The main application of cryptography is the establishment of secure channels. The most classical way to achieve this goal is definitely the use of variants of the signed Diffie-Hellman protocol. It applies a signature algorithm on the flows of the basic Diffie-Hellman key exchange, in order to achieve authentication. However, signature-less authenticated key exchange have numerous advantages, and namely from the efficiency point of view. They are thus well-suited for some constrained environments. On the other hand, this efficiency comes at the cost of some uncertainty about the actual security. This paper focuses on the two most famous signature-less authenticated key exchange protocols, MTI/CO and MQV. While the formal security of MTI/CO has never been studied, results for the plain MQV protocol are still debated. We point out algorithmic assumptions on which some security proofs can be built. in the random oracle model. The stress is put on implementation aspects that must he properly dealt with in order to obtain the expected security. Some formalizations about authenticated key exchange, and the generic model, are of independent interest.
['Sébastien Kunz-Jacques', 'David Pointcheval']
About the security of MTI/C0 and MQV