The article title really, <i>really</i> needs an extra word: &quot;Chrome&quot;, between &quot;Google&quot; and &quot;Will&quot;. At first glance I thought it would be about the search engine, which would be a very disturbing thought indeed; it&#x27;s already hard enough to find the older, highly informative and friendly sites --- which often are plain HTTP.<p>Nevertheless, quite convincing security arguments aside, I feel this also has a very authoritarian side to it: they are effectively saying that your site, if it is not given a &quot;stamp of approval&quot; by having a certificate signed by some central group of authorities, is worthless. Since CAs also have the power to revoke certificates, enforced HTTPS  makes it easier to censor, control, and manipulate what content on the Web users can access, which I certainly am highly opposed to. I can see the use-case for site like banks&#x27; and other institutions which are already centralised, but I don&#x27;t think such control over the Web in general should be given to these certificate authorities.<p>With plain HTTP, content can be MITM&#x27;d and there won&#x27;t be much privacy, but it seems to me that getting a CA to revoke a certificate is much easier than trying to block a site (or sites) by other means, and once HTTPS is enforced strongly by browsers, would be a very effective means of censorship. Thus I find it ironic that the article mentions &quot;repressive government&quot; and &quot;censor information&quot; --- HTTPS conceivably gives <i>more</i> power to the former to do the latter, and this is very much not the &quot;open web&quot; but the centralised, closed web that needs approval from authorities for people to publish their content in.<p>There&#x27;s a clear freedom&#x2F;security tradeoff here, and given what CAs and other institutions in a position of trust have done in the past with their power, I&#x27;m not so convinced the security is worth giving up that freedom after all...