Belisarius and Justinian, whose partnership had increased the size of the empire by 45 percent, died within a few months of each other in 565. Belisarius owned the estate of Rufinianae on the Asiatic side of the Constantinople suburbs. He may have died there and been buried near one of the two churches in the area, perhaps Saints Peter and Paul. During his first Persian campaign, Belisarius was on the winning side once, at Dara. In his first few battles he didn't hold overall command and as he was promoted soon after these defeats, his performance was probably positive. At Dara, he won a resounding victory by predicting and influencing enemy movement. When the enemy concentrated and broke through, he moved against their rear and defeated them. At the next battle at Callinicum, he probably tried to copy his own success at Dara. However, he positioned himself at the low ground and was not able to see it when the enemy concentrated to breakthrough. He had created no reserve at all, so he wasn't able to plug the gap, despite superior numbers. Belisarius' failure to position himself properly, make a cohesive plan, take advantage of the terrain and his failure to plug the created gap caused a disastrous defeat. Once the Persians had concentrated for a decisive attack, they held numerical superiority at the point of pressure, despite inferior numbers overall. In Africa, he walked accidentally into the battle of Ad Decimum. His ability to see an opportunity to gain the advantage and to take it, contrast positively with Gelimer's inactivity. As such, Hughes judges his generalship during that battle to be superior. In Italy, he mostly relied on sieges to defeat the Goths. At this he was so efficient that Totila refused to engage in them until Belisarius was unable to take the initiative due to supply shortages. In Italy, to deal with a changing situation, he made multiple strategies inside the span of a year. Meanwhile, his opponent Witigis had no coherent strategy after the failure of the siege of Rome. Belisarius tried to keep his strategic rear secure, besieging, for example, Auximus so he could safely move on Ravenna. When he saw fit, he sometimes did operate with a force in his strategic rear, like at the Siege of Ariminum, or when he planned to move on Rome without having taken Naples. In the east, he understood that the Persian garrison of Nisibis would be afraid to give the battle a second time after being defeated in the open earlier.