It was uncontested that Rosenthal had published or republished the e-mail on the internet. The trial court granted her motion, effectively dropping all of the claims against Rosenthal. In an unusually long 27-page written opinion, Judge Richman dismissed the case (against Rosenthal only) under the California anti-SLAPP statute, which is intended to stop lawsuits that are "brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for redress of grievances." The court further ordered that all three plaintiffs pay Rosenthal's attorney's fees. The appellate court upheld the dismissal against Grell and Barrett, but vacated the decision as against Polevoy. The court held that Section 230 did not protect Rosenthal for one statement she had reposted on two newsgroups, regarding Polevoy's alleged "stalking" of a Canadian talk show host. The court ruled that Rosenthal, as a "distributor", could be held liable under Section 230 for content republished after receiving notice of a potentially defamatory statement, just as vendors of traditional media can be. Rosenthal petitioned the California Supreme Court to hear the case, and the court granted her petition for review in April 2004. The California Supreme Court overturned the lower court in November 2006, in a landmark decision that is the first to interpret Section 230 defamation immunity as providing immunity to an individual internet "user" who is not a provider. The American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and a number of internet corporations — including Google, Yahoo!, and AOL — filed briefs on behalf of the defendant, arguing that only the originator of a defamatory statement published on the internet could be held liable. In the majority opinion, Justice Corrigan observed that the plain language of Section 230 shows that "Congress did not intend for an internet user to be treated differently than an internet provider." Both had immunity from liability for the republication of defamatory content on the internet. The court agreed that "subjecting Internet service providers and users to defamation liability would tend to chill online speech." (citing "Zeran v. America Online, Inc." (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327, 331-333), which ruled that Internet users – unlike publishers – are not liable for posting online content. Moreover, the court agreed with Rosenthal in the interpretation of congressional intent: The congressional intent of fostering free speech on the internet supported the extension of Section 230 immunity to active individual users. It is they who provide much of the 'diversity of political discourse,' the pursuit of 'opportunities for cultural development,' and the exploration of 'myriad avenues for intellectual activity' that the statute was meant to protect.