_:n21f71838e43942f38d198d09f388ebdexb20
<http://schema.org/description>
"We study the price of anarchy of mechanisms in the presence of risk-averse\nagents. Previous work has focused on agents with quasilinear utilities,\npossibly with a budget. Our model subsumes this as a special case but also\ncaptures that agents might be less sensitive to payments than in the\nrisk-neutral model. We show that many positive price-of-anarchy results proved\nin the smoothness framework continue to hold in the more general risk-averse\nsetting. A sufficient condition is that agents can never end up with negative\nquasilinear utility after playing an undominated strategy. This is true, e.g.,\nfor first-price and second-price auctions. For all-pay auctions, similar\nresults do not hold: We show that there are Bayes-Nash equilibria with\narbitrarily bad social welfare compared to the optimum."
<https://api.deepai.org/profile/thomas-kesselheim>