It often lost that broad meaning, and was restricted to just one of the four kinds. For authors such as Niccolò Machiavelli, in the field of political thinking, and Francis Bacon, concerning science more generally, Aristotles moving cause was the focus of their interest. A widely used modern definition of causality in this newly narrowed sense was assumed by David Hume. He undertook an epistemological and metaphysical investigation of the notion of moving cause. He denied that we can ever perceive cause and effect, except by developing a habit or custom of mind where we come to associate two types of object or event, always contiguous and occurring one after the other. In Part III, section XV of his book A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume expanded this to a list of eight ways of judging whether two things might be cause and effect. The first three:

"The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time." "The cause must be prior to the effect." "There must be a constant union betwixt the cause and effect. Tis chiefly this quality, that constitutes the relation." And then additionally there are three connected criteria which come from our experience and which are "the source of most of our philosophical reasonings": 
And then two more: 
In 1949, physicist Max Born distinguished determination from causality. For him, determination meant that actual events are so linked by laws of nature that certainly reliable predictions and retrodictions can be made from sufficient present data about them.
Aristotle further discerned two modes of causation: proper (prior) causation and accidental (chance) causation. All causes, proper and accidental, can be spoken as potential or as actual, particular or generic. The same language refers to the effects of causes, so that generic effects are assigned to generic causes, particular effects to particular causes, and actual effects to operating causes. Averting infinite regress, Aristotle inferred the first mover—an unmoved mover. The first movers motion, too, must have been caused, but, being an unmoved mover, must have moved only toward a particular goal or desire. Pyrrhonism
While the plausibility of causality was accepted in Pyrrhonism, it was equally accepted that it was plausible that nothing was the cause of anything. Middle Ages
In line with Aristotelian cosmology, Thomas Aquinas posed a hierarchy prioritizing Aristotles four causes: "final > efficient > material > formal". Aquinas sought to identify the first efficient cause—now simply first cause—as everyone would agree, said Aquinas, to call it God. Later in the Middle Ages, many scholars conceded that the first cause was God, but explained that many earthly events occur within Gods design or plan, and thereby scholars sought freedom to investigate the numerous secondary causes. After the Middle Ages
For Aristotelian philosophy before Aquinas, the word cause had a broad meaning. It meant answer to a why question or explanation, and Aristotelian scholars recognized four kinds of such answers. With the end of the Middle Ages, in many philosophical usages, the meaning of the word cause narrowed.