<a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.theatlantic.com&#x2F;international&#x2F;archive&#x2F;2015&#x2F;03&#x2F;return-of-the-mercenary&#x2F;388616&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.theatlantic.com&#x2F;international&#x2F;archive&#x2F;2015&#x2F;03&#x2F;ret...</a>, <i>&quot;The use of mercenaries in warfare has a very long history—much longer, in fact, than the almost-exclusive deployment of national militaries to wage wars. Before the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ended Europe&#x27;s Thirty Years&#x27; War and marked the rise of the modern state system, medieval powers from kings to popes routinely hired private fighters to do battle for them. As state governments sought a monopoly on the use of force within their territories in the 17th century, however, they moved to stamp out violence by non-state actors, including mercenaries, driving the industry underground.&quot;</i><p>The Peace of Westphalia, <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.m.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Peace_of_Westphalia" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.m.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Peace_of_Westphalia</a>, <i>&quot;… was a series of peace treaties signed between May and October 1648 … established … a new system of political order in central Europe, later called Westphalian sovereignty, based upon the concept of co-existing sovereign states … General recognition of the exclusive sovereignty of each party over its lands, people, and agents abroad, and responsibility for the warlike acts of any of its citizens or agents. Issuance of unrestricted letters of marque and reprisal to privateers was forbidden.&quot;</i>