Trying to brainstorm random scenarios about what could make there be a future &quot;3.&quot;, &quot;4.&quot;, etc...<p>3. &quot;Enabling&quot; (some kind of sabotage, infiltration, or collaboration) means a lot of things with a theoretically sound design are broken or backdoored in a way that is somehow hard to notice.<p>4. End-to-end encryption has a lot of UI inconveniences around key management, so it will only used for a small minority of communications.<p>5. The &quot;Going Bright&quot; paper&#x27;s world in which it continues to be easy for governments to hack people. (However, the connection to the data centers isn&#x27;t very obvious -- maybe for archiving stuff that was transferred with a non-forward-secret protocol, but why will things be transferred with such protocols?)<p>6. The fear about quantum computers is justified because they only cost about a billion dollars to reduce to practice at a level that can attack deployed systems. For some reason, the transition to post-quantum crypto is especially slow, difficult, or error-prone.<p>7. Crypto developers continue not to do Cryptopals and, for decades, continue to make frequent implementation mistakes that allow passive adversaries to defeat their systems.<p>8. There&#x27;s going to continue to be an easy covert way to get in proximity of servers and read their session keys, but that way doesn&#x27;t allow covert exfiltration of plaintexts from the servers so attackers need to record the ciphertext elsewhere.<p>9. The data centers are for recording metadata events, which are expected to become incredibly voluminous.<p>10. The Internet of Things industry still accepts second-class cryptographic mechanisms supposedly because of technical limitations of their devices, so uses smaller keylengths, no PFS, inadequate RNG, obsolete or custom ciphers...<p>11. People still use GSM phones with Kᵢ physically generated by their carrier as a basis for confidentiality of a portion of their communications, and it&#x27;s still possible to attack the carriers&#x27; generation and distribution of these keys.