In those cases, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges could cope. Indeed, after "Blakely" was decided, the Department of Justice instructed prosecutors to include drug quantity allegations in the indictment. Also, in many cases, Guidelines ranges overlap, and there would be no "Blakely" problem if the judge imposed a sentence within that overlapping range and based that sentence solely on judicial factfinding. In light of these valid applications of mandatory Guidelines (constrained by "Blakely"), Stevens saw no plausible way to say that the sentencing statute was unconstitutional in nearly all of its applications. Stevens further envisioned no difficulty in applying "Blakely" to the Guidelines. The word "court" could just as easily refer to the judge and jury together as it could to the judge alone. Congress must presumably legislate within constitutional limitations, after all, and it was not plain from the language of the statute that this alternative interpretation was incompatible. Stevens disputed that applying "Blakely" to the Guidelines would frustrate the goal of achieving uniformity in sentences based on real conduct, because judges retained discretion to impose sentences within prescribed ranges; if defendants pleaded guilty and waived their "Blakely" rights, the range within which the judge could exercise his discretion would necessarily increase. Given the fact-based nature of certain sentence enhancements under the Guidelines — drug quantity, firearm enhancements, and extent of injury or loss to the victim — there was no reason juries could not make those determinations. In complicated cases, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges together could be trusted to craft workable solutions. To the extent prosecutors overstep their charging authority, judges retain the ability to reject unsatisfactory plea agreements. In light of these objections, Stevens disputed that Congress would have preferred the majority's remedy to a solution of its own devising. Justice Breyer reiterated his disagreement with the "Apprendi" rule, and then identified specific reasons not to apply the "Blakely" holding to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The facts used to determine a defendant's sentence had historically been solely within a judge's purview, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be treated no differently. Creating a system that frustrated the goal of increased sentencing uniformity hardly seemed fair to defendants or to the public at large. The fact that the Guidelines were administrative rules rather than statutes also was significant to Breyer. And to the extent that the Guidelines did not adequately take into account an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, a judge was free to depart from the Guidelines range. Thus, the defendant had every expectation that, despite the Guidelines, he might receive a sentence at or near the "statutory" maximum rather than at the top end of the Guidelines range.