The NSA used to certify systems as highly assured by exhaustively analyzing and pentesting them for years. Had to beat their pentesters to be approved. Then, they&#x27;d try to restrict their export. It was a whole system process that applied from bottom to top to minimize complexity, reduce leaks, and enforce security policies. Here&#x27;s a description of a superset of that I used in private work:<p><a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;pastebin.com&#x2F;y3PufJ0V" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;pastebin.com&#x2F;y3PufJ0V</a><p>So, let&#x27;s just compare the author&#x27;s email to that list. A strong TCB at OS&#x2F;firmware&#x2F;trusted-component level like with EROS, INTEGRITY-178B, or GenodeOS? Nope. Components or apps made in a manner to reduce complexity, be type&#x2F;memory safe, use static analysis, analyzed for covert channels, and so on? Probably not given names I saw. Do the underlying projects use a subversion-resistant development process and SCM security that assumes a number of them are malicious w&#x2F; independent auditing? Virtually nobody does that despite Myers (1980) showing subversion the most powerful attack. Has the crypto and its implementation been tested by experts in that? Don&#x27;t know. Has the overall system and configuration been pentested by TAO-grade hackers? No.<p>So, it&#x27;s far from NSA-proof as the underlying properties necessary for NSA-proof operation don&#x27;t exist here. They exist only in a handful of defense-oriented products with some traits existing in other security-focused projects (esp in academia). This, at best, will slow down nation state attackers who are probably uninterested in his system anyway. A good configuration and 0-day mitigation tech might make this build survive typical blackhats and snoops. A real, threat profile along with more reasonable goal.<p>Won&#x27;t stop the NSA, though. You can put money on that. Assume it&#x27;s true every time you hear it, too. You can&#x27;t stop nation-state attackers until you know how (see framework) then apply that to every level and user&#x2F;machine interfaces. Even then, it might work and might just be an obstacle. So, include monitoring &amp; logging on top of it.