for Maduro from the Armed Forces, Guaidó’s rise to power is likely a symbolic event, with little chance of successful implementation.  Meanwhile, China and Russia, who have already declared their support for Maduro, had invested five and six billion dollars, respectively, in Venezuela to help kick-start the weakened petroleum industry. And in early December, Russia teased at a military deployment in Venezuela, landing two Tu-160 strategic bombardiers on Venezuelan soil and provoking criticism from the United States.  The intensification in political discourse and geopolitical pressure since the beginning of the new year will only worsen economic instability and cause a spike in migration. Barring military intervention organized by the United States and its allies, diplomatic pressure seems useless to take down Maduro. But the key element, the Armed Forces, seem to remain loyal to Maduro, making an internal military coup unlikely.  The probable outcomes range from a military intervention led by the United States in alliance with Colombia and Brazil to a prolonged stay in power for Maduro to the possibility of a Russian and Chinese intervention or a military coup. In the following text, we will analyze each of these potential outcomes.  The legitimacy of Maduro’s second six-year term is the point in question, given that a large portion of the opposition did not participate in the presidential elections held on May 20, 2018. The share of abstained votes, moreover, climbed to 54%. Compare this to the 79% participation rate during the last presidential elections in 2013. General lack of trust in the bodies overseeing the race, such as the Electoral Council, motivated a widespread boycott of the 2018 electoral process. Indeed, state institutions implemented crude tactics in the 2017 legislative elections, which verged on illegal: magistrates were appointed in an unprecedented fashion through the Chavista-backed Constituent Assembly, and opposition leaders were barred from running. Yet broadly speaking, neither general conditions nor the Electoral Council have changed since the opposition won a majority in the National Assembly in December 2015. For Chavista analysts, promoting low voter turnout was an opposition strategy that would force, in conjunction with the United States, an intervention in the country that would completely uproot the revolutionary movement. The events of the past few days could potentially give credence to this theory.  In the 2015 legislative elections, the opposition obtained 7,726,066 votes. In the presidential elections of May 2018, Maduro received 6,245,862. But this discrepancy could have been much higher, given the economic situation and the government’s inability to improve it in the two-and-a-half years between the two elections. But the opposition’s election boycott prevented another result, even if the government had let it happen. For the opposition and their international allies, winning presidential elections wouldn’t mean much if Chavismo retains power over the Armed Forces, the Supreme Court, and the Electoral Council. Instead, they preferred a clean slate. How could this be achieved?  This can only be understood as a show of support for a military coup with international cooperation. This brings us to Guaidó’s proclamation, and the immediate recognition of it by the United States and its regional allies. For the actions of January 23 to not wind up another failure for the opposition, they must take action quickly—military or otherwise. Trump, for his part, has emphasized that “all options are on the table.”  The threats of international backing for a coup d’état—although the opposition made its first coup attempt in 2002—started in earnest in early 2018. During a tour of Latin America, former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson commented that he believed there were would be “change” in Venezuela, and that “oftentimes it’s the military that handles that.” This was perhaps the first reference to a military coup that would replace the current regime in Venezuela. But it wasn’t until last August that the New York Times confirmed—according to leaked information corroborated by the United States government—that U.S. officials had met with members of the Venezuelan military who were planning a coup d’état.  Loyal Armed Forces, For the Most Part  During the past two years, different contingents of the opposition have set in motion a host of actions ranging from occupying military barracks to the stealing a helicopter to launching grenades at a federal building, to a drone assassination attempt against the president. All have either been aborted or have failed to meet their objectives, while the bulk of the military’s institutions remain loyal to Maduro. As Nikolaus Werz, professor emeritus at the University of Rostock, says in the German outlet DW, “Given the privileges enjoyed by many in the military within the framework of the Bolivarian Revolution, it is most likely that those in uniform will continue to support Maduro.”  But the reasons for the military’s support are not solely economic. On the one hand, the army has unified around the tenets of Chavismo, based on a rejection of any kind of foreign military intervention. On the other hand, the United States’ treatment of high-level Venezuelan military officials helps to explain the military’s entrenchment around Maduro. For example, Lieutenant Alejandro Andrade, former Treasury Secretary under Hugo Chávez, was sentenced to 10 years on corruption charges after collaborating with U.S. officials as a protected witness. If the military turns on Maduro, will other soldiers who want to take refuge feel confident trusting the United States? What message does Andrade’s sentence send to the Venezuelan military? Perhaps that if they want to protect themselves, the best option is to stand behind the Maduro regime.  So, the departure of the president via a military coup doesn’t seem to be around the corner. That’s how Brian Ellsworth and Mayela Armas see it. They conclude that there are “few signs that the military high command is prepared to abandon Maduro, a new spring for the opposition sector—and the excitement being generated among investors—could be premature.” Meanwhile, military expert Rocío San Miguel said in the wake of last Monday’s uprising: “I’m not worried about a rank-and-file sergeant from a security deployment [defecting], but I would be if there was a situation within a larger unit or a battalion.” Her analysis is that “military commanders are loyal to Maduro.”  U.S. policy toward Venezuela, especially during the Trump administration, has been contradictory, precipitating strategic errors by the Venezuelan opposition. Their main error has been to openly consider taking power through non-electoral means. The promises the Trump administration has made, both publicly and privately, about a non-electoral option to oust Maduro have exerted more pressure, inspiring the bulk of the opposition’s factions to stop considering electoral options at a time when they could have won in that arena. Thus, it is logical that, facing the Trump-backed option of an invasion, radical opposition politicians prefer to explore options of “exterminating” Chavismo, as the AP has reported, instead of continuing to challenge it in institutional spaces.  But there are other contradictory messages that could be contributing to Chavismo’s ongoing strength as a social, political, and military force, especially in regard to the sanctions imposed by the U.S. government. Since 2008, the U.S. Treasury has raised sanctions related to corruption against Venezuelan officials, but it wasn’t until 2017 that the sanctions prohibited U.S. citizens from making transactions with the Venezuelan government. Subsequent sanctions have targeted the Petro, a cryptocurrency created by Maduro, and the gold business Maduro developed to supplement decreases in price and production of petroleum.  In mid-July 2018, the Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on U.S. nationals doing business with the Venezuelan government—an act of improvisation. The moment the U.S. shifted its sanctions from targeting officials to targeting businesses with ties to Venezuela, the Venezuelan government’s discourse was able to double-down on its theory of an economic embargo and blame the U.S. government for causing the economic crisis. This analysis weakens the argument that Maduro was incapable of handling the situation and helped the government promote unity among their followers and the Armed Forces against a common foe.  Since Maduro’s second term began on January 10, the United States has reverted to sanctioning officials and Venezuelans associated with the government, all of them already identified and some imprisoned abroad. It appears that these decisions are veiled forms of pressure to appease radical right-wing sectors in the United States. Venezuela’s ruling party’s leadership has responded to these actions with mockery due to their inefficacy. On Friday, the United States announced that it would step up its economic actions against the Venezuelan government by imposing sanctions on the state oil company.  In short, there is no clarity in terms of Trump’s policies on Venezuela and, far from being effective, they have engendered the loss of the opposition’s institutional terrain while Russia and China have simultaneously gained more influence in Venezuela. These policies encouraged anti-Chavistas to abandon politics and abstain from participating in electoral processes, resulting in the loss of governorships, mayorships, and seats that the opposition would surely hold if it had participated. Trump, moreover, has not yet taken a sufficiently forceful action that would justify the opposition strategy to abandon electoral politics.  Meanwhile, other geopolitical forces have changed perceptions of the sanctions against Venezuela. On the one hand, each of the countries in the Lima Group does not recognize Maduro’s new administration and recognize Guaidó as President of the Republic—except for Mexico and Uruguay, which have promoted opening another dialogue. On the other hand, the Lima Group also amended controversial Point 9 of a January 4 statement supporting Guyana in a border dispute with Venezuela due to ExxonMobile’s oil exploration in the area. Removing its support for U.S. business interests in the region can be seen as going against U.S. policy in the territorial dispute between Guyana and Venezuela. This could signal that Latin American countries aren’t ready to blindly go along with U.S. intervention in Venezuela.  The European Union, for its part, did not recognize Guaidó right away, but on Saturday released a statement calling for new elections within a week’s time—which Maduro rejected the following day. Indeed, in December, the EU put together a “contact group” intended to establish a foundation for dialogue between the government and the opposition. Spain plays a key role in its implementation. Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stated in December: “We believe that the absence of political channels is a dangerous approach. Sanctions should always come with a space for dialogue and compromise.” Comments like this are in stark contrast with her previously radical stances. But Spain’s more recent remarks hint at its coming support of Guaidó, along with Germany and France.  If opportunities for dialogue are not provided, it could result in the regime further hardening its positions and acting like it has nothing to lose.Ana Soliz, researcher at the University Helmut Schmidt of the German Armed Forces, explained the shift from isolation to dialogue in more detail: “Isolating Maduro’s government is necessary, but without closing all channels of communication with Chavismo,” she said to DW.  Brazil has also revised its more radical statements on Venezuela. Once in power, the Bolsonaro administration has not been particularly hostile toward Venezuela, but has only joined in the statements of its allies. This stance contrasts with its positions in the weeks leading up to Bolsonaro’s inauguration, when his vice president, General Hamilton Mourao, who was Military Attaché for the Brazilian embassy in Venezuela, predicted a coup d’état in Venezuela. He said on December 17 that “the United Nations will have to intervene with peace-keeping troops…and that’s the role of Brazil: to lead the peace-keeping troops.” Such declarations have not been repeated since, despite official rejection to Maduro’s second term and the recognition of Guaidó.  The domestic political actors who refused to participate in the electoral process expected radical actions from these countries, such as the withdrawal of ambassadors, embassy closures, blockades, or petroleum embargos. But the fact that the countries most actively opposing Maduro have not taken any more definitive action could be seen as diplomatic weakness, which could frustrate them further. But just backing Guaidó as president, beyond being a symbolic act, doesn’t offer clear options for exerting power.  The two most radical economic scenarios—an economic blockade or a petroleum embargo—would consolidate the Venezuelan government’s entrenchment around allies like China, Russia, and Turkey. Even the withdrawal of ambassadors or the closure of embassies are unlikely to twist Maduro’s arm, and will instead feed into nationalist and anti-interventionist rhetoric. At the same time, increased migrationhas allowed millions of families in Venezuela to rely on remittances, alleviating the gravity of the situation.  In the domestic sphere, the opposition is again mobilized and waiting to see what Guaidó can do as president. Guaidó is a member of the most radical party of the opposition (Voluntad Popular) and the more moderate sectors are nervous because every venture of this type has culminated, until now, with a weakening and fracturing of the opposition itself. Guaidó is not a very well-known politician in the country, and does not appear to have sufficient support to completely subvert the ruling party from a military standpoint, which can also rely on tried and tested tools to contain street manifestations and their potential to become violent. The scenario at hand could end up dividing the opposition and the general public could lose patience, given the radical nature of their actions and demands.  In this context, it is possible that anti-Chavista forces, domestic and foreign, are considering only two options: to initiate a U.S.-led military invasion with the help of Brazil and Colombia, or simply to return to the electoral arena and wait six years for the next presidential election. The first of these options may lead the United States—and the Venezuelan people—in an uncertain direction.  For now, Venezuela faces a government weak in the economic and social arenas, but with strong judicial and military institutions. This will be the case unless—weakened by international pressure—Chavismo’s emerging fissures gather momentum and are able to undermine the government’s stability. However, as long as the U.S. government’s strategy operates on the basis of threats, Chavismo will have a reason to remain strong and unified.  Note to readers: please click the share buttons below. Forward this article to your email lists. Crosspost on your blog site, internet forums. etc.  Ociel Alí López is a political analyst, professor at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, and contributor to various Venezuelan, Latin American, and European outlets. His book Dale más Gasolina won the municipal literature award in social research.


globalresearch--2019-02-20--The Planning of a Coup against Venezuela Chile September 11 1973 The Ingredients of a Military C

The Planning of a Coup against Venezuela: Chile, September 11, 1973: The Ingredients of a Military Coup. The Imposition of a Neoliberal Agenda

The main objective of the US-supported military coup in Chile was to impose the neoliberal economic agenda. “Regime change” was enforced through a covert military intelligence operation. Sweeping macro-economic reforms (including privatization, price liberalization and the freeze of wages) were implemented in early October 1973.  Barely a few weeks after the military takeover, the military Junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet ordered a hike in the price of bread from 11 to 40 escudos, a hefty overnight increase of 264%. This “economic shock treatment” had been designed by a group of economists called the “Chicago Boys.” “While food prices had skyrocketed, wages had been frozen.  From one day to the next, an entire country had been precipitated into abysmal poverty.  In 1973, I was teaching economics at the Catholic University of Chile. I lived through two of the most brutal US sponsored military coups in Latin America’s history: Chile, September 11, 1973 and less than three years later, Argentina, March 24, 1976 under Operation Condor, which initiated Argentina’s Dirty War: “La Guerra Sucia”.  And today, the Trump administration is threatening to invade Venezuela with a view to “restoring democracy”, replacing an elected president (casually described by the Western media as a “dictator”) by a US proxy, speaker of Venezuela’s National Assembly.  More than forty-five years ago on September 11, 1973, the Chilean military led by General Augusto Pinochet, crushed the democratically elected Unidad Popular government of Salvador Allende.  The objective was to replace a progressive, democratically elected government by a brutal military dictatorship.  The military coup was supported by the CIA. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger played a direct role in the military plot.  Is Washington’s ongoing initiative directed against Venezuela modelled on Chile?  In early 1970s, in a note to the CIA in relation to Chile, Henry Kissinger recommended “Make the economy scream.” Visibly the same concept has been applied to Venezuela, with advanced techniques of financial warfare, which were not available in the 1970s.  Today it’s Mike Pompeo and John Bolton who are calling the shots, in tandem with the CIA.  Bolton has gone far beyond the Nixon-Kissinger agenda formulated at the height of the Cold War. Bolton refers to “The Troika of Tyranny”. The US sponsored coup against Venezuela is also directed against Cuba. And from Washington’s standpoint “after Venezuela, Cuba is next”.  The model of US intervention against Venezuela nonetheless bears some striking similarities with Chile 1973:  The US sponsored Pinochet dictatorship prevailed during a period of 16 years. During this period, there was no initiative on the part of the US to call for the replacement of the dictatorship by a duly elected government.  In 1989, elections were held and parliamentary democracy was restored. Continuity prevails. Patricio Aylwin of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) who was elected president in 1989 had endorsed a “military solution” in 1973. He was largely instrumental in the breakdown of the “Dialogue” between the Unidad Popular government and the Christian Democrats (DC). In August 1973, Patricio Aylwin provided a Green Light to the Chilean Armed Forces led by Augusto Pinochet on behalf of the DC.  The following texts shed light on the Chilean Coup d’Etat. The first text first published in 2003 serves as an introduction to the text I wrote in Chile in the month following the September 11 1973 military coup, which describes the chronology of the 1973 military coup.  Chile, September 11, 1973: The Ingredients of a Military Coup. The Imposition of a Neoliberal Agenda,  Today our thoughts are with the people of Venezuela.  In the weeks leading up the 1973 coup, US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis and members of the CIA held meetings with Chile’s top military brass together with the leaders of the National Party and the ultra-right nationalist front Patria y Libertad.  While the undercover role of the Nixon administration is amply documented,  what is rarely mentioned in media reports is the fact that the military coup was also supported by a sector of the Christian Democratic Party.  Patricio Aylwin, who became Chile’s president in 1989,  became head of the DC party in the months leading up to the September 1973 military coup (March through September 1973). Aylwin was largely instrumental in the break down of the “Dialogue” between the Unidad Popular government and the Christian Democrats. His predecessor Renan Fuentealba, who represented the moderate wing of the Christian Democratic (PDC), was firmly against military intervention. Fuentealba favored a dialogue with Allende (la salida democratica). He was displaced from the leadership of the Party in May 1973 in favor of Patricio Aylwin.  The DC Party was split down the middle, between those who favored “the salida democratica”, and the dominant Aylwin-Frei faction, which favored “a military solution”.  On 23 August 1973, the Chilean Camera de Diputados drafted a motion,  to the effect that the Allende government “sought to impose a totalitarian regime”. Patricio Aylwin was a member of the drafting team of this motion. Patricio Aylwin believed that a temporary military dictatorship was “the lesser of two evils.”  This motion was adopted almost unanimously by the opposition parties, including the DC, the Partido Nacional and the PIR (Radical Left).  The leadership of the Christian Democratic Party including former Chilean president Eduardo Frei, had given a green light to the Military.  And continuity in the “Chilean Model” heralded as “economic success story” was ensured when, 16 years later, Patricio Aylwin was elected president of Chile in the so-called transition to democracy in 1989.  At the time of the September 11, 1973 military coup, I was Visiting Professor of Economics at the Catholic University of Chile. In the hours following the bombing of the Presidential Palace of La Moneda, the new military rulers imposed a 72-hour curfew.  Salvador Allende in the defense of the Palacio de la Moneda, September 11, 1973 (left)  When the university reopened several days later, I started patching together the history of the coup from written notes. I had lived through the tragic events of September 11, 1973 as well as the failed June 29th coup. Several of my students at the Universidad Catolica had been arrested by the military Junta.  In the days following the military takeover,  I started going through piles of documents and newspaper clippings, which I had collected on a daily basis since my arrival in Chile in early 1973. Some of this material, however, was lost and destroyed in the days following the coup.  This unpublished article (below) was written forty-five years ago. It was drafted on an old typewriter in the weeks following the September 11, 1973.  This original draft article plus two carbon copies were circulated among a few close friends and colleagues at the Catholic University. It was never published. For 30 years it lay in a box of documents at the bottom of a filing cabinet.  I have transcribed the text from the yellowed carbon copy draft. Apart from minor editing, I have made no changes to the original article.  The history of this period has since then been amply documented including the role of the Nixon administration and of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the plot to assassinate Allende and install a military regime.  The main objective of the US-supported military coup in Chile was ultimately to  impose the neoliberal economic agenda.  The latter, in the case of Chile, was not imposed by external creditors under the guidance of IMF. “Regime change” was enforced  through a covert military intelligence operation, which laid the groundwork for the military coup. Sweeping macro-economic reforms (including privatization, price liberalization and the freeze of wages) were implemented in early October 1973.  Barely a few weeks after the military takeover, the military Junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet ordered a hike in the price of bread from 11 to 40 escudos, a hefty overnight increase of 264%. This “economic shock treatment” had been designed by a group of economists called the “Chicago Boys.”  While food prices had skyrocketed, wages had been frozen to ensure “economic stability and stave off inflationary pressures.” From one day to the next, an entire country had been precipitated into abysmal poverty; in less than a year the price of bread in Chile increased thirty-six fold (3700%). Eighty-five percent of the Chilean population had been driven below the poverty line.  I completed my work on the “unpublished paper’ entitled “The Ingredients of a Military Coup” (see text below) in late September.  In October and November, following the dramatic hikes in the price of food,  I drafted in Spanish an initial “technical” assessment of the Junta’s deadly macro-economic reforms. Fearing censorship, I limited my analysis to the collapse of living standards in the wake of the Junta’s reforms, resulting from the price hikes of food and fuel, without making any kind of political analysis.  The Economics Institute of the Catholic University was initially reluctant to publish the report. They sent it to the Military Junta prior to its release.  I left Chile for Peru  in December 1973. The report was released as a working paper (200 copies) by the Catholic University a few days before my departure. In Peru, where I joined the Economics Department of the Catholic University of Peru, I was able to write up a more detailed study of the Junta’s neoliberal reforms and its ideological underpinnings. This study was published in 1975 in English and Spanish.  Needless to say, the events of September 11 1973 also marked me profoundly in my work as an economist. Through the tampering of prices, wages and interest rates, people’s lives had been destroyed; an entire national economy had been destabilized. Macro-economic reform was neither “neutral” –as claimed by the academic mainstream– nor separate from the broader process of social and political transformation.  I also started to understand the role of military-intelligence operations in support of what is usually described as a process of “economic restructuring”. In my earlier writings on the Chilean military Junta, I looked upon the so-called “free market” reform as a well-organized instrument of “economic repression.”  Two years later, I returned to Latin America as a visiting professor at the National University of Cordoba in the northern industrial heartland of Argentina. My stay coincided with the 1976 military coup d’État. Tens of thousands of people were arrested; the “Desaparecidos” were assassinated. The military takeover in Argentina was “a carbon copy” of the CIA-led coup in Chile. And behind the massacres and human rights violations, “free market” reforms had also been prescribed, this time under the supervision of Argentina’s New York creditors.  In due course, the economic bullets of the free market system were hitting country after country.  Since the onslaught of the debt crisis of the 1980s, the same IMF economic medicine has routinely been applied in more than 100 developing countries. From my earlier work in Chile, Argentina and Peru, I started to investigate the global impacts of these reforms. Relentlessly feeding on poverty and economic dislocation, a New World Order was taking shape.  (For further details, see Michel Chossudovsky,The Globalisation of Poverty and the New World Order, Second Edition, Global Research, Montreal, 2003.  I should mention that the ongoing US-led economic destabilization of Venezuela including the manipulation of the foreign exchange market, leading to the collapse of the national currency the Bolivar  and the dramatic hikes in the prices of essential consumer goods, bears a canny resemblance to the months preceding the September 1973 military coup in Chile.  The transition to a right-wing military regime in Chile on September 11 [1973] has resulted after a lengthy and drawn-out process of economic boycott, subversion within the Armed Forces and political opposition to Allende’s Popular unity government.  In October 1970, General René Schneider was assassinated in a plot of the ultra-right together with seditious elements of the Armed Forces led by General Roberto Viaux. The assassination of General Schneider was part of a coordinated plan to prevent Parliament from ratifying Allende’s victory in the September 1970 presidential elections.  Last year’s [1972] October strike which paralyzed the economy for over a month, was organized by the gremios (employers’ organizations together with opposition labor and self employed organizations), the Partido Nacional and the ultra-right nationalist front Patria y Libertad. Some sectors of the Christian Democratic Party were also involved.  The October Strike had initially been planned for September 1972. “Plan Septiembre”  was apparently postponed due to the sudden dismissal of General Alfredo Canales from the Armed Forces. Canales together with Air Force General Herrera Latoja had earlier been in touch with Miguel Ubilla Torrealba of the nationalist front Patria y Libertad. Ubilla Torrealba was said to have been closely connected to the CIA. Despite General Canales premature retirement from the Armed Forces, Plan Septiembre was implemented in October beginning with a transport strike. The Right was hoping that those elements of the Armed forces, which had been inspired by General Canales would intervene against Allende. The October “Patronal” strike (employers and self-employed) failed due to the support of the Armed Forces headed by General Carlos Prats, who had integrated Allende’s cabinet as Minister of the Interior.  On June 29, 1973, Coronal Roberto Souper led his tank division in an isolated attack on La Moneda, the Presidential Palace, in the hope that other units of the armed forces would join in. The June coup had initially been planned for the morning of September 27 by Patria y Libertad as well as by several high ranking military officers. The plans were found out by Military Intelligence and the coup was called off at 6pm on the 26th. A warrant for the arrest of Coronal Souper had been issued. Confronted with knowledge of his impending arrest, Colonel Souper in consultation with the officers under his command, decided to act in a most improvised fashion. At 9 am, amidst morning rush hour traffic, Tank Division Number Two drove down Bernardo O’Higgins, Santiago’s main down-town avenue towards the Presidential Palace.  While the aborted June Coup had the appearance of an insolated and uncoordinated initiative, there was evidence of considerable support in various sectors of the Navy as well as from Air Force General Gustovo Leigh, now [September 1973] member of the military junta [on 11 September General Leigh integrated the military Junta headed by General Pinochet]. According to well-informed sources, several high ranking officers in the aero-naval base of Quintero near Valparaiso had proposed the bombing of State enterprises controlled by militant left wing groups, as well as the setting up of an air corridor to transport navy troops. The latter were slated to join up with the forces of Colonel Souper in Santiago.  The June trial coup was «useful» indicating to the seditious elements within the Chilean Armed Forces that an isolated and uncoordinated effort would fail. After June 29, the right-wing elements in the Navy and the Air Force were involved in a process of consolidation aimed at gaining political support among officers and sub-officers. The Army, however, was still under the control of Commander in Chief General Carols Prats, who had previously integrated Allende’s cabinet and who was a firm supporter of constitutional government.  Meanwhile in the political arena, the Christian Democrats were pressuring Allende to bring in members of the Military into the Cabinet as well as significantly revise the programme and platform of the Unidad Popular. Party leaders of the government coalition considered this alternative [proposed by the Christian democrats] as a « legalized military coup» (golpe legal) and advised Allende to turn it down. Carlos Altamirano, leader of the Socialist Party had demanded that an endorsement of the programme of the Popular Unity coalition by the military be a sina qua non condition for their entry into the Cabinet. Upon the impossibility of bringing in the Military into the Cabinet on acceptable terms, Allende envisaged the formation of a so-called “Cabinet of Consolidation” composed of well known personalities. Fernando Castillo, rector of the Catholic University and a member of the Christian Democratic Party, Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-|American Development Bank and other prominent personalities were approached but declined.  Pressured by economic deadlock and the transport strike, inflation of more than 15 percent per month and mounting political opposition, Allende sought in the course of July [1973] to resume the political dialogue with the Christian Democratic Party.  After the March [1973] parliamentary elections, Patricio Aylwin had replaced Renan Fuentealba [May 1973] as leader of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Fuentealba, who represented the progressive wing of the Christian Democratic (PDC), was known to be in favor of a rapprochement with Allende. In other words, this rightward shift and hardening of the Christian Democrats in relation to the Unidad Popular, contributed to reinforcing their tacit alliance with the ring wing National Party. This alliance was initially intended as an electoral pact in the March [1973] parliamentary elections in which the Unidad Popular obtained 43 percent of the popular vote.  The Dialogue between Allende and Alwyin was a failure. Aylwin stated :  The Communist Party Senator and prominent intellectual Volodia Teitelbaum response was:  While the Right was becoming more cohesive, a political split of the Left was imminent. The Communist Part sided with Allende’s constitutional strategy while a section of the Socialist Party (Allende’s own Party) led by Carlos Altamirano and the MAPU (Movimiento de Accion Popular Unitaria -initially a group of Christian Democrats which joined the Unidad Popular in 1969) led by Oscar Garreton, signified their distrust in “bourgeois legality” and the constitutional process and moved increasingly closer to the leftist revolutionary front Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). MIR maintained ideological and strategic relations with Cuban revolutionary groups as well as with the Bolivian and Uruguayan Tupamaros. While endorsing many features the programme of the Unidad Popular, the MIR rejected Allende’s “Chilean Road to Socialism” :  The cordones industriales were organized and politicized labor groups. Together with MAPU, MIR was in the process of developing the Grupos de Accion Urbana (Urban Action Groups), with the task of educating and preparing the masses for armed resistance in the case of a military coup.  In August [1973], the Armed forces initiated a series of violent search and arrests directed against the MIR and state enterprises integrated by the industrial belts (cordones industriales). These searches were conducted in accordance with the Fire Arms control Act, adopted by [the Chilean] Congress after the October [1992 employers] strike and which empowered the Armed Forces [bypassing the civilian police authorities] to implement (by Military Law) the control of fire arms. [The objective of this measure was to confiscate automatic weapons in the members of the industrial belts and curb armed resistance by civilians to a military coup]. Meanwhile, right-wing elements in the Navy and Air Force were involved in actively eliminating Allende supporters by a well organized operation of anti-government propaganda, purges and torture. On August 7 [1973], the Navy announced that a “subversive left wing group” integrated by MIR had been found out. Meanwhile, according to reliable sources, a seditious plan of the Right with the intent to bring down Allende’s government, using the Navy to control the entry of supplies into the country, had been discovered. Sailors and officers [within the Navy], who knew about these plans, were tortured and beaten.  The Role of the Political Right  [In August 1973], high ranking military officers and members of Patria y Libertad, met with Senator Bulnes Sanfuentes of the National Party. Admiral Merino now [September 1973] a member of the Junta participated in meetings with members of National Party, senators of the Christian Democratic Party and staff of the US embassy. In fact towards mid-August [1973], In FACT, towards mid-August, a motion declaring US ambassador Nathaniel Davis as persona non grata was drafted by a parliamentary committee of the Unidad Popular. Furthermore, the Armed Forces were colluding with the Ultra-Right by setting up a so-called Base operacional de Fuerzas especiales (BOFE) (Operational Base of Special Forces). BOFE units were integrated by member of the nationalist front Patria y Libertad.  BOFE units were paramilitary divisions receiving material and financial support from the Armed forces. They were intended to undertake subversive and terrorist activities, which the Armed Forces could not openly undertake. BOFE was responsible for the many bomb attacks on pipelines, bridges and electric installations in the months preceding the military coup of September 11 [1973].  On August 9, Allende reorganized his cabinet and brought in the three joint chiefs of staff, Carlos Prats (Army), Cesar Ruis Danyau (Air force) and Raul Montero (Navy) into a so-called “National Security Cabinet”. Allende was only intent upon resolving the Transport Strike, which was paralyzing the country’s economy, he was anxious to gain whatever support was left within the Armed Forces.  The situation was not ripe for a military coup as long as General Carol Prats was member of the cabinet, commander in Chief of the Army and Chairman of the Council of Generals. Towards mid-August, the armed forces pressured Allende and demanded Prats’ resignation and retirement ” due to basic disagreements between Prats and the Council of Generals”. Allende made a final attempt to retain |Prats and invited General Prats, Pinochet (now [September 1973] head of the Military Junta), Bonilla now Minister of the Interior), and others for dinner at his private residence. Prats resigned officially on August 23, both from the Cabinet and from the Armed Forces: “I did not want to be a factor which would threaten institutional discipline.. or serve as a pretext to those who want to overthrow the constitutional government”  With General Carlos Prats out of the way, the road was clear for a consolidated action by the Army, Navy and Air Force. Prats successor General Augusto Pinochet convened the Council of 24 generals in a secret meeting on August 28. The purpose and discussion of this meeting were not made public. In all likelihood, it was instrumental in the planning of the September 11 military coup. The reshuffle of Allende’s National Security Cabinet took place on the same day (28 August). It resulted after drawn out discussions with party leaders of the Unidad Popular coalition, and in particular with Socialist Party leader Carlos Altamirano.  The following day, August 29, Altamirano in a major policy speech made the following statement:  On the weekend preceding the military coup, leaders of the National Party and Christian Democratic Party made major political statements, declaring Allende’s government illegal and unconstitutional. Sergio Onofre Jarpa of the National Party declared:  A few days later, the Presidential Palace was bombed and Allende was assassinated. The “rebirth” of Chile, and a new institutional framework had emerged.  Selected References on the Role of Henry Kissinger in the 1973 military coup  Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, September 11, 1973, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8i.htm  30th anniversary of Chile coup; Calls for justice, scrutiny of United States role, Santiago. 11 Sep 2003, http://www.newsahead.com/NewWNF/ChileCoup.htm  USA Regrets Role in Chile’s September 11 Tragedy: US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, admitted Washington’s participation in Chile coup of 1973, Pravda, 17 March 2003,http://english.pravda.ru/world/20/91/368/9766_chile.html     [this statement was made barely a week after the military occupation of Iraq by US and British troops.]  Capital Accumulation in Chile and Latin America”, Yale University Lecture Series on Post-Allende Chile, North South, Canadian Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. IV, vol. XIII, no. 23, 1978, also published in Economic and Political Weekly.  “Acumulación de Capital en Chile”, Comercio Exterior, vol. 28, no. 2, 1978 (Spanish version of above article)  “Chicago Economics, Chilean Style”, Monthly Review, vol. 26, no. 11, 1975, in Spanish in a book published in Lima, Peru,  “Hacia el Nuevo Modelo Economico Chileno, Inflación y Redistribución del Ingreso, 1973-1974”, Cuadernos de CISEPA, no. 19, Catholic University of Peru, 1974, Trimestre Economico, no. 166, 1975, 311-347.  “The Neo-Liberal Model and the Mechanisms of Economic Repression: The Chilean Case”, Co-existence, vol. 12, no. 1, 1975, 34-57.  La Medición del Ingreso Minimo de Subsistencia y la Politica de Ingresos para 1974, documento de trabajo no. 19, Institute of Economics, Catholic University of Chile, Santiago, 1973, p. 37. (Initial  text on the economic reforms of the Chilean Military Junta published in December 1973)


globalresearch--2019-05-01--The Spontaneous Military Coup in Caracas was Meant to Fail

The Spontaneous “Military Coup” in Caracas was Meant to Fail?

Was it really a military coup?  Anybody who has lived in Caracas, knows that you cannot wage a spontaneous military coup starting up in Chacaito, an upper middle class residential area, with a view to eventually marching towards the Miraflores presidential palace located in the historical centre of Caracas, without getting caught in dense traffic.  There are important historical precedents of failed coups caught up in traffic.  Guaido presents the operation as the “Final phase” of “Operation Freedom.” ???  The government responded by sending in the riot police, with the Armed Forces using tear gas against the protesters.  This spontaneous so-called military putsch was meant to fail.  Visibly, it was not a carefully planned operation. And Washington was fully aware from the outset that it would fail.  In fact it was carefully staged “not to succeed”:  The scene then saw armed confrontations between the soldiers that backed Juan Guaido and those inside La Carlota airbase. [Carlota is not a full-fledged military base, it is a former private airport, largely defunct. It is now under the jurisdiction of the State of Miranda, used for both military and civilian emergencies] According to witnesses in La Carlota [air base], the Venezuelan armed forces fired tear gas towards the Altamira overpass, where civilian protesters began to gather, whereas Guaido’s soldiers returned live fire. Riot police also appeared on the scene to try and disperse the crowds. There are reports of protesters wounded and arrested that are unconfirmed at the time of writing. At the same time, many of the originally deployed soldiers withdrew from the scene, later revealing that they had been “deceived” by their superiors. Simultaneously, Chavista leaders took to state and social media to denounce what they termed a coup in progress, and large crowds gathered to defend Miraflores Presidential Palace. Guaido later attempted to lead a march, including some armed soldiers, into western Caracas but was stopped by Venezuelan National Guard forces in Chacaito, some 10 kilometers away from Miraflores.(Venezuela Analysis, May 1, 2019)  From Washington’s standpoint, the ‘putsch” nonetheless served a “useful” purpose. It created a “narrative”, which serves as propaganda and media disinformation.  In turn, the Western media goes into high gear.  The “coup” becomes a talking point for the Bolton -Pompeo national security team. It becomes a pretext and a justification for US military intervention in the name of Democracy at some future date. See Pompeo below  National security Advisor John Bolton calls upon Venezuela’s military to intervene, with US support.  Mild thunder before the storm? It sets the stage? What is the intended timeline?  A failed putsch which may be followed by a “real” US sponsored military coup at some later date? That option is already on the drawing-board of the Pentagon.  The failed coup, a sloppy intelligence operation? Unlikely. US intelligence was fully informed.  Was this event planned to fail from the very outset?  In Chile in 1973, the September 11 coup d’Etat which led to the assassination of Allende and the installation of a military government was a carefully prepared military-intelligence operation supported by the US. with Henry Kissinger playing a key role.  Of historical significance: The September 11, 1973 coup was preceded by a failed coup on June 29, 1973 , which, in retrospect, was intended to fail.  In 1973, I was visiting professor at the Catholic University of Chile. The following text is an excerpt from an article I wrote in Santiago de Chile in the immediate wake of September 11, 1973 military coup against the democratically elected government of president Salvador Allende.  Bear in mind: The circumstances of  Chile in 1973 as well as the command structure of the (Chilean) Armed Forces were very different to those of Venezuela in 2019.  In the course of the months of July-August 1973, following the June 29, 1973 failed coup, important shifts occurred within Chile’s Armed Forces.In turn, the Christian Democrats were pressuring Allende to bring the military into the government.  On June 29, 1973, Coronal Roberto Souper led his tank division in an isolated attack on La Moneda, the Presidential Palace, in the hope that other units of the armed forces would join in. The June coup had initially been planned for the morning of September 27 by Patria y Libertad as well as by several high ranking military officers. The plans were found out by Military Intelligence and the coup was called off at 6pm on the 26th. A warrant for the arrest of Coronal Souper had been issued. Confronted with knowledge of his impending arrest, Colonel Souper in consultation with the officers under his command, decided to act in a most improvised fashion. At 9 am, amidst morning rush hour traffic, Tank Division Number Two drove down Bernardo O’Higgins, Santiago’s main down-town avenue towards the Presidential Palace. While the aborted June Coup had the appearance of an insolated and uncoordinated initiative, there was evidence of considerable support in various sectors of the Navy as well as from Air Force General Gustovo Leigh, now [September 1973] member of the military junta [on 11 September General Leigh integrated the military Junta headed by General Pinochet]. According to well-informed sources, several high ranking officers in the aero-naval base of Quintero near Valparaiso had proposed the bombing of State enterprises controlled by militant left wing groups, as well as the setting up of an air corridor to transport navy troops. The latter were slated to join up with the forces of Colonel Souper in Santiago. The June trial coup was «useful» indicating to the seditious elements within the Chilean Armed Forces that an isolated and uncoordinated effort would fail. After June 29, the right-wing elements in the Navy and the Air Force were involved in a process of consolidation aimed at gaining political support among officers and sub-officers. The Army, however, was still under the control of Commander in Chief General Carols Prats, who had previously integrated Allende’s cabinet and who was a firm supporter of constitutional government. Meanwhile in the political arena, the Christian Democrats were pressuring Allende to bring in members of the Military into the Cabinet as well as significantly revise the programme and platform of the Unidad Popular. Party leaders of the government coalition considered this alternative [proposed by the Christian democrats] as a « legalized military coup» (golpe legal) and advised Allende to turn it down. Carlos Altamirano, leader of the Socialist Party had demanded that an endorsement of the programme of the Popular Unity coalition by the military be a sina qua non condition for their entry into the Cabinet. Upon the impossibility of bringing in the Military into the Cabinet on acceptable terms, Allende envisaged the formation of a so-called “Cabinet of Consolidation” composed of well known personalities. Fernando Castillo, rector of the Catholic University and a member of the Christian Democratic Party, Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-|American Development Bank and other prominent personalities were approached but declined. (Michel Chossudovsky, The Ingredients of a Military Coup, Universidad Catolica de Chile, Santiago, September 1973)  Minor edits to this text on May 1-2, 2019


globalresearch--2019-07-01--Military Coup in Sudan Overthrow of President Al-Bashir Transitional Process Impeded by Domestic

Military Coup in Sudan, Overthrow of President Al-Bashir:  Transitional Process Impeded by Domestic and International Factors

With the suppression by the military of the popular movement for democracy in the Republic of Sudan the current situation inside the country remains indecisive.  On June 3 the Rapid Security Forces (RSF) backed by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) violently disrupted an occupation being staged in Khartoum over the previous two months.  Demonstrations have taken place in this oil-rich nation since December when a sharp increase in bread and other commodities prices prompted mass protest. After commencement of the sit-in on April 6, just five days later the military leadership overthrew the government of President Omer Hassan al-Bashir who had ruled Sudan for three decades.  Sudan demonstrations led to the ouster of President al-Bashir  Negotiations between the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), an alliance of professional groups and various opposition political organizations, have broken down. FFC leaders are refusing hold direct talks with the TMC due to the actions carried out by the army and militias which resulted in the deaths of over 100 people.  Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visited Khartoum in an effort to mediate a settlement aimed moving the country towards civilian rule. Nonetheless, differing interpretations of the process for restarting talks have resulted in a social quagmire where neither the opposition groupings, which have not achieve total uniformity, along the military leadership, both appear to be unsure over which immediate directions are appropriate for the present circumstances.  Outside international interests including the United States, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are taking measures which bolster the TMC. Through Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the TMC is being subsidizes providing the basis for non-compliance with the demands of the FFC.  Egypt, which is the current chair of the continental African Union (AU), has supported the military in Khartoum. The approach of the AU as represented by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, is designed to maintain stability while at the same time follow the stated mandate of the AU of not recognizing regimes which come to power through military force.  Consequently, the Republic of Sudan has been suspended from AU membership while at the same time the TMC is hosting Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy as well as an appointed mediator from Addis Ababa, the seat of the continental organization. Although the U.S. administration of President Donald Trump condemned the crackdown on protesters in early June, a very limited role within the diplomatic arena is evident from Washington.  The U.S. had for many years maintained a hostile stance towards Sudan. The National Congress Party (NCP) government of ousted President al-Bashir over an extended period refused to abide by the foreign policy imperatives set down by successive administrations in Washington.  Two of the primary factors in the strained relations were the role of the People’s Republic of China in the burgeoning oil industry during the 1990s and the first decade of the 21stcentury, where Beijing has been enhancing its relations with the emerging petroleum producing state. In addition, support for the Palestinians and close diplomatic relations with Iran was strongly objected to by the U.S.  However, over the last several years there has been a dramatic foreign policy shift by the NCP administration. The participation by the Sudanese military in the western-backed war against the Ansurallah in Yemen marked a departure in regard to its relations with Tehran.  Overtures to the U.S. have become more pronounced while greater dependence upon Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Cairo increased. Despite these efforts by Khartoum, Washington and Wall Street is committed to bringing about the total subservience to an imperialist agenda for Sudan.  Political Composition of the FFC and Implications for Domestic and Foreign Policy  The most prominent of the opposition groups in Sudan which had demanded the resignation of the NCP government of ousted President al-Bashir is the Forces for Freedom and Change. This alliance issued a statement on January 1, 2019 with a program calling for various reforms to be enacted immediately.  According to the Declaration for Freedom and Change Forces (FFC):  “We, the people of Sudan across cities and villages, in the north, the south, the east, and the west; join our political and social movements, trade unions and community groups in affirming through this declaration that we will continue the course of peaceful struggle until the totalitarian regime is removed and the following goals are achieved: First, the immediate and unconditional end of General Omer al-Bashir’s presidency and the conclusion of his administration. Secondly: The formation of a National Transitional Government. This transitional government will be composed of qualified people based on merits of competency and good reputation, representing various Sudanese groups and receiving the consensus of the majority. Their role is to govern for a term of four years, until a sound democratic structure is established, and elections held.” (See this)  This same document continues by demanding an end to civil wars still raging inside the Republic of Sudan; the creation of a united front made up of various political interests; that special attention should be paid to improving the economic status and social welfare of the people inside the country; an effort to what is described as the rehabilitation of the image of the Republic of Sudan; the building of relations with neighboring governments and foreign states, with specific focus upon the newly-founded Republic of South Sudan which broke away from Khartoum with the full support of the U.S., Britain and Israel during 2011; and a respect for freedom of speech and the right to gather in order to address grievances.  The Declaration was signed by 22 different organizations including the SPA, which is listed first, and other academic, youth, women’s and civil society groupings. Interestingly enough, various opposition parties which have long been at odds with the NCP were not listed as signatories to the document.  Another political force involved in the mass efforts to overthrow the military and bring into existence civilian rule is the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). The party has expressed its solidarity with the FFC and the SPA. Nevertheless, the SCP in its statements emphatically emphasizes the critical role of trade unions in the struggle to replace the TMC.  In a statement issued on June 17, the SCP also urges elements within the military which are disgruntled with TMC rule to join the popular movement. This line says specifically that:  “Attempts must be made to win the soldiers of the armed forces into the revolution, and there are already references to the possibility of doing so. A TV channel had a dialogue with a member of the intelligence agency who had split to join the revolution, saying that the uniformed soldiers were stripped of their weapons and moved from their positions near the picket (sit-in) before the massacre and replaced by elements of the support forces (RSF). In other words, the generals were not fully confident of the loyalty of sectors of soldiers, who might have been following orders to kill the demonstrators.” (See this)  Prospects for Change and the Role of Divergent Political Interests  Other armed groups including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (North) and various organizations in Darfur where a full blown conflict had taken place several years ago against the central government in Khartoum, have been engaged in the discussions centering on establishing a new dispensation. However, it appears these efforts have not been successful in destabilizing the TMC during the period since the crushing of the mass demonstrations in early June.  The question becomes how long can the TMC hold out for its ultimate aim which is the acceptance of its “legitimate” role in the post-Bashir era? TMC spokespersons continue to articulate their willingness for the transition to a civilian government despite the repressive measures utilized against protesters.  At the same time the FFC and its allies must reset the character of popular resistance while maintaining a semblance of unity. Further repression against the FFC can only be transcended by the utilization of tactics which subvert the capacity of the TMC to maintain state power.  Washington is covertly attempting to influence the developments in Sudan since its objective is to ensure the maintenance of the state within imperialist sphere of influence. Only the sustainable resistance and revolutionary fervor of the people organized can supersede the forces of reaction leading to a people’s government and revolutionary transformation process.  Note to readers: please click the share buttons below. Forward this article to your email lists. Crosspost on your blog site, internet forums. etc.  Abayomi Azikiwe is the editor of Pan-African News Wire. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research.  All images in this article are from the author


sottnet--2019-11-11--The Military Coup Against Morales Won't End The Hybrid War On Bolivia

The Beginning Of The End?  President Morales resigned under duress following the military's "request" that he do so after the US-backed OAS alleged that it uncovered evidence supposedly proving that his recent re-election was rigged, but the military coup won't end the Hybrid War on Bolivia even in the unlikely "best-case" scenario that it ends the cycle of violence in the country becauseThe Hybrid War on Bolivia has thus far succeeded in removing the country's democratically re-elected and legitimate head of state after President Morales resigned under duress following the military's "request" that he do so, with this coup being made possible only because US intelligence had already co-opted the armed forces and. On the surface, it might appear as though the Hybrid War is over after it achieved its most visible victory of carrying out regime change in this lithium-rich and geostrategically located state smack dab in the center of South America, but the fact of the matter is that this campaign is far from over for several very important reasons.The first one is the most obvious, and it's that there might be some uncertain degree of physical resistance from ("former") President Morales' mostly indigenous supporters, whether in the form of street protests or possibly even a nascent insurgency that could represent the tangible beginning of a national liberation movement to liberate the country from the US-backed military-oligarchic yoke that it's suddenly been returned under after 13 years of freedom. The military preemptively sought to offset this scenario just prior to the coup by commencing what Reuters reported was "air and land operations to 'neutralize' armed groups that act outside the laws", which in the country's political context could only have been a euphemism for beginning operations against President Morales' mostly indigenous supporters and not their right-wing opponents allied with the armed forces who were rioting throughout the country for several weeks already.In hindsight, this means that not only did a military coup occur, but that it was preceded by what was arguably the unofficial onset of a low-level civil war whereby the armed forces went outside the legal chain of command (considering that they had yet to demand his resignation at the time) in order to " confront the people " despite previously denying that they had any such intention. This dramatic move came after the "opposition" seized state media in the capital, the homes of President Morales' sister and two of his governors were torched Saturday night, and an allied mayor was lynched in the streets by the "opposition" a few days prior.It's little wonder then that President Morales implored his countrymen during his resignation speech to "stop attacking the brothers and sisters, stop burning and attacking" since he feared for his supporters' lives after what had recently just taken place, especially seeing as how he would have already had knowledge of the military's ongoing operation against them that was commenced earlier that same day.while serving a so-called "warrant" for his arrest (on the presumable basis of something having to do with electoral or another form of alleged "corruption") and relying on what would have been the unsubstantiated claim that he "resisted" or was "armed" in order to "justify" killing him in cold blood just like their predecessors did to the famous Che Guevara a little over half a century ago.If they don't succeed in capturing him soon, the US-backed armed forces might even request American and/or Brazilian "anti-terrorist" assistance after possibly claiming that he and his supporters are connected to Iran's IRGC and/or Colombia's FARC considering President Morales' close with the Islamic Republic and vehement support of socialism, respectively. They could also "justify" their request for a direct military intervention by reminding the region of his alliance with Venezuelan President Maduro and alleging that the latter is somehow involved in President Morales' so-called "terrorist" and possibly even "drug-trafficking" activities. The deck is therefore stacked against him and his supporters even in the event that they resort to waging a national liberation campaign,That's the worst-case scenario, but the "best-case" one isn't much better, which would see theIn other words, his supporters would simply surrender and allow the process to unfold without any physical resistance, which seems extremely unlikely but could nevertheless still occur if the campaign of terror presently being waged against them succeeds in scaring the population into submission.Some of the most likely structural-institutional consequences would be the granting of fiscal (and possibly even political) autonomy to the gas-rich "opposition" strongholds of the so-called "Media Luna" lowlands where most of the mestizos live and the drastic reduction of taxes on foreign mining firms operating in the indigenous-populated highlands, which could altogether serve to deprive President Morales' mostly indigenous supporters of the resources needed to subsidize their socio-economic programs.Acutely aware of the future that awaits them if the military coup succeeds in stripping them of their hard-earned socio-economic rights and institutionalizing their status as slaves to the neoliberal-globalist system supported by their country's oligarchy and its American/Brazilian backers, it wouldn't be surprising if the "worst-case" scenario transpires of President Morales' mostly indigenous supporters waging a full-fledged national liberation insurgency.Considering the dynamics at play, Bolivia might soon become known as the "Latin American Libya", and the consequences could easily spread throughout the rest of South America just as Libya's spread throughout Africa.


fortruss--2019-06-18--Rebuilding Syrias Post-War Rural Economy It starts with Chickens

Rebuilding Syria’s Post-War Rural Economy? It starts with Chickens

In its weekly session, the Council of Ministers allocated one billion Syrian pounds to provide a free grant to rural families, including 15 chickens with 50 kg of fodder per family, in order to encourage the raising of domestic poultry and the economic empowerment of rural families. The Council also approved an integrated strategy for the re-development of the poultry industry in all its components as one of the main components of food security and economic development.  According to a press release of the Council, the strategy included the re-operation of destroyed and damaged work places, and the organization of the work of slaughterhouses and their geographical distribution. The Council requested the Ministry of Local Administration to simplify administrative licensing procedures for slaughterhouses and slaughterhouses and to settle the situation of those who are not licensed,


globalresearch--2019-12-03--Syria’s Post-War Reconstruction: 600 Establishments Resume Work at Aleppo Industrial City, Sheikh Na

Syria’s Post-War Reconstruction: 600 Establishments Resume Work at Aleppo Industrial City, Sheikh Najjar

Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city and the region’s economic power horse is getting back on its feet again, despite all the efforts by the US and its NATO stooges and terrorists.  It’s moving forward slowly but steadily, with over 600 establishments resuming work at the once-thriving Aleppo Industrial City at Sheikh Najjar, which Turkey’s madman Erdogan and his anti-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood criminals looted to its skeleton and then destroyed like all other areas infested by followers of these two cults.  The following report by SANA from the Aleppo Industrial City at Sheikh Najjar reveals the latest updates there:  The English transcript of the above video  Investment in the Sheikh Najjar industrial city in Aleppo is growing steadily in light of providing the necessary requirements for the industry in terms of infrastructure services and the facilities granted for the reconstruction of facilities affected by terrorism, and building new blocks and supplying them with production lines.  Hazem Ajan – Director of Sheikh Najjar Industrial City: After the city completed most of its service projects for production facilities and delivered basic services of electricity and water to the production workshops in the industrial city we moved on with our plans to strategic projects in the city like the Exhibition City that provides basic promotion of the city’s products in particular and local products in general, because it was selected as an exhibition city at the level of Aleppo province.  The project of labor housing has also started on an area of 258 hectares in coordination with the Public Housing Establishment, we are currently coordinating with the Union of Artisans in the first handicraft area, which provides about 500 artisans plots.  600 industrial establishments currently operating took off in the Industrial City, 50% of them are textile establishments, followed by engineering industries with about 150 establishments and the rest is distributed to the chemical and food industries.  Hussam Salahia – Owner of a textile facility: After the liberation of the industrial city we returned and renewed our work and now produce bathrobes and dyeing yarns, our yarns industry is national product.  Anas Dabbagh – owner of a facility for engineering industries and heaters: We were working before the war and despite the crisis and the damage done to us where the factory was sabotaged, we re-repaired and worked and continue to work. We produce everything related to heaters, we provide the needs for the local market and we export to Lebanon and other countries.  Omar Oso – Owner of Food Industries Establishment: We manufacture tahini and halawa in addition to jam. Production stages start with sesame, we add sugar to make halawah.  Syria is under unprecedented draconian sanctions by the USA and a host of countries under its control, these sanctions are imposed to punish the Syrian people for not accepting the US hegemony like its other slaves around the world and to impede the rebuilding of the country after almost 9 years of the US-led War of Terror.  Note to readers: please click the share buttons above or below. Forward this article to your email lists. Crosspost on your blog site, internet forums. etc.