I don&#x27;t think you get to say &quot;just design a universe such that X&quot; without actually producing one. In this context, that&#x27;s a circular argument, since the possibility of such a universe is precisely what we&#x27;re debating. And lots of things that look reasonable turn out to have inconsistencies buried deep inside. If you&#x27;re not familiar with computability, &quot;write a program that figures out if another program will run forever&quot; sounds possible at first. You can make specific counterexamples to my argument, but just saying &quot;it must be possible&quot; illuminates nothing.<p>Anyway, I&#x27;ll try to do better. Basically, in a universe in which &quot;evil&quot; is physically impossible, you may have &quot;free will&quot; in some sense to choose which good, but you cannot choose <i>whether to do good</i>, because all possible choices are &quot;good&quot;. It&#x27;s specifically <i>freedom to choose good or evil</i> that&#x27;s the key ingredient in &quot;good&quot; being a meaningful concept, or at least it&#x27;s consistent to so assume. You&#x27;re back to the pretty clockwork.<p>I don&#x27;t know if it&#x27;s possible to construct a bulletproof argument here. Shaky foundations are an occupational hazard of metaphysics, for both sides. Saying &quot;well, he&#x27;s God so he should be able to figure it out&quot; works just as well as &quot;he&#x27;s God and couldn&#x27;t do it, ergo it&#x27;s inconsistent&quot;. The best we can do is show our positions are consistent under some set of assumptions.