It depends on how P and Q are generated.<p>The NIST document specifying Dual EC offers default values for each curve. P is the usual base point for the curve; an arbitrary point Q is provided without justification or details of its generation.<p>Because the NIST curves have cofactor 1, all points other than the identity generate the same subgroup. This means any two points P and Q are related by some scalar d such that d * P = Q. Knowledge of d is the back door in the generator.<p>This also implies a simple means for choosing Q given P: pick a random integer d and calculate Q = d * P. Publish P and Q and then write down d someplace safe. This is exactly how NSA is speculated to have chosen the Dual EC parameters.<p>However, the NIST document also specifies a method for generating alternative points. It boils down to hashing a random seed and mapping the result to a curve point. If you generate the base points P and Q like this, the relationship between them is unknown. The scalar d still exists, but now no one knows what it is. Without that knowledge, there is no back door.<p>It&#x27;s not clear from that page how Juniper chose the parameters. Maybe they did choose a random scalar and multiply P, or maybe they followed the standard. The information on that page isn&#x27;t enough to say one way or the other.<p>EDIT: Just to be clear, I&#x27;m not saying this isn&#x27;t something to worry about. You should distrust and avoid anything that relies on Dual EC. I&#x27;m only saying there is not enough information to say definitively that Juniper put a back door in their own product, intentionally or otherwise.