Identity-based identification IBI schemes are generally insecure against reset attacks since they are commonly constructed from three-move $$\varSigma $$-protocols similar those of traditional public-key identification schemes. In 2009, Thorncharoensri et al. proposed the first IBI scheme secure against impersonators who are able to perform concurrent-reset attacks and is the only scheme that satisfies this notion of security in literature to date. However, their scheme suffers from correctness issues and is also constructed using pairings, which are known to be costly operationally. In this paper, we utilize one of Bellare et al's methods to reinforce the Schnorr-IBI scheme and also its more-secure variant: the Twin-Schnorr-IBI scheme against reset attacks, therefore achieving reset-secure IBI schemes without pairings.
['Ji-Jian Chin', 'Hiroaki Anada', 'Syh-Yuan Tan']
Reset-Secure Identity-Based Identification Schemes Without Pairings