_:n21f71838e43942f38d198d09f388ebdexb32
<http://schema.org/description>
"We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets.\nThat is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items\ninitially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize\nutility. Our mechanisms are designed based on a powerful correspondence between\ntwo-sided markets and prophet inequalities. They satisfy individual\nrationality, dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, budget-balance\nconstraints and give constant-factor approximations to the optimal social\nwelfare.\n  We improve previous results in several settings: Our main focus is on matroid\ndouble auctions, where the set of buyers who obtain an item needs to be\nindependent in a matroid. We construct two mechanisms, the first being a\n1/3-approximation of the optimal social welfare satisfying strong\nbudget-balance and requiring the agents to trade in a customized order, the\nsecond being a 1/2-approximation, weakly budget-balanced and able to deal\nwith online arrival determined by an adversary. In addition, we construct\nconstant-factor approximations in two-sided markets when buyers need to fulfill\na knapsack constraint. Also, in combinatorial double auctions, where buyers\nhave valuation functions over item bundles instead of being interested in only\none item, using similar techniques, we design a mechanism which is a\n1/2-approximation of the optimal social welfare, strongly budget-balanced and\ncan deal with online arrival of agents in an adversarial order."
<https://api.deepai.org/profile/thomas-kesselheim>