In view of this, the failure to adequately brief the pilots in a manner to insure maximation of the strike's effective and the safety of the crews could be considered a dereliction of duty. Of course, in order to justify an actual attack under the Rules, the enemy would have to fire at or be activated against our aircraft. This raises the question: What is meant by "activated against"? Obviously, it does not refer to actual firing since radar tracking constitutes "activation." On the second question about the falsification of the intelligence reports, the subcommittee accepted Lavelle's contention that the falsification resulted from a mis-interpretation of his guidance. The subcommittee criticized the policy of providing "virtual sanctuary" to the "whole of that enemy nation since 1968." The subcommittee stated that "This radical departure from orthodox military doctrine placed U.S. forces at a tremendous tactical disadvantage and contributed to prolonging the war." The subcommittee report also excoriated the Department of Defense for not releasing the Rules of Engagement and other relevant documents. The report suggested that the DoD was trying to hide something other than Lavelle's conduct. According to author William Shawcross, the secret the Air Force was trying to protect was probably the secret bombing of Cambodia, which came to light in 1973. The bombing of Cambodia was under the control of the USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC), rather than Lavelle's 7th Air Force. The secret Cambodian bombing began October 4, 1965. The commander-in-chief of SAC at the time the secret Cambodia bombings began in 1965 was General John D. Ryan, who in 1972 forced Lavelle to retire over 28 questionable missions flown over North Vietnam. For several months in 1973, Senator Hughes held up promotions for 160 Air Force and Navy officers who might have had "material evidence regarding unauthorized air strikes" in Southeast Asia but eventually gave it up. The false reporting system authorized by President Richard Nixon for the bombing of Cambodia was revealed in 1973, undercutting Hughes' campaign against Lavelle's subordinates. Slay, Gabriel, and O'Malley, who implemented the false reporting for the Lavelle missions, were all later promoted to four-star general. Gabriel served as Air Force Chief of Staff from 1982–1986. In February 2007, Lieutenant General (ret.) Aloysius Casey and his son Patrick Casey published an article in Air Force Magazine about the Lavelle affair. The article quoted recently released Nixon tapes that confirmed that Nixon had authorized the liberal interpretation of the Rules of Engagement as implemented by Lavelle.