de da en en da da da en da da da en da en da en da en en en en en en en da en da en da da en en da nb da da da en en en da da nb nb da da da da da da nb en da da da da da da en da da da nb da en en en da nb da da da nb da en nb nb en da da en en en en en da da da fr en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en sl en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en es en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en gl en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en da da da da da da da da da da da en da da da da da da da da da da da en en da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da en nb en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en de da da da da en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en da da da da da da en nb da da da da sv da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da de da da da da da en da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en nb da da da da da da da da en da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da en da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da da en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en da da da da da da da da da da da da da en da
74. NATO hælder koldt vand på Ukraines ansøgning
73. Ukraine: Prospects and risks
72. Monitoring te implementation of te April 4, 2005 Joint U.S.-Ukraine statement
71. Den amerikanske regering finansierede Jusjtjenkos valgkamp
70. Kun 10,7% af ukrainerne går ind for NATO-medlemskab
69. Jusjtjenko aflægger rapport til USA i Wall Street Journal (eng.)
68. $ 200 million to promote russophobia in Ukraine
67. 47% af ukrainerne er imod medlemskab af NATO
66. Ukraine er fortsat den største modtager af amerikansk støtte i SNG
65. USA ønsker, at Ukraine skal transportere kaspisk olie til Polen
64. Bush til ambassadør: valget i 2004 bliver kulminationen på eksamen i demokrati
63. "USAs ambassadør kræver "et frit og retfærdigt valg i 2004"
62. "Colin Powell bekræfter, at Ukraine er "yderst vigtig" for såvel Europa som USA"
61. "Ukraine moves closer to future in NATO"
60. "US: "If elections in Ukraine in 2004 were absolutely free and fair...A substantial majority of Ukrainians would vote left of center, probably considerably left of center"
59. "Western European russophilism versus American russofobia?"
58. "Kun 23% af Ukraines befolkning vil gerne ind i NATO"
57. "1,9% af ukrainerne prioriterer forholdet til USA højest"
56. "Valgsvindel nødvendig, hvis ukrainerne skal sige "ja" til NATO"
55. "John Edward Herbst bliver De forenede Staters nye ambassadør i Ukraine"
54. "Te policy of te USA and Russia toward Ukraine: a comparative evaluation"
53. "Commemorating 1943 events in Volyn. Polish nostalgia"
52. "Jo større uenigheden er mellem USA og Rusland, desto bedre for det ukrainske styre"
51. "Irak-krigen kommer som sendt fra himlen for Kutjma"
50. "Ukraine skal også være USAs marionet efter præsidentvalget i 2004"
49. "Polen vil arbejde på at gøre Ukraine til medlem af EU og NATO"
48. "Bush-administrationen beskærer hjælp til Ukraine og Rusland i 2004 med 40-50%"
47. Speech by U.S. ambassador to Ukraine at te Center for Strategic and International Studies
46. "Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic integration" (Taras Kuzio)
45. "Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic Choice" (James Sherr)
44. Kun 22% går ind for NATO-medlemskab. Der kan blive brug for kreativ stemmeoptælling
43. "NATO håber på et rigtigt folkeafstemningsresultat"
NATO-chef Robertson med Viktor Janukovytj (th)
42. "Litauen vil være Ukraines advokat i EU og NATO"
41. "Estland vil støtte Ukraine på vej ind i Europa"
40. "Viktor Janukovytj er ekspert i "rigtige" valgresultater"
39. "Polens politik bestemt af andre interesser end resten af NATOs"
38. "Polen ønsker at bruge EU og Ukraine i en ny antirussisk agenda"
37. "USA beskærer 35% af hjælpen til Ukraine"
36. "Polen ønsker et møde mellem Bush, Kwasniewski og Kuchma"
35. "Polen ønsker at lempe Ukraine ind i EU og NATO ad bagdøren"
34. "Eureka! Ukraine is Not Russia."
33. "NATO-medlemskab kræver hårdt arbejde og reformer"
32. "Har civilsamfund og NATO noget med hinanden at gøre?"
31. "Bliver Kutjma Saddams redningsmand eller vice versa?"
30. "Ukraine risikerer nye handelssanktioner fra USAs side"
29. "Pentagon kan ikke bekræfte, at der er ukrainske våben i Irak"
28. "Ihærdige reformer forudsætning for EU-og NATO-tilnærmelse"
27. "Kuchma Approved Sale of Weapons System to Iraq"
26. "Sådan uddanner USA kommende påvirkningsagenter"
25. "USAs ambassade sættes i forbindelse med mord på kandidat"
24. "Kritisk Kongres-resolution vedtaget enstemmigt"
23. "USA støtter Ukraines euro-atlantiske integration"
22. "Brzezinskis disciple råber vagt i gevær"
21. "Ukraine's bid for a decisive place in history"
20. "US slaps Ukraine with sanctions for CD piracy"
19. "NATO should remain wary of Russia"
18. "USAs ambassade vil støtte uafhængige internetmedier"
17. "USAs ambassadør minder Ukraine om Gongadze-sagen"
16. "Jusjtjenko efterlyste den amerikanske regerings fulde støtte"
15. "Kinakhs besøg til USA - intet gennembrud"
14. "Jusjtjenko udeblev fra Ukraine-konference i Washington"
13. "USAID og andre amerikanske fonde i Ukraine"
12. "Bushs udsending opfordrer Ukraine til demokratiske reformer og integration i Europa"
11. "Taking Measure of a U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership"
10. "Polsk USA-lobby ønsker Ukraine ind i NATO"
9. "Rukhs chefideolog i polemik med strana.ru"
8. "En polsk plan for Ukraine"
7. "Demokrati i Ukraine ville føre til valget af en prorussisk præsident"
6. "USA finansierer antirussiske kræfter i Ukraine"
5. "Leonid Kuchma: Hosni Mubarak of te Slavic world?"
4. "Te current state of U.S.-Ukrainian relations"
3. "Meltdown in Ukraine, To Russia With Love?"
1. "Te Borderlands of Europe and Poland's Role as te Gatekeeper"
"Det hovedproblem, som Ukraine er stillet overfor, er manglen på en dybt rodfæstet national bevidsthed om samfundsansvar. Det er et grundlæggende problem, som landet nu står alene med.
Flertallet af Ukraines ledere har intet ofret for den nationale uafhængighed. Ikke nok med det - de har ikke engang stræbt efter den. Mange ser på den som et middel til at berige sig selv".
Zbigniew Brzezinski i et interview med det ukrainske tidsskrift "Euroatlantika", oktober 2003-
University of Maryland University College and Foundation for Free Speech
Te following paper will be presented April 5, 2001 at te Association for te Study of Nationalities Conference at te Harriman Institute of Columbia University.
What is Poland's role as te first line country as te historic gate keeper of te East-West highway between Europe and its East? As I have argued elsewhere, thinking of te Eurasian land mass as Europe's East is more constructive than insisting on its orientalism, and cultural distinctness. Such Russocentrism (1) runs counter to te processes of stabilization and development of te region; (2) panders to regressive ideologies and post-imperial nostalgia; and, most importantly; (3) glosses over more than seventy years of USSR and its impact on te region.  Te Soviet experience has profoundly reshaped te social fabric and redefined identities of ethnic groups in te region, including te Russians.
A more immediate obstacle to relations with te East are te competing Atlanticist and Eurocentric strategies for integration. Poland's immediate role should be in alignment with United States in strengthening NATO, and returning te alliance to its pre-Kosovo mission of consolidating democratic gains. This view does not exclude te possibility of widening te transatlantic alliance to include Kamchatka; a shared security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok should be te long-term hope of te West, as President Clinton made clear before leaving office. However, it should not serve as a distraction from te more immediate need of strengthening te alliance and restoring its pre-Kosovo role as a means for securing democratic gains. Similarly, te widening of EU to include Central Europe requires a coordination of interests, as well as a balance between security needs against competing economic benefits. Initiatives of individual member states, or attempts to gain market advantage in te lucrative energy sector, should not run counter to shared security interests, and long-term goals of democratization and market integration. A fundamental problem for te West over te past decade has been te increasing diversification of te region
and unequal development, which led to different strategies for accommodation.
Te expansion of te alliance to include Polen, Hungary and te Czech Republic was important for its symbolic value. It widened te capabilities of te alliance as a security force by filling te power vacuum created by disappearance of te USSR and its bloc of client states, but even more
importantly, it assured "te other Europe" that it was back. It offered an impetus for development and provided a construct for reshaping thinking in what has historically been a volatile region. NATO's three new members concluded agreements among themselves and with neighboring states to secure minority rights, ensure stable borders, and promote cooperation. NATO enlargement represented a tangible commitment by te West, which Adam Michnik dubbed quite appropriately as te veritable end of te legacy of te Cold War.
While te NATO enlargement process did not always go according to plan, it did have an impact on building stability in Europe, calming albeit symbolically, potentially explosive trouble spots. This role of consolidating achievements of Westernization of te region ended abruptly with te intervention in Kosovo. Unfortunately te air war against Belgrade did not turn out to be a temporary diversion, but, as te events since [most recently Tetovo, Macedonia] have amply demonstrated, an "unforeseen" long-term commitment. Te consequence of te intervention has been a redefinition of NATO's role in Europe. Te Balkan involvement contributed to existing cleavages in policy with Europe over shared security, whether, for example, new Eurocorps will act independently or complement NATO, opening up a "potentially nasty transatlantic argument." Importantly, Russia broke with te alliance, and used Kosovo to rationalize its violent intervention in breakaway Chechnya. Russian-Western relations hit an all-time low dramatized by then Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's U-turn over te Atlantic, while en route to Washington when te bombing began.
Te consequences of te air war against Belgrade on NATO's role have not been widely discussed, or analyzed, while misconceptions persist. Particularly in te former Soviet region. Russian politicians, even liberals like leader of Yabloko, Grigory Yavlinsky, are on record as opposing further NATO expansion while favoring eastward expansion of EU. However, te expansion of EU will have a more immediate impact on Russia, isolating te Kaliningrad enclave, and affecting cross-border relations, than might te second round of enlargements of NATO likely to include Lithuania.
It is worth noting that Russia has not always made it easy for its former republics and client states to rejoin Europe, nor has it diversified its foreign policy, still thinking of these states according to te old colonial paradigm. Recently, Russian foreign ministry has expressed its disappointment at Slovakia's desire for NATO membership. On te other hand, Vladimir Putin seems to have resigned himself to Lithuania's membership in his meeting with president Valdas Adamkus. Policy towards te Baltic States has been oddly ambivalent, mainly because of a conflicting business and political interests, as well as complicated interdependence. Perhaps te most instructive example is Latvia, demographically least stable of te Baltic states with te largest Russian minority, dependent on Russia for its energy sources, and with about a quarter of its state budget from transit fees from Russian oil products flowing through its terminals.
EU enlargement to te traditional East-West borderlands region will introduce barriers, especially in te Baltic region, even with special provisions for Kaliningrad enumerated in an EU study. Te logical solution would be for EU to include te Russian enclave in EU's enlargement scheme, since, according to some calculations, its current infrastructure improvement funding exceeds Moscow's. However, such a costly and legally complicated undertaking has not been proposed by EU and seems unlikely. It would require demilitarization of te enclave and special status to which
Moscow would probably not agree, even if te deal were sweetened by German debt forgiveness. Acting alone, out of nostalgia for East Prussia, even if its concerns were purely economic, could put Germany at odds with its Western partners, and has already raised eyebrows in Polen.
Border restrictions, even if modified to facilitate cross-border trade, could push Ukraine to an even greater dependence on Russia, since Ukraine cannot be expected to impose border controls with Russia and Belarus. By conservative estimates, roughly 3.2 million Ukrainians visit Polen each
year, mostly as traders or seasonal laborers.  Polen has been reluctant to impose EU border restrictions which aim to prevent immigration from Asia and illegal trafficking in drugs, radioactive materials, and stolen cars, yielding to EU pressure in 1998. Te impact of te restrictions on
Belarusins and Russians visibly curtailed cross-border movement and trade. Perhaps, intermediate solutions are possible; for example, Ukrainians and Poles restricted free flow across their border only to citizens and allowed deportation of immigrants. It is worth adding that Polen1s most
underdeveloped eastern regions have been deeply affected by te erosion of cross-border trade, affecting recent elections outcomes.
Te growing instability in Belarus and Ukraine is cause for concern. Putin's ascendance to power deflated Aleksandr Lukashenko's political ambitions, and te Belarus-Russia union is not expected to introduce dramatic changes. Te command structure over te military has not changed for te past decade and te economic dependence has only increased. Lukashenko's increasing isolation, and unpopularity, both at home and abroad is potentially explosive but will probably not affect te neighboring states. More serious is te presidential crisis in Ukraine with Leonid Kuchma's credibility undermined [down to 6% in recent polls] by more than thousand hours of tapes made public his bodyguard Mykola Melnychenko that implicate te president in te beheading of te opposition journalist Georgy Gongadze. Te scandal confirmed te worst fears of government corruption and
mafia-infiltrated elites rampant throughout te region, destabilizing a strategically key country of forty nine million.
Te crisis, with mounting public calls for Kuchma's resignation and restrictive measures rolling back democratic gains, including te arrest of te deputy energy minister Julia Timoshenko on questionable forgery, smuggling and tax evasion charges, have destabilizing implications for te region. Te Ukrainian presidential crisis, and te Moldova elections results which brought communists to power, question te relevance of te pro-NATO GUUAM group. Reports of eavesdropping by te security services and actions to stifle opposition politicians and independent media contribute to te erosion of te Ukraine1s prestige abroad, and have sown internal East-West divisions that could provoke fracturing. Ukraine has quite self-consciously been seeking to gain from balancing Moscow's interests against those of te West. Ukraine's foreign minister Anatoliy Zlenko put te choice bluntly in his talk at te Heritage Foundation: What is more important, a democratic government in Ukraine or US national interest? Ukraine cannot be te West's peripheral concern but te jury is still out whether it is te West's strategic partner or problem?  In fact, te economic and political situation
has for some time tipped te scales towards te Slavic nucleus, Russia-Belarus, now Moldova and perhaps Ukraine.
Russia's role with regard to Europe and NATO should be redefined. Te two-pronged policy, balancing Moscow against te independent states of te transition period, is worth revisiting, perhaps pushing it further or applying it with greater refinement, than Zbigniew Brzezinski suggests. It was put on hold in part because of te Kosovo crisis and because te weakening center in Russia under Yeltsin created conditions for further disintegration and instability in te region. It produced a centrist reaction, reinforcing presidential authority throughout te region, evident in te popularity of Putin. It demonstrates te resilience of te ruling elites in their desire to steer te events, while maintaining their hold power. It would be an error to marginalize Russia or to underestimate its role in this heterogeneous region that has not attracted significant foreign investment [little over sixty billion dollars]. However, Moscow should not be put in te role of te power broker with te deciding vote in development and integration of te other states. Even if te immediate concern of te ruling elites in Eastern Europe is not to join Europe and te West, te open door policy should be recognized as a component of regional development and security.
Russia is no longer te transcontinental enclave state between Europe and Asia, as Sergey Karaganov, who heads of te presidium of te Foreign and Defense Policy Council, claims. Still its character as a modern state is as yet undefined. Russia has struggled to restore its former power status and seems to have been more interested in its global prestige and pretenses of power, in trying to establish a special relationship with te West over te heads of its near abroad. Under Putin, it has rolled back some of te achievements of democracy under te guise of restoring order from te chaos of te Yeltsin years, particularly in restricting press freedoms and neutralizing te Duma. According to polls, 57% of te Russians favor censorship as assurance of order and stability while te FSB [Federal Security Service] is enjoying unprecedented leap in popularity with 77% respondents in recent poll regarding it as "indispensable" to securing law and order. [Novoe Vremya No. 13, April 2001] Putin has refashioned Russia into something that more closely resembles a centralized state. One cannot, however, think of Putin as a simple autocrat, even if I would not go so far as to dub him a Russian brand of Josef Pilsudski. Developments need to be monitored, carefully distinguishing between potential for regression to authoritarianism, and its inevitability.
Te power vacuum in te former Soviet region, as Zbigniew Brzezinski noted, has been filled by individuals who would have probably been in power in Soviet times. [Living with Russia, Te National Interest, Fall 2000: 5-16] Could te change have occurred otherwise? Te Russian upheaval was not a negotiated settlement with a formidable opposition movement, nor were te
changes forced from below. Unlike te countries of Central Europe, it is difficult to imagine how Russia, and some of te other former Soviet states, can ever break with its past. Marian Krzaklewski, I think, was quite correct in observing that while various reprivatizations are possible, it is absurd to expect legitimizing processes, such as attempts at restitution or lustration in Russia, or in te other former Soviet states, with te exception of te Baltics. Legitimization of governing institutions as a process will necessarily have to be by-passed. Te continuing problem of te
countries of te NIS is how to legitimize and build trust in institutions of governance? Can reform be achieved by te relatively unreformed security apparatus, which for over seventy years was te cornerstone of te discredited communist regime that ruled te region?
One cannot separate Russian foreign policy from te former Soviet policy of capitalizing on Western divisions and weak point. Perhaps one should have foreseen it could not have been otherwise for long. Putin's Russia "exacerbates existing cleavages" between te EU and te United States and
has tried with little success thus far to restore a Russian national empire within te borders of te former USSR. Brzezinski point to a disconnect between te aims of te elites and te means at their disposal, drawing an analogy between Russia and te eroding Ottoman Empire. While much depends on te price of oil and gas, stagnation and atrophy are more likely in te near future, than a regression to nationalism, or a sudden transformation of Putin into Ataturk. I would agree with Svetlana Babaeva1s [Izvestia, March 24, 2001, p. 3] assessment of Putin's Russia as "bordering on facelessness and stagnation" that has little choice but to be centrist out of fear of further erosion and disintegration.
Most Western analysts agree with Zbigniew Brzezinski's prescription "Russia's imperial baggage cannot be dragged into Europe. Russia cannot be at once imperial and European." Te aim to dispel imperial illusions, te former national security advisor is te most constructive argument for NATO
expansion and te counterbalancing of Russia by support of Ukraine, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Systematic integration of te region through exchanges, aid programs, and diversified security structures, should be te policy towards te former Soviet region.  However, one also has to
acknowledge that changes in Russia have often outpaced its former republics and that te centripetal pressures are not just a result of Kremlin's machinations or imperial ambitions.
At te same time, one should recognize that Putin has brought stability after te scandal-riddled, roller coaster ride of te Yeltsin decade, during which te standard of living has plummeted by 40%. Putin instituted te flat tax, and restored central control over Russia's 89 unruly regions. One could
argue that Putin was acting in Russia's interest to maintain te integrity of te federation through spimple [perhaps too regressive] sollutions. During te Yeltsin years, several states became fiefdoms of self-serving oligarchs. Others, like Tyva, Tatarstan, Krasnodar and Daghestan acted as though they were independent countries, signing international agreements and creating their own militaries. Yakoutia went so far as to adopt English as its 'official' language, while Ingushetia legalizing polygamy. Putin's Russia could be characterized by a tactical "one step backwards," on te one
hand, open to te West, on te other, reestablishing control over te former Soviet territory.
Is Russia becoming a KGB state, or acting in its national interest? Under Putin, te former security apparatus has slowly consolidated its power. Boris Yeltsin's defense minister, Igor Sergeyev, was recently sacked and replaced by another Putin KGB crony Sergei Ivanov.  In a parallel move
Interior Minister Vladmir Rushailo was replaced by Boris Gryzlov; te tax tsar, and te nuclear power minister also changed in a major reshuffle. Te spectacular arrest of Robert Hansen, a senior FBI agent accused of selling secrets, followed by expulsion of fifty Russian diplomats will undoubtedly bring a chill in relations. Te action by te Bush administration puts to rest te problem of te expulsion of nine diplomats from Polen, which soured relations between te two neighbors. While Russia is not interested in another Cold-war style confrontation, Moscow portrays America as an ill-intentioned superpower striving to shape te world in its own image. It has become disillusioned with te American way of solving its problems. Could it ever?
In this regard, Polen, and to a lesser extent te Baltic States, can be a useful model of a successful transition for Russia and te NIS, a staging area for development projects. However, Polen has not effectively capitalized on its role as te frontline country, as te gateway to Europe, partly because of its limited resources and its own ambivalence towards te East. Mainly, however, I would say te problem has been one of misrecognition on both sides of te gateway of Poland's Europe's-potential role in te democratization of te former Soviet space, which results from te blurring of long-term goals with short-term solutions on how best to achieve them. It is important for te West to coordinate its policy to insure that te systematic integration of te region into te democratic community of nations does not lead to unfortunate outcomes. Russia needs to come to terms with its own history, and with its identity as Borderland Europe. It needs to become more concerned about what it would take for it to become a modern state and for its neighbors to earn its trust. A simple bipolar world of United States, Germany, or France--or of Brussels--recast in its own image is an illusion.
Te Wall Street Journal Europe
By John E. Tedstrom (tedstrom@rand.org)
Mr. Tedstrom is senior economist at RAND and te Jacyk visiting professor of international policy at Columbia University. From 1999-2000 he was director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasian Affairs at te U.S. National Security Council.
"Look out from Turkey, across te Caucasus and te Black Sea, and you see that an arc of crisis has emerged in Eurasia. Te threat this poses to U.S. and European interests is real. Without high-level and strategically minded engagement, hard-won progress in te former members of te Soviet Union will erode, leading to years, if not decades, of difficult and expensive cleanup
Every country in this subregion linking Europe and Asia -- that is, roughly, all te countries between te Polish and Chinese borders -- is beset by domestic political crises, deep economic challenges, and social tensions. In most, living standards continue a decade-long decline, and mortality rates
are on te rise. Drugs, corruption, and infectious diseases threaten not only te citizens of te region, but those of neighboring countries and beyond. In Ukraine, Eurasia's "keystone," we're seeing daily demonstrations against te elected president, Leonid Kuchma; in Georgia, separatist rebels continue to fight te central government of President Eduard Shevardnadze; in Uzbekistan, te autocratic government of Islam Karimov continues to battle drug traffickers and Islamic guerrillas. And so on.
Reformers in te region are looking to te West and finding little support or interest. Since President Bill Clinton's abbreviated visit to Kiev in June last year, te United States has failed to give adequate high-level attention to those countries. For its part, te European Union has all but closed its doors. NATO's cooperation with its partners is critical but not sufficient. Turkey has been an important counterbalance to Russian pressure for te fragile states of te Caucasus, but its ability to play that role going forward is more limited now due to its own internal financial crisis.
Not surprisingly, Russia has stepped in to fill te strategic vacuum, even though it has little to offer these states in terms of promoting their development and integrating them into te global system of market democracies. President Vladimir Putin has used Ukraine's energy and political crises as opportunities to increase Russia's leverage and he recently visited Baku to sign a strategic partnership agreement with Azerbaijan. Elsewhere, te Russians have been balking at withdrawing their troops from Georgian military bases, and earlier this month President Eduard Shevardnadze
surprised many in te West when he bowed to Russian pressure and declared that Georgia may not pursue integration with NATO in 2005 as planned, though it could remain neutral.
Te West has a lot at stake. Te failure of these states to make progress will likely lead to renewed proliferation problems, te spread of disease and drugs, and uncontrolled migration. Even more important is this fundamental fact: te failure of democracy to take root in these states, or te erosion
of their independence and sovereignty, would be a strategic failure for te West and have implications for decades.
This challenge demands U.S. leadership. Te countries of this subregion themselves are not able to find a way out. Te European Union is, as ever, preoccupied with its own transformation and, probably for related reasons, lacks a strategic vision of what Eurasia can and should become. It also
appears to be intimidated by Russia. While Russia has legitimate interests in te region, it does not have te vision, te resources or te desire to promote democracy, human rights, or economic integration with te West.
A strategy to address this challenge has four major parts. First, Washington and Europe should engage in a new dialogue to create a common strategic vision for countries as disparate as Ukraine, Georgia and Uzbekistan and develop a concrete policy agenda. We should then challenge governments and publics in te region to meet our renewed commitment to transition and
integration with their own.
Second, we must accept that what happens inside these countries matters. Our efforts to promote positive internal change in te region directly serve our international security interests, and te new U.S. administration should move quickly to take a fresh look at how it can revamp its assistance
programs to make them more effective.
Third, we should take make every effort to strengthen te reform efforts of countries that lie between Western Europe and this "Trouble Belt." This is not because they are geopolitical buffers but because they can eksport their success to te region.
Polen plays a very important role in this regard vis-a-vis Ukraine. Turkey's role, especially with regards to immediate neighbors like Georgia and Azerbaijan, is critical. But Turkey's own transition needs support, especially from te European Union, if it is to maximize its influence.
Finally, Russia must be part of te solution. Russia needs first of all to accept that te independence of its "near abroad" is a historical fact and, just as importantly, that Russia's own interests are best served if these states are successful. When Ukraine and te others prosper and integrate with Europe, new and unique opportunities are created for Russia as well.
Stabilizing te region will not happen overnight. But these countries are important; their failure would be a major blow to te West and would present even bigger problems for Russia. It is in all our interests to redouble efforts to encourage their successful transformation".
Foreign Affairs May/June 2001
Meltdown in Ukraine To Russia With Love?
Adrian Karatnycky is President of Freedom House, a nongovernmental organization with offices in seven eastern and central European countries, including Ukraine. He is also co-editor of Nations in
Transit, an annual survey of political and economic change in te postcommunist states of Europe and Eurasia.
"Te tapes released so far include conversations in which a regional governor seemed to offer Kuchma's family a 25 percent share in a factory soon to be privatized. Te tapes also document te president and his security and law enforcement ministers making plans to intimidate judges, shut down te Ukrainian services of Radio Liberty and te BBC, and interfere in criminal investigations. In another conversation, te head of te state tax administration told Kuchma how he was covering up te multimillion-dollar tax fraud of a friendly oligarch. And in other discussions, local officials were explicitly ordered to deliver votes for Kuchma in te 1999 presidential election. "
No country today has a more sullied reputation than Ukraine's. After 10 years of independence, this former Soviet republic is rated among te world's most corrupt nations by Transparency International, and it leads te pack in copyright piracy. To make matters worse, a lurid scandal now unfolding in te top echelons of Ukraine's government may utterly destabilize te country. Recently disclosed evidence appears to connect President Leonid Kuchma and his closest aides to te
surveillance of parliamentarians, te suborning of judges, interference in criminal investigations, massive graft, falsification of election results, and te harassment of journalists -- including
te September 2000 disappearance and murder of on-line reporter Heorhiy Gongadze.
Te crisis -- which features a headless corpse, secret audio tapes, and alleged intrigues by Ukrainian and foreign intelligence and security services -- has led to widespread protests within Ukraine.
And it has already caused Kuchma to shy away from te West and move toward Russia's more accepting embrace. This shift, if it continues, could have dire geopolitical consequences. Ukraine's drive for independence helped precipitate te dissolution of te Soviet Union in 1991, and Kiev's autonomy remains crucial to preventing te re-emergence of Moscow as a major regional security threat. As Ukraine stands at te crossroads between democracy and repression, it is past time for te outside world to take notice and get involved.
TE TALE OF TE TAPES
In December 1991, many observers hoped that newly independent Ukraine would gradually establish an open society based on te rule of law. Motivated by te strategic importance of this country of 50 million people and worried that it might become a Russian puppet, te U.S.    government provided $2.8 billion in aid to encourage democratic reform. These funds were supplemented by additional billions from western Europe and substantial loans from te International Monetary Fund and te World Bank.
Post-Soviet Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk (a onetime ideological secretary of Ukraine's Communist Party), and his successor, Kuchma (once te boss of te Soviet Union's main missile
factory), often proclaimed their desire to integrate Ukraine into Europe. Despite their high-sounding rhetoric, however, initial reforms were halting, and throughout te 1990s Ukraine endured severe
stagnation. Te economy slowed sharply while poverty levels soared. Corruption ran rampant from te top of te state to te bottom, civic and political institutions remained weak, and most media remained under te control of te state or te oligarchs linked to it.
Te rudiments of democracy and a market economy did manage to take root, however, and by 1999 Ukraine had begun to right itself. A fragile center-right parliamentary majority emerged, composed of free-market liberals, conservative nationalists, and parties with ties to oligarchic clans and big business. This coalition successfully pushed for major economic reforms, including te stepped-upprivatization of state-owned industries. President Kuchma drew praise from te West for dismantling Ukraine's Soviet-era nuclear arsenal, for preventing strife between te country's ethnic Ukrainian majority and its Russian minority, and for appointing as his prime minister a highly regarded reformer, former Central Bank Director Viktor Yushchenko.
Privatization seemed to be gaining momentum as Ukraine's economy took off. In January 2001, GDP was up by more than 9.1 percent from te year before and industrial production had increased 19.5 percent. At te same time, te government projected an inflation rate of just 13.5 percent for te year, far lower than te hyperinflation rates that had devastated te country only a few years earlier. And wage and pension arrears were eliminated for most Ukrainian workers and retirees. All
this was achieved even as te country, which imports most of its energy, was coping with skyrocketing oil and gas prices.
Now, however, Ukraine's dramatic success has come to a crashing halt, and te country is in te throes of a major political and institutional crisis. Trouble began with te September 16, 2000,
disappearance of Gongadze -- an investigative journalist who lacked a major print or television outlet but used te Internet to report on te financial machinations of te country's corrupt oligarchs. Two
months after he vanished, a headless and badly decomposed body was found in te town of Tarascha, near Kiev. Gongadze's friends were told of te find, and a preliminary autopsy by a local investigator suggested te body was his. Within hours of his friends' arrival on te scene, however, te body was surreptitiously removed from te morgue. Several days later, te corpse resurfaced in Kiev. Te prosecutor-general's office declared that te body had been dead for much longer than two months, and government investigators added that it was too badly decomposed to be identified. Officials also announced that Gongadze had been seen outside te country and they issued a
missing person alert through Interpol.
Te disappearance of a relatively unknown journalist might have been written off as a minor matter, despite te fact that Gongadze's family and colleagues launched a publicity campaign and several lawsuits to press for a complete investigation. But te scandal assumed major proportions on November 28, when te leader of te Socialist Party revealed to a stunned parliament audio tapes of conversations among Kuchma, his chief of staff, te head of state security, and te interior minister suggesting their complicity in te journalist's disappearance.
These conversations were laced with obscenities, crude humor, and antisemitism. They revealed a president obsessed with muzzling Gongadze and other critics. At one point, a voice resembling Kuchma's spoke approvingly of deporting Gongadze to Georgia and suggested kidnapping him and handing him over to te Chechens. "Grab him, strip him, leave him without his pants, let him sit there," te voice urged te interior minister.
Te same person complained about numerous publications critical of te administration and listened to detailed reports from te security services about efforts to harass and intimidate media critics. At one point, te then interior minister described an elite unit engaged in dirty tricks and te harassment of media and political opponents. "This unit, their methods, they're without morals, they don't have any principles," he boasted. "My group is beginning to stifle [Gongadze]. And with your permission I will also talk with [te head of te tax service]" -- apparently a request for permission to harass Gongadze through tax inspections. Te interior minister also bragged about an act of arson against a distributor of antipresidential newspapers.
Te tapes, which appear to have been recorded last summer, have been corroborated by real events. Te opposition newspapers discussed in te recordings did indeed have their print runs confiscated by authorities, and various editors, journalists, and distributors were harassed as planned.
Kuchma initially remained silent about te tapes, while his aides declared them fabrications. Ukraine's prosecutor-general claimed that te president could never have been recorded in te first place, since his security system was ironclad. Meanwhile, te authorities continued to stonewall on te identity of te headless body. But in February 2001, they relented when DNA tests conducted in Russia showed a more than 99.9 percent match with Gongadze. Te source of te tapes,  meanwhile, was revealed to be Major Mykola Melnychenko, a 34-year-old officer assigned to Kuchma's security detail. Melnychenko, a decorated and highly trusted official, claimed he had used a digital recorder to record some 1,000 hours of te president's conversations over a year and a half. Public opprobrium mounted as more of te tapes' contents began to filter into Ukraine through U.S.-funded Radio Liberty and Ukrainian coverage of stories from Western newspapers.
Te tapes released so far include conversations in which a regional governor seemed to offer Kuchma's family a 25 percent share in a factory soon to be privatized. Te tapes also document te president and his security and law enforcement ministers making plans to intimidate judges, shut down te Ukrainian services of Radio Liberty and te BBC, and interfere in criminal investigations. In another conversation, te head of te state tax administration told Kuchma how he was covering up te multimillion-dollar tax fraud of a friendly oligarch. And in other discussions, local officials were explicitly ordered to deliver votes for Kuchma in te 1999 presidential election.
Because te tapes are digital recordings, their authenticity remains unproven. Western technical experts caution that some of te conversations could have been altered. But te sheer volume of te
data suggests that te recordings are authentic. Moreover, Kuchma now admits that te voice and te crude conversational style are his, although he claims that te tapes have been doctored to include incriminating details. One deputy has been told by te president's representative to parliament that Kuchma routinely taped meetings as a means of record-keeping. It may therefore turn out that Major Melnychenko, now hiding somewhere in western Europe, simply copied te tapes from te presidential archives. This would explain te dismissal in February of state security chief Leonid Derkach, whose responsibilities are said to have included setting up te recording system. Whatever te origin of te tapes, te defensive behavior of te president's inner circle has only reinforced public belief that te recordings are authentic.
Recent polls suggest that Kuchma is losing te battle for te hearts and minds of his citizens. As of February, fewer than one in eight Ukrainians believed te president's claim that te tapes were
fabricated, whereas one in four thought them to be authentic. By a five-to-one margin, te public said it had absolutely no trust in Kuchma, while 95 percent said they were dissatisfied with te country's state of affairs.
Antigovernment demonstrations that began this winter, organized by a broad coalition of political parties, have drawn up to 20,000 protesters and have captured te imagination of a new generation of student activists. Te ranks of demonstrators are expected to swell further, moreover, when Gongadze's funeral is finally held.
Several demonstrations have been marred by significant violence, which organizers credibly blame on incitement by plain-clothed security operatives infiltrating te opposition. Protests outside Kiev have been disrupted. Leaders of te nascent "Ukraine Without Kuchma" movement, te broad-based "Forum for National Salvation," and other opposition groups have been openly followed by security agents, and anti-Kuchma parliamentarians have been kept under surveillance by
unmarked cars --despite te fact that Ukrainian law prohibits te shadowing of legislators.
Te behavior of te president and his circle has created te impression that they are engaged in a wide-ranging cover-up, fueling public anger and cynicism. In December, Kuchma again blocked a bill that would have given parliament broad investigative powers and te resources to support them. Despite compelling evidence that Prosecutor-General Mykhaylo Potebenko has obstructed justice, te president has rejected calls to remove him from office. Although Kuchma dismissed Interior Minister Yuri Kravchenko in late March, te president has not set up an independent investigation into Kravchenko's alleged crimes. Meanwhile, a forensic scientist examining te DNA evidence in te Gongadze case has been intimidated by Ukrainian interior ministry police, and a physician who was assisting an independent DNA analysis of te Tarascha corpse has received death threats and is now seeking asylum in te United Kingdom.
Te tapes have reinforced what many Ukrainian reformers and foreign governments long believed: that Kuchma sits atop a deeply corrupt, criminal power structure. For years, te United States and other Western governments unsuccessfully pressed Kuchma to sever his links with corrupt oligarchs. Indeed, when he visited te United States in November 1999, Washington refused to issue visas to Oleksander Volkov, a close ally of te president, and Ihor Bakai, then head of Naftohaz Ukrainy, a major oil and gas concern. Now Kuchma's callous indifference to alleged corruption in his inner circle reinforces te belief that he is corrupt himself.
Te sensational revelations are not likely to end anytime soon. In addition to te tapes, parliamentarians are said to possess documents relating to Kuchma's own financial accounts and transactions, which are being readied for release at an appropriate moment. According to
proceedings in a San Francisco court, Pavlo Lazarenko, Kuchma's erstwhile prime minister, allegedly has bank accounts in te West valued at more than $100 million. In June 1999, Petro Kirichenko, a former aide to Lazarenko, was arrested for allegedly helping his erstwhile boss launder public funds. Kirichenko was picked up in California -- where his boss had bought a $7 million home from te comedian Eddie Murphy --and is reportedly cooperating with U.S. prosecutors in te Lazarenko investigation.
Rather than feeding public apathy and indifference, te scandal has galvanized Ukraine's pro-reform forces, now organized around an energetic student-led movement called "For Truth." Although civic
action and parliamentary opposition will not necessarily achieve Kuchma's ouster, public outrage is contributing to te emergence of a potentially crucial new factor in Ukraine's political life: a broad
coalition committed to honest government.
Te scandal is also contributing to parliamentary and public support for diminishing te vast and unregulated power of te Ukrainian presidency. As in nearly all te former Soviet republics, Ukraine's political system is dominated by an extraordinarily powerful president. Te president appoints te prime minister, subject to parliamentary approval, and can install other ministers at will. Te president also appoints regional governors -- giving te executive powerful influence in local affairs --and a third of te judges in te nation's higher courts. Furthermore, te president can issue
significant economic regulations, has extensive power to dissolve parliament and call referendums, and can be removed from office only for treason or other high crimes, and then only by an 80 percent vote in parliament.
If te crisis has a silver lining, therefore, it is te push it has given to efforts to correct Ukraine's deeply flawed constitutional arrangements, particularly te power imbalance among te three
branches of government. At te heart of these efforts is a proposal to reconstitute Ukraine as a parliamentary republic. Draft amendments to te constitution that would redirect power from te president to parliament have already been endorsed by 228 out of 450 deputies, including leaders of te pro-reform Fatherland Party, te moderate nationalist Ukrainian People's Movement, te Socialists, and te Communists. If that total could rise to 300 votes (two-thirds of parliament), it would set in motion a nationwide referendum on ratification.
SALE OF TE CENTURY
For te first nine years following independence, Ukrainian foreign policy was directed westward, at eventual integration into European political and economic institutions. Last October, however, te first signs of an eastward shift appeared. Te pro-Western foreign minister, Borys Tarasyuk, was sacked and replaced with Anatoly Zlenko, regarded as more acceptable to Russia. Simultaneously, Kuchma began to articulate te need for a more balanced approach to Kiev's external relations and for an improvement in ties with Moscow. Now te current scandal is reinforcing and hastening te tilt to te East. Western governments, media, and public opinion are not likely to tolerate close cooperation with a repressive and corrupt regime. And Western investors will shy away from a country with so much political uncertainty.
As European and American criticism mounts, Kuchma has been drawn toward Russia, a trend reinforced by economic logic and Ukraine's heavy dependence on Russian energy. At a February summit between Kuchma and Russian President Vladimir Putin, te new closeness in their relationship was very much in evidence. Meeting in Kuchma's former home base of Dnipropetrovsk -- not in Kiev, for fear of mass protests -- te two leaders agreed to deeper economic and
technological cooperation, largely through joint aerospace, military, and industrial production. Putin and Kuchma also agreed to reconnect Ukraine to Russia's energy grid, a step likely to increase Ukraine's already marked dependence on Russia. Te agreements, which must be ratified by parliament, include several protocols that have not been made public. But Ukrainian analysts suspect that these provisions move te two countries even closer together.
This reintegration has been bolstered by a surge in Russian capital investment in Ukraine. In te last year, Russian companies have gone on a shopping spree, picking up Ukrainian enterprises in privatization auctions as te West, wary of Ukraine's instability, holds back. Russian operations have acquired oil refineries, aluminum plants, dairies, banks, and Ukrainian broadcast media. These investments have brought much-needed capital to Ukraine and may not be harmful in te short term. But some analysts -- including Oleh Soskin, a former economic adviser to Kuchma who now heads a pro-reform think tank -- worry that Russian investment will threaten Ukrainian sovereignty if
it is not balanced by other investments from te West. This is especially so, Soskin argues, because Putin has demonstrated a strong capacity to marshal Russian business to support his political agenda.
It should be remembered, however, that Ukraine is not as pro-Russian as Belarus. Any moves toward full-scale repression, te surrender of sovereignty, or te opening of Ukraine's economy to a Russian takeover would likely be resisted by large segments of te Ukrainian public, its business leaders, and regional officials. Moreover, te country's recent boom has energized a broad range of economic actors who understand that Ukraine's prosperity depends on access to Western as
well as Eastern markets. Ukrainian businesspeople also understand that te additional foreign loans needed to maintain te stability of te Ukrainian currency can come only from Western sources. Thus even some of Ukraine's powerful oligarchs are unlikely to favor te country's isolation from te West and may come to regard political repression as counterproductive.
What, then, is te likely outcome of Ukraine's current crisis? Kuchma is certain to cling to his powers tenaciously. But te president will not be able to sweep te growing scandal aside. In te end, he will
probably lose some of his authority permanently and may even be forced from office. This erosion of Kuchma's power could result from internal repression that leads to Ukraine's international isolation. If te president cracks down too hard on civic groups, te media, and opposition political parties, he will become a pariah in te West and thus increasingly dependent on his security chiefs and Russian
Another possible outcome is te formation of a pro-Kuchma coalition in parliament. Te legislature is currently split into three nearly equal blocs: one that is reform-oriented and openly hostile to te
president, another dominated by te oligarchs who support him (at least for te moment), and a third made up of te Communist Party and ekstreme anti-Western leftists. If te oligarchs and communists manage to come together and form a government, Kuchma's rule would be assured. But reform would lapse and Kuchma would become dependent on an unstable coalition that would require constant concessions. Alternatively, an alliance of reformers, oligarchs, and te business elite is also possible. This would restore te pre-crisis parliamentary status quo. Anti-Kuchma reformers, however, would demand serious concessions before they would join such a bloc. Their conditions would include a diminution of presidential powers and te replacement of corrupt ministers, te prosecutor-general, and te tax chief.
Two other outcomes are possible as well. All of te major political players could join together in a push for constitutional reform, restructuring te balance of political power in Ukraine by taking
authority away from te president and vesting it in a prime minister answerable to parliament. Alternatively, massive public protests, spurred perhaps by te upcoming funeral of Gongadze or te visit of Pope John Paul II in June, could unleash a democratic revolution against Ukraine's entrenched interests.
Of these five possible futures for Ukraine, te first two -- widespread repression or te formation of a coalition between oligarchs and communists -- would have te worst impact on Western interests and values. Te other three scenarios might allow for continued economic progress together with ongoing democratic reform. But since neither a popular uprising nor a stable restoration of te  pre-crisis parliamentary coalition is particularly likely, Western policy should focus on more plausible prospects. This means trying to foster long-term constitutional reform and political compromise that
preserves te pro-reform program of Prime Minister Yushchenko and leads to a durable system of checks and balances.
Last February, after a month on te ropes and with Ukraine approaching chaos, Kuchma went on te political offensive. He let loose te militia and security services, who brutally beat some protesters and started criminal proceedings against others. But despite these heavy-handed gestures, Kuchma simultaneously began making concessions to his reformist prime minister. And one of Kuchma's staunchest allies -- Sergei Tyhypko, a former deputy prime minister allied with one of
te oligarchic clans -- joined suit. Tyhypko issued what amounted to a call for compromise, saying, "We have to start with te acknowledgment that there is a problem and we need to launch a discourse. We need a dialogue. This dialogue has to begin with te leaders, with te parties, with te leaders of parliamentary factions. We need to shed ekstreme positions."
How should te United States, te European Union, and international donors respond to this complex and fluid situation? President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and various European leaders have all warned of te dire consequences that await Ukraine's leaders
should they pursue a path of repression. This strong tone toward Kiev should be maintained. Some in te West may be tempted to do little more than talk tough, believing te problems in Ukraine to be so deep-rooted and intractable as to be beyond resolution. Giving up would be a mistake, however. Despite recent events, te situation on te ground is actually far from bleak. Te billions of dollars of
foreign aid sent during te 1990s have not been squandered, and Ukraine today has significant pro-reform and pro-democracy forces, along with a new entrepreneurial class free from te corrupt
oligarchic system. These factors, as well as te growing disaffection of some of Kuchma's backers among te oligarchs, have left te president vulnerable and susceptible to pressure.
To nurture te forces of reform, Western policy must remain actively engaged in Ukraine through both diplomacy and democracy assistance. Economic aid to te Ukrainian government should be made conditional on respect for human rights and te rule of law, even as assistance to independent civic groups and te media is significantly expanded. Aid programs should serve a variety of objectives. These must include institutional and constitutional measures to reduce presidential    power, enhance te authority of investigative bodies (including parliament), ensure judicial independence, and promote a system of checks and balances. If a balance of power within te government is not restored, te current pattern of state scandals is likely to be repeated under future presidents.
Western aid should also aim to combat corruption by promoting transparency and by helping media and civic groups monitor abuses of power. This aid should be coupled with international efforts to track and expose corrupt Ukrainian officials, revealing te real estate, business, and financial holdings of government officials and comparing those holdings with te officials' publicly stated incomes.
Ukraine also needs technical assistance for its police and tax authorities. This aid must be linked to te services' strict depoliticization, however. Technical-assistance programs involving te Ukrainian interior ministry and te prosecutor-general's office should be suspended until officials linked to te obstruction of justice in te Gongadze inquiry and te tape case are removed from office.
Western policy should also funnel aid to exchange programs and educational initiatives that enhance links between Ukraine's future leaders and their counterparts in Europe and in te United States.
Such programs should be expanded, and Ukraine should be encouraged to work with new democracies in central Europe.
Finally, Western aid to civic groups, anticorruption activists, human rights organizations, and other Ukrainian policy centers should be dramatically expanded. Te able U.S. ambassador in Kiev, Carlos Pascual, announced in mid-March a new initiative to help te Ukrainian media. But te $750,000 allocated for this purpose is significantly less than is needed. A low-interest loan and grant program for assisting independent print and broadcast media should be established,  modeled in part on te successful Enterprise Fund programs that operates in central and northern Europe. Radio Liberty, which now reaches an audience of some 3.5 million listeners, has emerged as a major source for independent information as te state-controlled media have become more propagandistic. Radio Liberty's Ukrainian service should therefore be given new short-term resources to expand its reach and reporting.
In addition to these practical measures, a paradigm shift is also necessary for Western policy toward Ukraine. President Kuchma can no longer be regarded as te crucial personal guarantor of reform or of a pro-Western orientation. Indeed, Western leaders should recognize te possibility that Kuchma has become an obstacle to such aims. This is not to say, however, that Kuchma's resignation now would inevitably improve Ukraine's chances for reform. Other influential security and oligarchic forces are jockeying for control. Their accession to power could solidify te current patterns of corruption, anti-democratic practices, and drift toward Russia. Western efforts must therefore
revolve around bolstering democratic civic and political forces and helping Ukrainians build more effective democratic institutions.
Although Kuchma's image has been badly tarnished and his stature diminished, he has not yet crossed te line into outright political repression. Until he does so or until incontrovertible evidence proves his involvement in criminal actions, he should not be ostracized. Instead, te West should press him to allow open and impartial investigations of alleged misconduct, to start discussing possible compromises with his domestic critics, and to cede more power to Prime Minister Yushchenko's reform government. Kuchma and his allies should be warned, however, of te punishing economic and diplomatic isolation that will result if they resort to repression.
Te current crisis has shown that, after a decade of independence, most Ukrainians seem to have absorbed te norms of more established democracies: witness their appalled reaction to te alleged misconduct and corruption of their highest officials. Many Ukrainians have proven ready to mobilize in defense of democracy and te rule of law. There remains a good chance, therefore, that te current scandal and political crisis will end auspiciously, with te kind of changes that will lead te country toward healthy and durable political and economic development. These changes are far from guaranteed. But should they occur, it will mean that te death of Heorhiy Gongadze -- tragic though it was -- was not entirely in vain.
FROM:  E. Morgan Williams,  Conference Moderator "Ukraine......Breadbasket to Marketbasket"
May, 9th, Washington, D.C.
U.S.-UKRAINE FOUNDATION TE CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS.
SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR MAY 9, 2001
Te 10th Anniversary of te U.S.-Ukraine Foundation provides us with an opportunity to celebrate and review te important achievements Ukraine has accomplished since its independence just a decade ago.
Ukraine occupies one of te most important geo-strategic locations in te world.  It is truly a bridge from te west to te east.  I believe stability in Ukraine is in te national security interests of te United States.  I have taken a keen interest in Ukraine's emergence from te former Soviet Union as a responsible member of te international community.
I remember my first visit to Kiev in 1992, just after te dissolution of te Soviet Union.  Borispol Airport was full of broken windows and roving packs of dogs.  Kiev was a depressed city.  There was very little foreign investment, and te people displayed little hope for te future.  Te United States did not have an Ambassador in place, and we did not have an embassy.  In fact, our diplomatic presence consisted of a lone foreign service officer working out of his apartment.
That first visit to Ukraine convinced me of te need for te United States to seriously consider our relationship with this very important country.  When I returned to Washington, I visited with Secretary of State Baker and informed him of te conditions in Ukraine and te need for a strong diplomatic presence as well as American assistance. There was little doubt that foreign aid and investment would be essential to te future of te country.
Te testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan shocked many around te world.  Te nuclear aspirations of regional powers and rogue nations highlight te important decision made in Ukraine.  When te Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine became te third largest nuclear power in te world.  Kazakstan and Belarus inherited te fourth and eighth largest nuclear arsenals. Te addition of three more nuclear weapons states would have drastically changed te geo-strategic landscape.
Without Nunn-Lugar, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus would still have thousands of nuclear weapons.  Instead, all three countries are nuclear weapons-free. Many have forgotten te wise and brave choice Ukraine made in becoming nuclear-free.  There were many in Kiev who advocated te maintenance of these weapons.  Te people and te leaders of Ukraine wisely chose a nuclear-free status.
While debates over te future of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal were going on Kiev, Russian President Yeltsin was expressing great concern over te possibility of a nuclear neighbor.  My partner, former
Senator Sam Nunn and I visited with President Yeltsin in November of 1992 and explained our plans to travel to Ukraine and offer substantial amounts of American assistance in meeting te requirements of te Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
In Kiev we met with President Kravchuk to discuss Ukraine's nuclear future. I explained that te United States was willing to provide $150 million in assistance if Ukraine agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons.  President Kravchuk quickly called a press conference and announced that I had offered Ukraine $175 million in foreign assistance. Fortunately, President Bush agreed to this alteration of U.S. policy.
I am proud of te role te United States played in Ukraine's decision and te role of te Nunn-Lugar program in facilitating te removal of thousands of nuclear warheads. In Ukraine Nunn-Lugar has provided more than $500 million to dismantle hundreds of SS-19 and SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, silos, long-range Bear and Blackjack bombers, and nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise missiles. Work is expected to continue through 2005.
To date, te Nunn-Lugar Scorecard is impressive.  Nunn-Lugar has facilitated te destruction of 422 ballistic missiles, 367 ballistic missile launchers, 83 bombers, 425 long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, 308 submarine missile launchers, 184 submarine launched ballistic missiles, and 18 strategic missile submarines.  It also has sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels.  Most notably, 5,336 warheads that were on strategic systems aimed at te United States have been deactivated.  To put this into perspective, Nunn-Lugar has dismantled more nuclear weaponry than te countries of Great Britain, France, and China currently possess in their stockpiles and arsenals
Ukraine has also exhibited great leadership and far-sightedness in another area of nuclear concern.  Te world was relieved by Ukraine's decision to close te nuclear power plant at Chernobyl.  I am pleased te U.S. and E.U. cooperated with Ukraine to provide te funding and technical assistance necessary to secure te closing. Unfortunately, our relief is offset by te knowledge that many other similar reactors are still in place and operating in states of te former Soviet Union. Through programs such as te International Nuclear Safety Program at te Department of Energy, te U.S. hopes to complete safety upgrades for all 65 Soviet-designed nuclear power plants in nine countries by 2006.
I am pleased that Ukraine has established good relations with all of its neighbors, as well as with NATO.  Ukraine's membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace and te signing of te Ukraine-NATO Charter on Distinctive Partnership are important steps in Ukraine's emergence as an effective partner and international leader.  In both instances, Ukraine has been an active member hosting military exercises and participating in SFOR and KFOR peacekeeping missions in te Balkans.  They are making progress towards their stated goal of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic security structures.
Ukraine has correctly set its long-range sights on membership in te European Union.  I am pleased by te signing of several EU-Ukrainian agreements, including most-favored nation status and other trade advantages.
I would recommend to our colleagues in te European Union that they provide Kiev with a light at te end of te tunnel. An EU signal that future membership is possible would make a tremendous impact on Ukrainian commitment to market reforms.  Just as te open-door policy under Article 10 of te North Atlantic Treaty provides nations with hope and incentive for future NATO membership; so should te EU give states te encouragement to continue economic reforms.
Ukraine has been viewed as a model for former Soviet states. But for progress to continue and its emergence as a democratic and economic power be assured, its pro-Western stance in relation to NATO and te EU must be maintained and expanded.
Ukraine has had mixed success in economic reform.  Despite lapses, progress on monetary and fiscal policies have dramatically lowered inflation and permitted te establishment of a Ukrainian currency. However, corruption and structural reform must be addressed, only then will te ground work be laid for long-term growth.
Ukraine must legislate and implement necessary economic reforms.  I believe former Prime Minister Yushchenko' ambitious reform program was a proper model.  Unfortunately, various parties and cliques in te Rada were less than enthusiastic in legislating and implementing many specific reforms, including: tax reform, accelerated privatization of industry, land privatization, and bureaucratic reductions.  Only upon te resumption of reforms will te foundation be laid for long-term Ukrainian economic stability.
Te U.S. must remain committed to assisting Ukraine in pursuing market economic reforms.  Te American-Ukrainian partnership and economic cooperation must be renewed and expanded.  Not only must Ukraine be prepared to make difficult choices and implement challenging economic policies; but te U.S. must be prepared to expand its role in assisting in reform implementation.
Over te next two years, Ukraine will hold parliamentary and presidential elections.  It is unclear if a governmental solution will be found to move forward until then.  But it is clear that te cooperative coalition between te President, te Prime Minister, and te parliament must be refurbished.  Only with all three units of government operating towards te same ends, namely economic and structural reform, will Ukraine take te steps necessary to maintain its western orientation and complete economic reforms.
It is telling that Western observers point out that few Ukrainian political officials are particularly well-liked or admired. Former Prime Minister Yushchenko is generally regarded as te exception to this rule. I am hopeful this popularity has less to do with his personality and more to do with his strong support for economic and governmental reform.  I am hopeful that in te coming elections te
Ukrainian people will choose te proper path and te government delivers.
Many in Washington are concerned that Ukraine may slide backwards; rather, than continue its forward progress.  Ukraine must recommit itself to te  freedom of te press, religion, and te importance of human rights. Only by reinforcing te basic tenets of democratic governance will Ukraine shield itself from future threats on its march to a democratic, market economic state.
Te murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze remains a high hurdle to progress in Ukraine.  It is difficult to see how te reform agenda can be pursued until te investigation is concluded.  It is in te best interests of Ukraine to swiftly bring te case to justice. Te government must show its commitment to te rule of law and order. Requests for American and European cooperation and assistance would go far in reassuring te Ukrainian people that justice will be served.
Your meetings come at a very important time.  As a friend of Ukraine, I am concerned by te recent political developments in Kiev. Ukraine has made such important progress that we must all redouble our efforts to ensure that Ukraine does not lose ground during this time of political upheaval.
USA finansierer antirussiske kræfter i Ukraine
Den russiske internetavis Strana.ru offentliggjorde den 21.5.2001 et interview med direktøren for Center for politiske studier og konfliktologi i Kyiv, Mykhajlo Pohrebynskyj. "Hvad angår politiske organisationer er det velkendt, at de nationalistiske organisationer, som eksisterer i Ukraine og er blevet revitaliseret, udelukkende lever af vestlig hjælp, mener Pohrebynskyj", skriver reporteren Anna Tjeremushkina ifølge korrespondent.net.
Strana.ru: Hvilke hovedmål forfølger Washington efter Deres opfattelse i Ukraine? Hvem opstiller dem, og hvem fører dem ud i livet?
Pohrebynskyj: Frem for alt mener jeg, at Bush's regering indtil videre ikke har udarbejdet nogen klar linje i forhold til Ukraine, ligesom i øvrigt i andre spørgsmål. Der findes en ret indflydelsesrig gruppe derover, som forfægter en antirussisk linje. Dens allermest konsekvente eksponent er Zbigniew Brzezinski (polskfødt ruslandsekspert, red.), hans elever arbejder i eller er tilknyttet forskellige organisationer, som virker i Ukraine, så som f.eks. "Freedom House" og den ukrainske afdeling af radio "Liberty", som ledes af Roman Kupczinski. Deres holdning går i bund og grund ud på, at genetableringen af Rusland som en trusselsfaktor kun er mulig i fuldt omfang, hvis Ukraine påny falder ind under Moskvas afgørende indflydelse. Såfremt Ukraine bevares som en selvstændig stat, altså uafhængig udadtil, så vil Rusland ikke udgøre en sådan trussel. De politikere, som er opdraget i denne ånd, herunder den nye generation, findes. De havde indflydelse såvel i den forrige [amerikanske] regering som i den nuværende regering.
Det ser ud til, at der indtil videre ikke findes en endelig holdning, og det kan man udlede af en række nuancer. Men der er visse ændringer i den retorik, som repræsentanter for Bush's regering og andre organisationer, som bare for en måned siden indtog en klar anti-præsidentiel position, lægger for dagen. I dag bliver den opblødt, men i sidste ende kan en eller anden gennemsnitlig linje løbe af med sejren. Ikke den, som jeg lige har omtalt, og som betragter Ukraine som en garant for så at sige Ruslands relative svækkelse og Vestens garant i fremtiden mod et aggressivt og muligvis uforudsigeligt Rusland.
Den anden holdning er mere pragmatisk. Den går ud på, at Ukraine som en stabilitetsfaktor i Europa fortjener, at man engagerer sig i landets indre interesser uden at prøve på at ændre den offentlige mening og de fleste personers mening med brutale midler. Den består af mere subtile fremgangsmåder, som i det mindste skal fastholde en status af respektabelt partnerskab både i forhold til Rusland og Ukraine. Jeg tror, at der endnu ikke forelægger en klar position. Derfor er det i dag vanskeligt at komme med et mere definitivt bud.
Strana.ru: Hvor aktivt arbejder amerikanerne efter Deres mening med ukrainske anliggender? Hvilke af Ukraines politiske kræfter modtager penge fra USA?
Pohrebynskyj: Jeg ligger ikke inde med den slags oplysninger. Der er nogle meget indirekte data om, at der for det første findes et system af fonde, ligesom i Rusland. Disse fonde er først og fremmest amerikanske, og de bevilges frem for alt til organisationer, som har en national ukrainsk dimension, mens de organisationer, som er neutrale i den henseende reelt er afskåret fra dem. Det kan man betragte som en af kilderne til støtte for antirussiske aktiviteter. Der er f.eks. sådanne organisationer som "Judicial Foundation" - det er en juridisk fond, som ledes af Serhij Holovatyj, som er en aktiv oppositionel. Jeg formoder, at den ikke kan opretholde sig selv for egne midler. Efter alt at dømme lever den af en eller anden form for fonde, det er min antagelse.
Med hensyn til politiske organisationer er det velkendt, at nationalistiske organisationer, som nu har fået en revitalisering, udelukkende eksisterer i kraft af vestlig finansiel støtte. Det gælder bl.a. Kongressen af ukrainske nationalister (KUN) og partierne Rukh (leder Udovenko) og "Reformer og orden". D.v.s., at den finansielle støtte bevilges til netop denne kreds af organisationer, samt endvidere til enkeltstående personer, som så at sige repræsenterer den såkaldte tredje sektor - forskningscentrene. Der er personer, som er ledere af en eller anden form for sofa-partier og samtidigt er ledere af denne tredje sektors centre: centrum for udforskning af demokrati eller lykken for alle ukrainere i verden. De har let ved at modtage bevillinger. Mens dem, som ville ønske lykken for det russiske sprog i Ukraine, ikke har nogen som helst chancer.
Strana.ru: Hvem står så i spidsen for disse centre?
Pohrebynskyj: Små grupperinger, som imiterer enorm handlekraft for amerikanske penge. Hvis de af og til får adgang til præsidentens administration, eftersom vi ikke har nogen særlig dreven personalepolitik, så bliver de straks loyale. Når det så viser sig, at de udover at modtage fondsstøtte, ikke laver noget som helst, og det set i lyset af, at de har en eller anden videnskabelig titel, de underviste marksisme-leninisme, så bliver de nødt til at gå, og går igen i opposition (et eksempel er lederen af enmandspartiet "Ukraines national-konservative parti", Oleh Soskin, som forleden dag var i dansk Tv og talte om "krig mod Rusland og Kutjmas bande-regime" og som i 1999 en kort overgang var Kutjmas rådgiver, red.). Vi har også nogle, som allerede været ansat i præsidentens administration, hos borgmesteren og alligevel vender tilbage til det sted, hvor de kan få fondsmidler, og hvor de kan føle sig uafhængige.
"Demokrati i Ukraine ville føre til valget af en prorussisk præsident"
USAs politik i forhold til Ukraine kontrolleres hverken af det amerikanske udenrigsministerium eller af Det hvide Hus, men af en gruppering af senatorer og kongresmedlemmer, som styrer de fonde, som er umiddelbart engageret i Ukraine, mener Sergej Markov, der er direktør for Institut for politiske studier i Moskva. Hans synspunkt blev fremsat i et interview med den Kreml-nære website strana.ru i maj i år.
Strana.ru: Er det rigtigt, at Ukraine er en kampplads mellem Rusland og Vesten?
Markov: Det tror jeg ikke. Det er en forenkling, som forvandles til en usandhed. Sagen er den, at Vestens politik i relation til Ukraine kun er formuleret i nogle generelle træk. Dens kerne består i, at Ukraine skal have støtte til at befæste sin uafhængighed og skal eksistere som en uafhængig europæisk stat, og skal ikke opsluges af Rusland. Samtidigt må Ukraine støttes i gennemførelsen af demokratiske og økonomiske reformer og en trinvis integration i de europæiske strukturer, men her er hjælpen minimal. Med andre ord skal ukrainerne selv sørge for alt dette, mens Vesten bare skal hilse det velkomment og hjælpe hist og her.
Den russiske politik står ikke i modsætning til et eneste af disse hovedelementer i den vestlige politik i forhold til Ukraine. Rusland mener også, at Ukraine skal være en uafhængig europæisk stat og skal integreres i de europæiske økonomiske og politiske strukturer. Dernæst følger der visse uoverensstemmelser, men uoverensstemmelserne er ikke mellem Vesten og Rusland, men mellem to vestlige udgangspunkter.
Europæerne mener, at Ukraine skal tilslutte sig de europæiske strukturer, og samtidigt med det blive integreret med Rusland. Bl.a. ved at lave en økonomisk union, indgå en aftale om en toldzone, selvfølgeligt uden visa m.v. Europæerne antager, at Rusland og Ukraine sammen hurtigere vil kunne bevæge sig henimod en integration i Europa. Og europæerne ser ingen alvorlig trussel i deres fælles integration.
USA har en anden politik. USA er i dag meget bange for en integration mellem Rusland og Ukraine, men her er der også en specifik indfaldsvinkel. De er først og fremmest bange for en styrkelse af Rusland. Og her bør man fremhæve, at den amerikanske politik i forhold til Ukraine er marginaliseret. USAs politik i forhold til Ukraine kontrolleres hverken af det amerikanske udenrigsministerium eller af Det hvide Hus. Den styres af en gruppering af senatorer og kongresmedlemmer, som kontrollerer de fonde, som umiddelbart arbejder i Ukraine. Det system arbejder fortræffeligt. Arbejdet føres umiddelbart med de ukrainske deputerede, ukrainske journalister, ledere af ukrainske politiske partier og prominente politikere. Ukraine er for længst blevet USAs vassal, og Ukraines præsident er ikke fri i sin politik, men skal spørge om lov hos amerikanerne. Denne politik er rettet mod at forhindre en integration mellem Ukraine og Rusland og den provokerer og oppisker konflikter mellem Rusland og Ukraine. Alt i alt er denne politik ikke for alvor erkendt af flertallet af de amerikanske diplomater for slet ikke at tale om det amerikanske folk.
Og denne politik, som ikke afspejler USAs nationale interesser, og som frem for alt ikke afspejler Vesten generelle linje - denne politik kommer i modstrid med den russiske indfaldsvinkel.
Viktor Jusjenko er ikke nogen provestlig politiker. Hvordan kan han være det, når der i demonstrationerne til støtte for ham for det meste deltog ultranationalister og fascister, som heller ikke kan lide Vesten, og som mener, at det moderne Vesten er et kastreret og globalistisk subjekt.
I lyset af det ville jeg ikke påstå, at Rusland har en konfrontation med Vesten i Ukraine. Men Rusland fører ikke nogen dialog med Vesten, med europæerne, angående Ukraine. I den henseende er det, som træder frem, en marginal konflikt med en marginal gruppe, som har usurperet den amerikanske politik i forhold til Ukraine, og det russiske diplomati, som næsten intet laver.
Ukraine er interesseret i demokrati. Rusland er interesseret i ukrainsk demokrati. Eftersom det store flertal af Ukraines borgere går ind for den tættest mulige union med Rusland betyder det, at jo mere demokrati i Ukraine, des mere prorussisk bliver ukrainsk politik. Jeg formoder, at Rusland bør have en maksimal kontakt med europæerne for i fællesskab at føre en politik i Ukraine - en politik, som ville bidrage til demokratiets udvikling. Hvis man holder et demokratisk valg i Ukraine, vil man vælge en prorussisk præsident, mens en antirussisk politik kun kan blive påtvunget de ukrainske vælgere.
8. "En polsk plan for Ukraine"
I et interview med strana.ru dagen før Ukraines premierminister Viktor Jusjenko blev afsat af Verkhovna Rada den 26. april i år redegjorde Sergej Markov - direktør for Institut for politiske studier i Moskva - bl.a. for sin teori om "den polske plan for Ukraine":
"Efter 10 års permanent krise i Rusland er økonomien nu i vækst, man har en stærk og populær præsident, en rationel politik, som forfægter de nationale interesser og økonomiske reformer. Rusland står på tærsklen til en opgangsperiode, men der findes kræfter i verden, som gerne vil standse denne fremgang ved at spille Ukraine og Rusland ud mod hinanden.
Takket være en vis forbedring af relationerne mellem Rusland og Ukraine i løbet af det sidste 1½ års tid og takke være en begyndende vækst i den russiske økonomi har man i samme periode kunnet konstatere en markant vækst i Ukraines økonomi. Det er blevet klart, at Ukraines befolkning i stigende grad støtter en styrkelse af forbindelserne til Rusland og en fjernelse af de kunstige barrierer, som er blevet skabt i løbet af de sidste 10 år. Samtidigt med det har der fundet et lille kup sted, mens et stort kup er under forberedelse. Det lille kup er sket i USAs regering. Det ukrainske område er blevet overtaget af en gruppe kongressfolk og senatorer af polsk afstamning, mens både udenrigsministeriet, CIA, det nationale sikkerhedsråd og andre underafdelinger reelt er blevet fjernet fra de afgørende beslutninger i udarbejdelsen af den amerikanske politik i forhold til Ukraine. I USA kontrolleres denne politik i dag af en gruppering, som vi for enkelthedens skyld betegner som Brzezinskis gruppe, eftersom Zbigniew Brzezinski, der nærer et gammelt had til Rusland, og hans sønner Ian og Mark spiller en nøglerolle heri. De har udarbejdet og begyndt at virkeliggøre en plan for et krybende statskup i Ukraine.
Det er helt bevidst, at jeg ikke kalder Brzezinskis plan for en amerikansk plan. For den er i strid med USAs nationale interesser. Denne plan bryder med alle de amerikanske værdier, frihedsidealer, demokratiidealer, lighedsidealer o.s.v. Det er ikke en amerikansk plan, men en polsk plan for Ukraine.
Strana.ru: Hvorfor har Brzezinskis gruppering brug for et statskup i Ukraine?
Markov: Denne gruppes hovedmål er at skabe en kontrollabel konflikt mellem Ukraine og Rusland, for at forhindre Rusland i at genindtage sin plads i verden som en stormagt. En politiker, som går ind for at bryde forbindelserne til Rusland, kan ikke komme til magten i Ukraine ad demokratisk vej, eftersom det absolutte flertal af Ukraines borgere går ind for et godt forhold til vores land. Ifølge meningsmålinger går 36% ind for en sammenslutning med Rusland, 55% får ind for særlige venskabelige relationer (uden visum og told) og kun 8% går ind for, at Ukraine skal udvikle normale relatoner med Rusland, ligesom med andre lande. D.v.s. at 91% af Ukraines borgere går ind for en rationel forbedring af forholdet til Rusland. (En meningsmåling i 2001 synes i det store hele at bekræfte Markovs påstand, red.). Således kan en politiker med en antirussisk indstilling ikke vinde et valg i Ukraine ad demokratisk vej.
Situationen kan kun ændres gennem et fordækt og krybende statskup. Teknologien i denne omvæltning består i at indsætte en premierminister i Kutjmas regering, som kan være en marionet i de antirussiske politiske kræfters hænder og bagefter at sikre en langsom og glidende overførsel af magten fra præsidenten til premierministeren. Præsidenten bliver gjort til en syndebuk, mens premierministeren forbliver ren i offentlighedens øjne. Sidenhen bliver præsidenten fjernet fra magten, premierministeren overtager hans embedspligter som fungerende og koncentrerer den administrative resurse og massemedier i sine hænder. Kun på den måde kan en antirussisk politiker vinde et landsdækkende valg i Ukraine - ved hjælp af snyd og svindel. Premierministerposten er en nøglepost i den sammenhæng.
Det var sådan Viktor Jusjenko blev premierminister i Ukraine. Han er en svag politiker, men en sympatisk og venlig person at snakke med, og tilmed med en bohemeagtig natur. Jusjenko sover til middag, avler bier, arbejder med løvsav og maler. Men den rolle, som han har fået anvist, er at være Ukraines forræder. Med hans hjælp planlægger de antirussiske kræfter at skabe en kontrollabel konflikt mellem Ukraine og Rusland, hvor Ukraine bliver en brik i et fremmed geopolitisk spil. Jusjenko har sagt "ja" til at udføre denne rolle, og man er begyndt at promovere ham, "Gongadze-sagen" opstod, en sag, der helt sikkert er forfalsket. Alt dette blev skabt for at starte en klapjagt på Leonid Kutjma. Men Ukraines præsident og de grupperinger, som støtter ham, indså i sidste øjeblik, hvor det bar hen ad. De erkendte, at der venter Kutjma og dem, som omgiver ham, forfølgelser, hvis Jusjenko kommer til magten.
I denne situation er de grupperinger, som støtter Kutjma, blevet enige om at stille premierministeren overfor et mistillidsvotum. Deres mål er at forhindre et krybende statskup og, selvfølgeligt, at redde sig selv. [...]
Leonid Kutjma er en manøvrerende politiker. Som en svag personlighed er han bange for pres, og giver efter for det. Derfor giver Kutjma efter for pres [fra Brzezinski gruppen], selvom Jusjenkos tilbagetræden selvfølgelig er i hans egen interesse. Det er også muligt, at han udadtil lader som om han giver efter for presset og forsøger at overtale parlamentet til ikke at stemme for en mistillid til Jusjenko, men at han indadtil giver udtryk for, at han helst ser ham afsat, men via stråmænd; nemlig parlamentet.
Jeg tror, at det sidste er det mest sandsynlige. I forhold til dem, som afpresser ham, føler Kutjma, at han i deres øjne er nødt til at lægge afstand til afskedigelsen af en premierminister, som er blevet ham påduttet. [...]
Strana.ru: Hvad venter der Rusland, hvis det store kup, som De taler om, lykkes, og Viktor Jusjenko bliver Ukraines leder?
Markov: Så er det hele klart nok. For en måned siden tog Jusjenko ned for at besøge Kutjma på Krim og på vejen derned var det lige før han personligt fjernede og ødelagde russisk-sprogede vejskilte og udstedte direktiver om, at intet på Krim måtte minde om Rusland og russerne. Men Ukraines økonomi vil heller ikke ligefrem få gavn af det. Det er klart, at ingen i Europa venter på ukrainske varer, alt dette er bluff. Og hvis der skabes en kunstig konflikt mellem Ukraine og Rusland vil den ukrainske økonomi blive ramt af en altomfattende krise. Hvad er Krim uden russiske feriegæster? Regner man måske med, at tyskere og englændere vil tage derned?
Desværre er Jusjenko, som i starten hos mig personligt fremkaldte sympati, gået med til at spille rollen som trojansk hest, som udelukkende vil bringe Ukraine ulykker.
Strana.ru: Hvad er Tymoshenkos rolle i hele denne historie?
Markov: Tymoshenko er en meget sympatisk kvinde, en energisk og talentfuld manager. Ingen tvivl om, at sådanne som hende er det ukrainske folks guldreserve. Man kan imidlertid ikke komme udenom, at Julia Tymoshenko har sagt "ja" til at deltage i en fremmed plan. Hendes pris har været høj, for hvis Jusjenko bliver Ukraines præsident, så vil Tymoshenko blive premierminister, eller også vil hun, hvad der er mere sandsynligt, blive Ukraines vigtigste oligark. Tymoshenko er en meget sympatisk person, men hun har indgået en pagt med djævelen for pengenes og magtens skyld".
Ifølge en artikel bragt i strana.ru i marts 2001 under pseudonymet Bogdan Khmelnitskij går "Brzezinskis plan" bl.a. ud på "at etablere en permanent kontrollabel konflikt mellem Rusland og Ukraine". Planen skulle have følgende bestanddele:
- Skabelse af et intensivt konfliktfelt mellem Rusland og Ukraine og aktivering af hele spektret af uoverensstemmelser.
- Udnyttelse af det militært-teknologiske samarbejde med Rusland til at undergrave Ruslands militær-teknologiske potentiale for således at kuldkaste alle de fælles projekter indenfor den højteknologiske sfære.
- Etablering af NATOs kontrol med de ukrainske væbnede styrker og sikkerhedstjenester.
- Blokade af [den russiske] Sortehavsflåde og de russiske kommunikationslinjer.
- Ukraines tilslutning til det sanitære bælte rundt om Rusland.
- Indførelse af visumpligt mellem Rusland og Ukraine.
- Den totale fortrængning af det russiske sprog fra Ukraine og forbud mod brugen af det i de statslige institutioner og massemedier.
- Privatisering af gasledninger, energisystemer og andre af de tilbageblevne effektive virksomheder til fordel for polsk og anden østeuropæisk kapital.
Målet med en sådan kontrollabel russisk-ukrainsk konflikt er at blokere for Ruslands udvikling og sikre USAs og Polens dominans i Østeuropa og Eurasien.
9. "Rukhs chefideolog i polemik med strana.ru"
Professor of Political Science at Kyiv-Mohyla University Dr. Olexiy Haran' - Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. harano@wwic.si.edu
No more divisions of Europe
Te Baltimore Sun July 2, 2001
WASHINGTON - Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed his intention to integrate Russia into Europe, including te possibility of Moscow's membership in NATO.
Te problem for Mr. Putin is that NATO is not only a military alliance but a group of nations sharing democratic values and striving to unite Europe, not split it into post-Cold War spheres of influence.
But Moscow still considers te former Soviet republics, including te Baltic states, as its sphere of influence. It is significant that Mr. Putin's Russia greeted te new millennium with te sounds of te old Soviet anthem as Russia's new national anthem.
As a pragmatic politician, Mr. Putin understands he cannot restore te old Soviet Union. He is ready to recognize te independence of Russia's neighbors, but at te same time he takes every opportunity to circumscribe their shaky sovereignty by:
- Opposing NATO membership for all former Soviet republics.
- Opposing an association of Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, which seeks to diversify te transport of oil and gas from te Caspian Sea basin to Europe.
- Promoting te expansion of Russian capital in post-Soviet areas.
- Exploiting te economic, political and ethnic problems of te newly independent countries.
Te Kremlin is paying particular attention to Ukraine, a country with 50 million people.
Ukraine's relations with te West have deteriorated because of te scandal surrounding te disappearance and presumed assassination of online journalist Heorhij Gongadze, in which Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has been implicated, and te recent ouster of reform-minded Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko.
Te main channel of Russian television, which is widely viewed in Ukraine, participated in te discrediting campaign against Mr. Yushchenko. Further, te new Russian ambassador to Kiev, who also serves as Mr. Putin's special representative on economic issues, is Viktor Chernomyrdin, te former Russian prime minister.
Russia's most recent attack was te propaganda campaign against Pope John Paul II's visit to Ukraine. Te pope held religious services both in Kiev, where Orthodoxy was introduced in 988, and in Lvov, te center of Ukrainian Catholicism.
It appears Russia may view te border between Western and Orthodox civilization as cutting through Ukraine.
Te majority of Ukraine's population is Orthodox. But of te three Orthodox churches, only one recognizes te authority of Moscow. Moreover, more than 5 million people are Catholics of te Eastern Rite (Greek-Catholics) and recognize te authority of te Vatican. Te pope's presence in Ukraine served to underline te progress toward reconciliation among Jews, Ukrainians (Orthodox and Greek-Catholic) and Poles, who constitute te overwhelming majority of Ukraine's Roman Catholics.
Russia's concern about te "threat of Catholicism" is easily explained: Te Orthodox Church in Russia is terrified at te prospect of losing half of its parishes to te Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Te issue is not only te parishes but te money they generate. Mr. Putin must decide whether Russia's interests are served by te Russian Orthodox Church.
It is imperative that te West make it clear to Mr. Putin that te process of integrating Russia into Europe does not permit te division of Europe into spheres of influence. Unfortunately, te atmospherics in Moscow surrounding te pope's visit to Ukraine does not bode well
for Russia's alleged "Europeanism."
Olexiy Haran is professor of political science at Kiev-Mohyla University in Ukraine and a visiting scholar at te Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center.
27.07.01. Polsk lobby ønsker Ukraine ind i NATO
Den amerikanske nationale sikkerhedspolitiske rådgiver Condolizza Rice's besøg til Ukraine blev aktivt promoveret af Polen, hævder den polske avis Gazeta Wyborcza, skriver UP med henvisning til Deutsche Welles ukrainske afdeling.
Ifølge den polske regeringsavis har situationen i Ukraine efterhånden i længere tid været i centrum for polsk-amerikanske topmøder. Under den amerikanske præsidents seneste besøg i den polske hovedstad hørte Rice så meget om politikken i forhold til Kyiv, at hun ganske enkelt "blev smittet af en interesse for Ukraine", - hævder Gazeta Wyborcza.
Polakkernes pres har ført til, at der i øjeblikket er ved at blive dannet en "Klub for venner af Ukraine" som skal virke til fordel for en forbedring af relationerne mellem Washington og Kyiv. Efter planen skal denne klub arbejde efter samme model som klubben for "Venner af Polen", der op gennem 90'erne spillede rollen i den amerikanske hovedstad som lobby for Polens optagelse i NATO. Klubben havde nogle af de fremtrædende repræsentanter for den polske diaspora, amerikanske politikere, kongresmedlemmer, publicister, herunder Brzezinski og Novak-Jezioranski som medlemmer. De støttede Polen gennem breve, demonstrationer og konferencer.
I dag gøder de amerikanske "Venner af Ukraine" ifølge Gazeta Wyborcza bunden for et møde mellem præsidenterne Bush, Kwasniewski og Kutjma. Et sådant møde kunne medvirke til en offentlig anerkendelse af trekanten Washington-Warszawa-Kiev.
Taking Measure of a U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership
Washington, DC, International Conference to Assess Ukraine’s Global Strategic Role
WARREN, MI--Government leaders and international foreign-policy experts will gather in Washington, DC, to analyze Ukraine’s strategic role in world and regional affairs at a follow-up conference to last year’s successful inaugural session, called “Ukraine’s Quest for Mature Nation
Statehood: Roundtable II—Taking Measure of a U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership.”
This year’s gathering will be held at te U.S. Congress, Thursday, September 20, and Friday, September 21. According to te conference’s organizers, te Organization for te Defense of Four
Freedoms for Ukraine, te roster of speakers will include government officials from Ukraine, te United States and Eastern European countries, as well as prominent leaders from financial institutions, research centers and academia. According to te conference’s organizers, te Organization for te Defense of Four Freedoms for Ukraine, te roster of speakers will include government officials from Ukraine, te United States and Eastern European countries, as well as
prominent leaders from financial institutions, research centers and academia.
Te conference will feature 13 panels, divided among four principal sessions, two working lunches, two focus sessions and an evening reception. Organizers said that 73 speakers, 24 of whom are expected to be from Ukraine, will be featured at te conference.
“Over te course of te past decade, relations between te United States and Ukraine have undergone significant change. Two principal, overarching factors have emerged, which today constitute and justify te strategic nature of that relationship: global security and regional stability.
Beyond these core considerations, there are critical direct benefits to be derived form a strong bilateral relationship,” observed Bohdan Fedorak, president of te sponsoring organization.
Mr. Fedorak noted that te purpose of te conference is to objectively assess te capacity of te United States and Ukraine to make te requisite political, economic, diplomatic and military commitments to te realization of these strategic goals. Te year’s conference will be held on te occasion of te 10th anniversary of Ukraine’s restored independence, which should figure
prominently in te participants’ analyses.
Te year 2000 conference, which hosted 84 speakers, was held at te Library of Congress and at te Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. Major sessions of that conference were webcast live worldwide and, according to te sponsors, efforts are underway to simulcast via te Internet this year’s session. Last year’s conference was videotaped in its entirety by te U.S. Department of State for frequent airing at special occasions. A complete transcript of te proceedings was produced for te purposes of publishing a monograph in both English and Ukrainian.
Te following is te preliminary list of sponsors of “Ukraine’s Quest for Mature Nation Statehood--Roundtable II”:
Congressional Ukrainian Caucus, Embassy of Ukraine, American Foreign Policy Council, National Endowment for Democracy, International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, Harriman Institute/Columbia University, UNSP/Harvard University, SAIS/Johns Hopkins University, Organization for te Defense of Four Freedoms for Ukraine, Ukrainian American Freedom Foundation, Ukrainian World Congress, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Ukrainian National Information Service, Ukrainian Central Information Service, Ukrainian Academic and Professional Association.
Bushs udsending opfordrer Ukraine til demokratiske reformer og integration i Europa
De forenede Stater hilser gode udenrigspolitiske relationer mellem Ukraine og Rusland velkommen, og mener ikke at de skader USAs partnerskab med Kyiv. Det sagde USAs vice-udenrigsminister Elisabeth JONES på en pressekonference i Kyiv den 24. august, skriver korrespondent.net med henvisning til Ukrajinski Novyny.
"Vi konkurrerer ikke med Rusland", - erklærede Jones. "Vi hilser præsident Putins tilstedeværelse her velkommen". "Ukraine og Rusland er naboer og der bør herske gode relationer mellem naboer", - supplerede den amerikanske ambassadør i Kyiv, Carlos Pasqual.
Fru Jones var den amerikanske regerings officielle repræsentant under Ukraines 10-års jubilæum som selvstændig stat og hun medbragte en officiel erklæring, som opfordrede Ukraine til demokratiske reformer, der tager sigte på en tilslutning til Europa.
"Vi tror på Ukraines europæiske skæbne", - sagde den amerikanske vice-udenrigsminister.
Jones mødtes bl.a. med præsident Leonid Kutjma og oplyste, at hun takkede ham for den indstilling af våbenleverancerne til Makedonien, som Washington tidligere havde bedt Kyiv om.
USAID og andre amerikanske fonde i Ukraine
Artikel bragt på den officielle Kreml-hjemmeside strana.ru i juli 2001. Forfatteren til artiklen var ikke angivet, end ikke med et pseudonym, men man gå ud fra at strana.ru ikke offentliggør noget, der er pure opspind. Mange af oplysninger passer ind i et billede, der gennem længere tid har tegnet sig hos mig som iagttager af udviklingen af i Ukraine. Nyhederne har dog bortredigeret nogle af de mere spekulative afsnit. Strana har i øvrigt lige søsat et nyt internetprojekt - ukraine.ru.
"Netværket af vestlige velgørende fonde og non-profit organisationer omslutter alle sfærer af Ukraines politiske liv. Systemet af fonde og non-profit organisationer udarbejder og implementerer diverse støtteprogrammer til udvikling af det civile samfunds institutioner (såvel på regeringsniveau som på NGO-niveau) og tilbyder rådgivning indenfor diverse spørgsmål der vedrører statsbygningsprocessen. Systemet er opbygget på en måde, som omdanner det til et organisatorisk våben, som kan dirigeres over i gennemførelsen af radikale ændringer i staten, ligeså snart at der forelægger direktiver fra de reelle ejere.
Det er derfor værd at fremhæve en række felter, der udgør en særlig stor interesse for de vestlige donororganisationer:
- folkedeputerede (parlamentsmedlemmer) og deputerede i rådene på alle administrative niveauer;
- konkrete samfundsspidser og politikere;
- politiske partier og massemedier;
- fagforeninger og samfundsorganisationer.
I Verkhovna Rada (parlamentet) har man f.eks. det såkaldte "Støtteprogram for Ukraines parlament", som ledes af dr. Charles Weiss og støttes af De forenede Staters Agentur for international udvikling (United States Agency for International Development - USAID), Sammenslutningen af USAs tidligere kongresmedlemmer, Det højeste justitsvæsens konsortium (ARD), som er en del af USAID, og mange andre.
Der er etableret en mekanisme for rådgivningshjælp, som disse strukturer yder til de deputerede. Desuden eksisterer der et helt system af alskens bevillinger til parlamentsmedlemmer og deres referenter.
Via "Støtteprogram for Ukraines parlament" har man oprettet Ukraines Verkhovna Radas forskningstjeneste - også kaldet "De parlamentariske udvalgs virksomhed". Den amerikanske kongres' forskningstjeneste arbejder inde i [Ukraines] parlament. Omkring disse slagkraftige centre er der oprettet et helt netværk af forskningsstrukturer, som finansieres af velgørende fonde (Laboratorium 4 og lign.).
Officielt består alle disse strukturers programmer i en juridisk og forfatningsmæssig projektering og levering af alternativ information fra udenlandske kilder med henblik på udvikling af lovgivningsarbejdet og Verkhovna Radas infrastruktur. Reelt er det USAID der er hovedinvestoren i udviklingen af ukrainsk parlamentarisme. Agenturet har status af en amerikansk regeringorganisation (og bliver dermed finansieret af amerikanske skatteydere) og yder ikke nogen direkte bevillinger til ukrainske organisationer. Midlerne stilles til rådighed via amerikanske organisationer (i henhold til disses arbejdsområder), som der er indgået kontrakter med og som er modtagere af bevillingerne. De amerikanske donororganisationer er indenfor rammerne af deres bevillingspolitik forpligtede til at rådføre sig med USAIDs ledelse i Ukraine.
Ikke kun Ukraines parlament, men også landets økonomiske og sociale problemer falder ind under USAIDs interessesfære. Således har agenturet medvirket til at tilvejebringe et subsidieringssystem for kommunale ydelser og boligafgifter for mindrebemidlede befolkningsgrupper, oprette fire landmandsbaserede servicecentre, som forsyner ukrainske husholdninger med nødvendige materialer og udstyr. USAID har således fået en udvidet adgang til den socio-økonomiske information og dens kilder.
Med det formål at udvikle et beskæftigelsessystem i Verkhovna Rada har USAID udarbejdet et system for ansættelse af studerende fra humanitære fakulteter, som således kan høste erfaring fra det parlamentariske arbejde.
Dette udgør den pletfri og legale del af de amerikanske organisationer. Det negative består i, at der eksisterer en direkte fare for, at udenlandske strukturer øver pression mod det ukrainske parlament. Planen for en sådan pression eller påvirkning er forholdsvis enkel. Den vestlige velgørenhedsorganisation oversvømmer parlamentet med brochurer og notater, hvor et problem bliver belyst gennem denne organisations briller. I det videre forløb gør medarbejderne i Verkhovna Radas sekretariat, som selvsamme vestlige struktur har udvalgt tilsyneladende efter stillingsopslag, hver eneste konkrete deputerede bekendt med denne information. Eftersom konkurrencen om ansættelse eller praktikantstilling i Verkhovna Rada som regel finder sted blandt studerende, så udgøres en betydelig del af de udvalgte af personer som allerede arbejder som referenter og konsulenter for folkedeputerede.
Dernæst tilbyder man en folkedeputeret et bredt udvalg af bevillinger, muligheder for forretningskontakter, besøg på prestigefyldte internationale konferencer o.s.v. Således omvendes en folkevalgt efterhånden til en påvirkningsagent.
Forskellige fondes lobbyvirksomhed for andre staters økonomiske og politiske interesser er allerede mærkbar i det ukrainske parlament . En betydelig del af de folkedeputerede har allerede kontrol med en eller anden samfundsorganisation eller privat virksomhed, som samarbejder aktivt med udenlandske donorstrukturer.
Ikke et eneste dokument, som udgår fra Verkhovna Rada, får lov til at undslippe de udenlandske eksperter og konsulenter.
Hvis man kaster et blik på den konsulære virksomhed "Støtteprogram for Ukraines parlament" eller Det internationale republikanske institut, så vil man få øje på, at deres materialer informerer om enkelte landes erfaringer uden dog at foreslå nogle mekanismer for en konkret anvendelse af disse erfaringer i Ukraine. I de fleste tilfælde har denne form for informationsvirksomhed ikke den ringeste mening. Eksempelvis er det absurd at overføre den amerikanske model for parlamentariske partikomiteer til ukrainske forhold, eftersom de ukrainske partier arbejder på en anden måde end de amerikanske og har en anden organisationsstruktur. Der er næppe nogen tvivl om, at eksperterne selv udmærket kan se det absurde i denne form for "konsulentvirksomhed". Ineffektiviteten i de udbredte materilaer kan øjensynligt forklares med, at deres produktion ikke det primære formål; nej, hovedopgaven består i at indsamle information og hverve påvirkningsagenter.
Den vestlige presse har gentagne gange skrevet om de negative sider af Soros Fondens virksomhed (i Ukraine hedder dens afdeling "Vidrodzhenja" - "Revival" på engelsk) i de østeuropæiske lande som Kroatien, Slovenien, Serbien, Ungarn, Rumænien, Tjekkiet o.s.v. I Ukraine finansierer Soros Fonden projekter, som tager sigte på en monitoring af den økonomiske situation i landet og de politiske processer. Det vigtigste felt i Soros Fondens arbejde udgøres af uddannelsesprogrammer. Udover fondens centrale kontor og ressourcecentre i regionerne, kontrollerer Soros desuden Fonden for tilpasning af militærpersoner (hvor tidligere officerer bliver omskolet i grundlæggende økonomiske principper og forretningsføring).
George Soros er meget aktiv i Ukraine, selvom han havde tilkendegivet, at han ville nedskære sin finansiering af ukrainske programmer. Kort efter at Viktor Jusjenko var blevet udnævnt til premierminister foreslog de af "Vidrodzhenja" finansierede organisationer indenfor sammenslutningen "Freedom of choice" (leder Vladyslav Kaskin) i 2000 regeringen et Antikorruptionsprogram, som opererede med indførelse af grundlæggende monitoring af økonomiske og politiske processer i landet ved hjælp af de lokale samfundsstrukturers netværk. Programmet lagde hovedvægten på skabelsen af en åben budget-proces på alle niveauer samt en offentlig beretning om budgettets overholdelse.
Denne form for indsats krævede, at projektets deltagere skulle gennemføre en uhildet monitoring af situationen ned i mindste detalje. Det er værd at fremhæve, at Soros var villig til at betale 50% af de 4 mill. $, som en gennemførelse af programmet kostede. Ifølge Soros bør en regering der vel at mærke vil tilslutte sig antikorruptionsprogrammet blive "Vidrodzhenja"-fondens vigtigste partner.
Programmet blev imidlertid kun realiseret noget af vejen. Det lykkedes sammenslutningen "Freedom of choice" kun delvist at indsamle de nødvendige midler, og de ville da også kun have rakt til en løbende monitoring af den overordnede situation i landet.
Med udgangspunkt i sammenslutningen "Freedom of choice" og Antikorruptionsprogrammet blev det oppositionelle ungdomsnetværk og hovedbasen for bevægelsen "For sandheden" (Za Pravdu) grundlagt.
En lignende virksomhed udføres af "Freedom House" og direkte af USAs ambassade i Ukraine. "Freedom House" bevilger midler til forsknings-og ressourceprojekter i relation til studier af den økonomiske, sociale og politiske situation i regionerne. Netop denne strukturs midler går til mangeartede udstationeringer og undervisning af journalister i regionale og centrale massemedier. Desuden forsøger denne fond at oprette et selvstændigt netværk af ressourcecentre, som skal dække de regionale samfundsorganisationer.
"Freedom House"' virksomhed er så omfattende, at det ukrainske skattevæsens pressetjeneste den 15. februar 2001 meddelte, at en vis ukrainsk statsborger i løbet af 1998-2000 efter pålæg af den amerikanske statsborger I.N. Labunko fra hans private konto nr. 262009372, oprettet den 26. november 1996 i AS "Ukrinbank", havde hævet kontante midler til "akutte fornødenheder". Pengene på Labunkos konto indgik fra menneskerettighedsorganisationen "Freedom House". Borger F. havde i alt hævet 800.000 $ på kontoen. Derefter fortoner pengenes spor sig. Borger F. har ikke angivet disse penge som indtægt i selvangivelsen. Ifølge skattefolkene gennemførte den mystiske ukrainske statsborger finansielle operationer på vegne af "Freedoms House"'s ukrainske repræsentation og var ansat i denne organisation. Som svar på det ukrainske skattevæsens erklæring beskyldte "Freedom House" Ukraine for forsøg på at øve pression mod organisationen.
Såvel USAs ambassade i Ukraine som Sveriges, Nederlandenes, Storbritaniens (gennem "British Council") og Frankrigs (gennem kulturcentret) yder mindre bevillinger (indtil 5.000 $) til organisation af konkrete videnskabeligt-praktiske (propagandamæssige) tiltag, som tage sigte på at forme den offentlige mening.
En betydelig indsats indenfor de ukrainske samfundsorganisationer gennemføres af fonden "Counterpart", som er en struktur, der yder støtte til den såkaldte tredjesektor. Denne fonds virksomhed retter sig mod at etablere et vidtforgrenet netværk af formelt upolitiske samfundsorganisationer i Ukraine, som arbejder indenfor det lokale selvstyre, miljøbeskyttelse, fritid m.v.
Det er værd at fremhæve, at de vestlige velgørende organisationers arbejde med  samfundsorganisationerne i Ukraine er politisk farvet. Som Hvideruslands erfaring viser, så kan donorer via "upolitiske" samfundsorganisationer faktisk være i stand til at finansiere diverse politiske kræfter.
Der er ved at aftegne sig konturerne af en klar plan for de udenlandske fondes påvirkning af politiske partier - donationer, finansiering af valgkampe og materiel støtte til partistrukturer. I første ombæring bevilges midler, hvorefter partiets kurs bliver korrigeret, og partiet vil som konsekvens heraf, hvis det vel at mærke er repræsenteret i parlamentet, føre lobbyvirksomhed for den vestlige "partners" interesser.
Ungdomsbevægelsen udgør en særlig interessesfære for de internationale velgørende organisationer. Etableringen af en indflydelse i forhold til ungdommen anses for at være et strategisk vigtigt spørgsmål. Hvis man kan gøre en ungdomsleder materielt interesseret - eller bare en ungdomsorganisations aktive del - så vil denne struktur blive en "påvirkningsagent" i ungdomsmiljøet.
Det er værd at hæfte sig ved, at det overvældende flertal af de 1500 unge ukrainere som støttede "Manifestet fra den endnu ikke underkuede unge ukrainske intelligentsia", der indeholdt en appel til Leonid Kutjma om at træde tilbage frivilligt, var gået igennem det omtalte system af vestlige velgørende uddannelsesorienterede organisationer.
I dag har det overvældende flertal af de ovenomtalte vestlige velgørenhedsstrukturer i større eller mindre udstrækning rettet deres virksomhed til mod at yde finansiel og ressourcemæssig støtte til ukrainske samfundsorganisationer, som kontrolleres af oppositionelle politiske blokke. Flertallet af de amerikanske donorstrukturer begyndte fra starten af 2000 at intensivere deres samarbejde med sammenslutningen "Freedom of choice". Ungdomsbevægelsen "For sandheden" fik sit kontor oprettet ved hjælp af "Freedom House". Bevægelsens materialer herunder hjemmesiden (hvor f.eks. sikkerheds-og forsvarsrådets sekretær Jevhen Martjuk i marts i år blev hængt ud som Moskva-agent, red.) bliver da også udbredt via sammenslutningens informationsnetværk. Sammenslutningen "Freedom of choice" stillede lokaler og informationsteknologi til rådighed for bevægelsen "For sandheden".
I efteråret 2000 sagde den tidligere leder af UNA-UNSO og den nuværende formand for partiet "Broderskab" Dmytro Kortjynskyj i et interview til bladet "Elementy": "...i løbet af det sidste år har De forenede Stater investeret et forsvindende lille beløb på 3 mill. $ i Ukraines økonomi, samtidig med at de har investeret to-tre gange mere i politik. Det er nu heller ikke særlig meget, men det er langt mere. Både den amerikanske ambassade og repræsentanterne for AFT-KPP i Kyiv forsøger af al magt at øve indflydelse på de processer, som finder sted i Ukraine, såvel som den skov af de såkaldte amerikanske samfundsinstitutioner og fonde, som er repræsenteret i Ukraine. State Department, CIA og den amerikanske regering arbejder såvel internt som udenfor USA traditionelt via borgersammenslutninger, fonde, institutter, associationer o.s.v. Dem er der ret mange af i Ukraine og de øver en ret så stor indflydelse på situationen i landet. De investerer midler i den unge fagbevægelse, de forsøger at oprette fagforeninger i stålindustrien, det militær-industrielle kompleks, opkøbe fagforeninger i kulindustrien og i transportsektoren. Med andre ord forsøger de at arbejde ud fra det program, som er blevet afprøvet i de latinamerikanske lande, i Polen o.s.v. Deres mål er åbenlyst - at gøre Ukraine til en politisk og økonomisk koloni. Der er også en faktor som NGOers indflydelse. Situationen i dag er således, at selv en eller anden 2. eller 3. rangs udenlandsk økonomisk og politisk struktur har mulighed for at øve indflydelse på situationen i SNG".
Såvidt man kan bedømme, så foregår finansieringen af de ukrainske oppositionelle strukturer decentralt og via diverse strukturer. I en situation, hvor det ukrainske samfund er opsplittet og ustruktureret, bestræber de vestlige fonde sig ikke på at finansiere enkelte organisationer og partier, men de mest perspektivrige grupper i befolkningen. Efter [Kremls officielle hjemmesides, red.] mening er den direkte finansiering af enhver form for politiske strukturer kun mulig i det tilfælde, at disse strukturer antager konturerne af en reel massebevægelse og bliver så indflydelsesrige, at de kan forme Ukraines politiske system.
Man bør nok ikke sætte næsen op efter, at man i den nærmeste fremtid vil få strukturer som beskrevet ovenfor, eftersom ikke en eneste oppositionel gruppe har en tilstrækkelig politisk vægt.
Derfor forekommer det lidet sandsynligt, at en eller flere fonde vil gå direkte ind og finansiere højreekstreme og nationalistiske organisationer i Ukraine.
Samtidig med det kan disse organisationer forsøge at modtage finansieringen fra de vestlige fonde på den ene eller den anden måde.
Desuden gør nogle af de ultra-højreorienterede organisationers ideologi det muligt for dem at indgå aftaler med diverse finansieringsorganisationer og optræde som hyret arbejdskraft i gennemførelsen af forskellige former for provokationer".
Jusjenko udeblev fra Ukraine-konference i Washington
Ukraine har aldrig været førsteprioriteten i amerikansk politik. Efter begivenhederne den 11. september er Ukraine blevet skubbet ned på en "hæderlig plads som nr. 386" efter bin Laden, Afghanistan, miltbrand, Allehelgenes dag og andet godt, skriver UPs redaktør Olena Prytula i en kommentar fra den amerikanske hovedstad.
I snævre kredse spøger man med, at Viktor Jusjenko for at tiltrække opmærksomhed i dag ville være nødt til at iføre sig en arabisk turban.
Måske var dette netop årsagen til, at Jusjenko besluttede sig for ikke at tage til Washington og deltage i konferencen "Ukraine på vej mod en moden statslighed". Måske ville han bare ikke være "en blandt mange" - in casu en af konferencedeltagerne. En anden teori går ud på, at Jusjenko ganske enkelt ikke havde noget at sige.
Ex-premierminister Jusjenko var tiltænkt en central rolle på konferencen. Men i stedet for ham, kom den nuværende premierminister Anatolij Kinakh. Han kom til USA på et kort besøg, nåede lige at kigge forbi konferencen, men nåede også at gøre det nødvendige indtryk.
"Jusjenko tabte. Kinakh præsenterede alt det, som kendetegner ham som en seriøs politiker, der er orienteret mod demokratiske værdier. Og han formulerede det klart, konsekvent og kortfattet, i modsætning til Jusjenko, som lader sine taler ledsage af filosofiske betragtninger", - kommenterede leder af centret opkaldt efter Razumkov, Anatolij Hrytsenko, situationen overfor UP.
"Kinakh sagde det, som amerikanerne gerne ville høre fra hans mund - det var nøgleord som demokrati, markedsøkonomi, gennemskuelige valg, frie massemedier, beskyttelse af investorers rettigheder, samt jordloven.
"Et interessant sted i hans tale var, da Kinakh sagde, at den økonomiske vækst er et resultat af alle Ukraines regeringers arbejde i ti år. Dermed nivelleredes Jusjenkos indsats, som sørgede for, at ordet "reformer" ikke længere lød som et skældsord.
"Jusjenko var fraværende, og det var efter min opfattelse en politisk fejl. Når han næste gang kommer til USA vil han sige det samme, men med mere fantasifulde vendinger", sagde Hrytsenko.
Han er overbevist om, at Jusjenko havde en glimrende chance for at demonstrere sit hold på denne repræsentative konference. Men han gav frivilligt afkald på denne chance.
Der er nogle i ukrainsk politik, der nærer mistanke om, at det ikke var Jusjenko selv, der traf beslutning om at takke nej til konferencen, men at det var et råd, som han fik fra en af de tidligere ministre. Et gran af sandhed er der i det, men det forholder sig imidlertid noget anderledes.
Oprindeligt var konferencen planlagt til den 21. september, men den blev flyttet efter terroren i Amerika. Dengang blev Jusjenko vitterlig forsøgt overtalt til at melde fra, og det havde sine grunde. Dels var han blevet tildelt rollen som en ordinær deltager i konferencen, og ikke som hovedoplægsholder. Jusjenkos rådgivere mener logisk, at en tidligere succesrig reform-premierminister og måske en fremtidig kandidat til præsidentposten ikke skal tage til takke med indbydelser, der ikke svarer til hans niveau. Dernæst forholder det sig således, at Jusjenko agtede at besøge USA en måned senere. De meget hyppige besøg i udlandet fra en tidligere premierministers side, som i forvejen har ry for at være provestlig og endda har en amerikansk hustru, går de østlige vælgere på nerverne.
Efter at konferencen var blevet flyttet, lykkedes det Jusjenkos omgivelser efter intense forhandlinger med den amerikanske part at gøre hans tale til en af konferencens centrale begivenheder. Man løste problemet med de private besøg i Vesten - Jusjenkos andet besøg kunne man kombinere med hans tale på konferencen. Amerikanerne åndede lettet op og ventede nu Jusjenko med åbne arme, men i sidste øjeblik ombestemte han sig. "Der er et forhold, som jeg ikke kan løfte sløret for", - sagde en af premierministerens mest fortrolige medarbejdere til UP.
Nu venter Amerika den tidligere premierministers besøg den 4. november. Han skal besøge Boston, New York og Washington. Der bliver ikke tale om et besøg på topplan, og det kan der heller ikke være tale om. Men der er ret mange indflydelsesrige mennesker i Amerika, såvel i regeringen som i tænketankene, som sætter deres lid til ham. Han kan eksempelvis imødese et behageligt møde med fru Albright.
Mon det lykkes Jusjenko at leve op til den amerikanske elites håb, spørger UP.
Kinakhs besøg til USA - intet gennembrud
Den delegation premierminister Anatolij Kinakh havde med til USA tyder på, at hovedopgaven var at overbevise amerikanerne om at udvide handelssamkvemmet og de økonomiske relationer mellem de to lande. Den ukrainske delegations betydningsfuldhed gav den russiske avis Kommersant anledning til at vurdere Kinakhs besøg som "et gennembrud i de amerikansk-ukrainske relationer". Men i selve USA ser man imidlertid intet der minder om eufori. Tværtimod må man desværre konstatere, at "gennembruddet" udeblev, skriver UP's korrespondet fra Washington.
Selve tidspunktet for besøget var dårligt valgt. Amerikanerne er ganske enkelt helt aldeles begravet i kampen mod terrorismen og regeringsembedsmændene i Washington har simpelthen ikke tid til for alvor at tænke på andet. Opgaven, som den ukrainske premierminister havde fået væltet ned over sine skuldre, var meget vanskelig. Enten skal der arbejdes meget længe og hårdt på at løse den eller glemme alt om den, ligeså snart den ukrainske delegation har sat fødderne på den fædrene jord. Den nuværende situation i USA taget i betragtning er det snarere det sidste der vil ske.
For bare at normalisere handelsrelationerne og de økonomiske forbindelser mellem de to lande, for slet ikke at tale om at udvide dem, er det nødvendigt at fjerne den velkendte Jackson-Vennick rettelse. Den blev vedtaget af den amerikanske Kongres tilbage under "den kolde krig". Rettelsen gælder fortsat og gør udviklingen af de økonomiske relationer mellem USA og Ukraine afhængig af overholdelsen af menneskerettighederne på Dnirpo-flodens bredder. Det betyder at "alene" for at normalisere forholdet til USA skulle Kinakh bevise, at dette spørgsmål er "løst tilfredsstillende" i Ukraine. For at kunne tale om en forøgelse af de amerikanske investeringer i Ukraine bør de herskende kredse overbevise amerikanerne om, at man har skabt hvis ikke de allergunstigste så dog i det mindste normale vilkår for deres investeringer. Det lykkedes ikke den ukrainske premierminister at løse nogen af disse opgaver, og det vil sikkert gå lang tid endnu. Og sagen afhænger på ingen måde af ham. Amerikanerne forstår ganske enkelt udmærket forskellen på demagogi og "PR", på den ene side, og livets barske realiteter i Ukraine på den anden side.
Sandheden er altid konkret og amerikanerne kender den. Her er bare et par eksempler.
Et af New-Yorks store investeringsselskaber har skudt hen ved en million dollars i et velkendt hotel i Kyiv. Den ukrainske side stod for udviklingen af investeringen. Efter kort tid kom det frem, at man i stedet for et fascionabelt femstjernet hotel har fået bygget en hule styret af den organiserede kriminalitet og centrum for en livlig narkohandel og natlig prostitution. Alle forsøg fra amerikansk side på at bringe orden i sagerne har hidtil været forgæves, eftersom de forbrydere, som styrer hotellet, efter deres oplysninger har magtfulde beskyttere i statsapparatet. Og hvis man i den ukrainske regering tror, at hr. Kinakhs veltalenhed har større betydning for amerikanerne end de lobby-muligheder, som New-Yorks største investeringsfirma er i besiddelse af, er det en kæmpe fejl. Det konkrete eksempel med amerikanske investeringer i et hotel i Kyiv fortæller Washington og New-York mere end ti højtidelige udtalelser fra ukrainske lederes side.
Anatolij Kinakhs delegation talte den ukrainske nationalbankchef. Han stod foran en umuligt opgave - at overbevise amerikanerne om, at alt er OK i den ukrainske bankverden. Ikke alene er amerikanerne ganske enkelt blevet trætte af højtplacerede ukrainske embedsmænds uendelige løgne, de får kvalme af dem. Det er nok at nævne missilet i Brovary, nedskydningen af det russiske passagerfly, mordet på Gongadze og de "tilfældige" dødsfald blandt andre journalister. Opremsningen af disse enfoldige løgne kan fortsætte ud i en uendelighed. Kun en uforbedrelig optimist eller en komplet idiot kan håbe på at der er nogle i USA som tror på de ukrainske lederes ord efter alt dette. Uanset alle sine mangler hører den amerikanske elite hverken til katergorien af uforbedrelige optimister eller en komplete idioter.
Der var f.eks. banken "Slovjanskyj", der som en af sine hovedaktionærer havde den ukrainske statsborger Borys Feldman. Ifølge Melnitjenkos bånd blev "Slovjanskyj" undergravet efter ordre fra præsident Kutjma. Banken blev ruineret, dens aktiver blev for en slik opkøbt af personer, som står den øverste ledelse nær, mens Feldman selv blev smidt i fængsel for at forhindre ham i at lave en international skandale.
Feldman sad i fængsel i 19 måneder, hvorefter en domstol kendte fængslingen af ham ulovlig og pålagde, at han straks skulle løslades. Men sådan skulle det ikke gå. Vicerigsadvokat hr. Kudrjavtsev træffer straks afgørelse om, at rettens kendelse er ulovlig og beordrer at Feldman skal forblive i fængsel.
Dette er forskellen på et civiliseret land og et barbarisk. Var dette sket i Amerika, havde man omgående løsladt Borys Feldman, mens regeringen var blevet pålagt at udbetale ham en erstatning for den ulovlige varetægtsfængsling. Mens statsadvokaten, som på det groveste tillod sig at ignorere loven og tilsidesætte domstolens beslutning, havde indtaget Feldmans plads i fængslet. I Ukraine er de lige omvendt: Feldman sidder fortsat i fængslet, mens statsadvokat Kudrjavtsev fortsætter med at være på den rigtige side af loven. Amerikanerne har for længst forstået, at det som foregår i Ukraine ikke har det fjerneste med loven at gøre. Her hersker en patologisk dyriskhed og en ond vilje hos en snæver kreds af personer, især dem som er tættest på lederen. Ingen forsikringer fra Kinakhs side kan overbevise dem om det modsatte.
Det er muligt, at alt dette er "småting" for de herskende kredse i Ukraine, som ikke bør skygge for "storpolitikken". I Amerika har man en anden opfattelse. I USAs Kongres mener man, at spørgsmålet om den ukrainske bankmand Borys Feldmans skæbne og Jackson-Venncik rettelserne er to sider af samme sag, og beslutningen omkring rettelsen vil blive vedtaget på grundlag af de reelle menneskerettigheder i Ukraine, og ikke på grundlag af deklarationer. Samme holdning indtages af de største amerikanske menneskerettighedsorganisationer, samt den jødiske lobby, hvis indflydelse er velkendt, og hvis repræsentanter oplyste, at præsident Kutjma inden længe vil få mulighed for at stifte bekendskab med sagens kerne.
Den 31. oktober stilede den magtfulde Washington-baserede organisation "Union af råd til støtte for jøder i det tidligere Sovjetunion" et brev til præsident Kutjma, som indeholdt et krav om omgående at løslade "den politiske fange Borys Feldman" og give de tusinder af ukrainske indskydere i banken "Slovjanskyj", som blev ruineret af de ukrainske styres overlagte handlinger, deres rettigheder tilbage. Kopier af brevet er sendt til det amerikanske udenrigsministerium, den amerikanske ambassadør i Kyiv og USAs Kongres. Det er vigtigt at påpege, at denne organisation i sin tid stod bag selvsamme Jackson-Vennicks rettelse, som Anatolij Kinakh kom for at få strøget. Så brevet til Kutjma kan anskues som en sikker indikator af hvor vellykket Kinakhs besøg i USA vurderes at have været.
Som allerede oplyst er det eneste materielle udbytte af Kinakhs rejse en lånerate på 125.000 $ til den tekniske begrundelse af olierørledningen "Odessa-Brody". Hvis jeg havde været den ukrainske regering, så havde jeg tilbageholdt denne information som en militær hemmelighed. En lånerate på 125.000 til et stort europæisk land er ikke noget gennembrud i de bilaterale økonomiske relationer. Fra amerikansk side er det en sølle og nedværdigende almisse som et "hold kæft bolsje" til barnet. For Kinakh er det ikke et gennembrud men en hoppen på stedet.
På det seneste har der i Washington gået rygter om, at den ukrainske regering agter at hyre et af de største amerikanske "PR"-selskaber med henblik på at skabe et positivt image af Ukraine i USA. Det fremkaldte mildest talt en let forundring her. Sagen er nemlig, at civiliserede landes regeringer, f.eks. de europæiske landes, overhovedet ikke laver "PR" i USA. Den slags kostbare "medicin" købes traditionelt enten af diktaturer, som har kompromitteret sig selv med forbryderiske handlinger, eller odiøse personligheder, som lider af manglende evne til at formulere sig på en tilgængelig måde. Hvis det ukrainske styre nu laver et så dumdristigt skridt, så vil amerikanerne henføre det til en af de ovennævnte kategorier.
Hvis man i Ukraines ledende kredse har indset nødvendigheden af at tillokke amerikansk kapital og skabe et positivt image for sit land i USA, så burde de indse, at det er soleklart i Washington, at det herskende regime er den hovedfaktor, der kompromitterer Ukraine på den internationale scene. Og hvis man for alvor går i gang med at forbedre landets image, så bør man begynde netop med det herskende regime, skriver UPs korrespondent fra Washingon.
COMMENTARY: NATO SHOULD REMAIN WARY OF RUSSIA
by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2001,
Was te recent Bush-Putin summit in Crawford, Texas, a replay of Yalta or of Malta? Though it is too early to judge, it is not too early to ask. In 1945 at Yalta, a charmed Franklin Roosevelt fraternized with "Uncle Joe" and obtained a tactical Soviet commitment to enter te war against
Japan, while strategically conceding East-Central Europe to Soviet control. In 1989 at Malta, an exuberant George H.W. Bush tactically hailed te last Soviet leader as a great European statesman while gaining his strategic acquiescence that a soon-to-be-unified Germany had to be firmly anchored in te Atlantic alliance.
Both summits were spectacular exercises in personal diplomacy. That dimension naturally commanded most attention and produced an avalanche of press commentaries that usually began with awed references to "a new era" or "a historical breakthrough" or "a grand realignment" in American-Russian relations. In both summits, Russia's leaders were widely credited by Western media with having overcome hidden internal opposition to their not-always-very-evident personal
desire for a strategic accommodation with te U.S.
However, te truly important lesson from such personal diplomacy is much more prosaic. Personal diplomacy at summits cannot succeed unless it is infused with determination to achieve firmly held strategic goals, derived from a cold calculation of te actual balance of power between te two interlocutors. To be sure, personal diplomacy can soften te hard edges of te encounter, and it can create a screen behindwhich te weaker party can make concessions without evident humiliation. But if focused only on tactical concerns, it can be a prescription for eventual disappointment.
At Malta te president knew what he wanted (strategically), and what he could get (tactically). His success led to te end of te Cold War on terms that represented a victory for freedom, democracy and human rights. Yalta was anything but that.
Te question now is whether te new Bush-Putin relationship will lead to te further expansion of te Euro-Atlantic space and te long-term assimilation into it of post-Soviet Russia; or whether te preoccupation with te campaign against global terrorism will precipitate arrangements that will in fact dilute te political cohesion of te integrated Atlantic alliance, America's greatest post-World War II accomplishment.
Russia's assimilation is desirable and even historically inevitable. Russia really has no choice, with its huge but largely empty spaces bordering in te south on 300 million Muslims (whom it has thoroughly antagonized by its wars against te Afghans
USA støtter Ukraines euro-atlantiske integration
USAs ambassade i Ukraine udsendte i går (20.3.2002) en pressemeddelelse med følgende indhold:
"Filmen "PR", som blev vist på kanalen ICTV den 16. og 17. marts i år indeholder fejlagtige og vildledende formodninger med hensyn til den amerikanske politiks mål i Ukraine. Vi plejer ikke at kommentere falske beskyldninger, men de uretfærdige anklager som filmen fremsætter, kræver et svar", - hedder det i USAs ambassades erklæring.
"Relationerne mellem USA og Ukraine har altid bygget på og bygger på et konkret politisk mål: støtten til et uafhængigt, demokratisk og markedsorienteret Ukraine, der er integreret i Det euro-atlantiske fællesskab. Vores støtte er ikke rettet mod særskilte ledere eller blokke. Det valg er det op til det ukrainske folk selv at foretage.
Den amerikanske hjælp til Ukraine under valget gives på foranledning af den ukrainske regering og er rettet mod at støtte en fri og ærlig valgproces, som giver de ukrainske borgere mulighed for at vælge sine ledere. De forenede Stater støtter ikke enkelte ledere, partier eller blokke gennem så meget som et eneste program.
Den skriftlige beskrivelse af den amerikanske hjælp under valget og støtten til NGO'er er tilgået Præsidentens administration, Ukraines nationale sikkerheds-og forvarsråd, Ukraines udenrigsministerium, SBU og andre statslige institutioner. Vi er altid parat til at svare på spørgsmål i den forbindelse. Som medlem af OSCE har Ukraine underskrevet og vedtaget OSCEs standarder for demokratiske valg, herunder hvad angår internationale observatører.
De forenede Stater støtter ikke oppositionelle kræfter eller demonstrationer i Ukraine. Da der i det ukrainske fjernsyn i april 2001 lød ubegrundede beskyldninger om en sådan støtte - de blev gentaget i filmen "PR" - forklarede USAs ambassade straks, at USAs repræsentanter holder øje med de politiske begivenheder i Ukraine i overensstemmelse med Geneve-konventionen, og for at danne sig et billede af situationen med henblik på at være i stand til at informere de amerikanske borgere om eksistensen af trusler.
Efter de ubegrundede beskyldninger i 2001 analyserede USAs ambassade sin belysning af disse begivenheder sammen med Præsidentens administration, Ukraines nationale sikkerheds-og forsvarsråd, udenrigsministeriet og SBU og besvarede deres spørgsmål.
Et blomstrende, stabilt og uafhængigt Ukraine er det, der bedst svarer til såvel Ukraines som USAs interesse. Erfaringen i hele verden har bevist, at den slags stater er mest livsduelige i åbne, konkurrencedygtige markedsdemokratier, hvor borgerne vælger ledere, som står til ansvar for dem. Den politiske intrige bør ikke spille nogen som helst rolle i fremmet af ukrainske eller amerikanske nøgleinteresser", hedder det USAs ambassade erklæring, oplyser UP.
Kritisk Kongres-resolution vedtaget enstemmigt
Tirsdag den 19. marts vedtog Repræsentanternes Hus under USAs Kongres en resolution omkring det ukrainske parlamentsvalg under overskriften "Ukraines regering opfordres til at sikre en demokratisk, gennemskuelig og retfærdig valgproces". Kongresmedlem Louisa Slaughter havde taget initiativ til resolutionen, og hendes initiativ blev bakket op (medsponsoreret, red.) af kongresmedlemmerne Joseph Haphel og Christopher Smith, oplyser UP.
Resolution blev vedtaget i en bemærkelsesværdig enstemmighed: 480 deputerede mod 1 og i løbet af forholdsvis kort tid; nemlig syv uger. Det er værd at nævne, at flertallet af de resolutioner som bliver fremlagt i Huset aldrig kommer til afstemning. Den eneste "opposition" var Ron Paul, kongresmedlem fra Texas, som stemte imod.
"Ukraine har modtaget millioner af dollars i støtte fra De forenede Stater, - sagde kongresmedlem Paul i sit indlæg. - Alene i finansåret 2002 er der blevet afsat 154 millioner dollars. Og efter alle de penge, som vi nu får vi nu at vide er blevet brugt til at udvikle demokratiet, mere end 10 år efter Sovjetunionens opløsning, får vi nu at vide i denne her resolution, at Ukraine kun har gjort meget få fremskridt, om overhovedet nogen, på vej mod at skabe et demokratisk politisk system".
Derved sluttede diskussionen. Alle andre talere insisterede på vigtigheden af og nødvendigheden af at vedtage resolutionen nu. Under udvalgsarbejdet var visse af dokumentets dele blevet ændret, men alligevel svarer det for 95% vedkommende til det forslag, som UP offentliggjorde i midten af sidste måned. På trods af den ukrainske ambassades pres og Ron Pauls synspunkt bevarede resolutionen alle de væsentligste anmærkninger: om brugen af den administrative ressource, den uopklarede Gongadze-sag, forfølgelsen af de oppositionelle massemedier m.v.
UP bad Orest Deychakivsky, der er rådgiver for USAs Kongres' udvalg for sikkerhed og samarbejde i Europa om at kommentere begivenheden. Helsinki Kommissionen, som dette udvalg populært kaldes, har stået i forreste række under fremlæggelsen, gennemgangen af og afstemningen om resolutionen. Dens formand - den indflydelsesrige republikanske kongresmedlem Christopher Smith - var en af medsponsorerne på dokumentet.
UP: Hvad er forklaringen på denne resolution? Hvorfor er USAs Kongres principielt optaget af det ukrainske valg?
Deychakivsky: USAs Kongres' interesse for Ukraine er ikke opstået i går. Kongressen begyndte at interessere sig for de ukrainske forhold længe før Ukraine blev en uafhængig stat. Der er blevet vedtaget mange forskellige resolutioner, opfordringer til løsladelse af politiske fanger tilbage i sovjet-Ukraines tid samt undertrykkelser af de ukrainske kirker og vedrørende Tjornobyl.
Efter Ukraines uafhængighedsdeklaration kom landet temmelig hurtigt op på en tredjeplads i verden med hensyn til størrelsen af den amerikanske internationale bistand. Men de senere års begivenheder: mordet på Georgij Gongadze, korruptionen, intimideringen og forfølgelsen af den uafhængige presse har medført, at selv de kongresmedlemmer, som har gjort meget for Ukraine og er dens oprigtige venner, er blevet skuffede over det ukrainske styre.
For nærværende bringer visse massemedier mærkelige fantasifortællinger om, at der eksisterer en eller anden hemmelig sammensværgelse mod Ukraine fra Amerikas side. Man tegner et dystert billede af den amerikanske indflydelse på ukrainske anliggender. Alt dette får betegnelsen "Brzezinskis plan" eller noget i den stil.
I virkeligheden findes der ikke nogen sammensværgelse. Årsagerne til den amerikanske interesse for Ukraine er meget mere simple. Vi mener, at dette valg bliver en demonstration af, om Ukraine vil fortsatte demokratiseringen eller ej. Vi mener, at det ukrainske styre bør bevise en hengivenhed overfor demokratiets principper ikke mindst taget i betragtning af, at dette styres repræsentanter konstant taler om integration i Europa. Hvis Kongressen ikke havde bekymret sig om Ukraine, havde denne resolution ikke set dagens lys. Det er det, der er hovedårsagen til interessen for det ukrainske valg og ikke alle mulige luftkasteller.
UP: 408 kongresmedlemmer stemte for resolutionen. Fandtes der overhovedet ikke nogen alternative synspunkter?
Deychakivsky: Der fandtes naturligvis forskellige synspunkter, især under diskussionen mellem Europaudvalget og Udenrigsudvalget. Først blev resolutionen drøftet dér. Der blev gjort forsøg på at blødgøre den del, hvor Gongadze og efterforskningen af mordene på andre journalister bliver omtalt. Men det var forgæves.
UP: Kongresmedlem Smith erklærede, at den ukrainske ambassade ikke alene gik imod omtalen af Gongadzes navn i teksten, men var imod resolutionen som helhed. Hvad er Deres kommentar?
Deychakivsky: Jeg kunne godt fornemme, at visse personer på ambassaden ikke brød sig om resolutionen. Det kan jeg sagtens forstå. Som bekendt, kunne Ukraines præsident ikke lide denne resolution, hvilket han gav udtryk for overfor USAs tidligere udenrigsminister Madeleine Albright. Ambassaden gør bare det, som den får besked på fra Kyiv. Vi kritiserer de seneste begivenheder i Ukraine, fordi Ukraine på eget initiativ har underskrevet OSCEs forpligtelser.
UP: Visse ukrainske politikere betragter resolutionen som indblanding i Ukraines indre anliggender. Hvad mener De?
Deychakivsky: Det minder mig om sovjettiden, da Sovjetunionen beskyldte de internationale organisationer for indblanding hver eneste gang, landet blev taget i overtrædelser af menneskerettighederne. Efter min opfattelse er der tale om en ret primitiv tankegang. Til syvende og sidst bøjede Sovjetunionen sig for den logik, at medlemmer af OSCE kan rejse spørgsmålet om andre OSCE-deltageres overtrædelser af OSCE-aftaler. Det skete i september 1999 på OSCEs Moskva-konference. Ukraine er ganske enkelt nødt til at overholde de aftaler, man har underskrevet.
USAs ambassade sættes i forbindelse med mord på kandidat
USAs ambassadør i Ukraine, Carlos Pasqual, meddelte i går (1.4.02), at der ikke er hold i oplysingerne om, at hans land var indblandet i mordet på vice-guvernør i Ivano-Frankivsk regionen og kandidat til parlamentet for SDPU (o), Mykola Shkribliak, der stillede op i enkeltmandskreds nr. 90, oplyser UP.
Dementien er formuleret i et åbent brev til den fungerende chefredaktør for den socialdemokratiske avis Kievskie Vedomosti, Mykola Zakrevskyj, som den 1. april havde bragt en artikel, hvor det bl.a. hed sig, at "Mykola Shkribliak holdt et uofficielt møde med en medarbejder fra USAs ambassade i Ukraine, hvor vice-guvernøren blev tilbudt at trække sig som kandidat. Et af argumenterne var følgende ord: Lad være med at udfordre skæbnen."
Ifølge Pasqual var mordet på Shkribliak den 30. marts "en ægte tragedie". "USAs regering fordømmer på det skarpeste mordet og alle de personer, som er indblandet i mordet. Påstande, som antyder, at USAs regering står bag mordet på hr. Shkribliak, er løgn og har intet på sig", - hedder det i brevet.
SDPU (o)s formand, Viktor Medvedtjuk, udtalte på valgdagen den 31. marts til flere Tv-kanaler, at "repræsentanter for en af de førende ambassader - han ville af hensyn til efterforskningen ikke nærmere ind på hvilken - havde holdt møde med Shkribliak kort inden mordet". Ifølge både Medvedtjuk og Kievskie Vedomosti var formålet med møderne at overtale Shkribliak til at trække sig fra deltagelse i parlamentsvalget.
Den myrdede Mykola Shkribliaks hovedmodstander var parlamentsmedlem Roman Zvarutj fra "Vores Ukraine", som indtil 1992 var amerikansk statsborger. Roman Zvarytj blev den 31. marts valgt med 60% af stemmerne uden reelle modkandidater. Ifølge SDPU (o) lå den myrdede til at kunne slå Zvarytj, som derfor angiveligt havde fremsat adskillige slet skjulte trusler mod ham. Shkribliak blev skudt i ryggen på tæt hold inde i sin opgang om aftenen den 29. marts og døde efterfølgende af sine skudsår.
Roman Zvarytj - den 31.3.02. genvalgt i 90. kreds i Ivano-Frankivsk.
"Ihærdige reformer forudsætning for EU-og NATO-tilnærmelse"
Vesten forventer, at Ukraine gennemfører de politiske og økonomiske reformer mere ihærdigt, og landets tilnærmelse til de europæiske (EU, red.) og euroatlantiske (NATO, red.) strukturer vil afhænge af deres succesfulde gennemførelse. Det sagde USAs ambassadør i Ukraine, Carlos Pasqual, lørdag d. 27.4.02. i Kyiv. Ifølge ambassadøren er et af Ukraines hovedproblemer såvel i dag som før er "korruptionen i de centrale og lokale magtorganer, de økonomiske sektorer, herunder energisektoren, hvor flertallet af beregningerne for gas finder sted i form af byttehandel".
Under konferencen "Ukraine og Vesten-2002: handlingsprogram for fremskridtets skyld" påpegede Pasqual endvidere "det ligeså korrupte retssystems svaghed i Ukraine", herunder på lokalt niveau.
I en kommentar til den fremtidige dialog mellem Ukraine og NATO påpegede USAs ambassadør, at "Ukraine bør besvare spørgsmålet om, det har brug for et civilt samfund". "NATO holder døren åben for alle europæiske demokratiske lande, og hvis Ukraine tager på sig forpligtelsen til at fortsætte reformer, vil NATO sætte alt ind for at samarbejde med Ukraine som med en af sine nøglepartnere", - sagde han.
Pasqual mente endvidere, at Ukraine har brug for at stille sig selv spørgsmålet om udarbejdelsen af et mere detaljeret samarbejdsprogram med NATO, idet de fælles initiativer "ikke har været tilstrækkeligt indholdsrige".
Ambassadøren udtalte sig til fordel for en fremskyndelse af reformeringen af den ukrainske hær.
Hvad angår udsigten til de ukrainske fredsbevarende styrkers deltagelse i operationerne under FN, fremhævede Pasqual nødvendigheden af, at de ukrainske militærpersoner lærer fremmedsprog.
Blandt Ukraines vigtigste opgaver nævnte ambassadøren envidere nødvendigheden af at opstille en hård kontrol med teknologier, som gør det muligt at fremstille masseødelæggelsesvåben. Terror-organisationer er interesseret i at få fingre i dem, mindede diplomaten om, skriver UP.
1,9% af ukrainerne prioriterer forholdet til USA højest
En tredjedel af Ukraines borgere (31,7%) mener, at relationerne til Den europæiske Union bør være hovedprioriteten i landets udenrigspolitik, mens 29% af ukrainerne går ind for at give forholdet til Rusland en hovedprioritet. Det er resultatet af en meningsmåling, som Det ukrainske center for økonomiske og politiske studier opkaldt efter Oleksandr Razumkov har gennemført i dagene den 1.-8. juni 2003. 2011 personer over 18 år i alle Ukraines regioner deltog i undersøgelsen.
Samtidig prioriterer 23,1% af de adspurgte udviklingen af kontakterne med de lande, som indgår i SNG (de tidligere sovjetrepublikker bortset fra de baltiske lande).
1,9% af de adspurgte mener, at forholdet til USA har hovedprioriteten. 3,2% af de adspurgte mener, at det er vigtigst at udvikle forholdet til andre lande. 11,1% af de adspurgte var i tvivl.
Ifølge Razumkov-centrets eksperter vidner dynamikken i den udenrigspolitiske orientering i de seneste tre år, at samfundet har etableret en stabil prioritering af udviklingen af relationerne med EU og Rusland. Sidste år konstateredes en mindskelse af andelen af dem, som prioriterer udviklingen af relationerne til SNG-landene højest.
Antallet af tilhængere af at give relationerne til USA en hovedprioritet har i løbet af de seneste tre år aldrig været højere end 7%; men er i februar-juni i år faldet til det mindste nogensinde; nemlig mellem 2,8% og 1,9%.
74,9% af Ukraines borgere forholder sig negativt til, at det i fremtiden vil blive nødvendigt at medbringe et udenrigspas, hvis man skal til Rusland.
Kun 6,5% af de adspurgte er positive i forhold til indførelsen af udenrigspas ved rejser til Rusland. 16,3% af de adspurgte forholder sig neutralt til dette. 2,3% af de adspurgte var i tvivl. Interfaks-Ukrajina. UP.
RFE/RL Newsline, June 18, 1002
Exposing te Putin Myth
Te new myth being created surrounding Russian President Vladimir Putin continues a long tradition of mythologizing earlier Soviet and Russian leaders. Te Putin myth has highlighted two distinct trends.
First, there are sharp differences in te way U.S. and Western European countries view Russia and myths surrounding Soviet and Russian leaders. Te U.S. administration and media tend toward a literal view of Russian politics, focusing on formal processes while downplaying te informal, and critically examining Russia's claims that it is implementing reforms. Some EU countries, however, take te opposite approach and are more willing to go along with a mythical view of domestic progress in te former USSR and Russia in te interests of a strategic partnership.
Second, a mythical positive transition record in Russia is contrasted with a negative one in Ukraine when in reality te opposite is true. Contrast te mythical Western favorable impression of Putin with that of te highly negative view of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. Freedom House's 2003 "Nations in Transit" study gives Ukraine a better score than Russia in democratization. Ukraine also receives a better score than Russia in te 2002 Reporters Without Frontiers Index of Media Freedom and te 2002 Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom (yet only Russia, not Ukraine, has been granted market economic status by te EU in 2002). Te June 2003 Pew Global Attitudes Project gives Ukraine a better score than Russia in democratization, freedom of te press, fair judiciary, freedom of speech, free elections, and safety from crime and violence.
Mythologizing of Soviet leaders goes as far back as te 1930s. Its most recent manifestations began under Yurii Andropov, who came to power in 1992 and was welcomed as a sigh of relief over Leonid Brezhnev's "era of stagnation." Some Western commentators inferred from rumors that Andropov drank whiskey and played tennis that he was a closet liberal Westernizer (despite te role he played in suppressing te Hungarian uprising in 1956 and jailing dissidents). Mikhail Gorbachev was widely seen as a new type of Soviet leader who was "like us," ready to halt te arms race, willing to withdraw Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, and spoke of a "common European home." Gorbachev has remained popular in Europe even after te collapse of te USSR, even though in te post-Soviet states his popularity had already plummeted by 1989-90.
Te early post-Soviet era was characterized by myths surrounding Boris Yeltsin, te Russian leader who dared to stand on a tank and defy te August 1991 putschists. Yeltsin launched radical economic reform in 1992 under te Yegor Gaidar government and his anticommunism stance complemented his image as a liberal reformer.
Te Yeltsin myth was showing serious signs of damage by te late 1990s, and te March 2000 election of Putin to succeed him was therefore hailed as another wind of change. Like Andropov, te sportsman Putin, both of whom were from KGB backgrounds, was contrasted to Yeltsin (just as Gorbachev had been to his predecessors Konstantin Chernenko and Brezhnev).
Te extent of Europe's fascination with Putin can be judged by te hyperbole of some of te press commentaries on te recent summit to celebrate te 300th anniversary of te founding of St. Petersburg on 30-31 May. Te Swiss daily "Neue Zuercher Zeitung," for example, characterized Putin as Russia's new "Peter te Great," while London's "Te Independent" profiled Putin as "te modern-day tsar who would make Russia great again." Te U.S. media largely ignored te myth of Putin te "modernizer" in favor of focusing on his poor record on human rights and democratization. Adrian Karatnycky, a senior scholar at Freedom House, described Russia in a "Te Wall Street Journal" article as a "militocracy." He wrote that under Putin, former military and KGB officers -- who seek to revive Russia as a superpower, make a fetish of te state, disrespect human rights, and promote anti-Western sentiments -- are increasingly in control of te country.
As noted above, West European media and academia are for te most part more enamored of Putin than their equivalents in North America. There are two main reasons for this divergence.
First, Russophilism is still deeply influential in Western Europe and might well grow under Italian President Silvio Berlusconi when Italy takes over te EU Presidency in July. Te EU, unlike te United States, gave priority to a strategic partnership with Russia over human rights and democratization issues at te recent St. Petersburg summit. Dov Lynch, a research fellow at te EU's Institute for Security Studies, point out in "Russia Faces Europe" (Paris: ISS-EU, May 2003) that Russia and te EU have "radically different" strategic agendas because Russia is disinterested in te pursuit of "shared values" with te EU. Knowing this, some leading EU states might be willing to prioritize a strategic partnership with Russia (rather than "shared values"). Russia is essential to te EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy for those EU states who see it as a counterweight to U.S. "unilateralism."
Second, as te world's new "hyper power" te United States has less need of Russia as a "strategic partner" than te EU. Te U.S.-Russian partnership remains mired in difficulties since te Iraqi conflict, especially over Russia's continued support for Iran's nuclear-power program. Finally, it should be noted that these differing attitudes to te Putin myth influence, in turn, contrasting attitudes toward Russia and Ukraine. NATO and te EU approach Ukraine and Russia in different ways. Te EU has had little choice but to prioritize strategic issues with Russia because of its disinterest in "shared values," whereas it calls on Ukraine to deepen reforms in te absence of membership prospects. Russia is strategically important to te EU while Ukraine is only strategically important to te United States and NATO. These attitudes go some way toward influencing positive views of Putin and negative views of Kuchma.
Dr. Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at te Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto and a visiting fellow at te Institute for Security Studies-EU, Paris.
"US: "If elections in Ukraine in 2004 were absolutely free and fair...A substantial majority of Ukrainians would vote left of center, probably considerably left of center"
June 26, 2003 09:19
"Te tragedy of Ukraine today," Sergey (not his real name) sighed, "is that public opinion is emerging as a force to be reckoned with at exactly te moment when conditions do not favor market-oriented democracy or rule of law. I am talking about deep and widespread poverty, soaring unemployment, te absence of a free press, weak political parties, and -- rightly or wrongly -- disillusionment with te West. And that disillusionment plays into Kuchma's hands and those around him whose natural instincts are antithetical to building an open society or sustained dialogue with te West."
I listened carefully as Sergey continued. That snowy February evening, replete with heaps of food, too much wine, and scintillating conversation for which Ukrainians are justly famous, was drawing to a close. A Fulbright scholar from Eastern Ukraine whose political insights matched his intellectual grasp of Western law and philosophy, Sergey was in a somber mood. Alone among te experts on international relations whom I interviewed during my return visit to Kyiv last winter, Sergey focused on te domestic component of Ukraine's global posture.
"You know," he grimaced, "too many Americans and, maybe, too many Europeans want to blame it all on Kuchma or a few other rotten apples. Of course Kuchma is bad and his policies, especially his foreign policy, are disastrous for Ukraine. Not to mention his paranoid personality and insecurity in te face of excellence from anyone in his administration.
"But you see, Bill, te absence of democracy in 2003 goes far beyond one man or one clan or a group of clans, for that matter. Authoritarian regimes are not always forced on a people. Sometimes they are embraced by people for a spell. Even an otherwise cultured nation can go off track, so to speak. Look at Nazi Germany in te 1930s or at several Latin American countries today.
Under certain conditions, people quite willingly reject what you and I take for granted -- a democratic society. They reject democracy not because they do not value freedom, but because for te moment their priorities and needs are elsewhere. And that, I fear, is where we may be heading in Ukraine now, with all that implies for Ukraine's standing in te eyes of te Western community," Sergey intoned, reaching across te table to top off my wine glass for te umpteenth time.
"One question," he said, a tight-lipped smile planted on a handsomely etched face. "If elections in Ukraine in 2004 were absolutely free and fair, how would we vote? And I'm not talking specific leaders or individuals, or even specific parties. I'm talking about ideas and values."
I sipped te wine slowly.
"A substantial majority of Ukrainians would vote left of center, probably considerably left of center. They'd vote for a watered-down version of Soviet-style socialism; jobs for everyone, inexpensive and universal medical care, cheap transportation and cheap rents. Never mind te observation that, practically speaking, this is a wish list akin to Disneyland (Sergey has been to Disneyland so I did not quibble with his analogy).
"Te fact is that Ukrainians, with te exception of most Western Ukrainians and a thin veneer of educated elite in major urban centers, are Soviet in mentality and psychology. And that is not going to change with our rapidly aging population and te enormous need for state assisted health-care, education, and social services. Any presidential contender who openly advocates a free market ideology in 2004 will get no more than 20 percent of te vote, 25 percent tops. Not exactly a winning number, correct?"
Te implications of Sergey's sweeping assessment of te Ukrainian ethos run deep and disturb, promoters of democracy and policymakers, both in Ukraine and te West. It is a society conservative from top to bottom.
Conservative in te deepest sense of te word: a people terrified of change and averse to risk-taking. Moreover, that attitude -- fear of change -- is unmistakably realistic, given Ukraine's history across te past century, including te decade since independence. Te sad fact is that virtually every time that sweeping change has occurred, be it in 1917, 1932, or 1991, conditions for te average person have worsened dramatically and suddenly. It is but a small jump mentally from that point to te unalterable perception (call it a gut feeling) that all change is threatening. Or, as te maxim goes, better te devil you know than te one you don't.
Unless underlying material conditions improve enough to create a decent-sized middle class, citizen behavior through voting will frustrate believers in democracy, whether in Kyiv, Brussels, or Washington, D.C. A deeply entrenched authoritarian regime -- never mind te rhetorical acceptance of democracy by Kuchma & Co. -- combined with an impoverished people fearful of what lays ahead, calls into question te significance of elections for Ukraine's democratic transition. As Sergey intimated, a truly fair vote would backfire because, and this is te key point, democracy historically flowers from processes of socioeconomic development stretching over decades if not centuries, whether in England, Italy or Japan. Ukraine is only at te dawn of that transformation and it is too much to ask a people schooled in politics under Soviet tutelage and decimated by economic collapse since 1991 to fly in te face of history; to jump over historical stages and perform miracles. Way too much.
Te suspicion that economic conditions are more fundamental to an understanding of Ukraine's prospects in 2003 than corrupt leadership or a tenuous civil society has another corollary: Fair elections could produce a deeply divided country unhinged by civilization's fault lines. As Sergey noted, Galicia and Volhynia naturally would gravitate to te West while te rest of Ukraine would swing eastward, in te direction of Russia [author's emphasis. -- ed.]
Seen from this perspective, from te vantage point of Ukraine's dire economy, te Ukrainian-Russian nexus takes on added coloration. Remember first of all that many Ukrainians, particularly those from te eastern and southern regions of te country, voted for an end to te Soviet Union in 1991 because they expected their standard of living to rise dramatically. That has not happened, nor is it about to.
Remember too that foreign direct investment from te West has been, and is, abysmal. As everyone knows, improvement in FDI is tied squarely to economic and political reform of te highest order, an iffy likelihood given both te power of te Presidential Administration and te divided nature of te parliamentary opposition (does anyone really expect Yushchenko and Symonenko to work together through te 2004 elections?).
Only one country stands ready to invest in Ukraine to any appreciable degree: Russia. Ukraine's eastern neighbor is a country flush with cash, a country already employing millions of Ukrainians, a country whose ambassador to Ukraine could almost single-handedly underwrite whole companies because of his enormous personal wealth. And a country deliberately blind to te criminal doings of te Kuchma cohort dating back to Gongadze, at least.
Does this mean that Ukraine is destined to become unglued or to be swallowed up by its eastern neighbor? Nothing in history is inevitable and Clio, te muse of history, always exceeds our limited imaginations. 1989 and 1991 confounded te experts who assumed that communism was here to stay. 9/11 was totally unexpected by virtually everyone on te planet, save te perpetrators of te carnage and a few intrepid intelligence analysts whose reports of horrors to come were passed over by their superiors. Te EU, te preserve during te heights of te Cold War of Western Europe, now stands on Ukraine's doorstep. Who could have foreseen any of this a mere fifteen years ago?
To suggest then that Ukraine is finished is both ahistorical and melodramatic, postures this writer denies. But it is not farfetched to suggest that economic conditions are driving Ukraine eastwards, with all that it implies domestically and geopolitically. Nor is it exaggerated to suggest that Western policies toward Ukraine must go well beyond blaming leaders for non-democratic results so far, as natural as it may seem. Kuchma's contributions to Ukraine's debacle since 1994 are well documented.
It is a truism to say that as long as Kuchma dominates te political landscape, Ukraine is going nowhere. However, Sergey's point remains: if material conditions stay pretty much as they are today, Kuchma's removal may not mean much. Nations do not always get te leaders they deserve, but they almost always get leaders generated by conditions.
William Gleason Ph.D. is a historian specializing in Russia, te former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe who is currently Ukrainian course coordinator for te U.S. State Department's Foreign Service Institute. Te above is te third of a trilogy of articles based on his last trip to Ukraine.
72. Monitoring te implementation of te April 4, 2005 Joint U.S.-Ukraine statement
Te identified 20 specific tasks agreed by te two governments.
Foreign Policy and National Security Task Force
Washington, D.C., Friday, February 17, 2006
Presidents Bush and Yushchenko on April 4, 2005 issued a joint statement on "A New Century Agenda for te Ukrainian-American Strategic Partnership" during President Yushchenko's visit to Washington. Both governments described te joint statement as a road map for developing and deepening te U.S.-Ukraine bilateral relationship in te aftermath of Ukraine's Orange Revolution.
Te Foreign Policy and National Security Task Force is part of te non-governmental U.S.-Ukraine Policy Dialogue, which was launched in June 2005. Te Task Force has taken on as one of its key assignments monitoring te U.S.-Ukraine relationship, including implementation of te April 4 joint statement. Task Force members reviewed te joint statement and identified 20 specific tasks agreed by te governments.
What follows below is our assessment of te progress te two governments have made as of January 31, 2006 in implementing those 20 tasks.
TASK #1: To work together to back peaceful resolution of conflicts in Georgia and Moldova.
Status: Te Ukrainian government launched a new plan to press for a settlement of te Transnistrian dispute (Moldova) in May 2005. Te U.S. government has expressed support for this effort and has joined te multilateral talks on Transnistria as an observer. Te Ukrainian government agreed on October 7, 2005 with te European Union and Moldova on deploying EU border monitors along te Ukraine-Moldova border, and te monitors began operating in December 2005.
TASK #2: To support te advance of freedom in Belarus.
Status: Te U.S. and Ukrainian governments supported a resolution on Belarus at te April 2005 session of te UN Commission on Human Rights. Te Ukrainian government has participated in Belarus donor coordination meetings (which include coordination of democracy assistance).
TASK #3: To support te advance of freedom in Cuba.
Status: Te U.S. and Ukrainian governments supported a resolution on Cuba at te April 2005 session of te UN Commission on Human Rights.
TASK #4: Te U.S. government to proceed with a process on Ukraine's market economy status.
Status: Te U.S. Department of Commerce has extended its review of Ukraine's application for market economy status; a decision is to be announced on or before February 16, 2006. (Although this assessment covers only te period through January 31, 2006, it was announced on February 17, 2006 that te U.S. government has granted Ukraine market economy status.)
TASK #5: Te Ukrainian government to secure approval of necessary legislation and enact regulations to facilitate accession into te World Trade Organization (WTO).
Status: Te Rada passed intellectual property rights/optical disc legislation on July 7, 2005, President Yushchenko signed it into law, and it was promulgated on August 2, 2005. Te Rada has passed a number of other laws to bring te Ukrainian trade regime into compliance with te WTO regime and is considering additional laws; as of January 2006, te Rada still needs to pass nine or ten laws.
TASK #6: To complete bilateral negotiations for Ukraine's WTO accession by te end of 2005.
Status: Te end of 2005 deadline was missed, but te sides report that te negotiations are down to a handful of final issues. Te U.S. side has suggested options for resolution of these issues, and is awaiting te Ukrainian response.
TASK #7: Te U.S . government to support immediately ending application of te Jackson-Vanik amendment to Ukraine.
Status: Te U.S. Senate passed on November 18, 2005 a resolution to graduate Ukraine from Jackson-Vanik; action is now with te House of Representatives.
TASK #8: Te U.S. government to support an offer of an Intensified Dialogue on membership issues for Ukraine at te April 2005 NATO- Ukraine Ministerial meeting.
Status: Done. An Intensified Dialogue was launched at te April 21, 2005 NATO-Ukraine Ministerial.
TASK #9: To cooperate through a U.S.-led NATO trust fund to destroy obsolete and excess conventional weaponry.
Status: Te NATO/Partnership for Peace Trust Fund implementing agreement was signed on November 23, 2005, and implementation has begun.
TASK #10: To initiate an energy dialogue to address restructuring/reform of Ukraine's energy sector and to establish a bilateral energy consultative mechanism.
Status: Done. Te energy dialogue was initiated and consultative mechanism established during Secretary of Energy Bodman's May 26-27, 2005 visit to Kyiv. Te U.S. government sent two energy experts to examine Ukraine's energy strategy and report to te U.S. Department of Energy on areas of possible bilateral cooperation. Te Bilateral Consultative Group, which met in Kyiv on January 24, 2006, addressed energy security issues, particularly in te aftermath of te Ukraine-Russia gas dispute.
TASK #11: To deepen cooperation on non-proliferation, eksport controls, border security and law enforcement.
Status: An agreement on te prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials was signed in April 2005. An implementing agreement on securing radioactive materials was signed on May 27, 2005. An agreement on countering te threat of bioterrorism was signed on August 29, 2005.
TASK #12: To explore bilateral missile defense cooperation.
Status: Preliminary exchanges have taken place on a research, development, testing and evaluation agreement, which would provide te legal framework for bilateral missile defense cooperation. Te first formal discussions are scheduled for March 2006. Te U.S. Missile Defense Agency and National Space Agency of Ukraine conducted missile defense workshops in July and October 2005. Contacts are ongoing between U.S. firms and Ukrainian companies to establish industry-to-industry relationships.
TASK #13: To cooperate on halting te spread of HIV/AIDS and TB.
Status: Te U.S. government has increased assistance to more than double te coverage of information and services to target populations at high risk of HIV/AIDS.
TASK #14: To cooperate against organized crime.
Status: Te U.S. government is providing support for Ukraine's reform of te criminal justice system.
TASK #15: To cooperate to halt trafficking in persons and child pornography.
Status: To facilitate te Ukrainian Ministry of Interior's decision to create an anti-trafficking in persons department, te U.S. government provided $250,000 worth of vehicles, computers and other technical equipment. Te U.S. government facilitated contacts between te new department and te Southeastern European Cooperative Center for Combating Transnational Crime.
TASK #16: Te U.S. government to contribute an additional $45 million to te Chornobyl Shelter Fund.
Status: Te U.S. government allocated $13 million toward this pledge in 2005 and intends to allocate a minimum of $20.5 million more in 2006.
TASK #17: Te Ukrainian government to make an additional financial contribution to te Chornobyl Shelter Fund.
Status: Done. Te Ukrainian government pledged to increase its financial contribution to an equivalent of $22 million at te EBRD Donor Conference held in London on May 12, 2005.
TASK #18: Te Ukrainian government to end visa requirements for American citizens.
Status: Done. Te Ukrainian government dropped visa requirements for American citizens effective July 1, 2005 on a provisional basis; this was in full effect by September 1, 2005.
TASK #19: Te U.S. government to reduce visa fees for Ukrainian citizens.
Status: Done. Te U.S. government eliminated visa issuance fees for Ukrainian citizens, leaving only visa application fees, effective July 6, 2005.
TASK #20: To enhance exchanges between citizens and business communities.
Status: Te U.S. government plans to use FY 2005 FREEDOM Support Act supplemental funds to increase exchanges, with a focus on eastern and southern Ukraine.
For more information on te U.S.-Ukraine Policy Dialogue please contact Marta Matselioukh at te U.S.-Ukraine Foundation at (202) 223-2228 or martam@usukraine.org; or Jan Neutze at te Atlantic Council of te United States at (202) 778-4990 or jneutze@acus.org. Links to te program: http://www.acus.org/docs/06-02-US-Ukraine_Relations_Press_Release.pdf http://www.acus.org/programs-relations-projects-US-Ukraine.asp http://www.usukraine.org/dialogue.shtml
Te Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service
09.02.08. NATO hælder koldt vand på Ukraines ansøgning
Hverken Ukraine eller Georgien skal forvente at få et NATO-medlemskab stillet i udsigt foreløbig. De to lande er ikke politisk modne nok, vurderes det i NATO.
Af Ole Bang Nielsen
Berlingske Tidende, Lørdag den 9. februar 2008
NATOs forsvarsministre mødtes i går i skyggen af det fjernsynstårn i Litauens hovedstad, Vilnius, der i 1990 var stedet for den største demonstration, da de baltiske lande kæmpede for deres frihed og selvstændighed fra det smuldrende Sovjetunionen.
Men det står klart, at NATO er tilbageholdende over for at optage flere af de tidligere sovjetiske republikker, efter at Litauen, Estland og Letland i 2002 fik det begærede NATO-medlemskab.
Ukraine har overrasket alliancen ved på ny at søge om medlemskab, efter at ukrainerne tidligere havde lagt spørgsmålet på is i forbindelse med det politiske opgør i landet mellem det russiske mindretal og ukrainerne.
»Det her er et vigtigt skridt for landets fremtid, som den næste generation vil nyde godt af,« siger Ukraines forsvarsminister, Jurij Jekarunov, om Ukraines forsøg på i første omgang at få en såkaldt MAP-status – en »Membership Action Plan« – som er første skridt mod fuldt medlemskab.
Men internt i NATO-kredsen er der kun få tilhængere af at give Ukraine MAP-status på alliancens næste topmøde i Bukarest i april. For sagen er politisk betændt i Ukraine, hvor den Moskva-orienterede oppositionsleder Viktor Janukovitj er gået i clinch med regeringen ledet af den Vest-orienterede Julia Timosjenko om spørgsmålet.
»Det er svært at se, hvordan NATO kan optage et medlemsland, hvor der er stor folkelig modstand mod alliancen,« siger en NATO-diplomat.
I en meningsmåling gennemført for nylig sagde et flertal nej til NATO-medlemskab, og 52 procent af de adspurgte betegnede NATO som »en imperalistisk blok«, som vil drage Ukraine med ind i militære konflikter.
Polen og en række andre af de »nye« medlemslande er parat til at åbne for Ukraine, men stort set alle de »gamle« europæiske medlemslande – herunder Tyskland, Storbritannien og Frankrig – er imod at give Ukraine MAP-status, mens USA også er tøvende.
Georgiens muligheder for at blive stilet op i rækken til et NATO-medlemskab er også svundet drastisk efter den politiske uro i landet i de seneste måneder, og især en række af de europæiske medlemslande er imod at lade Kaukasus-republikken få medlemskab. Rusland ventes at ville reagere voldsomt, hvis Georgien får NATO-medlemskab stillet i udsigt, og europæiske diplomater tvivler også på, at georgierne er politisk modne til medlemskab. Til gengæld står det fast, at Kroatien vil få tilbudt medlemskab på topmødet i Bukarest. Albanien og Makedonien håber også at få grønt lys, men Grækenland volder problemer for makedonerne på den gamle strid om Makedoniens navn. Grækenland vil ikke acceptere betegnelsen Makedonien og beskylder makedonerne for at have territoriale ambitioner på den nordlige græske provins af samme navn.