The situation was dire. Japanese were steadily advancing on Port Moresby along the Kokoda Trail and were also threatening Milne Bay and Wau. Rowell and his staff were all seasoned officers with combat experience in the Middle East and the Battle of Malaya and "brought to New Guinea skill and organisation that Morris and his staff had been unable to provide". However, the main body of Rowell's staff did not arrive until 17 August. Rowell turned down a suggestion from Blamey that he needed additional base staff to cope with his administrative problems, given that a corps headquarters was a tactical headquarters, intended to operate as part of an army, with the latter handling most of the administrative work. Rowell's staff gradually discovered how enormous the task before them was; they had few maps, the only transport aircraft were destroyed in a Japanese raid, and the supplies that had been forwarded by air to Kokoda could not be located. Rowell refused to give General Douglas MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) in Brisbane a "ball to ball" description of the action, sending only factual information at stated times. Failure to keep GHQ up to date could only lead to fears of the worst, which were confirmed when Major General George Kenney reported that in his opinion Port Moresby would soon fall unless something drastic was done, and Rowell was "defeatist". On 17 September, the General MacArthur discussed the situation in New Guinea with Prime Minister John Curtin on the secraphone. He pointed out that while the Japanese faced all the same difficulties as the Australian troops fighting on the Kokoda Track, the Japanese were advancing and the Australians were retreating, and the whole situation seemed to MacArthur to be a lot like the Malaya. He recommended that General Blamey be sent up to New Guinea to take personal command of the situation. Blamey took over command of New Guinea Force, but not I Corps. The difference was academic insofar as there was only one staff. Blamey wrote a letter to Rowell to explain the situation in advance of his arrival in Port Moresby on 23 September:  Rowell took it very badly. He wrote to Major General Cyril Clowes at Milne Bay:  On 25 September, at MacArthur's suggestion, Blamey flew to Milne Bay with Brigadier General Kenneth Walker and ordered Clowes to send a force by air to Wanigela. This would be an important step forward. Rowell, Kenney noted, was "not even consulted anymore".