The security argument makes sense.<p>The background is the following: Right now certificate revocation is essentially broken. There are two mechanisms (CRL and OCSP), and both don&#x27;t work. CRL for obvious scalability issues and OCSP because you&#x27;d need near 100% uptime of the OCSP responder for it to be reasonable and never have any firewall (think of captive portals) that blocks the conncetion to OCSP. Therefore browsers decided either to implement OCSP insecurely with a soft fail (mostly pointless) or not at all.<p>So we have no working revocation. Someone hacks into your server and steals your key and uses it to attack your users. What do you do? Of course you revoke your cert, but it doesn&#x27;t really make a difference.<p>People have been thinking how to fix revocation. One way would be OCSP Stapling + must staple. But that&#x27;s still a long way till this will work (the ocsp stapling implementations of both apache and nginx would need a huge overhaul, they are pretty bad and not up to the task). Short lived certificates are a way to make revocation less important, because it reduces the time a hacked key can be used.<p>And if this really bothers you a lot: There are two other free CAs that will give you one year certs: StartSSL and Wosign.