Charitable giving is one of the essential tasks of a properly functioning civil so- ciety. This task is greatly complicated by the lack of organizational transparency and by the information asymmetries that often exist between organizations and donors in the mar- ket for charitable donations. The disclosure of financial, performance, donor-relations, and fundraising-related data is thus an important tool for nonprofit organizations attempting to attract greater donations while boosting accountability and public trust. There are, however, varying payoffs associated with such disclosure depending on the nature of donor pref- erences and the relative openness and effectiveness of competing organizations. To help understand the interplay between nonprofit organizational disclosures and individual do- nations, we present a novel game-theoretic model of disclosure-donation interactions that incorporates the predominant forms of both donor preferences and "value-relevant" infor- mation.
['Jun Zhuang', 'Gregory D. Saxton', 'Han Wu']
Publicity vs. Impact in Nonprofit Disclosures and Donor Preferences: A Sequential Game with One Nonprofit Organization and N Donors