The court agreed that if the letter had just stood alone it would not be probable cause to get a warrant. The court also recognized that under the Aguilar–Spinelli two-pronged test, it would be very hard for the "reliability" prong to ever be satisfied from an anonymous tip so it therefore should be abandoned. This case is a landmark case in the evolution of probable cause and search warrants. In this case, the Supreme Court abandons the Aguilar–Spinelli test. In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, stated that "Only one of the cases cited by the Court in support of its 'totality of the circumstances' approach, "Jaben v. United States", 381 U.S. 214 (1965), was decided subsequent to Aguilar. It is by no means inconsistent with "Aguilar"." The dissent argued that the two pronged test of the honesty of the informant and the basis of knowledge was more protective of a citizen's rights, leaving less chance of a warrant being issued based upon the claims of a dishonest or unreliable "informant." The dissenters believed that the Aguilar–Spinelli test was effective and should not have been replaced; that tests and laws that protect the rights of accused are too easily disregarded because the court and law enforcers are eager to prosecute suspects; and that the rights of the suspects also have to be protected. The dissenters stated,"By replacing Aguilar and Spinelli with a test that provides no assurance that magistrates, rather than the police, or informants, will make determinations of probable cause; imposes no structure on magistrates' probable-cause inquiries; and invites the possibility that intrusions may be justified on less than reliable information from an honest or credible person, today's decision threatens to obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state, where they are the law." Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall also argued that the court did not show any persuasive reason for rejecting Aguilar and Spinelli, saying that the Court "reflects impatience with what it perceives to be overly technical rules governing searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment." The dissenters supported their opinion by stating that, "Words such as practical, nontechnical, and common sense, as used in the Court's opinion, are but code words for an overly permissive attitude towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment."