The Realist Case for Tibetan Autonomy
When President Obama didn't meet with the Dalai Lama during his October trip to Washington, it gave many the impression that human-rights promotion was not central to this administration's foreign policy. This impression needs to be promptly corrected. While the U.S. accepts that Tibet is part of the People's Republic of China, for decades our country has supported Tibetan autonomy, especially in culture and religion. If the U.S. were to step back from this position, increased Chinese repression of Tibetans would likely follow.</br></br>Such repression would also have adverse consequences for China. A China that engages in harsh repression is incapable of ensuring domestic stability. An oppressive China is also unable to function as a responsible global player -- something that the U.S. has long sought to encourage.</br></br>The view that repression in Tibet would have negative consequences for China is shared by our European allies. As British Foreign Minister David Miliband has said: "Like every other EU member state and the United States, we regard Tibet as part of the People's Republic of China. Our interest is in long-term stability, which can only be achieved through respect for human rights and greater autonomy for the Tibetans."</br></br>Contrary to the oft-repeated, but erroneous claims to the contrary, the U.S. commitment to Tibet -- which began during the Nixon administration -- has not harmed U.S.-Chinese relations. The overarching principle for both China and America has been stability and consistency. Any alteration of America's long-standing policy toward Tibet would prompt the opposite result.</br></br>It would certainly not earn us any lasting gratitude from Beijing. Any rebalancing of American policy toward China would most likely cause the Chinese to conclude that the U.S. -- beset by an economic crisis -- is retrenching from many of its traditional commitments and can't be counted on to pursue robust policies across a range of international issues. If China were to reach such a conclusion, it would be inclined to be less helpful to the U.S. on such issues as Iran, North Korea or even economic cooperation.