Considerable efforts have been made to understand the biological basis of ToM, culminating in a wealth of data. There is also on-going debate about whether human and non-human animals have evolved a domain-specific module to represent mental states, or whether this process may be underpinned by domain-general mechanisms (Heyes, 2014). As long as the psychological and neural mechanisms supporting ToM are still to be determined such debate will continue. Understanding the neurocomputational principles supporting ToM is likely to provide a step-change in our ability to address these issues, and Predictive Coding models suggesting that interoception plays a role in social abilities contribute to this endeavor (Happé et al., 2017, Koster-Hale and Saxe, 2013, Ondobaka et al., 2017, Seth, 2013). The current results suggest that interoception is not necessary for the representation of mental states per se, however it contributes to accurate representation of mental states in situations where this process is reliant upon emotional, or otherwise interoceptive, information. It was also notable that performance on emotional questions (M = 70.53, SD = 11.56) was significantly (t = 7.41, P < .001, d = .06) worse than on non-emotional questions (M = 81.21, SD = 9.76), which may be due to the fact that emotional ToM requires processing of additional interoceptive information.