Your points are all good. But they have nothing to do with meaning, or with semantics.<p>Cellular automata are lookup tables, and Wolfram and others proved some cellular automata rules are Turing complete computers. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Rule_110" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Rule_110</a>  
My point was merely about the equivalence of computational mechanisms, not about lookup tables per se. And by corollary, that the computational complexity is equivalent regardless of the computational mechanism.  (I think we agree on this point.)<p>Searle&#x27;s Room is a just to explain that what computers are doing is syntactic.<p>Searle would posit that passing a Turing test in any amount of time is irrelevant to determining consciousness. It&#x27;s a story we hypothetical use to &quot;measure&quot; intelligence, but it&#x27;s only a story. it&#x27;s not a valid test for sentience, and passing such a test would not confer sentience.  Sentience is an entirely different question.<p>What would be more interesting is if a computer intentionally failed turing tests because it thinks turing tests are stupid.<p>We could test humans with Turing tests to determine their &quot;level&quot; of intelligence.  But if you put teenage boys in a room and made them do Turing tests, pretty quick they would come up with remarkable ways to fail those tests, chiefly by not doing them! How could you write a program or create a system that intentionally fails Turing tests?  or a program which avoids taking turing tests... because it thinks they are stupid?<p>Could you write a program that knows when it fails? (it&#x27;s a pretty long standing problem...)<p>I like the speed (or space-bound question) you ask because it is not a thought experiment to me. It&#x27;s an actual real problem I face! at what point does the speed of the underlying computing become so interminably slow that we say something is no longer sentient?  In my work, I don&#x27;t think there is some such slow speed. The slowness simply obscures sentience from our observation.<p>In the excellent example: &quot;I think it is reasonable to believe that after enough clicks the entity is not sentient...&quot;<p>How would you distinguish between the &quot;loss&quot; of sentience from reduced complexity, from the loss of your ability to perceive sentience from the reduced complexity?  The question is, how could you tell which thing happened? If you don&#x27;t observe sentience anymore, does that mean it&#x27;s not there?  (Locked in syndrome is similar to this problem in human beings.)  And if you have a process to determine sentience, how do you prove your process is correct in all cases?<p>I do not think of these as rhetorical questions. I actually would like a decent way to approach these problems, because I can see that I will be hitting them if the model I am using works to produce homeostatic metabolic like behavior with code.<p>Computation is a subset of thinking.  There is lots of thinking that is not computation.  Errors are a classic example. The apprehension of an error is a representational process, and computation is a representational process. We may do a perfectly correct computation, but then realize the computation itself is the error.  (As a programmer learns, it is exactly these realizations that lead to higher levels of abstraction and optimization.)<p>Searle&#x27;s point is that a lookup table or any other computational mechanism, can not directly produce sentience because it&#x27;s behavior is purely syntactic. &quot;Syntax is not semantics and simulation is not duplication.&quot;   <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.youtube.com&#x2F;watch?v=rHKwIYsPXLg" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.youtube.com&#x2F;watch?v=rHKwIYsPXLg</a><p>Aaronson&#x27;s points are very well made, but none of them deal with the problem of semantics or meaning.  Because they don&#x27;t deal with what representation is and how representation itself works. All of the complexity work is about a sub-class of representations that operate with certain constraints.  They are not about how representation itself works.<p>&gt; &quot;suppose there is this big lookup table that physics logically excludes from possibility.&quot;... That is the point!<p>Even if there were such a lookup table, it would not get us to sentience, because it&#x27;s operations are syntactic. It is functional, but not meaningful.  You are correct, it could never work in practice, but it could also never work under absolute conditions.  That&#x27;s why I figured Aaronson was poking fun of those critiquing Searle, because it would ALSO, not work in practice.<p>Aaronson writes, &quot;I find this response to Searle extremely interesting—since if correct, it suggests that the distinction between polynomial and exponential complexity has metaphysical significance. According to this response, an exponential-sized lookup table that passed the Turing Test would not be sentient (or conscious, intelligent, self-aware, etc.), but a polynomially-bounded program with exactly the same input&#x2F;output behavior would be sentient.&quot;<p>This statement supports Searle&#x27;s argument, it doesn&#x27;t detract from it.  Hypothetically, an instantaneous lookup of an exponential table system would not be sentient but an instantaneous lookup of an algorithmically bound table system would be sentient?  On what basis then does sentience confer, if the bound is the only difference between the lookup tables?  Introducing the physical constraints doesn&#x27;t change the hypothetical problem.<p>Searle and Aaronson are just talking about different things.<p>If Aaronson was actually refuting Searle, what is the refutation he makes?<p>Aaronson never says something like &quot;Computers will be sentient by doing x, y, and z, and this refutes Searle.&quot;  The arguments against Searle (which I take Aaronson as poking at) are based in computation.  So... show me the code!  Nobody has written code to do semantic processing because they don&#x27;t know how.  It could be no one knows how because it&#x27;s impossible to do semantic processing with computation - directly.<p>That is my view from repeated failures, there simply is no path to semantics from symbolic computation. And if there is, it&#x27;s strange voodoo!