President of Iran
The President of Iran (Persian: رییس‌جمهور ایران "Rayis Jomhur-e Irān") is the head of government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The President is the highest popularly elected official in Iran (however, the President is still required to gain the Supreme Leader's official approval before being sworn in before the Parliament and the Leader also has the power to dismiss the elected President anytime). The President carries out the decrees, and answers to the Supreme Leader of Iran, who functions as the country's head of state. Unlike the executive in other countries, the President of Iran does not have full control over anything, as these are ultimately under the control of the Supreme Leader. Chapter IX of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran sets forth the qualifications for presidential candidates. The procedures for presidential election and all other elections in Iran are outlined by the Supreme Leader. The President functions as the executive of the decrees and wishes of the Supreme Leader. These include signing treaties and other agreements with foreign countries and international organizations, with Supreme Leader's approval; administering national planning, budget, and state employment affairs, as decreed by the Supreme Leader. The President also appoints the ministers, subject to the approval of Parliament, and the Supreme Leader who can dismiss or reinstate any of the ministers at any time, regardless of the president or parliament's decision. The Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei directly chooses the ministries of Defense, Intelligence and Foreign Affairs, as well as certain other ministries, such as the Science Ministry. Iran’s regional policy is directly controlled by the office of the Supreme Leader with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ task limited to protocol and ceremonial occasions. All of Iran’s ambassadors to Arab countries, for example, are chosen by the Quds Corps, which directly reports to the Supreme Leader.
Views on the nuclear program of Iran
Analyzing Iranian nuclear policy, Uriel Abulof submits that "facing a deepening legitimacy crisis, the Iranian regime, throughout Ahmadinejad's tenure, has been increasingly drawing on nuclear diversion to boost public support," and that "if the legitimacy crisis lingers, the regime may opt to further employ diversionary nuclear strategies, most of which require a viable 'nuclear latency,' rather than actual military nuclear capability." On 15 June 2013, Hassan Rohani won the Iranian presidential election and assumed office on 3 August 2013. Rouhani is considered "the most moderate and outward-looking of the presidential cadidiates deemed fit to contest the election by the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei" and subsequently "has raised hopes for a nuclear deal between Iran and the international community.""The Economist", however, argues that neither a moderate Iranian president, nor sanctions, or military threats will divert Iran from attaining the capability to rapidly "produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one or more bombs before the IAEA or Western intelligence agencies would even know it had done so." "Mr. Rohani's election means the next round of negotiations will be conducted in a better atmosphere. But to what end? ... For Iran, the continuation of talks is a means of getting some easing of sanctions in exchange for concession that will have little impact on its nuclear program." The newspaper thinks that a more accommodating Iranian president can be a trap for the international community as well as an opportunity for it. Rohani can improve relations with the West through constructive engagement and ultimately ease the burden of sanctions on Iran. But Iran could take advantage of its rosier international standing by continuing to enrich uranium and achieve a breakout capability. Abulof argues that "the 2013 election of Hassan Rouhani as president demonstrated the regime’s legitimacy crisis, while upping the ante for both mitigating the crisis and exacerbating it. If the latter transpires, the regime may opt to further escalate its diversionary nuclear strategies."