I&#x27;m not seeing your point. A vulnerability was found in OpenSMTPD. That vulnerability could not be exploited on OpenBSD because there was no way to overflow the buffer without smashing the stack canary. If you had the same version of OpenSMTPD running on a generic Linux kernel or on Mac OS X, it was vulnerable. On OpenBSD it was not. Ergo, OpenSMTPD running on OpenBSD is more secure than OpenSMTPD running on other platforms that do not provide the same mitigations.<p>At least, that&#x27;s the way I see it.<p>Now, are you saying that because it&#x27;s possible to bypass the mitigations in some other cases, preventing that vulnerability (and others) doesn&#x27;t matter?<p>Or, are you saying that it would be possible to craft an exploit that bypassed the stack protection for that particular vulnerability? In which case I would love to see your PoC.<p>Or something else?