_:n68f15fbe6c5b435588e0b711cd96e951xb7
<http://schema.org/description>
"In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network,\nwhere a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers\nthrough the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism\nis strategy-proof, individually rational, efficient, and weakly budget\nbalanced. In addition, we propose α-APG mechanisms, a class of\nmechanisms which operate a trade-off between efficiency and weakly budget\nbalancedness. In multi-item auctions, there already exists a strategy-proof\nmechanism when all buyers need only one item. However, we indicate a\ncounter-example to strategy-proofness in this mechanism, and to the best of our\nknowledge, the question of finding a strategy-proof mechanism remains open. We\nassume that all buyers have decreasing marginal utility and propose a\ngeneralized APG mechanism that is strategy-proof and individually rational but\nnot efficient. Importantly, we show that this mechanism achieves the largest\nefficiency measure among all strategy-proof mechanisms."
<https://deepai.org/profile/takehiro-kawasaki>