Replication Data for:  Causas y efectos del patronazgo en municipios de Chile, 2008-2012
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We investigated the presence of clientelistic linkages and patronage in Chile as a method of electoral mobilization. We analyze the 345 municipalities between 2008 and 2012. With spending data on personnel and municipal employees, we assess the causes of patronage and the effects that these practices on turnout and electoral performance of mayors. Mayors from the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) spend more on personnel. However, municipalities controlled by the Partido Por la Democracia (PPD) have the highest rates of municipal employment. We also found evidence about the use of municipal employment as an electoral mobilization strategy' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Chile","clientelism","patronage","spending on personnel","municipal employment","mayors","electoral mobilization"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We investigated the presence of clientelistic linkages and patronage in Chile as a method of electoral mobilization. We analyze the 345 municipalities between 2008 and 2012. With spending data on personnel and municipal employees, we assess the causes of patronage and the effects that these practices on turnout and electoral performance of mayors. Mayors from the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) spend more on personnel. However, municipalities controlled by the Partido Por la Democracia (PPD) have the highest rates of municipal employment. We also found evidence about the use of municipal employment as an electoral mobilization strategy' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
We investigated the presence of clientelistic linkages and patronage in Chile as a method of electoral mobilization. We analyze the 345 municipalities between 2008 and 2012. With spending data on personnel and municipal employees, we assess the causes of patronage and the effects that these practices on turnout and electoral performance of mayors. Mayors from the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) spend more on personnel. However, municipalities controlled by the Partido Por la Democracia (PPD) have the highest rates of municipal employment. We also found evidence about the use of municipal employment as an electoral mobilization strategy
Chile; clientelism; patronage; spending on personnel; municipal employment; mayors; electoral mobilization