The market value is set by the board of directors, not CEOs.<p>Furthermore, supposing there were some sort of absentee owner effect (boards of directors are comprised of other CEOs, and they conspire to raise each other&#x27;s pay), you&#x27;d expect to see a different market value in closely held corporations. Strangely, the price of a CEO for a closely held corporation closely tracks the price of a CEO for absentee shareholders.<p><a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;scholarship.law.duke.edu&#x2F;cgi&#x2F;viewcontent.cgi?article=2424&amp;context=dlj" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;scholarship.law.duke.edu&#x2F;cgi&#x2F;viewcontent.cgi?article=...</a><p>The obvious way to fix this is with increased shareholder activism (ala Gordon Gekko), and reducing regulations on hostile takeovers. Possibly also regulating things like poison pills, staggered board elections, etc. Do you favor such rule changes? If not, why not?