Belief merging has been an active research field with many important applications. The major approaches for the belief merging problems, considered as arbitration processes, are based on the construction of the total pre-orders of alternatives using distance functions and aggregation functions. However, these approaches require that all belief bases are provided explicitly and the role of agents, who provide the belief bases, are not adequately considered. Therefore, the results are merely ideal and difficult to apply in the multi-agent systems. In this paper, we approach the merging problems from other point of view. Namely, we treat a belief merging problem as a game, in which rational agents participate in a negotiation process to find out a jointly consistent consensus trying to preserve as many important original beliefs as possible. To this end, a model of negotiation for belief merging is presented, a set of rational and intuitive postulates to characterize the belief merging operators are proposed, and a representation theorem is presented.
['Trong Hieu Tran', 'Ngoc Thanh Nguyen', 'Quoc Bao Vo']
Axiomatic characterization of belief merging by negotiation