Lazy argument  The Lazy Argument or Idle Argument () is either an argument for fatalism or an attempt at undermining the philosophical doctrine of fatalism. Its basic form is that of a complex constructive dilemma. The general idea behind the Lazy Argument can already be found in Aristotle's "De Interpretatione", chapter 9. The earliest surviving text that provides the argument in full is Cicero's "On Fate" 28-9. It is also presented in Origen, "Against Celsus" ("Cels" II 20) and mentioned in Pseudo-Plutarch, "On Fate" 574e. Seneca "Natural Questions" II 38.3 provides evidence for a similar argument. Here is the argument, as found in Origen: If it is fated that you will recover from this illness, then, regardless of whether you consult a doctor or you do not consult [a doctor] you will recover. But also: if it is fated that you won't recover from this illness, then, regardless of whether you consult a doctor or you do not consult [a doctor] you won't recover. But either it is fated that you will recover from this illness or it is fated that you won't recover. Therefore it is futile to consult a doctor. The argument has force only for those who accept that what happens to people is determined by fate. The Stoic philosopher Chrysippus' refutation of the lazy argument is given in Cicero's "On Fate" ("De fato") and in Eusebius' "Preparation for the Gospel" ("Praeparatio evangelica"). The argument, as presented by Cicero, calls upon the idea that an event is 'co-fated' with other events. As in the example above, if it is fated for someone to recover from an illness, then the necessary steps towards recovery are also fated, and can be said to be co-fated along with this final event; so whilst recovery will occur, the steps towards recovery must also occur and evidently will occur if one is truly fated to recover. The lazy argument only seems plausible if one fails to consider the necessity of the occurrence of intermediate events related to a final, fated event. Yet this is unsound and thus the lazy argument must be rejected. Consider this hypothetical argument; if at a given time it is fated that I will pass an exam, the lazy argument would suggest that it is as justifiable for me to not study as it would be to study, because I will pass the exam regardless of any action I may take.