We study competition and cooperation among a group of storage units. As the number of energy storages increases, the profit of storages approaches zero u nder competition. We propose two ways in which storages can achieve the maximum possible profit. Th e first is a decentralized approach in which storages incur artificial costs that act as incentives for them to behave as a coalition. No private information needs to be exchanged between the storages to calculate the artificial cost function. The second is a centralized approach in which an aggregator coordinates and splits profits with storages in order to achieve maximum profit. We do not assume the nature of the storage-aggregator relationship and derive the necessary conditions for longterm cooperation. We use Nash’s axiomatic bargaining problem to model and predict the profit split between aggregator and s torages.
['Jesus E. Contreras-Ocaña', 'Miguel A. Ortega-Vazquez', 'Baosen Zhang']
Cooperation and Competition among Energy Storages