Self-reported & Revealed Trust: Experimental Evidence [Dataset and Replication Code]
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'I study the relationship between self-declared trust attitudes - using a well-recognised and established personality questionnaire - and trust choices in an induced infinitely repeated trust game. I find that self-reported trust measures are significantly related with trust choices as long as trust is part of equilibrium strategies. I find that questions regarding others' intentions is a missing component in previous work that studies self-reports of trust. An important aspect of the design is that first movers are not privy to the choices made by their partners. This design feature, coupled with an uncertainty element introduced in determining the first mover's final payoff, allows me to analyse how first movers react to bad outcomes. Trusting individuals are more likely to give the benefit of doubt to others. Analysis of the incentivi' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["intentions","personality","risk preferences","self-reported trust","subjective beliefs","trust"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'I study the relationship between self-declared trust attitudes - using a well-recognised and established personality questionnaire - and trust choices in an induced infinitely repeated trust game. I find that self-reported trust measures are significantly related with trust choices as long as trust is part of equilibrium strategies. I find that questions regarding others' intentions is a missing component in previous work that studies self-reports of trust. An important aspect of the design is that first movers are not privy to the choices made by their partners. This design feature, coupled with an uncertainty element introduced in determining the first mover's final payoff, allows me to analyse how first movers react to bad outcomes. Trusting individuals are more likely to give the benefit of doubt to others. Analysis of the incentivi' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
I study the relationship between self-declared trust attitudes - using a well-recognised and established personality questionnaire - and trust choices in an induced infinitely repeated trust game. I find that self-reported trust measures are significantly related with trust choices as long as trust is part of equilibrium strategies. I find that questions regarding others' intentions is a missing component in previous work that studies self-reports of trust. An important aspect of the design is that first movers are not privy to the choices made by their partners. This design feature, coupled with an uncertainty element introduced in determining the first mover's final payoff, allows me to analyse how first movers react to bad outcomes. Trusting individuals are more likely to give the benefit of doubt to others. Analysis of the incentivi
intentions; personality; risk preferences; self-reported trust; subjective beliefs; trust