I take issue with the suggestion that this is an unambiguous sign of ethical progress in scientific research.<p>One problem is that there is rather little clarity on the set of ethical principles that warrants the inclusion of other species into our sphere of moral concern. It seems that, from a detached perspective, the only identifiable basis for our moral sense is that it enables human beings to negotiate conflict and cooperate in social settings without recourse to violence. It&#x27;s difficult for some to see how a concern for the other great apes advances this goal. On the other hand, there are many research contexts where the close evolutionary relationship between <i>Homo sapiens</i> and the other great apes makes the latter an extremely useful pool of specimens in situations where experimenting directly on the former would conflict with this goal. In other words, we need to clarify the justification for concern for the well-being of the other great apes. Is this mere empathy, or is there a rational basis for the ethical judgment which accounts for the basis of morality?