A Defense of Abortion  "A Defense of Abortion" is a moral philosophy paper by Judith Jarvis Thomson first published in "Philosophy & Public Affairs" in 1971. Granting for the sake of argument that the fetus has a right to life, Thomson uses thought experiments to argue that the fetus's right to life does not trump the pregnant woman's right to have jurisdiction over her body, and that induced abortion is therefore not morally impermissible. Her argument has many critics on both sides of the abortion debate, yet continues to receive defense. Thomson's imaginative examples and controversial conclusions have made "A Defense of Abortion" perhaps "the most widely reprinted essay in all of contemporary philosophy". In "A Defense of Abortion", Thomson grants for the sake of argument that the fetus has a right to life, but defends the permissibility of abortion by appeal to a thought experiment:  Thomson says that one can now permissibly unplug themself from the violinist even though this will cause his death: this is due to limits on the right to life, which does not include the right to use another person's body, and so by unplugging the violinist, one does not violate his right to life but merely deprive him of something—the use of someone else's body—to which he has no right. "[I]f you do allow him to go on using your kidneys, this is a kindness on your part, and not something he can claim from you as his due." For the same reason, Thomson says, abortion does not violate the fetus's legitimate right to life, but merely deprives the fetus of something—the non-consensual use of the pregnant woman's body and life-support functions—to which it has no right. Thus, by choosing to terminate her pregnancy, Thomson concludes that a pregnant woman does not normally violate the fetus's right to life, but merely withdraws its use of her own body, which usually causes the fetus to die. Thomson criticizes the common method of deducing a woman's right to abort from the permissibility of a third party committing the abortion. In almost all instances, a woman's right to abortion may hinge on the doctor's willingness to perform it. If the doctor refuses, then the woman is denied her right. To base the woman's right on the accordance or refusal of a doctor, she says, is to ignore the mother's full personhood, and subsequently, her rights to her body. Thomson presents the hypothetical example of the 'expanding child':  Thomson concedes that a third party indeed cannot make the choice to kill either the person being crushed or the child.