ParliamentParliamentary oversight of intelligence agenciesAnirudh- July 8, 2010"Parliamentary approval of the creation, mandate and powers of security agencies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for upholding the rule of law. A legal foundation increases the legitimacy both of the existence of these agencies and the (often exceptional) powers that they possess." Though mechanisms for ensuring accountability of the executive to the Parliament are in place for most aspects of government in India, such mechanisms are completely absent for the oversight of intelligence agencies. In India, various intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing, and the Intelligence Bureau are creations of administrative orders, and are not subject to scrutiny by Parliament. This is in direct contrast to the practise of the Legislature's oversight of intelligence agencies in most countries.  Though different countries have different models of exercising such oversight, the common principle - that activities of intelligence agencies should be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, remains uniform. In the US for example, both the House and the Senate have a Committee which exercises such scrutiny.  These are House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, established in 1977, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, created in 1976.  Both committees have broad powers over the intelligence community.  They oversee budgetary appropriations as well as legislation on this subject.  In addition, the House Committee can do something which the Senate can not:  “tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities.”  This gives the Committee the power to look into actual tactical intelligence, and not just broader policy issues.  Intelligence agencies are also governed by a variety of laws which clearly lay out a charter of responsibilities, as well as specific exemptions allowing such agencies to do some things other government agencies ordinarily cannot. (For source,click here) In UK, the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 set up a similar framework for intelligence organisations in the UK, and also set up a mechanism for legislative oversight.  The Act set up a Committee which should consists mostly of Members of Parliament.  The members are appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of opposition, and the Committee reports to the Prime Minister.  The Prime Minister is required to present the report of the Committee before Parliament. (For the Act,click here) Recently, the Committee has expressed concerns in its 2009-10 report over the fact that it is financially dependent on the Prime Minister's office, and that there could be a conflict of interest considering it is practically a part of   the government over which it is supposed to express oversight. (For the report,click here) A study titled "Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice" captures the best components of Parliamentary oversight of intelligence bodies.  Some of these are:The entire intelligence community, including all ancillary departments and officials, should be covered by the mandate of one or more parliamentary oversight bodies.The mandate of a parliamentary oversight body might include some or all of the following (a) legality, (b) efficacy, (c) efficiency, (d) budgeting and accounting; (e) conformity with relevant human rights Conventions (f) policy/administrative aspects of the intelligence services.The recommendations and reports of the parliamentary oversight body should be (a) published; (b) debated in parliament; (c) monitored with regard to its implementation by the government and intelligence community.The resources and legal powers at the disposal of the parliamentary oversight body should match the scope of its mandate.Parliament should be responsible for appointing and, where necessary, removing members of a body exercising the oversight function in its name.Representation on parliamentary oversight bodies should be cross-party, preferably in accordance with the strengths of the political parties in parliament.Government ministers should be debarred from membership (and parliamentarians should be required to step down if they are appointed as ministers) or the independence of the committee will be compromised. The same applies to former members of agencies overseen.The oversight body should have the legal power to initiate investigations; Members of oversight bodies should have unrestricted access to all information which is necessary for executing their oversight tasks.The oversight body should have power to subpoena witnesses and to receive testimony under oath.The oversight body should take appropriate measures and steps in order to protect information from unauthorised disclosure.The committee should report to parliament at least yearly or as often as it deems necessary.The oversight body should have access to all relevant budget documents, provided that safeguards are in place to avoid leaking of classified information.ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»