That&#x27;s not trying to break the mitigations: it&#x27;s simply testing if they stop an exploit which isn&#x27;t designed to bypass the mitigations. Really easy to pull off. :) Below are examples of a clever scheme for stopping control flow attacks and a successful attempt to breaking it. When I say testing the mitigations, I mean work like what&#x27;s in the second paper.<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.usenix.org&#x2F;system&#x2F;files&#x2F;conference&#x2F;usenixsecurity13&#x2F;sec13-paper_zhang.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.usenix.org&#x2F;system&#x2F;files&#x2F;conference&#x2F;usenixsecurit...</a><p><a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.cs.berkeley.edu&#x2F;~daw&#x2F;papers&#x2F;cfi-sec15.pdf" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.cs.berkeley.edu&#x2F;~daw&#x2F;papers&#x2F;cfi-sec15.pdf</a><p>Note: Native Client, which protects Chrome, is a form of Control-flow Integrity. Hence, me using it as an example.