Replication Data for: Agency independence, campaign contributions, and favouritism in US federal government contracting
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The impacts of money in US politics have long been debated. Building on principal-agent models, we test whether and to what degree companies’ political donations lead to their favoured treatment in federal procurement. We expect the impact of donations on favouritism to vary by the strength of control by political principals over their bureaucratic agents. We compile a comprehensive dataset of published federal contracts and registered campaign contributions for 2004-2015. We develop risk indices capturing tendering practices and outcomes likely characterised by favouritism. Using fixed effects regressions, matching, and regression discontinuity analyses, we find that a large increase in donations from 10,000 USD to 5 million USD increases favouritism risks by about 1/4th standard deviation. These effects are largely partisan, with firm' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Corruption, Favouritism, Public Procurement, Campaign Contributions, Bureaucracy"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The impacts of money in US politics have long been debated. Building on principal-agent models, we test whether and to what degree companies’ political donations lead to their favoured treatment in federal procurement. We expect the impact of donations on favouritism to vary by the strength of control by political principals over their bureaucratic agents. We compile a comprehensive dataset of published federal contracts and registered campaign contributions for 2004-2015. We develop risk indices capturing tendering practices and outcomes likely characterised by favouritism. Using fixed effects regressions, matching, and regression discontinuity analyses, we find that a large increase in donations from 10,000 USD to 5 million USD increases favouritism risks by about 1/4th standard deviation. These effects are largely partisan, with firm' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
The impacts of money in US politics have long been debated. Building on principal-agent models, we test whether and to what degree companies’ political donations lead to their favoured treatment in federal procurement. We expect the impact of donations on favouritism to vary by the strength of control by political principals over their bureaucratic agents. We compile a comprehensive dataset of published federal contracts and registered campaign contributions for 2004-2015. We develop risk indices capturing tendering practices and outcomes likely characterised by favouritism. Using fixed effects regressions, matching, and regression discontinuity analyses, we find that a large increase in donations from 10,000 USD to 5 million USD increases favouritism risks by about 1/4th standard deviation. These effects are largely partisan, with firm
Corruption, Favouritism, Public Procurement, Campaign Contributions, Bureaucracy