So, your concern with password managers right now is that losing your master password means you lose everything?<p>You wish to design a new system where the threat model includes losing the master password? I think your implementation only adds 3 bits &quot;more&quot; security than a &quot;basic&quot; implementation that is: hash web site name || root password.<p>Say, in your implementation, the attacker gets the root password and &quot;salt based on another random password&quot; (it&#x27;s likely that they get both at the same time because they would be stored in the same place. If they&#x27;re not stored in the same place, you just discovered a weak form of 2-factor auth). All the attacker has to do at this point is guess 10 values (30-40) and try each one to get the account password. That&#x27;s your 3 extra bits of security from the &#x27;basic&#x27; implementation.<p>But if you just look at the two &quot;features&quot; you presented of your scheme, I don&#x27;t know any popular password manager (LastPass, 1Password, etc) that doesn&#x27;t have them. Can you explain?