_:n21f71838e43942f38d198d09f388ebdexb28
<http://schema.org/description>
"We present a computationally-efficient truthful mechanism for combinatorial\nauctions with subadditive bidders that achieves an\nO((loglogm)^3)-approximation to the maximum welfare in expectation\nusing O(n) demand queries; here m and n are the number of items and\nbidders, respectively. This breaks the longstanding logarithmic barrier for the\nproblem dating back to the O(logm·loglogm)-approximation\nmechanism of Dobzinski from 2007. Along the way, we also improve and\nconsiderably simplify the state-of-the-art mechanisms for submodular bidders."
<https://api.deepai.org/profile/thomas-kesselheim>