The argument of the article is that no one is experiencing the illusion. The entirety of the experience <i>is</i> the illusion itself.<p>Essentially: consciousness does not exist. We only think it does because the thing we think with is wrong. But because we think with it, we can&#x27;t tell the difference. So asking &quot;who is experiencing the illusion&quot; is begging the question.<p>Look at it this way: what evidence can you use to distinguish between an object that is actually conscious, and an object that is merely faking consciousness? This is commonly known as the Chinese Room problem.<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Chinese_room" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Chinese_room</a><p>But whereas the Chinese Room has been used to argue that computers can never be fully conscious, this article reverses the equivalence: maybe the Chinese Room proves that <i>nothing</i> is fully conscious, and it is our concept of consciousness that is mistaken, not the rest of the observable world.<p>This is conceptually similar to the mental leap behind General Relativity: since we can&#x27;t find any way to distinguish between gravitational and inertial acceleration, maybe they are in fact physically equivalent and indistinguishable--then build the theory from there.<p>Starting with the concept that all consciousness is an illusion allows us to side-step a lot metaphysical conversation and just try to figure out the mechanics of the illusion--how it works, not whether it exists.