_:n00373e576bf14f13a3f2db32b9907694xb29
<http://schema.org/description>
"All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent\ninteractions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of\nplayers' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures, and\nfully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, we present a symmetric\nequilibrium and show that under some conditions the equilibrium is unique. We\nreveal various properties of the equilibrium, such as the lack of influence of\nthe most-likely-to-participate player on the behavior of the other players. We\nperform this analysis with two scenarios: the sum-profit model, where the\nauctioneer obtains the sum of all submitted bids, and the max-profit model of\ncrowdsourcing contests, where the auctioneer can only use the best submissions\nand thus obtains only the winning bid.\n  Furthermore, we examine various methods of influencing the probability of\nparticipation such as the effects of misreporting one's own probability of\nparticipating, and how influencing another player's participation chances\nchanges the player's strategy."
<https://cdnjs.deepai.org/profile/jeffrey-s-rosenschein>