Cardinal virtues
Augustine of Hippo, discussing the morals of the church, described them:
The "cardinal" virtues are not the same as the three theological virtues: Faith, Hope and Charity (Love), named in 1 Corinthians 13. 
"And now these three remain: faith, hope and love. But the greatest of these is love."
Because of this reference, a group of seven attributes is sometimes listed by adding the four cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice) and three theological virtues (faith, hope, charity).
Together, they comprise what is known as the seven virtues. While the first four date back to Greek philosophers and were applicable to all people seeking to live moral lives, the "theological virtues" appear to be specific to Christians as written by Paul in The New Testament.
Nicomachean Ethics
According to Aristotle, character properly understood (i.e. one's virtue or vice), is not just any tendency or habit but something that affects when we feel pleasure or pain. A virtuous person feels pleasure when she performs the most beautiful or noble ("kalos") actions. A person who is not virtuous will often find his or her perceptions of what is most pleasant to be misleading. For this reason, any concern with virtue or politics requires consideration of pleasure and pain. When a person does virtuous actions, for example by chance, or under advice, they are not yet necessarily a virtuous person. It is not like in the productive arts, where the thing being made is what is judged as well made or not. To truly be a virtuous person, one's virtuous actions must meet three conditions: (a) they are done knowingly, (b) they are chosen for their own sakes, and (c) they are chosen according to a stable disposition (not at a whim, or in any way that the acting person might easily change his choice about). And just knowing what would be virtuous is not enough. According to Aristotle's analysis, three kinds of things come to be present in the soul that virtue is: a feeling ("pathos"), an inborn predisposition or capacity (dunamis), or a stable disposition that has been acquired (hexis). In fact, it has already been mentioned that virtue is made up of "hexeis", but on this occasion the contrast with feelings and capacities is made clearer—neither is chosen, and neither is praiseworthy in the way that virtue is.