These decisions apparently sustain the plaintiff's contention that foreclosing the mortgage was without the necessary parties, and was therefore void for want of jurisdiction. The defendants responded that because Avegno's mortgage contained the pact "de non alienando" (in which the mortgagor agrees not to alienate/encumber the premises to the prejudice of the mortgage), he was the only necessary party to Morgan's suit. The effect of such a stipulation was well settled in Louisiana. In "Nathan v. Lee", 2 Martin N.S. 32, the effect was decided to be that the mortgagee is not bound to pursue a third possessor, but may have the hypothecated property seized in via executina as if no change had taken place in its possessors, because any alienation or transfer made in violation of the pact de non alienando is ipso jure void, as it relates to the creditor, and that this effect of the pact is not annulled by the provisions of the Civil Code in relation to mortgages, and the rules laid down for pursuing the action of mortgage. In Stanbrough v. McCall, 4 La. Ann. 324, the court reviewed the cases on this subject and held that where a mortgage contained the pact "de non alienando", a party that purchases the property from the mortgagor cannot claim to be in any better condition than such mortgagor, and cannot plead any other exception, and that any alienation in violation of the pact is null. These cases, and those cited in the note, establish that "non alienando" mortgagees may enforce mortgages by proceeding against the mortgagor alone, without regard to subsequent disposition of the property, and that this binds anyone relying on such a disposition. In the Avegnor case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that there was such a privity between a person whose life estate had been condemned under the Act of July 17, 1862, and his heirs, that the latter were bound by a suit and decree to enforce a mortgage executed by their ancestor containing the pact "de non alienando", to which the ancestor alone had been made a party defendant. It is sustained by Wallach v. Van Riswick, "ubi supra", as will appear by the following passages from that Court's opinion: If it be contended that the heirs of Charles S. Wallach," the person whose property had been condemned,  cannot take by descent unless their father, at his death, was seized of an estate of inheritance, e.g., reversion or a remainder, it may be answered that even at common law it was not always necessary that the ancestor should be seized to enable the heir to take by descent.