Ignacy Skorupka
A day later his body was transported to a garrison church in Warsaw, and shortly, he was given a state funeral at the prestigious Powązki Cemetery, attended by many government and military authorities; general Józef Haller presented him with a posthumous Silver Cross of the Virtuti Militari. His death became a political ploy, used by the opponents of Polish military commander and leader Józef Piłsudski, architect of the Polish strategy that led to the victory at Warsaw. His opponents labelled the battle "miracle of Vistula", and attributed the Polish victory to a number of causes, up to and including divine intervention, and Skorupka's martyr-like death became part of their attempt to minimize Piłsudski's fame. Several monuments, streets and other landmarks were dedicated to him in the Second Polish Republic; he became a central figure in several books, poems and dramas; and Pope Pius XI commissioned a wall painting of him by Jan Henryk de Rosen at the battle at the Castel Gandolfo. Another popular painting of him was created by Jerzy Kossak.
Polish–Soviet War
Joseph Stalin, then chief political commissar of the South-western Front, was engaged at Lwów, about 320 kilometres from Warsaw. The absence of his forces at the battle has been the subject of dispute. A perception arose that his absence was due to his desire to achieve 'military glory' at Lwów. Telegrams concerning the transfer of forces were exchanged. Leon Trotsky interpreted Stalin's actions as insubordination; Richard Pipes asserts that Stalin '...almost certainly acted on Lenin's orders' in not moving the forces to Warsaw. That the commander-in-chief Sergey Kamenev allowed such insubordination, issued conflicting and confusing orders and did not act with the decisiveness of a commander-in-chief contributed greatly to the problems and defeat the Red forces suffered at this critical junction of the war.
The Polish 5th Army under General Władysław Sikorski counter-attacked on 14 August from the area of the Modlin fortress, crossing the Wkra River. It faced the combined forces of the numerically and materially superior Soviet 3rd and 15th Armies. In one day the Soviet advance toward Warsaw and Modlin had been halted and soon turned into retreat. Sikorski's 5th Army pushed the exhausted Soviet formations away from Warsaw in a lightning operation. Polish forces advanced at a speed of thirty kilometers a day, soon destroying any Soviet hopes for completing their enveloping manoeuvre in the north. By 16 August, the Polish counter-offensive had been fully joined by Marshal Piłsudski's "Reserve Army." Precisely executing his plan, the Polish force, advancing from Warsaw (Colonel Wrzaliński's group) and the south (Polish 3rd and 4 Army), found a huge gap between the Soviet fronts and exploited the weakness of the Soviet "Mozyr Group" that was supposed to protect the weak link between the Soviet fronts. The Poles continued their northward offensive with two armies following and destroying the surprised enemy. They reached the rear of Tukhachevsky's forces, the majority of which were encircled by 18 August. Only that same day did Tukhachevsky, at his Minsk headquarters 480 kilometres (300 mi) east of Warsaw, become fully aware of the proportions of the Soviet defeat and ordered the remnants of his forces to retreat and regroup. He hoped to straighten his front line, halt the Polish attack, and regain the initiative, but the orders either arrived too late or failed to arrive at all.