There was also political pressure on the Labour government from the trade unions, who feared that Crown immunity would severely affect the rights of workers in nationalised industries. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowitt, also believed that it was politically important to demonstrate that the Labour government was committed to maintaining the rights of citizens against the State. The result was that the Act was made a priority, and passed through Parliament in 1947 with little controversy and to general acclaim. Section 1 of the Act allows claims, for which a petition of right would previously have been demanded, to be brought in the courts directly as against any other defendant. However, a petition and "fiat" still appear to be necessary for personal claims against the monarch. Section 2 renders the Crown liable as though it were a natural person for:  Section 2(2) provides that the Crown is liable for breach of statutory duty so long as the statute binds both the Crown and private persons. Section 3 provides for the protection of patents, registered trade marks, design rights and copyrights from breach by Crown servants. Section 2(5) exempts the Crown from liability for any person exercising "responsibilities of a judicial nature". This means, for example, that a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 may not be brought against the Crown with respect to judicial decisions, unless it is brought within a right of appeal according to Section 9 of that Act. Section 10 exempted the Crown from actions for death or personal injury caused by members of the British Armed Forces to other members of the British Armed Forces. This section was suspended by the Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987, sections 1 and 2 with a power for the Secretary of State for Defence to revive it when "necessary and expedient". There was some retrospective litigation after the 1987 Act in which a declaration was made under the Human Rights Act 1998, section 4 that such immunity was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, article 6(1). Section 28 gave the courts, for the first time, the power to order disclosure of documents by the Crown and require the Crown to answer requests for further information. This new power is subject to important qualifications in s.28(2) including the provision that the Crown can resist disclosure where this could be “injurious to the public interest”. This reasserted the traditional doctrine of Crown privilege but also made the issue justiciable, ultimately giving rise to the doctrine of public-interest immunity. Apart from petitions of right, the Act abolished several ancient writs and procedures:  Sections 5 to 8 originally covered Admiralty claims but these sections were repealed and replaced by provisions under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.