You mostly have it right.<p>It&#x27;s mostly a PoC for a nokernel architecture, and a rather admirable affront at taming the darker corners of x86 segmentation to create a system where you have a per-address space &quot;event core&quot; rather than a traditional kernel, thus largely not performing so much as multiplexing. Though, I think an important addendum is that the selector relocation is context-global and thus the probabilistic mitigation cannot be thwarted by spacing the workload across threads.<p>----<p>(EDIT: Actually, I just reread it and in fact the event core will terminate a process after three successive &quot;segment not present&quot; faults, so that should be effective.)<p>----<p>By their testimony it is not any more susceptible to standard memory corruption errors than traditional monolithic OSes. One could then argue that the probabilistic weakness requires a malicious application that higher level security policy could weed out, but even further that the value added of a nokernel exceeds the downside of this hole relative to the monolithic kernel state of the industry which is <i>already</i> susceptible to a host of other vulnerabilities. It would, however, discount this KLOS in particular from any high-assurance use cases, but again so are monolithic kernels to begin with.<p>I think the gist of this is that the nokernel architecture <i>is</i> viable, but perhaps COTS architectures are not that expressive. Certainly not x86 it seems.