_:nbf0bb71cf7f34f6fa66e7a086cb78a04xb4
<http://schema.org/description>
"We consider a model where agents differ in their `types' which determines\ntheir voluntary contribution towards a public good. We analyze what the\nequilibrium composition of groups are under centralized and centralized choice.\nWe show that there exists a top-down sorting equilibrium i.e. an equilibrium\nwhere there exists a set of prices which leads to groups that can be ordered by\nlevel of types, with the first k types in the group with the highest price and\nso on. This exists both under decentralized and centralized choosing. We also\nanalyze the model with endogenous group size and examine under what conditions\nis top-down sorting socially efficient. We illustrate when integration (i.e.\nmixing types so that each group's average type if the same) is socially better\nthan top-down sorting. Finally, we show that top down sorting is efficient even\nwhen groups compete among themselves."
<https://deepai.org/profile/siddhartha-bandyopadhyay>