Slavich put it simply, "All your firepower is no good if you kill women and children." Brigadier General Joseph Stilwell Jr. wrote at that time of the uniqueness of the helicopter unit, commenting that it was "the only one of its kind in the Army and the only one doing the kind of work it does in a combat environment" in the midst of formidable obstacles such as "the development of appropriate maneuvers, operation of outdated HU-1A helicopters with commensurate parts supply problems, use of jury rigged weaponry, and administrative problems connected with a unit on temporary station orders which had also to perform certain test objectives as well." Stilwell concluded, "That this unit has gained the reputation and respect and professional competence it has may be solely contributed to the drive, ambition, dedication, and integrity displayed by Major Slavich during this period of command." Once word spread about the effectiveness of the UTT, Army and Marine transport pilots refused to fly without UTT support; at times, Slavich and his men would fly up to five and six missions a day, proving to his superiors "that these most vulnerable of military machines were, when flown with originality and daring, in fact not vulnerable at all". General Paul Harkins, head of over 14,000 advisers in South Vietnam, called the UTT "the most essential unit in my command". In a 1963 fitness report for Slavich, General Stilwell—who rode shotgun with him on numerous missions, even occasionally serving as his door gunner—wrote: "[Slavich's] unit, beyond a doubt, has offered more protection and saved more American lives, through the ingenuity of employment, than any other element in a counter-insurgency role in the Republic of Vietnam." Although the UTT's experimental mission of providing close-in tactical support was a success, the ongoing issue of politics remained. Owing to the Key West Agreement of 1948, the air force essentially owned the skies when it came to the use of strategic and tactical air assets. The achievements of "Slavich's People", as they were called, repeatedly drew the ire of the air force, creating a second front of sorts in the Vietnam arena: a PR war. Slavich excelled in that battle as well. Not one to merely tell war correspondents about the Hueys and what they could accomplish, he often invited the journalists to fly on missions so they could see for themselves, usually with very little notice and often much to the chagrin of the army's Public Information Office (PIO).