In this paper, we consider a spectrum trading network. The primary service providers (PSPs), which are the long term owners of chunks of frequency spectrum, lease portions of their licensed frequency bands to secondary users for short term basis. The PSPs have also their own regular customers who expect to receive a minimum amount of bandwidth and a minimum level of quality of service. The existence of various network elements that want to maximize its own profits makes the problem very complex, with usually conflicting objective functions. The proposed framework in this paper aims at investigating the impact of power emission of secondary users to the pricing process. We have used a model based on game theory for PSPs' pricing problem to provide with a well defined equilibrium. The spectrum demand of secondary users is modeled using the multi-nomial logit (MNL) which is a kind of discrete choice model. We have used the MNL model to estimate the probability that a secondary user chooses a particular PSP as the seller. The application of the framework is shown on a simple demonstrative example. The results show that the proposed framework allows PSPs to make additional profit while preserving the social welfare of the network.
['Gülfem Isiklar Alptekin', 'Ayse Basar Bener']
The impact of power management to spectrum trading