Ford Pinto engine
At the beginning of 1984, Ford Pinto engine displacement range switched from 1.3/1.6/2.0 to 1.6/1.8/2.0. The newly introduced 1.8 L engine used the 2.0 L crankshaft, so to uniform engine parts for the whole range after dropping the 1.3 L — the 1.6 L was redesigned to also take the 2.0 L crankshaft which had a stroke. This of course led to bringing the bore down to to keep the displacement within range — it was now 1598 cc. The TL16E became now the only available 1.6 L engine of the Pinto range. Although the compression ratio was raised to 9.5:1, the power figures did not differ much from the earlier TL16H version — the engine developed of power and of torque.
This engine is sometimes referred to as 1.6 E-Max engine.
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.
Given this description of the Pinto's design problem, some comments can be offered on the decision-making process within Ford that resulted in the Pinto. As shown above, a famous Ford report cannot be interpreted as showing Ford balancing lives against dollars in designing the Pinto. To state that the report does not itself reveal such a process does not mean, however, that such a process did not take place. Accordingly, I have consulted the Grimshaw record to learn what light it sheds on this question. As far as basic gas tank location is concerned, I am persuaded that the trunk capacity problem, in conjunction with American auto custom, provides the best explanation for Ford's choice to place the Pinto gas tank behind the axle. As for additional design proposals brought forward by the plaintiffs, several of them-for example, a bladder within the gas tank, and a "tank within the tank"-concerned somewhat innovative technology that had never been utilized in actual auto production. At trial, there was testimony that a bladder would have been feasible in the early 1970's, but also rebuttal testimony that a bladder was at this time beyond the bounds of feasibility. The jury's general verdict does not reveal whether and how the jury resolved such conflicts in the evidence; and I am in no position to resolve them here. Consider now, however, the combination of a stronger bumper, a smooth (bolt-free) differential, and the addition of both hat sections and horizontal cross-members. This combination of design changes clearly would have improved the Pinto's safety to some appreciable extent. According to the evidence, the overall cost of this combination would have been $9; and it makes sense to assume that these items were turned down by Ford in planning the Pinto primarily on account of their monetary costs. It is plausible to believe, then, that because of these costs, Ford decided not to improve the Pinto's design, knowing that its decision would increase the chances of the loss of consumer life. Once a variety of misconceptions are stripped away, this limited core of the Pinto story remains. And this is a core that may well be strong enough to support the "myth" of the Ford Pinto case in the second of the meanings described above. What follows is my effort to explicate the elements of that myth.