_:nf62b2cdc5c614c92be1e7f14927fffa6xb0
<http://schema.org/description>
"It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable\nstrategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These\nresults were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's\ndilemma), or for classes of games satisfying certain conditions not known to be\nboth necessary and sufficient.\n  We derive a complete characterization in the form of simple necessary and\nsufficient conditions for the existence of a computable strategy without a\ncomputable best response under limit-of-means payoff. We further refine the\ncharacterization by requiring the strategy profiles to be Nash equilibria or\nsubgame-perfect equilibria, and we show how the characterizations entail that\nit is efficiently decidable whether an infinitely repeated game has a\ncomputable strategy without a computable best response."
<http://api.deepai.org/publication/a-complete-characterization-of-infinitely-repeated-two-player-games-having-computable-strategies-with-no-computable-best-response-under-limit-of-means-payoff>