ConstitutionRethinking judicial appointments: Collegium vs. CommissionPrianka Rao- October 16, 2015Earlier today, the Supreme Court struck down the two Acts that created an independent body for the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. One of the Acts amended the Constitution to replace the method of appointment of judges by a collegium system with that of an independent commission, called the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC).  The composition of the NJAC would include: (i) the Chief Justice of India (Chairperson) (ii) two other senior most judges of the Supreme Court, (iii) the Union Law Minister, and (iv) two eminent persons to be nominated by the Prime Minister, the CJI and the Leader of Opposition of the Lok Sabha.  The other Act laid down the processes in relation to such appointments. Both Acts were passed by Parliament in August 2014, and received Presidential assent in December 2014.  Following this, a batch of petitions that had been filed in Supreme Court challenging the two Bills on grounds of unconstitutionality, was referred to a five judge bench.  It was contended that the presence of executive members in the NJAC violated the independence of the judiciary. In its judgement today, the Court held that the executive involvement in appointment of judges impinges upon the independence of the judiciary.  This violates the principle of separation of powers between the executive and judiciary, which is a basic feature of the Constitution.  In this context, we examine the proposals around the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary.Appointment of judges before the introduction of the NJACThe method of appointment of the Chief Justice of India, SC and HC judges was laid down in the Constitution.[i]The Constitution stated that the President shall make these appointments after consulting with the Chief Justice of India and other SC and HC judges as he considers necessary.  Between the years 1982-1999, the issue of method of appointment of judges was examined and reinterpreted by the Supreme Court.  Since then, a collegium, consisting of the Chief Justice of India and 4 other senior most SC judges, made recommendations for persons to be appointed as SC and HC judges, to the President.[ii]Recommendations of various bodies for setting up an independent appointments commissionOver the decades, several high level Commissions have examined this method of appointment of judges to the higher judiciary.  They have suggested that an independent body be set up to make recommendations for such appointments.  However, they differed in the representation of the judiciary, legislature and executive in making such appointments.  These are summarised below.Table 1: Comparison of various recommendations on the composition of a proposed appointments bodyRecommendatory BodySuggested composition2ndAdministrative Reforms Commission (2007)Judiciary: CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state]Executive: Vice-President (Chairperson), PM, Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state]Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leaders of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament.Other: No representative.National Advisory Council (2005)Judiciary: CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state]Executive:Vice-President (Chairman), PM (or nominee), Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state]Legislature:Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament.Other:No representative.NCRWC (2002)Judiciary:CJI (Chairman), two senior most SC judgesExecutive: Union Law MinisterLegislature: No representativeOther: one eminent personLaw Commission (1987)Judiciary: CJI (Chairman), three senior most SC judges, immediate predecessor of the CJI, three senior most CJs of HCs, [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state]Executive: Law Minister, Attorney General of India, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state]Legislature: No representativeOther: One Law academicSources: 121stReport of the Law Commission, 1987; Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002; A Consultation Paper on Superior Judiciary, NCRWC, 2001;  A National Judicial Commission-Report for discussion in the National Advisory Council, 2005; Fourth Report of the 2ndAdministrative Reforms Commission (ARC), ‘Ethics in Governance’, 2007; PRS. It may be noted that the Law Commission, in its 2008 and 2009 reports, suggested that Government should seek a reconsideration of the judgments in the Three Judges cases.  In the alternative, Parliament should pass a law restoring the primacy of the CJI, while ensuring that the executive played a role in making judicial appointments.Appointments process in different countriesInternationally, there are varied methods for making appointments of judges to the higher judiciary.  The method of appointment of judges to the highest court, in some jurisdictions, is outlined in Table 2.Table2: Appointment of judges to the highest court in different jurisdictionsCountryMethod of Appointment to the highest courtWho is involved in making the appointmentsUKSC judges are appointed by a five-person selection commission.It consists of the SC President, his deputy, and one member each appointed by the JACs of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.[iii](The JACs comprise lay persons, members of the judiciary and the Bar and make appointments of judges of lower courts.)CanadaAppointments are made by the Governor in Council.[iv]A selection panel comprising five MPs (from the government and the opposition) reviews list of nominees and submits 3 names to the Prime Minister.[v]USAAppointments are made by the President.Supreme Court Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the United States Senate.[vi]GermanyAppointments are made by election.Half the members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the executive and half by the legislature.[vii]FranceAppointments are made by the President.President receives proposals for appointments from Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature.[viii]Sources: Constitutional Reform Act, 2005; Canada Supreme Court Act, 1985; Constitution of the United States of America; Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany; Constitution of France; PRS. In delivering its judgment that strikes down the setting up of an NJAC, the Court has stated that it would schedule hearings from November 3, 2015 regarding ways in which the collegium system can be strengthened.[i]Article 124, Constitution of India (Prior to 2015 Amendments)[ii]S.P. Guptavs. Union of India, AIR 1982, SC 149; S.C. Advocates on Record Associationvs.Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268;In re:Special Reference, AIR 1999 SC 1.[iii].  Schedule 8, Constitutional Reform Act, 2005.[iv].  Section 4(2), Supreme Court Act (RSC, 1985).[v].  Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the retirement of Justice Morris Fish,http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/04/23/statement-prime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-morris-fish.[vi].  Article II, Section 2, The Constitution of the United States of America.[vii].  Article 94 (1), Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.[viii]Article 65, Constitution of France,http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_oct2009.pdf.ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»