Gujarat High CourtSharukh @ Baba Anishbhai Kureshi vs The Commissioner Of Police on 10 June, 2020Author:Ilesh J. VoraBench:Ilesh J. VoraC/SCA/70/2020                                 ORDER\n\n\n\n\n         IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD\n\n            R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 70 of 2020\n\n==========================================================\n               SHARUKH @ BABA ANISHBHAI KURESHI\n                            Versus\n                  THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE\n==========================================================\nAppearance:\nMR HEMANT B RAVAL(3491) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1\nfor the Respondent(s) No. 2\nMR DHAWAN JAISWAL, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3\n==========================================================\n CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA\n\n                          Date : 10/06/2020\n\n                           ORAL ORDER1.   By way of this petition underArticle 226of the Constitution of\nIndia, the petitioner through his wife Shabana Shakhrukh Kureshi\nhas challenged the legality of the order of detention of her husband\nviz. Shahrukh @ Baba Anisbhai Kureshi, dated 03.12.2019 passed\nby respondent no.1 - Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, under\nsub-section 2 ofSection 3of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti- Social\nActivities Act, 1985 ("P.A.S.A Act" for short) by detaining the\ndetenue as a dangerous person as defined underSection 2 (c)of\nthe PASA Act with a view to prevent the detenue from acting in\nany manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the\narea of Ahmedabad City. In pursuance of the said order dated\n03.12.2019, the detenue has been detained in jail at Surat.2.   The detenue came to be detained as a dangerous person on\nhis involvement in two offences i.e. FIR being C.R.No.I-51/2018\nregistered at Shaherkotda Police Station, Ahmedabad, underSection 392of IPC and the second FIR being C.R. No.I-57/2019 isPage 1 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020C/SCA/70/2020                                          ORDERregistered at Kalupur Police Station, Ahmedabad, underSection\n324of IPC and Section 135(1) of G.P.Act. .3.   Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following\ncontentions:(I) That         the   detaining     authority   has    not      properly\n            considered the distinction between the law and order\n            situation and public peace and passed the order of\n            detention against the detenue without application of\n            mind, therefore, the order is illegal and null and void;(II)The detenue has been falsely involved in the cases\n            mentioned in the grounds of detention and there is no\n            material to indicate that, the alleged activities created\n            strong fear in public, prejudicial to the maintenance of\n            the public order and the society as a whole is ever\n            disturbed;(III)       The detenue would not fall within the definition of\n            dangerous person as defined underSection 2 (c)of the\n            PASA Act;(IV)        The detenue has been detained in two alleged\n            offences and therefore, the authority concerned by\n            abusing their powers and process of legal machinery,\n            passed the order of detention, which is nothing, but\n            arbitrary and illegal.4.   On the other hand, Mr. Dhawan Jaiswal, learned AGP has\nsupported the impugned order of detention passed by respondent\nno.1 and submitted that the detenue is a ''dangerous person'' and\nsufficient material and evidence was found during the course ofPage 2 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020C/SCA/70/2020                                 ORDERinvestigation, indicating that the detenue is in habit of indulging\nhimself into activities as defined underSection 2 (c)of the PASA\nAct and therefore, considering the facts of the case, the detaining\nauthority has rightly passed the order of detention, which deserves\nto be upheld by this Court.5.    Learned AGP further contended that there are two offences\nregistered against the detenue and he has been arrested in\nconnection with the same. The detenue is strong person and has\nindulged into anti-social activities, which are prejudicial to the\nmaintenance of public order. In view of this, there is sufficient\nmaterial to arrive to the satisfaction that the detenue is a\ndangerous person and is involved into anti-social activities, which\nare prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. He also\ncontended that the order of detention is passed based on material\nsubjective satisfaction and therefore, he prays this Court to dismiss\nthis petition.6.    Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having\ngone through the material on record, the only question arises for\nconsideration in this petition is, whether the order of detention\ndeserves to be quashed ?7.    It is settled by the catena of decisions of the Apex Court that,\na person shall be deemed to be "acting in any manner prejudicial\nto maintenance of public order", when such person is engaged or\nhe is making preparation for engaging in any activity which affect\nadversely or are likely to affect adversely to maintenance of public\norder. The public order shall be deemed to have been affectedPage 3 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020C/SCA/70/2020                                    ORDERadversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected inter alia, if any\nof the activities of any person referred to in sub-section (4) ofSection 3of PASA Act directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to\ncause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among\nthe general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread\ndanger to life, property or public health.8.    In the instant case, the impugned order having been passed\nafter considering two criminal cases registered against the\ndetenue. The factual aspects of the said cases show that, on\n14.05.2018, the detenue had looted cash money from the\npassenger of his rickshaw and accordingly, case was registered\nagainst him. The second case was registered on the basis of the\ndispute on money matter with one Mujib Ansari - rickshaw driver.\nThe case papers collected by the Investigating officer shows that,\nit is an issue of law and order and there is no any public\ndisturbance which will affect the public order. The acts of the\ndetenue constituting the offences cannot have affected the tempo\nof the life of community.9.    At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to the case ofPiyush Kantilal Mehta Vs. Commissioner of Police, reported in\nAIR 1981 SC 419, wherein, it was observed that, " a person may\nbe very fierce by nature, but so long as the public generally are not\naffected by his activities on conduct, the question of maintenance\nof public order may not arise. In order that, an activity may be said\naffect adversely the maintenance of public order, there must be a\nmaterial to show that, there has been feeling of insecurity among\nthe general public. If any act of a person creates panic or fear inPage 4 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020C/SCA/70/2020                                          ORDERthe minds of the member of a public upsetting the tempo of life of\nthe community, such acts must have a direct bearing on the\nquestion of maintenance of public order. The commission of\noffence will not necessarily come within the purview of public\norder.10.   It is apt to refer to the case ofMustakmiya Jabbarmiya\nShaikh Vs. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner, reported in 1995 (3)\nSCC 237, wherein the Apex Court observed thus:6. With a view to deal with the aforementioned submissions\n         advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and to\n         examine the legality/validity of the impugned order of detention\n         it would be appropriate to look into the relevant provisions of the\n         Act in question under which the detention order has been\n         passed. It may be pointed out that the Act provides for\n         preventive detention of bootleggers, dangerous persons, drug\n         offenders, immoral traffic offenders and property grabbers for\n         preventing their anti-social and dangerous activities prejudicial\n         to the maintenance of public order. In the present case having\n         regard to the grounds of detection the detaining authority on\n         being satisfied that the detenu - petitioner was a 'dangerous\n         person' within the meaning of clause (C) ofSection 2of the Act\n         and passed the order of detention.Section 2(C)of the Act reads\n         as under:"Dangerous person" means a person, and either by himself or\n         as a member or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts\n         to commit or abetes the commission of any of the offences\n         punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of theIndian\n         Penal Codeor any of the offences punishable underChapter V\n         of the Arms Act, 1959".Here it would also be appropriate to reproduce the relevant part\n         ofSection 3of the Act as under:-"3(l)-The State Government may if satisfied with respect to any\n         person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any\n         manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is\n         neces-sary so to do, make an order directing that such person\n         be detained.", (2) If having regard to the circumstances\n         prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of\n         the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of\n         Police, the State Govern-ment is satisfied that it is necessary so\n         to do, it may, by order in writing, direct that the District\n         Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, may also, if satisfiedPage 5 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020C/SCA/70/2020                                         ORDERas provided in sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred by\nthe said sub-section".(3)..............(4) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to\nbe 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public\norder when such person is engaged in or is making preparation\nfor engaging in any activities whether as a bootlegger or\ndangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or\nproperty grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect\nadversely the maintenance of public order,"Explanation. - For the purpose of this sub-section, public order\nshall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be\ndeemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the\nactivities of any person referred to in this sub-section directly or\nindirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or\nalarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any\nsection thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property\nor public health.7. A reading of the preamble of the Act will make it clear that the\nobject of provisions contained in the Act including those\nreproduced above is to prevent the crime and to protect the\nsociety from anti-social elements and dangerous characters\nagainst perpetration of crime by placing them under detention\nfor such a duration as would disable them from resorting to\nundesirable criminal activities The provisions of the Act are\nintended to deal with habitual criminal dangerous and desperate\noutlaws who are so hardened and incorrigible that the ordinary\nprovisions of the penal laws and the moral fear of punishment\nfor crime are not sufficient deterrents for them.Section 3of the\nAct is, therefore, intended to deal with such criminals who\ncannot readily be apprehended to be booked under the ordinary\nlaw and who for special reasons, cannot be convicted under the\npenal laws in respect of the offences alleged to have been\nperpetrated by them, But this power under the Act to detain a\nperson should be exercised with restraint and great caution. In\norder to pass an order of detention under the Act against any\nperson the detaining authority must be satisfied that he is a\n'dangerous person' within the meaning ofSection 2(C)of the\nAct who habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abetes the\ncommis-sion of any of the offences punishable under Chapter\nXVI or XVII of the Penal Code or any of the offences punishable\nunderChapter V of the Arms Actas according to sub-section (4)\nofSection 3of the Act it is such 'dangerous person' who for the\npurpose ofSection 3shall be deemed to be a person 'acting in\nany manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order'\nagainst whom an order of detention may lawfully be made.8.The Acthas defined 'dangerous person' in clause (C)\nofSection 2to mean a person who either by himself or as aPage 6 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020C/SCA/70/2020                                        ORDERmember or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to\ncommit or abetes the commis-sion of any of the offences\npunishable under the chapters XVI or XVII of the Penal Code or\nany of the offences punishable underChapter V of the Arms\nAct. The expression 'habit' or 'habitual' has however, not been\ndefined under the Act, According to the Law Lexicon by P.\nRamanatha Iyyar, Reprint Edition 1987 page 499 'habitually'\nmeans constant, cus-tomary & addicted to specified habit and\nthe term habitual criminal may be applied to any one who has\nbeen previously convicted of a crime to the sentences and\ncommitted Jo prison more than twice. The word 'habitually'\nmeans 'usually' and 'generally'. Almost similar meaning is\nassigned to the words 'habit' in Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary, 10th\nEdition page 485. It does not refer to the frequency of the\noccasions but to the invariability of practice and the habit has to\nbe proved by totality of facts. It, therefore, follows that the\ncomplicity of a person in an isolated offence is neither evidence\nnor a material of any help to conclude that a particular person is\na 'dangerous person' unless there is material suggesting his\ncomplicity in. such cases which lead to a reasonable conclusion\nthat the person is a habitual criminal.InGopalan Chari v. State\nof Kerala, AIR (1981) SC 674 this Court had an occasion to deal\nwith expressions like 'bad habit', 'habitual', 'desperate',\n'dangerous', and 'hazardous'. This Court observed that the word\nhabit implies frequent and usual practice.Again inVijay Narain\nSingh v. State of Bihar, [1984] 3 SCC 14, this Court construed\nthe expression 'habitually' to mean repeatedly or persistently\nand observed that it implies a thread of continuity stringing\ntogether similar repetitive acts but not isolated, individual and\ndissimilar acts and that repeated, persistent and similar acts are\nnecessary to justify an inference of habit. It, therefore,\nnecessarily follows that in order to bring a person within the\nexpression 'dangerous person' as defined in clause (C)\nofSection 2of the act, there should be positive material to\nindicate that such person is habitually committing or attempting\nto commit or abeting the commission of offences which are\npunishable under Chapter XVI or XVII of theI.P.C. or underChapter V of the Arms Actand that a single or isolated act\nfalling under Chapters XVI or XVII ofI.P.C, orChapter V of\nArms Actcannot be characterised as a habitual act referred to\ninSection 2(C)of the Act.9. Further, sub-section (1) ofSection 3of the Act confers power\non the State Government and a District Magistrate or a\nCommissioner of Police under the direction of the State\nGovernment to detain a person on being satisfied that it is\nnecessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in\nany manner prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order'. The\nexplanation attached to sub-section (4) ofSection 3reproduced\nabove in the foregoing para contemplates that 'public order'\nshall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall bePage 7 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020C/SCA/70/2020                                         ORDERdeemed likely to be affected adversely inter-alia if any of the\nactivities of any person referred to in sub- section (4) directly or\nindirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or\nalarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any\nsection thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property\nor public health. Sub-section (4) ofSection 3also provides that\nfor the purpose ofSection 3, a person shall be deemed to be\n'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public\norder' when such person is a 'dangerous person' and engaged\nin activities which affect adversely or more likely to affect\nadversely the maintenance of public order. It, therefore,\nbecomes necessary to determine whether besides the person\nbeing a 'dangerous person' his alleged activities fall within the\nambit of the expres-sion 'public order'. A distinction has to be\ndrawn between law and order and maintenance of public order\nbecause most often the two expressions are confused and\ndetention orders are passed by the authorities concerned in\nrespect of the activities of a person which exclusively fall within\nthe domain of law and order and which have nothing to do with\nthe main-tenance of public order. In this connection it may be\nstated that in order to bring the activities of a person within the\nexpression of 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the\nmaintenance of public order", the fall out and the extent and\nreach of the alleged activities must be for such a nature that\nthey travel beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to deal with\nhim or to prevent his subversive activities affecting the\ncommunity at large or a large section of society. It is the degree\nof disturbance and its impact upon the even tempo of life of the\nsociety or the people of a locality which deter-mines whether the\ndisturbance caused by such activity amounts only to a 'breach\nof law and order' or it amounts to 'public order.' It the activity\nfalls within the category of disturbance of 'public order' then it\nbecomes essen-tial to treat such a criminal and deal with him\ndifferently than an ordinary criminal under the law as his\nactivities would fall beyond the frontiers of law and order,\ndisturbing the even tempo of life of the community of the\nspecified locality.In the case ofArun Ghose v. State of West\nBengal, [1970] 1 SCC 98 this Court had an occasion to deal\nwith the distinction between law and order and public order.\nHidayatullah, C.J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court\nobserved that public order would embrace more of the\ncommunity than law and order. Public order is the even tempo\nof the life of the community taking the country as a whole or\neves a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be\ndistinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not\ndisturb the society to the extent of causing a general\ndisturbance of public transquillity. It is the degree of disturbance\nand its affect upon the life of the community in a locality which\ndetermines whether the disturbance amounts only to breach of\nlaw and order. It has been further observed that the implicationsPage 8 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020C/SCA/70/2020                                          ORDERof public order are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life\nand public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of\nthe act embrace large sections of the community and incite\nthem to make further breaches of the law and order and to\nsubvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its\nown gravity.In its quality it may not differ from another but in its\npotentiality it may be very different, Again in the case ofPiyush\nKantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police, [1989] Supple.\n1SCC322, this Court took the view that b order that an activity\nmay be said to affect adversely the maintenance of public order,\nthere must be material to show that there has been a feeling of\ninsecurity among the general public. If any act of a person\ncreates panic or fear in the minds of the members of the public\nupsetting the even tempo of life of the community, such act\nmust be said to have a direct bearing on the question of\nmaintenance of public order. The com-mission of an offence will\nnot necessarily come within the purview of public order which\ncan be dealt with under ordinary general law of the land.\n10, Now reverting to the grounds of detention and the summary\nof incidents alleged against the petitioner as mentioned in the\nbeginning of this judgment, it may be stated that the first\nincident is said to have taken place on 24.4.1993 at about 6.45\nPM in which the detenu - petitioner alongwith some of his\nassociates is alleged to have dragged out the complainant, one\nMohd. Hussain from inside the Hair Cutting Saloon of Shahpur\nand associates of the petitioner fired four rounds from the\nrevolver injuring the complainant and one another customer.\nThe report lodged by the complainant Mohd. Hussain himself on\n24.4.1993, a copy of which has been placed on record, goes to\nshow that a day earlier, that is on 23.4.1993 at about 9.30 PM\nthere was a quarrel between Amjad Khan, the younger brother\nof the complainant Mohd. Hussain and the petitioner upon\nsounding the scooter horn in the gali of the house of the\npetitioner and it was in that connection that next day i.e. on\n24.4.1993 the alleged incident of assault by the petitioner and\nhis associates to the complainant Mohd. Hussain took place.\nFrom the narration of facts in the said complaint it is abundantly\nclear that the criminal activity was directed against an individual\nand from the nature of the incident it is difficult to assume that it\ngave rise to public order disturbing the tranquillity of the locality.\nAt the most it was a criminal act directed only against an\nindividual which has nothing to do with the question of public\norder It appears that it was on account of the earlier day\nincident that the petitioner made a plan alongwith his associates\nto teach a lesson to the complainant by assaulting him when he\nwas seen in the Hair Cutting Saloon on 24.4.1993, This apart\nthe incident had occurred on 24,4.1993 while the detention\norder was passed on 19.8.1994 after the lapse of more than 16\nmonths. This long lapse of time between the alleged prejudicial\nactivity and the detention order loses its significance becausePage 9 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020C/SCA/70/2020                                         ORDERthe said prejudicial conduct was not approximate in point of time\nand had no rational connection with the conclusion that the\ndetention was necessary for maintenance of public order. Such\na stale incident can not be construed as justifiable ground for\npassing an order of detention. The second incident dated11.4.1994 was that the detenu - petitioner was harbouring\noffender which is an offence underSections 212/214of the\nI.P.C, An offence underSection 212/214of the I.P.C. cannot be\nmade a basis for passing an order of detention against the\npetitioner as the said offence does not fall either under Chapters\nXVI or XVII of theI.P.C. In order to bring a person within the\ndefinition ofSection 2(C)of the Act it is essential to show that\nsuch person either by himself or as a member of or a leader of a\ngang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the\ncommission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or XVII\nof theIndian Penal Codeor any of the offences punishable\nunderChapter V of the Arms Act. But as pointed out earlier the\noffence registered against petitioner under F.I.R. of C.R.No.\n7/94 of DCB dated 11,4. 1994 is one underSections 212/214of\nthe I.P.C. which falls under Chapter XI of theI.P.C. and not\nunder any of the chapters XVI or XVII which is the requirement\nofSection 2(C)of the Act. This incident, therefore, can not be\nmade a basis for satisfaction of the detaining authority that\npetitioner is a habitual offender, so as to sustain the order of\ndetention.11. This brings us to criminal activities of the detenu - petitioner\nwhich are said to have taken place on 10.8.1994 at 4.00 PM\nand on 12.8.1994 at 7.00 PM. I the incident dated 10.8.1994 the\npetitioner is alleged to have purchased goods worth Rs. 5(K)\nfrom a businessman and on the demand of the price of the\ngoods, the petitioner is alleged to have dragged him out on the\npublic road and not only gave a beating to him but also aimed\nhis revolver towards the people gathered over there. Similarly it\nis alleged that on 12.8.1994 at about 7.00 PM the detenu -\npetitioner stopped the witness on the road near eastern side of\nSardar Garden and beat him as the petitioner doubted that he\nwas informing the police about the anti-social activities of the\npetitioner and his associates. The petitioner is also alleged to\nhave rushed towards the people gathered there with the\nrevolver. Taking the aforesaid two incidents and the allegations\non their face value as they are, it is difficult to comprehend that\nthey were the incidents involving public order. They were\nincidents directed against single individuals having no adverse\naffect prejudicial to the maintenance of public order disturbing\nthe even tempo of life or the peace and tran- quillity of the\nlocality. Such casual and isolated incidents can hardly have any\nimplications which may affect the even tempo of life or\njeopardize the public order an incite people to make further\nbreaches of the law and order which may result in subversion of\nthe public order. As said earlier the Act by itself is notPage 10 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020C/SCA/70/2020                                         ORDERdeterminant of its own gravity but it is the potentiality of the act\n         which matters.12. The alleged incident dated 12.8.1994 relating to the beating\n         of some person on suspicion that he was informing the police\n         about criminal activities of the petitioner, the allegation is\n         sweeping without any material to support it. Neither any timely\n         report appears to have been made about it to the police nor any\n         offence appears to have been registered against the detenu -\n         petitioner concerning the said incident. There remains the\n         solitary incident dated 10.8.1994 pertaining to the alleged\n         beating of a businessman which as said earlier directed was\n         against an individual having no adverse impact on public at\n         large. Besides, the solitary incident dated 10.8.1994 alone\n         would not provide a justification to hold that the petitioner was\n         habitually committing or attempting to commit or abetting the\n         commission of offences as contemplated inSection 2(C)of the\n         Act because the expression 'habitually' postulates a thread of\n         continuity in the commission of offence repeatedly and\n         persistently. However, in our considered opinion hone of the\n         aforementioned two incidents can be said to be incidents\n         affecting public order nor from these stray and casual acts the\n         petitioner can be branded as a dangerous person within the\n         meaning ofSection 2(C)of the Act, who was habitually engaged\n         in activities adversely affecting or likely to affect adversely the\n         maintenance of public order. Similar is the position with regard\n         to the recovery of .32 bore country made revolver from the\n         possession of the petitioner without any permit or licence which\n         is an offence underSection 25of the Arms Act. The said\n         revolver was found to be rusty and had a broken barrel. Mere\n         possession of a firearm without anything more cannot bring a\n         case within the ambit of an act affecting public order as\n         contemplated inSection 3of the Act unless ingredients\n         ofSection 2(C)of the Act are also made out. From the facts\n         discussed above it turns out that there was no material which\n         may lead to a reasonable and definite conclusion that the\n         detenu - petitioner was habitually engaged in criminal activities\n         and, therefore, a dangerous person. The detaining authority\n         thus passed the impugned order of detention against the\n         petitioner without application of mind on the aforesaid aspects\n         of the case and, therefore, the detention order could not be\n         sustained."11.   In the instant case, the detaining authority has failed to\nsubstantiate that the alleged anti-social activities of the detenue,\nadversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of\npublic order. Therefore, in the absence of sufficient material toPage 11 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020C/SCA/70/2020                                 ORDERarrive at a subjective satisfaction that, the detenue is a dangerous\nperson and he is indulged into the activities which are prejudicial to\nthe maintenance of public order would not sustain in the eyes of\nlaw and the order impugned having been passed without\napplication of mind and it is against the settled proposition of law.12.       In the result, present petition is allowed. The impugned order\nof detention dated 03.12.2019 passed by respondent no.1 -\nCommissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, is hereby quashed and set\naside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, if not\nrequired in connection with any other case.13.       Registry is directed to communicate this order to the\nconcerned jail authority by fax/e-mail forthwith.(ILESH J. VORA,J)\n\n\nPallaviPage 12 of 12Downloaded on : Wed Jun 10 22:06:15 IST 2020