Microsoft responded that: (1) Windows software could not be a “component” of a patented invention within the meaning of § 271(f) because it was intangible information; (2) even if the Windows software were a “component,” no actual “components” had been “supplied” from the United States as required by § 271(f) because the copies installed on the foreign-assembled computers had all been made abroad. However, rejecting all these responses, the District Court held Microsoft liable under § 271(f). After Microsoft appealed, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit still affirmed the District Court's decision. In October 2006, the Supreme Court finally agreed to address the conflicting case law surrounding § 271(f) by granting a writ of certiorari. Oral argument was held on February 26, 2007 in front of eight Justices. On April 30, 2007, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit and ruled in favor of Microsoft. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York explained that § 271(f) did not limit “components” to only physical machines or tangible structures, but also intangible information or data. Therefore, the district court rejected Microsoft's argument that software can not be a “component” of a patented invention under § 271(f). As for the copies made abroad, the district court held that such copies should still be considered as “supplied from" the United States because the code or master disk used for foreign replication was originally manufactured and shipped from the U.S. Therefore, the court denied Microsoft's claim that foreign copies should not be considered as "supplied from" the United States. By considering the legislative intent of § 271(f) to prohibit the circumvention of infringement through exportation, the Court ruled that Microsoft was liable for patent infringement. Microsoft appealed  The appellate court relied on prior Federal Circuit case law "Eolas Technologies Incorporated v. Microsoft Corporation" and held that software code alone qualifies as an invention eligible for patenting. Since statutory language does not limit § 271(f) to patented ‘machines’ or ‘physical structures,’ software can very well be a ‘component’ of patented invention under § 271(f)”. The Federal Circuit also explained that the act of "copying" is subsumed in the act of "supplying". Therefore, the exportation of the master disk, with the specific intent to be replicated abroad, was an act considered as “supplied or caused to be supplied from the United States within the meaning of § 271(f).”