It implicitly rejected the evidence from GNR senior managers who denied that there was any prior history of problems, but made no comment on the discrepancy. Operating practice at that time was that the signals were left in the 'clear' position continuously unless protecting a static obstruction. Consequently, the signals stood at clear for considerable periods of time, and there was little opportunity to spot the problem. The inquiry report noted various suggested improvements to signal arrangements, but cautioned against over-elaborate solutions: It is well that these and other proposals for improvement, which are constantly invented or advocated, such as combining sight with sound at the signals, and the use of detonators, mechanically applied, to supersede the use of fogmen, should receive full consideration and discussion, after the experience of so terrible an accident, caused mainly by the failure of existing signal-arrangements. But, in the course of such deliberations, the facts must not be lost sight of, that men are still liable to make mistakes, machinery is still liable to fail, and further complication is by no means certain in all cases to produce greater safety. It commented adversely on the performance of individuals:  and, without blaming individuals, on   The Board of Trade had no regulatory powers to enforce the recommendations of the inquiry report. The most important were:   Over a longer timescale, and after further accidents  Notes  References