What is the Supremacy Clause?
Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (Article VI, Clause 2) establishes that the Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it, and treaties made under its authority, constitute the supreme law of the land. It provides that state courts are bound by the supreme law; in case of conflict between federal and state law, the federal law must be applied. Even state constitutions are subordinate to federal law. In essence, it is a conflict-of-laws rule specifying that certain federal acts take priority over any state acts that conflict with federal law. In this respect, the Supremacy Clause follows the lead of Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation, which provided that "Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress Assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them." A constitutional provision announcing the supremacy of federal law, the Supremacy Clause assumes the underlying priority of federal authority, at least when that authority is expressed in the Constitution itself. No matter what the federal government or the states might wish to do, they have to stay within the boundaries of the Constitution. This makes the Supremacy Clause the cornerstone of the whole American political structure.
United States v. More
Chief Justice Marshall replied that, if Congress had made no provision for appeals of any kind to the Supreme Court, "your argument would be irresistible." But, Marshall countered, under the Exceptions Clause, when Congress "has said in what cases a writ of error or appeal shall lie, an exception of all other cases is implied." The Exceptions Clause provides that "[i]n all [cases other than those in which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction], the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
Jurisdiction
In the United States, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution makes all treaties that have been ratified under the authority of the United States and customary international law a part of the "Supreme Law of the Land" (along with the Constitution itself and acts of Congress passed pursuant to it) (U.S. Const.art. VI Cl. 2) and, as such, the law of the land is binding on the federal government as well as on state and local governments. According to the Supreme Court of the United States, the treaty power authorizes Congress to legislate under the Necessary and Proper Clause in areas beyond those specifically conferred on Congress ("Missouri v. Holland", 252 U.S. 416 (1920)).
Import-Export Clause
The Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the authority to "regulate trade with foreign nations, among the states, and with the Indian Tribes," complements the authority of Congress given in the Import-Export Clause. Following the "Michelin" interpretation of the Import-Export Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court re-examined its application of the dormant commerce clause doctrine in "Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady", which related to interstate commerce and established a four-prong test in which a tax is valid if it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." In "Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles", the U.S. Supreme Court had occasion to consider the application of the dormant commerce clause doctrine to foreign commerce. In addition to the four-prong test in "Complete Auto Transit", the court added two prongs derived from the Import-Export Clause: whether the tax creates a risk of multiple taxation and whether it impairs the federal government's one voice in dealing with foreign nations. The dormant commerce clause is important in complementing the Import-Export Clause (which only prohibits "imposts" and "duties"), since the former also prohibits discriminatory regulations. In "West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy", for example, the Supreme Court cited a tariff as "the paradigmatic example of a law discriminating against interstate commerce ... so patently unconstitutional that our cases reveal not a single attempt by any State to enact one. Instead the cases are filled with state laws that aspire to reap some of the benefits of tariffs by other means."
History of the Puritans under King Charles I
The events of the 1640s caused the English legal community to worry that the Westminster Assembly was preparing to illegally alter the church in a way that overrode the Act of Supremacy. As such, John Selden, arguably the foremost jurist in England since the death of Edward Coke in 1634, led a campaign against altering the Church of England in a way that would undermine the Act of Supremacy. Thus, just as the Presbyterian party in the Assembly was dominated by non-members (the Scottish Commissioners), the Erastian party was dominated by Selden and the other lawyers. Selden argued that not only English law, but the Bible itself required that the church be subordinate to the state: he cited the relationship of Zadok to King David and Romans 13 in support of this view.
Speech or Debate Clause
The Court refused to protect congressional aides either from prosecution for criminal conduct or from testifying at trials or grand jury proceedings involving third-party crimes. The Supreme Court also vacated the lower court's order permitting some questions and barring others, concluding that if the testimony is privileged then the privilege is absolute.
Supremacy: Your Will Be Done
The goal of "Supremacy" is to create and protect a network of planetary colonies and defeat a computer adversary who is trying to do the same. There are four skill levels, each represented by an enemy race, and each featuring a progressively stronger opponent. The more advanced a system is, the more freedom a player has when purchasing spacecraft. Higher skill levels also result in different numbers of planets in each system.
Goldstein v. California
Justice William O. Douglas filed a dissent asserting that the Supremacy Clause was implicated in state extension of copyright to materials not protected federally, just as it would for a state extension of duration beyond the term of a federally granted copyright.
Acts of Supremacy
The Act was passed in 1559, but is dated 1558 because until 1793 legislation was backdated to the beginning of the session of Parliament in which it was passed.
Due Process Clause
When a law or other act of government is challenged as a violation of individual liberty under the due process clause, courts nowadays primarily use two forms of scrutiny, or judicial review, which is used by the Judicial Branch. This inquiry balances the importance of the governmental interest being served and the appropriateness of the government's method of implementation against the resulting infringement of individual rights. If the governmental action infringes upon a fundamental right, the highest level of review—strict scrutiny—is used. To pass strict scrutiny review, the law or act must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.
Quasi-constitutionality
A quasi-constitutional statute uses a "primacy clause" to achieve the apparently contradictory goals of respecting parliamentary sovereignty whilst retaining primacy in the face of later, contradictory statutes. A primacy clause is a provision stating that the statute can only be repealed or limited by a later statute if that later statute contains a primacy clause of its own, specifically stating that the new law is overriding the earlier, quasi-constitutional statute. For example, subsection 1(1) of the "Alberta Human Rights Act" reads "Unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Legislature that it operates notwithstanding this Act, every law of Alberta is inoperative to the extent that it authorizes or requires the doing of anything prohibited by this Act." The human rights codes of some other provinces user similar language.
Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co. v. Stiffel Co.
These two cases were the first decisions of the Supreme Court that states could not, because of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, create their own patent or patent-like laws. The issue had been raised, but not decided, in "Gibbons v. Ogden", 22 U.S. 1 (1824), in which Attorney General Wirt argued on behalf of the United States for federal patent preemption of New York's grant of a steamboat patent to Robert Fulton.
Sanctuary city
Whether federal or local government has jurisdiction to detain and deport undocumented immigrants is a tricky and unsettled issue, because the U.S. Constitution does not provide a clear answer. Both federal and local government offer arguments to defend their authority. The issue of jurisdiction has been vigorously debated dating back to the Alien Act of 1798. Opponents of local level policing tend to use the Naturalization Clause and the Migration clause in the Constitution as textual confirmation of federal power. Because the Supremacy Clause is generally interpreted to mean that federal law takes priority over state law, the U.S. Supreme Court in the majority of cases has ruled in favor of the federal government. Certain states have been affected by illegal immigration more than others and have attempted to pass legislation that limits access by undocumented immigrants to public benefits. A notable case was Arizona's SB 1070 law, which was passed in 2010 and struck down in 2012 by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional.
Antoine v. Washington
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that treaties and laws must be construed in favor of Native Americans (Indians); that the Supremacy Clause precludes the application of state game laws to the tribe; that Congress showed no intent to subject the tribe to state jurisdiction for hunting; and while the state can regulate non-Indians in the ceded area, Indians must be exempted from such regulations.
Arizona SB 1070
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) criticized the statute as a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which states that federal law, so long as it is constitutional, is paramount over state laws. Erwin Chemerinsky, a constitutional scholar and dean of the University of California, Irvine School of Law said, "The law is clearly pre-empted by federal law under Supreme Court precedents."
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.
Conclusion: The test, therefore, is whether the matter on which the State assets the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act. If it is, the federal scheme prevails though it is a more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the State. By that test each of the nine matters we have listed is beyond the reach of the Illinois Commission since on each one Congress has declared its policy in the Warehouse Act. The provisions of Illinois law on those subjects must therefore give way by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. U.S.Const., Art. VI, Cl. 2.
Narragansett land claim
Citing "Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton" (1st Cir. 1975) and other various Supreme Court decisions, the court held that the Nonintercourse Act applied to the lands in question. The court rejected all the defendant's affirmative defenses: laches, statute of limitations/adverse possession, estoppel by sale, operation of state law, and public policy. The court noted that: "The broad principle dictated by the Supremacy Clause ... that state statutes cannot supersede federally created rights has been applied with especial vigor to the question of Indian title as a result of the federal government's 'unique obligation toward the Indians." Thus, the court held that the state's attempt to disband the tribe in 1880 and the various state services provided to the tribe were irrelevant. The court held that the defendant's purported affirmative defenses would not defeat the tribe's claim if it proved the elements of a prima facie case; in other words, they were not affirmative defenses.
Supremacy (film)
Supremacy is a 2014 American drama thriller film directed by Deon Taylor, written by Eric J. Adams, and starring Joe Anderson, Dawn Olivieri, Danny Glover and Derek Luke. The film chronicles the real life events of March 29–30, 1995, perpetrated by Aryan Brotherhood members Walter Scully Jr. and Brenda Kay Moore. After fatally shooting a police officer, white supremacist Garrett Tully (along with his companion, Doreen) breaks into a house and takes an African-American family hostage.
Blueford v. Arkansas
Before the Supreme Court, Blueford argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a retrial on charges of capital murder and first-degree murder because the foreperson's report that the jury had unanimously voted against those charges acquitted him of those charges. Blueford asserted that even though the jury had not filled out a formal form verdict, the foreperson's clear announcement in open court that the jury had unanimously voted to acquit Blueford of charges constituted a final verdict of acquittal. Additionally, Blueford argued that because the trial court had instructed the jury to consider the lesser included charges only if the jury had unanimously voted to acquit on the more serious charge, the jury's deadlock on manslaughter established that it had acquitted Blueford on capital murder and first-degree murder. Blueford also contended that because a conviction of a lesser included offense implicitly acquits on a more serious offense, a deadlock on a lesser included offense must also implicitly acquit on a more serious offense.
Entergy Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that it granted certiorari to determine whether its filed rate doctrine holdings in "Nantahala Power and Light Co. v. Thornburg", 476 U.S. 953 (1986), and "Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore", 487 U.S. 354 (1988), would lead to federal preemption of the Louisiana PSC order. The filed rate doctrine is an American administrative law rule that a court should not permit a collateral attack on a tariffed rate of a public utility that was determined by an agency, and that any litigation regarding the validity of that rate must be conducted before that agency. With the Supremacy Clause, any tariffed rate approved by a federal agency must be given effect by a state public utility commission that regulates a public utility and sets intrastate rates.
Goldstein v. California
Justice Warren Burger, writing for the 5-4 majority, held that the Copyright Clause did not exclusively invest Congress with the power to enact copyright law, and thus state copyright was in principle valid. If states choose to protect more copyrightable works than the federal government does, they are not prohibited from doing so by the Supremacy Clause. He also held that state laws are not subject to the durational limitation the Copyright Clause enforces on federal copyright.
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions
In the case of "Cooper v. Aaron", the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Arkansas' effort to use nullification and interposition. The Supreme Court held that under the Supremacy Clause, federal law was controlling and the states did not have the power to evade the application of federal law. The Court specifically rejected the contention that Arkansas' legislature and governor had the power to nullify the "Brown" decision.
United Building &amp; Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden
The New Jersey Supreme Court held first that the ordinance did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause because the city was acting as a market participant. It further held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not apply to the ordinance because the discrimination was based on municipal, not state, residency.
States' rights
The balance of federal powers and those powers held by the states as defined in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution was first addressed in the case of "McCulloch v. Maryland" (1819). The Court's decision by Chief Justice John Marshall asserted that the laws adopted by the federal government, when exercising its constitutional powers, are generally paramount over any conflicting laws adopted by state governments. After "McCulloch", the primary legal issues in this area concerned the scope of Congress' constitutional powers, and whether the states possess certain powers to the exclusion of the federal government, even if the Constitution does not explicitly limit them to the states.
Passenger Cases
Justice McLean, the most senior member of the Court at the time, began his opinion by weighing in on the debate concerning the nature of the Commerce Clause. He asserted thar the Commerce Clause "is exclusively vested in Congress." 
Therefore, if the federal government does not regulate a particular area of foreign or interstate commerce, the omission is not an invitation to the states to provide interim regulation but is an expression of federal policy that the area should remain unregulated.
Perez v. Campbell
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that Arizona's law suspending a driver's license was unconstitutional due to its conflict with the federal Bankruptcy Act under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
Privileges and Immunities Clause
The Supreme Court has never interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause as requiring any state to protect general rights of citizenship beyond those that the state already protects for its own citizens, though even a state's own citizens must be allowed to leave the state in order to enjoy privileges and immunities in any other state.
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Clause mandates that individuals in similar situations be treated equally by the law. Although the text of the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Equal Protection Clause only against the states, the Supreme Court, since "Bolling v. Sharpe" (1954), has applied the Clause against the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment under a doctrine called "reverse incorporation."
Privileges or Immunities Clause
In "obiter dicta", Justice Miller's opinion in "Slaughter-House" went so far as to acknowledge that the privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States include at least some rights listed in the first eight amendments: "The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances...are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution". The Privileges or Immunities Clause was perhaps originally intended to incorporate the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights against the state governments, while also incorporating other constitutional rights against the state governments such as the privilege of the writ of "habeas corpus". However, that incorporation has instead been achieved mostly by means of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Álvaro Antonio
Suprema Lex Fraternity
Strict scrutiny
The Supreme Court has established standards for determining whether a statute or policy's classification requires the use of strict scrutiny. The class must have experienced a history of discrimination, must be definable as a group based on "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics," be a minority or "politically powerless," and its characteristics must have little relationship to the government's policy aims or the ability of the group's members to contribute to society.[Citations needed.]
Privileges and Immunities Clause
The Privileges and Immunities Clause (U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1, also known as the Comity Clause) prevents a state from treating citizens of other states in a discriminatory manner. Additionally, a right of interstate travel may plausibly be inferred from the clause.
Supremacism
Before the American Civil War, the Confederate States of America was founded with a constitution that contained clauses restricting the government's ability to limit or interfere with the institution of "negro" slavery. In the Cornerstone Speech, Confederate vice president Alexander Stephens declared that one of the Confederacy's foundational tenets was white supremacy over black slaves. Following the war, a secret society, the Ku Klux Klan, was formed in the South. Its purpose was to "restore" white supremacy after the Reconstruction period, even though there still was white, Protestant supremacy in the United States, at the time. The group preached supremacy over all other races, as well as supremacy over Jews, Catholics, and other minorities.
Missouri v. Holland
Although the Court found sufficient jurisdictional basis for Missouri to enjoin an allegedly unconstitutional federal regulation -- due to the quasi-sovereign right of a state to regulate game hunting -- it ultimately ruled that the Supremacy Clause renders treaties the "supreme law of the land," and thus treaty provisions could not be challenged by the states through judicial review. The Court also reasoned that protecting wildlife was in the national interest and could only be accomplished through national (i.e. federal) action.
Supremacy (1940 board game)
Supremacy is a World War II board wargame published in c.1940. The format of the game is loosely based on "Monopoly", although it has some major differences. The currency for the game is different types of military units: officer, infantry, aeroplane, submarine, destroyer, tank, general and battleship.
Supremacy (film)
Recently paroled after serving a fifteen-year prison sentence, Garrett Tully meets Doreen to complete a drug errand for their incarcerated Aryan Brotherhood boss, Paul Sobecki. After fatally shooting a cop, Tully breaks into a house, where he and Doreen take an African-American family hostage. An ex-con himself, the family patriarch, Sonny Walker, attempts to understand the neo-Nazi's motives and get his family out alive.
Act of Supremacy 1558
The act also made it a crime to assert the authority of any foreign prince, prelate, or other authority, and was aimed at abolishing the authority of the Pope in England. A third offence was high treason, punishable by death.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
The Court also rejected the theoretical underpinnings of the "National League of Cities v. Usery" decision—that the Constitution's recognition of the sovereignty of the states necessarily implies limits on the power of the federal government to regulate their employment relations. In the majority's view, the constitutional grant of authority to Congress to regulate interstate commerce was not qualified by any implied limitation on the right to regulate the activities of the states when they engaged in interstate commerce; on the contrary, the Commerce Clause invalidates state regulations that interfere with commerce, while the Supremacy Clause allows Congress to preempt state laws that conflict with federal law in this area. According to the majority, the framers believed that state sovereignty could be maintained by the peculiar structure they adopted: a Senate in which each state was given equal representation, regardless of its population, an electoral college that gave the states the power to choose electors, and the indirect election of Senators by the legislature of each state prior to the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Noting that the same Congress that extended the FLSA to cover government-run mass transit systems also provided substantial funding for those systems, the Court concluded that the structure created by the framers had indeed protected the states from overreaching by the federal government.
Alden v. Maine
However, Congress may abrogate sovereign immunity when the suit is to enforce a statute protecting Fourteenth Amendment rights: 
The majority stated that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution only applies to pieces of legislation that fit within its design. Therefore, any law passed by Congress pursuant to Article I that seeks to subject states to suit would violate the original, unamended Constitution. However, Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity when it passes legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See, for example, "Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer" (1976).
California Resale Royalty Act
The Commerce Clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as not only affirmatively granting to Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states, but also, by negative implication, prohibiting the states from unjustifiably discriminating against or burdening the flow of interstate commerce. A state regulation violates the Commerce clause where it "directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State."
Suzerainty
The 1871 Act was affirmed in 1886 by the US Supreme Court, in "United States v. Kagama" 118 U.S. 375 (1886), which affirmed that the Congress has plenary power over all American Indian tribes within its borders by rationalisation that "The power of the general government over these remnants of a race once powerful … is necessary to their protection as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell".
Before 1871 the United States had recognised the Indian tribes as semi-independent. The Supreme Court affirmed that the US Government "has the right and authority, instead of controlling them by treaties, to govern them by acts of Congress, they being within the geographical limit of the United States … The Indians owe no allegiance to a State within which their reservation may be established, and the State gives them no protection."
Acts of Supremacy
The act declared that the king was "the only supreme head on Earth of the Church of England" and that the English crown shall enjoy "all honours, dignities, preeminences, jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, immunities, profits, and commodities to the said dignity." The wording of the act made clear that Parliament was not granting the king the title (thereby suggesting that they had the right to withdraw it later); rather, it was acknowledging an established fact. In the Act of Supremacy, Henry abandoned Rome completely. He thereby asserted the independence of the "Ecclesia Anglicana". He appointed himself and his successors as the supreme rulers of the English church. Henry had been declared "Defender of the Faith" ("Fidei defensor") in 1521 by Pope Leo X for his pamphlet accusing Martin Luther of heresy. Parliament later conferred this title upon Henry in 1544.
Federalism
From 1938 until 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court did not invalidate any federal statute as exceeding Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Most actions by the federal government can find some legal support among the express powers, such as the Commerce Clause, whose applicability has been narrowed by the Supreme Court in recent years. In 1995 the Supreme Court rejected the Gun-Free School Zones Act in the Lopez decision, and also rejected the civil remedy portion of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 in the "United States v. Morrison" decision. Recently, the Commerce Clause was interpreted to include marijuana laws in the "Gonzales v. Raich" decision.
Coram nobis
Following the Constitution and Congressional statutes, the next highest source for direction and guidance of rules and procedures is the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the highest federal court. Lower courts, such as federal appellate courts and federal district courts, must follow the decisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has discretionary appellate jurisdiction, meaning the Court chooses to hear cases for reasons it deems “compelling reasons” (such as resolving a conflict in the interpretation of a federal law or resolving an important matter of law). Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, cannot override any law enacted by Congress unless the law violates the Constitution. Federal courts also cannot repeal a statute unless Congress clearly intended to repeal the statute.
In 1954, "United States v. Morgan" provides writ of coram nobis to former federal prisoners. The Court determined coram nobis relief “should be allowed . . . only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice”. Specifically, the circumstances must include all three of these conditions:
Since 1954, the Supreme Court granted review of only one other coram nobis case. In 2009, the Court clarified that Article I military courts have jurisdiction to entertain coram nobis petitions to consider allegations that an earlier judgment of conviction was flawed in a fundamental respect. Other than providing military courts the authority to issue the writ, the Supreme Court has declined to provide federal courts additional guidance in coram nobis proceedings. Appellate courts have occasionally criticized the Supreme Court for failing to provide this additional guidance. The Seventh Circuit called the writ of coram nobis, “a phantom in the Supreme Court's cases” and contends “[t]wo ambiguous decisions on the subject in the history of the Supreme Court are inadequate.” The Sixth Circuit took a similar stance saying, “[t]he Supreme Court has decided only one coram nobis case in the last forty-two years, "Morgan", and that opinion is ambiguous concerning whether proof of an ongoing civil disability is required.” The First Circuit wrote that its decision of time limitations “derives from the Morgan Court's cryptic characterization of coram nobis as a ‘step in the criminal case.’” In another case, the First Circuit writes, “[t]he metes and bounds of the writ of coram nobis are poorly defined and the Supreme Court has not developed an easily readable roadmap for its issuance.”
Missouri v. Jenkins
The Court also said: "To hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes upon them."
United States v. Locke
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that certain state regulations regarding oil tankers and oil barges are preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution in deference to the extensive body of federal regulations affecting these classes of vessels.
Reconstruction Amendments
The second, third, and fourth sections of the amendment are seldom, if ever, litigated. The fifth section gives Congress enforcement power. The amendment's first section includes several clauses: the Citizenship Clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Citizenship Clause provides a broad definition of citizenship, overruling the Supreme Court's decision in "Dred Scott v. Sandford" (1857), which had held that Americans descended from Africans could not be citizens of the United States. The Privileges or Immunities Clause has been interpreted in such a way that it does very little. While "Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment reduces congressional representation for states that deny suffrage on racial grounds," it was not enforced after southern states disfranchised blacks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (see below, at Fifteenth Amendment). While Northern Congressmen in 1900 raised objections to the inequities of southern states being apportioned seats based on total populations when they excluded blacks, Southern Democratic Party representatives formed such a powerful block that opponents could not gain approval for change of apportionment.
Cooper v. Aaron
More importantly, the Court held that since the Supremacy Clause of Article VI made the US Constitution the supreme law of the land and "Marbury v. Madison" (1803) made the Supreme Court the final interpreter of the Constitution, the precedent set forth in "Brown v. Board of Education" is the supreme law of the land and is therefore binding on all the states, regardless of any state laws contradicting it. The Court therefore rejected the contention that the Arkansas legislature and Governor were not bound by the "Brown" decision. The Supreme Court also rejected the doctrines of nullification and interposition in this case, which had been invoked by segregationists. Segregation supporters argued that the states have the power to nullify federal laws or court rulings that they believe to be unconstitutional and the states could use this power to nullify the "Brown" decision. The Arkansas laws that attempted to prevent desegregation were Arkansas' effort to nullify the "Brown" decision. The Supreme Court held that the "Brown" decision "can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation." Thus, "Cooper v. Aaron" held that state attempts to nullify federal law are ineffective.
Supremacy 1914
The game is hosted in Germany where the majority of players are, but a substantial number of players also come from the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Japan, among many other nations. Over 4000 unique players come online each day. It was ranked the 2009 Browser Game of the Year by Game Genetics.
Act of Supremacy 1558
Another act (1 Eliz.1 c.5) dealing with treason was passed in 1558, which made it treason to "compass" or "imagine" to deprive the Queen (or her heirs) of the Crown, or destroy her or her heirs, or levy war against them in their dominions, or depose them, or say that they are not or ought not to be the monarch.
Arbitration clause
In the United States, the federal government has expressed a policy of support of arbitration clauses, because they reduce the burden on court systems to resolve disputes. This support is found in the Federal Arbitration Act, which permits compulsory and binding arbitration, under which parties give up the right to appeal an arbitrator's decision to a court. In "Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.", the U.S. Supreme Court established the "separability principle", under which enforceability of a contract must be challenged in arbitration before any court action, unless the arbitration clause itself has been challenged.
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
In "McDonald v. Chicago "(2010), Justice Clarence Thomas, while concurring with the majority in incorporating the Second Amendment against the states, declared that he reached this conclusion through the Privileges or Immunities Clause instead of the Due Process Clause. Randy Barnett has referred to Justice Thomas's concurring opinion as a "complete restoration" of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Privileges or Immunities Clause
The Supreme Court did not prevent application of the Bill of Rights to the states via the Privileges or Immunities Clause in "Slaughter-House", but rather addressed whether a state monopoly statute violated the natural right of a person to do business and engage in his trade or vocation. In other words, no provision of the Bill of Rights was at issue in that case, nor any other right that followed under the U.S. Constitution.
Supremacy Clause
Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as the 1976 Medical Device Regulation Act, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs, Congress allowed federal regulatory agencies to set federal minimum standards, but did not preempt state regulations imposing more stringent standards than those imposed by federal regulators. Where rules or regulations do not clearly state whether or not preemption should apply, the Supreme Court tries to follow lawmakers’ intent, and prefers interpretations that avoid preempting state laws.
Act of Supremacy 1558
The Act of Supremacy 1558 (1 Eliz 1 c 1), sometimes referred to as the Act of Supremacy 1559, is an act of the Parliament of England, passed under the auspices of Elizabeth I. It replaced the original Act of Supremacy 1534 issued by Elizabeth's father, Henry VIII, which arrogated ecclesiastical authority to the monarchy, and which had been repealed by Mary I. Along with the Act of Uniformity 1558 it made up what is generally referred to as the Elizabethan Religious Settlement.
Machinae Supremacy
2004
Suprematism
Historic Exhibitions
Ineligibility Clause
The Ineligibility Clause (sometimes also called the Emoluments Clause, or the Incompatibility Clause, or the Sinecure Clause) is a provision in of the United States Constitution that makes each incumbent member of Congress ineligible to hold an office established by the federal government during their tenure in Congress; it also bars officials in the federal government's executive and judicial branches from simultaneously serving in either the U.S. House or Senate. The purpose of the clause is twofold: first, to protect the separation of powers philosophy (upon which the federal frame of government is built); and second, to prevent Congress from conspiring to create offices or increase federal officials' salaries with the expectation that members of Congress would later be appointed to these posts.
Acts of Supremacy
Henry VIII's Act of Supremacy was repealed in 1554 during the reign of his staunchly Roman Catholic daughter, Queen Mary I. Upon her death in November 1558, her Protestant half-sister Elizabeth I succeeded to the throne. The first Elizabethan Parliament passed the Act of Supremacy 1558, which declared Elizabeth the Supreme Governor of the Church of England, instituted an Oath of Supremacy, requiring anyone taking public or church office to swear allegiance to the monarch as head of the Church and state. Anyone refusing to take the oath could be charged with treason.
Due Process Clause
The Supreme Court has formulated a balancing test to determine the rigor with which the requirements of procedural due process should be applied to a particular deprivation, for the obvious reason that mandating such requirements in the most expansive way for even the most minor deprivations would bring the machinery of government to a halt. The Court set out the test as follows: "[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."
Act of Supremacy 1558
The Oath of Supremacy, imposed by the Act of Supremacy 1558, provided for any person taking public or church office in England to swear allegiance to the monarch as Supreme Governor of the Church of England. Failure to so swear was a crime, although it did not become treason until 1562, when the Supremacy of the Crown Act 1562 made refusal to take the oath a treasonable offemce. The Oath was later extended to include Members of Parliament and people studying at universities: all but one of the bishops lost their posts and a hundred fellows of Oxford colleges were deprived, as many dignitaries resigned rather than take the oath. The bishops who were removed from the ecclesiastical bench were replaced by appointees who would agree to the reforms.
Supremacy (film)
Anderson, Glover, and Dawn Olivieri were the first to be cast; the announcement was made on February 9, 2012 by Indiewire.
Tafflin v. Levitt
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court noted that under the dual American system of state and federal sovereignty, state courts have inherent authority to adjudicate claims under federal law subject only to the limits of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Thus, state courts are presumed under the Court's "Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp"
decision to have concurrent jurisdiction over a claim under federal law unless there is a provision in the statute expressly or implicitly limiting jurisdiction to federal courts. There was nothing in the RICO statute explicitly or implicitly preventing state courts from considering civil RICO claims.
Supremacy Clause
However, in the case of "California v. ARC America Corp.", , the Supreme Court held that if Congress expressly "intended" to act in an area, this would trigger the enforcement of the Supremacy Clause, and hence nullify the state action. The Supreme Court further found in "Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council", , that even when a state law is not in direct conflict with a federal law, the state law could still be found unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause if the "state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress's full purposes and objectives". Congress need not expressly assert any preemption over state laws either, because Congress may implicitly assume this preemption under the Constitution.
Intergovernmental immunity
In United States Constitutional Law, intergovernmental immunity is a doctrine that prevents the federal government and individual state governments from intruding on each other's sovereignty. It is also referred to as a Supremacy Clause immunity or simply federal immunity from state law.
Federal preemption
According to the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, clause 2) of the United States Constitution,
Clarence Thomas
Thomas agreed with the judgment in "McDonald v. Chicago" (2010) that the right to keep and bear arms is applicable to state and local governments, but Thomas wrote a separate concurrence finding that an individual's right to bear arms is fundamental as a privilege of American citizenship under the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than as a fundamental right under the due process clause. The four justices in the plurality opinion specifically rejected incorporation under the privileges or immunities clause, "declin[ing] to disturb" the holding in the "Slaughter-House Cases", which, according to the plurality, had held that the clause applied only to federal matters.
Supremacism
Supremacism is an ideology which holds that a particular class of people is superior to others, and that it should dominate, control, and subjugate others, or is entitled to do so. The supposed "superior" class of people can be an age, race (classification of human beings) species, ethnicity, religion, gender (social construct), sexuality, language, social class, ideology, nation, or culture, or any other part of a population.
United States v. The Amistad
By insisting that the case fell under the treaty of 1795, the Spanish were invoking the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which would put the clauses of the treaty above the state laws of Connecticut or New York, where the ship had been taken into custody, "no one who respects the laws of the country ought to oppose the execution of the treaty, which is the supreme law of the country." The case was already in the federal district court.
Florida Lime &amp; Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul
The Florida avocado growers' main challenge was under the Supremacy Clause, because some avocados that satisfy the standard set by the AAA marketing order do not satisfy the California 8% oil test.
Oath of Supremacy
The Oath of Supremacy required any person taking public or church office in England to swear allegiance to the monarch as Supreme Governor of the Church of England. Failure to do so was to be treated as treasonable. The Oath of Supremacy was originally imposed by King Henry VIII of England through the Act of Supremacy 1534, but repealed by his daughter, Queen Mary I of England and reinstated under Henry's other daughter and Mary's half-sister, Queen Elizabeth I of England under the Act of Supremacy 1559. The Oath was later extended to include Members of Parliament and people studying at universities. Catholics were first allowed to become members of parliament in 1829, and the requirement to take the oath for Oxford university students was lifted by the Oxford University Act 1854.
Pennsylvania v. Nelson
The Constitution of the United States establishes the U.S. Constitution, Federal Statutes, and U.S. Treaties as "the supreme law of the land". This power, found in Article VI, Clause 2 is known as the Supremacy Clause. The text reads:
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett
The Court reversed the decision of the First Circuit with Justice Alito writing for the majority. The Court centered its opinion around the impossibility of a generic drug manufacturer both meeting its obligations under State law and Federal Law. Where such conflict exists, the court writes, Federal Law must take primacy under the Supremacy Clause.
Chapter One of the Constitution of South Africa
Section 2, ""Supremacy of Constitution"", is the supremacy clause; it declares that any other law or conduct that is inconsistent with the constitution is invalid. This section gives the Constitutional Court and the other courts the power to overturn acts of Parliament, elements of the common law and actions of the executive that are unconstitutional.
Passenger Cases
Notwithstanding the firmness of his opinion regarding the right of Congress, to the complete exclusion of state prerogative, to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, and even his view that the exclusivity principle had been authoritatively established by prior precedent of the Supreme Court, Wayne criticized a parallel discussion of Justice McLean and announced that he and the other Justices concurring in the judgment "do not think it necessary in these cases to reaffirm... what this Court has long since decided, that the constitutional power to regulate 'commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states and with the Indian tribes,' is exclusively vested in Congress, and that no part of it can be exercised by a state." He reasoned that even those who take the position that the states have the right to regulate foreign and interstate commerce in the absence of federal regulation readily admit that when the federal government actively regulates some aspect of foreign or interstate commerce, the states are prohibited by the Supremacy Clause from enacting or enforcing any law inconsistent with the federal law. He deemed that the federal government had engaged in regulating foreign commerce regarding passengers arriving from Britain when it entered into a series of treaties with that country. Wayne declared that the New York and Massachusetts statutes "conflict with treaty stipulations existing between the United States and Great Britain, permitting the inhabitants of the two countries 'freely and securely to come, with their ships and cargoes, to all places, ports, and rivers in the territories of each country to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of said territories, respectively;...'"
Supremacy Clause
In "Pennsylvania v. Nelson", 350 U.S. 497 (1956) the Supreme Court struck down the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which made advocating the forceful overthrow of the federal government a crime under Pennsylvania state law. The Supreme Court held that when federal interest in an area of law is sufficiently dominant, federal law must be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject; and a state law is not to be declared a help when state law goes farther than Congress has seen fit to go.
Supremacy (film)
The film premiered at the Los Angeles Film Festival on June 12, 2014, and was released in the United States on January 30, 2015.
Supremacy Clause
The constitutional principle derived from the Supremacy Clause is federal preemption. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and Food and Drug Administration regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs.
Federalist No. 33
Hamilton notes that the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause "have been the source of much virulent invective and petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution." This stirs up much of the issues amongst the people due to the uncertainty of the consequences of granting the government "too much power". He argues that the first clause is implicit in the constitution—if congress is granted a power, it must necessarily be able to draft laws that enable it to execute that power. Hamilton then applies this line of logic to the issue of taxation, stating that Congress must have the power to create legislation to collect taxes. The people's reluctance is understandable, considering their recent break from Great Britain. Hamilton ridicules the anti-federalist alarmism about giving the national government more power, writing that the national government has "been held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation as the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated; as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane…" This quote expresses Hamilton's frustration for the people's inability to hear him out and truly understand the reasoning and importance for the two clauses because these legislations and clauses are stated specifically to avoid anyone from being able to nitpick and find loopholes, and without anyone enforcing it, it would just be a treaty.
Dormant Commerce Clause
The "market participation exception" to the dormant Commerce Clause does not give states unlimited authority to favor local interests, because limits from other laws and Constitutional limits still apply. In "United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Camden", , the city of Camden, New Jersey had passed an ordinance requiring that at least forty percent of the employees of contractors and subcontractors on city projects be Camden residents. The Supreme Court found that while the law was not infirm because of the Dormant Commerce Clause, it violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist's opinion distinguishes the market-participant doctrine from the privileges and immunities doctrine. Similarly, Congress has the power itself under the Commerce Clause to regulate and sanction states acting as "market participants", but it lacks power to legislate in ways that violate Article IV.
Act of Supremacy 1558
An act to the same effect was passed in Ireland in the following year, the Act of Supremacy (Ireland) 1560 (2 Eliz.1 c. 1).
Supremacy Clause
In Federalist No. 44, James Madison defends the Supremacy Clause as vital to the functioning of the nation. He noted that state legislatures were invested with all powers not specifically defined in the Constitution, but also said that having the federal government subservient to various state constitutions would be an inversion of the principles of government, concluding that if supremacy were not established "it would have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members".
State legislation in protest of federal law in the United States
Several US States have introduced various resolutions and legislation in protest to federal actions. Despite this, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the idea that the states can nullify federal law. In "Cooper v. Aaron" (1958), the Supreme Court of the United States held that federal law prevails over state law due to the operation of the Supremacy Clause, and that federal law "can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes ..." Thus, state laws purporting to nullify federal statutes or to exempt states and their citizens from federal statutes have only symbolic impact.
Supremacy Clause
In "Martin v. Hunter's Lessee", 14 U.S. 304 (1816), and "Cohens v. Virginia", 19 U.S. 264 (1821), the Supreme Court held that the Supremacy Clause and the judicial power granted in Article III give the Supreme Court the ultimate power to review state court decisions involving issues arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Therefore, the Supreme Court has the final say in matters involving federal law, including constitutional interpretation, and can overrule decisions by state courts.
Recusancy in Ireland
In 1559 the Irish Parliament passed both the Act of Supremacy and the Act of Uniformity, the former prescribing to all officers the Oath of Supremacy, the latter prohibiting the Mass and commanding the public use of the Book of Common Prayer. Whoever refused the Oath of Supremacy was dismissed from office, and whoever refused to attend the Protestant service was fined 12 pence for each offence. A subsequent viceregal proclamation ordered all priests to leave Dublin and prohibited the use of images, candles, and beads. The "Recusancy Acts", which began during the reign of Elizabeth I and which were repealed in 1650, imposed a number of punishments on those who did not participate in Anglican religious activity, including fines, property confiscation, and imprisonment. The purpose of the Acts was to compel Irish Catholics and members of other churches such as the Puritans or Presbyterians to attend their local Church of Ireland church.
Privileges or Immunities Clause
The Privileges or Immunities Clause is Amendment XIV, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. 
Along with the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment, this clause became part of the Constitution on July 9, 1868.
Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead
The Supreme Court reversed the New Mexico Supreme Court, holding that the New Mexico energy tax was invalid under the Supremacy Clause since it violated 15 U.S.C. § 391. The Court noted that the statute was directed specifically at a state tax on generation or transmission of electricity and not on the overall tax burden of electric companies. As the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax on generation ensured locally consumed electricity had no tax burden, it violated that statute. The Court stated that Congress, in enacting the ban on these types of state taxes and against the New Mexico tax in particular, had broad authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce, as the Court had held in cases such as "Katzenbach v. McClung", "Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States", and "Wickard v. Filburn".
Supremacy Clause
In "Ableman v. Booth", 62 U.S. 506 (1859), the Supreme Court held that state courts cannot issue rulings that contradict the decisions of federal courts, citing the Supremacy Clause, and overturning a decision by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Specifically, the court found it was illegal for state officials to interfere with the work of U.S. Marshals enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act or to order the release of federal prisoners held for violation of that Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that because the Supremacy Clause established federal law as the law of the land, the Wisconsin courts could not nullify the judgments of a federal court. The Supreme Court held that under Article III of the Constitution, the federal courts have the final jurisdiction in all cases involving the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the states therefore cannot interfere with federal court judgments.
James v. Dravo Contracting Co.
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937), is a 5-to-4 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States that a state's corporate income tax did not violate the Supremacy Clause (Article Six, Clause 2) of the United States Constitution by taxing the Federal government of the United States.
Perez v. Campbell
This decision overruled precedent in "Keeler v. Department of Public Safety", 269 US 153 (1962) and "Reitz v. Mealey", 314 US 33 (1941), stating that those rulings "have no authoritative effect to the extent they are inconsistent with the controlling principle that state legislation that frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is invalidated by the Supremacy Clause.", and was seen as reinforcing "the Hines test", the rule specified for identifying Supremacy Clause violations in "Hines v. Davidowitz" (1941).
Matthew Whitaker
Whitaker stated in 2013 he supports the right of states to nullify federal laws. Stephen Vladeck, a University of Texas law professor, stated that Whitaker's views on nullification are "irreconcilable not only with the structure of the Constitution, but with its text, especially the text of the Supremacy Clause," and added that "For someone who holds those views to be the nation's chief law enforcement officer, even temporarily, is more than a little terrifying."
Gibbons v. Ogden
The part of the ruling which stated that any license granted under the Federal Coasting Act of 1793 takes precedence over any similar license granted by a state is also in the spirit of the Supremacy Clause, although the Court did not specifically cite this clause.
Suprematism
Retrospective Exhibitions
Supremacy (song)
"Supremacy" is a song by English rock band Muse. It was released on 20 February 2013 as the fourth single from their sixth studio album, "The 2nd Law". "Supremacy" peaked at number 58 on the UK Singles Chart.
Supremacy (film)
Scully was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, but insisted during his trial that the killing of Deputy Trejo was an accident and not racially motivated; Trejo was Latino. Scully was nevertheless found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death plus 274 years (for 11 "related" felony convictions) on June 14, 1997. He is currently on California's death row, awaiting execution (as of 2015). Moore was sentenced to 14 years, and has since been sentenced to a further seven years for her "involvement in a prison gang whose members included Scully".
Clarence Thomas
In "Foucha v. Louisiana", Thomas dissented from the majority opinion that required the removal from a mental institution of a prisoner who had become sane. The court held that a Louisiana statute violated the Due Process Clause "because it allows an insanity acquittee to be committed to a mental institution until he is able to demonstrate that he is not dangerous to himself and others, even though he does not suffer from any mental illness." Dissenting, Thomas cast the issue as a matter of federalism. "Removing sane insanity acquittees from mental institutions may make eminent sense as a policy matter," he concluded, "but the Due Process Clause does not require the States to conform to the policy preferences of federal judges." In "United States v. Comstock", Thomas' dissent argued for the release of a former federal prisoner from civil commitment, again on the basis of federalism. In "U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton", he authored the dissent defending term limits on federal house and senate candidates as a valid exercise of state legislative power.
Ecotax
A variety of ecotaxes (often called "severance taxes") have been enacted by various states in the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States held in "Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana", 453 U.S. 609 (1981), that in the absence of federal law to the contrary, states may set ecotaxes as high as they wish without violating the Commerce Clause or the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
Three Supremes
The “Three Supremes” are as follows:
1. “Supremacy of the business of the CCP” (党的事业至上)
2. “Supremacy of the interests of the people” (人民利益至上)
3. “Supremacy of the Constitution and the laws” (宪法法律至上)
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Privileges or Immunities Clause, which protects the privileges and immunities of national citizenship from interference by the states, was patterned after the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, which protects the privileges and immunities of state citizenship from interference by other states. In the "Slaughter-House Cases" (1873), the Supreme Court concluded that the Constitution recognized two separate types of citizenship—"national citizenship" and "state citizenship"—and the Court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause prohibits states from interfering only with privileges and immunities possessed by virtue of national citizenship. The Court concluded that the privileges and immunities of national citizenship included only those rights that "owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws." The Court recognized few such rights, including access to seaports and navigable waterways, the right to run for federal office, the protection of the federal government while on the high seas or in the jurisdiction of a foreign country, the right to travel to the seat of government, the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the right to participate in the government's administration. This decision has not been overruled and has been specifically reaffirmed several times. Largely as a result of the narrowness of the "Slaughter-House" opinion, this clause subsequently lay dormant for well over a century.
United States v. Lee (1882)
"United States v. Lee" is one of three important federal sovereign immunity cases, and the most important doctrinally. The case showed just how sharply divided the Supreme Court was over the scope and legitimacy of sovereign immunity in the United States. The majority opinion questioned whether sovereign immunity was appropriate in a republic, and suggested that it had been adopted in an unprincipled and careless way by previous court decisions. The decision was the first to refuse to extend sovereign immunity to officers of the state acting as individuals, a principle which would later become known as the "stripping doctrine". The decision also revised the Supreme Court's "nominal party rule," first enunciated in "Osborn" and "Davis". In those cases, the Court had salvaged federal and state sovereign immunity by creating a bright-line legal fiction that the suits were against government officers in their capacity as individuals and not acting on behalf of the state. The Court in "Lee" reaffirmed this "nominal party rule" but only with five votes—which proved to be the last time it was invoked. In "Louisiana ex rel. Elliot v. Jumel", 107 U.S. 711 (1882), a majority of the Court upheld the "nominal party rule" but refused to invoke it on an technicality. In "New Hampshire v. Louisiana", 108 U.S. 76 (1883), the Court abandoned the "nominal party rule" in favor of a "real party interest test." The Court openly rejected the rule (without necessarily overturning its previous decision) in "In re Ayers", 123 U.S. 443 (1887). Nevertheless, the Court did not overturn "Lee" but rather distinguished it narrowly and continued to affirm its basic principles in "Jumel" and "Ayers".
Samuel Alito Supreme Court nomination
Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) asked Alito whether statements in his 1985 'Personal Qualifications Statement' when applying to be an Assistant Attorney General under Pres. Ronald Reagan represented his views at the time and also whether they represent his views today. Alito gave ananswer about "stare decisis" and the process he would use to consider how he would decide issues that might come before him. Senator Schumer responded, stating that Alito had stated forthrightly that "the Constitution does not protect a right to an abortion". Senator Schumer said that "it's important that you (Alito) give an answer." Alito replied that if a case involving abortion rights came up, he would use a judicial process. Senator Schumer rejoined ... "I'm not asking about a process;... Do you still believe it?" Senator Schumer remarked "I'm not asking you about case law". Senator Schumer then asked whether the "Constitution protects the right of free speech" whereupon Alito agreed. Senator Schumer then compared that question with the question of whether the Constitution protects the right to an abortion. Senator Schumer then made an elliptical comment about hypothetical in-laws. Senator Schumer said that he didn't expect Alito to answer the abortion question. Senator Schumer mentioned the "National League of Cities v. Usery" case and how it was overruled by "Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority" and how "Lawrence v. Texas" overruled "Bowers v. Hardwick" and "Brown v. Board of Education" overruled "Plessy v. Ferguson". So Alito agreed that "stare decisis" is not inviolate. Senator Schumer made allusions to Justice Clarence Thomas's views on "stare decisis", which he claimed included a call for "Buckley v. Valeo", "Calder v. Bull" and a long string of cases establishing Supreme Court precedent to be overturned.