There isn&#x27;t but that is largely because the [general points] are popularly known:<p>1) Politically, at the Federal level, steps were taken to regularly increase subsidies to the housing market. It was a populist position in both parties so it seemed safe from serious intervention that would depress prices.<p>2) Housing had been increasing for some time and this upward momentum &quot;seemed&quot; safe in the general case where the borrowers were credit worthy. In the long term, housing has always gone up decade-over-decade at least as fast as inflation.<p>3) Housing demand is rock solid, even in times of crisis, so the fluctuations would be less severe than the surrounding environment. In other words, they had always assumed they could find buyers for housing in any market environment so the hits they took in a recession would be small.<p>4) Subprime being a vector for a contagion that would affect middle class homeowners and cripple the economy didn&#x27;t occur to them. As such, risk was effectively mispriced even tho the banks [frankly] were and still are aware that the Credit Agencies are really captured by the large financial institutions. They had assumed that &quot;AAA&quot; would remain relatively safe.<p>5) The institutions themselves didn&#x27;t really understand that the grading mechanisms for credit were so badly corroded by corruption to be essentially worthless in the housing market until the damage was so severe that all they could do was unload the toxic assets before other people realized they were toxic. The only people who could buy these at scale were other banks and financial institutions...