It&#x27;s even more complicated than that - Juniper used Dual EC, and changed the Dual EC parameters, but ultimately the output of that PRNG was being used to seed a different PRNG (probably for speed purposes).<p>From your 2nd link:<p><i>ScreenOS does make use of the Dual_EC_DRBG standard, but is designed to not use Dual_EC_DRBG as its primary random number generator. ScreenOS uses it in a way that should not be vulnerable to the possible issue that has been brought to light. Instead of using the NIST recommended curve points it uses self-generated basis points and then takes the output as an input to FIPS&#x2F;ANSI X.9.31 PRNG, which is the random number generator used in ScreenOS cryptographic operations.</i><p>Because of this, it&#x27;s not entirely clear at this point that an attack would have been feasible even for an actor that had the P and Q used for Dual EC here[1].<p>[1] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;pwnallthethings&#x2F;status&#x2F;678371705367212032" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;pwnallthethings&#x2F;status&#x2F;67837170536721203...</a>