The rupiah–US dollar rate was at 2,436 rupiah to one dollar on 11 July. It fell to 2,663 by 14 August and 2,955 by 15 August – a 122% fall. Government debt (Bank Indonesia Certificates or SBI) rose from 12% to 30%, and overnight call rates reached 81% (per annum). At this stage, the crisis was a limited one; while the currency had fallen, the extent of the fall did not appear catastrophic. The government announced its response in September, calling for a restructure of the banking sector, cancellation of government projects, and supporting some banks with its own liquidity. The SBI rate was reduced three times in September to around 20%. As of 24 September, the exchange rate still lingered at 2,990 rupiah per dollar. The government response to the crisis sent mixed messages, with falling interest rates doing nothing to support confidence in the rupiah, and the rupiah continued to be sold, as companies that had been borrowing heavily in dollars had to meet their obligation. By 4 October, the currency had collapsed a further 19%, falling to 3,690 per dollar. It had now lost a third of its value, and now a full-blown 'crisis' existed in Indonesia. On 8 October with the rupiah at 3,640 per dollar, the government decided to seek the support of the International Monetary Fund. During the month, the rupiah fluctuated in the 3,300–3,650 range. IMF's response was announced on 1 November 1997. Sixteen small and insolvent banks, holding a market share of 2.5%, would be closed. Private banks would be subject to improved monitoring, and some state banks would be merged. Deposits would be underwritten up to 20 million rupiah (about US$5,500). About 90% of all depositors held less than this amount in their bank accounts. After this announcement, the rupiah immediately gained almost 10%, to around 3,300 rupiah per dollar. Soon after, however, confidence began to fall. The IMF response had only been published in summary form from the government and BI, the choice of the 16 banks being closed appeared arbitrary, and the details of the 34 others subject to special measures were not announced. The deposit guarantee was seen as inadequate, and funds were moved from private to state banks, exchanged for dollars, or transferred offshore, as confidence in the plan began to evaporate.