Madras High CourtS.V.Chandran vs The State on 17 December, 2018Author:V.ParthibanBench:V.Parthiban1

                                THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

                                       Reserved on              :   29.11.2018
                                       Pronounced on            :   17.12.2018

                                                      CORAM:
                                THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V.PARTHIBAN
                                             Crl.R.C.No.1217 of 2018

                      S.V.Chandran                                           ...Petitioner
                                                          Vs.

                      The State
                      Rep.y by its Inspector of Police,
                      Kaveripakkam Police Station,
                      Vellore District.
                      Crime No.403 of 2018                                       ...Respondent

                             The Criminal Revision filed under Section 397 read with 401 ofCode of Criminal Procedureagainst the order passed by the learned
                      District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate No.I, Walajapet, in
                      Cr.M.P.No.2602 of 2018 dated 24.10.2018 to return of vehicle Tractor
                      Mahindra 605 Arjun Model 50 HP, Engine No.NJA4WNE 0142, Chasis
                      No.MBNWHBDUEJNA 00532 belongs to the petitioner under the
                      custody of the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate No.1, Walajapet,
                      to the petitioner forthwith.


                                     For Petitioner   : Mr.K.Selvakumaraswami

                                     For Respondent: Mr.G.Hari Hara Arun Soma Sankar,
                                                     Govt. Advocate (Crl.Side)

                                                       ORDERIn the present revision case, a preliminary objection was taken

                      by the learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) appearing for the

                      respondent police that the revision case is not maintainable under




http://www.judis.nic.in2Section 397of Cr.P.C., against the order passed by the Court below

                      underSection 451of Cr.P.C., refusal of return of properties. According

                      to the learned Government Advocate, the order being passed underSection 451of Cr.P.C., is only an interlocutory in nature and such

                      order is not open to challenge in the revision case, in view of the bar ofSection 397(2)of Cr.P.C., which, is extracted hereunder.“(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section
                                 (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
                                 interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry,
                                 trial or other proceeding.”

                             2     The learned Government Advocate would also refer to the

                      contents ofSection 451of Cr.P.C. which provides for passing of order

                      pending conclusion of the enquiry or trial and therefore this revision

                      case is against such interlocutory order passed by the learned

                      Magistrate underSection 451of Cr.P.C., which is extracted hereunder

                      for appreciation of the preliminary objection raised by the learned

                      Government Advocate (Crl.Side) appearing for the respondents.“451. Order for custody and disposal of property pending
                          trial in certain cases.When any property is produced before any Criminal Court
                          during an inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as it
                          thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the
                          conclusion of the inquiry or trial, and, if the property is subject
                          to speedy and natural decay, or if it is otherwise expedient so to
                          do, the Court may, after recording such evidence as it thinks
                          necessary, order it to be sold or otherwise disposed of.
                          Explanation.—
                          For the purposes of this section, "property" includes—



http://www.judis.nic.in3(a) property of any kind or document which is produced before
                          the Court or which is in its custody.(b) any property regarding which an offence appears to have
                          been committed or which appears to have been used for the
                          commission of any offence.”
                              3    In support of his contention, the learned counsel straight

                      away would draw the attention of this Court to the order passed by the

                      learned Judge of this Court in Crl.MD.No.30 of 2012 dated

                      27.01.2012 in the case ofK.Basha vs State. The learned

                      Government Advocate would draw reference to paragraph nos. 8 to 10

                      of the order, which is extracted hereunder:“8.If at all the petition for interim custody is returned in
                            utter disregard of the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme
                            Court issued inSunderbai Ambalal vs. Stateof Gujarat's
                            case, which was followed in a catena of cases by various
                            High courts, the petitioner could have re-presented the
                            petition drawing the attention of the Judicial Magistrate tothe said judgment. Instead of doing it, the petitioner has
                            chosen to file a revision before the High Court
                            invokingsections 397and401Cr.P.C, despite the existence
                            of a provision in sub-section 2ofsection 397Cr.P.C. It shall
                            also be appropriate to observe here that the tendency shown
                            by some of the Judicial Magistrates in simply returning the
                            petitions filed either undersection 451or undersection
                            457Cr.P.C seeking interim custody of the properties seized
                            by the police citing the non- production of the property
                            before the Magistrate as the reason will amount to
                            dereliction of the duty on the part of the Judicial Magistrate,
                            provided the petition is filed under appropriate provision
                            without misleading the Magistrate as to the provision
                            applicable, sincesection 451and457Cr.P.C apply under
                            different circumstances.A similar tendency is also seen on
                            the part of the litigants to approach the revisional court
                            against such return unmindful of the fact that such an order
                            is only an interlocutory order and not a final order finally
                            disposing of the petition and the petition could be re-http://www.judis.nic.in4presented stating how the reasons assigned by the court for
                          the return of the petition are not correct.9.When there is a specific provision barring entertainment of
                          the revisional powers in respect of interlocutory orders, the
                          said provision should be respected and the same should not
                          be flouted and made a dead letter by entertaining revision
                          on the ground that the interest of justice would require such
                          entertainment to avoid miscarriage of justice or to render
                          complete justice. The said grounds pertain the domain of the
                          inherent powers of the High Courts undersection
                          482Cr.P.C. In such cases, it may be appropriate to file a
                          petition undersection 482Cr.P.C, but that does not mean
                          that such an order can be challenged by way of a revision
                          undersection 397r/w 401Cr.P.C. If such a revision is
                          entertained as a revision case, the same will amount to
                          recognizing a power on the Sessions Judge also
                          undersection 399to entertain a revision against such an
                          order, which no-doubt is an interlocutory order. For all the
                          reasons stated above, this court comes to the conclusion
                          that the present Criminal Revision Case is not maintainable
                          and the same deserves to be dismissed.10.Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed as
                          not maintainable, as it stands barred bysection
                          397(2)Cr.P.C. The office is directed to return the
                          unnumbered criminal miscellaneous petition filed by the
                          petitioner in the trial court to the petitioner retaining the
                          copy of the same available in the typed set of papers to
                          enable the petitioner to re-present the same before the
                          learned Judicial Magistrate concerned.According to the learned Government Advocate, the learned Judge has

                      categorically held that the revision would not lie against the order

                      passed by the trial Court under Section 451 of Cr.P.C. He would also

                      further submit that the statutory provisions are very clear that the

                      orders are passed either way under Section 451 of Cr.P.C., only




http://www.judis.nic.in5pending finalisation of the trial and therefore there is a clear bar as

                      provided under Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C.4     At this, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

                      would submit that all along this Court has been entertaining the

                      revision cases against the orders passed by the       lower Court under

                      Section 451 of Cr.P.C and several orders have been passed by various

                      Judges of this Court entertaining the revision cases against the order

                      passed under Section 451 of Cr.P.C.5     In any case, the counsel should point out that the order

                      relied on by the Government Advocate appearing for the respondent

                      did not lay down the correct proposition of law, since, as far as, return

                      of properties is concerned, there is a final determination of right of the

                      party and such determination cannot be construed as one of the

                      interlocutory in nature. According to the counsel that the right to

                      properties is a constitutional right and rejection of such right even

                      though in pendency of trial cannot by any stretch on legal standard be

                      construed as interlocutory in nature.http://www.judis.nic.in66      In support of his contentions, the learned counsel has

                      relied on the decision of High Court of Himachal Pradesh reported in

                      (1989) 0 CrLJ2537 (Praveen Kumar vs. State of Himachal

                      Pradesh). The learned counsel would draw the attention of this Court

                      to paragraph nos.7 and 8, wherein, the issue was addressed and the

                      revision was held to be maintainable. The said paragraphs are

                      extracted hereunder.“7. Now the question is which order can be said to be
                          interlocutory and, therefore, not revisable and which order final
                          and liable for revisional jurisdiction of the Court of Session and
                          the High Court. It is impossible to lay down any strict principles
                          and guidelines to effect a complete and unassailable division.
                          Therefore, the matter has to be examined by the Court to arrive
                          at a decision on such an issue. In Para 12 of this judgment AIR
                          1978 SC 47 : (1978 Cri LJ 165), the Court observed:—
                          “Ordinarily and generally the expression ‘interlocutory order’ has
                          been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term
                          ‘final order’. In Volume 22 of the third edition of Halsbury's Laws
                          of England at page 742, however, it has been stated in para
                          1606:—“……a judgment or order may be final for one purpose
                          and interlocutory for another, or final as to part and interlocutory
                          as to part. The meaning of the two words must therefore be
                          considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for
                          which it is required.” In Para 1607 it is said:—“In general a
                          judgment or order which determines the principal matter in
                          question is termed ‘final’.”In Para 1608 at pages 744 and 745 we
                          find the words: “An order which does not deal with the final
                          rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and
                          gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely
                          on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and
                          merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the
                          final judgment are to be worked out, is termed “interlocutory”. An
                          interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute,
                          may be conclusive as to the subordinate; matter with which it
                          deals.” The Court further observed in Para 13 that:—“…..The


http://www.judis.nic.in7order can be said to be a final order only if, in either event, the
                          action will be determined. In our opinion, if this strict test were to
                          be applied in interpreting the words “interlocutory order”
                          occurring inS. 397(2), then the order taking cognizance of an
                          offence by a Court, whether it is so done illegally or without
                          jurisdiction, will not be a final order and hence will be an
                          interlocutory one. Even so, as we have said above, the inherent
                          power of the High Court can be invoked for quashing such a
                          criminal proceeding. But in our judgment such an interpretation
                          and the universal application/of the principle that what is not a
                          final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted
                          nor justified. If it were so it will, render almost nugatory the
                          revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court
                          conferred on it byS. 397(1). On such a strict interpertation, only
                          those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the
                          final determination of the action but are not appealable under
                          Chapter XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the
                          intention of the Legislature, when it retained the revisional power
                          of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898
                          Code………………”The Court further said:—“………… On the
                          one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the
                          High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that
                          power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it
                          appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to
                          equate the expression “interlocutory order” as invariably being
                          converse of the words “final order”. There may be an order
                          passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be
                          final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswamy's case AIR 1949 FC
                          1 : (1950-49 Cri LJ 625) (supra) but, yet it may not be an
                          interlocutory order, pure or simple. Some kinds of orders may
                          fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we
                          think that the bar in sub-s. (2) ofS. 397is not meant to be
                          attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be
                          final orders for the purposes ofArt. 134of the Constitution, yet it
                          would not be correct to characterise them as merely
                          interlocutory orders within the meaning ofS. 397(2). It is neither
                          advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to
                          demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or
                          simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final,
                          and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders
                          which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well
                          known and can be culled out from any decided cases. We may,


http://www.judis.nic.in8however, indicate that the type of order with which we are
                          concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one
                          sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-
                          sec. (2) ofS. 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order
                          of the type falling in the middle course.”8. An application underSec. 451Cr. P.C. has to be decided by
                          the Court after hearing the parties seeking the release of the
                          property in question. The parties are allowed to adduce
                          evidence and it is only after hearing them that the Court passes
                          the order thereby giving the custody of the property to one of
                          them who may be adjudged by the Court to be best entitled for
                          the same. To say that such an order is revisable by the Court on
                          the termination of the proceedings or in between is no reason to
                          call the order interlocutory order. Till such an order is made, it is
                          final between the parties and the Magistrate cannot arbitrarily or
                          without proper justification change the same during the course
                          of the proceedings. The argument of the petitioner that such an
                          order becomes final on the termination of the proceedings
                          cannot be accepted because even that order is subject to
                          determination by a Civil court. Therefore, in the light of the
                          decision of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye's case (1978
                          Cri LJ 165) (supra), it can be held that this kind of order is final
                          between the parties deciding their entitlement to the property in
                          question finally at that stage. Therefore such an order is
                          necessarily subject to revision by the Court and revision against
                          the same is competent before a Court of Session.The view
                          which I have taken has a support from 1981 Cri LJ 1529 (Andh
                          Pra) Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. State and 1974 Cri LJ 231
                          (Ishar Singh v. The State of Punjab) The argument of Sh. S.S.
                          Kanwar on this count, therefore, fails and is rejected.”


                      The counsel appearing for the petitioner would also draw the attention

                      of this Court to the detailed reasoning given by the yet another High

                      Court of Karnataka vide its order dated 17.09.1992 in Criminal

                      Revision     Petition     No.72       of     1990     in    the     case    ofT.Narayanaswamy          vs.    State       and   othersreported        in



http://www.judis.nic.in9Manupathra in MANU/KA/0120/1992, the relevant portion of the

                      order is extracted hereunder:“4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that
                           the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the
                           revision petition filed by respondent No. 2, as the order
                           passed by the learned Munsiff and J.M.F.C., was only an
                           interim order. This point has been dealt with by this Court
                           in the case ofM. Abbas v. State of Karnataka, 1980(2)
                           K.L.J. 259. His Lordship has relied on the ruling of the
                           Supreme      Court     in   interpreting  the   expression
                           "interlocutory order". The relevant portion of his Lordship
                           in that judgment is as follows :"Taking the first contention of Mr. Gopalakrishna, it
                           appears, there is not much substance in the same. What is
                           an interlocutory order has not been defined. This was also
                           one of the contentions raised before the learned Sessions
                           Judge, and he has rightly rejected the contention after
                           discussing the case law on the point.InMadhu Limaye v.
                           State of Maharashtra(1978) Cri LJ 165 their Lordships of
                           the Supreme Court observed (at page 169) :-
                           "Ordinarily and generally the expression 'interlocutory
                           order' has been understood and taken to mean as a
                           converse of the term 'final order'. In volume 22 of the
                           third edition of Halsbury's Laws of England at page 742,
                           however, it has been stated in para 1806 :-"......... a judgment or order may be final for one purpose
                           and interlocutory for another, or final to part and
                           interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words
                           must therefore be considered separately in relation to the
                           particular purpose for which it is required ...."In Para 1607 it is said :"In general a judgment or order which determines the
                           principal matter in question is termed final."In para 1608 at pages 744 and 745 we find the words :"An order which does not deal with the final rights of the
                           parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives
                           no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely



http://www.judis.nic.in10on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment,
                          and merely directs how the declarations of right already
                          given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is
                          termed "interlocutory". An interlocutory order, though not
                          conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to
                          the subordinate matter with which it deals."Proceeding further, their Lordships observed :"Although the words occurring in a particular statute are
                          plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in
                          manner which would fit in the context of the other
                          provisions of the statute and bring about the real intention
                          of the legislature. On the one hand, the legislature kept
                          intact the revisional power of the High Court, on the other,
                          it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any
                          interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us
                          that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate
                          the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably being
                          converse of the words "final order". There may be an
                          order passed during the course of a proceeding which may
                          not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case,
                          AIR 1949 FC 1 : (49 Cri LJ 625) (supra), but, yet it may
                          not be an interlocutory order pure or simple. Some kinds
                          of the order may fall in between the two. By a rule of
                          harmonious construction, we think that in bar in sub-
                          section (2) ofS. 397is not meant to be attracted to such
                          kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders
                          for the purpose ofArt. 134of the Constitution, yet it
                          would not be correct to characterise them as merely
                          interlocutory orders within the meaning ofS. 397(2). We
                          may, however, indicate that the type of order with which
                          we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be
                          final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to
                          attract the bar of sub-section (2) ofS. 397. In our opinion
                          it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in he
                          middle course."Mr. Gopalakrishna invited my attention to the decision
                          inNathu Lal v. State, 1976 Cri LJ 358 (All) and argued,
                          the order passed underS. 451Cr.P.C. was in the very
                          nature interlocutory, because it was an order passed
                          during the pendency of the proceeding and subject to the
                          final determination on the conclusion of the trial. No


http://www.judis.nic.in11doubt, the decision supports his contention. But with due
                          respect, I am unable to persuade myself to accept it as
                          laying down the correct law on the question. The
                          provisions ofS. 451, Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to make
                          such order as necessary for interim custody of the
                          property produced before the Court during the enquiry
                          and trial and any order passed underS. 451, Cr.P.C., so
                          far as that stage is concerned, would be final between the
                          parties, in that it concludes who among the contending
                          parties would be entitled to the interim custody and is final
                          as between the contending parties and is therefore open
                          to revision." In view of this ruling the order of the learned
                          Magistrate granting interim custody of the vehicle to the
                          petitioner cannot be said to be an interlocutory order and
                          therefore the respondent No. 2 has challenged it by way
                          of revision in the Court of the Prl. Sessions Judge,
                          Shimoga, Similarly, when the revision petition is decided
                          against the petitioner, he has got a right to prefer a
                          revision petition against that order which cannot be
                          construed as an interlocutory order for he purpose ofS.
                          397, Cr.P.C. in this Court.Further the learned would also draw reference to the observation

                      made in Paragraph no.8 of the order of the       Hon'ble Supreme Court

                      made in Appeal (Crl) 858 of 2001 dated 27.08.2001 reported in

                      Manupathra      in   MANU/SC/0489/2001,            which    is   extracted

                      hereunder.“8. The interdict contained inSection 397(2)of the Code of
                           Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) is that the powers
                           of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any
                           interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or
                           not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or
                           merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory
                           stage. The safe testlaid down bythis Court through a
                           series of decisions is this: If the contention of the petitioner
                           who moves the superior court in revision, as against the


http://www.judis.nic.in12order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal
                            proceedings as a whole culminate?If it would, then the
                            order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was
                            passed during any interlocutory stage.”
                      Lastly, the learned counsel would rely on the decision rendered by the

                      High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Crl.R.C.No.268 of 1981 dated

                      10.08.1981, in the case ofBharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., vs.

                      State and another, wherein, the learned Judge has held that orders

                      passed underSection 451of Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order. The

                      observation of the learned Judge in Paragraph no.15 is extracted

                      hereunder.“15. I do not agree with the learned counsel for the
                              respondent that it is an interlocutory order and no
                              revision lies underSection 397(2)Cr.P.C. The order in
                              question substantially affects the rights of the parties.
                              If so, it cannot be considered to be an interlocutory
                              order. (SeeAmar Nath v. State of Haryana,
                              Manu/SC/0068/1977 : 1977 CrlJ1891).”


                            7       In view of the above decisions of several High Courts and

                      also the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as cited supra, the

                      orders passed underSection 451of Cr.P.C. cannot be essentially an

                      interlocutory order and thereforeSection 397(2)of Cr.P.C. is not

                      attracted. Therefore the learned counsel would submit that the present

                      revision case will have to be entertained and orders may be passed on

                      its merits.http://www.judis.nic.in138        This Court has considered the rival submissions made by

                      the learned counsels both on the side of the petitioner as well as on

                      the side of the respondent. Although, the learned Judge of this Court

                      has held that the revision is not maintainable against the order passed

                      under Section 451 of Cr.P.C. overwhelmingly this Court entertained

                      revision cases against the orders passed under Section 451 of Cr.P.C.Several decisions rendered by the various judges of this Court have

                      been brought to the knowledge of this Court and this fact has not been

                      disputed by the learned Government Advocate appearing for the

                      respondent. However he would only submit that this issue was not

                      raised in such revisions and therefore there was no occasion for

                      several judges of this Court to embark upon the maintainability of the

                      revision cases.9        In any case, after perusing the various judgments, which

                      are brought to the attention of this Court, this Court is of the view that

                      the   orders     passed   underSection   451of   Cr.P.C.   cannot   be

                      characterised as an interlocutory order essentially. It depends upon

                      the property seized and properties produced before the Court. Some

                      may lose its value by passage of time; some may perish due to

                      exposure to rain and sun or due to efflux of time and in such event,




http://www.judis.nic.in14the Magistrate is empowered to dispose of the properties, pending

                      finalisation of the trial. In such circumstances, it should be considered

                      that the order to be passed underSection 451of Cr.P.C. is almost like

                      final orders touching upon valuable right to property of the petitioner.Any decision rendered by the Courts, exercising power underSection

                      451of Cr.P.C. will affect the rights of the petitioner to have his

                      property returned and in such circumstances to turn the petitioner

                      away on the ground that the revision case is not maintainable, will not

                      secure the ends of justice. More so, such orders passed underSection

                      451of Cr.P.C. are also not appealable.10    For the above said reasons, this Court is more inclined to

                      accept the decision of various High Courts which held that the revision

                      is maintainable against the order passed underSection 451of Cr.P.C

                      as the same is not interlocutory in nature, but such order determines

                      the constitutional rights of the petitioner for return of properties or for

                      disposing of properties. Therefore the revision case shall be disposed

                      of on its merits, by holding that the revision is maintainable.http://www.judis.nic.in1511      The present revision case has been filed against the order

                      passed by the learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate No.I,

                      Walajapet, in Cr.M.P.No.2602 of 2018 dated 24.10.2018, rejecting the

                      petition filed underSection 451of Cr.P.C, seeking return of vehicle

                      seized by the respondent police and produced before the Court.12      After hearing both the parties, the learned Magistrate has

                      dismissed the petition on the basis of an order passed by the Division

                      Bench of this Court as held in Paragraph no.7, which is extracted

                      hereunder:“7. The revival submission made by the prosecution
                            also considered, further more this Court thinks to refer the
                            following Judgment, in this regard is fit to this case. In this
                            connection, our Honourable High Court of Madras, Madurai
                            Bench given the verdict regarding to sand theft sized
                            vehicle should not be return to the owner of the vehicle,
                            further directed no Court should entertain such a petition
                            filed before the Court. Besides our Honourable Court of
                            Madras Madurai Bench observed as follows in the WP (MD)
                            No.7595 of 2018, Mahalingam Vs. The Secretary to
                            Government and others as follows:We have perused the report filed by the third
                            respondent District Collector, Pudukkottai. From the
                            submissions made on both sides, we are satisfied that not
                            only in the place, which is subject matter of writ petition,
                            but also in the entire State indiscriminately mining is going
                            on illegally by using vehicles and bullock carts. The action
                            taken is far and few. We are afraid to say that even this is
                            mainly restricted to only imposing of fine. The vehicles
                            involved are either released by the official respondents or
                            by the Courts. Every thing has become a part of the
                            routine transaction.http://www.judis.nic.in16The action taken so far has not yielded any result. Sand in
                             the present form takes thousands of years. Removal of the
                             sand will lead to a destruction of the rivers. At this speed,
                             we may lose the rivers once for all. A report of NITI Aayog
                             – a Government Think Tank, indicates by 2050 there will
                             not be any water for the entire state. 21 cities including
                             Chennai will run out of ground water affecting about 100
                             millions people. The aforesaid situation is the stock reality
                             bourne out of the greed of the man. May be, the
                             generation next might see water only in bottle. Day in and
                             day out we are forced to deal with such cases. However,
                             illegal mining goes on unchecked under our nose. This is
                             the reality.2. Taking note of the aforesaid situation, we direct
                             the State of Tamil Nadu, represented by the Secretary,
                             Home Department, Fort St. George, Chennai, impleaded
                             suo motu as 8th respondent, to see to it that appropriate
                             steps are taken by placing the responsibility on the
                             revenue officials on ground. We further direct all the
                             District Collectors in the entire state not to release any
                             vehicle, which is involved in illegal mining of sand until
                             further orders from this Court. In case of involvement of
                             bullock carts, the carts will have to be retained while
                             releasing the bulls. We also make it clear that no Courts in
                             the State shall entertain any request from the owners of
                             the vehicles involved in illegal sand mining. We may note
                             registering Criminal cases made little impact which cases
                             ending in acquittal”.13     Mr.K.Selvakumarasamy, the learned counsel appearing for

                      the petitioner would submit that subsequently the Division Bench of

                      this Court has modified the above order on 29.10.2018 in a batch of

                      writ petitions and held as under:“4. According to the petitioners, the official
                               respondents seized he vehicles in question on the
                               ground of want of valid permit and till date no order
                               has been passed by the respondents concerned.
                               Hence these writ petitions have been filed.5. On the other hand, it is submitted by the learned



http://www.judis.nic.in17Government          Advocate/Special      Government
                          Pleader/Additional Government Pleader appearing
                          for the respective respondents that the vehicles in
                          question were used for illegal transportation of
                          mines and minerals like sand, gravel etc., and hence
                          they were seized.6. In any event, as the vehilces are under the
                          custody of the respondents from the date of seizing
                          and considering the fact that if the same is allowed
                          to be kept idle by exposing the same to sun and
                          rain, it would certainly diminish their value.Therefore, this Court is of the view that the vehicles
                          may be released by imposing conditions on the
                          petitioners for release of the same.“7.Accordingly, the concerned respondents are
                          directed to release the vehicle in question to the
                          petitioners within a period of 7 days from the date of
                          receipt of a copy of this order subject to the
                          following conditions:“(i) The petitioners shall produce necessary
                          documents before the respondents to establish the
                          ownership of the vehicle in question.(ii) The petitioners in W.P.(MD).Nos.215639,
                          21816 and 21300 of 2018 shall deposit a sum of
                          Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only)
                          each, before the Tahsildar concerned as non
                          refundable deposit and the petitioners in other cases
                          shall deposit a sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty
                          Thousand only) each, before the Tahsildar concerned
                          as non refundable deposit;(iii) The petitioners shall give an undertaking
                          that he will not use the vehicle for any illegal
                          activities in future and shall produce the same as
                          and when required by the respondents;(iv) on doing so, the vehicle in question shall
                          be returned to the petitioners;(v) The petitioners shall not alienate the
                          vehicle in question till the disposal of the
                          proceedings before the authority concerned; and(vi) The petitioners are also directed to
                          participate in the enquiry to be conducted by the



http://www.judis.nic.in18respondents.”
                      The learned counsel would also rely on the observations made by the

                      Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in its judgment reported in (2002) 10

                      SCC 283. The learned counsel would draw the attention of this Court

                      to Paragraph no.17 of the order, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

                      has observed as follows:“17. In our view, whatever be the situation, it is of no use
                           to keep such seized vehicles at the police stations for a
                           long period. It is for the Magistrate to pass appropriate
                           orders immediately by taking appropriate bond and
                           guarantee as well as security for return of the said
                           vehicles, if required at any point of time. This can be
                           done pending hearing of applications for return of such
                           vehicles.”




                      The learned counsel would further draw the attention of this Court to

                      yet another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2010)

                      6 SCC 768 and would refer to paragraph no.14 of the order, which is

                      extracted hereunder:“14.It is a matter of common knowledge that as and
                             when vehicles are seized and kept in various police
                             stations, not only do they occupy substantial space in
                             the police stations but upon being kept in open, are
                             also prone to fast natural decay on account of weather
                             conditions. Even a good maintained vehicle loses its
                             roadworthiness if it is kept stationary in the police
                             station for more than fifteen days. Apart from the
                             above, it is also a matter of common knowledge that


http://www.judis.nic.in19several valuable and costly parts of the said vehicles
                              are either stolen or are cannibalised so that the
                              vehicles become unworthy of being driven on road. To
                              avoid all this, apart from the aforesaid directions issued
                              hereinabove,      we     direct  that   all   the    State
                              Government/Union Territories/Director Generals of
                              Police shall ensure macro implementation of the
                              statutory provisions and further direct that the activities
                              of each and every police station, especially with regard
                              to disposal of the seized vehicles be taken care of by
                              the     Inspector     General     of   Police    of    the
                              division/Commissioner of Police concerned of the
                              cities/Superintendent of Police concerned of the district
                              concerned.“


                            In view of the same, the learned counsel appearing for the

                      petitioner would submit that the order passed by the learned

                      Magistrate is liable to be interfered with.14    At this, the learned Government Advocate (Crl.side)

                      appearing for the respondent police would submit that the petitioner

                      having involved in illegal activities, cannot be granted any relief and

                      the learned Magistrate has rightly dismissed his claim, which does not

                      call for any interference.15    Heard the rival submissions made by the learned counsel

                      on either side and perused the materials placed on record.http://www.judis.nic.in2016    Considering      the    observations     made     by   the    Hon'ble

                      Supreme Court and also the fact that the property, which is sought to

                      be returned will lose its value and ultimately it is of no use to any

                      stake holder in keeping the property in the custody of the police, in all

                      fairness and fitness of things that pending finalisation of the trial or

                      investigation, the vehicle, as far as possible shall be returned to the

                      owner. In this case, this Court is satisfied that the vehicle is liable to

                      be returned to the owner. Therefore, the impugned order passed by

                      the learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate No.I, Walajapet, in

                      Cr.M.P.No.2602 of 2018 dated 24.10.2018 is hereby set aside. The

                      vehicle covered under C.M.P.No.2602 of 2018 is ordered to be

                      released within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy

                      of this order subject to the following conditions:“(i)    The   petitioner        shall   produce    necessary
                            documents     before    the     respondent     to   establish      the
                            ownership of the vehicle in question.(ii) The petitioner shall deposit a sum of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) each, before the
                            Tahsildar concerned as non refundable deposit;(iii) The petitioner shall give an undertaking that he
                            will not use the vehicle for any illegal activities in future
                            and shall produce the same as and when required by the
                            respondent;http://www.judis.nic.in21(iv) The petitioner shall not alienate the vehicle in
                            question till the disposal of the proceedings before the
                            authority concerned; and(v) The petitioner is also directed to participate in the
                            enquiry to be conducted by the respondent.”



                           17    In the result, the criminal revision is allowed in terms of

                      the above conditions.17.12.2018

                      Index : Yes/No
                      Speaking order/non speaking order
                      cgi
                      To1. The District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate No.I, Walajapet.2. The Additional Public Prosecutor, High Court of Madras.http://www.judis.nic.in22V.PARTHIBAN, J.,


                                                      cgi




                                    Pre-Delivery Order inCrl.R.C.No.1217 of 201817.12.2018




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