I&#x27;m not sure which of the two cases you&#x27;re addressing; I&#x27;ll respond with one comment assuming each.<p>If you are talking about case 2 (fixed UBI, fixed tax rate, making up the difference - when there is one - by printing money or borrowing), then when one individual stops working the UBI payment does not decrease.  If productivity falls when that worker stops working (presumably the case for most workers), then we would expect to eventually see some 
inflation.  It may work out to 1%, with the proper assumptions; I&#x27;m not certain.<p>Still I don&#x27;t see why it follows that <i>&quot;a rational actor would stop working&quot;</i> - some may, but only if they decide the small decrease in UBI <i>and large decrease in earned income</i> is worth it.<p>At sufficiently high UBI level relative to earned income, that&#x27;s pretty likely to be the case.  At sufficiently low UBI level ($1?) that&#x27;s pretty unlikely to be the case.<p>&gt; Similarly, if 95 out of 100 stop working, then the other 5 have little incentive to work, because their income is basically funding everyone else.<p>The same chunk of their income as ever is going directly to fund everyone else.  A bigger portion of their income is being diluted by the money printed to make up the rest of the UBI.  But as the currency devalues, presuming they are doing things people want, they are able to demand more money for their production.  The UBI is diluted toward meaningless.  At some point, other workers decide to get back in the game, because the (nominally constant but really much lower) UBI will not fund the lifestyle they want, slowing the inflating.<p>This is a negative feedback loop.