Photo

Read in Chinese | 点击查看本文中文版

President Xi Jinping is making his first state visit to the United States at a time when China exerts greater influence on the world stage than at any point since the Communist Party took power in 1949. To some Westerners, the image of Mr. Xi as a canny and potent leader has been dulled a bit in recent weeks by growing questions over the economic slowdown and the government’s handling of the stock market crisis. But for many Chinese, Mr. Xi remains very much the symbol of a new era of nationalist fervor, as Mr. Xi, in his words, seeks to secure the “China dream” for his people and drive the nation further down the “road to rejuvenation.”

Photo

Part of that national revival involves expanding China’s territorial footprint in the South China Sea, to the consternation of the United States and Southeast Asian nations, as well as underlining Chinese wartime resistance to Japan. Jessica Chen Weiss, an associate professor of government at Cornell University, has studied grass-roots nationalism in China and the interplay between populist protests and the Chinese party-state. Her book “Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations,” published last year, is based on that research. In an interview, she discussed Mr. Xi’s brand of nationalism and how that has played out in China.

Q.

Earlier this month, you said that the Chinese Communist Party’s military parade commemorating the defeat of Japan in World War II reflected “Xi’s renewed emphasis on top-down nationalism.” How has this manifested itself in the first three years of Xi’s tenure, and how does it differ from the pre-Xi era?

A.

For all Xi’s rhetoric about the “China dream,” the Chinese leadership is afraid that nationalist mobilization will trigger broader instability and put undue pressure on Chinese foreign policy.

Grass-roots activism has been largely repressed since Xi Jinping took over three years ago. Under Xi, China has designated three new holidays to commemorate World War II, including a spectacular parade to showcase China’s growing military might. But public participation in commemorative events has been tightly scripted. Even a Baidu message board search for Sept. 18, the newly enshrined day to remember Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, turns up the result: “Sorry, according to relevant laws and policies, this board is temporarily closed.”

Q.

Some analysts compare Xi Jinping to Mao Zedong and speak of similarities in the ways in which they tried to harness grass-roots nationalism. What are your thoughts?

Photo

A.

Every leader since Mao has tried to harness grass-roots nationalism to some extent, as I show in “Powerful Patriots.” Under Mao, rallies against the United States and the Soviet Union were massive and commonplace. Even Deng Xiaoping, who reopened China to the world, invoked student protests in admonishing Japanese leaders to temper their behavior. Under Jiang Zemin, anti-NATO and anti-American demonstrations erupted when U.S. planes accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Hu Jintao presided over two waves of anti-Japanese protests: in 2012, over Japan’s purchase of three islands in the East China Sea, and in 2005, over Japan’s bid to join the permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council.

As for Xi, comparisons to Mao mostly rest on his efforts to concentrate power and build a charismatic image as “Uncle Xi.” But unlike Mao, Xi has not called upon the masses to rise up and shake a collective fist against foreign powers. So far, Xi Jinping has shown a tough but temperate face to the world, relying upon China’s material power to assert and defend Chinese interests without giving in to extreme voices on the Internet. But this restraint may not last. With all the attention that the Chinese media have given lately to China’s maritime claims, a fatal collision or provocative incident — particularly with the United States or Japan — could trigger a public response that would be difficult for the Chinese government to control.

Q.

In your writings, you describe a complex relationship between the Chinese party-state and grass-roots protesters and how street protests provide an opportunity for officials to send signals to various audiences in China and abroad. At the same time, those protests pose a risk to the leaders. In the Xi Jinping era, have you seen this kind of interplay?

A.

For the past three decades, China’s leaders have selectively tolerated grass-roots protests, allowing nationalist demonstrations to bolster a tough diplomatic stance and repressing such protests to show flexibility and reassurance. But stage-managed protests are often suspected of being puppet shows rather than genuine popular movements. Chinese officials thus face a Catch-22 in managing popular nationalism. For the “feelings of the Chinese people” to be credible with outside observers, citizens must also be free to air their views online and in the streets.

Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, shortly after anti-Japanese protests underscored the domestic and diplomatic dangers of trying to stage-manage nationalist protests. Demonstrations in over 200 Chinese cities showcased the danger that protests against Japan might change direction and gather outside government headquarters, as they did in the southern city of Shenzhen. But these deviations from the official script were regarded by foreign skeptics as evidence that state-sponsored nationalism was merely a convenient outlet for domestic grievances.

Xi inherited the standoff with Japan in the East China Sea. Preventing an accidental escalation to war, plus a redoubled effort to crack down on possible sources of public dissent, explains why would-be activists have been told that the time is “not convenient” to organize.

Photo

Q.

Xi Jinping will be only the fourth Chinese leader since 1949 to be welcomed by the White House with the formalities of a state visit. How will this play to grass-roots nationalism in China?

A.

Whether or not the summit produces any tangible outcomes, Xi’s visit is likely to be portrayed positively back home. The desire for international respect is central to the nationalist narrative that girds the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy. Xi Jinping has placed particular emphasis on achieving a “new type of major power relations” that implies a more equal footing between China and the United States. Barring any unexpected slights or gaffes in protocol, Xi’s state visit and speech at the United Nations will provide a visible domestic reminder that China is an important and powerful member of the international community.

The diplomatic stakes of Xi’s visit are far greater than the domestic stakes. Coming at a time when U.S. businesses are increasingly worried about Chinese economic policies and Republican candidates have criticized Obama for being too soft on China, a positive outcome of Xi’s visit would be to signal China’s renewed commitment to international cooperation and arrest the rising chorus of mutual criticism.

Q.

Xi Jinping’s military parade tried to capitalize on a sense of Chinese pride in resisting Japan. How widespread is that sentiment in China these days?

A.

Negative attitudes toward Japan are widespread among mainland Chinese. According to a recent Pew survey, less than 10 percent of Chinese think that Japan can be trusted — and the feeling is mutual. Many observers are surprised by how vehemently young Chinese who did not personally experience the war feel about Japan. State propaganda and patriotic education in schools also tend to make criticism of Japan politically correct, so it’s difficult to know how entrenched these attitudes are.

The geographic dispersion of nationalist protests is another way of looking at variation in Chinese nationalism. In a recent paper with Jeremy Wallace, we find that cities with larger numbers of college students were more likely to have a protest at the beginning of the 2012 wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations. Cities with larger numbers of migrant workers were also more likely to witness an anti-Japanese protest.

Q.

What can we expect to see at the grass-roots level here as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan continues to try to transform the Japanese military?

A.

With the passage of legislation allowing Japanese forces to fight abroad and assist the United States in an event of an attack, Prime Minister Abe has done an end-run around the more difficult and symbolic hurdle of revising the Japanese Constitution. Two factors make it unlikely that Chinese authorities will encourage or tolerate a strong grass-roots response. First is Washington’s support for an expanded Japanese role. Second is the icy détente between China and Japan in the East China Sea and the knowledge that Abe is unlikely to be replaced in the near term. Given China’s focus on managing relations with the United States, it is unlikely that China will do more than verbally denounce Japan’s expanding military role and Prime Minister Abe’s “irresponsible” attitude toward Japan’s wartime past.

Q.

We haven’t seen notable street protests in China yet over territorial conflicts in the South China Sea, even when Chinese workers were killed in Vietnam last year by protesters during one particularly tense period. Why?

A.

Quashing street protests over the South China Sea is consistent with China’s broader strategy of expanding its physical presence in the area while trying to mitigate the regional backlash. China has not hesitated to press its material advantage over Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea, so Chinese resolve in these disputes has not been questioned. Nationalist sentiment in China is also less vehement toward Southeast Asian nations than Japan or the United States, so the “supply” of popular Chinese activism has been comparatively smaller and easier for the Chinese government to tamp down. Indeed, it is China’s growing presence around disputed islands and shoals that have triggered nationalist protests in Vietnam and the Philippines. Despite riots that killed several Chinese workers in Vietnam, China prevented retaliatory protests and showcased Vietnamese efforts to crack down on the so-called troublemakers.

Q.

To what extent does your research apply to Vietnam, which has a turbulent history with China but where the Vietnamese Communist Party often studies Chinese governance models?

A.

China is not alone in invoking popular feelings in its diplomatic relations. The Vietnamese government has also allowed grass-roots protests to convey Vietnamese anger and resolve to Beijing. In a new paper on nationalist protests and territorial disputes in Southeast Asia, John Ciorciari and I note that Vietnam briefly tolerated anti-Chinese protests in 2007, 2011 and 2014, but stifled them in 2009, 2012 and 2013. This pattern can be explained by Vietnamese efforts to resist Chinese actions in the South China Sea, balanced with government fears that nationalist protests could spiral out of control. The danger that “a single spark can start a prairie fire” was realized last year when peaceful anti-China protests in Vietnam escalated to riots against foreign factories, many of them not even Chinese.

When authoritarian leaders want to resist foreign pressure, they often point to grass-roots sentiment in the proverbial street. The challenge for Chinese, Vietnamese and other authoritarian leaders is making these claims credible. Even when nationalist protests get out of hand, the mixture of motivations — such as poor wages or working conditions — may also feed foreign accusations that protesters do not really care about the international dispute.

Follow Edward Wong on Twitter @comradewong.