&gt; Locally installed certificates override pins.<p>Which is a blatant security risk, which should be fixed immediately.<p>&gt; wouldn&#x27;t be deployable inside large companies that have regulatory requirements to monitor traffic from their own desktops<p>I guess they don&#x27;t use ssh?<p>This claim is complete nonsense, because you are conflating the installing of a certificate with a capability to override HPKP. All those businesses need is a way to add an exception to HPKP. This is no more difficult that any other IT-managed configuration.<p>The bug here is the <i>assumption</i> that installing a certificate <i>always</i> means HPKP should be overridden. This assumption is patently not universally true, as this Kazakhstan situation demonstrates.<p>&gt; no benefit<p>Why is it that so many people seem to forget about the concept of <i>Defense In Depth</i> when one of the layers of protection is attacked?<p>A physical-key analogy: there is a decent chance the lock on your home&#x27;s front door can be opened trivially with a bump key[1], which is an attack against the entire class of traditional pin-and-tumbler locks. The many homes that have such a lock can be entered in seconds. Does this mean that they shouldn&#x27;t bother locking their front door? <i>No</i> - while it might be a good idea to invest in a better lock, forcing someone to bump the lock has benefits. Someone trying to enter your house might not have the right tool. If they do carry a bump key, that could have legal consequences (&quot;burglar&#x27;s tools&quot;).<p>Layered defenses help to reduce attack surface and raise the attack cost.<p>&gt; less transparent<p>I fail to see how forcing an attacker to patch binaries or otherwise work around HPKP. Doing so will leave clear evidence that the system has been tampered with. On the other hand, a proper certificate has a small amount of plausible deniability.<p>&gt; it doesn&#x27;t address this problem<p>It doesn&#x27;t <i>solve</i> the problem, but it should be a speed-bump that makes the attack harder, raising the cost of MitM.<p>[1] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Lock_bumping" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Lock_bumping</a>