<p><pre><code>    Nowadays, as several philosophers at the workshop said, 
    Popperian falsificationism has been supplanted by Bayesian 
    confirmation theory, or Bayesianism, a modern framework 
    based on the 18th-century probability theory of the English 
    statistician and minister Thomas Bayes. Bayesianism allows 
    for the fact that modern scientific theories typically make 
    claims far beyond what can be directly observed — no one has 
    ever seen an atom — and so today’s theories often resist a 
    falsified-unfalsified dichotomy. Instead, trust in a theory 
    often falls somewhere along a continuum, sliding up or down 
    between 0 and 100 percent as new information becomes 
    available. “The Bayesian framework is much more flexible” 
    than Popper’s theory, said Stephan Hartmann, a Bayesian 
    philosopher at LMU. “It also connects nicely to the 
    psychology of reasoning.”
</code></pre>
I&#x27;ve never heard of Bayesianism in this context. Is this a serious approach in the philosophy of science?