That&#x27;s my interpretation as well. It might be a bit of a stretch to label it as a &quot;forward-secure platform&quot;, as you can&#x27;t know anything about what the receiver will do with the mail&#x2F;(session)keys.<p>As a <i>general system</i>, I don&#x27;t really see the attraction of forward secrecy for asynchronous, &quot;email-like&quot;, communication -- I&#x27;m sure I&#x27;m not the only one that likes having a record of things I&#x27;ve said, or things others have said to me (good ideas, tips about everything from food to trips, not to mention the general &quot;letter&quot;-type things -- the stuff that can partially make up for not keeping a diary etc). The danger of being convicted for plotting to kill the president based on the contents of digital letters must be balanced against the historic value of having such records available for further students of history, so to speak.<p>But it just occurred to me that a system like looking glass could easily accommodate both: have the system automatically archive a copy of incoming and outgoing email, both encrypted to the (gpg-)key belong to the system owner. Such a system might retain &quot;cryptological&quot; plausible deny-ability (the owner, having the key, could fabricate a fake archive) -- but it would probably loose any &quot;legal&quot; equivalent. (eg: anyone can fake their browser history log files, but they&#x27;re still used as evidence etc).<p>It would be easy to automate what should be archived, and it would also remain possible to shred certain things from the archive, if wanted. It might even be possible to store an archive in a git-like fashion, so that it will be easy to see if something had been deleted -- while hard to prove that a certain deleted plain-text was <i>what</i> was deleted.<p>[ed: to add: To misquote a common Internet meme: &quot;I don&#x27;t <i>always</i> plan a revolution, but when I do, I use a forward-secure platform&quot;. But I mostly don&#x27;t plan revolutions.]