This was unsuccessful although elements of his force got to within of Tunis before being pushed back. As further Allied forces arrived at the front they suffered from a lack of co-ordination. Eventually, in late January 1943, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO), persuaded the French to place their newly formed XIX Corps under Anderson's First Army and also gave him responsibility for the overall "employment of American troops", specifically the U.S. II Corps, commanded by Major General Lloyd Fredendall. However, control still proved problematical with forces spread over 200 miles (320 km) of front and poor means of communication (Anderson reported that he motored over 1,000 miles (1,600 km) in four days in order to speak to his corps commanders). Anderson and Fredendall also failed properly to coordinate and integrate forces under their command. Subordinates would later recall their utter confusion at being handed conflicting orders, not knowing which general to obey – Anderson or Fredendall. While Anderson was privately aghast at Fredendall's shortcomings, he seemed frozen by the need to preserve a united Allied front, and never risked his career by strongly protesting (or threatening to resign) over what many of his own American subordinates viewed as an untenable command structure. The II Corps later suffered a serious loss at Kasserine Pass, where "Generalfeldmarschall" Erwin Rommel launched a successful offensive against Allied forces, first shattering French forces defending the central portion of the front, then routing the American II Corps in the south. While the lion's share of the blame fell on Fredendall, Anderson's generalship abilities were also seriously questioned by both British and Allied commanders. When Fredendall disclaimed all responsibility for the poorly-equipped French XIX Corps covering the vulnerable central section of the Tunisian front, denying their request for support, Anderson allowed the request to go unfulfilled. Anderson was also criticised for refusing Fredendall's request to retire to a defensible line after the initial assault in order to regroup his forces, allowing German panzer forces to overrun many of the American positions in the south. Furthermore, the U.S. 1st Armored Division commander, Major General Orlando Ward, vehemently objected to the dispersal of his division's three combat commands on individual assignments requested by Anderson which he believed diluted the division's effectiveness and resulted in its heavy losses. In particular, his American subordinate, Major General Ernest N. Harmon (later to replace Ward as commander of the U.S. 1st Armored Division) and Major General George S. Patton (who replaced Fredendall in command of the U.S. II Corps) thought little of Anderson's ability to control large forces in battle.