Superson believes that it is not possible to support morality by arguing the desirability of performing on an individual basis moral actions without taking in to account what motivates someone to perform those actions, and believes that the rationality of actions and the rationality of the motivation of those actions must be assessed in tandem. Superson critiques the common presentation of the traditional moral skeptic as a theoretical actor who asks "Why should I act in a moral way?". Superson believes that this model overlooks two important facts: first, that people often benefit from privilege in a way that cannot be captured by such a model, and second, that the theoretical moral skeptic's own preferences might be deformed by their own oppressive experiences (and thus fulfilling them may not actually maximize their own self-interest.) Superson suggests that defeating the moral skeptic requires proving that the act of privileging oneself over others is irrational. Superson aims to convince the reader that oppression is not only immoral but irrational, and believes that doing so may stop people from acting in oppressive ways. This thesis has been criticized by other feminist ethicists who believe that it is not sufficiently connected to the real world because it ignores the fact that people frequently behave in irrational ways and often continue behaving in such ways even if they realize their irrationality.