There are plenty of casual users who want the capability to have one-off conversations without worrying about who might be intercepting and storing the conversations, let alone without having to install anything new and try to convince their friends to use it too. This is made with them in mind.<p>I see where you&#x27;re coming from with the added attack surface argument, though I&#x27;d counter that browser sandboxing actually makes a web application safer for this use compared to creating a native application on the basis that if the native application is exploited, all user-mode data is now at risk. At least with the containment of the browser, the only things at risk are (potentially) your messages assuming successful XSS.<p>So long as the proper mitigations are in place, it really makes no difference. The <i>largest</i> future improvement for Cyph in the future would be to incorporate one of the CSP2 changes for more safely allowing inlining, notably hash-src. However, since CSP2 adoption isn&#x27;t all that widespread quite yet, it&#x27;s better to hold off until the implementation details between the largest browsers are equalized.<p>Edit to address your last paragraph: &quot;[Users] won&#x27;t install an app because people keep luring the away with insecure web-page based secure messengers.&quot;<p>Native encrypted messaging apps have been around for a while and haven&#x27;t really caught on unless integrated into existing apps a la iMessage. That&#x27;s where the need for in-browser apps is coming from.<p>My 2 cents. I&#x27;m likely <i>entirely</i> wrong; you&#x27;ve got more experience in general AppSec than I do, so my assumption of risks here might be off-base.