&gt; It&#x27;s rare to see a kernel-bug that can&#x27;t be worked around in some way other than patching.<p>While it&#x27;s true that most critical bugs I&#x27;ve run into with the kernel can be workaround in some way, it&#x27;s at the detriment to some use-case that some users, somewhere rely upon.<p>A vulnerability I discovered a bit of a year ago allowed local privilege escalation for any user with access to write to an XFS filesystem. The only workarounds were to modify their SELinux policies or switch to another filesystem. I&#x27;m not aware of any users that rewrote their SELinux policies for this. It had been fixed in the kernel and fairly quietly fixed in a RedHat security advisory, but I don&#x27;t think any other distribution did anything at all.<p>I&#x27;d estimate that critical kernel bugs happen at least other month. Worse, discussion of these bugs happens in the public and takes dozens of months to fix. Again, assuming you even know of these vulnerabilities, while there are often workarounds, they&#x27;re not always practical.<p>Did you know that via user namespaces, all non-root users on a machine can elevate to a root user? That root user is supposed to be limited, but it&#x27;s allowed the mount syscall. Numerous vulnerabilities have been discovered as a result of this. The kernel team usually considers them low-impact and they get a low CVSS score, but when using certain applications this can lead to local privilege escalation. The workarounds are to disable user namespaces or disable mount for user namespaces, both of which will break some set of users.<p>Did you know that any user capable of creating a socket can load kernel modules? For a long time this allowed loading ANY kernel module! The only workarounds were to compile it out of the kernel or monkeypatch the kernel. Only last year was this was finally fixed upstream so only those modules patching a pattern were loading. Yet, it was also discovered that if you used busybox&#x27;s modprobe, the filter would still allow non-root users to load arbitrary kernel modules from anywhere on the filesystem!<p>Point being, this is par for the course. Clearly one needs to understand their threat model, but if the model is at all worried about local privilege escalation, update weekly until you find another OS.