Few seconds later, the crew of Flight 812 reported to Bali Control that he was over the station turning outbound descending to flight level 120. This was acknowledged by Bali Control and Flight 812 was then instructed to change over to Bali Tower. After establishing contact with Bali Tower, Flight 812 reported that they were making outbound procedure at flight level 110 and requested for lower altitude. They were later cleared for lower altitude. The crew of Flight 812 then decided to execute an early right turn on 263 degrees. The early execution of the right turn was caused by the malfunctioning ADF number one, which swung. The input was made since the crew assumed that they were nearing the NDB (Non-directional beacon). Investigators stated that the right hand turn was made at a position approximately 30 NM North of the beacon. Several attempts were made to regain proper indication on the ADFs after the turn, however this couldn't happen since the plane was "shielded" by the mountain. The crew then continued their approach and the plane subsequently impacted terrain. It was determined that the premature execution of a right-hand turn to join the 263-degree outbound track, which was based on the indication given by only one of the radio direction finders while the other one was still in steady condition, is the most probable cause of the accident. The crash of Flight 812 was a wake-up call for Pan Am. Flight 812 was the third 707 the airline had lost in the Pacific in less than a year after Pan Am Flight 806 in Pago Pago on 30 January 1974 and Pan Am Flight 816 in Papeete on 22 July 1973. Following the crash Pan Am addressed the issue and encouraged an early form of Crew Resource Management. Flight 812 was the final 707 lost following the safety improvements. Due to the crash of Flight 812, the Federal Aviation Administration ordered an in-depth inspection of the airline’s worldwide flight operations including pilot training, area qualification, operational procedures, pilot supervision and scheduling, line-check procedures, and other related matters of safety. The FAA did not criticize Pan American Airways or imply unsafe operations. They estimated about 3 months investigation time. On 8 May 1974, Pan American Airways ordered the installation of a new cockpit warning device designed to prevent crashes such as this April 22 incident. The entire fleet of 140 airplanes under Pan Am received the device. The apparatus was engineered and manufactured by Sundstrand Data Control, Inc. The ground proximity warning system provided additional indications, for example if a plane was heading for a mountain slope or if it was too low for a landing.