It&#x27;s a good presentation with many good points outside the horrid formatting. Just turn it into a PDF with slides for goodness sakes. Write key pages on a piece of paper for audience questions where you have to go back. Should work fine. :)<p>Btw, one thing worth correcting is false claim that QubesOS was or is only attempt at workstation security. I&#x27;ve evaluated almost a dozen over past 10 years with some still existing. List those here:<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=11654680" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=11654680</a><p>You really need to look up separation kernels as isolating most critical stuff in a dedicated partition protected with 4-12kloc kernel is one of strongest approaches. seL4 and Muen are examples with GenodeOS an example of FOSS attempt to do a Nizza-like architecture with strong foundation and best-of-breed components (esp Nitpicker GUI). High-assurance security is moving forward with hardware-software architectures with one maybe getting SOC release (plus source code) in 1-2 years. Yet, our prior work with separation kernels&#x2F;VMM&#x27;s plus safe code (esp SPARK Ada or C w&#x2F; Astree Analyzer) for trusted components is <i>still</i> stronger than any crap mainstream FOSS, VMware, etc are making. They rarely learn from the past.<p>Note: Email me if you want more examples of past and current high-assurance work. I have collected them for most focus areas with papers, prototypes and&#x2F;or products.