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But it is clear that "A believes that p", "A thinks p", "A says p", are of the form "`p' says p": and here we have no co-ordination of a fact and an object, but a co-ordination of facts by means of a co-ordination of their objects.
5.5421    This shows that there is no such thing as the soul - the subject, etc. - as it is conceived in superficial psychology.
A composite soul would not be a soul any longer.
5.5422    The correct explanation of the form of the proposition "A judges p" must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this condition.)
5.5423    To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are combined in such and such a way.
This perhaps explains that the figure
can be seen in two ways as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts.
(If I fix my eyes first on the corners a and only glance at b, a appears in front and b behind, and vice versa.)