Replication data for: Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Do national legislatures constitute a mechanism by which commitments to international human rights treaties can be made credible?  Treaty ratification can activate domestic mechanisms that make repression more costly, and the legislative opposition can enhance these mechanisms.  Legislative veto players raise the cost of formalistic repressive strategies by declining to consent to legislation.  Executives can still choose to rely on more costly, extralegal strategies, but these could result in severe penalties for the leader and require the leader to expend resources to hide.  Especially in treaty member-states, legislatures can use other powers to also increase the cost of extralegal violations, which can further reduce repression.  By using an empirical strategy that attempts to address the selection effects in treaty commitment decis' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Human rights","International law","Legislatures"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Do national legislatures constitute a mechanism by which commitments to international human rights treaties can be made credible?  Treaty ratification can activate domestic mechanisms that make repression more costly, and the legislative opposition can enhance these mechanisms.  Legislative veto players raise the cost of formalistic repressive strategies by declining to consent to legislation.  Executives can still choose to rely on more costly, extralegal strategies, but these could result in severe penalties for the leader and require the leader to expend resources to hide.  Especially in treaty member-states, legislatures can use other powers to also increase the cost of extralegal violations, which can further reduce repression.  By using an empirical strategy that attempts to address the selection effects in treaty commitment decis' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Do national legislatures constitute a mechanism by which commitments to international human rights treaties can be made credible?  Treaty ratification can activate domestic mechanisms that make repression more costly, and the legislative opposition can enhance these mechanisms.  Legislative veto players raise the cost of formalistic repressive strategies by declining to consent to legislation.  Executives can still choose to rely on more costly, extralegal strategies, but these could result in severe penalties for the leader and require the leader to expend resources to hide.  Especially in treaty member-states, legislatures can use other powers to also increase the cost of extralegal violations, which can further reduce repression.  By using an empirical strategy that attempts to address the selection effects in treaty commitment decis
Human rights; International law; Legislatures