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President Reagan put a high glossÛÓ ÛÏHe comes home in triumphÛÛÓon Secretary of State Alexander HaigÛªs work at the NATO meeting. No doubt Haig deserved it. Working under pressure, he gave the allies the assurances they demanded of American readiness to negotiate with Moscow on limiting nuclear weapons in Europe, and he got the allies to go along with some tough Reagan-style talk about Soviet global conduct.</br></br>I fear, however, that the Haig performance, though a ÛÏtriumphÛ of sorts, was ephemeral and perhaps even deceptive. It came about against the better judgment of the administrationÛªs dominant national security figures, headed by President Reagan, and will not be easily sustained.</br></br>Check the fine print of the NATO communique;, ÛÏThe allies welcomed the intention of the U.S. to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on Theater Nuclear . Forces arms controlÛÛÓexcept the sentence didnÛªt end there. It ended this way: ÛÏon Theater Nuclear Forces arms control within the SALT framework.Û</br></br>ThereÛªs the rub. There is no SALT frameworkÛÓno framework within which to negotiate with Moscow, not just on European ÛÏtheaterÛ weapons but also on the weapons in the two great powersÛª central systems. Reagan has set aside the old framework but has not approached Moscow to construct a new one.</br></br>To promise to negotiate on European nuclear arms ÛÏwithin the SALT frameworkÛ is to throw a curve. It puts the United States in a posture of earnestness and permits the European allies to teil their anxious publics that, since the new administration is ready to move on the first track of a 1979 NATO decision to negotiate on limiting nukes in Europe, the Europeans should go ahead on the second track of preparing to deploy those nukes, starting two years hence. But if there is no SALT framework, there can be no real negotiations over nukes based in Europe. The Europeans are bound to catch on.