On contrary, the person making that claim needs to prove it&#x27;s true or else we reject it as FUD against proprietary software. For a long time, the only software to resist prolonged pentesting by NSA were proprietary products certified to B3&#x2F;A1 and Type 1 respectively. If NSA could hack them, they couldn&#x27;t pass. Likewise, in safety, we&#x27;ve seen a number of high assurance systems fielded where every state (including failure) it could be in was known ahead of time. Some setups, like mainframes, hit 17-30 year uptime. All proprietary.<p>Meanwhile, in OSS land, we have a steady stream of easily-prevented or detected defects that compromise security. Just like in most proprietary shops. Like proprietary, those OSS projects producing highly-secure stuff are done by great designers&#x2F;coders with careful review and testing processes. The community-developed OSS hasn&#x27;t reached the assurance of aforementioned proprietary systems or some in academia. Yet, highly correct or secure stuff seems equally rare in both types of development with proprietary having a bit more just because there were people paying professionals to build those. In theory, with free&#x2F;cheap labor, OSS could eventually produce more but there&#x27;s not enough interest.<p>So, the endless stream of bugs in both closed and OSS software that are often really old disproves many eyes argument. It didn&#x27;t work for even shallowest bugs consistently, much less deep ones. Software quality comes from people taking responsibility and putting time into QA, esp design&#x2F;code review. OSS, shared-source proprietary, closed-source... always same requirement that gives quality.