&gt;<i>Since WWII, IIRC, most NATO militaries have been structured (in part originally with US support and in some cases insistence, though the US preference has changed on this, especially since the end of the Cold War) to be dependent on the US as the core of any major operations (this was, IIRC, a substantial issue for the UK, particularly as to the structure of its naval forces, in the Falklands.)</i><p>UK, France, Italy, Germany, et al. were more than perfectly capable of winning a war with the tired army of the 1&#x2F;3 of an ex-socialist Yugoslavia.<p>&gt;<i>Kosovo was the tail end of the breakup of Yugoslavia; it certainly wasn&#x27;t the motivation for the US intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which substantially predate the crisis in Kosovo, unless you are suggesting some kind of long conspiracy that even the harshest critics of US policy in the region have never suggested before.</i><p>The Kosovo has been a point of interest in the area (and a conflict zone) way before the US intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina -- even in mid-eighties. Everybody, including &quot;tied&quot; Germany, made its moves, to be a player in the future of Yugoslavia, even before the county dissolved.<p>And, by the way, 5-10 years ahead are not &quot;long&quot;, they&#x27;re literally nothing much in diplomatic and foreign affairs planning.<p>The US have a plan for Cuba after Castro dies for decades now (revised to new situations of course), and similar, players in international politics play the long game, including centuries of interventions and moves, all the time.