&gt; buzzwords<p>Ok, so apologies for that - the point I was trying to make is that PI&#x27;s view of &quot;meaning is use&quot; is consonant with some quite recent and popular (and therefore buzzword-prone) ideas about AI and psychology.<p>Right at the start of PI, the &quot;Augustinian picture&quot; of meaning is set out: &quot;words in language name objects - sentences are combinations of such names&quot; a picture where &quot;every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.&quot; And so (later, #81) we &quot;think that if anyone utters a sentence, and <i>means</i> or <i>understands</i> it, he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.&quot; This is the view of language which PI aims to - sorry, buzzword incoming - disrupt.<p>By contrast, PI puts the case that there is no central unifying model applicable to all instances of language use, rather: &quot;I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all - but that they are related to one another in many different ways, and it is because of this relationship, or these relationships that we call them all language.&quot; (PI #65)<p>There follows a discussion of vagueness. In the Augustinian picture where the meaning of a word is an object, and a calculus of these objects is performed, it is difficult to avoid the consequence that meanings are exact. PI uses the example of defining the word &quot;game&quot;: &quot;How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should describe <i>games</i> to him, and we might add: &quot;This <i>and similar things</i> are called &#x27;games&#x27;&quot;. And do we know any more about it ourselves? [...] But this is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. [...] we can draw a boundary - for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all! [...] One might say that the concept &#x27;game&#x27; is a concept with blurred edges.&quot;<p>So much for &quot;decentralised&quot; and &quot;statistical&quot;. As far as &quot;emergent&quot; goes, I think even with the large variance in readings of PI it&#x27;s uncontroversial to say that it seeks to ground meaning and understanding in relation to &quot;customs&quot; or social practices rather than in some variety of metaphysical correspondence between language and reality required by different variations of the Augustinian picture. In this sense, meaning emerges from the use of words relative to these cultural forms.<p>Connectionism, as an investigative paradigm, (oops, buzzword!) is simpler (I believe) in that it doesn&#x27;t require the identification of an actual realised model (or &quot;mental mechanism&quot;) such as a neural encoding of a &quot;language of thought&quot; or cognitive frames, etc., in the brain - it &quot;just&quot; requires that a bunch of simple elements can result in complex rule-following behaviour without needing to explicitly encode the rules. Hopefully the quotes above will go some way to indicate how this programme is philosophically somewhat in tune with PI.<p>(Indeed the extensive sections on samples and teaching language games are eerily reminiscent of descriptions of training neural nets, now that I think of it... &quot;How do I explain the meaning of &#x27;regular&#x27;, &#x27;uniform&#x27;, &#x27;same&#x27; [...] if a person has not yet got the <i>concepts</i>? I shall teach him to use the words by means of <i>examples</i> and by <i>practice</i> - And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself.&quot; (PI #208))