It is quite striking to me that the decentralised, statistical, emergent treatment of meaning in PI fits so well with neural-networks and connectionism[1] whereas Fodor&#x27;s &quot;Language of Thought Hypothesis&quot; and other opposing views seem wedded to &quot;top-down&quot; cognitive approaches.<p>Given the ability of neural nets to produce &quot;modeling functionality&quot; (like playing Breakout as though there was a model of the game somewhere in the AI) without requiring the actual model implementation, Ockham seems to favour Wittgenstein over Fodor &amp;co. (despite the excellent qualities of the Fodor fog parody linked in the article[2].)<p>As PI is often at pains to show, however, our own naive thinking tends to assume that the modeling function of language is in virtue of some fundamental metaphysical relation with reality, so that when Wittgenstein wrote:<p><pre><code>  &quot;There must surely be a further, different connexion
  between my talk and N, for otherwise I should still not
  have meant HIM.&quot;

  Certainly such a connexion exists. Only not as you
  imagine it: namely by means of a mental mechanism.
</code></pre>
he now seems to me to be aiming squarely at our inner cognitivist.<p>1: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Connectionism" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Connectionism</a><p>2: <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;garbage.world&#x2F;fodor&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;garbage.world&#x2F;fodor&#x2F;</a><p>3: PI: #689