More specifically, the but-for test was said to be limited in two key types of cases:   Instead, Chief Justice Mason argued that both common sense principles and value judgments based on public policy considerations should be taken into account when attributing legal responsibility for causation. On this basis, he stated that both the negligence of Stefanato/Stramare in parking the truck in a risky position and the negligence of March in driving in an intoxicated state was what had caused March's injuries to occur. March's own negligence could not be considered as an intervening act which had dismissed the wrongful actions of Stefanato and Stramare, and subsequently allowed the appeal. Justice Deane:  Stated that although an attentive driver would have probably seen the truck's hazard and parking lights and would have not crashed into it, Stefanato and Stramare still possessed a duty of care towards all road users which extended even to intoxicated drivers like March. However, Justice Deane argued that March had still displayed negligence in driving under the influence of alcohol and consequently, legal responsibility should be apportioned between both parties pursuant to section 27A(3) of the "Wrongs Act 1936" (SA). Justice Deane also stated that he did not believe that the but-for test should be the exclusive test for all causation cases,  providing three key reasons for this view:   Based on these reasons, Justice Deane expressed the view that causation should be determined based on value judgments which took common sense principles into account, and allowed the appeal. Justice Toohey:  Agreed with the reasoning provided by Chief Justice Mason, stating that but-for test was not the exclusive test for causation as it did possess limitations, especially when an intervening act was involved. Justice Toohey also reiterated that in cases of negligence, both value judgments and public policy concerns should be taken into account when attributing legal responsibility to the parties. On this basis, Justice Toohey stated that the appeal should be allowed and that the judgment of the trial judge should be restored. Justice Gaudron:  Concurred with the conclusions drawn by Chief Justice Mason and Justice Deane in allowing the appeal. Justice McHugh:  Stated that the appeal should be allowed as the action of parking a truck on the center line of a six-lane road did give rise to a duty of care towards all users of said road. He expressed the view that Stefanato and Stramare had broken this duty of care by failing to prevent the reasonably foreseeable accident, and that the cost of March's injuries should be apportioned between both Stefanato/Stramare and March.