==Summary of research on 3rd Ypres== 
 I. The decision to attack at Ypres put the Germans on the spot, stand fast and get another battering or withdraw to buy time and risk compromising the German hold on the area further north and the Belgian coast. Haig's preparations with 4th Army were taken seriously by the Germans. 

 II. The operation was far bigger than Messines so it is potentially misleading to compare them. 

 III. The 'delay' between Messines and Pilckem Ridge was a practical matter because the British had to shift artillery from further south around Arras and the north end of the Hindenburg Line and because poor weather and the German unveiling of Mustard gas before 31st July inhibited the counter-battery effort. 

 IIIa. French support was less than expected due to the effect of the failure of the breakthrough attempts of the Nivelle Offensive but it showed a promising revival later on at Malmaison and Verdun as well as on the northern flank of the Ypres operation from the start. 

 IV. The width of the front attacked on the 31st was as wide as practical and a narrower front attack along the ridge would have caused more problems than the attack that did take place by inviting enfilade fire from the area of Houthoulst Forest and hampering French flank support. 

 V. The 'neglect' of the Gheluvelt Plateau is hindsight since II Corps was the biggest corps in the BEF and had an unprecedented amount of artillery support. 

 VI. Gough's 'breakthrough' efforts amount to a desire not to let opportunities go begging so making provision for a further push by advance guards to the Red Line, which was conditional on the state of the German defence (to be determined by the local div and corps commanders) and that the Green Line was the line to consolidate on. An advance to the Green Line was 3,000-3,500 yards which doesn't amount to a breakthrough attempt and exceeds Davidson's recommendation by 500 yards only, in one part of the attack front. 

 VII. Gough envisaged a series of similar set pieces, which is what did happen except that the lousy unseasonable weather in August and the German relative defensive success on the plateau inhibited the advance further north after the 31st. 

 VIII. The armies regrouped to counter the relative success of the German defence of the Plateau and demolished it in late September-early October in much better weather using a refinement of the methods used earlier, against which German defensive methods were unavailing. 

 IX. The lousy weather returned but the British used their refined method to overcome the obstacles created by the weather and the German defence to capture Passchendaele village and ground beyond in three more short bounds which left the Germans hanging on by their fingernails.