Project 4.1
In 1994, a 1953 "Castle Bravo" program prospectus was found which included reference to Project 4.1 apparently written before the "Bravo" shot had occurred. The U.S. government responded that someone had gone back into the project list after the "Bravo" test to insert Project 4.1; thus, according to the U.S. government, the acts were not premeditated. All other U.S. documents point to Project 4.1 having been established after the "Bravo" test—most sources point to its having been organized on March 7, 1954. The final Project 4.1 report began in its preface with the statement that "Operation CASTLE did not include a biomedical program" (it mentions this in discussing the ad hoc nature by which the project personnel were assembled). All official and mainstream historical accounts of the "Bravo" test indicate that its high level of fallout was a result of a miscalculation in relation to its design and was not deliberate (see the Castle Bravo article for more information on the alleged accident).
Alvin C. Graves
Graves became dismissive of the radiation risks from nuclear testing while serving as test director for the Nevada Test Site shots during the 1950s. He announced that the risks from fallout were "concocted in the minds of weak malingerers." As a spokesman for the Nevada Test Site, he spoke in local areas around Nevada assuring the population of no danger from the activities there. As the head of the Los Alamos Laboratory's J (Test) Division, he was the scientific director or deputy director of most of the nuclear tests from 1948 through the 1950s, including the Desert Rock exercises which exposed military personnel to radiation, and the Castle Bravo test that irradiated many native islanders and test personnel. Asked to testify before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the danger of radiation causing cancer, Graves replied: