Add-On Signing which can be automated does provide <i>very</i> little added security for the user, and just serves as a big pain the butt for everyone else involved.<p>I&#x27;m routinely questioned to do support for users, and I find malware extensions regularly installed in Chrome which has even stricter requirements. The other day I found a laptop with one extension that redirected google.com to a scraper. Chrome did <i>EVEN</i> include a drop-down warning just below the URL bar that the homepage was being currently redirected by an add-on. Did the user notice? Not a bit.<p>In fact, Chrome adding a <i>WARNING</i> for it made me feel even more sad: they know this is going on. Is FF going to do the same? If I was an user with an extension that did that for whatever reason I wanted, I would be furious as hell to see an added warning which I need to disable (IF possible), and that will be ignored by most users anyway.<p>Malware developers will just get by faster, so Mozilla will not be able to keep up with the list of addons to blacklist. At the same time, initial approvals for legitimate addons will get slower. Reporting issues with Addons is clearly insufficient as Chrome Store demonstrates. In fact, I&#x27;m also <i>NOT</i> ok with the idea that extensions can be blacklisted at all, in spite of that &quot;added security&quot; aura around it. By the same logic, if extensions are required to be signed, then blacklisting (and blacklisting updates) shouldn&#x27;t be allowed to be disabled.<p>And, let&#x27;s remind ourselves, that most of the extensions I&#x27;ve seen installed were side-loaded with other software (with &quot;extras&quot;) that was installed in the system with the same privileges of the browsers. So really, <i>I do expect</i> malware to simply patch the FF binary to either disable the check or change the public key, or change it entirely with a patched version.<p>I do not support walled gardens of any kind.
Use a fork.