Abstract   Recent applications of game-theoretic analysis to supply chain efficiency have focused on constructs between a buyer (the retailer or  manufacturer ) and a seller (the  supplier ) in successive stages of a supply chain. If demand for the final product is stochastic then the supplier has an incentive to keep its capacity relatively low to avoid creating unneeded capacity. The manufacturer, on the other hand, prefers the supplier’s capacity to be high to ensure that the final demand is satisfied. The manufacturer therefore constructs a contract to induce the supplier to increase its production capacity. Most research examines contracting when final demand is realized  after  the manufacturer places its order to the supplier. However, if final demand is realized  before  the manufacturer places its order to the supplier, these types of contracts can be ineffective. This paper examines two contracts under the latter timing scenario: long-term contracts in which the business relationship is repeated, and penalty contracts in which the supplier is penalized for too little capacity. Results indicate long-term contracts increase the profit potential of the supply chain. Furthermore, the penalty contracts can ensure that the supplier chooses a capacity level such that the full profit potential is achieved.
['Mark R. Frascatore', 'Farzad Mahmoodi']
Long-term and penalty contracts in a two-stage supply chain with stochastic demand