Other biosecurity measures include cleaning and disinfecting facilities and vehicles, banning visits to poultry farms, not bringing birds intended for slaughter back to farms, changing clothes, disinfecting foot baths, and treating food and water.If live poultry markets are not closed, then "clean days" when unsold poultry is removed and facilities are disinfected and "no carry-over" policies to eliminate infectious material before new poultry arrive can be used to reduce the spread of influenza viruses. If a novel influenza viruses has breached the aforementioned biosecurity measures, then rapid detection to stamp it out via quarantining, decontamination, and culling may be necessary to prevent the virus from becoming endemic. Vaccines exist for avian H5, H7, and H9 subtypes that are used in some countries. In China, for example, vaccination of domestic birds against H7N9 successfully limited its spread, indicating that vaccination may be an effective strategy if used in combination with other measures to limit transmission. In pigs and horses, management of influenza is dependent on vaccination with biosecurity. Diagnosis
Diagnosis based on symptoms is fairly accurate in otherwise healthy people during seasonal epidemics and should be suspected in cases of pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), sepsis, or if encephalitis, myocarditis, or breaking down of muscle tissue occur. Because influenza is similar to other viral respiratory tract illnesses, laboratory diagnosis is necessary for confirmation. Common ways of collecting samples for testing include nasal and throat swabs. Samples may be taken from the lower respiratory tract if infection has cleared the upper but not lower respiratory tract.
For example, in late 2016 to early 2017, an avian H7N2 strain was found to be infecting cats in New York.Equine IAVs include H7N7 and two lineages of H3N8. H7N7, however, has not been detected in horses since the late 1970s, so it may have become extinct in horses. H3N8 in equines spreads via aerosols and causes respiratory illness. Equine H3N8 perferentially binds to α-2,3 sialic acids, so horses are usually considered dead-end hosts, but transmission to dogs and camels has occurred, raising concerns that horses may be mixing vessels for reassortment. In canines, the only IAVs in circulation are equine-derived H3N8 and avian-derived H3N2. Canine H3N8 has not been observed to reassort with other subtypes. H3N2 has a much broader host range and can reassort with H1N1 and H5N1. An isolated case of H6N1 likely from a chicken was found infecting a dog, so other AIVs may emerge in canines.Other mammals to be infected by IAVs include H7N7 and H4N5 in seals, H1N3 in whales, and H10N4 and H3N2 in minks. Various mutations have been identified that are associated with AIVs adapting to mammals. Since HA proteins vary in which sialic acids they bind to, mutations in the HA receptor binding site can allow AIVs to infect mammals.