Replication Data for: Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition, and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'What is the effect of increased electoral competition on patronage politics? If programmatic appeals are not credible, institutional reforms that move politics from an elite- to a mass-focused and more competitive environment increase patronage efforts. This leads to an overall surge and notable spike in discretionary state hiring in election years. We test this prediction in the context of Indonesia's decentralized education sector. We exploit the exogenous phasing in and timing of elections in Indonesian districts for causal identification. We find evidence for election-related increases in the number of contract teachers on local payrolls and increases in civil service teacher certifications, which dramatically increases salaries. These effects are particularly pronounced for districts in which the former authoritarian ruling party i' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Patronage, Elections, Civil Service"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'What is the effect of increased electoral competition on patronage politics? If programmatic appeals are not credible, institutional reforms that move politics from an elite- to a mass-focused and more competitive environment increase patronage efforts. This leads to an overall surge and notable spike in discretionary state hiring in election years. We test this prediction in the context of Indonesia's decentralized education sector. We exploit the exogenous phasing in and timing of elections in Indonesian districts for causal identification. We find evidence for election-related increases in the number of contract teachers on local payrolls and increases in civil service teacher certifications, which dramatically increases salaries. These effects are particularly pronounced for districts in which the former authoritarian ruling party i' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
What is the effect of increased electoral competition on patronage politics? If programmatic appeals are not credible, institutional reforms that move politics from an elite- to a mass-focused and more competitive environment increase patronage efforts. This leads to an overall surge and notable spike in discretionary state hiring in election years. We test this prediction in the context of Indonesia's decentralized education sector. We exploit the exogenous phasing in and timing of elections in Indonesian districts for causal identification. We find evidence for election-related increases in the number of contract teachers on local payrolls and increases in civil service teacher certifications, which dramatically increases salaries. These effects are particularly pronounced for districts in which the former authoritarian ruling party i
Patronage, Elections, Civil Service