The "assumption" under MAD is that nobody will ever start a nuclear war because of its consequences. However, humans are not inextricably bound to act in a rational manner, which history has proven time and time again. While Allison did not claim that any of his additional two models could fully explain anything, he noted that policymakers and analysts alike would benefit from stepping away from the traditional model and exploring alternate viewpoints (although this last remark could be viewed as facetious on Allison's part). The book is part of an ongoing argument between supporters of rational expectations theories and analysts who look for alternative explanations. Milton Friedman, in particular, countered that, even if rational expectational theories do not describe reality "per se", they should be kept since they provide accurate predictions (instrumentalism). Allison countered that Friedman has not provided enough evidence to demonstrate his theories actually predict anything, and criticizes his arguments as unscientific. Another argument (again, made by Friedman) is that the information needed for Allison's bureaucratic and political models is so large that it is impractical to use in such a crisis. Allison has conceded this is true, but argued that this does not mean a person should automatically revert to the rational actor worldview. Moreover, Allison pointed out that the "rational actor" model continues to be applied even in long-term analyses (i.e., analyses that take place long after the event or "crisis" is past). In "Essence of Decision", Allison suggests that one reason for the popularity of rational actor models is that, compared to other models, they require relatively little data and provide researchers with an "inexpensive approximation" of the situation. Allison also quotes Thomas Schelling's description of rationalistic thinking and vicarious problem solving:  Finally, in Allison's first edition (1971), he was unable to fully explore his theories because much of the information was still classified. As a result, he made a number of assumptions on his own part. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the release of American recordings of EXCOMM, this new information (included in the revised 1999 edition) sometimes agreed with Allison's assumptions, but sometimes didn't. For example, in 1971, he guessed that Kennedy must have made an "under the table" agreement concerning the Turkish missiles, probably using his brother as a liaison. The American tapes confirmed this. However, Allison also guessed, in 1971, that Khrushchev must have formed his own "EXCOMM," or his own committee of advisors, to aid him during the crisis, and even named the Russian leaders he believed were with Khrushchev at the time.