The real solution is high assurance systems: those designed in a rigorous way with an argument that they&#x27;ll remain secure against any known classes of attack. That&#x27;s every layer of the stack and sideways as my proprietary framework [1] used to show. Here&#x27;s an example [2] of what that&#x27;s like applied to Tor. Ottela&#x27;s Tinfoil Chat is only one I know that applies high assurance at the design level to eliminate risk of High Strength Attackers. He took a lot of feedback from us on Schneier&#x27;s blog and applied it well.<p>Client-side encryption using C libraries on Linux or whatever is just asking to be hacked. Best will be secure hardware, drivers, kernel, and trusted components. See CHERI processor [4], EROS documentation [5] (esp &quot;Principle-driven...&quot;) and Mikro-SINA VPN [6] for examples of The Right Thing in security-critical development. Need more like that.<p>[1] <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;pastebin.com&#x2F;y3PufJ0V" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;pastebin.com&#x2F;y3PufJ0V</a><p>[2] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.schneier.com&#x2F;blog&#x2F;archives&#x2F;2014&#x2F;09&#x2F;identifying_dre.html#c6678915" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.schneier.com&#x2F;blog&#x2F;archives&#x2F;2014&#x2F;09&#x2F;identifying_d...</a><p>[3] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;maqp&#x2F;tfc-otp" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;maqp&#x2F;tfc-otp</a><p>[4] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.cl.cam.ac.uk&#x2F;research&#x2F;security&#x2F;ctsrd&#x2F;cheri&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.cl.cam.ac.uk&#x2F;research&#x2F;security&#x2F;ctsrd&#x2F;cheri&#x2F;</a><p>[5] <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;eros-os.org&#x2F;eros.html" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;eros-os.org&#x2F;eros.html</a><p>[6] <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;genode-labs.com&#x2F;publications&#x2F;mikro-sina-2005.pdf" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;genode-labs.com&#x2F;publications&#x2F;mikro-sina-2005.pdf</a>