Even though the member states approved the DSM, and the definition for the DSM was accepted by European institutions as a key priority, only one proposal was adopted at the end of 2012. Despite being a priority in the SMA I & II, legislative initiatives failed due to the high cost of implementation measures. Also, there were its potential ‘blockbuster for economic gains’  and the protest of citizens against sovereign debt countries rescues and bail-out banks. The slow adoption of the proposal is partly due to Member States’ protectionist temptations after the economic crisis. Each state wanted to put forward its preferences and legislation about concerning this field. With regard to artificial intelligence (AI), the Commission adopted various initiatives with no meaningful coordination. The more pervasive the digital ecosystem becomes, the more sector-specific regulatory framework should be merged into general regimes. Even if the Commission used the crisis as a window of opportunity, it did not allow to go deeper and further in implementing a high transformation of the Single Market (SM). The crisis context pushed the political actors to move forward to better manage the crisis, but it does not permit to fully implement the DSM. One of the key priorities of the EU is to guarantee fair competition. Yet, within the Digital Market, the competition seems to be distorted. The more network effects are exerted, the higher the barriers to entry (difficulty for a new entrant to enter the market and compete) in the hub market. Vertical or horizontal mergers and acquisitions take place in closed ecosystems. In order to limit this digital ecosystem to absorb all the market are the tools, the EU aims to qualify them either as an “abuse of dominant position” or  a “cartel” which are against the competition prosperity within the Single Market. Digital companies such as the GAFA prosper thanks to their various free services that they make available to consumers, which seems to be beneficial for consumers, but less for other firms to compete in a fairway. It seems difficult for the regulators to sanction them, in the way that the GAFA provides jobs and services worldwide. The problems remain plural for the regulators. They need to identify and define platforms. There is no possibility to regulate exante to limit the size of the platform. The European Commission can sanction afterwards when the platform abuse already of its dominant position. Moreover, Member-states lack coordination, and may be independent of the regulator, who can not have a global vision of the market. Tax evasion of digital MNEs has become a growing concern for most of the European governments, including the European Commission.