SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Stop Nuclear Assistance to State 
Sponsors of Terrorism Act of 2009''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was 
        established in 1957 with the objectives of seeking to 
        ``accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to 
        peace, health and prosperity throughout the world'' and to 
        ``ensure . . . that assistance provided by it or at its request 
        or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way 
        as to further any military purpose.''.
            (2) The United States, via assessed contributions, is the 
        largest financial contributor to the regular budget of the 
        IAEA.
            (3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now called the 
        Technical Cooperation Program, financed primarily through 
        voluntary contributions by member states to the Technical 
        Cooperation Fund, to provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC) 
        for peaceful purposes to countries worldwide.
            (4) The United States is the largest financial contributor 
        to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund.
            (5) A March 2009 report by the Government Accountability 
        Office (GAO) found that ``neither [the Department of State] nor 
        IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to countries 
        the United States has designated as state sponsors of 
        terrorism--Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria--even though under U.S. 
        law these countries are subject to sanctions.''.
            (6) The GAO report also found that ``Together, [Cuba, Iran, 
        Sudan, and Syria] received more than $55 million in TC 
        assistance from 1997 through 2007.''. These four countries 
        received over $4,400,000 in TC assistance in 2008.
            (7) The GAO report also found that ``proliferation concerns 
        about the [Technical Cooperation Program] have persisted 
        because of the assistance it has provided to certain countries 
        and because nuclear equipment, technology, and expertise can be 
        dual-use--capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but also 
        useful in contributing to nuclear weapons development.''.
            (8) The GAO report also found that ``[The State Department] 
        reported in 2007 that three TC projects in [Iran] were directly 
        related to the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr.''.
            (9) The GAO report also found that ``The proliferation 
        concerns associated with the [Technical Cooperation Program] 
        are difficult for the United States to fully identify, assess, 
        and resolve . . . [because] there is no formal mechanism for 
        obtaining TC project information during the proposal 
        development phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State 
        documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC proposals 
        were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in U.S. policies and 
        IAEA procedures [including monitoring proliferation risks] 
        related to TC program fellowships.''.
            (10) The GAO report noted that ``IAEA officials told us 
        that the [Technical Cooperation Program] does not attempt to 
        exclude countries on the basis of their status as U.S.-
        designated state sponsors of terrorism or other political 
        considerations'' and that, according to the Deputy Director 
        General for the Technical Cooperation Program, ``there are no 
        good countries and there are no bad countries'' with respect to 
        provision of technical cooperation by the IAEA.
            (11) The GAO report also found that ``given the limited 
        information available on TC projects and the dual-use nature of 
        some nuclear technologies and expertise, we do not believe [the 
        State Department] can assert with complete confidence that TC 
        assistance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruction] 
        programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism''.
            (12) The GAO report also found that ``we do not share [the 
        State Department's confidence in IAEA's internal safeguards to 
        prevent TC projects from contributing to weapons development . 
        . . ]''.
            (13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
        seq.) prohibited any of the funds authorized to be appropriated 
        for ``International Organizations and Programs'' from being 
        made available for the United States proportionate share for 
        programs for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Liberation 
        Organization, inter alia.
            (14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
        Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105-118) 
        prohibited any of the funds made available by such Act for the 
        IAEA from being made available for programs and projects of the 
        IAEA in Cuba.
            (15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 
        1998 (Public Law 105-277) required the United States to 
        withhold a proportionate share of funding to the IAEA for 
        projects in Cuba regarding the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and 
        the Pedro Pi Nuclear Research Center.
            (16) The GAO report asked Congress ``to consider directing 
        [the State Department] to withhold a share of future annual 
        contributions to the [Technical Cooperation Fund] that is 
        proportionate to the amount of funding provided from the fund 
        for U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism and other 
        countries of concern, noting that such a withholding is a 
        matter of fundamental principle and intended to foster a more 
        consistent U.S. policy toward such nations.''.
            (17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that the Government 
        of Iran continues its work on heavy water-related projects and 
        its enrichment of uranium, in violation of United Nations 
        Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 
        (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008).
            (18) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) 
        decided ``that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the 
        IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, 
        agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes 
        [inter alia] . . . but that no such technical cooperation shall 
        be provided that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive 
        nuclear activities . . .''.
            (19) According to multiple news reports, the IAEA Director 
        General reported to the IAEA Board of Governors in June of 2009 
        that the Government of Iran now has approximately 7,000 
        centrifuges for enriching uranium, is running almost 5,000 of 
        them, and has increased its stockpile of low-enriched uranium 
        to over 1,300 kilograms, considered sufficient for further 
        enrichment into enough high-enriched uranium for an atomic 
        bomb.
            (20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to 
        the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of 
        February 19, 2009, that ``there remain a number of outstanding 
        issues which give rise to concerns . . . [regarding] the 
        existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear 
        programme''.
            (21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to 
        the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of 
        February 19, 2009, that ``Iran has not implemented the 
        Additional Protocol, which is a prerequisite for [the IAEA] to 
        provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared 
        nuclear material and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the 
        IAEA's] request that Iran provide, as a transparency measure, 
        access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the 
        manufacturing of centrifuges, research and development on 
        uranium enrichment, and uranium mining and milling, as also 
        required by the Security Council.''.
            (22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to 
        the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of 
        February 19, 2009, that ``as a result of the continued lack of 
        cooperation by Iran in connection with . . . issues which give 
        rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran's 
        nuclear programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive progress 
        on these issues.''.
            (23) Iran has refused to comply with resolutions adopted by 
        the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, November 26, 
        2003, March 15, 2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 
        11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, and July 31, 
        2006, regarding ``Iran's many failures and breaches of its 
        obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement'' and 
        continues to block IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, 
        in violation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement.
            (24) According to multiple news reports, Iran recently 
        denied access to its enrichment site at Natanz to IAEA 
        inspectors, and has also denied a request by the IAEA to place 
        one or more additional surveillance cameras at the enrichment 
        site at Natanz.
            (25) In April of 2008, United States Government officials 
        publicly revealed that Syria was building at the Dair Alzour 
        site, with North Korea's assistance, a secret nuclear reactor 
        that was based on a North Korean model capable of producing 
        plutonium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away from 
        becoming operational before an Israeli air strike reportedly 
        destroyed the reactor in September 2007.
            (26) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hayden, the former 
        Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that the 
        Syrian reactor at Dair Alzour could have produced enough 
        plutonium for 1 or 2 bombs within a year of becoming 
        operational.
            (27) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board 
        of Governors, on November 19, 2008, that the Syrian facility at 
        Dair Alzour bore features that resembled those of an undeclared 
        nuclear reactor, adding that ``Syria has not yet provided the 
        requested documentation in support of its declarations 
        concerning the nature or function of the destroyed building, 
        nor agreed to a visit to the three other locations which the 
        IAEA has requested to visit.''.
            (28) The IAEA Director General publicly stated to the IAEA 
        Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, that ``the limited 
        information and access provided by Syria to date have not 
        enabled the Agency to determine the nature of the destroyed 
        facility'' at Dair Alzour site, that uranium particles have 
        been found in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature 
        Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and that the 
        particles found at both sites ``are of a type not included in 
        Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material.''.

SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FUNDS.

    (a) In General.--No funds from any United States assessed or 
voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be used to support any 
assistance provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation 
program to any country, including North Korea that--
            (1) is a state sponsor of terrorism;
            (2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its obligations 
        regarding--
                    (A) its safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
                    (B) the Additional Protocol;
                    (C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
                    (D) any relevant United Nations Security Council 
                Resolution; or
                    (E) the Charter of the United Nations; or
            (3) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance 
        with the obligations specified in paragraph (2).
    (b) Withholding of Voluntary Contributions.--Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall withhold from the United States voluntary contribution to the 
IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA in the period 
from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through its Technical Cooperation 
Program to countries described in subsection (a).
    (c) Withholding of Assessed Contributions.--If, not later than 30 
days of the date of the enactment of this Act, the amount specified in 
subsection (b) has not been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all 
assistance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program to the 
countries described in subsection (a), an amount equal to that 
specified in subsection (b) shall be withheld from the United States 
assessed contribution to the IAEA.

SEC. 4. WAIVER.

    The provisions in subsections (b) and (c) of section 3 may be 
waived if--
            (1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance provided through 
        its Technical Cooperation Program to the countries described in 
        section 3(a); or
            (2) the President certifies that the countries described in 
        section 3(a) no longer pose a threat to the national security, 
        interests, and allies of the United States.

SEC. 5. UNITED STATES ACTIONS AT IAEA.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States at the IAEA to block the allocation of funds for any 
assistance provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation 
Program to any country described in section 3(a).

SEC. 6. REPORT.

    Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on the implementation of this Act.

SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
            (2) State sponsor of terrorism.--The term ``state sponsor 
        of terrorism'' means a country the government of which has been 
        determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 
        6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of 
        the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms 
        Export Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government 
        that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
        terrorism.
Stop Nuclear Assistance to State Sponsors of Terrorism Act of 2009 - Prohibits funds from any U.S. assessed or voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from being used to support assistance provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation Program to any country, including North Korea, that is: (1) a state sponsor of terrorism; or (2) in breach of or noncompliance, or under investigation for breach or noncompliance, with its obligations regarding IAEA safeguards, specified treaties, or the U.N. Charter or relevant U.N. resolutions.

Directs the Secretary of State to withhold specified voluntary and assessed IAEA contribution amounts.

Authorizes the waiver of such withholding if: (1) the IAEA has suspended all Program assistance to such countries; or (2) the President certifies that such countries no longer pose a threat to U.S. security and allies.
To prohibit the expenditure of United States taxpayer dollars on nuclear assistance to state sponsors of terrorism, and for other purposes.