Distributed hash table-based overlays are widely used to support efficient information routing and storage in structured peer-to-peer networks, but they are also subject to numerous attacks aimed at disrupting their correct functioning. In this paper, we analyse the impact of the eclipse attack on a chord-based overlay in terms of number of key lookups intercepted by a collusion of malicious nodes. We propose a detection algorithm for the individuation of ongoing attacks to the chord overlay, relying on features that can be independently estimated by each network peer, which are given as input to a C4.5-based binary classifier. Moreover, we propose some modifications to the chord routing protocol in order to mitigate the effects of such attacks. The countermeasures introduce a limited traffic overhead and can operate either in a distributed fashion or assuming the presence of a centralised trusted entity. Numerical results show the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation techniques.
['Cristina Rottondi', 'Alessandro Panzeri', 'Constantin Yagne', 'Giacomo Verticale']
Detection and mitigation of the eclipse attack in chord overlays