Central Administrative Tribunal - DelhiShri Azad Singh vs Delhi Transport Corporation on 27 February, 2015CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
                 PRINCIPAL BENCH

OA 3786/2013

New Delhi this the 27th day of February, 2015
	
	Honble Mr. A.K.Bhardwaj, Member (J)
	Honble Mr. Ashok Kumar, Member (A)

	Shri Azad Singh,
S/o late Shri Balbir Singh,
Badge No. 19934,
Pay Token No. 57967,
R/o VPO Sampla,
District Rohtak, Haryana
Presently at Delhi.					          Applicant

(By Advocate Ms.Rashmi B.Singh )

VERSUS

Delhi Transport Corporation
I.P.Estate,
Through its Chairman,
New Delhi-110002			        		   ...  Respondent

(By Advocate Ms.Manashi Pathak for Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat )

ORDER

Honble Mr. A.K.Bhardwaj, Member (J):Consequent upon his conviction by the Court of Shri V.S.Malik, Additional Session Judge, Rohtak and sentenced with punishment to undergo life imprisonment and pay fine of Rs.500/- for the offence punishable underSection 302/34IPC, the applicant was dismissed from the services of the Corporation w.e.f 20.05.2002 under Clause 5 (2) (vii) of the D.R.T.A (Conditions of appointment and services) Regulations, 1952 read with para 9 (g) & 10 (a) of the Executive Instructions. The order of conviction was challenged before Honble High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in criminal appeal no. 510-DB-2002 in which Honble High Court passed the order dated 02.05.2013, relevant excerpt of which read thus:-The aforesaid circumstances, mentioned by the alleged two witnesses are totally improbable that two persons, who were un-armed, in the presence of four members of the family of the deceased could strangulate the deceased, whose arms were free within 1 = minutes and also rub away from the spot despite the fact that one of the appellant (Azad Singh) was even caused injury by PW9. Moreover, according to the prosecution, appellant No.2 (Anoop Singh), after his arrest, produced rope from his pocket which too is highly improbable. There is a delay also in lodging the FIR.Thus, keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances, order of conviction and sentence passed by the  learned Court below is found unsustainable and is accordingly set aside and the appeal is hereby allowed.

In the wake, the applicant filed the present OA, praying therein:-a.	To direct the respondent to reinstate the applicant in services.b.	to direct the respondent for the payment of his entire back wages from the date of his illegal termination i.e. 20.05.2002 till reinstatement and the difference in salary which was paid to him during suspension period and salary to which he is entitled to receive as if he was not suspended.c.	Award he costs of the present petition in favour of the applicant and against the respondents.d.	Any other relief, which this Honble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances narrated hereinabove, may also be awarded to the applicant.2.		Learned counsel for the applicant espoused that:-(i) the act of the respondent in not allowing the applicant to join the service for none of his fault is illegal and arbitrary.(ii) Once the applicant has been acquitted in the criminal case registered against him, he deserves to be reinstated in service.3.	On the other hand, Ms. Manashi Pathak, learned proxy counsel for the respondent submitted:-(i) There is no rule for automatic reinstatement of an employee on acquittal by criminal court even when the charges leveled against him in the enquiry proceeding and criminal cases are same. To buttress her arguments, she relied upon the following judgments of Honble Supreme Court, Delhi High Court and of this Tribunal:-(1)   State of West Bengal and Ors Vs. Sankar 
                                  Ghosh( 2014) 3 SCC 610)

(2)   Rajinder Singh Vs. Delhi Transport 
                                  Corporation (W.P (C) 8135/2006

(3)    Jage Ram Vs. DTC (W.P (C) No.1883/1996


(4)    Baldev Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors(2005) 8 SCC 747).(5)    Inderjeet Singh Vs. DTC (OA 3785/2010 ) 
      		decided on 19.11.2010



4.	We heard counsel for parties and perused the record.InState of West Bengal and Others Vs. Sankar Ghosh(2014) 3 SCC 610), the respondent  a Sepoy in the 2nd Battalion of Kolkata Armed Force was implicated in case no. 383 registered on 12.11.2003 and was charged with  offence undersections 392,395and412of IPC read withSections 25and27of the Arms Act. He was placed under suspension w.e.f. 26.11.2003 and was subjected to parallel disciplinary proceeding commenced with    issuance of  charge sheet dated 01.06.2004.  The chargesleveled against him in the disciplinary case were held proved and he was dismissed from service w.e.f. 27.12.2004. The appeal preferred against the penalty order was rejected vide order dated 25.08.2005. Subsequent thereto, the Additional Session Judge, Barrackpore, who was trying the criminal case acquitted the applicant. Since the disciplinary authority had imposed the penalty of dismissal from service upon the applicant after independent inquiry, Honble Supreme Court ruled that the acquittal of the respondent before it could not have resulted in automatic reinstatement in service.  Para 16 to 20 of the judgment read thus:-16.InDeputy Inspector General v. S. Samuthiram[(2013) 1 SCC 598], this Court in paragraph 24, 25 and 26 of the judgment has elaborately examined the meaning and scope of the honourable acquittal and held as follows:-26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.17. The judgment ofS. Samuthiram(supra) was later followed by another Bench of this Court inCommissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. V. Mehar Singh[(2013) 7 SCC 685].18. We indicate that the respondent could not lay his hand to any rule or regulation applicable to the Police Force stating that once an employee has been acquitted by a Criminal Court, as a matter of right, he should be reinstated in service, despite all the disciplinary proceedings. In otherwise there is no rule of automatic reinstatement on acquittal by a Criminal Court even though the charges levelled against the delinquent before the Enquiry Officer as well as the Criminal Court are the same. On this aspect, reference may be made to para 27 of the judgment inS. Samuthiram(supra), which reads as under:-27. We have also come across cases where the service rules provide that on registration of a criminal case, an employee can be kept under suspension and on acquittal by the criminal court, he be reinstated. In such cases, the reinstatement is automatic. There may be cases where the service rules provide that in spite of domestic enquiry, if the criminal court acquits an employee honourably, he could be reinstated. In other words, the issue whether an employee has to be reinstated in service or not depends upon the question whether the service rules contain any such provision for reinstatement and not as a matter of right. Such provisions are absent in the Tamil Nadu Service Rules.19.Regulation 4of Chapter 19 of the Police Regulations of Calcutta, 1968, which is applicable to the case in hand, specifically provides that acquittal or discharge in a criminal proceeding shall not be a bar to award punishment in a departmental proceeding in respect of the same cause or matter. The said Regulation is extracted below for easy reference :4. Discharge or acquittal not a bar to departmental punishment. - An order of discharge or acquittal of a Police Officer shall not be a bar to the award of departmental punishment to that officer in respect of the same cause or matter.

Above rule indicates that even if there is identity of charges levelled against the respondent before the Criminal Court as well as before the Enquiry Officer, an order of discharge or acquittal of a police officer by a Criminal Court shall not be a bar to the award of the departmental punishment. The Tribunal as well as the High Court  have not considered the above-mentioned provision 
and have committed a mistake in holding that since the respondent was acquitted by a Criminal Court of the same charges, reinstatement was automatic.20. We find it difficult to support the finding recorded by the Tribunal which was confirmed by the High Court. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Tribunal, which was affirmed by the High Court. However, there will be no order as to costs.5.InRajinder Singh Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation          (W.P (C) 8135/2006) decided by Honble High Court on   11.09.2014, again the petitioner was implicated in a criminal case and was charged for committing offence underSection 279and304Aof Indian Penal Code. On being convicted and sentenced with penalty of rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.4500 in the criminal case, he was dismissed from service. The plea raised by the petitioner in the Industrial Dispute was that the disciplinary action could have been taken against him only after disposal of his appeal against the conviction and the stringent penalty like termination/dismissal should not have been imposed upon him. Honble High Court rejected his appeal.6.	 In Jage Ram Vs.  Delhi Transport Corporation (W.P. (C) 1883/1996), the main thrust of the argument of the counsel for petitioner was that in the absence of disciplinary proceedings, his termination amounted to retrenchment underSection 2 (00)of the ID Act and was illegal.  In the said case also, the issue raised before Honble High Court was, whether the removal from service of Shri Jage Ram was illegal and unjustified. Thus in none of the aforementioned cases, the issue, whether on reversal of    the    conviction   order   in the criminal appeal, the 
penalty order based on conviction order need to be revisited or not was the issue before the Honble Supreme Court and High Court.7.	In OA No.3785/2010 (Inderjeet Singh Vs. DTC) decided by this Tribunal in terms of order dated  19.11.2010  issue involved was, when in appeal preferred against the conviction, the order of Trial court was set asided, whether on reinstatement the employee was entitled to back-wages or not. For easy reference, the brief order is reproduced hereinbelow:-Applicant has challenged order dated 11.8.2010 whereby he has been denied back wages. He has sought a direction to the respondent to pay him back wages and suspension allowance etc. for the period from 23.7.2002 till reinstatement with interest.2. The brief facts, as stated by the applicant are that he was appointed as Driver with the respondent DTC on 15.10.1989 and was allotted badge No.17896. In 1998, an FIR was lodged against him and his brothers on 24.6.1998 and he was arrested. Applicant was placed under suspension w.e.f. 25.6.1998. He was released from jail on 1.12.1999. Accordingly, his suspension was revoked w.e.f. 12.01.2000 vide order dated 11.01.2000. He joined duty.3.  Finally, Sessions Court convicted the applicant to undergo 10 years of rigorous imprisonment vide judgment dated 23.07.2000. Being aggrieved, he filed an appeal before the Honble High Court which was admitted. He informed the respondents about his conviction and filing of an appeal vide letter dated 04.10.2002.4. At this stage, respondent gave him a show cause notice dated 30.04.2004 as to why he should not be dismissed. He replied that since his appeal was pending, no action could be taken against him in terms of office order No.201 dated 24.11.1954 till his appeal was decided.5. Ignoring the office order, the applicant was dismissed from service vide order dated 20.05.2004 w.e.f. 23.07.2003 (page 18). The criminal appeal was allowed by the Honble High Court vide judgment dated 22.11.2004 and the applicant was acquitted. He accordingly informed DTC about his acquittal vide letter dated 06.12.2004 with a request to reinstate him in service. No order was passed so he was constrained to file Writ Petition No.22777/2005 for    being    reinstated.    During the pendency of the Writ 
Petition, respondent issued order dated 5.6.2007 whereby he was reinstated without back wages. In the meantime Writ Petition was transferred to the Tribunal and the Writ Petition was remembered as T.A. No. 1286/2009. The T.A. was disposed of with liberty to the applicant to challenge order dated 5.6.2007 vide order dated 12.8.2009.6. In view of the above the applicant filed OA No. 2722/2009 for challenging order dated 5.6.2007. The said order was quashed vide order dated 3.3.2010 by directing the respondents to pass a reasoned order for the period of suspension and from dismissal to the date of reinstatement after putting him on notice.7. The respondents issued show cause notice dated 8.6.2010 which was replied to by the applicant on 23.6.2010. Applicant had specifically taken the plea that since his appeal was still pending, he could not have been removed from service in view of Office Order dated 24.11.1954. His representation has been rejected vide order dated 11.8.2010 on the ground that Office Order dated 24.11.1954 was not applicable because he was not convicted for any fatal accident/mis-happening during the course of his employment duty but was arrested in FIR No.76/1998 at P.S. Jafferpur Kalan, New Delhi on the allegation of murder and was sent to jail. He remained in jail from 23.7.2002 to 22.11.2004. Immediately after his conviction, he was again arrested and remained behind the bars till his appeal was allowed, as such he could not have rendered any service to the corporation.8. As far as the suspension period from 25.6.1998 to June, 1999 and July, 1999 to 11.1.2000 is concerned, subsistence allowance of Rs.52,287/- has already been paid as per Clause 15 (4) sub-clause (a) of DRTA (Condition of Appointment & Services) Regulation. They also clarified that the period, i.e., 23.7.2002 to 4.6.2007 shall be treated as not spent on duty and without back wages. However, it will not confirm break in service. The said period will not be counted for any pensionary benefits, fixation of pay, increment, ACP, promotion etc.9. It is this order which has been challenged by the applicant on the sole ground that since his appeal was pending, respondents could not have dismissed the applicant as per respondents own policy dated 24.11.1954.10. We have heard counsel for the applicant and perused the pleadings. Since applicants whole case is based on Office Order dated 24.11.1954, it would be necessary to quote the same. It reads as under:-DELHI ROAD TRANSPORT AUTHORITY
			SCINDIA HOUSE, NEW DELHI

		No.ADMI-8(1)/54 		Dated 24-11-1954

				OFFICE ORDER NO.201

		Sub.:	Procedure for disposal of cases in which DTC employees are prosecuted while on duty.The following instructions are issued for the information and guidance of staff:-Legal defence will continue to be provided by the management in all cases up to the lower court in accordance with the practice as at present.In cases where drivers are challenged on account of some defects or absence of some equipments in buses, legal defence will be provided upto and including the appeal stage. Where a driver is merely fined in such cases, it will be within the discretion of the management to allow the employees to go to the Higher Court or not.Fines imposed upon drivers in challan cases on account of some defects or lack of some equipments in buses, will be paid on the spot by the management through the traffic superintendents or traffic inspectors.The question of taking departmental action against an employee convicted by court will be taken up only after the employees appeal has been decided by the appellate court. In cases where the employees does not file an appeal, the question of taking departmental action will be considered on the expiry of the period fixed for filing appeal. If an employee, who has been convicted by a court desires to perform duty in this organization during the period between the decision of the lower court and the appellate court, he will be put on such duties as might be considered suitable by the General Manager. If, during this period, he is unable to attend duty on account of lock-up etc. or otherwise desires to take leave, he will be granted such leave including leave without pay as may be due to him in accordance with the provisions of D.R.T.A. (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952.The serious departmental action of termination of service will not be taken against a driver if he is convicted by the court for an offence which is committed by him for the first time during his service in this organization. This conviction will, however, be taken into consideration while deciding the nature of departmental action to be taken against him for a subsequent offence.    No   departmental   action will be 
taken against a driver who is convicted in an offence which is due to some defects or lack of some equipment in a bus.Sd-B.K. LALL GENERAL MANAGER11. Perusal of above shows that Office Order relates to the cases where Drivers or employees are prosecuted while on duty. It is not a general circular for conviction in a criminal case outside the duty by a driver or employee of DTC. We, therefore, find no force in the argument of learned counsel for the applicant. Respondents have rightly observed that this Office Order would not apply to the facts of the case because applicant was not convicted due to any accident while on duty but for offence of murder. We, therefore, reject the sole ground taken by the counsel for the applicant. Applicant has not taken any other ground. He has also not disputed the fact that he has already been paid the subsistence allowance for the period of suspension and the he remained in jail throughout after he was convicted so naturally applicant could not have performed any duty while he was in jail. This aspect has already been dealt with by the Honble Supreme Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and Another reported in AIR 1997 SC 1802 by observing as follows:-The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is : Whether he is entitled to back wages? It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in his own backdrops. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages.This view has been followed by Honble Supreme Court inUnion of India and Others Vs. Jaipal Singhreported in 2004 (1) SCC 121 by observing as follows:-We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Ranchhodji (1996 (11) SCC 603). If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest    or     by    department  itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial Court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing re-instatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be re-instated, in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court in so far as it directed payment of back wages are liable to be and is hereby set aside.12. These judgments have been referred to in the impugned order. No effort was made by the counsel for the applicant to distinguish his case from these judgments, therefore, this case being fully covered by the above judgments is dismissed at the admission stage itself. No costs.

Thus, none of the aforementioned orders relied upon by the counsel for respondents are relevant to the issue involved in the present case.  As far as the plea  of limitation raised on behalf of 
respondents is concerned, the same could be relevant only to the issue of challenge to the termination order dated 20.05.2002, as the same was passed about a decade before filing of  the present OA.  Nevertheless, the said order passed in the given circumstances cannot be found suffering from any infirmity.  The only right accrued in favour  of  the  applicant, as a result of the order passed by Honble Punjab and Haryana High Court is that the disciplinary authority needs to revisit the order of termination.  Such is the view taken by Honble Supreme Court inUnion of India Vs. V.K.Bhaskar(1997) (11) SCC 383). In the said case, it could be ruled that if the Government servant-accused is acquitted on appeal or other proceedings, the penalty order can always be revisited.Nevertheless, at the same time, as has been ruled in the case ofSushil Kumar Singhal Vs. The Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank (JT2010) 8 SCC 233), it is the misconduct of the convicted employee that leads to his dismissal, thus while revisiting the order of dismissal/termination based on conviction, the authority competent to do so may always keep in view the charges leveled against the employee in the criminal case.8.	The aforementioned order passed by Honble Supreme Court was followed by this Tribunal in OA No.4236/2012 (Rajesh Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhithrough Chief Secretary and Ors) decided on 12.02.2015. The relevant excerpt of the order of this Tribunal read thus:-5.	We heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. It is not in dispute that the respondents had dismissed the service of the applicant under Rule 9 (1) of  CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, i.e. in view of his conduct which led  to his conviction and no independent inquiry was held.Admittedly, the order of conviction has been set asided.  As has been viewed by Honble Supreme Court inUnion of India Vs. V.K.Bhaskar(1997 (11) SCC 383) relied upon by Ms. Rashmi Chopra, counsel for respondents, once the Government servant-accused is acquitted on appeal or other proceedings, the order of dismissal can always be revisited and if the Government servant is reinstated, he will be entitled to all the benefits to which he would have been entitled to had he continued in service.  Para 4 of the judgment read thus:-4. Rule 19(1 of the Rules is based on clause (a) of the proviso to sub-article (2 ofArticle 311of the Constitution.Construing the said proviso toArticle 311(2, this court, in Deputy Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) v. S. Nagoor Meera, has held:"This clause, it is relevant to notice, speaks of 'conduct which has led his conviction on a criminal charge'. It does not speak of sentence or punishment awarded. Merely because the sentence is suspended and/or the accused is released on bail, the conviction does not cease to be operative.Section 389of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 empowers the appellate court to order that pending the appeal 'the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond'. Section 389(1), it may be noted, speaks of suspending 'the execution of the sentence or order', it does not expressly speak of suspension of conviction.*

We are, therefore, of the opinion that taking proceedings for and passing orders of dismissal, removal of reduction in rank of a government servant who has been convicted by a criminal court is not barred merely because the sentence or order is suspended by the appellate court or on the ground that the said government servant-accused has been released on bail pending the appeal.The Tribunal seems to be of the opinion that until the appeal against the conviction is disposed of, action under clause (a) of the second proviso toArticle 311(2 is not permissible.We see no basis or justification for the said view. The more appropriate course in all such cases is to take action under clause (a) of the second proviso toArticle 311(2 once a government servant is convicted of a criminal chargeand not to wait for the appeal or revision, as the case may be. If, however, the government servant-accused is acquitted on appeal or other proceeding, the order can always be revised and if the government servant is reinstated, he will be entitled   to   all the  benefits to which he would have 
been entitled to had he continued in service. The other course suggested, viz., to wait till the appeal, revision and other remedies are over, would not be advisable since it would mean continuing in service a person who   has been convicted of a serious offence by a criminal court. It should be remembered that the action under clause (a) of the second proviso toArticle 311(2 will be taken only where the conduct which has led to his conviction is such that it deserves any of the three major punishments mentioned in Article 311(2).*                        *               *

What is really relevant thus is the conduct of the government servant which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Now, in this case, the respondent has been found guilty of corruption by a criminal court. Until the said conviction is set aside by the appellate or other higher court, it may not be advisable to retain such person in service. As stated, above, if he succeeds in appeal or other proceeding, the matter can always be reviewed in such a manner that he suffers no prejudice."The argument put forth by the learned counsel for applicant that it is the conduct of the delinquent which led to his conviction and not the conviction itself is supported by the view taken by Honble Supreme Court in the case ofSushil Kumar Singhal Vs. The Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank (JT2010 (8) SC 233), the relevant excerpt of which read as under:-27.  In view of the above, we reach the conclusion that once a Criminal Court grant a delinquent employee the benefit of Act, 1958, its order does not have any bearing so far as the service of such employee is concerned. The word disqualification inSection 12of the Act, 1958 provides that such a person shall not stand disqualified for the purpose of other Acts like theRepresentation of the People Act, 1950etc.

	The conviction in a criminal case is one part of the case and release on probation is another. Therefore, grant of benefit of the provision of Act, 1958, only enables the delinquent not to undergo the sentence on showing his good conduct during the period of probation. In case, after being released, the delinquent commits another offence, benefit of Act, 1958 get terminated and the delinquent can be made liable to undergo the sentence. Therefore, in case of an employee who stands convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude, it is his misconduct that leads to his dismissal.
			xxx               xx7. In view of the aforementioned, we dispose of the present OA with direction to appellate authority to revisit its order in the wake of the order passed by Honble High Court of Delhi in criminal appeal No. 487/2011 (ibid), as expeditiously as possible preferable within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. While doing so, the appellate authority would keep in view the aforementioned judicial pronouncements. No costs.9.	 In view of the aforementioned, the OA is disposed of with direction to respondents to decide the representation dated 29.07.2013 made by the applicant (Annexure-B) as expeditiously as possible preferably within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.  It is made clear that while adjudicating the representation, the authority will not go into the correctness of the order dated 5.08.2002, as in the given circumstances, the order was correctly passed. The representation would be examined only to the limited extent of revisiting the said order in the wake of the order passed by Honble High Court in appeal. While doing so, the concerned authority will keep in view the charge against the applicant in the criminal case and his conduct in the said case. No cost.(Ashok Kumar)					         (A.K.Bhardwaj)
          Member (A)					           Member (J)

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