<i>This is on everyone’s short list of problems with Bayes. In the simplest interpretation of Bayes, old evidence has zero confirming power. If evidence E was on the books long ago and it suddenly comes to light that H entails E, no change in the value of H follows. This seems odd – to most outsiders anyway.</i><p>I don&#x27;t understand what he&#x27;s referring to here. If we now know that H entails E, then that means our model of the world changed, and thus our posterior on H changed as well. Did I miss anything?<p>It&#x27;s an interesting article, but there is a lot of debate around the interpretation of Bayesian inference, and IMO there are answers to be found. In particular, Andrew Gelman argues against the subjective interpretation: <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.stat.columbia.edu&#x2F;~gelman&#x2F;research&#x2F;published&#x2F;philosophy_online4.pdf" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.stat.columbia.edu&#x2F;~gelman&#x2F;research&#x2F;published&#x2F;phil...</a> It&#x27;s the best article I&#x27;ve read on the subject.