As far as I can tell this proposal allows to ensure that it is possible to &quot;factory reset&quot; a system in a way that removes all malware, and also allows to &quot;dual boot&quot; OSes without any of the OSes being able to compromise the other (by flashing malicious firmware which then exploits the other OS on a subsequent boot).<p>It also prevents some more exotic attacks like replacing the BIOS (but not any hardware) with a malicious one as the laptop is delivered, used without network access (but not with network access) and then stealing the laptop and trying to read unencrypted user data leaked by the malicious BIOS.<p>It is not effective against undetected arbitrary physical attacks (insert a keylogger between keyboard and motherboard) or against persistent software attacks against a single vulnerable OS (persist via the OS autostart mechanism and exploit the OS on each boot).<p>Having an external stick also mitigates detectable physical attacks (e.g. theft of laptop, or manipulation detected by a broken tamper-proof seal) where the attacker has already stolen the encryption password, since they still won&#x27;t get the stick and thus won&#x27;t be able to get the data anyway.<p>The stick being external doesn&#x27;t seem to provide much advantage otherwise, since if the laptop hardware is malicious it doesn&#x27;t help, and if it is not malicious then an internal trusted stick equivalent works just as well.