_:n00373e576bf14f13a3f2db32b9907694xb31
<http://schema.org/description>
"Committees are an important scenario for reaching consensus. Beyond standard\nconsensus-seeking issues, committee decisions are complicated by a deadline,\ne.g., the next start date for a budget, or the start of a semester. In\ncommittee hiring decisions, it may be that if no candidate is supported by a\nstrong majority, the default is to hire no one---an option that may cost\ncommittee members dearly. As a result, committee members might prefer to agree\non a reasonable, if not necessarily the best, candidate, to avoid unfilled\npositions. In this paper we propose a model for the above\nscenario---Consensus Under a Deadline (CUD)---based on a time-bounded\niterative voting process. We explore theoretical features of CUDs, particularly\nfocusing on convergence guarantees and quality of the final decision. An\nextensive experimental study demonstrates more subtle features of CUDs, e.g.,\nthe difference between two simple types of committee member behavior, lazy\nvs. proactive voters. Finally, a user study examines the differences between\nthe behavior of rational voting bots and real voters, concluding that it may\noften be best to have bots play on the voters' behalf."
<https://cdnjs.deepai.org/profile/jeffrey-s-rosenschein>