Data for: Forbearance as redistribution: The politics of informal welfare in Latin America
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'OverviewWhy do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations, and when do they enforce them?  Conventional wisdom is that state weakness erodes enforcement, particularly in the developing world.  In contrast, this book project, 'Forbearance as Redistribution: The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America,' highlights the understudied political costs of enforcement.  Governments choose not to enforce laws and regulations, or forbearance, when it is in their electoral interest.Focusing on laws that the poor violate, the manuscript shows how a simple distributive logic can account for enforcement patterns over space and time.Politicians forbear when formal welfare policies are inadequate and they depend on the poor’s votes to win office.  Forbearance both indirectly signals a politici' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["cities","housing","informal economy","law enforcement","local government","poverty programs","squatters","squatter settlements"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'OverviewWhy do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations, and when do they enforce them?  Conventional wisdom is that state weakness erodes enforcement, particularly in the developing world.  In contrast, this book project, 'Forbearance as Redistribution: The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America,' highlights the understudied political costs of enforcement.  Governments choose not to enforce laws and regulations, or forbearance, when it is in their electoral interest.Focusing on laws that the poor violate, the manuscript shows how a simple distributive logic can account for enforcement patterns over space and time.Politicians forbear when formal welfare policies are inadequate and they depend on the poor’s votes to win office.  Forbearance both indirectly signals a politici' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
OverviewWhy do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations, and when do they enforce them?  Conventional wisdom is that state weakness erodes enforcement, particularly in the developing world.  In contrast, this book project, 'Forbearance as Redistribution: The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America,' highlights the understudied political costs of enforcement.  Governments choose not to enforce laws and regulations, or forbearance, when it is in their electoral interest.Focusing on laws that the poor violate, the manuscript shows how a simple distributive logic can account for enforcement patterns over space and time.Politicians forbear when formal welfare policies are inadequate and they depend on the poor’s votes to win office.  Forbearance both indirectly signals a politici
cities; housing; informal economy; law enforcement; local government; poverty programs; squatters; squatter settlements