That could be the problem. If it was, I take by what was in the comments to those people. Will have to make it more clear next time. No 4 was source code that maps directly to specs, high-level design, requirements, whatever. Modular, code that clearly belongs. No 5 either means generating the system onsite from source-code or an audit trail that goes from source statements to object&#x2F;assembler code so you can see they match.<p>&quot;I think OpenSSL&#x27;s past disproves many of the pro-OSS claims.&quot;<p>100% agreement.<p>&quot;Defense in depth, layers of security, crunchy on the outside, still tough on the inside. If you put all your eggs in one basket, you&#x27;re gonna have a bad time, unless it was a very expensive, well-engineered basket.<p>And even then you might still have a bad time.&quot;<p>Decent points. Other engineers and I went back and forth on discussions involving the latter point due to all the factors involved. A high assurance design <i>usually</i> worked pretty well. Yet, it might not, so Clive Robinson and I&#x27;s consensus was combining triple, modular redundancy w&#x2F; voters and diverse implementation concepts. So, three, different implementations of concepts that shouldn&#x27;t share flaws with at least one high assurance (preferably three). The voting logic is simple enough it can nearly be perfected. Distributed voters exist, though.<p>Shit gets worse when you think of the subversion potential at EDA, mask-making, fab, and packaging companies. You <i>have</i> to come up with a way to trust (or not) one entity. For HW, esp low hundreds of MHz, the diverse redundancy with voters should do the trick. Until the adversary breaks them all or the voter. Lol...