First Jewish–Roman War
The Great Revolt of Judea marked the beginning of the Jewish–Roman wars, which radically changed the Eastern Mediterranean and had a crucial impact on the development of the Roman Empire and the Jews. Despite the defeat of the Great Revolt, tensions continued to build in the region. With the Parthian threat from the East, major Jewish communities throughout the Eastern Mediterranean revolted in 117 CE. The revolt, known as the Kitos War, while poorly-organized, was extremely violent and took two years for the Roman armies to subdue. Although only the final chapter of the Kitos War was fought in Judea, the revolt is considered part of the Jewish–Roman Wars. The immense number of casualties during the Kitos War depopulated Cyrenaica and Cyprus and also reduced Jewish and Greco-Roman populations in the region. The final conflict in the Jewish–Roman Wars erupted in 132 CE in Judea, led by Simon bar Kokhba. Although Bar Kokhba was initially successful against Roman forces and established a short-lived state, the eventual Roman effort defeated Bar Kokhba's rebels. The result was an almost complete genocide of the Jews, a ban on Judaism, and the renaming of the province from Judea to Syria Palaestina. Although Hadrian's death (in 137 CE) eased restrictions and persecution of the Jews, the survivors of his campaign were not many. Only a small Jewish community of several thousand survived in Galilee, with smaller communities in other parts of the Mediterranean.
Pierre Renouvin
In the midst of this disastrous situation for the "Reich", the Kiel mutiny broke out with the sailors of the High Seas Fleet mutinying rather going on a "death cruise" in the North Sea Tha was intended to see the High Seas Fleet destroyed in a battle with the Anglo-American Grand Fleet just so that German admirals could claim that the High Seas Fleet had not been useless in the war. Renouvin wrote that for German elites, the High Seas Fleet mutiny was the final straw, and as such, they were determined to end the war while something could be saved for the "Reich" rather than see Germany destroyed forever as a great power and/or swept from power by the revolution that the High Seas Fleet mutiny had sparked. Renouvin noted that such was the determination of German elites to salvage something out of the catastrophe of 1918 that the German officer corps, until then a bastion of monarchism, turned against the monarchy with Wilhelm's generals ordering him to abdicate, as the Allies made it clear that they would not sign an armistice with him under any conditions. renouvin wrote that "Wilson did not know Europe", as the president ignored the wishes of his Allies and American public opinion, which did not want any halfway measures that might allow Germany to fight again. Renouvin argued that Wilson had no masterplan for the peace, improvised his diplomacy in response to events and vastly overrated his personal powers of persuasion when it came to dealing with both friends and foes. Renouvin maintained that the armistice of 11 November 1918 was a muddled affair on both sides. The Germans signed the armistice only to end a losing war and were prepared to resume the struggle if an opportune moment occurred. For exactly that reason, French and the British had insisted on an armistice so harsh that Germany could never resume the war. Renouvin stated that Wilsonwanted the "Reich" to continue to exist as a state because as long as Germany remained, his allies needed US assistance, which gave Wilson leverage in negotiating a peace that would be favourable to American interests. Renouvin argued that at the same time, Wilson did not want Germany to resume its quest for "world power status" that might one day threaten the United States, which meant that Wilson was not the advocate of a generous peace towards Germany that English-speaking historians often liked to claim.