During 1980, a destroyer was designed using an improved sea-keeping hull form, reduced infrared and radar cross-sections, and upgrades to the Aegis Combat System. The first ship of the , , was commissioned during 1991. Flight II of the "Arleigh Burke" class, introduced in 1992, incorporated improvements to the SPY radar, and to the Standard missile, active electronic countermeasures, and communications. Flight IIA, introduced in 2000, added a helicopter hangar with one anti-submarine helicopter and one armed attack helicopter. The Aegis program has also projected reducing the cost of each Flight IIA ship by at least $30 million. The Multi-Mission Signal Processor (MMSP) provides Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)/Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) multi-mission capability for the first 28 ships (DDGs 51–78) of the US Navy's "Arleigh Burke"-class destroyers as part of the Aegis Open Architecture Modernization Program. This capability will also be incorporated in and following new construction, and as well as Aegis Ashore. MMSP modifies transmitters of the SPY-1D radar to enable dual-beam operation for reduced frame times and better reaction time, and provides stability for all D(V) waveforms. The SPY-1 radar system detects, tracks, and supports engagements of a broader range of threats. MMSP improves performance in littoral, ducted clutter, electronic attack (EA), and chaff environments and provides greater commonality in computer programs and equipment. This will result in the merger with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System. In 2010 it was reported that Aegis radar systems on board some individual warships were not being maintained properly. A Navy panel headed by retired Vice Adm. Phillip Balisle issued the "Balisle report," which asserted that over-emphasis on saving money, including cuts in crews and streamlined training and maintenance, led to a drastic decline in readiness, and left Aegis Combat Systems in low state of readiness. The Aegis system was involved in a disaster in which shot down Iran Air Flight 655 in 1988 resulting in 290 civilian deaths. It was determined by a formal military investigation that the Aegis system was completely operational and did not have any maintenance problems. The investigation ruled that if the commanding officer had relied on the complete tactical data displayed by the Aegis system the engagement might never have occurred. Additionally, psychological effects of the crew subconsciously manipulating the data to accord with a predefined scenario greatly contributed to the false identification.