A game-theoretic model for studying power control in multicarrier code-division multiple-access systems is proposed. Power control is modeled as a noncooperative game in which each user decides how much power to transmit over each carrier to maximize its own utility. The utility function considered here measures the number of reliable bits transmitted over all the carriers per joule of energy consumed and is particularly suitable for networks where energy efficiency is important. The multidimensional nature of users' strategies and the nonquasi-concavity of the utility function make the multicarrier problem much more challenging than the single-carrier or throughput-based-utility case. It is shown that, for all linear receivers including the matched filter, the decorrelator, and the minimum-mean-square-error detector, a user's utility is maximized when the user transmits only on its "best" carrier. This is the carrier that requires the least amount of power to achieve a particular target signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio at the output of the receiver. The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for the proposed power control game are studied. In particular, conditions are given that must be satisfied by the channel gains for a Nash equilibrium to exist, and the distribution of the users among the carriers at equilibrium is characterized. In addition, an iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching the equilibrium (when it exists) is presented. It is shown that the proposed approach results in significant improvements in the total utility achieved at equilibrium compared with a single-carrier system and also to a multicarrier system in which each user maximizes its utility over each carrier independently
['Farhad Meshkati', 'Mung Chiang', 'H.V. Poor', 'S.C. Schwartz']
A game-theoretic approach to energy-efficient power control in multicarrier CDMA systems