Excerpts from a report by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, issued to the UN Security Council on Friday 28 April.
On 27 April 2006, the Director General [Mr ElBaradei] received from Iran a letter of the same date in which it stated... the following: ...Islamic Republic of Iran is fully prepared to continue granting the Agency's [IAEA] inspection in accordance with the Comprehensive Safeguards provided that the Iran's dossier will remain, in full, in the framework of the IAEA and under its safeguards...
The Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to resolve the remaining outstanding issues in [the Director General's] report.. of 27 February 2006...
In this regard, Iran will provide a timetable within next three weeks.
As noted in the Director General's report of 27 February 2006 ... the Agency has repeatedly requested Iran to provide additional information on certain issues related to
its enrichment programme.
Iran declined to discuss these matters at the 12-14 February 2006 meeting in Tehran... on the grounds that, in its view, they were not within the scope of the [nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] Safeguards Agreement.
As noted in previous reports, the Agency was shown by Iran in January 2005 a copy of a handwritten one-page document reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987
by a foreign intermediary.
In order to be able to ascertain its nature and origin, a copy of the document is needed by the Agency. However, Iran continues to decline the agency's request for a copy of the document.
In February 2006, Iran started enrichment tests at PFEP [Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant] by feeding UF6 gas into a single P-1 machine, and later into 10-machine and 20-machine cascades.
During March 2006, a 164-machine cascade was completed, and tests of the cascade using UF6 were begun.
On 13 April 2006, Iran declared to the Agency that an enrichment level of 3.6% had been achieved. On 18 April 2006, the Agency took samples at PFEP, the results of which tend to
confirm as of that date the enrichment level declared by Iran.
All the nuclear material declared by Iran to the Agency is accounted for. Apart from the small quantities previously reported to the [IAEA's] Board, the Agency has found no other undeclared nuclear material in Iran.
However, gaps remain in the Agency's knowledge with respect to the scope and content of Iran's centrifuge program.
Because of this, and other gaps in the Agency's knowledge, including the role of the military in Iran's nuclear program, the Agency is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
After more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear program, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern.
Any progress in that regard requires full transparency and active co-operation by Iran - transparency that goes beyond the measures prescribed in the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol - if the Agency is to be able to understand fully the 20 years of
undeclared nuclear activities by Iran.
Iran continues to facilitate the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and had, until February 2006, acted on a voluntary basis as if the Additional Protocol were in force.
Until February 2006, Iran had also agreed to some transparency measures requested by the Agency, including access to certain military sites.
Additional transparency measures, including access to documentation, dual use equipment and relevant individuals, are, however, still needed for the Agency to be able to verify the scope and nature of Iran's enrichment program, the purpose and use of the dual use equipment and materials purchased by the PHRC [Physics Research Centre], and the alleged studies
which could have a military nuclear dimension.
Regrettably, these transparency measures are not yet forthcoming.
With Iran's decision to cease implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol, and to confine Agency verification to the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agency's ability to make progress in clarifying these issues, and to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, will be further limited.
While the results of Agency safeguards activities may influence the nature and scope of the confidence building measures that the Board requests Iran to take, it is important to note that safeguards obligations and confidence building measures are different, distinct and not interchangeable.
The implementation of confidence building measures is no substitute for the full implementation at all times of safeguards obligations.
In this context, it is also important to note that the Agency's safeguards judgments and conclusions in the case of Iran, as in all other cases, are based on verifiable information available to the Agency, and are therefore, of necessity, limited to past and present nuclear activities.
The Agency cannot make a judgment about, or reach a conclusion on, future compliance or intentions.