He thus established the "main purpose rule", holding that no exclusion clause would be allowed to cut into the main purpose of any contract. "Tate & Lyle v Hain Steamship Company" was a further deviation case following this approach. Although the 19th century cases were maritime cases, the idea of the "main purpose" caught on in the general law of contract after Lord Greene MR, in "Alderslade v. Hendon Laundry Ltd."(1945) , labelled the fundamental term as ‘the hard core of the contract'. In "Karsales v Wallis" [1956] EWCA Civ 4 a buyer inspected a car dealer's used Buick car and agreed to buy it. The car was later delivered at night, and had been towed. When the buyer inspected the car in the morning, it would not work and it was clear it had been involved in an accident, and there were other changes: its tyres had been replaced by old ones, body parts were missing, and the engine's cylinder head was detached, revealing burnt valves. This was a serious breach, but the dealer sought to rely on a clause in the contract: "No condition or warranty that the vehicle is roadworthy or as to its age, condition or fitness for any purpose is given by the owner or implied herein." Although the clause was clear and well drafted, the Court of Appeal declared that a "car" was a "vehicle capable of self-propulsion", and accordingly this Buick was not a proper car. Following "Glynn v Margetson" and using its "main purpose" concept, the court held that the dealer was "in breach of a fundamental obligation" and so could not rely on any exclusion clause. This decision was clearly fair to the buyer, and "Karsales v Wallis" soon became the leading case on "fundamental breach". As a matter of law, under the doctrine of fundamental breach of contract, exclusion clauses were deemed not to be available to a party in fundamental breach of the contract. However, all was not well, as business people felt alarmed that an agreed contract term could be set aside by a court; there seemed to be no "certainty". Also, there arose some confusion as to what "fundamental breach" actually was. Some alleged it was a breach that went to "the root of the contract", a breach so fundamental it would permit the distressed party to repudiate the contract and claim damages. However, since both common law and statute already recognised that while that breach of warranty entitled a claimant only to damages, any breach of condition would entitle a claimant both repudiation and damages, it seemed that fundamental breach offered nothing new.