&gt;There&#x27;s a schism in philosophy between analytic - the more &quot;logical&quot; side, with rigorous proofs and arguments - and continental - the more &quot;what is art&#x2F;ethics&#x2F;love&quot; side. I was firmly interested in the continental side. Of those that left philosophy, I found that continental people would often end up in some kind of community-oriented area, like education or sociology or social work or the like, whereas on the analytic side, people tended to end up doing physics&#x2F;maths&#x2F;comp sci type stuff.<p>Ironically, I&#x27;m a comp-sci&#x2F;math type person, and I regard continental philosophy a bunch better than analytic.  Continental philosophy usually considers matters inside their social and historical context, so at least sometimes, when they can be bothered to refer to the real world, they&#x27;re referring to it with a solid context.<p>Whereas analytic philosophy often seems to me to suffer from math-envy, and to formalize too early and too often.  The result is that analytic philosophers spend a lot of time debating over <i>what they think</i> are rigorous, scientifically-grounded concepts <i>when in fact</i> our best science says that things just don&#x27;t work that way or the theories aren&#x27;t &quot;done cooking&quot;.<p>(I&#x27;m thinking of a Stanford Philosophy Encyclopedia page someone directed me to last night on &quot;reductionism&quot;, which was given three definitions, <i>none</i> of which matched what a working scientist would usually call reductionism.  Or of the very concept of supervenience, which needs less metaphysics and more information theory.  Or of the perennial debates over the &quot;Hard Problem&quot; of consciousness.)