Replication Data for: Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'A prerequisite for the durability of authoritarian regimes as well as their effective governance is the regime's ability to gather reliable information about the actions of lower-tier officials.  Allowing public participation in the form of online complaints is one approach authoritarian regimes have taken to improve monitoring of lower-tier officials. In this paper, we gain rare access to internal communications between a monitoring agency and upper-level officials in China. We show that citizen grievances posted publicly online that contain complaints of corruption are systematically concealed from upper-level authorities when they implicate lower-tier officials or associates connected to lower-tier officials through patronage ties. Information manipulation occurs primarily through omission of wrongdoing rather than censorship or fa' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Authoritarian regimes, China, monitoring, citizen participation, automated text analysis"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'A prerequisite for the durability of authoritarian regimes as well as their effective governance is the regime's ability to gather reliable information about the actions of lower-tier officials.  Allowing public participation in the form of online complaints is one approach authoritarian regimes have taken to improve monitoring of lower-tier officials. In this paper, we gain rare access to internal communications between a monitoring agency and upper-level officials in China. We show that citizen grievances posted publicly online that contain complaints of corruption are systematically concealed from upper-level authorities when they implicate lower-tier officials or associates connected to lower-tier officials through patronage ties. Information manipulation occurs primarily through omission of wrongdoing rather than censorship or fa' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
A prerequisite for the durability of authoritarian regimes as well as their effective governance is the regime's ability to gather reliable information about the actions of lower-tier officials.  Allowing public participation in the form of online complaints is one approach authoritarian regimes have taken to improve monitoring of lower-tier officials. In this paper, we gain rare access to internal communications between a monitoring agency and upper-level officials in China. We show that citizen grievances posted publicly online that contain complaints of corruption are systematically concealed from upper-level authorities when they implicate lower-tier officials or associates connected to lower-tier officials through patronage ties. Information manipulation occurs primarily through omission of wrongdoing rather than censorship or fa
Authoritarian regimes, China, monitoring, citizen participation, automated text analysis