1. The roots and TLDs remain RSA-keyed.<p>2. As recently as months ago, those keys were 1024-bit RSA.<p>3. If the zones above those Cloudflare manages are RSA, it doesn&#x27;t matter if Cloudflare&#x27;s own zones are ECDSA.<p>4. ECDSA is itself outmoded and dangerous.[1]. Cloudflare has the first significant deployment of curve-based DNS on the Internet, and because of standards group torpor, they&#x27;re forced to use <i>bad</i> NIST-curve DSA, while the rest of the world has moved on to better curves and deterministic signatures.<p>5. It takes just a few hours to write a new draft for ED25519. Pretty much the entire browser vendor community agrees that TLS needs a standardized Curve25519; a draft for that was submitted over a year ago, and <i>still hasn&#x27;t made it out of committee</i> because of bikeshedding. Worse: browsers can enable Curve25519 piecemeal, because TLS is a negotiation protocol. DNS isn&#x27;t. Because DNSSEC advocates have pushed deployment of broken &#x27;90s crypto, it could take close to a decade to get Ed25519 deployable in DNSSEC.<p>The idea that better DNSSEC crypto is just a standards document away is a pretty good illustration of what has gone wrong with 21+ years of attempted DNSSEC standardization.<p>There&#x27;s a better alternative than DNSSEC, and it isn&#x27;t DNSCurve: it is literally &quot;do nothing&quot;. Don&#x27;t break the Internet. Don&#x27;t create a massive new deployment of embarrassing old curve crypto. Don&#x27;t effectively sign keys over to the NSA. Billions of dollars of commerce flow over the Internet every week and none of it, not one bit, is protected by DNS security. DNSSEC isn&#x27;t useful, it isn&#x27;t needed, it certainly isn&#x27;t a priority. It&#x27;s in this case a way for Cloudflare to make some extra money, and nothing more.<p>[1]: <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;blog.cr.yp.to&#x2F;20140323-ecdsa.html" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;blog.cr.yp.to&#x2F;20140323-ecdsa.html</a>