This is a great example of the house of cards all our network systems are built on top of.<p>Imagine this scenario: you maintain a network of web servers, database servers, file servers, etc.  They all combine to generate a large website used by tens of millions of users every month.  One day you are just doing a cursory look over a certain server, but you see something strange.  Someone is logged in to your server.  And they have a Russian IP address.<p>What do you do?  Obviously, the first step is you login to your edge routers and null route all of Russia.  GFTO.  Next, you&#x27;ve got an idle session on one server.  What were they doing?<p>How can you reconstruct what they were doing?  bash history?  maybe.  Network forensics?  Your network probably isn&#x27;t recording every historical connection between servers—99.9999% of the time useless—but critical in this case.  File system access?  Your file system probably isn&#x27;t logging every historical access—useless 99.99999% of the time—but would be really freaking useful in this case.<p>So, you investigate their history, double check some database logs, check netstat, check lsof, and in the end, you really have no idea what they were doing at all.  Our systems don&#x27;t leave enough bread crums around to reconstruct even interior hostile activities, much less semi-intelligently disallowing Google to not index confidential information when accidentally left exposed.