Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Project Summary This project addresses the relationship between electoral strategies and distributive politics, in particular, between electoral strategies and clientelism. The authors distinguish clientelism from other forms of distributive politics in two ways. First, clientelist resources are targeted towards particular groups of voters, and are not distributed indiscriminately. Second, receiving clientelist resources is contingent upon supporting the party that is distributing the resources. Thus, electoral support from voters who receive clientelist goods is coerced. Beginning with these two properties, which are located within a broader taxonomy of distributive politics, the authors address following questions: How does non-programmatic politics, and especially clientelism, work? What causes shifts away from clientel' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["brokers","clientelism","developing democracy","distributive politics","machine politics","political parties"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Project Summary This project addresses the relationship between electoral strategies and distributive politics, in particular, between electoral strategies and clientelism. The authors distinguish clientelism from other forms of distributive politics in two ways. First, clientelist resources are targeted towards particular groups of voters, and are not distributed indiscriminately. Second, receiving clientelist resources is contingent upon supporting the party that is distributing the resources. Thus, electoral support from voters who receive clientelist goods is coerced. Beginning with these two properties, which are located within a broader taxonomy of distributive politics, the authors address following questions: How does non-programmatic politics, and especially clientelism, work? What causes shifts away from clientel' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Project Summary This project addresses the relationship between electoral strategies and distributive politics, in particular, between electoral strategies and clientelism. The authors distinguish clientelism from other forms of distributive politics in two ways. First, clientelist resources are targeted towards particular groups of voters, and are not distributed indiscriminately. Second, receiving clientelist resources is contingent upon supporting the party that is distributing the resources. Thus, electoral support from voters who receive clientelist goods is coerced. Beginning with these two properties, which are located within a broader taxonomy of distributive politics, the authors address following questions: How does non-programmatic politics, and especially clientelism, work? What causes shifts away from clientel
brokers; clientelism; developing democracy; distributive politics; machine politics; political parties