_:n21f71838e43942f38d198d09f388ebdexb34
<http://schema.org/description>
"We consider the problem of posting prices for unit-demand buyers if all n\nbuyers have identically distributed valuations drawn from a distribution with\nmonotone hazard rate. We show that even with multiple items asymptotically\noptimal welfare can be guaranteed.\n  Our main results apply to the case that either a buyer's value for different\nitems are independent or that they are perfectly correlated. We give mechanisms\nusing dynamic prices that obtain a 1 - Θ( 1/log\nn)-fraction of the optimal social welfare in expectation. Furthermore,\nwe devise mechanisms that only use static item prices and are 1 - Θ( logloglog n/log n)-competitive compared to the\noptimal social welfare. As we show, both guarantees are asymptotically optimal,\neven for a single item and exponential distributions."
<https://api.deepai.org/profile/thomas-kesselheim>