But five years later, in "Sapir v. United States," the Supreme Court issued a single-paragraph per curiam opinion, vacating a Court of Appeals' order that directed a new trial under similar factual circumstances as in "Bryan." The Court did not explain itself. But Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion, in which he distinguished "Sapir" from "Bryan" on the ground that Bryan had "asked" for a new trial and, therefore, had "open[ed] the whole record for such disposition as might be just." Then, in "Yates v. United States", the Court invoked its power under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to order new trials for some defendants and acquittals for others. "[U]nder that statute," the Court reasoned, there was "no doubt" that it was "justified in refusing to order acquittal even where the evidence might be deemed palpably insufficient, particularly since petitioners have asked in the alternative for a new trial as well as for acquittal." Finally, the Court had held in "Forman v. United States" that a new trial following a reversal—no matter the ground—never constitutes double jeopardy: "It is elementary in our law that a person can be tried a second time for an offense when his prior conviction for that same offense has been set aside by his appeal." In "Burks", the Court read the ""Bryan-Forman" line of decisions" to mean that "[a] defendant who "requests" a new trial as one avenue of relief may be required to stand trial again, even when his conviction was reversed due to failure of proof at the first trial." The Court acknowledged that because Burks had appealed from the district court's denial of his motion for new trial, the "Bryan-Forman" line, if it were followed, allowed a new trial upon reversal. But the Court departed from that line, holding "it should make no difference that the "reviewing court", rather than the trial court determined the evidence to be insufficient"—Double Jeopardy bars retrial in both cases. The Court provided the following justifications for its rule and its rejection of precedent as well as of the Sixth Circuit's equitable remedy:   The Court also explained why the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a second prosecution following reversal for trial error—such as flawed jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, or prosecutorial misconduct—but not for evidentiary insufficiency. Because trial errors "impl[y] nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant," the Court reasoned, "[i]t would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction."