Göring was attempting to undercut foreign policy of Hitler and Ribbentrop by sending Wiedemann to London, a policy manoeuvre that was ruined when Dirksen told Ribbentrop that Wiedemann was in London, which enraged the Foreign Minister, who insisted quite vehemently that foreign policy was the sole preserve of the "Auswärtiges Amt", and led to Wiedemann being recalled. In early August 1938, Dirksen returned to Berlin to tell Hitler personally of his belief that Britain would go to war if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, a message that the Führer was not interested in. Hitler generally ignored Dirksen in August–September 1938, but Dirksen was in contact with several Nazis such as Rudolf Hess and Fritz Bohle, expressing his concerns that Hitler might trigger a general war by going ahead with his plans to invade Czechoslovakia on 1 October 1938. In September 1938, at the Nuremberg Party Congress, Dirksen met Hitler, where he told him of his fears of a general war, and of his belief that the British were prepared to pressure the Czechoslovak government into ceding the Sudetenland to Germany as the price for peace. Hitler was not interested at this point in either a peaceful resolution of the Sudetenland dispute or in Dirksen's views. During the Nuremberg Party Congress, Hitler in his keynote speech on 12 September 1938 laid claim to the Sudetenland, and announced if the Sudetenland was not allowed to join Germany by 1 October, he would invade Czechoslovakia, escalating the crisis and taking Europe to the brink of war. In the crisis of September 1938 that led to the Munich Agreement, Dirksen played only a small role, but as a diplomat with an elegant bearing and aristocratic manners whose fluent English and polite ways charmed many in Britain, Dirksen was the respectable face of Nazi Germany in Britain in 1938. As a professional diplomat and an aristocrat, Dirksen enjoyed a good rapport with the British elite, and his insistence that Hitler was only seeking to correct the "injustices" of Versailles and not dominate Europe impressed many of the British policy-makers he met. Unlike Ribbentrop, whose arrogance and ignorance led him to commit many social gaffes, the eminently "correct" Dirksen with his perfect gentlemanly manners made a favourable impression in London. Right after the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-German Declaration, both signed on 30 September 1938, Dirksen was told by Ribbentrop that the Anglo-German Declaration, which committed the two nations never to go to war again, meant nothing to Hitler.