I think this article is great, but something did stand out for me.<p>I&#x27;m a huge supporter of universal end-to-end encryption, but Feinstein&#x27;s point is making me feel some cognitive dissonance:<p>&gt;&quot;I think with a court order, with good justification, all of that can be prevented.&quot;<p>There <i>are</i> cases where I would want law enforcement to be able to read encrypted communications in an emergency situation, with a valid court order. If someone is being held hostage, for example. Of course I don&#x27;t want intelligence agencies having this same access; just very specific requests during exigent circumstances, with judge approval. A real judge in a real court, not a secret FISA court.<p>But to do that you need some kind of key escrow already set up with the government, and if you have that, there&#x27;s nothing stopping law enforcement and intelligent agencies from spying on what they want when they want.<p>Right now this isn&#x27;t a huge problem since a lot of people still communicate in plaintext, or things that are encrypted but logged&#x2F;intercepted by a central location (Skype). But eventually more and more things will move to end-to-end encryption.<p>What is the right way to handle this?