SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``End Oil Speculation Act of 2008''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds that--
            (1) skyrocketing energy prices in oil and gas are damaging 
        families of the United States, as well as the economy, foreign 
        policy, and national security of the United States;
            (2) while there are a number of reasons for increasing 
        energy costs, a large part of the problem appears to be from 
        excessive speculation in petroleum in the futures markets;
            (3) oil and gas prices result from the prices established 
        in the petroleum futures markets;
            (4) in the early 20th century, speculators were trading 
        commodities to make money at the expense of farmers and 
        families of the United States;
            (5) Congress stopped that action by enacting the 
        Commodities Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), which was 
        reinforced later when Congress established the Commodity 
        Futures Trading Commission (referred to in this section as the 
        ``Commission''), both of which were designed to ensure that the 
        futures markets worked free of fraud, manipulation, and 
        excessive speculation;
            (6) the Commission accomplished this (directly or through 
        delegated authority) primarily by promulgating rules and 
        regulations that required the disclosure of trading information 
        and that limited speculative trading;
            (7) Congress made it clear in the Commodities Exchange Act 
        and in the establishment of the Commission that the petroleum 
        futures markets exist for legitimate hedging of actual, 
        physical commercial products that are bought and sold today, 
        but are to be delivered in the future;
            (8) for a long time after enactment and enforcement of that 
        Act (including rules and regulations), the prices generated in 
        the petroleum futures markets were based largely on fundamental 
        factors relating to supply and demand for oil and gas in the 
        United States and world markets;
            (9) those prices no longer appear to be based on those 
        factors, as excessive speculation appears to have, once again, 
        hijacked the petroleum futures markets and sent oil and gas 
        prices soaring;
            (10) some experts have concluded that as much as 30 to 50 
        percent of the recent increase in the price of oil may be due 
        to manipulation or excessive speculation in the petroleum 
        futures markets;
            (11) some experts have estimated that as much as 70 percent 
        of the trading in the petroleum futures markets is by 
        speculators rather than commercial parties seeking to hedge the 
        risk of the future delivery of an actual physical product and 
        their counterparties;
            (12) the excessive speculation appears to have resulted, in 
        part, from a variety of actions by the Commission (including 
        the issuance of exemptions, exclusions, and no action letters), 
        technology changes, and threats by market participants to take 
        their business outside the regulated United States markets to 
        overseas unregulated markets in which the participants may not 
        have to disclose their trading activities and will be subject 
        to less regulation designed to protect markets and consumers;
            (13) the petroleum futures markets must be restored to 
        their original intent and purpose, which is legitimate hedge 
        trading directly involving commercial parties and in which 
        manipulation and excessive speculation are eliminated;
            (14) the Commission is the primary regulator of the 
        petroleum futures markets and has ample existing investigative 
        and regulatory authority to end manipulation and excessive 
        speculation and to do so quickly;
            (15) Congress acknowledges that the Commission announced on 
        May 29, 2008, that the Commission was conducting a broad and 
        far-reaching investigation into the national and international 
        crude markets (including into oil trading on regulated and 
        unregulated exchanges, over the counter trading, cash trades, 
        and storage, pipeline operations, shipping, and transportation 
        generally) to determine if there was or is any improper 
        manipulation or excessive speculation; and
            (16) the announced investigation by the Commission is a 
        good start, but it is only a start and much more needs to be 
        done quickly.

SEC. 3. ELIMINATION OF MANIPULATION AND EXCESSIVE SPECULATION AS CAUSE 
              OF HIGH OIL AND GAS PRICES.

    Section 4a of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 6a) is amended 
by adding at the end the following:
    ``(f) Elimination of Manipulation and Excessive Speculation as 
Cause of High Oil and Gas Prices.--
            ``(1) Duty of commission.--
                    ``(A) In general.--In accordance with subparagraph 
                (B), the Commission shall use the authority provided 
                under this Act to restore the petroleum futures markets 
                to the original purpose and intent of the markets by 
                eliminating manipulation and excessive speculation by 
                investigation, regulation, and rulemaking.
                    ``(B) Consideration of findings.--In carrying out 
                subparagraph (A), the Commission shall take into 
                account each finding described in section 2 of the End 
                Oil Speculation Act of 2008 (including paragraphs 2, 4 
                through 7, and 10 through 14 of section 2 of that Act).
            ``(2) Legitimate hedge trading.--
                    ``(A) In general.--In carrying out this Act, the 
                Commission shall distinguish between--
                            ``(i) trading involving transactions by 
                        commercial producers and purchasers involving 
                        actual physical petroleum products for future 
                        delivery (referred to in this subsection as 
                        `legitimate hedge trading'); and
                            ``(ii) all other trading;
                    ``(B) Inclusion.--For purposes of this subsection, 
                legitimate hedge trading shall include counterparties 
                to a transaction by commercial producers and purchasers 
                involving actual physical petroleum products for future 
                delivery regardless of whether the counterparties are 
                commercial producers or purchasers of the physical 
                products.
            ``(3) Type of trading.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
        of this Act, the Commission shall modify (or delegate any 
        appropriate entity to modify) such definitions, 
        classifications, and data collection under this Act as is 
        necessary to ensure that all direct and indirect parties and 
        counterparties to all trades in the petroleum futures market 
        are distinctly, clearly, and correctly identified for all 
        purposes as engaging in--
                    ``(A) legitimate hedge trading; or
                    ``(B) any other type of trading.
            ``(4) Elimination of excessive speculation.--
                    ``(A) In general.--Notwithstanding any other 
                provision of this Act, the Commission shall review all 
                regulations, rules, exemptions, exclusions, guidance, 
                no action letters, orders, and other actions taken by 
                or on behalf of the Commission (including any action or 
                inaction taken pursuant to delegated authority by an 
                exchange, self-regulatory organization, or any other 
                entity) regarding all petroleum futures market 
                participants or market activity (referred to in this 
                subsection individually as a `prior action') to ensure 
                that only legitimate hedge trading occurs and that 
                excessive speculation is eliminated.
                    ``(B) Prior action.--
                            ``(i) In general.--The Commission shall 
                        revoke or modify the application after the date 
                        of enactment of this subsection of any prior 
                        action taken by the Commission (including any 
                        prior action taken pursuant to delegated 
                        authority by any other entity) with respect to 
                        any trade on any market, exchange, foreign 
                        board of trade, swap or swap transaction, index 
                        or index market participant or trade, hedge 
                        fund, pension fund, and any other transaction, 
                        trade, trader, or petroleum futures market 
                        activity that is not a legitimate hedge trade.
                            ``(ii) Revocation.--In carrying out this 
                        subparagraph, the Commission shall consider 
                        revoking the results of each prior action that, 
                        in whole or in part, has the direct or indirect 
                        affect of limiting, reducing, or eliminating--
                                    ``(I) the full applicability of 
                                position limits on any trading that is 
                                not legitimate hedge trading; or
                                    ``(II) the filing of any report or 
                                data regarding any direct or indirect 
                                trade or trader, including the filing 
                                of large trader reports.
                    ``(C) Different rules or regulations.--
                            ``(i) In general.--The Commission shall 
                        apply different rules and regulations to 
                        legitimate hedge trading and any other 
                        transactions, trades, traders, or petroleum 
                        futures market activity in a manner that 
                        accomplishes the purposes of this subsection.
                            ``(ii) Margin requirements.--In carrying 
                        out this subparagraph, the Commission shall 
                        modify the purpose of margin requirements from 
                        credit protection only to include discouraging 
                        excessive speculation by setting margin 
                        requirements of at least 25 percent for any 
                        trading that is not legitimate hedge trading.
            ``(5) Regulation.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
        law (including regulations), the Commission shall subject, to 
        the maximum extent practicable, any person engaging, directly 
        or indirectly, in a petroleum futures market trade, 
        transaction, or other petroleum futures market activity in any 
        location to regulation by the Commission unless and until the 
        trade or transaction occurs in a market or exchange that has 
        regulations that are substantially identical to the regulations 
        of the Commission and that are fully and effectively enforced 
        in each such market or on each such exchange.
            ``(6) Disclosure to commission.--Notwithstanding any other 
        provision of law (including regulations), the Commission shall 
        ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that the activity of 
        each participant in the petroleum futures markets, and all 
        trades, trading, traders, and direct and indirect parties to 
        the trades, trading, and traders, are fully, clearly, and 
        accurately disclosed to the Commission so that the Commission 
        and Congress can effectively regulate and monitor all such 
        activity.
            ``(7) Working group of international regulators.--The 
        Commission shall convene a working group of international 
        regulators to develop uniform international reporting and 
        regulatory standards to ensure the protection of the petroleum 
        futures markets from excessive speculation, manipulation, 
        location shopping, and lowest common denominator regulation, 
        which pose systemic risks to all petroleum futures markets, 
        countries, and consumers.
            ``(8) Reports.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The Commission shall submit to 
                Congress--
                            ``(i) not later than 60 days after the date 
                        of enactment of this subsection, a report that 
                        describes in detail the actions the Commission 
                        has taken, is taking, and intends to take to 
                        carry out this subsection, including any 
                        recommended legislative changes that are 
                        necessary to carry out this subsection; and
                            ``(ii) every 45 days thereafter, an update 
                        of the report required under clause (i).
                    ``(B) Additional employees or resources.--Not later 
                than 60 days after the date of enactment of this 
                subsection, the Commission shall submit to Congress a 
                report that describes the number of additional 
                employees and resources that the Commission determines 
                are necessary to carry out this subsection (including 
                the specific duty of each additional employee).
            ``(9) Expedited procedures.--
                    ``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the 
                Commission shall use emergency and expedited procedures 
                to carry out this subsection.
                    ``(B) Report.--If the Commission decides not to use 
                the procedures described in subparagraph (A) in a 
                specific instance, not later than 30 days after the 
                date of the decision, the Commission shall submit to 
                Congress a detailed report that describes in each 
                instance the reasons for not using the procedures.''.

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    (a) In General.--This Act and the amendments made by this Act take 
effect on June 24, 2008.
    (b) Application.--Section 4a(f) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 
U.S.C. 6a(f)) (as amended by section 3) applies to any action taken by 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or any person or entity on or 
after June 24, 2008.
    (c) Implementation.--The Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall 
implement section 4a(f) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 6a(f)) 
(as amended by section 3) not later than December 31, 2008.
End Oil Speculation Act of 2008 - Amends the Commodity Exchange Act to direct the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to eliminate manipulation and excessive speculation on petroleum futures markets by investigation, regulation, and rulemaking, while distinguishing between: (1) transactions by commercial producers and purchasers (as well as counterparties) involving actual physical petroleum products for future delivery ("legitimate hedge trading"); and (2) all other trading.







Instructs the CFTC to review and: (1) revoke or modify prior action regarding certain transactions, participants, or petroleum futures market activity that is not a legitimate hedge trade; and (2) consider revoking results of prior actions that have the effect of limiting, reducing, or eliminating the full applicability of position limits on trading that is not legitimate hedge trading, or the filing of any report or data regarding a trade or trader.

Directs the CFTC to set margin requirements of at least 25% for any trading that is not legitimate hedge trading.

Directs the CFTC to subject to its regulation any person engaging in a petroleum futures market activity in any location unless and until the activity occurs in a market or exchange whose regulations are substantially identical to CFTC regulations and are fully enforced.

Requires the CFTC to ensure that petroleum futures market participant activities are fully and accurately disclosed.

Instructs the CFTC to convene a working group of international regulators to develop uniform international oversight to protect petroleum futures markets from excessive speculation and other specified practices that pose systemic risks.
A bill to amend the Commodity Exchange Act to provide oil and gas price relief by requiring the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to take action to end excessive speculation, and for other purposes.