Orissa High CourtMilu @ Rashmi Ranjan Jena vs State Of Odisha on 31 October, 2022Author:Chittaranjan DashBench:Chittaranjan DashIN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK\n\n                      CRLA No. 23 of 2014\n\nMilu @ Rashmi Ranjan Jena                    ....            Appellant\n\n                                 -versus-\nState of Odisha                              ....          Respondent\n\nAdvocates appeared in the cases:\n\nFor Appellant                :              Mr. Bikram Chandra Ghadei\n                                                            Advocate\n\nFor Respondent               :                   Mrs. Saswata Patnaik\n                                     Additional Government Advocate\n\n CORAM:\n THE CHIEF JUSTICE\n JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH\n\n                           JUDGMENT31.10.2022\n Dr. S. Muralidhar, CJ.1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 17th December\n 2013, passed by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Puri in\n S.T. Case No.37/365 of 2013/2012, convicting the Appellant for\n the offence punishable underSection 376of Indian Penal Code\n (IPC) and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI)\n for seven years with a fine of Rs.5000/- and in default to undergo\n RI for a period of six months and further convicting the Appellant\n for the offence punishable underSection 302of IPC and\n sentencing him to undergo RI for life with a fine of Rs.5000/- and\n in default to undergo RI for six months. Both the sentences were\n directed to run concurrently.CRLA No.23 of 2014                                    Page 1 of 172. By the impugned judgment, the trial Court found the Appellant\nguilty of raping and murdering by setting on fire an adolescent\nminor girl of 15 years.3. The case of the prosecution as spoken to by Ranjana Swain\n(PW-1), the mother of the deceased, was that the deceased was in\nfriendly terms with the Appellant which was disapproved by the\nfamily members of the deceased. They asked the deceased to\ndiscontinue her relationship with the Appellant despite which, the\ndeceased was stated to be still seeing him.4. Further the case of the prosecution as spoken to by PW-1 was\nthat in the night of 10th May, 2012 at around 2 am, when the\ndeceased was sleeping with her grandmother in a room which was\nadjacent to the room in which PW-1 was sleeping with her\nhusband, Nimai Swain (PW-4), the Appellant entered the house\nand called the deceased away. He is stated to have sexually\nassaulted her inside the mill. On her insisting that if the Appellant\nrefused to marry her she would disclose the fact before the family\nmembers, the Appellant is stated to have poured kerosene kept in\na jerry can in the mill and set the deceased on fire.5. Hearing the shouts of the deceased, Pabitra Kumar Swain (PW-5) and Rinku Swain (PW-6) rushed to the mill as they were out to\nattend nature's call at that time. According to them, the rice mill\n(huller) was about 35 cubits from where they were. By the time\nthey reached there, they noticed the Appellant who gave PW-5 a\npush blow and escaped from the spot. PWs-5 and 6 immediatelyCRLA No.23 of 2014                                      Page 2 of 17tried to save the life of the deceased by pouring water on her\nbody. Thereafter, they shouted for help. Hearing their hullah,\nother family members living nearby came to the spot. They took\nthe deceased first to the house when she was still in a conscious\nstate and she disclosed before PWs 5, 6 and PW-1 that she had\nbeen called by the Appellant at the dead hour of the night to the\nrice huller, where he committed rape on her and when she insisted\nthat he should marry her, the Appellant sprinkled kerosene on her\nbody and set her on fire.6. PWs 5 and 6 arranged to take the deceased first to the hospital\nat Rebena Nuagaon and thereafter to the District Headquarters\nHospital (DHH), Puri where she was attended to by Dr.\nChintamani Tripathy (PW-8) in the burns ward. PW-8 is stated to\nhave recorded the dying declaration of the deceased at around 9\npm on 11th May, 2012. The deceased finally succumbed to the\nburn injuries and died on 13th May, 2012 around noon. Thereafter,\nher post-mortem was conducted by Dr. Susanta Kumar Panda\n(PW-9) who opined that the cause of death was due to septicaemia\nfrom anti-mortem burns which was more than 95%. It was at this\nstage that the vaginal swab was collected and sent for pathological\nexamination.7. Srikanta Kumar Tripathy (PW-10) was the Sub-Inspector of\nPolice (SI) attached to the Puri Sadar Police Station (PS), before\nwhom a written report was presented on 11th May, 2012. After\nregistering the FIR underSections 376/326/307of IPC, he took up\ninvestigation and in course thereof, on 15th May, 2012 effected theCRLA No.23 of 2014                                  Page 3 of 17arrest of the Appellant from village Sahanikera. After the receipt\nof the information of death of the deceased on 13th May 2012, the\noffence was converted toSection 302IPC apart fromSection 376IPC. Certain exhibits were collected from the spot and sent to the\nS.F.S.L., Rasulgarh for chemical examination. He also visited the\nSahanikera School and received an extract of the Admission\nRegister which showed the age of the victim/deceased to be 15\nyears old on the date of the incident.8. On completion of investigation, a charge sheet was laid against\nthe Appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. As\nmany as ten witnesses were examined on behalf of prosecution\nand for the defence; Dr. Badri Narayan Mishra (DW-1), who was\non duty as Medical Officer in the OPD/Casualty of DHH, Puri\nwas examined.9. On an analysis of the evidence, the trial Court came to the\nconclusion that the prosecution had proved the charges against the\nAppellant on both counts of offences i.e., underSections 302and376of IPC, beyond all reasonable doubt and proceeded to convict\nand sentence him as noted hereinbefore.10. The findings of the trial Court were as under:(i) The evidence of PWs 5 and 6 proved that the Appellant was\nlast seen with the deceased; while he was running away from the\nspot, he gave a push to PW-5;CRLA No.23 of 2014                                   Page 4 of 17(ii) From the version of PWs 2, 5 and 6, it was plain that the\nAppellant and the deceased were not the strangers to the mill\nbecause they had visited it often in the past;(iii) PW 2 stated that he had kept the jerrycan of kerosene near the\nelectric motor along with a match box and this was not unknown\nto the Appellant, since he had visited the mill on many occasions;(iv) Although PW 7, the nurse on duty was declared hostile, in her\nexamination-in-chief she admitted that on 11th May 2012, the\ndeceased had been admitted in the burns ward and that on that\ndate, PW-8 had recorded her dying declaration at 9 pm. Although\nshe denied her presence at the time of recording it, the fact of\nrecording of the dying declaration by PW-8 was admitted by her;(v) PW-8 in his cross-examination did admit that the deceased had\nsuffered 95% burns and was in a critical condition but he added\nthat he had recorded the statement of the deceased when she was\nconscious, although he did not make an endorsement on the body\nof the dying declaration that she was in a fit state of mind.Further, it was also not recorded in the question-answer form. The\nmother of the victim, i.e., PW-1, who was present throughout, was\nnot made a witness to the dying declaration. Since the victim\nsurvived for more than 48 hours thereafter, it could be presumed\nsafely that she was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the\ndying declaration;CRLA No.23 of 2014                                   Page 5 of 17(vi) The evidence of Dr. Badri Narayan Mishra (DW-1) did not\nweaken the case of the prosecution. He admitted the fact that he\nhad not mentioned in the bed head ticket about the state of\nconsciousness of the deceased and he also maintained studied\nsilence with regard to the nature of the burn injuries;(vii) The mere failure while PW-1 to disclose at the time of\nadmission of the deceased about her being raped and burnt would\nnot throw doubts of the truth of her version "as such she might\nhave thought it prudent being scared and scarred not to disclose\nthe same before the doctor in the earliest opportunity";(viii) The vaginal swab was sent nearly four days after the\noccurrence, when the entire body of the victim was completely\nburnt and, therefore, the pathological report with regard to the\npresence of spermatozoa in the vaginal swab "cannot be safely\naccepted";(ix) PW-9, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem, admitted\nthat he had not reflected in his report that there was a smell of\nkerosene in the body but, the fact that the deceased was burnt\nalive by the Appellant was evident from the statement of PW-1;(x) Although PWs-1 to 6 were related witnesses, it was unnatural\nto expect in an offence of this nature, witnesses other than close\nfamily members to be available to narrate what happened. Their\nevidence was fully corroborated by the medical evidence;CRLA No.23 of 2014                                    Page 6 of 1711. This Court has heard the submissions of Mr. Bikram Chandra\nGhadei, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant and Ms.\nSaswata Patnaik, learned Additional Government Advocate\n(AGA) for the State.12. Mr. Ghadei submitted that where there was no certification by\nthe doctor on the body of the dying declaration that the victim was\nconscious and in a fit state of mind to make the declaration, the\ntrial Court ought not to have accepted the dying declaration.\nReliance is placed on the decision inSurinder Kumar v. State of\nHaryana2011 SAR (Criminal) 972. The mother did not endorse\nthe dying declaration as a witness despite her presence\nthroughout. Further, with the deceased having suffered 95%\nburns, it was very unlikely that she was in a fit state of mind to\nmake any statement whatsoever. The dying declaration, therefore,\nought to be discarded.Reliance is placed on the decision inNallapati Sivaiah v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Guntur A.P.2007\nSAR (Criminal) 941.13. Mr. Ghadei submitted that there was no evidence whatsoever\nof the Appellant having committed rape on the deceased. In Ext-\n15, it had been stated that there was no sign of any recent physical\nintercourse or presence of any spermatozoa on the vaginal swab.\nAt the spot of occurrence, there were no burn marks. Mr. Gadhei\nsubmitted that from the evidence of DW-1, it appeared that the\ninformation given by the attendants of the deceased was that the\nburn had been caused by self-immolation by pouring kerosene at\nhome. It was submitted that the trial Court ought to have held thatCRLA No.23 of 2014                                   Page 7 of 17she committed suicide being depressed about the decision held in\nthe meeting in the evening hours that the deceased should not\nhave any further relationship with the Appellant.14. Mr. Gadhei submitted that since all the PWs were related\nwitnesses and inimical to the Appellant, their testimonies ought\nnot to be accepted. Their evidence was also not fully corroborated\nby the medical evidence. Therefore, it was unsafe to base the\nconviction of the Appellant on such evidence. Reliance is placed\non the decisions inState of Rajasthan v. Yusuf2009 SAR\n(Criminal) 677, Arun Bhanudas Pawar v. State of Maharashtra\n(2010) 45 OCR (SC)-494,Waikhom Yaima Singh v. State of\nManipur(2011) 49 OCR (SC)-609,Gopal Singh v. State of M.P.(2010) 46 OCR (SC)-739 andState of Orissa v. Tulu Dalabehera(2009) 44 OCR-800.15. Mrs. Saswata Patnaik, learned Additional Government\nAdvocate appearing for the State on the other hand, submitted that\nthe dying declaration was correctly recorded by PW-8, who being\na government servant was the attending doctor at the DHH, Puri.\nThere was no need for PW-8 to fabricate any evidence as he was\nnowhere concerned with either the deceased or the Appellant.\nReference was made to the Constitution Bench decision of the\nSupreme Court inLaxman v. State of Maharashtra(2002) 6 SCC\n710, which clarified that even in the absence of certification by\nthe doctor as to the mental status of the deceased, the dying\ndeclaration could be relied upon. It was submitted that the other\ndecisions cited by learned counsel for the Appellant wereCRLA No.23 of 2014                                  Page 8 of 17distinguishable on facts. In the present case, not only is the last\nseen evidence fully proved by PWs-5 and 6 but, PW-8 has proved\nthe dying declaration of the deceased and has also withstood the\ncross-examination of the defence in that regard. The medical\nevidence also has corroborated the dying declaration.16. The above submissions have been considered. The crucial\npiece of evidence in the present case is the dying declaration,\nmade by the deceased, naming the Appellant as the person who\nraped her and then set her on fire when she insisted that he should\nmarry her. The legal position in regard to the dying declaration\nhas been explained inSham Shankar Kankaria v. State of\nMaharashtra(2006) 13 SCC 165 as under:"10. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the\n      accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which\n      a person is on deathbed is so solemn and serene when he\n      is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is\n      the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement. It is\n      for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-\n      examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the\n      dying declaration be excluded it will result in\n      miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally\n      the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of\n      the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of\n      evidence.11. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great\n      weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no\n      power of cross- examination. Such a power is essential\n      for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be.\n      This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying\n      declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full\n      confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has\n      to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as\n      a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of\n      imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that theCRLA No.23 of 2014                                    Page 9 of 17deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear\n       opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once\n       the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and\n       voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction\n       without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid\n       down as an absolute rule of law that the dying\n       declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction\n       unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring\n       corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court\n       haslaid down inseveral judgments the principles\n       governing dying declaration, which could be summed up\n       as under as indicated inPaniben v. State of Gujarat(1992) 2 SCC 474 (SCC pp.480-8 1, para 18).(Emphasis supplied)(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that\n       dying declaration cannot be acted upon without\n       corroboration. (SeeMunnu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976)\n       3 SCC 104)(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is\n       true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without\n       corroboration. (SeeState of U. P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav(1985) 1 SCC 552 and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar\n       (1983) 1 SCC 211).(iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration\n       carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the\n       result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The\n       deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the\n       assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.\n       (SeeK. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor(1976) 3 SCC 618).(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not\n       be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (SeeRasheed Beg v. State of M.P.(1974) 4 SCC 264).(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could\n       never make any dying declaration the evidence with\n       regard to it is to be rejected. (SeeKake Singh v. State of\n       M.P.1981 Supp. SCC 25).CRLA No.23 of 2014                                     Page 10 of 17(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity\n      cannot form the basis of conviction. (SeeRam Manorath\n      v. State of U.P.(1981) 2 SCC 654).(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain\n      the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.\n      (SeeState of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati\n      Naidu, 1980 Supp SCC 455).(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is\n      not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the\n      statement itself guarantees truth. (SeeSurajdeo Ojha v.\n      State of Bihar1980 Supp SCC 769).(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether\n      deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying\n      declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where\n      the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and\n      conscious state to make the dying declaration, the\n      medical opinion cannot prevail. (SeeNanhau Ram v.\n      State of M.P., 1988 Supp SCC 152).(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the\n      version as given in the dying declaration, the said\n      declaration cannot be acted upon. (SeeState of U.P. v.\n      Madan Mohan, (1989) 3 SCC 390).(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the\n      nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time\n      must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying\n      declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable,\n      it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani\n      v.State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700)"17. The above legal position was reiterated inPuran Chand v.\nState of Haryana(2010) 6 SCC 566 and Panneerselvam v. State\nof Tamil Nadu (2008) 17 SCC 190.CRLA No.23 of 2014                                    Page 11 of 1718. In the present case, the dying declaration unequivocally and\nunambiguously points to the guilt of the Appellant on both counts\ni.e., for the offence underSection 376of IPC and of murder underSection 302of IPC. This is not a case where inconsistent dying\ndeclarations have been made by the deceased. The fact remains\nthat although she was burnt alive at around 2 am on 10th May,\n2012, she remained alive till the noon of 13th May, 2012, i.e., for\nwell over three days. Further, she remained alive for almost 48\nhours after the making of the dying declaration at 9 pm on 11th\nMay, 2012. Her state of mind to make the dying declaration has to\nbe assessed in the above background notwithstanding that she\nsuffered 95% burns.19. PW-8 is obviously an experienced doctor and was fully aware\nof the gravity of the situation as far as the making of the dying\ndeclaration was concerned. He clearly mentions "at the time of\nrecording the statement, though she was able to talk but was\nsuffering from severe pain". In his cross-examination, he\nmentioned inter alia as under:"4.....when I visited the patient at about 12.05 P.M. she\n       was in critical condition having 95% burn injuries and\n       was beyond my control. As such she was referred to\n       Cuttack medical. Throughout the treatment the mother\n       of the patient was present by her side and expressed her\n       inability to shift the patient to Cuttack hospital and\n       preferred to treat her at the Headquarters hospital, Puri.\n       There was 3 degrees of consciousness namely,\n       conscious, subconscious and non-conscious and usually\n       unconscious and sub-conscious state it can be safely\n       presumed that a person cannot speak rationally.\n       However, in a conscious state though a person is capable\n       of revealing her mind rationally in the event of any\n       serious injury, but it cannot be discarded in some casesCRLA No.23 of 2014                                    Page 12 of 17even in conscious state of mind also in extreme case of\n      injury, one can speak in-coherently in state of\n      delirium.xxx"20. The above statement in cross-examination indicates that PW-8\nwas aware of what he was doing. There was no need for him to\nwrite up a dying declaration which was never made. Merely\nbecause he did not endorse on the bed head ticket that the victim\nwas in a conscious state would not mean that no such statement\nwas ever made by her. The same also holds good for the criticism\nthat the declaration was not in a question-answer form. These are\nnot inviolable mandatory requirements for the acceptance of a\ndying declaration. On the other hand, a Constitution Bench of the\nSupreme Court inLaxman v. State of Maharashtra(supra)\nexplained as under:"3...The court, however has always to be on guard to\n      see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result\n      of either tutoring or prompting or a product of\n      imagination. The court also must further decide that the\n      deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the\n      opportunity to observe and identify the assailant.\n      Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether\n      the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the\n      dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But\n      where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a\n      fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the\n      medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that\n      since there is no certification of the doctor as to the\n      fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying\n      declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be\n      oral or in writing and in any adequate method of\n      communication whether by words or by signs or\n      otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive\n      and definite. In most cases, however, such statements\n      are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to\n      writing by someone like a magistrate or a doctor or a\n      police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessaryCRLA No.23 of 2014                                  Page 13 of 17nor is the presence of a magistrate is absolutely\n       necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to\n       call a magistrate, if available for recording the statement\n       of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law\n       that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a\n       magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a\n       magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such\n       recording. Consequently, what evidential value or\n       weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily\n       depends on the facts and circumstances of each\n       particular case. What is essentially required is that the\n       person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied\n       that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is\n       proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the\n       declarant was fit to make the statement even without\n       examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted\n       upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be\n       voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is\n       essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary\n       and truthful nature of the declaration can be established\n       otherwise."21. The Court is not persuaded that in the present case the dying\ndeclaration was not voluntarily made by the deceased or not in a\nconscious state of mind and that it should be discarded.InSurinder Kumar v. State of Haryana(supra) at the relevant time\nnot only was the deceased brought to the hospital with 100%\nburns, but at the time when the Magistrate recorded her statement,\nthe treating doctor was not present. In the present case, the doctor\nwas very much present when the statement was made and in fact\nit is the doctor who recorded it. Each case, therefore, turns on its\nown facts and it cannot be laid down as inviolable general rule\nthat without certification of the state of consciousness of the\ndeceased, a dying declaration recorded without such endorsement\nshould be rejected.CRLA No.23 of 2014                                    Page 14 of 1722. Again inNallapati Sivaiah v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Guntur\nA.P.(supra) there was no evidence of the details of any treatment\nadministered to the victim. The doctor, who was said to have been\npresent at the time of recoding of the dying declaration, was not\nexamined. Moreover, there were two dying declarations which\nwere inconsistent. In the present case, however, there is only one\ndying declaration and it is not shown to be suffering from any\ninternal inconsistency. The second factor here is that the dying\ndeclaration is consistent with what was spoken by the deceased\nfirst, soon after the incident, in front of the family members which\nin turn has been consistently spoken to by PWs 1, 5 and 6.Therefore, the decision inNallapati Sivaiah v. Sub-Divisional\nOfficer, Guntur A.P.(supra), is also of no assistance to the\nAppellant in the present case.23. Turning now to the decision inState of Rajasthan v. Yusuf(supra), it is found that there was an inherent attempt to falsely\nimplicate a large number of family members of the accused. That\nwas what perhaps persuaded the Court to discard the dying\ndeclaration. However, in the present case, there is no attempt to\nimplicate anyone other than the Appellant himself. The dying\ndeclaration made in the present case lends assurance to its truth\nand credibility. The other decisions, cited by learned counsel for\nthe Appellant also appeared to have turned on its own facts and do\nnot persuade the Court to discard the dying declaration made by\nthe deceased.CRLA No.23 of 2014                                   Page 15 of 1724. As regards as the presence of the accused at the scene of\ncrime, both PWs 5 and 6 have consistently spoken about the\nAppellant running away from the spot when they reached there.\nPW 5 stated that the accused gave him a 'push blow'. This was\ncorroborated by PW 6. Therefore there could be no mistake as\nregards his identity. Both PWs 5 and 6 were subject to detailed\ncross-examination, which they withstood. Further, when the IO\n(PW 10) conducted a raid at the house of the accused the next\nmorning, he was absconding. He could be traced only on 15th May\n2012. Consequently, the presence of the accused at the scene of\ncrime soon after its commission by him, stands conclusively\nproved by the prosecution. The alternative plea that the victim\nimmolated herself stands belied by the fact that the accused ran\naway from the spot and made no attempt to save her.25. The medical evidence does show that the death was due to\nante-mortem burns which were extensive. The forensic evidence\nhas also supported the case of the prosecution regarding the\ndeceased being killed by burning.26. The dying declaration implicates the accused of both offences\nviz., of rape and murder. Although the vaginal swab did not\nindicate the presence of spermatozoa, it has to be recalled that the\nswab was itself taken three days after the deceased was admitted\nto the hospital and in a condition of 95% burns. Therefore, the\nmere absence of forensic corroboration of the dying declaration\non this aspect will not falsify the dying declaration, which has\notherwise been held to be voluntary and truthful. Consequently,CRLA No.23 of 2014                                   Page 16 of 17this Court concurs with the trial Court as far finding the Appellant\n        guilty of the offence underSection 376IPC is concerned.27. The net result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is\n        dismissed as such.(S. Muralidhar)\n                                                      Chief Justice\n\n\n                                                  (Chittaranjan Dash)\n                                                         Judge\n\n\n\nS. Behera/ Jr. Steno.CRLA No.23 of 2014                                   Page 17 of 17