High-assurance security approaches on separation&#x2F;MILS kernels have been doing this successfully for years. It&#x27;s common for those RTOS&#x27;s to have a native target on microkernel, a safety-critical runtime for Ada&#x2F;Java, a featured runtime for them, a POSIX layer, user-mode Linux... all containing pieces of the system or even an application working together through robust middleware.<p>So, it&#x27;s a proven model that&#x27;s literally flying through the air right now due to aerospace take-up. It would likely work for unikernels, too, so long as they included same checks&#x2F;mediation at interface points or middleware that prior model required. The only real questions should be about the resulting attributes of that system: is it a good approach vs regular unikernels w&#x2F; performance, containment, etc (theory vs practice)? Or just ditch them to enhance separation kernels, micro-hypervisor platforms, or capability systems?<p>Personally, I&#x27;m not sold on unikernels for resilience: prior, security models were better, field-proven, and survived advanced pentesting. Under-utilized imho. Cross-language is similar in both, though, with attributes of one application likely carrying to other. The real problem is the TCB being complex &amp; insecure, breaking isolation paradigm.