_:n68f15fbe6c5b435588e0b711cd96e951xb9
<http://schema.org/description>
"Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been\nattracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for\nauctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness,\nnon-deficit, non-wastefulness, and individual rationality for the multi-unit\nunit-demand auction, except for some naive ones. In this paper, we first\npropose a mechanism that satisfies all the above properties. We then make a\ncomprehensive comparison with two naive mechanisms, showing that the proposed\nmechanism dominates them in social surplus, seller's revenue, and incentive of\nbuyers for truth-telling. We also analyze the characteristics of the social\nsurplus and the revenue achieved by the proposed mechanism, including the\nconstant approximability of the worst-case efficiency loss and the complexity\nof optimizing revenue from the seller's perspective."
<https://deepai.org/profile/takehiro-kawasaki>