Gujarat High CourtRahul Hareshbhai Parmar vs State Of Gujarat on 17 July, 2018Author:A.J. ShastriBench:A.J. ShastriC/SCA/8694/2018                                        JUDGMENT




            IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

             R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8694 of 2018


FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.J. SHASTRI

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1     Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to
      see the judgment ?

2     To be referred to the Reporter or not ?

3     Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
      judgment ?

4     Whether this case involves a substantial question of law
      as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any
      order made thereunder ?

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                           RAHUL HARESHBHAI PARMAR
                                    Versus
                              STATE OF GUJARAT
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Appearance:
MR PB GOSWAMI(3377) for the PETITIONER(s) No. 1
MS ASMITA PATEL, AGP for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 3
RULE SERVED BY DS(65) for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 1,2
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    CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.J. SHASTRI

                                Date : 17/07/2018

                               ORAL JUDGMENT1.     Heard   learned   advocates   appearing   for   the 
respective parties.2.     The   present   petition   is   directed   against   order 
of detention dated 21.2.2018 passed by the respondentPage 1 of 10C/SCA/8694/2018                             JUDGMENT- detaining authority in exercise of powers conferred 
undersection 3(2)of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti 
Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short "the Act") by 
detaining the petitioner - detenue as defined undersection 2(c)of the Act.3.   Learned   advocate   for   the   detenue   submits   that 
the   order   of   detention   impugned   in   this   petition 
deserves to be quashed and set aside on the ground of 
registration of four offences underSections 379and114of the Indian Penal Code by itself cannot bring 
the   case   of   the   detenue   within   the   purview   of 
definition undersection  2(c)of the Act.   Further, 
learned advocate for the detenue submits that illegal 
activity likely to be carried out or alleged to have 
been carried out, as alleged, cannot have any nexus 
or bearing with the maintenance of public order and 
at the most, it can be said to be breach of law and 
order.     Further,   except   statement   of   witnesses, 
registration   of   above   FIR/s   and   Panchnama   drawn   in 
pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and 
cogent material is on record connecting alleged anti­
social activity of the detenue with breach of public 
order.   Learned advocate for the petitioner further 
submits that it is not possible to hold on the basis 
of the facts of the present case that activity of the 
detenue   with   respect   to   the   criminal   cases   had 
affected even tempo of the society causing threat to 
the   very   existence   of   normal   and   routine   life   of 
people   at   large   or   that   on   the   basis   of   criminal 
cases,   the   detenue  had   put   the   entire   social 
apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for wholePage 2 of 10C/SCA/8694/2018                              JUDGMENT




system to exist as a system governed by rule of law 
by disturbing public order.4.   Learned   AGP   for   the   respondent   State   supported 
the   detention   order   passed   by   the   authority   and 
submitted  that   sufficient  material   and   evidence   was 
found during the course of investigation, which was 
also supplied to the detenue indicate that detenue is 
in   habit   of   indulging   into   the   activity   as   defined 
undersection  2(c)of   the   Act   and   considering   the 
facts   of   the   case,   the   detaining   authority   has 
rightly passed the order of detention and detention 
order deserves to be upheld by this Court.5.   Having   heard   learned   advocates   for   the   parties 
and   considering   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the 
case,   it   appears   that   the   subjective   satisfaction 
arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said 
to   be   legal,   valid   and   in   accordance   with   law, 
inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR/s cannot 
have any baring on the public order as required under 
the Act and other relevant penal laws are sufficient 
enough   to   take   care   of   the   situation   and   that   the 
allegations as have been levelled against the detenue 
cannot   be   said   to   be   germane   for   the   purpose   of 
bringing   the   detenue   within   the   meaning   ofsection 
2(c)of the Act.   Unless and until, the material is 
there to make out a case that the person has become a 
threat and menace to the Society so as to disturb the 
whole   tempo   of   the   society   and   that   all   social 
apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the 
instance of such person, it cannot be said that thePage 3 of 10C/SCA/8694/2018                             JUDGMENT




detenue   is   a   person   within   the   meaning   ofsection 
2(c)of the Act.  Except general statements, there is 
no material on record which shows that the detenue is 
acting   in  such   a  manner,   which   is  dangerous   to  the 
public order.6.   Further, The essential concept of the preventive 
detention is that the detention of a person is not to 
punish him for something he has done but to prevent 
him   from   doing   it.   The   basis   of   detention   is   the 
satisfaction   of   the   executive   of   a   reasonable 
probability of the likelihood of the detenu acting in 
a manner similar to his past acts and preventing him 
by   detention   from   doing   the   same.   A   criminal 
conviction   on  the   other   hand   is  for  an   act  already 
done which can only be possible by a trial and legal 
evidence.   There   is   no   parallel   between   the 
prosecution in a Court of law and a detention order 
under the Act. One is a punitive action and the other 
is a preventive act. In one case a person is punished 
to prove on proof of his guilt and the standard  is 
proof   beyond   the   reasonable   doubt   whereas   in   the 
preventive   detention   a   man   is   prevented   from   doing 
something which it is necessary for reasons mentioned 
insection 3of the Act to prevent.7.   The   power   of   preventive   detention   is 
qualitatively different from punitive detention. The 
power   of   preventive   detention   is   a   precautionary 
power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may orPage 4 of 10C/SCA/8694/2018                             JUDGMENT



may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel 
proceeding.   It   does   not   over   lap   with   prosecution 
even   if   it   relies   on   certain   facts   for   which 
prosecution   may   be   launched   or   may   have   been 
launched.   An   order   of   preventive   detention,   may   be 
made before or during prosecution. An
order   of   preventive   detention   may   be   made   with   or 
without   prosecution   and   in   anticipation   or   after 
discharge   or   even   acquittal.   The   pendency   of 
prosecution   is   no   bar   to   an   order   of   preventive 
detention. An order of preventive detention is also 
not a bar to prosecution.8.   The Supreme Court on several occasions examined 
the concepts of "law and order" and "public Order". 
Immediately after the Constitution came into force, a 
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case 
ofBrij   Bhushan   &   Another   v.   The   State   of   Delhi, 
(1950) SCR 605 dealt with a case pertaining to public 
order.   The   court   observed   that   "public   order"   may 
well   be   paraphrased   in   the   context   as   "public 
tranquility".8.1 Another   celebrated   Constitution   Bench   judgment 
of the Supreme Court is in the case ofRomesh Thappar 
v. The State of Madras, (1950) SCR 594. In this case, 
Romesh   Thappar,   a   printer,   publisher   and   editor   of 
weekly journal in English called Cross Roads printed 
and published in Bombay was detained under theMadras 
Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. The detention 
order was challenged directly in the Supreme Court ofPage 5 of 10C/SCA/8694/2018                            JUDGMENT



India by filing a writ petition underArticle 32of 
the Constitution. The allegation was that the detenu 
circulated   documents   to   disturb   the   public 
tranquility and to create disturbance of public order 
and tranquility.The Supreme Court observed:­

      "...   `Public   order'   is   an   expression   of   wide 
      connotation   and   signifies   that   state   of 
      tranquillity   which   prevails   among   the   members 
      of a political society as a result of internal 
      regulations   enforced   by   the   Government   which 
      they have established .... ... it must be taken 
      that `public safety' is used as a part of the 
      wider concept of public order ..... "9.   The distinction between "public order" and "law 
and  order"   has   been   carefully   defined   in   a 
Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in 
the case ofDr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & 
Others,   (1966)   1   SCR   709.   In   this   judgment,   His 
Lordship   Hidayatullah,   J.   by   giving   various 
illustrations clearly defined the "public order" and 
"law   and   order".   Relevant   portion   of   the   judgment 
reads thus:"....Does the expression "public order" take in 
      every kind of disorder or only some? The answer 
      to   this   serves   to   distinguish   "public   order"from   "law   and   order"   because   the   latter 
      undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order 
      if   disturbed,   must   lead   to   public   disorder. 
      Every   breach   of   the   peace   does   not   lead   to 
      public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and 
      fight   there   is   disorder   but   not   public 
      disorder.   They   can   be   dealt   with   under   the 
      powers to maintain law and order but cannot bePage 6 of 10C/SCA/8694/2018                              JUDGMENT



      detained   on   the   ground   that   they   were 
      disturbing   public   order.   Suppose   that   the   two 
      fighters   were   of   rival   communities   and   one   of 
      them   tried   to   raise   communal   passions.   The 
      problem   is   still   one   of   law   and   order   but   it 
      raises   the   apprehension   of   public   disorder. 
      Other   examples   can   be   imagined.   The 
      contravention   of   law   always   affects   order   but 
      before  it can  be said  to affect  public   order, 
      it must  affect  the  community   or the public   at 
      large.   A   mere   disturbance   of   law   and   order 
      leading   to   disorder   is   thus   not   necessarily 
      sufficient   for   action   under   theDefence   of 
      India   Actbut   disturbances   which   subvert   the 
      public   order   are.   A   District   Magistrate   is 
      entitled to take action under Rule 30(l)(b) to 
      prevent   subversion   of   public   order   but   not   in 
      aid   of   maintenance   of   law   and   order   under 
      ordinary circumstances.It will thus appear that just as "public order"in   the   rulings   of   this   Court   (earlier   cited) 
      was   said   to   comprehend   disorders   of   less 
      gravity   than   those   affecting   "security   of 
      State",   "law   and   order"   also   comprehends 
      disorders of less gravity than those affecting 
      "public   order".   One   has   to   imagine   three 
      concentric   circles.   Law   and   order   represents 
      the   largest   circle   within   which   is   the   next 
      circle   representing   public   order   and   the 
      smallest   circle   represents   security   of   State. 
      It is then easy to see that an act may affect 
      law and order but not public order just as an 
      act may affect public order but not security of 
      the State...."10.In   Darpan   Kumar   Sharma   aliasDharban   Kumar 
Sharma v.  State of T.N. and others, reported in AIR 
2003   SC   971,   the   Supreme   Court   made   the   following 
observations :"The   basis   upon   which   the   petitioner   has   been 
      detained  in the instant case is that he robbed 
      one   Kumar   at   the   point   of   knife   a   sum   ofPage 7 of 10C/SCA/8694/2018                             JUDGMENT



      Rs.1000/­. Any disorderly behaviour of a person 
      in   the   public   or   commission   of   a   criminal 
      offence   is   bound,   to   some   extent,   affect   the 
      peace   prevailing   in   the   locality   and   it   may 
      also affect law and order but the same need not 
      affect   maintenance   of   public   order.   Under   the 
      definitions   in   the   Act   it   is   stated   that   the 
      case of 'Goonda' the acts prejudicial to public 
      order   are   'when   he   is   engaged,   or   is   making 
      preparations   for   engaging,   in   any   of   his 
      ativities   as   a   goonda   which   affect   adversely, 
      or   are   likely   to   affect   adversely,   the 
      maintenance   of   public   order'.   The   question 
      whether   a   man   has   only   committed   a   breach   of 
      law and order or has acted in a manner likely 
      to cause disturbance  of the public  order is a 
      question of degree and the extent of the reach 
      of   the   act   upon   the   society;   that   a   solitary 
      assault on one individual can hardly be said to 
      disturb   public   peace   or   place   public   order   in 
      jeopardy   so   as   to   bring   the   case   within   the 
      purview   of   the   Act   providing   for   preventive 
      detention."11. Thus, from the various decisions of the Supreme 
Courtreferred to above, it could easily be said that 
the   detaining   authority   has   failed   to   substantiate 
that the alleged antisocial activities of the detenu 
affect   adversely   or   are   likely   to   affect   adversely 
the   maintenance   of   public   order.   It   is   true   that 
there is a very thin line between the question of law 
and order situation and a public order situation, and 
some times, the acts of a person relating to law and 
order   situation   can   turn   into   a  question   of   public 
order situation. What is decisive for determining the 
connection   of   ground   of   detention   with   the 
maintenance of public order, the object of detention, 
is not an intrinsic quality of the act but rather itsPage 8 of 10C/SCA/8694/2018                              JUDGMENT



latent   potentiality.   Therefore,   for   determining 
whether the ground of detention is relevant for the 
purposes of public order or not, merely an objective 
test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would 
not be a safe guide. The potentiality of the act has 
to   be   examined   in   the   light   of   the   surrounding 
circumstances,   posterior   and   anterior.   Just   because 
one   case   has   been   registered   against   the   detenu   of 
the   offence   underSection   324of   the   Indian   Penal 
Code and two in­camera statements have been recorded 
of   the   witnesses   whose   identity   has   not   been 
disclosed, by itself do not have any bearing on the 
maintenance   of   the   public   order.   The   detenu   may   be 
punished   for   the   offence   which   has   been   registered 
against   him   but,   surely,   the   acts   constituting   the 
offence   cannot   be   said   to   have   affected   the   even 
tempo of the life of the community.12. Thus,   in   the   overall   view   of   the   matter,   I   am 
convinced that the detention of the petitioner is not 
in   accordance   with   law   and   the   order   of   detention 
deserves to be quashed and set aside.13. In   view   of   above,   I   am   inclined   to   allow   this 
petition,   because   simplicitor   registration   of   FIR/s 
by  itself  cannot   have  any   nexus   with   the  breach  of 
maintenance of public order and the authority cannot 
have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and 
cogent   material   exists   for   invoking   power   undersection 3(2)of the Act.  In the result, the present 
petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order ofPage 9 of 10C/SCA/8694/2018                         JUDGMENT




detention   No.PCB/DTN/PASA/146/2018  dated  21.2.2018 
passed   by   the   respondent   -   detaining   authority   is 
hereby quashed and set aside.  The detenue is ordered 
to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any 
other case.14. Rule   is   made   absolute   accordingly.     Direct 
service today is permitted.(A.J. SHASTRI, J)
V.J. SATWARAPage 10 of 10