Battle of Ekeren
The Battle of Ekeren, which took place on 30 June 1703, was a battle of the War of the Spanish Succession. A Franco-Spanish army of around 24,000 men surrounded a smaller Dutch force of 12,000 men, which however managed to break out and retire to safety. The battle had very little strategic effect, but while it had shown the skill of the Dutch troops, it also highlighted the disunity in the Anglo-Dutch command structure. Conflicts arose between various commanders, who all blamed eachother for the near-disaster. In France Louis XIV was also displeased, as his superior force had led the Dutch escape. Background
The War of the Spanish Succession had commenced in the Netherlands in 1702 with the siege and capture of Kaiserswerth, and with the unsuccessful assault of the French army on Nijmegen. Marlborough, later seeing himself at the head of 60,000 men, took advantage of this strong force by going on the offensive and penetrating into the Spanish Netherlands. Like Frederick Henry in 1632, the British commander followed the course of the river Meuse. The river was very important as a line of operation, because, due to the inadequacy of the land roads at that time, the possession of a river or a canal to transport an army's military necessities was not only advantageous, but almost necessary. The fortresses along the Meuse of Venlo, Stevensweert, Roermond and Liège succumbed to the Allies during this campaign. The French commanders observed the sieges of those cities idly. They had no other intention than to protect the regions of Brabant by means of an extensive entrenched line, which, passed over to the right bank of the Scheldt at Antwerp, and extended over Herentals, Aarschot, Diest and the Mehaigne near Huy to the Meuse. (See gallery at the bottom of the page)

Prelude
In 1703 the campaign began with the siege of Bonn, which gave way to Menno van Coehoorn's attacks in the first half of May. After the surrender of that fortress, Marlborough and the army that had conducted the siege joined the army with which Ouwerkerk had stood firm at Maastricht, for the purpose of countering Villeroy's French army and preventing it from advancing to the aid of Bonn. The greater part of May and June continued with inconclusive movements on both side, after which Marlborough decided to attack and break through the entrenched lines behind which the French army had withdrawn. Marlborough proposed sieges of Ostend and Huy to draw French forces away from the vital centre of Anwerp, but his plan was vetoed by the Dutch. Instead Marlborough planned to break through the lines near Diest with the main army of 55,000 men under himself and Ouwerkerk, while on the left bank of the Scheldt a division under generals Coehoorn and Sparre would attack the lines, opposite Dutch Flanders. Another division under general Count Wassenaer Obdam, had to enclose Antwerp via the other side of the Scheldt, and to that end advance to the village of Ekeren, only one hour away from the French lines. Questions can be raised about this plan of attack as the two divisions under the Dutch generals were isolated from each other by the Scheldt and would not be able to come to each other's aid quickly in case of emergency. Obdam had to send several of his battalions to join Coehoorn. His depleted force marched on 28 June from Bergen op Zoom to Antwerp and arrived the next day at Ekeren, seven kilometres north of Antwerp, just south of Dutch held Fort Lillo. Obdam's army had not remained blind to the danger it faced, and two of its sub-commanders, the Lord of Slangenburg and Count of Tilly, had stressed that danger to the head of the army. Obdam believed he should not act against the orders received and not abandon the position at Ekeren, but he reminded Marlborough of the precarious state of the Dutch army. Marlborough however ordered him to stay were he was. If this situation had lasted only a short while, and the allies had kept the enemy occupied everywhere by attacking quickly and forcefully, the danger to Obdam would have been reduced. This was however not this case. On 27 June, Coehoorn and Sparre did attack and capture the enemy's lines at Stekene near Hulst,  but the main army under Marlborough and Ouwerkerk started its diversion too early. By the end of June, the army had already stripped the area around Maastricht and Liège bare and would therefore have to move elsewhere. They warned Obdam on 29 June that Villeroy had taken advantage of this to send Duc de Boufflers with part of the French army to Antwerp. The baggage was moved to safety in time, but the positions which the army occupied were not yet abandoned. The battle

Early in the morning of 30 June French dragoons marched from Merksem and Ekeren in the direction of Kapellen to cut off the escape route near Hoevenen for the Dutch to return to Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. The Marquis of Bedmar and his Spanish troops were positioned near Wilmarsdonk. This ensured that the Dutch forces were surrounded on all sides. Although estimates vary most historians describe that the Dutch were severely outnumbered by two to one or more. Soon Dutch reconnaissance discovered the French dragoons and Obdam immediately sent his cavalry to Hoevenen and Muisbroek, but it was too late, the villages were packed with French troops. They also found the French in great numbers in the village of Oorderen. Seeing the road through Oorderen as the only way to escape the encirclement, Obdam gave orders, around 4 o'clock, to attack the village and the Dutch secured control of the village without much difficulty. Meanwhile in the polder, Slangenburg, the Tilly and François Nicolas Fagel started to fight the French in a struggle reminiscent of a rearguard action. It was only now that the bulk of the Franco-Spanish infantry arrived on the battlefield. They were mainly sent to the polder where the Franco-Spanish attack gained new intensity. Supported by 10 pieces of artillery, they stormed the Dutch positions. However, the many ditches and hedges in the landscape eroded the cohesion of the attackers and the fighting evolved into isolated battles. Meanwhile, the French-Spanish cavalry had to remain largely inactive because the terrain hindered their usage. The engagement was long and bloody, but Dutch drill and independently and quick thinking lower commanders made up for their lack in numbers. In the meantime, the French tried to retake Oorderen, but a first attempt was comfortably repulsed. After the arrival of fresh Franco-Spanish troops, another attempt was made. Here, too, the battle was long and fierce. Around 6 o'clock, Fagel sustained a head injury, which caused some confusion among his troops fighting in the polder. They pulled back which gave the French and Spanish the opportunity to throw more troops into the battle for Oorderen and the Dutch were finally driven out of the village. Mérode-Westerloo then led further attacks to break through to Wilmarsdonk, but these were repulsed. However, a charge by a detachment of French dragoons did manage to separate Obdam from his troops and after some time after 6 o'clock there was no more sign of him. He and his companions had removed the Allied green from their hats and their Orange sashes so that the French mistook them for their own countrymen. Thinking his army was destroyed, he then sent a letter reporting defeat to The Hague. Slangenburg, supported by Tilly, Fagel and  took over command. Around this time, some Dutch troops ran out of ammunition and Fagel ordered the soldiers to use the tin buttons of their uniform coats as bullets. It now became very urgent to break the encirclement. Tilly ordered an attack on some 1,500 Franco-Spanish horseman crammed on a dyke to relieve the pressure on the Dutch troops in the polder. Hompesch gathered a number of cavalry squadrons and then charged the Franco-Spanish cavalry. The Franco-Spanish cavalry broke and Hompesch pursued them for a distance of more than a kilometre. He then attacked the French infantry and managed to disperse some of their battalions, after which these French troops left the battlefield in confusion. As a result the French in the polder pulled back. An attack by four fresh Spanish battalions from Antwerp approaching over the Scheldt embankment was subsequently repulsed. These successes created the opportunity to free up troops for a final assault on Oorderen, to force a breakthrough to safety. If this failed, the army was still lost. Mérode-Westerloo commanded the French troops in Oorderen, but the quality of his troops left much to be desired. Some had even dived into the cellars and came out drunk, while a lack of pioneers had prevented the village from being substantially fortified. Around 9 o'clock, the Dutch attack began. The Baron of Friesheim and the Count of Dohna sent their men wading through waist-deep water, with bayonets ready, on a flanking manoeuvre. They surprised the French and appeared on their flank and rear. The main Dutch force, clustered in a thick mass and followed by the cavalry, advanced over the Scheldt embankment from Wilmerdonk, and stormed Oorderen from that side. Here too the fighting was long and hard, but after 10 o'clock Mérode-Westerloo was forced to retreat. The French still held out at a sluice behind the village, where they had entrenched themselves; but this post was also overwhelmed. The Dutch now occupied the village and the encirclement was broken. The Dutch army spent the night at Oorderen, where it was reinforced by a few battalions that Coehoorn had sent to their aid from the other side of the Scheldt. At dawn of the following day, the march was continued to Lillo, where they arrived unhindered, without any French attempts to prevent their retreat. The Duke of Berwick, one of the French generals, wrote:

Aftermath

The battle was undecided, but both sides claimed victory. The Dutch because they had forced the French from the battlefield, allowing the outnumbered Dutch to retire to safety and the French and Spanish because they occupied the battlefield the next day. Both parties also appealed to outward signs of victory such as captured banners and standards. The battle had meant little strategically. The Dutch pulled back several kilometres, occupying a tactically more favourable position, and Boufflers' detachment returned, as if nothing had happened, to the French main army. Not much changed about the situation in Flanders. The chances of success for the Allied plans had neither increased nor decreased. Both before and after the battle, everything depended on the actions of the main armies under Marlborough and Villeroy. Boufflers was blamed for letting a perfect chance slip through his fingers. He argued that the limited success of the French forces in this otherwise well-designed and initially promising undertaking was caused by the quality of Bedmar's infantry regiments. Alongside battalions that performed their duties to the best of their ability, there were others whose combat value was less than mediocre. However, Louis XIV was so displeased with Boufflers that he not only withheld the supreme command from him in future, but also did not allow him to lead a force in the open field anymore, except for the year of 1709. Obdam had panicked in the afternoon and had managed to get through the enemy line with a handful of riders. The States of Holland, after a careful investigation, declared that they had found that he was not at fault, but the incident ruined his military career. Slangenburg, for his part, was acclaimed as a Dutch hero. He had always been known as a difficult character, but with his newfound fame he was even less inclined to keep quiet. He refrained from supporting rehabilitation for Obdam, got into open conflict with other Dutch commanders and was also furious at Marlborough, who he accused of allowing them to fall into a trap he had warned Marlborough about. This difficult relationship with his peers would eventually lead to his dismissal in 1705. Nevertheless, the Dutch officers and men had shown their best side while the French and Spanish troops, despite their superiority, had been unable to hold out. The Dutch infantry had once again proved to be the best in Europe. Boufflers wrote that the Dutch had very-exercised troops whose strength is to fire well, which they certainly do to perfection and with a marvelous order. But it was the performance of the Dutch cavalry that most impressed contemporaries. Chaplain of the Royal Scots, Samuel Noyes, wrote: The Dutch Horse has done wonders against the troops of the French household and [the French] begin to despise them as much as they were formerly despised by others. They had shown that they were no longer inferior to the French and Spanish cavalry. Although Obdam's conduct was widely criticised, in England the battle was presented by most as a Dutch success. Marlborough described the battle as one of the most magnificent exploits of the era, but did not share the delight of his countrymen. He was criticised because of the incident, and although Huy, Limbourg and Geldern fell into Allied hands in the months following Ekeren, Marlborough failed to bring Villeroy to battle. He feared that the lack of decisive success in the Low Countries would deter the Dutch from sending troops to Germany, where the Holy Roman Emperor was in an increasingly dire military situation. Notes

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Battle of Ekeren
Battles involving France
Battles involving the Dutch Republic
Battles of the War of the Spanish Succession
Battles involving the Spanish Netherlands
1703 in Europe
Battle of Ekeren
18th century in the Southern Netherlands
Battles involving Spain