The CNSA was also supported in its early activities by Charles de Broqueville's Belgian government in exile. The logistical problems involved in coordinating the huge shipments of food to Belgium meant that the CNSA began to look for foreign assistance in procuring and transporting material to Belgium. Francqui used his personal acquaintance with Herbert Hoover, future President of the United States, to create an external body to assist the management of the CNSA. Hoover became the director of the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB), and led successful attempts to raise money abroad in order to improve the humanitarian situation in Belgium. Because the CRB was officially an American organization, the CRB was also necessary to assure that the food, once delivered to the CNSA, was not immediately seized by the Germans. The CRB also provided the international support necessary to convince the British government to permit the shipments. Once received, the food and material from the CRB was distributed through the CNSA's network of 125,000 agents across the country. The CNSA continued to expand throughout the occupation. In April 1915, the German Government allowed the CNSA to extend its operations to the occupied regions of northern France, under the auspices of a subcommittee called the "Comité d'Alimentation du Nord de la France" ("Food Committee of Northern France"). By 1918, the CNSA had distributed 3.4 billion Belgian francs' worth of aid across Belgium. The work of the CNSA during the war was considered extremely successful by contemporaries and modern historians alike. By providing a network of food distribution, the CNSA and CRB managed to avoid a major famine in Belgium during the occupation. Nevertheless, although the CRB and CNSA were part of the same network, the CRB criticized the CNSA, holding it responsible for occasional thefts of food by the Germans and for providing inadequate security for the shipments. The Belgian arm, however, felt under undue pressure from the CRB. In 1916, Francqui even petitioned the British to allow the CNSA to take full charge of the international network away from the CRB, although this appeal was dismissed because of the precarious position CNSA held within the occupied country. Nevertheless, relations between the two bodies remained generally good. The Committee also played an important political role. By providing an alternative supply of food, the CNSA prevented the German administration of Belgium from being able to use food as a bargaining tool to force Belgians to work in war industries and contributed to the passive resistance movement within occupied Belgium.