Aristotle further discerned two modes of causation: proper (prior) causation and accidental (chance) causation. All causes, proper and accidental, can be spoken as potential or as actual, particular or generic. The same language refers to the effects of causes, so that generic effects are assigned to generic causes, particular effects to particular causes, and actual effects to operating causes. Averting infinite regress, Aristotle inferred the first mover—an unmoved mover. The first movers motion, too, must have been caused, but, being an unmoved mover, must have moved only toward a particular goal or desire. Pyrrhonism
While the plausibility of causality was accepted in Pyrrhonism, it was equally accepted that it was plausible that nothing was the cause of anything. Middle Ages
In line with Aristotelian cosmology, Thomas Aquinas posed a hierarchy prioritizing Aristotles four causes: "final > efficient > material > formal". Aquinas sought to identify the first efficient cause—now simply first cause—as everyone would agree, said Aquinas, to call it God. Later in the Middle Ages, many scholars conceded that the first cause was God, but explained that many earthly events occur within Gods design or plan, and thereby scholars sought freedom to investigate the numerous secondary causes. After the Middle Ages
For Aristotelian philosophy before Aquinas, the word cause had a broad meaning. It meant answer to a why question or explanation, and Aristotelian scholars recognized four kinds of such answers. With the end of the Middle Ages, in many philosophical usages, the meaning of the word cause narrowed.
According to the counterfactual view, X causes Y if and only if, without X, Y would not exist. Hume interpreted the latter as an ontological view, i.e., as a description of the nature of causality but, given the limitations of the human mind, advised using the former (stating, roughly, that X causes Y if and only if the two events are spatiotemporally conjoined, and X precedes Y) as an epistemic definition of causality. Having an epistemic concept of causality is needed to distinguish between causal and noncausal relations. The contemporary philosophical literature on causality can be divided into five big approaches to causality. These include the (mentioned above) regularity, probabilistic, counterfactual, mechanistic, and manipulationist views. The five approaches can be shown to be reductive, i.e., define causality in terms of relations of other types. According to this reading, they define causality in terms of, respectively, empirical regularities (constant conjunctions of events), changes in conditional probabilities, counterfactual conditions, mechanisms underlying causal relations, and invariance under intervention. Geometrical significance
Causality has the properties of antecedence and contiguity. These are topological, and are ingredients for space-time geometry. As developed by Alfred Robb, these properties allow the derivation of the notions of time and space. Max Jammer writes "the Einstein postulate ... opens the way to a straightforward construction of the causal topology ... of Minkowski space." Causal efficacy propagates no faster than light.Thus, the notion of causality is metaphysically prior to the notions of time and space.