Take a look at google&#x27;s certs. They&#x27;re only valid for a few months. A system that tracks certificates encourages site operators to share the same cert and key across many servers and to allow it to live for a long time. With the sorry state of certificate revocation this is not ideal.<p>On the server side it&#x27;s better for each server to have it&#x27;s own private key and certificate which is valid for a short period of time and frequently renewed. So the compromise of one server does not compromise certificates on any other servers and the useful lifetime of a compromised key is very limited.<p>I think DNSSEC and DANE is the best solution. Allow the certificate thumbprints to be published securely in DNS. At least then we reduce the number of trusted authorities to the TLDs and the scope of authority for each one is automatically restricted to it&#x27;s own TLD.