This train of thought further reinforced French perception that subversive ideas came from the outside rather than domestically: of the 57 soldiers involved in the mutiny, 17 had served abroad. On the other hand, according to the Thiry report, the proportion of soldiers with foreign service at Yên Bái did not exceed that in other garrisons, so this was not abnormal. In addition to punishing soldiers, tightening dismissal regulations and reducing the number of Vietnamese servicemen in France, the French decided to improve the military intelligence service. This was to be achieved by strengthening military intelligence through closer coordination with the Sûreté, and by raising internal standards. An inquiry into the mutiny at showed that cooperation between Resident Massimi and Commandant Le Tacon did not exist despite multiple requests, and that it was partly responsible for the uprising. The relationship between the civilian and military authorities were traditionally poor, but Yên Bái stood out in the total lack of military-civilian cooperation. Further VNQDĐ conspiracies to foment mutinies in other garrisons, such as Kiến An, were detected and scotched at late notice. It was decided that the teamwork with the Sûreté had to be raised to greater heights to prevent future Yên Bái style rebellions. The rebellion allowed the civilian authorities an opportunity to involve themselves in military matters. The Sûreté's indirect penetration of military affairs involved linking the military intelligence service (SRM) to the Sûreté and the information provided by it, thereby making itself dependent on the political information and even political judgement and agenda of the civilian authorities. The central SRM then relayed this information to its local branches as part of its SRM Bulletin. As a result of the uprising, the SRM became more closely linked to the Sûreté and its methodology and philosophy in of analysing Vietnamese anti-colonial activity. It was further resolved to have all officers involved in studying revolutionary parties. The focus widened from observing only internal army activities to include developments among Vietnamese anti-colonial organisations at large. General Aubert cited complacency and laziness as a factor in the ineffectiveness of the officers in implement French intelligence strategy. He further asserted that the flow of intelligence between French officers and Vietnamese warrant officers was not as smooth as desired. He felt that his men were often not tactful and discreet enough; citing a lack of language skills or interest in talking to their Vietnamese colleagues in an attempt to extricate information.